9/11/2001 Attacks Were An Inside Job > 9/11 Material & Research

9/11 Memorandum Commission Select Committees 2004 - Israeli Surveillance

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Just in case no one has seen this - it is a must read...

MemorandumtotheCommissionandSelectCommitteesbold Israeli Surveillance


Israeli Surveillance of the Future
Hijackers and FBI Suspects in the
September 11 Attacks and Their
Failure to Give Us Adequate Warning:
The Need for a Public Inquiry
September 15, 2004

It is far more important, to all of us, that the Commission’s work be accurate and complete or, at the very least, that the Commission urge that these questions be explored and resolved by another panel as independent, distinguished and objective as itself. Both the Senate and House Committees should endeavor to explore and resolve these issues as well.
1. General Preliminary Conclusions
This memorandum, on the basis of the information set forth below, the Exhibits hereto and the reports and other documents cited herein, comes to the following general preliminary conclusions. The confirmation or effective rebuttal of these conclusions can be arrived at only by a public inquiry and a thorough examination of all necessary and appropriate witnesses and all relevant documentary and other evidence. A detailed summary of these tentative conclusions is set forth at pages 49 to 52.
I emphasize at the outset that the purpose of this memorandum is not to accuse any individual or individuals (excluding the hijackers themselves), or any company, of any unlawful act or any other act harmful to
the United States. That will be the task of others only after, and solely if justified by, the determination of all the relevant facts in the course of the public inquiry.--
1. In the months leading up to September 11, 2001, the Israeli DEA Groups1 were spying on the United States.2 They were at the same time keeping Arab groups in our country under surveillance, including the future hijackers and other FBI suspects in the catastrophic attacks of September 11. The base of operations for both the Israeli DEA Groups and the future hijackers of the World Trade Center Planes and the Pennsylvania Plane was in and around Hollywood, Florida.
2. During the same period, the Israeli New Jersey Group was keeping under surveillance Arab groups in Bergen and Hudson Counties, New Jersey, across the Hudson River from Manhattan, including the future hijackers of the Pentagon Plane, whose center of operations was also in Bergen and Hudson Counties. The Israeli New Jersey Group appears to have been aware, before they occurred, that hijackings had been planned by Arab terrorists, as evidenced by their jubilation when the World Trade Center was first struck, by the North Tower Plane. The leader of the Israeli New Jersey Group, who has fled the United States for Israel, is included, along with the names of the hijackers and FBI suspects, on the May 2002 FBI Suspect List.
3. The Israeli Government, through its external security agency, Mossad, warned the United States in August 2001 that an impending catastrophic attack on our soil was being planned by Arab terrorist cells located in the United States. The warnings were the result of the Israeli Groups’ surveillance of the future hijackers in this country.
4. The Mossad warnings were too vague and too late to have enabled the United States to take any action to prevent the imminent attacks at unspecified locations in
1 Capitalized terms used initially in this memorandum without definition have the respective meanings later specified.
2 As shown in this memorandum, the evidence establishing this fact appears to be conclusive.
the U.S., or to detain the individuals who were planning them.
5. Why the Israeli government decided not to share with us all the critical information they had, and the extent of that information, is a subject for the public inquiry. They may have thought some sort of warning prudent in the event their surveillance activities later became a matter of public knowledge. But any energetic Israeli effort to assist the United States in preventing the attacks would not have served their strategic interest, in view of the disastrous effect those attacks were likely to have on the relationships between the United States and the Arab world. As a leader of the Israeli New Jersey Group said when he was arrested on the afternoon of September 11, “We are Israeli. We are not your problem. Your problems are our problems.”
6. Whether and to what extent the CIA, though surely not aware of the plans of the future hijackers before the attacks, might have been aware of or condoned the Israeli Groups’ surveillance of Arab groups generally in the United States prior to September 11 is a further question that must be explored in the course of the public inquiry. The CIA’s explanation of why two future hijackers were placed on a Watchlist in August 2001, as set forth in the Commission’s Final Report, is implausible and may have been designed to conceal the Israeli warnings. This consideration, along with other important factors discussed below, opens the door to a thorough investigation of this issue as well.


--- Quote from: TahoeBlue on January 30, 2009, 05:14:56 pm ---Just in case no one has seen this - it is a must read...

