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Offline Dig

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MITRE Corporation is an ANTI-government, Nazi, criminal false flag perpetrator

Meet the MITRE Corporation: McClean, Virginia’s Dr. Strangeloves

by Tom Burghardt / June 10th, 2008

Antifascist Calling…

Move over Herman Kahn. Forget the “missile gap.” The latest “crisis” facing U.S. “warfighters” in their noble quest to defend the “homeland” and dominate the “battlespace” is… the sleep gap!

That’s right. According to a newly disclosed report by The MITRE Corporation’s defense science advisory panel know as JASON, the United States must continue investigating the potential by America’s adversaries “to exploit advances in Human Performance Modification, and thus create a threat to national security,” Secrecy News reveals.

According to Steven Aftergood,

    Their report examined “the present state of the art in pharmaceutical intervention in cognition and in brain-computer interfaces, and considered how possible future developments might proceed and be used by adversaries.”

    Among their findings was the under-appreciated significance of sleep and the possibility of a “sleep gap” (a term not used in the report).

    “The most immediate human performance factor in military effectiveness is degradation of performance under stressful conditions, particularly sleep deprivation.” (“JASON Warns of Threat from Sleeping Enemies,” Secrecy News, June 5, 2008)

Though its hard to take Strangelovian madness such as this seriously, the investigation of military applications of “Human Performance Modification” is no laughing matter. Undoubtedly, the Office of Defense Research and Engineering, the Pentagon agency that commissioned the study, aren’t laughing either.

When JASON researchers conclude, “If an opposing force had a significant sleep advantage, this would pose a serious threat,” its difficult not to crack a smile. That is, until one considers that the The MITRE Corporation, a McClean, Virginia-based “not-for-profit corporation,” was formed in 1958 when “several hundred employees from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Lincoln Laboratories came to MITRE to create new technology for the Department of Defense–specifically the Semi-Automated Ground Environment, which used brand new digital computers.”

Currently fronting 6,700 scientists and “support specialists,” MITRE “customers” include the Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Defense Information Systems Agency, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), Missile Defense Command, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Intelligence Agencies, as well as “other members” of the “National Security Community.”

Additionally, MITRE’s “Homeland Security customers” include the full panoply of agencies under the (dark) wing of the Department of Homeland Security: the Directorate for Science & Technology, the Directorate for National Protection & Programs, Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Services, U.S. Coast Guard, U.S. Customs & Border Protection (Secure Border Initiative) and U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE).

According to researcher Nick Turse in his book The Complex, “MITRE brought in a cool $275,384,277″ in research, development, test and evaluation money from the Pentagon in 2005. All in all, MITRE is one of the spookiest corporations you’ve never heard of.

As a leading provider of technical researchers for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, MITRE behavioral scientists are on the “cutting edge” of what Pentagon war criminals have euphemistically designated an “Enhanced Human Performance Project.” Among the more frightening aspects of this venture, DARPA claims they will “exploit the life sciences to make the individual warfighter stronger, more alert, more endurant, and better able to heal.”

In other words, a warfighting “Terminator” in the service of corporate power. These developments are further along than you might think. As Nick Turse revealed:

    Right now, researchers are already growing insects with electronics inside them. They’re creating cyborg moths and flying beetles that can be remotely controlled. One day, the U.S. military may field squadrons of winged insect/machine hybrids with on-board audio, video or chemical sensors. These cyborg insects could conduct surveillance and reconnaissance missions on distant battlefields, in far-off caves, or maybe even in cities closer to home, and transmit detailed data back to their handlers at U.S. military bases.

    Today, many people fear U.S. government surveillance of email and cell phone communications. With this program, the Pentagon aims to exponentially increase the paranoia. Imagine a world in which any insect fluttering past your window may be a remote-controlled spy, packed with surveillance equipment. Even more frightening is the prospect that such creatures could be weaponized, and the possibility, according to one scientist intimately familiar with the project, that these cyborg insects might be armed with “bio weapons.” (“Weaponizing the Pentagon’s Cyborg Insects,” TomDispatch, March 30, 2008)

Called HI-MEMS, Turse reports that DARPA aims to transform “insects into unmanned air-vehicles.” HI-MEMS program manager Armit Lal, an associate professor on leave from Cornell University described the research thusly at DARPA’s annual symposium, DARPATech:

    “[T]he HI-MEMS program seeks to grow MEMS and electronics inside the insect pupae. The new tissue forms around the insertions, making the bio-electronic interface long-lasting and reliable.” In other words, micro-electronics are inserted at the pupal stage of metamorphosis so that they can be integrated into the insects’ bodies as they develop, creating living robots that can be remotely controlled after the insect emerges from its cocoon.

And, as with all military research aiming to weaponize all aspects of the natural world, MITRE scientists and their DARPA “customers” cloak their devilish tinkering as purely “defensive” moves designed to impede an unseen, but nevertheless cunning and ruthless “adversary.”

Thus we read in JASON’s bizarre executive summary:

    1. Maintain a strong internal research activity, with concomitant personnel expertise, because this is crucial for evaluation of potential threats based on the activity of adversaries in human performance modification.

    2. Monitor enemy activities in sleep research, and maintain close understanding of open source sleep research. Use in-house military research on the safety and effectiveness of newly developing drugs for ameliorating the effects of sleep deprivation, such as ampakines, as a baseline for evaluating potential activities of adversaries.

    3. Develop a corps of trained analysts capable of evaluating technical developments in human performance modification. These analysts should be trained in assessing the meaning of statistical metrics, and also in assessing the experimental methods and results of the original scientific literature on which claims are based. (E. Williams,, Human Performance, JASON, The MITRE Corporation, March 2008, JSR-07-625)

And what conclusion can we infer from JASON’s recommendation that the U.S. develop a “technical knowledge base” in “behavior modification”?

    The US military will certainly test whether, and to what extent, the new lessons of neuroscience can be used in military training, and it is reasonable to expect that adversaries will do so as well. We do not expect the development of super-soldiers as a result of improved training, although enhanced military capability can certainly be expected. However, unexpected adversarial behavior could result if training included behavior modification (e.g., for increased aggressiveness or decreased empathy). Thus one strong recommendation of this study is that the US should develop a technical knowledge base concerning scientifically based training tools, especially as applied in behavior modification. This knowledge base should be combined with information-gathering and analysis concerning the training techniques (both civilian and military) in adversaries’ cultures.

Simply put, psychoanalysis describe such notions as projection: the process whereby what is inside is misunderstood, consciously or otherwise, as originating outside the self or body politic. In its most malignant, pathological form–as is in the self-interested mendacities of corporate and political elites–projected attitudes seriously distort the object on whom they are projected, as in the branding of x, y, or z as a “new Hitler,” as a defense mechanism to mask one’s own aggression.

Interestingly enough, the Nazi’s genocidal project to eradicate the Jewish people was thusly theorized as a “defense” of Germanic culture against a “Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy.” So it is today, with JASON’s obsession with the “training techniques” in “adversaries’ cultures” allegedly “training for increased aggressiveness or decreased empathy.” What is this if not a descriptive catalogue of the horrors visited on the Iraqi people by an “imperialism gone wild”?

As the history of the U.S. Government’s earlier experiments in “behavior modification” demonstrate, building on the “skill-sets” acquired from vanquished Nazi and Japanese war criminals, The MITRE Corporation and their DARPA “customers” are following along the path blazed decades earlier by the CIA and the Pentagon.

Sporting esoteric names and “above top secret” pedigrees, projects such as ARTICHOKE, MKULTRA, MKDELTA and MKNAOMI embodied the 1950s “cutting edge” zeitgeist of science, academia, military heavy-lifting, covert operations and expanding “business horizons.” While America’s Cold War vision was guided by anticommunist paranoia, consumerism and its accompanying cult of the “normal,” as well as the “can-do” optimism of “winnable” nuclear war, its ideological hubris arose in the political-economic context of an American superpower that had annihilated its German and Japanese capitalist rivals.

As America’s permanent war and surveillance society morphs into the dystopian phantasmagoria of Philip K. Dick’s The Minority Report, technological optimism–as is inevitable in kleptocracies such as the United States–is harnessed and reified by bio-behavioral modification engineers, sociopaths in lab coats, who populate outfits such as The MITRE Corporation like so many poisonous intellectual mushrooms.

Imagining monstrous hybrids fueled by perverse fantasies of swarming cyborg-insects that “dominate the battlespace” or morals-free imperialist “Terminators” jacked-up by “pharmaceutical enhancements” and “invasive brain-computer interfaces,” the JASONs, like their Hollywood namesake–the masked killing machine who ran amok in a score of popular slasher films–are, in the end, not harbingers of a bright, shining globalized future but rather, its terminal end point: the corporatist Borg hive where resistance is futile.

Tom Burghardt is a researcher and activist based in the San Francisco Bay Area. His articles are published in many venues. He is the editor of Police State America: U.S. Military "Civil Disturbance" Planning, distributed by AK Press.

MITRE's Stalinist takeover of private sector & local police computer systems
Homeland Security Department To Help Protect Business Websites
LOLITA C. BALDOR   06/27/11 08:11 PM ET

WASHINGTON -- Businesses facing a growing threat of cyberattacks against their websites will now have more tools to protect themselves and harden their Internet sites against hackers.

The Homeland Security Department will help small companies and nonprofit groups avoid programming problems that allow hackers to get into the businesses' websites.

The government's latest cybersecurity effort follows a series of high-profile hacking attacks against corporate and federal websites, including one that shut down the CIA's site for several hours last week.

The new program was developed with the Mitre Corp. and is an effort to shore up known weaknesses in programming that give hackers a backdoor into websites. The effort began well before the recent website attacks.

It includes a list of top 25 technical software problems that hackers exploit and sets up a way to rank software so that customers can see whether it meets necessary standards.

Right now, when owners of small businesses buy software or hire a firm to build a website, it is difficult to know whether the programs are secure or not, said Alan Paller, director of research at SANS Institute, a computer-security organization.

He said the information, which has been compiled on a special website that the public can view, will tell people what to look for in setting up a secure website and how to judge potential programming errors. It also sets up a scorecard, so that companies looking for a firm to set up a website can check their security score.

The effort is aimed at the more than 1 million computer programmers and other high-tech professionals who write code, build websites and develop software. It lays out known software weaknesses and how to fix them.

MITRE Cyber Forums Help Law Enforcement Community Combat Cyber Threats
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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« Reply #1 on: October 06, 2011, 05:20:14 pm »
MITRE's "LocalEyes"-Precision Strike assassination false flags via human ISR

Cell Phone Application Reports Local Criminal Activities, Aids Disaster Response

February 2007

Eye with emergency symbol

One of the problems in catching terrorists is that they blend into the local populations so well that it's hard to identify them. That could soon change with LocalEyes, a concept that enlists the eyes of local citizens as sensors and their cell phones as data capture devices. Emergency communications during natural disasters such as floods and hurricanes is another likely use of the LocalEyes technology.

Harry Sleeper, a department head in MITRE's Command and Control Center (C2C), created the LocalEyes concept. His idea was to develop a language-independent service that didn't rely on where in the world a user was reporting an event—it just had to be easy for anyone, anywhere to use the application. "The cell phone is used as a simple, everyday input device," says Sleeper. "Symbols, icons, or pictures representing the current situation are sent with just a click of a button."

Rich Byrne, a C2C vice president, formalized the idea in an internal paper about using LocalEyes to counter asymmetric warfare. "Asymmetric warfare involves changes in tactics of a seemingly weak enemy that can offset the strengths of a superior opponent," says Byrne. "Rather than fight together as a well-defined group that can be easily targeted, the terrorists disperse into the population."

"Our traditional C2 systems are self-contained and use sophisticated and expensive systems to find the enemy," he notes. "This works well when a large tank is associated with a foe, but it doesn't do well when looking for an individual dressed and hidden amidst a larger population of similar citizens."

LocalEyes is an easy-to-use, low-cost cell phone application. It allows citizens in communities throughout the world to report criminal and terrorist activities without revealing their identities. Citizens can also use it to send data reports to authorities on public safety issues such as missing manhole covers, new pot holes, gas leaks, breaks in dams, and downed power lines.

LocalEyes is a machine-to-machine data-driven system, so it doesn't need language translation. A citizen need only push a few buttons to send data about the "what," "where," and "when" of a sighting to a collection database. For example, if the sighting is a cache of AK-47 rifles, the citizen turns on LocalEyes and selects an image that's an exact match or is similar to an AK-47, and types in the location. Photos and text can be added to the report as attachments. The citizen now pushes a button to send the LocalEyes report, along with a time stamp, to the collection database.

