Yes, unanimous again, and quoting not only the Constitution, but the Federalist Papers as well...
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 12–1281
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD, PETITIONER
v. NOEL CANNING, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
[June 26, 2014]
JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.
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IIBefore turning to the specific questions presented, we shall mention two background considerations that we find relevant to all three.
First, the Recess Appointments Clause sets forth a subsidiary, not a primary, method for appointing officers of the United States. The immediately preceding Clause—Article II, Section 2, Clause 2— provides the primary method of appointment. It says that
the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States” (emphasis added).
The Federalist Papers make clear that the Founders intended this method of appointment, requiring Senate approval, to be the norm (at least for principal officers). Alexander Hamilton wrote that the Constitution vests the power of nomination in the President alone because “one man of discernment is better fitted to analise and estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than a body of men of equal, or perhaps even of superior discernment.”
The Federalist No. 76, p. 510 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
At the same time, the need to secure Senate approval provides “an excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and would tend greatly to preventing the appointment of unfit characters from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal attachment, or from a view to popularity.” Id., at 513.
Hamilton further explained that the
“ordinary power of appointment is confided to the President and Senate jointly, and can therefore only be exercised during the session of the Senate; but as it would have been improper to oblige this body to be continually in session for the appointment of officers; and as vacancies might happen in their recess, which it might be necessary for the public service to fill without delay, the succeeding clause is evidently intended to authorise the President singly to make temporary appointments.” Id., No. 67, at 455.
Thus the Recess Appointments Clause reflects the tension between, on the one hand, the President’s continuous need for “the assistance of subordinates,” Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52, 117 (1926), and, on the other, the
Senate’s practice, particularly during the Republic’s early
years, of meeting for a single brief session each year, see Art. I, §4, cl. 2; Amdt. 20, §2 (requiring the Senate to “assemble” only “once in every year”); 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States §1551, p. 410 (1833) (it would be “burthensome to the senate, and expensive to the public” to require the Senate to be “perpetually in session”). We seek to interpret the Clause as granting the President the power to make appointments during a recess but not offering the President the authority routinely to avoid the need for Senate confirmation.
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