MemorandumtotheCommissionandSelectCommitteesbold Israeli Surveillance

--- End quote ---

This is a very interesting find. Thanks for posting it! Any idea who the author is? They describe themselves as an International Corporate Lawyer. Evidently what they have done is very carefully read the DEA report on the suspicious "art students" that was written in June of 2001, and also carefully read the Joint Senate and Congressional investigation of 9/11 along with the 9/11 commission report. I haven't read every single word in this report you found but I will, and from what I've read so far I'm very f**king impressed.

I've been going over the 9/11 "Vans" on the bridges and looking at "Saudi Intel" Bin Laden Inc. Safari Club Le Cercle via Ptech and those connections to the Mossad.

Notice where ever the "DEA" is so are the future hi-jackers (and the CIA) and that gets into Abamnoff and drug smuggling money laundering and Atta.

Also about the vans on on 9/11 ... There are multiple vans and the bomb sniffing dogs detected explosives...

some links:

 USA False flag terrorists Mossad 911 Jews celebrate success !

Abramoff and atta - mafia and murder connections

Casino Watch - Terrorists At Casinos

9-11 bridge van explosives - Google Search

van full of explosives at the G.W. Bridge


It should be clarified now that there were at least two vans stopped that day, which has led to some confusion.

One van was stopped at the "approach ramp" to the "George Washington Bridge," with either two suspects (CBS/Jerusalem Post) or three suspects (CNN).

A second van was stopped on a "service road off Route 3 near New Jersey's Giant Stadium" in "East Rutherford" (ABC/Bergen Record), with five suspects. This van was stopped "around 4pm" (ABC).

The latter van was stopped 12 miles away (MAPQUEST) at the George Washington Bridge, after 10pm on 9/11.

We can be pretty damned certain that:

1) There was a van very near the George Washington Bridge.
2) It was stopped at the approach to the George Washington Bridge by police.
3) The traffic across the bridge was closed for several hours.
4) News reporters were informed of a large amount of explosives in the van.
5) Two or three people were in the van, and were arrested.
6) No mention at all of these facts (or of "Urban Moving Systems") was presented at the 9/11 Commission, and it was never acknowledged by their (phony) report or by the Congressional Joint Inquiry Report.

And, you know what? That's enough. Just the fact that we were told about a truck bomb on the evening of 9/11 needed to be clarified and explained by the U.S. federal government in significant detail.

The fact that they have buried this and pretended it never happened is damning in and of itself.

At this point, one may say yes, a van was stopped, but it didn't actually have explosives in it.

Okay, but why would someone assume that CNN, CBS, Jerusalem Post and others are wrong about the presence of the explosives? And why is that assumption good enough?

How did all of their sources provide them with the explosives information in the first place?

The van had to contain something that led police to conclude it was "tons" of explosives (CNN), and "enough explosives ... to do great damage to the George Washington Bridge." (CBS)

If so, what was in the van? Let us see this evidence for ourselves.

More importantly: were the two or three suspects arrested at the bridge just ghosts? Didn't they exist? What are their names?

Minutes after the arrests, the Police Commissioner of New York City, Bernard Kerik, confirmed (on CNN) from his own sources the arrest of "three men in a van," and he had been told specifically that there were "no explosives in the van." Kerik also evaded the question of where exactly this van was located:

YouTube - 911 Explosive laden van 2-3 arrests

But they dissappear....

here is no van full of explosives reported at the G. Washington Bridge  Indybay

Suspicious Activities Involving Israeli Art Students at DEA Facilities

more excerpts...

e. Israeli Surveillance of Arab Groups, the Future

Hijackers and FBI Suspects_____________________
Israel’s Institute for Intelligence and Special Tasks, commonly known as Mossad, is the Israeli agency responsible for its external security. A few days after September 11, Israeli intelligence officials reported that two senior experts of Mossad had warned the United States in August 2001 that large-scale terrorist attacks on the U.S. mainland were imminent. They also informed U.S. officials of the existence of a cell of as many as 200 terrorists preparing the operation.33
One highly placed investigator stated later that fall that there was evidence linking the Israeli DEA Groups to the gathering of intelligence about the September 11 attacks. He refused to disclose the evidence, however, since it was classified. A highly regarded American journal that broadly covers Israeli affairs reported in December 2001 that the Israeli DEA Groups were spying on Islamic networks in the United States linked to Middle East Terrorism.34
There was no implication in these reports that the Israelis were involved in planning for or carrying out the September 11 attacks. Rather, it was suspected that the Israelis gathered advance information about the attacks and decided not to share it. “What investigators are saying is that that warning from Mossad was nonspecific and general.” 35