Three Principles Leverage the Local Population

Byrne uses three principles to leverage the "local eyes" of a population. (Although he originally focused on Iraq, these principles apply to any country with a large cell phone user base.)

   1. Use the local cell phone infrastructure to capture the knowledge of many. Iraq has more than seven million cell phone subscribers, so the country has a good infrastructure.
   2. Use data, not voice. Data doesn't need an army of linguists to perform translations so large amounts of data can be passed from system to system without human intervention. Such machine data would be easy to integrate into our traditional C2 systems.
   3. Enable local groups to adapt the system rapidly. Terrorists rapidly change their tactics, and our systems must be agile enough to evolve just as fast. Locals must be able to change applications on their own because they are closest to the problem.

Brandon Wolfe, the lead developer at MITRE for LocalEyes, says it was designed to be independent of the infrastructure it's running on. "In Iraq, for example, we can quickly overlay LocalEyes on the existing infrastructure so that people can send reports on suspicious activities," he says. "The application can be easily transitioned to the Iraqi security forces; we don't have to pull the infrastructure around with us."

Adaptable to Any Culture

LocalEyes can be set up by just about anyone in any culture. The local administrator just creates a checklist of things he or she wants LocalEyes to do. For example, to allow people to attach photos, a check mark is placed next to that option on the configuration list. Images and text that fit with the local culture are selected by the administrator. When the location-based version of LocalEyes is completed, it can be automatically pushed out to the cell phone users.

New applications can be quickly built within minutes or hours. "If a disaster occurs, for example, local authorities may want to establish which homes have been searched and where victims are trapped," says Wolfe. "They use the online application builder to customize information about the disaster. When a cell phone user starts LocalEyes, it will update itself with the most recent selections and allow the user to submit relevant event reports."

Gene O'Sullivan, a principal multi-discipline systems engineer, and Bill Knickerbocker, the project leader for USSOUTHCOM's Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Support, believe that LocalEyes could be used in countries like Colombia for drug enforcement and public safety.

"A successful trial in Bogota might encourage the government to expand its cell phone infrastructure into the countryside," says O'Sullivan. "Then, people in remote regions could use LocalEyes to summon help if they see suspicious activities. LocalEyes could be a tool for helping people clean up their environment of criminal activity."

"LocalEyes has the potential for being a dramatic paradigm shift in how we operate traditional command and control," says Byrne. "It will affect how we interoperate with coalitions, allies, the public, state and federal agencies. It could be the centerpiece of a new type of interoperability."

—by David A. Van Cleave

All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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« Reply #2 on: October 06, 2011, 05:22:25 pm »
MITRE's Modeling Complex Behavior Team for PRECISION STRIKING bad nodes
Through the Eyes of the Enemy: Modeling Adaptive Behavior
May 2005

Smugglers know a hundred tricks. They hide drugs in propane tanks, tuck them into high-top sneakers, conceal them in children's toys, and stash them in tins of butter. One smuggler even encased his cargo in tombstones. And every day the smugglers invent a brand new ploy. MITRE is creating a simulation that models the smugglers' evolving tactics in order to help U.S. agencies think like the smugglers—and outwit them.

According to a 2002 study by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Mexico is the transit point for 70 percent of the cocaine sold in the United States, the producer of seven metric tons of heroin per year, and the primary supplier of marijuana sold in this country. To stop this flood of drugs across the southwest border, agencies such as Customs and Border Protection use screening methods to determine which few people among the hundreds of thousands who cross from Mexico into the United States each day are smugglers. Once smugglers are caught, their methods are studied and incorporated into a set of standard screening techniques. But what of the smugglers who are not caught? What methods are they using to evade detection? MITRE is developing screening strategies to thwart these unknown methods.

MITRE has created a simulation program capable of modeling the complex adaptive behaviors of the smugglers. The program will be capable of generating a steady stream of novel smuggling techniques so that strategies can be crafted to combat them. Once an agency produces these strategies, it can feed them into the simulation to test how smugglers may adapt their methods in response. In just a few simulation runs, the user can gain insight into smuggling and prevention techniques that years of trial and error studies in the field may never have revealed.

The Modeling Complex Adaptive Behavior Project is headed by Daniel Venese and sponsored by MITRE's Center for Enterprise Modernization. Venese previously led MITRE's efforts for the Defense Information Systems Agency's Anti-Drug Network program, for which he designed counter-drug strategies, applied data mining to land border targeting, and developed a variety of advanced prototypes. Setting out on this new project, Venese realized that his findings could extend beyond drug smuggling. "This simulation technology has taken on an added importance with the focus on homeland security. Many of the same challenges faced in anti-smuggling apply to anti-terrorism as well."

Like terrorists, smugglers rely on ingenuity to escape detection. "Major smuggling organizations are highly sophisticated: they observe what's going on, they learn from their mistakes, and they improve and evolve over time," says Venese. "If you didn't know it was a smuggling operation, you would think it was a Fortune 500 organization." To model the complex adaptive behavior of the smugglers, Venese and his team programmed the simulator with an understanding of reinforcement learning, multiple strategies, randomization, and emergent behavior, which are described below.

• Reinforcement learning is when subjects learn from their successes and failures. For example, if the subject determines a tactic is successful, he or she will employ that tactic more often. Faced with a failure, the subject will employ that tactic less often.

• Multiple strategies describes the process of employing more than one tactic so as to avoid putting all of your energies into one effort.

• Randomization describes the smugglers' efforts to avoid being predictable. This involves changing tactics frequently.

• Emergent behavior is when complex behaviors arise from simple actions. Simulators study this phenomenon by programming multiple models with simple actions and then observing the complex behaviors that result from the models' interactions. For example, animal behaviorists used this technique to uncover why geese fly in a "V" pattern. They programmed their model "geese" with a simple understanding of aeronautics. When allowed to "fly," the geese quickly adapted the "V" formation as the most economical mode of flight.

Venese's team soon found that as complicated as it was to program the simulator, running the simulations was even more challenging. The team decided that it needed to incorporate the maximum amount of detail into the border crossing model to come up with useful results. "For example," Venese explains, "one million vehicles cross over a medium-sized border crossing in one year. To model such a crossing at a high degree of fidelity, we had to simulate events lasting as few as two seconds. When you program in those kinds of numbers, one run of one year was taking 80 hours, and we wanted to do 30 runs to get a statistical distribution. So to completely explore the parameters of the simulation we were looking at a 45-year project."

Venese went searching for help to speed up the simulations. He found it right under MITRE's roof. "This is an example of the wonderful synergy you have here. We found out that there was another MITRE team developing a high-performance simulation engine called the JAVA Meets Simulation. Using their technology, we were able to take that 80-hour run down to one hour, and we're still making improvements."

With the simulator now providing information at a reasonable rate, the team could begin collecting information that can be used to help capture even the slipperiest smugglers. The simulator quickly illuminated the most crucial border screening factors. "In any environment, you're always trying to identify the factors that have the greatest effect on your performance—positive and negative," Venese says. "That way you can avoid spending a lot of time and money studying factors that don't have much effect either way."

The Modeling Complex Behavior team can now glimpse the world through a smuggler's eyes. The results have been so successful that MITRE has extended funding for the research project for a second year. Venese hopes that his team's modeling work will be used by MITRE sponsors that are trying to puzzle out—and combat—the behaviors of terrorists and other criminals.

—by Christopher Lockheardt

One Step Ahead: MITRE's Simulation Experiments Address Irregular Warfare
September 2009

Irregular warfare—broadly defined as a conflict involving forces not employing traditional methods and not belonging to the regular forces of a legally constituted state—has emerged in the last decade as the dominant form of threat confronting the United States, both domestically and internationally. The Somali pirate incident last April is only the latest example of this growing national security issue.

To proactively confront these threats with action (not reaction), a new U.S. military approach known as Operational Adaptation (OA) is currently under review. "OA is a concept that combines hardware, software, remote sensors, and networked communications that allow our military to develop a decision and action tempo that's beyond an antagonist's ability to maintain," explains Jim Dear from MITRE's Naval Program Directorate.

In other words, the goal is to probe, shape, and manipulate the enemy at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. "Basically, OA aims to get inside the decision-making process of insurgents, predict what they're going to do, and counter it with a variety of command and control systems as well as sensors," he says.

Synergistic Lab

To help the military maintain the upper hand when faced by irregular warfare, the Office of Naval Research in Arlington, Va., recently conducted a series of sophisticated simulation experiments at the Naval Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Experimentation Lab (NCEL). The lab is unusual in that it's a Navy- and Marine Corps-sponsored lab located on MITRE premises. "That gives it a different flavor," says Dean Zywicki, technical director of the facility.

"This lab is very synergistic," says Dear, the lab's project leader. Designed to host experiments involving realistic scenarios, uniformed operators, and simulated sensors and weapons, the lab enables sponsors to better develop integrated warfighting capabilities. MITRE has previously supported a variety of time critical targeting and maritime domain awareness experiments. The simulation experiments for Operational Adaptation, however, were prompted after a project officer from the Office of Naval Research visited the lab and observed a simulation experiment involving Navy sensors and C4I (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence) tools.

Singular Focus Aligned with Sponsor Needs

To prepare for the initial experiment, which took place in May 2008, a data collection team from MITRE's Information and Computing Technologies Technical Center sat down with representatives from the Office of Naval Research to develop objectives for the simulation experiments. "It's very much sponsor-driven," says Zywicki. "All of the objectives at the SIMEXs [simulation experiments] are closely aligned with the sponsor, which exemplifies how we act as a trusted agent for the government."

The NCEL Lab

The Naval Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) Experimentation Lab (NCEL) is a Naval and Joint-sponsored lab that supports multiple Naval and Joint commands at the MITRE campus in McLean, Va. "We conduct several SIMEX [simulation experiments] a year to address sponsor tactics, techniques, and procedures, CONOPS [concepts of operations], and interoperability requirements," explains Jim Dear, project leader. "The lab focuses on C4ISR processes for time-sensitive targeting and surface surveillance and tracking, and we're able to address both ashore and afloat targeting environments."

Much goes into the planning of a SIMEX, which kicks off with an initial planning conference that synchronizes and consolidates the mission of several sponsors. Thereafter, the CONOPS and technical architecture are developed and tested, a data collection and analysis plan is built, and the scenarios are finalized. A typical execution schedule lasts five days, resulting in an immediate, "quick look" report, which precedes the more comprehensive final report. Some of the complex SIMEXs that have come through the NCEL Lab recently include Joint Surface Warfare, Naval Special Warfare, and Maritime Domain Awareness.

Unlike other large-scale simulation exercises, which are characterized by many experiences running concurrently for many sponsors, NCEL is distinguished by its singular focus. "Our niche is focused experiments, working side-by-side with the sponsor," says Zywicki.

"We did a lot of system integration and testing before the SIMEX came together, bringing various aspects together in OA scenarios, ensuring things would work before the warfighters arrived and the experiments began," says Dear.

To develop simulations to test new sensors—"some of which didn't even exist yet," according to Dear—required substantial collaboration, including seven different cross-discipline engineers from MITRE and three different government labs. "The fact that MITRE has a lab staffed with people experienced in running experiments, integrating simulations, and realistically representing warfighting scenarios in a controlled environment is a distinct advantage," says Dear.

Zywicki described the team's role as "technical drivers" at the experiments. "Our contribution came in the form of software and middleware development, as well as providing operational research experts and data collection people who helped the sponsor understand the capabilities of sensors, and how best to employ them," he says.

Making Diagrams into Reality

A few months after the initial SIMEX, another OA SIMEX at the lab took place in September. "Basically, we took their PowerPoint diagrams and made them real," says Zywicki. "We have teams that worked side-by-side with the customer throughout the entire process," which facilitated the development of new sensor capabilities for irregular warfare. "In some cases, operators used them in different ways than what they were designed for, and they learned new capabilities."

The experiments also allowed the sponsor to provide training for participants who didn't have experience working with advanced technology in a Maritime Operations Center. "There's always a training aspect on top of the overall mission," says Dear.

The two simulation experiments provided a valuable environment for Operational Adaptation to test its concept of operations as well as tactics, techniques, and procedures. The events also confirmed the lab as a productive training environment that could produce rapid results. "Within two weeks of the SIMEXs, we generated 'quick look' briefs, and within two months, we produced the final report that directly addressed the original objectives of the experiment," says Zywicki.

This summer the Operational Adaptation sponsor planned live demonstrations in a field environment, which will follow up on the work performed at NCEL. "The sponsor was satisfied with the SIMEX results," Dear says.

