http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB104/index.htmKISSINGER TO ARGENTINES ON DIRTY WAR: "THE QUICKER YOU SUCCEED THE BETTER"Newly declassified documents show Secretary of State gave green light to junta, Contradict official line that Argentines "heard only what [they] wanted to hear." While military dictatorship committed massive human rights abuses in 1976, Kissinger advised "If you can finish before Congress gets back, the better."
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Washington, D.C.,
4 December 2003 - Newly declassified State Department documents obtained by the National Security Archive under the Freedom of Information Act show that in October 1976, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and high ranking U.S. officials gave their full support to the Argentine military junta and urged them to hurry up and finish the "dirty war" before the U.S. Congress cut military aid.
A post-junta truth commission found that the Argentine military had "disappeared" at least 10,000 Argentines in the so-called "dirty war" against "subversion" and "terrorists" between 1976 and 1983; human rights groups in Argentina put the number at closer to 30,000.
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB133/...
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The Memorandum of Conversation explains why the Argentine generals believed they got a clear message from the Secretary that they had carte blanche for the dirty war," said Carlos Osorio, Director of the Southern Cone Documentation Project at the National Security Archive. "It appears that
Secretary Kissinger gave the 'green light' to the Argentine military during the June 1976 meeting with Guzzetti in Santiago," he added.
The June10 Memorandum of Conversation was obtained by the National Security Archive's Southern Cone Documentation Project through a Freedom of Information Act request to the Department of State filed in August 2002 and appealed in February 2004. The document was misdated June 6, 1976. The meeting took place during the morning of June 10, 1976, when Secretary Kissinger met with several foreign dignitaries attending the OAS General Assembly in Santiago. That afternoon he traveled to Mexico City [See Secretary Kissinger's travels at the Department of State Historian's web page and the Secretary's calendar of events for that day].
In Santiago, Guzzetti told Secretary Kissinger of the difficulties the Argentine security forces faced in dealing with the refugees, mostly because of lack of information: "[refugees] do not want to register… We have no names. Only the refugee committees know something in detail…"
A day earlier, on
June 9, 1976 clandestine Argentine security forces had ransacked the Catholic Commission for Refugees in Buenos Aires and stolen refugee records. The day after Guzzetti and Secretary Kissinger met, on June 11, twenty-four Chilean and Uruguayan refugees were kidnapped, held illegally for two days, and tortured by a combined Argentine-Chilean-Uruguayan squadron.
Guzzetti also described the intelligence coordination with neighboring dictatorships: "The terrorist problem is general to the entire Southern Cone. To combat it, we are encouraging joint efforts to integrate with our neighbors… All of them: Chile, Paraguay, Bolivia, Uruguay, Brazil." This collaboration was codenamed
Operation Condor...
By the end of 1976, 10,000 Argentines had been disappeared or assassinated by the Argentine security forces; half a dozen American citizens had been kidnapped and tortured. On the international front, the cooperation between Argentine military and intelligence forces and other Southern Cone militaries left hundreds of Uruguayans, Chileans, Bolivians, Paraguayans, and Brazilians disappeared, tortured, and/or dead.
http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1982/eirv09n21-19820601/eirv09n21-19820601_032-kissingers_boys_in_the_administr.pdfKissinger's boys in
the administration
by Robert Zubrin and Kathleen Klenetsky
British agent Henry Kissinger is still exerting substantial control over U.S. foreign policy through a network of proteges, who served under him at the National Security Council (NSC) or in the State Department, and who now occupy key positions in the Reagan administration. The following is a partial list of Kissinger's forces.
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Alexander Haig. Secretary of State, was Kissinger's top aide in the Nixon NSC from 1969 to 1973. During that time he helped Kissinger wreck the Rogers Plan to bring permanent peace to the Middle East and assisted Kissinger in Middle East War, which kicked off the first oil hoax. In 1974, Haig, as White House Chief of Staff, was Kissinger's key ally in orchestrating the White House coup which forced Nixon out of office.
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Frank Carlucci, Deputy Secretary of Defense, was Kissinger's representative as U.S. Ambassador to Portugal from 1975 to 1977, at a time when NATO made repeated attempts to organize a military coup counterrevolution in that country.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/William_ColbyWilliam Egan Colby (January 4, 1920 – April 27, 1996) spent a
career in intelligence for the United States, culminating in holding the post of Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from September 1973 to January 1976....
Colby was for most of his life a staunch Roman Catholic.[1] He was often referred to as "the warrior-priest." He married Barbara Heinzen in 1945 and they had five children.
The Catholic Church played a "central role" in the family's life, with Colby's two daughters receiving their first communion at St. Peter's Basilica.[2] In 1984, he divorced Barbara and married Democratic diplomat Sally Shelton-Colby.