8. Inadequate Israeli Warnings in August 2001
As noted above, almost immediately after September 11, reports emerged of Israeli warnings, in August, that major terrorist attacks were imminent. On September 16, 2001 the Daily Telegraph (London) reported that Israeli intelligence officials said that they--
“warned their counterparts in the United States last month that large-scale terrorist attacks on highly visible targets on the American mainland were imminent. . . .
. . . (T)wo senior experts with Mossad, the Israeli military intelligence service, were sent to Washington in August to alert the CIA and FBI to the existence of a cell of as many of 200 terrorists said to be preparing a big operation.
They had no specific information about what was being planned but linked the plot to Osama bin Laden and told the Americans that there were strong grounds for suspecting Iraqi involvement."102

The Los Angeles Times reported on September 20, 2001 that a “high-ranking U.S. law enforcement official” confirmed that--
“FBI and CIA officials were advised in August that as many as 200 terrorists were slipping into the United States and planning ‘a major assault on the United States . . . .’
The advisory was passed on by the Mossad. . . . It cautioned that it had picked up indications of a ‘large-scale target’ in the United States and that Americans would be ‘very vulnerable’, the official said.
It is not known whether US authorities thought the warning to be credible, or whether it contained enough details to allow counter-terrorism teams to come up with a response. But the official said the advisory linked the information ‘back to Afghanistan and [exiled Saudi militant] Osama bin Laden.’”103

Fox News also reported on May 17, 2002 (and apparently also on September 14, 2001)104 that-
“based on its own intelligence, the Israeli government provided ‘general’ information to the United States in the second week of August that an al Qaeda attack was imminent.”
Neither the Commission in its Final Report or in its Staff Statements nor the Joint Committee Report specifically mentions any such warning from the Israeli government. These Statements and Reports do, however, defer to our intelligence community’s desire to safeguard and maintain the secrecy of its “sources and methods”. These are likely to have included Israeli warnings and the Israelis’ own sources. But in view of the dramatic questions raised by the Israeli Groups’ activities in the United States in the months leading up to September 11, these sources and methods now need to be disclosed.

As shown in the tabular comparison in Exhibit E, the accounts of Mossad’s warnings in August bear the unmistakable imprints of authenticity. Mossad’s warnings were reported by the Daily Telegraph and others right after September 11, well over two years before the Joint Committee’s report and the publication of the Presidential Daily Briefing (PDB) of August 6, 2001. Yet they bear a remarkable similarity to both the Joint Committee’s description of “all-source reporting” and the PDB’s account of “clandestine, foreign government and media reports and recent FBI information.” The key differences, as shown in Exhibit E, are Mossad’s warning that (a) the attacks were imminent, (b) they were to take place on the U.S. mainland, and (c) 200 terrorists were in the United States to carry them out. Mossad also alone warned of “suspected Iraqi involvement,” though this of course has never been established and is generally considered to be untrue.

With ample room for personnel and electronic equipment, the vans were ideal vehicles for electronic eavesdropping.123 The extent to which Nice Systems, the Israeli wiretapping company for which Tomer Ben Dor worked (the Israeli with the reference to “DEA Groups” in his computer files) will be a matter for the public inquiry. Nice Systems was ideally suited to provide equipment and expertise to the Israeli New Jersey Group because its U.S. headquarters were located in Rutherford, New Jersey, near the center of the Group’s operations (MAP 3).
The future hijackers were frequent users of land lines and cell telephones and thus were ideal subjects for electronic surveillance. Mihdhar regularly telephoned a terrorist facility in the Middle East from the United States.124 Both Mihdhar and Hazmi were “constantly on their cell phones.”125 Mohamed Atta made calls to Madrid from Coral Springs126 and used his cell phone to call lodging establishments in Florida.127 Ramzi Binalshibh, a plot leader based in Hamburg, frequently called Atta,128 Shehhi129 and Moussaoui130 from Hamburg. Jarrah made hundreds of phone calls from Florida131 and Hanjour, Hazmi and other hijackers made 75 calls in two days132 to locate apartments, flight schools and car rental agencies for the New Jersey hijackers (of the Pentagon Plane).