—by Cheryl Scaparrotta

All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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Re: ESC, MITRE officials take hands-on approach to terminal management

Seems that MITRE now has their own personal antenna and connection to all the satellite communications terminals. Nice to know that corporate America has such access. I could be making a mountain out of a mole hill here, but the US Air Force twitter ( ) was proud to announce this. If someone else has posted this already, I apologize for the duplication in advance.
ESC, MITRE officials take hands-on approach to terminal management
by Chuck Paone
66th Air Base Wing Public Affairs

7/9/2009 - HANSCOM AIR FORCE BASE, Mass. (AFNS)  -- Officials at Electronic Systems Center and MITRE Corp. are taking a hands-on approach to managing a major satellite communications terminal program, especially now that they have purchased and set one up in their own backyard.

More specifically, a team from the 653rd Electronic Systems Wing's Space and Nuclear Network division here, along with representatives from MITRE, set the large antenna up on the roof of the program office.

The team recently received the Ground Multi-band Terminal, or GMT, equipment and were trained to set it up and operate it. Then they hauled the pieces of the dish-shaped antenna onto the roof of a MITRE building in Bedford, Mass., and began assembly.

"It was incredibly easy and very user friendly," said Capt. Matt Hirzel, the GMT program manager. "Two trained operators can set up an entire system in about an hour."

While the ESC-MITRE team didn't get everything set up quite so quickly, they did validate the vaunted set-up ease of GMT, which supports deployed Air Force operations. GMTs provide wideband communications over both military and commercial satellite systems, including the new Wideband Global SATCOM, or WGS, satellite system.

The terminals can operate in four different frequency bands -- C, X, Ku, and Ka -- and enable operators to make "long-haul" transmissions, covering about one-third of the globe, according to Carl Markey, lead engineer for the program. The terminals connect deployed locations with one another and provide reach-back to rear area headquarters and support elements.

"GMTs help to create the tactical edge of the Global Information Grid," Mr. Markey said.

The GMTs were designed to replace, and are now replacing, Ground Mobile Forces, or GMF, terminals, which have been in the Air Force inventory for more than 20 years. The new terminals are packaged in transportable cases to support a wide range of operational scenarios and have been designed to significantly reduce the deployed footprint.

The main components of a dual-hub GMT, which supports two radio frequency strings, can be shipped on just one aircraft pallet, whereas two X-band-only GMF terminals needed to perform the same function required 24 pallets. Each GMT package is also 18,000 lbs. lighter than an equivalent GMF system.

"This allows the satellite communications equipment to arrive with the warfighters rather than after them," Mr. Markey said.

GMTs also provide far greater communications capacity. They supply 100 times the data throughput that GMFs provided. They also take advantage of the two-way Ka-band capabilities offered by the new WGS satellites.

Having a system -- in addition to the roof-top antenna, a laboratory has been set up to house the modems, multiplexer and control equipment -- in place in the program office allows program officials to troubleshoot reported problems and review terminal changes and enhancements before they're sent to the field, said Steve Briggs, a support contractor in the program office.

The program team also will use the terminal to support risk reduction efforts on the High Data Rate-Radio Frequency, or HDR-RF, program. That program will provide a five-fold increase in data transmission rates, from the current 52 megabits per second to 274 Mbps. This increased speed will prove particularly helpful to the intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance community, Mr. Markey said.

GMT fielding has been under way for a little more than two years, with 61 of a planned 115 already in place, and is expected to wrap up by June 2011. That would be several months ahead of the original fielding schedule, Captain Hirzel said.

"The program is already on a very successful track, with great user feedback," the captain said. "Installing the GMT locally, so that we can work directly with it, should definitely help us provide an even better product, and better support, to the warfighters relying on the system."
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MITRE Corp's Jason Group intrested in "living Nightmares"
The JASON study focused instead, and from the outset, on one issue. Specifically, we took a hard look at what the near-term future of biological warfare held, based on how recent advances in the life sciences have changed the nature and scope of that threat. In brief, we concluded that progress in biomedical science inevitably has a dark side, and potentiates the development of an entirely new class of weapons of mass destruction (WMD): genetically engineered pathogens. The danger of such next-generation biological weapons (BW) in the twenty-first century is quite real, and they pose a threat [that could be exploited for financial gain as well as population control.]

There have been documented efforts to alter the properties of existing pathogens in such a way as to improve their effectiveness in biological warfare. Notable here is the work of Dr. Ken Alibek (formerly Dr. Kanatjan Alibekov, the Deputy Director of Biopreparat, the USSR’s bioweapons program), who defected to the US in 1992.

For the flu, the two main surface antigens are neuraminidase (N) and hemagglutinin (H). Gene swapping is thought to come about in a natural way. There are many forms of the flu in animals, including an avian form affecting birds such as geese and ducks, a swine form affecting pigs, and a human form affecting ourselves. Pigs can harbor both the avian and human forms, in addition to their own. In situations where ducks, pigs, and humans live in close proximity and under poor sanitary conditions (for example, on small farms in China), a pig can sometimes become infected simultaneously with two or more influenza strains, including one fromducks and one from humans. With some probability, the genes occasionally get mixed up inside pig cells and the result is the emergence of a novel, recombinant virus with a subset of components derived from each strain. A bioweapons developer inspired by this state of affairs might attempt the ab initio construction of a synthetic virus using a kind of “erector set” strategy, building it up by literally mixing and matching known components of existing viruses.

Gene Therapy as a Weapon

The goal of gene therapy is to effect a change in the genetic makeup of an individual by introducing new information

Stealth Viruses

A “stealth virus” is another menacing possibility afforded by genetic engineering (see figure 2-7). The basic idea behind a stealth virus is to produce a tightly regulated, cryptic viral infection, using a vector that can enter and spread in human cells, remaining resident for lengthy periods without causing detectable harm. However, once triggered by an appropriate external (or internal) signal, the cryptic virus is activated and causes disease. Stealth viruses could be designed to be contagious, and therefore distribute themselves silently throughout a given population. They might even be designed against specific target groups. A population could be slowly preinfected with a stealth virus over an extended period, possibly years in
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MITRE's rationale for destroying the United States of America in a planned coup

Note:  See below PDF for 50 pages of graphs, images, illustrations, etc.


In September 2006, The MITRE Corporation hosted a one-day conference titled “Socio- Cultural Perspectives: A New Intelligence Paradigm.”  The goal of the conference was to explore various ways in which socio-cultural perspectives could be used in intelligence analysis.  The conference also was designed to raise awareness among participants, and their host organizations, of current activities in this area, and to establish the groundwork for ongoing interaction within and across organizations and agencies.

The conference demonstrated that cultural intelligence is important for a wide range of national security endeavors and that this fact is increasingly recognized in many government quarters.  Questions arose regarding tools, including the development and use of computational models; methods, including issues relating to data collection, analysis, and dissemination; and the development of cross-community and interdisciplinary ties that would allow the intelligence community as a whole to move forward.  There also was discussion of the contested nature of the term “culture” among academics and some communities of practice, as well as how an analyst might use socio- cultural knowledge to further intelligence analysis.  In addition, methodological rigor, development of best practices, engagement of a wide variety of disciplines, and interaction with open source communities all arose as essential issues to pursue in the future.

Participants emphasized that the cultural problem is a systems problem.  It is important to understand ourselves and the ways in which we interact with others in different contexts, as these interactions color the ways others perceive our actions and their interaction with us.  There also were many conversations about how socio-cultural data are gathered, analyzed, and computationally manipulated.  Participants discussed disciplinary and theoretical concerns, and how different approaches could impact the clarity of conversations among analysts.

While there was consensus that cultural intelligence must inform national security activity, there remained many unanswered questions about method, approach, data, and institutionalization of the capability.  Many of the findings from this conference can be used to build a follow-on exercise that would more specifically focus on identification of problem areas in methodology, tool development and use, and communication.  The results of such efforts would, in turn, provide a basis for a research program, as well as policy and best practice guidelines, that would fuel significant advancement of the state- of-the-art in cultural intelligence data gathering, analysis, and use.
KEYWORDS:  analytic tools, behavioral science, computational social models, cross- cultural competency, cultural analysis, cultural awareness, cultural intelligence, culture, intelligence analysis, multidisciplinary theory, situational awareness, social science, socio-cultural knowledge, socio-cultural models, socio-cultural perspectives, soldier as sensor

Table of Contents

1   Introduction   7
2   Background   7
3   Conference   9
4   Discussion of Themes   9
4.1   Socio-cultural Analysis   10
4.2   Defining “Cultural Intelligence”   10
4.3   Culture Debates   11
4.4   Culture as a Framework for Understanding   11
4.5   An “Anthropology of Us”   12
4.6   Understanding Intent   12
5   Data   13
6   Theoretical Concerns   14
7   Methods   15
8   Analytic Tools   17
9   The Path Forward   19
9.1   Conference Recommendations   20
9.2   Ethical Considerations   20
10   Conclusion   21
11   Addendum 1 – Selected Conference Briefings   22

1   Introduction

Since September 11, 2001, socio-cultural perspectives have had an increasingly high profile in government circles.  They have been applied to many dimensions of national security, including threats, capabilities, and intentions, as well as preventive, protective, and predictive strategies.  This paper explores some of the background for this increased attention. It then summarizes a conference held in September 2006 to recognize this growing interest in the United States intelligence community (IC), and to identify opportunities and concerns the IC faces as it increases socio-cultural analysis.  This paper concludes with recommendations for further assessment and strengthening of socio- cultural data, analysis, and approaches in intelligence.

2   Background

The use of socio-cultural perspectives in intelligence analysis is as old as the endeavor itself.  Sun Tzu (c. 500 B.C.) spoke of the necessity of knowing one’s enemy as well as one’s neighbors, and of taking advantage of local guides.1   Throughout history, cultural knowledge and language capabilities–along with deception and disguise–have provided outsiders with the ability to interact with, and even blend into, local populations in order to gain crucial knowledge of the thinking, intentions, and capabilities of others.2   In more recent times, the British use of these techniques, as they played “the Great Game”3 across Central Asia, became legendary and was immortalized in fiction, such as Kipling’s novel, Kim.4

During the Cold War–the major focus of U.S. government intelligence activity during the second half of the twentieth century–socio-cultural perspectives were overshadowed by concerns about economic power, political and military dominance, and technological superiority. 5    This is not to say that socio-cultural perspectives were entirely ignored. The development of Soviet studies, and other area studies specialties, increased the capacity to analyze and interpret the multiple cultures of the Communist Bloc and
provide context for interpreting ideological, political, and strategic precepts and actions.6

1 Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Ralph D. Sawyer, trans.  (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), [c. 500BC].
2 Rose Mary Sheldon, Espionage in the Ancient World: An Annotated Bibliography (N.p.: McFarland and Company, 2003).
3 Peter Hopkirk, The Great Game: The Struggle for Empire in Central Asia (New York: Kodansha America, 1994).
4 Rudyard Kipling, Kim (New York: Doubleday, Page, 1901).
5 Benjamin Frankel, Roots of Realism (New York: Frank Cass, 1996); Jonathan Nashel, "Cold War (1945–91): Changing Interpretations," in The Oxford Companion to American Military History, ed. John Whiteclay Chambers II (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
6 Victoria E. Bonnell and George Breslauer, "Soviet and Post-Soviet Area Studies," in The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines, ed. David L. Szanton (Berkeley: University of California Press/University of California International and Area Studies, 2002); David L. Szanton, "The Origin, Nature, and Challenges of Area Studies in the United States," in The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies

The concept of “strategic culture” also developed in strategic studies and gained currency in foreign policy and international relations.7

The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the Soviet collapse in 1991, and the end of the Cold War to a large degree eliminated the political threat posed by the Soviet Union.  While the emergence of China as a “new” peer competitor continues, the Chinese strategic threat remains far below that of the Soviet Union in its heyday.  Socio-cultural analyses still took a back seat post-1991 to technical questions in the intelligence community, both in terms of visibility and resource allocation.