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After the war,
Colby graduated from Columbia Law School and then briefly practiced law in [ WIlld Bill] William Joseph Donovan's New York firm. Bored by the practice of law and inspired by his liberal beliefs, he moved to Washington to work for the National Labor Relations Board.
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'Operation Condor' trial begins in Buenos Aires - WALB.com, Albany ...
www.walb.com/story/21523707/www.walb.comMar 5, 2013 – Argentina has begun a long-awaited human rights trial focused on Operation Condor, the effort by South America's dictators in 1976 to work together to eliminate leftist ... Casey Anthony comes out of seclusion in Tampa, Fla.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Director_of_Central_Intelligence#George_H._W._Bush_1976.E2.80.931977...
William Colby 1973–1976...
Colby's time as DCI was also eventful on the world stage. Shortly after he assumed leadership, the Yom Kippur War broke out, an event that surprised not only the American intelligence agencies but also the Israelis. This intelligence surprise reportedly affected Colby's credibility with the Nixon Administration. Meanwhile, after many years of involvement, South Vietnam fell to Communist forces in April 1975, a particularly difficult blow for Colby, who had dedicated so much of his life and career to the American effort there. Events in the arms control field, Angola, the Middle East, and elsewhere also demanded attention.
George H. W. Bush 1976–1977 Bush's confirmation as the Director of Central Intelligence was opposed by many politicians and citizens who were still reeling from the Watergate scandal (when Bush was the head of the Republican National Committee, and a steadfast defender of Nixon[citation needed]) and the Church Committee investigations. Many arguments against Bush's initial confirmation were that he was too partisan for the office. The Washington Post, George Will, and Senator Frank Church were some notable figures opposed to Bush's nomination. After a pledge by Bush not to run for either President or Vice-President in 1976, opposition to his nomination died down.
Bush served as the DCI for 355 days, from January 30, 1976, to January 20, 1977. [7] The CIA had been rocked by a series of revelations, including disclosures based on investigations by the Senate's Church Committee, about the
CIA's illegal and unauthorized activities, and Bush was credited with helping to restore the agency's morale.[8]
On February 18, 1976, President Ford issued Executive Order 11905, which established policy guidelines and restrictions for individual intelligence agencies, and clarified intelligence authorities and responsibilities. Bush was given 90 days to implement the new order, which called for a major reorganization of the American Intelligence Community and firmly stated that intelligence activities could not be directed against American citizens.[9]
In his capacity as DCI, Bush gave national security briefings to Jimmy Carter both as a presidential candidate and as President-elect, and discussed the possibility of remaining in that position in a Carter administration...
http://www.globalissues.org/news/2013/03/05/16007Operation Condor on Trial in Argentinaby Marcela Valente (buenos aires)
Tuesday, March 05, 2013
Inter Press Service
BUENOS AIRES, Mar 05 (IPS) - The trial over a campaign of terror coordinated among the dictatorships of the Southern Cone of South America in the 1970s and 1980s began Tuesday in Buenos Aires with former dictator Jorge Rafael Videla as one of the main defendants, along with another 24 former military officers.
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The trial that began Tuesday, which could stretch on for up to two years, is for the kidnapping and forced disappearance of 106 people. The largest group of victims were Uruguayans (48), but there were also Argentines, Bolivians, Chileans, Paraguayans and one Peruvian.
The case was initiated in 1999, when the two amnesty laws that put a stop to the prosecution of members of the military for human rights abuses committed during Argentina's 1976-1983 dictatorship were still in force.
The lawsuit thus invoked forced disappearance as a crime against humanity that was not subject to amnesty.
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Further evidence is contained in declassified documents from the United States State Department, such as a 1976 memo from an FBI agent describing the coordinated actions of South America's military regimes, which could go "as far as murder."http://www.globalresearch.ca/operation-condor-latin-america-the-30-years-dirty-war/5326022“Operation Condor”. Latin America: The Thirty Years Dirty Warby Pierre Abramovici
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According to the CIA, which claims not to have heard of Condor until 1976 (
, three of the countries involved, namely Chile, Argentina and Uruguay, “extended cooperation on anti-subversion activities to the assassination of high-ranking terrorists living in exile in Europe”. Although it had been accepted for years that information was to be exchanged bilaterally, “a third, top-secret phase of Operation Condor apparently involved training special teams from member countries for joint operations that included the assassination of terrorists and terrorist sympathisers. When a terrorist or sympathiser from a member country was identified, a team would be sent to locate the target and keep him under surveillance. Then a hit squad would be despatched. The special teams were made up of people from one or several Condor states who were supplied with false identity papers issued by member countries.”
The CIA claims that the operation centre for phase three was in Buenos Aires, where a special team had been set up. Meanwhile, bilateral meetings between the countries of the Southern Cone continued as usual under the aegis of the CAA, and their effects were just as devastating (9).