As to the Israeli DEA Groups’ surveillance of the DEA, it is difficult if not impossible to learn from the public record, at this time, the precise nature of the information they were seeking from that agency. The DEA itself was not sure then, and it may not know to this day.
The DEA had its own concerns about the Israeli DEA Groups relating to previous drug investigations, as noted above. Perhaps these concerns were well-founded. Perhaps the Israelis were using these units in part as a training ground (on our soil) for future agents, or were interested in learning the DEA’s methods for tracking drug traffickers and their money, a potential source of funding for terrorist groups.


11. The CIA’s Role and Responsibilities
Finally, it is possible that the CIA was aware that the two Israeli Groups were tracking suspected Arab groups on our soil, but remained unaware until after September 11 that they had come across the future hijackers. There is presently little evidence of the CIA’s possible knowledge of the Israeli Groups’ activities, beyond the sheer scope and magnitude of the Israeli DEA Groups’ operations in the U.S., the CIA’s general unwillingness to share information with the FBI, as outlined in the Commission’s Final Report, and, perhaps, the brazenness of the Israeli New Jersey Group on September 11. The CIA’s clumsy reconstruction of the miraculous work of “John”, “Mary”, “Jane” and “Alice”, which appears designed to point away from the Israeli warnings, also raises legitimate questions.
The CIA was prohibited by law from engaging in field intelligence operations inside the United States. They may have been reluctant to cooperate with the FBI because of the burdensome constraints of constitutional protections benefiting potential defendants. They may also have regarded the Israelis as unusually effective because of their familiarity with Arab culture and their common understanding of the Arabic language.133

A leading Israeli newspaper, Yedioth Ahronoth, reported in the fall of 2002 that prior to the September 11 attacks, when members of the Israeli DEA Groups were being detained or arrested across the United States, the CIA “actively promoted their expulsion.”134 The implication in that article was that the CIA was simply being careless, not trying to spirit the Israelis safely out of the country. But at this point we cannot be certain. The CIA may have been eager to protect the surveillance activities of the Israeli Groups a whole in an operation that, ultimately, failed to protect us. Any delegation on the part of the CIA of its responsibilities abroad to foreign agents in the U.S. would, of course, have been unlawful. It would also have rendered our country particularly vulnerable because, as suggested above, the interests of the Israeli government and its agents are not necessarily consonant with our own.
The CIA also failed to press for the continuing detention of the members of the Israeli New Jersey Group after their arrest on September 11. After three months the men were released and returned to Israel, even though their names had appeared in our own counter-intelligence data base, at least two of them were suspected Mossad agents, and their leader had fled to Israel on or about September 14-only to be placed on the May 2002 FBI Suspect List a few months later.