With the end of the Cold War and the rise of asymmetric terrorist threats in the late twentieth century, the need for socio-cultural perspectives increased.8

Absent this singular [Soviet] focus, in the post-Cold War environment the Intelligence Community struggled to reestablish its identity and purpose in what had become a world of multiple crises and transient threats.9

These new threats and crises were rising from regions and cultures around the world less familiar to Western analysts. In addition, terrorist ideologies were often emergent as well as generally less transparent than the well-documented and established philosophies undergirding Communism.  Moreover, as retrospective analyses of the intelligence failures leading to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, have shown, there was an overreliance on “technical collection systems with little acknowledgement of the political/cultural context.” 10

Need for socio-cultural perspectives also became a major theme in comments from military personnel returning from the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  Officers cited their practical experience on the ground dealing with nontraditional warfare, local populations, and inadequate cultural and linguistic knowledge.11   A growing body of testimonials and studies citing their lessons learned and recommendations for change, provided additional validation of the need for socio-cultural perspectives.12   This discussion illuminated some ways in which intelligence support for operations (and analysis) needs improvement and also spawned a proof-of-concept program to place teams of cultural and “human terrain” specialists in theater to provide direct support to brigade commanders.13

and the Disciplines, ed. David L. Szanton (Berkeley: University of California Press/University of California International and Area Studies, 2002).
7 Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Culture: From Clausewitz to Constructivism, prepared for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency Comparative Strategic Curriculum (October 2006).
8 Austin T. Turk, “Sociology of Terrorism,” Annual Review of Sociology 30 (2004): 271-286.
9 Richard Kerr, Thomas Wolfe, Rebecca Donegan, and Aris Pappas, “Issues for the Intelligence Community: Collection and Analysis on Iraq:,” Studies in Intelligence 49, no. 3 (2005).
10 ibid.; also see Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President (2005),
11 For example, see Lieutenant General David H. Petraeus, “Learning Counterinsurgency: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq,” Military Review (January-February 2006): 2-12; Major Ben Connable, “Marines are From Mars, Iraqis are From Venus,” Small Wars Journal (May 2004); Mounir Elkhamri, “Dealing with the Iraqi Populace:  An Arab-American Soldier’s Perspective,” Military Review (January-February 2007):
110-113; Craig T. Trebilcock, “The Modern Seven Pillars of Iraq,” Army (February 2007): 25-33.
12 For example, see Sarah E. Archer, “Civilian and Military Cooperation in Complex Humanitarian Operations,” Military Review (March-April 2003): 32-41; Major Patrick Carroll, “Increasing Cultural Awareness,” Marine Corps Gazette (June 2004); Jennifer V. Chandler, “Why Culture Matters:  An


The confluence of these factors provided the impetus for holding the conference described in this report.  The goal was to create an opportunity to explore current activities, identify gaps in resources and methods, articulate recommendations for how to move forward, and contribute to community-building.  The sections that follow summarize major points of conference discussion and recommendations.

3  Conference

In September 2006, The MITRE Corporation hosted a one-day conference titled “Socio- Cultural Perspectives: A New Intelligence Paradigm.”  Over 130 participants from more than 50 different government organizations attended the conference. In keeping with the conference theme, participants brought a broad range of expertise in the social and behavioral sciences; intelligence analysis; military and intelligence operations, including experience in theater; area studies; and technology.

The goal of the conference was to explore various ways socio-cultural perspectives could be used in intelligence analysis.  Another goal was to raise awareness among participants, and their host organizations, of current activities in this area, and to establish the groundwork for ongoing interaction within and across organizations and agencies. Conference organizers anticipated that the day's activities would highlight areas in the field that need additional programmatic or research attention, and identify specific ideas for follow-up.

4  Discussion of Themes

Throughout the conference program, there was lively discussion of socio-cultural perspectives in meeting national security challenges, and how to characterize the nexus of socio-cultural and intelligence analysis. Although participants represented mixed backgrounds and diverse organizations, there was implicit or explicit consensus on several key points.

Empirically-Based Pre-Deployment Training Program,” M.A. Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School (September 2005); Lieutenant Commander John P. Coles, “Cultural Intelligence and Joint Intelligence Doctrine,” Joint Forces Staff College Paper (2005),; Major James A. Gordon, “Cultural Assessments and Campaign Planning,” School of Advanced Military Studies (2004); Colonel Maxie McFarland, “Military Cultural Education,” Military Review (March-April 2005): 62-69.
13 Jacob Kipp, Lester Grau, Karl  Prinslow, and Captain Don Smith, “The Human Terrain System:  A CORDS for the 21st Century” Military Review (2006): 8; Montgomery McFate and Andrea Jackson, “An
Organizational Solution for DoD’s Cultural Knowledge Needs” Military Review  (2005): 18.

4.1  Socio-cultural Analysis

There was no formal attempt to define “socio-cultural analysis,” but the term was used consistently in two ways.  In one sense, it was used to mean the analysis of socio-cultural data or scenarios.  In the other sense, it connoted the employment of socio-cultural perspectives in the analysis of any type of data or scenario.  As one of the stated goals of the conference was to foster open exchange and sharing of viewpoints, no attempt was made to reconcile varying uses of such terms. Rather, as long as different uses of terms and concepts were understood in context, they were allowed to coexist and thereby represent the spectrum of priorities and orientations brought to the table by conference participants. In this report, the phrase “socio-cultural data, analysis, and approaches” is intended to encompass the set of ideas referred to as “socio-cultural analysis” during the conference.

4.2  Defining “Cultural Intelligence”

The term “cultural intelligence” was used frequently, also with variations in meaning. However, there was implicit acceptance of three underlying tenets:

Cultural intelligence:

•   includes, or is informed by, socio-cultural data and their analysis
•   must be actionable, in the sense that it can be used in decision-making
•   includes perspective, theory, and method derived from the social and/or behavioral sciences

The most explicit discussion of definitions was presented by the speakers from the Marine Corps Intelligence Activity (MCIA), who described a framework that distinguishes among three levels of knowledge, interpretation, and application of cultural data.  The first of these, cultural awareness, was defined as behavioral dos and don’ts, and basic familiarity with language and religion.  The second level, cultural understanding, encompassed the “why” of behavior embodied in perceptions, mindsets, attitudes, and customs.  The third level, cultural intelligence, included the implications of these behaviors and their drivers, including ways in which culture can shape theater or policy decision-making.14 In addition, MCIA noted that they consider cultural intelligence to be a type of all-source analysis that relies heavily on open-source intelligence (OSINT) and human intelligence (HUMINT).  In other words, cultural intelligence is the product of analysis rather than something that can be collected.  In fact, they maintained, it requires multi-disciplinary approaches and a multi-step process.15

Presentations and discussions during the course of the day also shifted between strategic and tactical uses for cultural intelligence. There was tacit agreement among participants that cultural intelligence could be useful in both environments.  This suggests the importance of discussing metrics for measuring the quality and success of cultural intelligence, and the likelihood that such metrics may differ between tactical and strategic intelligence applications. Though there was no direct discussion of this during the conference, it would be a fruitful topic for future exploration.

14 Arthur Speyer and Job Henning, “MCIA’s Cultural Intelligence Methodology and Lessons Learned” (paper presented at the Socio-Cultural Perspectives: A New Intelligence Paradigm Conference, McLean, Virginia, September 12, 2006).  See Addendum 1.
15 ibid.


The term “cultural intelligence” has also entered the lexicon of the organizational management field through a model based largely on psychological concepts.16  This model defines cultural intelligence as “a person’s capability to adapt effectively to new cultural contexts,” and proposes constructs for cognition, motivation, and behavior.17
Interestingly, this individual capability-based definition of cultural intelligence, though frequently cited in studies, was not raised at the conference, perhaps because it was not seen as relevant to analysis.  This definition may be more relevant to issues of cross- cultural competence being debated as part of training and education efforts.18

4.3  Culture Debates

In contrast to the implicit acceptance of a shared understanding of key terms such as “socio-cultural analysis” and “cultural intelligence,” a number of speakers, including some of the anthropologists present, drew attention to the fact that the root word “culture” has long been contested.19  This was illustrated during the course of the conference.  For example, one speaker cited a standard dictionary definition that portrayed culture as attitudes, values, and behaviors, distinguishing it from social phenomena that relate to the structure of groups.  Another participant spoke of the social, cultural, political, and economic dimensions of a group, but separated the political and economic from the larger socio-cultural framework.  A third speaker focused specifically on the culture defined by intellectual capital and work practice, positing that members of some professions have much in common around the world because their education and expertise cross-cut or transcend more traditional definitions of culture based on factors such as national or ethnic identity.

4.4  Culture as a Framework for Understanding

Most participants agreed that understanding culture helps establish a context for human activity and provides key insights into the potential meaning and significance of actions. It helps analysts understand the “why” and the “so what” of behavior.  In this way, socio-cultural perspectives provide a framework for understanding. The ability of the social and behavioral sciences to contribute to the predictive capabilities of intelligence was also debated.  

16 Christopher P. Earley and Soon Ang, Cultural Intelligence: Individual Interactions Across Cultures (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003).
17 ibid.
18 Selmeski, Brian, “Military Cross-Cultural Competence: Core Concepts and Individual Development,” Royal Military College of Canada Centre for Security, Armed Forces & Society Occasional Paper Series–
no. 1 (2007).
19 The vigorous and long-standing debate of culture definitions is illustrated in Alfred L. Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, Culture (New York: Meridian Books, 1952). Also see Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of
Cultures (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

Among the questions participants thought might be profitably addressed using socio-cultural perspectives were:  what critical factors shape how leaders make decisions in different contexts?, and, what criteria should be used to select methods and circumstances for inter-group negotiations? 20   The field of cross-cultural communication was cited as a potentially relevant resource for work in this area.21

4.5  An “Anthropology of Us”

Conferees made the point that awareness of the interpretive frames one employs in analyzing human behavior is valuable, including those that might be illuminated by an “anthropology of us” as well as an “anthropology of them.”  One speaker noted that we need to understand the intersection of the adversary’s and the analyst’s “situational awareness.”  Indeed, ethnographic studies of military officers and intelligence professionals have revealed how culture can impact one’s work and effectiveness, sometimes in unexpected ways.  Examples include the influence of national and organizational culture on military officers participating in peace support operations,22 attitudes toward asymmetric power and authority relationships for military advisors,23 and perceived ethnocentrism among intelligence analysts.24

4.6  Understanding Intent

Several comments during the course of the conference also suggested that it was, perhaps, not the notion of cultural intelligence per se that was new, but its relative emphasis. As one speaker put it, “It isn't al-Qa’ida itself that's the problem, it's their ideology.”  This was repeated in different terms in another comment about how the threats in today's world can be defined ninety percent by intention, and only ten percent by capability.  The difficulties we are having countering improvised explosive devices, which are relatively crude technologically, and suicide bombers, whose lethality stems (again) not from the sophistication of the weapon but the intensity of the bombers’ commitment and our lack of understanding of the dimensions of that commitment, are strong illustrations of this point.25  

20 Melville J. Herskovits, "Economizing and Rational Behavior," in Economic Anthropology, ed. Melville J. Herskovits (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1952); Christina H. Gladwin, Ethnographic Decision Tree Modeling, Qualitative Research Methods series 19 (Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1989); Paul C. Nutt, "Comparing Public and Private Sector Decision-Making Practices," Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 16 (2006).
21 J. Michael Greig, “The End of Geography?: Globalization, Communications, and Culture in the International System, Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 2 (2002: 225-243; Annette Scheunpflug, “Cross-Cultural Encounters as a Way of Overcoming Xenophobia,” International Review of Education 43, no. 1 (1997): 109-116; Francesca O. Norales, Cross Cultural Communication: Concepts, Cases, and Challenges (Youngstown, NY: Cambria Press, 2006).
22 Robert A. Rubinstein, “Peacekeepers and Politics: Experience and Political Representation Among U.S. Military Officers,” in Anthropology and the United States Military: Coming of Age in the Twenty-first Century, ed. Pamela R. Frese and Margaret C. Harrell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
23 Anna Simons, “The Military Advisor as Warrior-King and Other ‘Going Native’ Temptations,” in Anthropology and the United States Military: Coming of Age in the Twenty-first Century, ed. Pamela R. Frese and Margaret C. Harrell (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).
24 Rob Johnston, Analytical Culture in the U.S. Intelligence Community: An Ethnographic Study (Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2005).

Highly motivated and focused individuals can be a significant threat without sophisticated technology.  Additionally, sophisticated technology has a social dimension.26   In either case, as one speaker noted, “Technology is knowledge put to use,” and, further, “You can't have technology without technologists [i.e., people].”  This turns our focus back to socio-cultural factors.  During the Cold War, our adversaries' motivation and intention were well-studied and well-understood.  A comparable understanding of the socio-cultural context of current national security threats is just as critical to decision-making today.