Many Condor meetings took place in 1976. They were often attended by the same people who took part in CAA bilateral meetings. According to the CIA, “although cooperation between the various intelligence and security services had existed for some time, it was not formalised until late May 1976 at a Condor meeting in Santiago de Chile, where the main topic was long-term cooperation between the services of the participating countries going well beyond the exchange of information. The Condor member countries identified themselves by code numbers: Condor One, Condor Two, etc.
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Flying like a condor
But the scale of repression made the existence of Condor increasingly difficult to hide.
The CIA itself became a source of embarrassing rumours as staff exchanged quips about colleagues sent abroad because they could “fly like a condor”. Finally, Contreras’ own policy of targeted assassinations put paid to the operation. On 21 September 1976 he had Chile’s former foreign minister, Orlando Letelier, assassinated in Washington. It was a major blunder.
The US investigators were determined to identify those responsible. The FBI’s chief officer in Buenos Aires filed a special report on phase three of Operation Condor, and extracts found their way into the American press. A Congressional committee of inquiry was quickly set up. The Chileans responded by disbanding Dina and replacing it by another organisation. Contreras was ditched.
The newly elected US president Jimmy Carter had made human rights part of his platform. He was not prepared to countenance Condor-type operations. At the very least, he did not want the US involved in them. T
he prevailing view is that the Carter administration pressured the Latin American countries to close Condor down.
Representatives of all the Condor member states met in Buenos Aires on 13-15 December 1976 to discuss future plans in the light of the new situation.
The Argentinians, who had outstripped all the other dictatorships in the ferocity of their methods since the putsch of 23 March, took matters in hand. With help from Paraguay, they sought a more secure and discreet channel for anti-subversion operations in the form of the Latin American Anti-Communist Federation (CAL), an offshoot of the World Anti-Communist League (WACL).| - - -
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Safari_Club...
^ Scott, The Road to 9/11 (2008), p. 63. "These offshore events in
1976 were mirrored by a similar arrangement for off-loading former CIA agents and operations in Latin America. This was the Confederación Anticomunista Latinoamaericana (CAL) and its death-squad collaboration Operation Condor.
Operation Condor was a coalition of intelligence agencies of CAL countries, chiefly Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Paraguay.
The CAL was funded through the World Anti-Communist League by the governments of South Korea and Taiwan and—once again—the petrodollars of Saudi Arabia."http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_CondorOperation Condor (Spanish: Operación Cóndor, also known as Plan Cóndor, Portuguese: Operação Condor) was a campaign of political repression and terror involving assassination and intelligence operations officially implemented in 1975 by the right-wing dictatorships of the Southern Cone of South America. The program aimed to eradicate communist or Soviet influence and ideas and to control active or potential opposition movements against the participating governments.[1]
Due to its clandestine nature, the precise number of deaths directly attributable to Operation Condor is highly disputed. Some estimates are that at least 60,000 deaths can be attributed to Condor,[2][unreliable source?] and possibly more.[3][4][5] Condor's key members were the governments in Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil. The United States provided technical support and supplied military aid to the participants until at least 1978, with Ecuador and Peru joining later in more peripheral roles.[
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Cold War context
Operation Condor, which took place in the context of the Cold War, had the tacit approval of the United States. In 1968, U.S. General Robert W. Porter stated that "in order to facilitate the coordinated employment of internal security forces within and among Latin American countries, we are...endeavoring to foster inter-service and regional cooperation by assisting in the organization of integrated command and control centers; the establishment of common operating procedures; and the conduct of joint and combined training exercises." Condor was one of the fruits of this effort.
The targets were officially armed groups (such as the MIR, the Montoneros or the ERP, the Tupamaros, etc.) but in fact included all kinds of political opponents, including their families and others, as reported by the Valech Commission.[citation needed]
The Argentine "Dirty War", for example, which resulted in approximately 30,000 victims according to most estimates, targeted many trade-unionists, relatives of activists, etc.[citation needed]
From 1976 onwards, the Chilean DINA and its Argentine counterpart, SIDE, were the operation's front-line troops.
The infamous "death flights," theorized in Argentina by Luis María Mendía — and also used during the Algerian War (1954–1962) by French forces — were widely used,
in order to make the corpses, and therefore evidence, disappear.[citation needed] There were also many cases of child abduction/...
The Argentine Dirty War was carried out during and around Operation Condor. The Argentine SIDE cooperated with the Chilean DINA in numerous cases of desaparecidos. Chilean General Carlos Prats, former Uruguayan MPs Zelmar Michelini and Héctor Gutiérrez Ruiz, as well as the ex-president of Bolivia, Juan José Torres, were assassinated in the Argentine capital.
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