12. Detailed Summary
Set forth below is a detailed summary of the tentative conclusions reached in this memorandum, which amply illustrate the urgent need for a public inquiry into the activities of the Israeli DEA Groups and the Israeli New Jersey Group. The inquiry must include, without limitation, the examination of members of the Israel Groups and related persons; officials of the Israeli government and certain of its agencies, including Mossad; FBI suspects, agents of the DEA, the INS and the FBI; certain local law enforcement officials; agents of the CIA (in camera to the extent required); other intelligence sources cited by the public press to the extent possible; the boxes of documents and computer hard drives (referred on page 29) seized by the FBI from the Israeli New Jersey Group; and of all other relevant documents, reports, communiqués and information.--
1. The Israeli DEA Groups were spying on the Drug Enforcement Agency and thus upon the United States. The DEA itself has concluded that they were probably engaged in organized intelligence gathering on our soil.
2. A highly regarded American journal knowledgeable about Israeli affairs, has concluded (a) based on its own sources, that the Israeli DEA Groups were spying on radical Islamic networks suspected of links to Middle East terrorism, and (b) based on the representations of a former American intelligence official regularly briefed on these matters by law enforcement officials, that (i) at least two members of the Israeli New Jersey Group were Mossad operatives, (ii) Urban Moving, the company used by the Israeli New Jersey Group, was a front for Mossad and its operatives, and (iii) the Israeli New Jersey Group was spying on local Arabs.
3. The intelligence sources of a substantial American television network report that the Israeli DEA Groups may have gathered information about the September 11 attacks in advance, and not shared it with the United States. One investigator said that evidence linking the Israeli DEA Groups to such intelligence gathering was classified and could not be disclosed.
4. The Israeli DEA Groups were comprised of 125 or more Israelis operating on our soil. Their leaders and apparent associates included military commanders and experts with military backgrounds in intelligence, electronic intercepts and telecommunications.
5. The wiretapping and intelligence expertise of members of both Israeli Groups, and the use of vans in local neighborhoods where the future hijackers were planning the attacks, and the extensive use by the hijackers of cell phones and land lines, made the Israeli Groups ideally suited to gather information regarding the hijackers’ plans.
6. The principal operation of the Israeli DEA Groups was located in and around Hollywood, Florida, the central training and staging ground for the hijacking of North and South Tower Planes and the Pennsylvania Plane. The addresses and places of residence of the members of the Israeli DEA Groups in Hollywood itself were within hundreds of yards those of the future hijackers.
7. The operations of both the Israeli New Jersey Group and the hijackers of the Pentagon Plane were centered in Hudson and Bergen Counties in New Jersey, within a common radius of about six miles.
8. All five celebrating members of the Israeli New Jersey Group arrested on September 11 were aware, when the North Tower Plane struck the World Trade Center, based on their immediate reaction to the attack and the information said to be contained in their van, that the attack had been planned and carried out by Arab terrorists.
9. After being questioned by the FBI on September 11, the leader of the Israeli New Jersey Group immediately fled the United States to Israel. His name and aliases appear, along with those of the hijackers and other FBI suspects, on the May 2002 FBI Suspect list.
10. Israeli intelligence officials have reported that two senior officials of Mossad warned the United States in August 2001 that as many as 200 terrorists on American soil were planning an imminent large-scale attack on high visibility targets on the American mainland. One press report states that in August Mossad provided the CIA with the names of future hijackers Khaled al Mihdhar and Nawaf al Hazmi.
11. The CIA’s explanation of how Mihdhar’s and Hazmi’s names were placed on the Watchlist through the spontaneous efforts of CIA and FBI agents is not only difficult to follow but, as the sole reason for the Watchlisting, hardly credible.
12. Mossad’s own information appears to have come from its sources inside the United States. All of the facts and circumstances set forth in this memorandum appear to show that Mossad’s two likely sources of information were: (a) the Israeli DEA Groups, comparable in number to that of the Arab suspects and who appear to have tracked the future hijackers in their central places of operation and in other states, and (b) the Israeli New Jersey Group, operating through their Mossad front in another principal locus of operations of the future hijackers, two of whom were Mossad agents, and five of whom appeared immediately aware of the origin of the attacks on September 11.
13. While little direct evidence supports the
contention that the CIA was aware of or condoned the Israeli Groups’ tracking of Arab terrorist groups in the United States prior to September 11, the CIA’s pressing for the expulsion of members of the Israeli DEA Groups when they were detained before September 11, their failure to cooperate with the FBI, their circuitous explanation of how the above two hijackers were placed on the Watchlist, and other relevant considerations require that the issue be taken up as a part of the public inquiry into these painful events.

Gerald Shea

More on Gerald Shea...


Israeli Wiretappers, the NSA, and 9/11
(James Bamford has done another great deed for the public by revealing the extent of the NSA’s wiretapping on U.S. soil, and how the NSA sub-contracts the vast majority of its work to Israeli high-tech firms bristling with “former” Israeli military intelligence agents, and in the case of Verint, a company with serious corruption issues. It was Bamford who popularized the existence of Operation Northwoods in his 2001 book, Body of Secrets. In The Shadow Factory, he sheds light in the secret rooms of Verizon and AT&T, and shows the NSA to be a very poor custodian of the nation’s security.)

Amdocs and NICE

The two companies that should be getting extra scrutiny from 9/11 researchers are Amdocs, and NICE Systems. Both have direct links to 9/11 via the milieu known as the “Israeli DEA Groups”. To date, the best report on the DEA Groups was assembled by retired international lawyer, Gerald Shea; you can download the report from Antiwar.com.

I consider Shea’s report the best so far, because it is high on content, and low on speculation, and, it names names. The content is damning. Consider the following graph from Shea which places the DEA Groups in the same general vicinity as the alleged 9/11 hijackers, in the time period running up to 9/11;


Shea makes a distinction between the DEA Groups, and the New Jersey Group detained on 9/11, where two of the 5 Israelis arrested were later identified as Mossad agents. The Mossad connection was discussed on Democracy Now! in February of 2007;

Yea, those vans of explosives seemed to be part of the event that didn't work out and then disappeared.


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