The general point made in these discussions is an important one.  We, along with any other actors, are part of a system.  People do not act in a vacuum but in response to, and in concert with, the actions of others. Recognition of this system and its dynamic relationships and interdependencies is vital from the tactical through strategic levels. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier, our own analyses are colored by the values and interpretive frames we bring to them.  We therefore need to better understand our own biases in order to understand others.

5  Data

This new focus on socio-cultural perspectives requires a different kind of data than that of interest during the Cold War.27   Socio-cultural data can be significantly different in kind than data collected about capabilities, technologies, or artifacts.  Many at the conference asserted that data are best collected by immersion in the target environment.  This belief is supported by formal methodological approaches, especially participant-observation, developed by the field of anthropology.28   This clearly falls into the realm of human intelligence (HUMINT).  One participant commented, “You can’t collect this stuff by satellite.”  Another speaker, who represented an operational organization, said that his unit’s best advantage was that “we know our neighborhood.”  Accordingly, some of that organization’s most valuable assets are individuals who can visually and behaviorally blend into that neighborhood.

The emphasis on HUMINT raised interesting questions about the data themselves and associated analytic tools.  The cultural data most often collected are narrative and qualitative in nature.29   If analytic tools are computational, data may need to be translated into a form that can be processed.  While this is often possible, analysts need to be aware of the limitations and constraints of such translations and understand the costs and benefits of these types of approaches.

25 Steven Metz and Raymond Millen, “Intervention, Stabilization, and Transformation Operations: The Role of Landpower in the New Strategic Environment,” Parameters 35, no. 1 (2005); Jeffrey Record and W. Andrew Terril, Iraq and Vietnam: Differences, Similarities, and Insights (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, 2004).
26 Joseph C. Pitt, Thinking about Technology: Foundations of the Philosophy of Technology (New York: Seven Bridges Press, 2000).
27 Richard K. Betts, “Fixing Intelligence,” Foreign Affairs 81, no. 1 (2002).
28 H. Russell Bernard, Research Methods in Anthropology (Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press, 2001).
29 ibid.


The question arose whether data must be quantifiable.  It was pointed out that computational models, because they must use quantified data, often use surrogates for qualitative data.  However, surrogates may have varying levels of validity according to the standards of different social science disciplines (e.g., the number of times one goes to church is not necessarily a valid measure of intensity of religious belief) and users of these models and their outputs must consider these issues and their potential impact on analyses.  Another speaker remarked that qualitative data are not considered credible in many environments.  The growing interest in cultural intelligence, as evidenced by comments such as these, highlights the need to examine underlying assumptions about the value, utility, and interpretation of both qualitative and quantitative data.

It also became clear that collection of qualitative data is labor-intensive. A speaker whose work focuses on data collection was questioned about how to ensure consistency across collectors.  The speaker replied that this methodological issue is a challenge that should be addressed by training and the development of collection protocols, such as interview guidelines.

Cultural data also have a temporal dimension.  As a speaker from an operational organization pointed out, his collectors spend a great deal of time establishing socio- cultural baselines in communities.  Establishing these baselines allows collectors and analysts to recognize significant change over time.  Understanding the cultural context of these changes is what allows them to grasp the significance of the change.

Speakers pointed out that in addition to the temporal dimension of socio-cultural data, there is also a spatial dimension.  Socio-cultural data collection and analysis should be driven not only by intelligence requirements, but also by an assessment of local contextual factors.  Communities do not live in isolation and individuals can move in and out of communities.  Moreover, social structures, such as kinship relations or tribal identity, can have significance across community and geographical boundaries.  Once again, a holistic systems view must encompass both these socio-cultural dimensions.

6  Theoretical Concerns
Sound data collection must be guided by appropriate collection protocols.30   Analytic tools, such as computational models, do not attempt to include the whole world in an analytic exercise, only part of it.  As one speaker noted, models–whether conceptual or computational–do not represent the whole world: they would not be models if they did.

In the social sciences, theoretical frameworks shape the definition of research problems and the approaches taken to explore them. For example, a cultural materialist approach would focus on the interrelationship between people and their physical environment, while a symbolic or semiotic approach would pay more attention to expressive forms of culture such as language and visual representations.  One presenter noted that a “social constructivist” framework31 underpinned his organization’s approach to cultural intelligence. Others were less explicit about their theoretical biases, which led to requests for presenters to clarify what was and was not included in their approaches.

30 ibid.

Because all human activity occurs in socio-cultural environments, it is fundamentally a multi-dimensional phenomenon.  In order to address these multiple dimensions, analysts will need to leverage approaches from different disciplines in the social sciences (e.g., political science, anthropology, sociology), behavioral sciences (e.g., psychology), life sciences (e.g., physiology, ecology/environmental science), and physical sciences (e.g., physics, chemistry), as well as engineering.  Builders of analytic tools, including computational social models, also need to understand how multi-disciplinary theories and approaches can impact data collection, integrity, manipulation, and interpretation.

7  Methods

Understanding and analyzing socio-cultural contexts and their potential implications have led the analytic community to seek new social science skill sets and focus on integrating them into intelligence analysis as we have shown earlier.  Though some organizations have made great strides in this area there still is, in general, a lack of institutionalization of frameworks and best practices for addressing socio-cultural topics.  Also discussed by conference participants were methods by which one gains cross-cultural competency. Moreover, expertise in the social and behavioral sciences, as in the physical sciences, often is stovepiped by discipline.  Economics, psychology, political science, anthropology, and sociology – to name only a few disciplines – employ different methodological approaches, apply different theoretical structures, and provide insights into different aspects of the human condition.32

This raises issues of interdisciplinary access and integration that must be addressed. These cross-disciplinary efforts are critical, but can present challenges of their own. They can require not only acquisition of new vocabularies, but open-mindedness toward different scientific approaches and methods.  The conference did not address this topic directly, but it is important to recognize the difficulties inherent in such interdisciplinary dialogue.  Impediments can range from mutually incomprehensible vocabularies, to different definitions of key problems, to varied criteria for what constitutes legitimate data.

Cross-disciplinary efforts also require ongoing collaborative dialog.  A one-way conversation in which a subject-matter expert gives data to a modeler, for example, who then goes off to build a model and hand it over to an analyst, is likely to be of limited utility.  

31 Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckman, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Doubleday, 1966).
32 W.S. Bainbridge, "The Future in the Social Sciences," Futures 35 no. 6 (2003).

Arguably, one of the most productive aspects of creating an analytic tool is the conversation that occurs between its creators during the process of its construction.  For computational social models, it is at this stage that the analyst is forced into explicit awareness of relevant variables and relationships, available data, and the limitations, as well as benefits, of the tool itself.33   Both tool builders and tool users emphasized these points during the conference.

Given the increasing importance of cultural intelligence, the national security community might formally catalog the human assets it can task (with both collection and analysis) and determine whether these assets are being used effectively.  Currently there is talk in some circles of the “soldier as sensor,”34 that is, using deployed soldiers as collectors of socio-cultural data.  This would, of course, require the development and institutionalization of mechanisms to train soldiers to capture and transmit socio-cultural data, as well as consideration of how that activity might affect other missions and goals.

The intelligence community also needs to recognize that much of the expertise and existing data required for cultural intelligence reside outside the intelligence community. For example, although one presentation given by a speaker who works outside the traditional intelligence and academic communities presented relevant methods and data types, questions from participants revealed that many were unable to interpret how these data and methods might be used in intelligence analysis.  Cases such as this demonstrate the need for cross-cultural translation of the frameworks and vocabularies commonly employed in different disciplines and professional contexts.  This also applies to contact across sectors of government, academia, and the business community.

Several speakers emphasized the element of creativity necessary for socio-cultural analysis in the sense that, while there may be guidelines or theoretical constructs to follow, there is rarely an exact prescription.  One called it a process of “scientific improvisation.”  Another used a cooking analogy.  While a good cook will follow a recipe and produce an edible meal, a chef will use the same basic recipe and produce a gastronomic work of art.  We should not expect cultural analyses necessarily to provide the same strict interpolation from data to conclusion that is generally expected in the physical sciences.35

33 Thomas H. Karas, “Modelers and Policymakers: Improving the Relationship,” Sandia Report 2004-2888 (Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories, 2004).
34 R.L. Brownlee and Peter J. Schoomaker, The United States Army 2004 Posture Statement, Office of the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Special Actions Branch,
35 Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Peering into the Future,” Foreign Affairs 73, no. 4 (July/August 2004): 82-93. Even in the physical sciences, quantitative data are subject to both intentional and unintentional subjective
interpretation and manipulation.  See Stephen Jay Gould, The Mismeasure of Man (New York: Norton, 1996), or Donald Mackenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Sociology of Nuclear Missile Guidance
(Cambridge, MA:  MIT Press, 1990).

8  Analytic Tools

Analysis of socio-cultural data can be accomplished by a wide range of analytic approaches ranging from hermeneutics36 to structural explanations,37 some of which require manipulations of quantitative data.38   Since most social science data are collected, communicated, and archived in textual format, hermeneutical or interpretive approaches of various types have historically been most widely applied. However, as these types of analytic approaches draw on mental models, 39 they depend heavily on the training and capabilities of individual analysts.  Results may, therefore, be difficult to verify and/or replicate.  The explosion in computational power over the last few decades, combined with decreasing cost and development of user-friendly interfaces for non-specialists, have led to an increasing emphasis in the social sciences on the use of quantitative analytic approaches and computational models.  Analysts, who are under significant pressure to produce analytic results quickly and face ever-increasing amounts of data, stand to benefit from this trend.  However, the recent increase in the use of computational tools to model socio-cultural phenomena has raised some important questions for the field of cultural intelligence.

One of the most critical questions is about the role of the computational model itself and how its use has changed socio-cultural analysis. One school of thought holds that the computational model is merely an externalization of a mental model or theory, and that it occupies a middle space between theory and the “real world.”  Another school of thought argues that the model itself teaches us something about the phenomenon it represents.40

Computational models are quantitatively based, yet, in the socio-cultural world, they deal with phenomena that are qualitative in nature and generally collected and presented in narrative, rather than numeric, form.41   Furthermore, some model types, such as social network analyses, are data intensive. Gathering the amount of data required to fully populate these types of models, especially when working in denied areas or with clandestine groups, can be a significant challenge.  Lack of such data will contribute significantly to uncertainty of model output, as discussed above.  A couple of speakers addressed these limits of computational models, including the need to have data in quantitative form. Other speakers argued that the problem is the ineffective deployment of current tools.  For example, there are many extant databases that do not interoperate or interact adequately with computational models.  Some of the tools, although technically excellent, remain difficult to apply or integrate into the analytical process.

36 See Geertz Interpretation of Cultures op. cit. for an example of symbolic anthropology, and Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976) for an example of a seminal text in post-modern exegesis. In transferring this latter approach to the social sciences, anthropologists and others have treated cultures as “texts.”
37 The structural-functionalism of E.E. Evans-Pritchard and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown are examples of this type of formalism.  See E.E. Evans-Pritchard, The Nuer: A Description of the Modes of Livelihood and Political Institutions of a Nilotic People (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1934), and A.R. Radcliffe-Brown, Structure and Function in Primitive Society (New York: The Free Press, 1952).
38 Social network analysis, an analytic approach that has been developed and applied since the 1930s, is one of this class of methods that has recently gained much prominence.  See Stanley Wasserman and Katherine Faust, Social Network Analysis:  Methods and Applications (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994).
39 Kenneth Craik, The Nature of Explanation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967).
40 See Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morrison, eds., Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999) for a discussion of this argument.
41 There is also a “chicken and an egg” problem here.  Because tools to effectively and efficiently manipulate large, quantitative data sets have been historically lacking, many field workers in the social sciences have tended not to collect this type of data.


Developing computational models also can be expensive in both money and time. Models need to be problem-driven and time- and place-specific because, as the dimensions of the problem shift, the required model type may change or the nature of the available data set may shift.  For example, a problem focusing on the exchanges between two individuals may be most amenable to a social network approach. However, an inquiry into whether, and if so, how, different types of individuals might have different impacts on an exchange might be better suited to an agent-based approach. An assessment of macro-influences in a socio-cultural environment may be best explored with a systems-dynamics model.  These factors emphasize the need for ongoing, continuous interaction between the model builder and the social scientist and/or socio- cultural analyst.  In many cases, the value of the computational model as a method for learning lies as much in the rigor imposed on the thinking of the analyst during the model construction process as on the output of the model once it is built.42

Models also need to account for changes or uncertainty in data.  As a couple of conference speakers noted, data can be incomplete, inherently uncertain, and vary because of inconsistency across collectors or in response to changing circumstances. As some watchers of the intelligence community have suggested, the shift in intelligence from focusing on lists of weapons to actors’ intentions has resulted in a change from discovering secrets or puzzles to unraveling mysteries.43   Rarely are these types of uncertainty or incompleteness articulated explicitly or accounted for in the results of analytic processes.

Uncertainty in data is not the only type of uncertainty a model builder or user must consider. There is also uncertainty regarding the choice of model type (“model uncertainty”).  Since a model is a set of “things” or variables connected to each other in certain ways,44 and, by definition, represents only a portion of the target system, the analyst must determine which portion of the system – both in terms of phenomena (“things”) and relationships among the phenomena (structure) – are of interest.45   This determination is driven by two factors: the modeler’s theoretical predisposition (that is, his own notion of the way the target system functions) and the problem the model is to address.  

42 Margaret Morrison and Mary S. Morgan, “Models as Mediating Instruments,” in Mary S. Morgan and Margaret Morrison, eds., Models as Mediators: Perspectives on Natural and Social Science (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
43 Joseph S. Nye Jr., op. cit.; Gregory F. Treverton, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (New York: RAND/Cambridge University Press, 2003).
44 Jack P. Kleijen, “Verification and Validation of Simulation Models,” European Journal of Operational Research 82, no. 1 (1995): 145-162.
45 T. Nilsen and T. Aven, “Modes and Model Uncertainty in the Context of Risk Analysis,” Reliability Engineering & System Safety 79, no. 3 (2003): 309-317; David Draper, “Assessment and Propagation of
Model Uncertainty,” Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B (Methodological) 57, no. 1 (2005).

These two factors drive the modeler’s choice of model type.46   As discussed above, if the problem is how information is transmitted among members of a group, and the modeler (or model user) believes the most important factor in this analysis is the strength of the relationships among the members of the group, and not the content of the information or the socio-cultural factors that allowed certain individuals to become members of the group, then the model structure of choice would be a social network analysis.  Conversely, if the model builder/user believes that the characteristics of participants are of greater importance, an agent-based approach might be selected. However, as one conference participant noted, there is often inadequate explanation of why a particular model type has been chosen for a given problem or tool in computational social-simulation approaches.  In fact, most discussions of uncertainty tend to focus on data uncertainty and neglect structural uncertainty.47

9  The Path Forward

In its 2003 report, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Discriminate Use of Force concluded that we need a “comprehensive, long-term, and coherent effort to understand adversaries in a systemic way,” and that this would require models that account for not only physical dimensions, but “softer” social and cultural dimensions as well.  The Task Force also noted that our capabilities in this area are immature.48   The Defense Science Board’s 2006 Summer Study on 21st Century Science and Technology Vectors places social science foremost among the four operational capabilities and enabling technologies needed to support future military missions, and emphasizes that:

Perhaps most central is to gain deeper understanding of how individuals, groups, societies and nations behave and then use this information to (1) improve the performance of U.S. forces through continuous education and training and (2) shape behaviors of others in pre-, intra- and post-conflict situations.  Key enablers include immersive gaming environments, automated language processing and human, social, cultural and behavior modeling.49

The following recommendations for ways to advance and strengthen the IC’s capabilities in these areas were made by Socio-Cultural Perspectives conference participants.

46 Turnley, Jessica Glicken, “Validation Issues in Computational Social Simulation” (paper presented at 3rd Lake Arrowhead Conference on Human Complex Systems, Lake Arrowhead, CA, 2005),
47 Draper, op.cit.
48 Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Discriminate Use of Force, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (July 2003).
49 2007 Report of the Defense Science Board 2006 Summer Study on 21st Century Science and Technology Vectors (Volume 1, Main Report), Office of the Secretary of Defense (February 2007).

9.1  Conference Recommendations

1.   Characterize needs for qualitative and quantitative socio-cultural data, analytic tools, and methods, and identify knowledge and resource gaps
2.   Establish IC-wide coordination to:
2.1. Establish and nurture networks of government professionals with socio-cultural interests and expertise
2.1.1.   Facilitate liaisons among data providers, analysts, tool-builders, and end- users
2.2. Establish and maintain partnerships with non-government experts and organizations in socio-cultural areas of interest, optimize the potential for collaboration, and build outreach programs to support ongoing engagement of different types
2.3. Ensure that socio-cultural data sets, analytic tools, and techniques are available to all IC organizations
2.4. Develop standards and guidelines for quality assurance and life-cycle management of socio-cultural resources
2.5. Provide education and training (e.g., conceptual frameworks, theory, and research design and methods from the social and behavioral sciences; and legal and ethical requirements) to enable socio-cultural analysis
2.5.1.   Develop approaches tailored to fulfill strategic, operational, and tactical requirements
2.5.2.   Address these activities with the vigor applied to the 1960’s “space race”
2.6. Provide guidance regarding the potential impact of evolving ethical considerations on the collection, storage, dissemination, and use of socio-cultural information
2.7. Facilitate the adaptation of inter- and intra-organizational work practice and collaboration as needed to incorporate socio-cultural perspectives
2.8. Establish a program to capture and analyze lessons learned in order to inform and improve socio-cultural efforts across the IC
2.9. Develop performance-assessment system requirements, including a 360-degree feedback component, for socio-cultural expertise and its application

9.2  Ethical Considerations

Several social science disciplines have raised ethical concerns about the collection and use of socio-cultural knowledge in a national security environment.50   The American Psychological Association, for example, has issued a formal statement on the ethics of the use of psychology and psychologists in interrogations.51   The American Anthropological Association has established an ad-hoc commission to investigate the implications of its members’ participation in national security activities, and a heated internal debate is underway.52  

50 American Anthropological Association, "Principles of Professional Responsibility (as amended through November 1986)” (Washington, 1971); Olivia Moorehead-Slaughter, "Ethics and National Security," Monitor on Psychology 37, no. 4 (Washington: American Psychological Association, 2006).
51 American Psychological Association, “Report of the American Psychological Association Presidential
Task Force on Psychological Ethics and National Security ,” June 2005

Members of the business and non-governmental organizations (NGO) communities, as well as private citizens, have also raised concerns regarding ethical issues resulting from policies and activities affecting local populations.53   The IC needs a sophisticated understanding of the history and context of ethical issues as they apply to national security, and to remain informed about new and evolving developments in this arena.

10  Conclusion

The Socio-Cultural Perspectives: A New Intelligence Paradigm conference demonstrated that there is keen interest in, and need for, socio-cultural data, analysis, and approaches in a wide range of critical national security endeavors.  The conference also made clear that this need is increasingly recognized in many government quarters.  Questions arose regarding tools, including the development and use of computational models; methods, including issues relating to data collection, analysis, and dissemination; ethics; and the development of cross-community and interdisciplinary ties that would allow the intelligence community, as a whole, to move forward.  Methodological rigor, development of best practices, engagement of a wide variety of disciplines, and interaction with open-source communities all arose as essential issues to pursue.

The recommendations distilled from the conference discussion, which are presented in this report, provide a blueprint for progress in the intelligence community.  If implemented, the recommendations will afford an unprecedented opportunity to build a foundation to support new levels of collaboration and synergistic thinking that will employ socio-cultural perspectives to address a broad range of national security challenges.

52 See recent issues of Anthropology News.
53 Asian Peoples Security Network, “Human Security not National Security–A Call to Action, Declaration of the Regional NGO Workshop on Democracy and Security of the People of the Asian Region,” (Nakhon
Nayok, Thailand, August 23-25, 2002); Adrienne Paul Elwell, “US Aid: Through a National Security Lens,” Reality of Aid Reports 2006, Part V (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Thematic Reports, 2006),


11  Addendum 1 – Selected Conference Briefings

This section contains the briefings presented by several speakers at the Socio-Cultural Perspectives:  A New Intelligence Paradigm conference, held at The MITRE Corporation in McLean, Virginia, on September 12, 2006.  An additional Addendum is available on Intellipedia.

Broader Access Models for Realizing Info Dominance
(save locally, spread globally!)

JASON Program Office
MITRE Corporation

Horizontal integration refers to the desired end-state where intelligence of all kinds flows rapidly and seamlessly to the warfighter, and enables information dominance warfare.

1.1 As Usual, Sun Tzu Had It Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Today’s Context Is Important for This Study . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.3 What Problems Need Solving? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2.1 The Present System Is Largely Unchanged Since the 1940s . . 7
2.1.1 Before 1940 There Was Only Informal Classification . . 7
2.1.2 The Present System Was Established in 1940 and Has Changed Little . . . . 9
2.2 In Principle, Risk Level Governs Classification . . . . . . . . . 10
2.3 In Practice, Distribution Channels Are a Dominant Factor . . 12
2.4 Computers and Networks Present Enormous Challenges . . . . 13
2.5 There Is Increasing Evidence That the Present Construct Is Breaking Down . .15
2.6 The Present System Has Some Good Constructs But Is Missing Others .  . 16
2.6.1 Constructs Present in the Present System . . . . . . . 16
2.6.2 Missing Constructs in the Present System . . . . . . . 18
3.1 A New System Should Satisfy Some Basic Criteria . . . . . . . 21
3.2 The STU III Is a Good Example of Accepting Risk . . . . . . 22
3.3 IAD’s “45 Day Study” Is Useful But Not Radical Enough . . . 23
3.4 Three Guiding Principles for Any New System . . . . . . . . . 25
4 SPECIFIC PROPOSAL FOR A NEW PARADIGM. . . . . . . . . . . . .27
4.1 We Propose a Three-Phase Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2 Preparatory Phase (Phase 0) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
4.2.1 Developing a Risk Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
4.2.2 Developing Necessary Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4.2.3 “Enclaves” or Communities of Interest . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2.4 NetTop Is an Important Technology . . . . . . . . . . . 35
4.3 Risk is Tokenized in Phase 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.3.1 What is a Token? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.3.2 How Are Tokens Denominated? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
4.3.3 Phase 1 Tokens Are Not Fully Fungible . . . . . . . . . 42
4.3.4 How Are Tokens Distributed? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
4.3.5 How Are Information Producers Incentivized? . . . . . 44
4.3.6 Steps Toward an Efficient Market Economy . . . . . . 46
4.4 Originator Control is Eliminated in Phase 2 . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.4.1 Tokens Collapsed to a Few Broad Token Types . . . . 48
4.4.2 Within A Broad Token Type, Access Is Now Fungible . 49
4.4.3 Phase 2 Requires Both a Risk Model and a Damage Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
4.4.4 Tokens Are Created And Distributed by a National Authority (Central Bank) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.4.5 In a Tokenized System, Personnel Reliability Is a Continuous Variable . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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JASON Group | Membership list
Part-time defense think tank for university professors

The JASON scholars are a select group of scientists who conduct studies for different parts of the U.S. government. The group is referred to as the JASON Defense Advisory Group or simply the JASON Group. Today their headquarters are located at the JASON Program Office at the MITRE Corporation, a not-for-profit federally funded research and development company.

JASON was founded in 1958-1959 by scientists as Sidney Drell, Kenneth Watson, John Wheeler, Charles Townes and Marvin Goldberger (1). It was created as a special part-time division within the newly-established Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a federally-funded academic think tank that acted as a counterweight to research done by the different military branches, private corporations and the CIA. According to the official history of IDA:

"IDA traces its roots to 1947, when Secretary of Defense James Forrestal established the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) to provide technical analyses of weapons systems and programs. In the mid-1950s, the Secretary of Defense [Charles E. Wilson] and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [likely Admiral Radford] asked the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to form a civilian, nonprofit research institute. The Institute would operate under the auspices of a university consortium to attract highly qualified scientists to assist WSEG in addressing the nation's most challenging security problems... IDA only works for the government... IDA does not work directly for the military departments... IDA does not work for private industry." (2)

To provide a bit more detail: In 1956, James R. Killian Jr., president of the MIT Corporation and a close associate of Vannevar Bush, suggested to Eisenhower that the country's best scientific talents should be brought together in an effort to break all Russian encryption systems. In response, Eisenhower appointed Bell Labs president of research, Dr. William O. Baker, as head of a commission to see what could be done with Killian's proposal. In February 1957, the Baker Commission announced its support for Killian and one of the responses of Eisenhower and his secretary of defense, Charles E. Wilson*, was to ask Killian, as president of MIT, to set up the Institute for Defense Analyses, which was to be done in cooperation with such universities as Caltech, Columbia and Stanford. Vannevar Bush, who used to be vice president of MIT before the war, briefly returned to MIT to take the chairmanship, from 1957 to 1959.

* Wilson was CEO of General Motors and proposed a "permanent war economy" after WWII to prevent another great depression. Together with John Foster Dulles he had been responsible for picking the committee members that turned the Psychological Strategy Board into the Operations Coordinating Board.

The purpose of IDA was to take over WSEG from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and to supply it with new ideas and technology concepts. Killian became chairman of the board of trustees of IDA. Other early members of the think tank were Eric A. Walker, mainly associated with the Office of Naval Research, and later JASON scholar Charles H. Townes, who had recently co-invented the maser, the predecessor of the laser. Both became leading officers of IDA, just as General Maxwell D. Taylor and the CIA's Richard M. Bissell, Jr. in later years. Someone like Admiral Harry Train also became involved with IDA after his retirement, although only as a regular trustee. The official history of IDA continues:

"In 1958, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, IDA established a division to support the newly created Advanced Research Projects Agency. Shortly thereafter, the mandate of this division was broadened to include scientific and technical studies for all offices of the Director of Defense, Research and Engineering. Subsequent divisions were established to provide cost analyses, computer software and engineering, strategy and force assessments, and operational test and evaluation... Throughout its history, IDA also has assisted other federal agencies." (3)

Although several subsidiary groups were created within IDA, it is almost certain that the newly created division to support the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA; later DARPA) was the JASON Group. ARPA appears on JASON documents under the heading 'Controlling Office Name' and JASON was created in the same 1958-1959 time period. IDA also talks about the mandate of the division expanding to perform studies for the DoD and such, which is also what happened with the JASON Group.

Three different JASON studies: 1967, 1978, and 1988. JASON started out at IDA. SRI became independent of Stanford University in 1970 and at this moment JASON might have moved over there until about 1978-1979 when its headquarters were relocated again, this time to the MITRE Corporation. A leaked 1973 membership list of the JASON Group, which is accurate, shows JASON had already been incorporated within SRI in 1973.

The above compilation of three different JASON studies shows how the organization it was part of changed over time (4). In the late 1960s it was incorporated within IDA; in the late 1970s it had been moved to Stanford Research Institute International (SRI); and in the late 1980s the JASONs had become part of the MITRE Corporation. Most studies were commissioned by DARPA, but other contractors have been the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the U.S. Army Research Office, the NRO, and a few other organizations.

James Killian was the most central player in the creation of all these civilian research institutions under Eisenhower. He not only founded IDA in 1957, but also the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), both of which he became chairman. In 1958, he founded ARPA and as head of IDA, he approved the proposal to create the JASON Group. In 1958, Killian was also asked to create the Communications Research Division (CRD) within IDA, a Princeton-located top secret think tank for the NSA. Then, in 1959, Killian oversaw the creation of MITRE. He became a trustee of MITRE in 1960 and from 1967 to 1969 he was chairman of the board of trustees of this think tank, which was very similar to IDA and RAND. He remained on the board until 1982. In 1960, together with the earlier-mentioned William O. Baker and JASON scholars Richard Garwin and Sidney Drell, Killian was a co-founder of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an intelligence agency that remained secret for about a decade; although its existence was only announced officially after the Cold War had ended (5). Back in 1957, Vannevar Bush is said to have suggested Killian as the follow-up of defense secretary Charles E. Wilson. That didn't go through as Neil McElroy became Eisenhower's new secretary of defense.

Vannevar Bush was chairman of MIT from 1957 to 1959 and would be followed up by Killian. Both had long careers at MIT. Killian was involved in founding PSAC, DARPA, MITRE, NRO, IDA, JASON, CRD, and possibly IDA's Research and Engineering Support Division and its Economic and Political Studies Division. JASON, as a part time group, would do studies for many of these organizations.

Most JASON studies have to do with the development of new cutting edge technology concepts for the electronic battlefield. The contractors evaluate the papers written by JASON members and then decide whether or not to do something with it. Many other studies have to do with the nuclear weapons arsenal. In the early 1990s, a couple of studies were done on climate change; in the mid 1990s studies started into the human genome; and still a couple of years later this science was combined with nanotechnology. Almost all studies are conducted to see if these technologies can be used to maintain a military advantage over the enemy. Recent studies have also involved the concept of Homeland Security. A good example of this is the 2002-2003 study 'Biodetection Architectures'. Since a lot of JASONs are university professors, most studies are conducted in the summer months when students are on leave. It is believed that each year about 15 studies are conducted, half of them classified. A study can be done by as little as two or three JASON members to as many as 17 or 18.

In the JASON membership list you will find 11 Nobel prize winners, usually received for achievements in physics (6). The vast majority of JASONs have Ph.D.'s in this field although some have chosen to specialize in electrical engineering, mathematics, oceanography, chemistry, or biological sciences. Generally, JASONs, especially the older ones, are very well rounded and can be involved in a wide variety of studies spanning multiple decades. One of its founders, Sidney Drell, was still active in 2003. Freeman Dyson is another member whose career with the JASONs spans four decades. Some other long time members are Stanley Flatte, Richard Garwin, Curtis Callan, and Alvin Despain. These were active since the 1970s or the early eighties and were still performing studies at the beginning of the 21th century. According to different sources, JASON consisted of about 45 to 50 members at any given time. Counting the members manually per decade in the membership list confirms that and seems to indicate the list is almost complete. Information about the 1960s remains scarce though, but the group started out with about 15 members and rapidly expanded. The universities below are represented by the 119 JASON members that can be found in the membership list. The list below refers to the universities these individual JASON

University   Percentage
California   50%
Princeton, Princeton (NJ)    14%
Stanford, Silicon Valley (CA)    13%
Harvard, Boston   8%
MIT, Boston   8%
Columbia, New York   7%
Chicago   5%
Cornell, Ithaca (NY)    4%
Texas   4%
Maryland   4%
Michigan   4%
Washington   3%
Rockefeller, New York    2%
Yale, New Haven    1%
Dartmouth, Hanover (NH)   1%
   members have been employed, not where they got their education.

Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, Caltech, the Scripps Institution for Oceanography, and a bunch of faculties in the Los Angeles area are all managed by the University of California. This is one reason for the large amount JASONs affiliated with this university. A second reason is that Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore are the most important labs in the United States for research in nuclear energy and nuclear weapons, which has always been a primary occupation of JASON members. The South-West is also the location where most of the weapons systems and other cutting edge technology is
developed. Stanford, although many times smaller than the UC complex, is another university really focused on science and technology. It is located right in the middle of Silicon Valley and quite a few JASON members have been employed at its Stanford Linear Accelerator Center (SLAC); and more often than not, they held the senior positions. Another significant portion of JASON members have been employed at Princeton and some of its most veteran members worked at the physics lab of this university: Curtis Callan, Freeman Dyson, and Francis Perkins. They were all active for JASON from the sixties or the early seventies until the turn of the century. Another prominent physicist at Princeton was John Wheeler.

Most JASONs never played any significant role in politics. There are a few exceptions of course and these exceptions tend to be members of the Council on Foreign Relations. Of the 119 individuals in the membership list, only 11 are members of the CFR. These 11 are the ones who usually chair all kinds of national science committees, advise presidents on scientific matters, and work for a variety of large corporations. Non-CFR JASONs often have impressive biographies too, but they tend to focus on other things than Washington politics or Wall Street business.

Even though there are not a whole lot, below you can find a short list of some of the more interesting individuals in the JASON Group. Take a look at the membership list for additional details.

Name   JASON   Description
Luis W. Alvarez   60's-70's   Developed the detonators for 'Fat Man' during the Manhattan Project. On board the Enola Gay as it dropped the bomb. Pushed for the development of thermo-nuclear weapons. Together with J. Allen Hynek he was a member of the January 1953 Durant Panel Report in which the recent UFO waves were debunked as paranoia and considered no threat to national security. According to the panel the phenomenon should be ignored because the "irrelevant reports" were "clogging the channels of communication". According to Hynek the Pentagon wouldn't allow any other position on the subject. Joined the board board of IDA and stayed until 1967. In 1965, Alvarez X-rayed the great pyramid of Khafre (Giza) in search for hidden chambers. Initially the team reported all kinds of anomalous behavior which made their data unreadable, but quickly thereafter they reported that there weren't any problems. Analyzed the Zapruder film in 1967, which convinced the Church Committee in 1976 that Kennedy's headshot could have been caused by a bullet from behind, indicating Oswald was the sole assassin. Received the Nobel Prize in 1968. In 1980, together with his son, Alvarez published the theory that an asteroid wiped out the dinosaurs 65 million years ago.

Lewis M. Branscomb   1960's   Recipient of the Vannevar Bush Award of the National Science Board and the Rockefeller Public Service Award in 1957. Vice president and chief scientist of IBM Corporation. Director at IBM. President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) 1964–1968. Has been a director of Mobil Corp., RAND, MITRE, Lord Corp., C.S. Draper Laboratories and Arcturus Pharmaceutical. Member of the American Ditchley Foundation. Prominent in the War on Terror movement since 9/11.

Sidney D. Drell   60's - 21th   Member of the CFR and the President's Science Advisory Committee (PASC). Co founder of the NRO and the JASON Group. Worked with the CIA. Member National Security Council. Very influential individual, especially in things pertaining to the nuclear weapons arsenal.

Richard L. Garwin    60's - 21th   Co founder of the NRO. Director of Science and Technology of the CFR. Served on the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) and chaired its panels on Military Aircraft, Anti-submarine and Naval Warfare. Informed Henry Kissinger on certain science topics. Expert in electromagnetic weaponry, but admitted he didn't have access to all the of the compartmented programs that are going on.

Murray Gell-Mann   60's - 80's    Received the Nobel Prize in Physics in 1969 for his work in creating the 'standard model' in physics. Concerned with global policy matters such as population growth, conservation and biodiversity, sustainable economic development, and geopolitical stability. Co-chairman of the Science Board of the Santa Fe Institute. Member of the CFR and the Royal Society of London. Trustee of the World Conservation Society together with the Astors, Rockefellers, Phipps, Schiffs and other elite Pilgrims Society families. In February 2006, Gell-Mann attended The Amazing Meeting in Las Vegas, a benefit for the James Randi Educational Foundation. Phil Plait (the "bad astronomer" and nemesis of Richard Hoagland) also spoke at the conference.

Joshua Lederberg   1980's   Member of the CFR. Throughout his career a science advisor to the government and employed by the Rockefellers. President of the Rockefeller University 1978-1990. Chairman of Jimmy Carter's President's Cancer Panel in 1979. In 1994, he headed the Defense Science Board Task Force on Persian Gulf War Health Effects, which investigated Gulf War Syndrome. It concluded that there was no evidence of a "specific Gulf War Syndrome" and no evidence of biochemical exposures.

Gordon J.F. MacDonald   70's - 90's   Member of the CFR. Consultant to NASA. President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC). Expert in weather control technology who predicted it would be able to cause droughts or severe rain by the year 2018. In the 1970s, according to Nexus Magazine, Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote: "Political strategists are tempted to exploit research on the brain and human behavior. Geophysicist Gordon J. F. MacDonald-specialist in problems of warfare-says accurately-timed, artificially-excited electronic strokes 'could lead to a pattern of oscillations that produce relatively high power levels over certain regions of the Earth... In this way, one could develop a system that would seriously impair the brain performance of very large populations in selected regions over an extended period..."

William A. Nierenberg   70's - 90's    Member of the CFR. Director of the Scripps Institution of Oceanography from 1965 to 1986. Member of the Board of Science Advisors at Science and Environmental Policy Project (SEPP). Science advisor to NATO and the U.S. State Department. Served on the advisory board of the Electric Power Research Institute. Chairman of the first National Academy of Sciences study (1983-1984) on the greenhouse effect, possible sea-level rises, and climate change, which was conducted in the early part of the eighties (titled: 'Changing Climate' and 'Acid Rain'). Frequent visitor of New York and well known at the Rockefeller University. He was a protege of Detlev Bronk, president of the Rockefeller University.

Back in early 1970s there was a group called Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political Action (SESPA). They criticized the JASONs for their support of the Vietnam war. Some myths were helped in the world by this group, mainly that the JASONs were an "elite group" with "extremely high levels" of clearance. They indicated that JASONs had above top secret clearances by adding that "Top Secret is a low level of clearance" (7).

JASON scholar Richard Garwin, director of Science and Technology at the CFR, basically summarizes the story of JASON in the following statement:

"In my analyses of the effect of radiowaves on people [for the DoD], I have never found any significant effect other than heating of the tissues... So I don't think there is much in the threat of electromagnetic signals to control or disorient people by the effect on the human brain... [but] there are always 'compartments' to which even people with high-level security clearances do not have access." (8)

Most JASONs do not have any significant background in the military, in intelligence or as engineers and directors in private defense-oriented corporations as TRW, Lockheed, Northop, E-Systems, Bechtel or SAIC. Quite a bit of evidence has surfaced to indicate this is where all the real action has been going on, at least since the 1950s and 1960s. In case of electromagnetics, someone like Col. John Alexander would be much better suited to be put in charge of these black projects. Not only his high level background in Military Intelligence would qualify him for that, but also his controversial history and associates at, for example, the US Global Security Council, a private institution filled with generals, admirals, directors of every intelligence agency, SAIC executives, politicians, hawkish neoconservatives, Opus Dei members, Knights of Malta and supporters of the Unification Church. Edward Teller, a friend of Col. Alexander, used to be a member of that think tank (9).

The career of JASON scholar Luis W. Alvarez, one of the more interesting early members. Update, Dec. 2008: Alvarez was also part of a Los Alamos committee in 1979 which in all likelyhood covered up Israeli nuclear bomb tests in the Indian Ocean by claiming the detected flashes could have been due to "unusual weather conditions". (2006, Michael Karpin, 'The Bomb in the Basement'). It is known that one of Alvarez's colleagues, the rabid anti-communist hardliner and father of the hydrogen bomb, Edward Teller, was close to the Israeli leadership and advised this country on nuclear matters. It is also known that Israel received enormous support from elements in French and U.S. intelligence in setting up a secret nuclear weapon program.

A small portion of the JASONs might have been privy to the nation's biggest secrets back in the 1950s and maybe 1960s, but there's no indication of that in the past few decades. They are a group of university professors doing defense-oriented research for the DoD on a part-time basis. Their papers indicate they are working on what is generally considered the cutting edge of science; but these are still the kind of things you can read about in every popular science magazine. It's a far cry from technology descriptions that have come from the deep black programs located in the military-industrial complex. The problem of course of that last category is that you can never be completely sure where misinformation and disinformation ends and reliable statements begin. In any case, the academic-civilian structure from which JASON emerged remains interesting as this was established during the exact time when president Eisenhower is said to have lost control over the blackest programs within the US government. As the story goes, his intention was that the civilian-government structure, represented by such institutions as IDA and MITRE, were at all times aware of the nation's deepest secrets. Something seems to have gone wrong with that idea (10), hence Eisenhower's last speech to the nation in January 1961 in which he warned for the rise of the military-industrial complex. An excerpt of that speech can be read in the column on the left.

References[1]   February 10, 1986, American Institute of Physics, Interview with Kenneth M. Watson (Drell is mentioned as a co-founder in some of his biographies)    
[2]   2005, Institute for Defense Analyses, IDA's History   
[3]   Ibid.   
[4]   Federation of American Scientists (FAS), 'JASON Defense Advisory Panel Reports'    
[5]   August 18, 2000, NRO news, 'NRO Honors Pioneers of National Reconnaissance'    
If you click on the link to Storming Media you will find a list of JASON studies. In each individual description you can find several of the authors. When you compare all these names with other sources you'll find the same names. It turned out to be so easy it's almost embarrasing.    
[7]   December 1972, Scientists and Engineers for Social and Political Action (SESPA), 'Science Against the People - The Story of Jason'    
[8]   Email conversation between Mind Justice and Richard Garwin   
[9]   More information and sources in PEHI's article on Le Cercle    
[10]   Disclosure Project testimony of Master Sergeant Dan Morris, USAF (Retired)/ NRO Operative:
"Now, Eisenhower wanted somebody to be in charge, he tried the CIA Director, and it didn’t work. The CIA was working primarily for itself. Most of the intelligence directors of the services were working for themselves. So he said, “I want it to be independent, I want it to be civilian. I want it to be some of our top scientists.” So it was organized but the name of the NRO was kept secret for years."
Disclosure Project testimony of Brigadier General Steven Lovekin, who was part of Eisenhower's and Kennedy's staff:
"I served under Eisenhower from May of 1959 until he got out of office and then I served under Kennedy until I left the service in August of 1961... Bluebook was discussed quite openly in the office... One afternoon when we were just about ready to finish up training, Colonel Holomon brought out a piece of what appeared to be metallic debris... He went on to further explain that this was the material that had come from a New Mexico crash in 1947 of an extraterrestrial craft... When he would get these [UFO] reports it would excite him [Eisenhower]. He was just a kid. He would get so excited and give orders like D-day was happening all over again. He was very, very interested in the shapes and sizes of the UFOs and what made them go... But what happened was that Eisenhower got sold out. Without him knowing it he lost control of what was going on with the entire UFO situation... I think he felt like he trusted too many people. And Eisenhower was a trusting man. He was a good man. And I think that he realized that all of a sudden this matter is going into the control of corporations that could very well act to the detriment of this country. This frustration, from what I can remember, went on for months. He realized that he was losing control of the UFO subject. He realized that the phenomenon or whatever it was that we were faced with was not going to be in the best hands. As far as I can remember, that was the expression that was used, “It is not going to be in the best hands”."   

Additional references [1]   March 1967, Jason Division of IDA, 'Tactical Nuclear Weapons in Southeast Asia'    
[2]   March 3, 1968, New York Times, Sane Bids the U.S. Uphold Atom Ban'   
[3]   April 29, 1972, New York Times, 'Lab Occupation Ends'    
[4]   June 6, 1985, Washington Post, 'CIA Studies Sub Vulnerability'    
[5]   November 12, 1985, LA Times, 'Scientists Dispute Test of X-Ray Laser Weapon Livermore Lab...'    
[6]   June 4, 1986, LA Times, 'X-Ray Laser Test Data Inaccurate, GAO Study Finds'   
[7]   June 20, 1986, LA Times, 'Defense Expert Physicist Expected to Be Named as Scripps Director'   
[8]   February 18, 1990, Washington Post, 'Board Responded to a Narrow Question'   
[9]   November 1994, JASON & The MITRE Corporation report, 'Science Based Stockpile Stewardship' (JSR-94-345)    
[10]   August 4, 1995, JASON & The MITRE Corporation report about Nuclear Testing (JSR-95-320)    
[11]   August 15, 1995, Washington Post, 'Relevancy, at Last'   
[12]   October 1, 1995, Washington Times, 'Should we sign on to a nuclear test ban treaty?'    
[13]   October 28, 1995, San Francisco Chronicle, 'Bechtel Lands Nuclear Test Job'    
[14]   November 26, 1997, Washington Times, 'Ratifying the nuclear test ban treaty is a step toward nonproliferation'   
[15]   September 27, 1999, United Press International, 'US Not Ready for Bio-War Attack'    
[16]   December 17, 1999, LA Times, 'Adrift at a Tender Age'    
[17]   September 18, 2001, San Francisco, Chronicle, 'Bacteria, viruses pose grave threat, experts say'   
[18]   March 9, 2003, San Francisco Chronicle, 'Battlefield nukes Secret Vietnam-era report, just declassified, highlighted dangers'    
[19]   March 9, 2003, LA Times, 'MILITARY STRATEGY; Making the Case Against Calamity'    
[20]   March 9, 2003, LA Times, 'NUCLEAR WEAPONS; A Bad Idea in Vietnam, an Even Worse Idea Today'   
[21]   March 9, 2003, Washington Post, ''67 Study Discouraged Use of Nuclear Weapons in Vietnam War'   
[22]   December 15, 2004, United Press International, 'Report: Govt secrecy hurting warfighters'    
[23]   December 19, 2004, United Press International, 'Group slams unwieldy security'    
[24]   May 26, 2005, FAS, 'JASON on Sensors to Support the Soldier'    
[25]   Wikipedia, 'JASON Defense Advisory Group'   

Author: Joël van der Reijden
Original: August 20, 2005
Version 2.0: November 17, 2006
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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HORIZONTAL INTEGRATION: Broader Access Models for Realizing Information Dominance


THE CHALLENGE TO PREVENT that nightmare from materializing led many physicists to work with the military and the government. Their commitment took many forms, some working a weapons laboratories and others working as technical advisers in the arms- control negotiating and policy initiatives. Some of us had the good fortune of being able to divide our lives between our academic research trying to understand Nature’s mysteries and our technical efforts to help better understand and thereby try to reduce or counter the dangers we face. It is my personal conviction that the scientific community—not each individual but as a whole—bears a responsibility, a moral obligation, to project the implications of the technological changes initiated by our scientific progress, and to help citizens and their governments shape their practical applica- tions in ways beneficial to all society. This responsibility is most cogently manifest in dealing with nuclear weapons, whose enormous destructive potential leaves so little margin for error.

In my case the dual tracks of academic research and teaching and involvement in government work opened in 1960 when the JASON group was organized. Its purpose was to enlist fresh scientific talent to work on problems of importance for our national security. We were in the dawning new age of nuclear weapons, space and intercontinental missiles, and the challenges they presented to formulating national security policy. At the same time, the great physicists and other scientists, whose contributions were so important in the winning of World War II with radar and the atomic bomb, had other responsibilities and were twenty years older than at the start of that war. I was inspired and greatly influenced in considering JASON by the example of two of my heroes. As physicists and wise counselors, Wolfgang K. H. (“Pief”) Panofsky and Hans Bethe had made great personal commitments and enormously valuable contributions to informed policy choices by the United States concerning arms control and national security. I very much admired what they had done. JASON thus became a new component of my scientific work. It served as an introduction for me to new problems that were often scientifically fascinating and strategically compelling. Subsequently many other doors opened for my involvement, both inside and outside of the government. Over time I ended up working on a variety of interesting technical issues of national security and arms control.

EARLY ON I BECAME INVOLVED in the technical possibilities of gaining intelligence from space-based satellite systems as a way of piercing the Iron Curtain erected by an obsessively secretive Soviet government. Photoreconnaissance from satellites circling the earth above the atmosphere at altitudes above 100 miles enabled the United States to pierce the shroud of secrecy by means that were effective, and that were accepted as non-provocative. With the photography brought back to earth we could more accurately assess the growing threat of Soviet nuclear warheads mounted on intercontinental range missiles and bombers. Subsequently it also opened the path to arms control. Since we could count and size the Soviet’s threatening strategic forces from the satellite photographs, we could negotiate treaties and verify compliance with treaty provisions to limit their deployment and to initiate reductions. Photoreconnaissance satellites were the first big step toward achieving the Open Skies that President Eisenhower had first called for in 1955. Working in this area of technical intelligence was compelling for its obvious strategic importance. The more accurately we can gauge the nature and imminence of developing threats from our perceived or potential foes, the more responsibly and confidently we can act in crises and plan for our national security. This truism is consonant with the fundamental tenet of an academic career—the more we learn and the better we understand a situation, the better prepared we are to address it and act wisely. I also found this work, continuing up to the present, extraordinarily fascinating on technical grounds as I interacted with scientists and engineers from both the academic and the industrial world whose accomplishments were remarkable. Throughout the cold war the issue of how best to discourage, deter, or defend ourselves against the use of nuclear weapons was on center stage, front and center. Debates about the potential value, versus the dangerous illusions, of nationwide anti-ballistic missile (ABM) defenses were ongoing, with periodic crescendos, for more than three decades. Though often driven by political considerations, these were serious debates about strategic policy that touched a fundamental instinct of all human beings to protect our families and homes. Nuclear warheads with their enormous destructive potential had greatly changed the requirements of an effective defense from the pre-nuclear era. But how different, and what constituted sensible programs and goals? Was it practical to try to defend society with ABMs? What was the best way to maintain a survivable missile force in order to establish a strategic stability that relies on mutual assured destruction to deter a would-be attacker? There is an essential technical core to any informed debate be- tween defense and deterrence. It has commanded the attention of many scientists for a long time, and I did not escape involvement in this important issue of national security.

At the root of this issue are two technical realities: the relative ease and economy of designing and deploying offensive countermeasures to overpower any conceivable defenses; and the requirement that a missile defense against nuclear-tipped missiles must be near perfect if it is to be effective in protecting society. In addition, and of utmost importance, one has to consider the almost certainly harmful impact of an arms build up between competing offenses and defenses, and their countermeasures and counter-countermeasures, on strategic stability and future prospects of reducing the nuclear threat.

About the Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HS SEDI)

The Homeland Security Systems Engineering and Development Institute (HS SEDITM) is a federally funded research and development center (FFRDC) operated by The MITRE Corporation.
The JASON Society & The JASON Group
2007 06 08
Check this post out,,,

This Jason Group is one evil bunch......
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately