Author Topic: ***MUST READ: State Dept. Cables on SPP/NORTHCOM cybernetic takeover of Mexico  (Read 5588 times)

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Offline birther truther tenther

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http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/01/08MEXICO23.html

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136383,1/4/2008 22:01,08MEXICO23,"Embassy Mexico",UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY,08STATE145633,"VZCZCXRO5183
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SENSITIVE
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STATE FOR S/CT (Secretary/Counter terrorism)- RHONDA SHORE AND WHA/MEX
 
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV MX
SUBJECT: DRAFT COUNTRY TERRORISM REPORT FOR 2007
 
REF: STATE 145633
 
Mexico is a key ally of the United States in combating
terrorism, and its commitment to work with us to preempt
terrorist activity or entry through our shared border is
strong.  There are no known international terrorists residing
or operating in the country.  No terrorist incidents
targeting U.S. interests/personnel have occurred on or
originated from Mexican territory.  Although the July and
September attacks on oil and gas pipelines by a guerrilla
group called the Popular Revolutionary Army (EPR) have raised
the specter of domestic terrorism, Mexico primarily
represents a terrorist transit threat and our bilateral
efforts focus squarely on minimizing that threat.
 
Since entering office last December, President Calderon's
Administration has demonstrated an unprecedented commitment
to improve national security. Moreover, the GOM (Government of Mexico) is also resolved to greatly strengthen law enforcement and counter
terrorism cooperation with the USG (US Government) in coming years. USG law
enforcement agencies enjoy much improved  relationships with
Mexican security institutions across the board. Mexico worked
with the USG in 2007 to enhance aviation, border, maritime,
and transportation security, secure critical infrastructure,
and combat terrorism financing.
 
In 2007, the GOM continued to make steady progress in the
area of counter terrorism with an emphasis on border security
projects focused on special interest aliens (SIAs) and alien
smuggling.  The GOM worked to professionalize federal law
enforcement institutions, restructuring and strengthening the
institutions directly responsible for fighting organized
crime, and developing tools under the framework of the
Security and Prosperity Partnership (SPP) to better address
national security threats.
 
Information-sharing on counter terrorism issues in the first
year of the Calderon administration was strong. The March
2005 launch of the SPP, which consists of ten
security-related goals within its Security Pillar,
institutionalized mechanisms for information exchange between
the U.S. and Mexico.  The USG will continue working with
Mexico to improve existing information sharing initiatives.
In particular, USG will continue to support digitalization of
the GOM information-gathering procedures in order to build a
database of usable biometric information and strengthen our
ability to accurately analyze the information provided by
GOM.

 
The continued exploitation of smuggling channels traversing
the U.S. Mexico border, and lack of enforcement along
Mexico's border with Guatemala remain continuing strategic
concerns.  The GOM takes the terrorist transit and SIA (Special Interest Aliens) smuggling possibility seriously and has been responsive to
U.S. reports concerning SIA smuggling.  Mexico passed a law
against human-trafficking which will aid in pursuing criminal
proceedings against traffickers and smugglers operating in
Mexico.  In a recent case, Mexican authorities provided
substantial support to U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement in arresting a third country national wanted in
the U.S. for SIA smuggling.
 
One setback was a change in detention procedures for SIAs.
In 2005 and 2006, Mexico's Immigration Service (INM)
maintained a policy of housing all detained aliens of Special
Interest Countries at their detention facility near Mexico
City. However, in March 2007, INM began releasing such
detainees from their point of arrest, thus hindering
information-sharing and the USG's ability to track the
movement of SIAs.
 
Nevertheless, cooperation between the USG and GOM has been
strong overall, especially in investigating individuals
suspected of cooperation with SIA smugglers or terrorist
organizations. The two countries exchange information and
closely cooperate in targeting alien smugglers, particularly
along Mexico's northern border. A particularly effective
mechanism is the Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on
Safety and Security (OASISS), which allows Mexican and U.S.
law enforcement officials to systematically share real-time
 
MEXICO 00000023  002 OF 003
 
 
information regarding ongoing alien smuggling investigations.
 OASISS enhances the ability of both governments to prosecute
alien smugglers and human traffickers, who otherwise might
elude justice.  OASISS is currently operational in the U.S.
in all four states along the southwest border and in most of
Mexico's northern border states. The program provides a model
for bilateral information-sharing in a variety of law
enforcement and security areas.  An essential next step will
be to expand OASISS to all Mexico's northern border states.
At the same time, the USG needs to continue to support the
GOM's efforts to expand operations targeting SIA smuggling
organizations along Mexico's southern border.
 
The U.S.-Mexico Border Security and Public Safety Working
Group formed in March 2006 has become another important tool
for bilateral cooperation, establishing protocols between
both governments to respond cooperatively at a local level to
critical incidents and emergencies along the border.  The
success of the pilot sites led to the expansion and
formalization of the program.  These protocols are now in
place along the entire US/Mexico border.
 
The USG was able to further develop its border security
relationship with the GOM under President Calderon through
training programs, which focused on using non-intrusive
inspection equipment, detecting weapons of mass destruction,
and identifying fraudulent documents.
 
The GOM coordinated with the USG on information sharing of
air passenger data and the use of its Integrated System for
Migratory Operations (SIOM).  The USG is also planning to
support the establishment by the INM of a national center for
migratory alerts.  This center will correlate information
drawn from various other agencies to alert immigration
officials of possible suspect entries into Mexico. In
addition, the USG and GOM agreed to share on an ad hoc basis
biometric data for inclusion in the Integrated Automated
Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS).  In order to
accomplish this goal, USG needs to continue to support GOM's
effort to improve their biometric collection procedures in
line with USG standards and practices.

 
In mid-2006, the GOM and USG began negotiations on programs
designed to deter terrorists from using the Mexico's seaports
to ship illicit materials, detect nuclear or radioactive
materials if shipped via sea cargo, and interdict harmful
material before it could be used against the U.S. or one of
our allies.  The cooperative effort will include installation
of specialized equipment to screen cargo containers for
nuclear or other radioactive materials.  If anything were
detected, the equipment would alert Mexican port officials of
the need to further examine the cargo and take appropriate
action.
 
In the area of money laundering, the USG developed strong
working relationships with the Financial Intelligence Unit of
the Attorney General's Office (PGR) and its companion unit in
the Mexican Treasury (Hacienda) in combating money
laundering, terrorist financing, and narcotics trafficking.
In one case in late 2007, Mexican police worked with U.S.
authorities to identify and arrest the alleged finance head
for the Sinaloa drug cartel, targeting a ring that bought
airplanes with laundered money to smuggle drugs.  The GOM
also deployed to Mexico City's international airport a task
force that included elements from the Federal Investigative
Agency (AFI), Mexican Customs, and prosecuting attorneys from
the Attorney General's anti-money laundering criminal
prosecution section.
 
On June 28, 2007 President Calderon signed into law
legislation outlawing terrorist financing and associated
money laundering.  The new law establishes international
terrorism and terror financing as serious criminal offenses,
as called for in UN resolution 1373, and provides for up to
40 year prison sentences.  The measure also incorporates
several non-finance related provisions including jail
sentences for individuals who cover up the identities of
terrorists and for those who recruit people to commit
terrorist acts. While it lacked some important provisions,
such as assets forfeiture measures, the law is a significant
 
MEXICO 00000023  003 OF 003
 
 
step forward in suppressing those who plan, facilitate,
finance or commit terrorist acts.  Mexico's legislature is
currently working on legal reform legislation which, if
enacted, will offer law enforcement officials broader
authorities (including assets forfeiture) to investigate and
prosecute serious criminal cases, including terrorist
activity. Despite the recent legislation and excellent
USG-GOM cooperation, money laundering remains a significant
problem in Mexico, and the USG would like to see more Mexican
resources dedicated to tackling the problem.
 
The Mexican Navy and Army continued to expand their counter
terrorism capabilities in 2007.  The Mexican Navy improved
control over ports of entry by deploying a newly constituted
infantry force.  The Navy is also looking to expand its still
incomplete control over Mexico's vast maritime zone by better
integrating radar, patrol craft, sea going vessels, air
platforms, and land based platforms.  If undertaken, these
enhancements to Mexico's maritime air surveillance will allow
the Navy to better protect key national strategic facilities,
including those related to oil production in the Bay of
Campeche.  In 2007 the GOM deployed significant military
forces to combat a growing wave of drug related violence.
The experience gained in these operations could be applied to
future counterterrorism efforts, especially in regards to
intelligence and logistics operations.  It remains difficult
to assess the Mexican Army's counterterrorism capabilities
due to the institution's closed nature. While there have been
improvements in U.S.- Mexico military to military cooperation
in the past year, the USG and the GOM armed forces have
limited interoperability in the area of counter terrorism.
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
Leslie BASSETT

Offline birther truther tenther

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Cable: more on SPP and US-Mexico Mil-Mil Merger under NORTHCOM
« Reply #1 on: February 12, 2011, 06:58:41 pm »
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2008/04/08MEXICO1082.html

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149444
2008-04-10 19:12:00
08MEXICO1082
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 MEXICO 001082
 
SIPDIS
 
SIPDIS
 
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE - FOR OSD
 
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/10/2017
TAGS: MX OVIP PGOV PINR PREL PTER SNAR
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR THE VISIT OF SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
GATES TO MEXICO CITY -- APRIL 29-30, 2008
 
Classified By: ADCM Charles Barclay for reasons 1.4. (B,D)
 
¶1.  (SBU)  On behalf of the U.S. Mission, let me warmly
welcome you to Mexico City.  Your visit comes at a key
juncture, as Mexico's military takes stock of its role in
Mexico and the world -- and looks at its evolving
relationship with its U.S. counterpart in light of ongoing
challenges and new responsibilities given it by President
Calderon.  You will encounter nuanced attitudes among your
interlocutors regarding cooperation with the U.S. and mixed
perspectives on many key global and regional security issues.
 However your visit here will provide an excellent overview
of Mexico's challenging security environment.  Yours is the
first SecDef visit in over a decade, and we believe you can
move forward a number of key objectives during your visit,
 
Calderon's Key Security Challenge
 
¶2.  (U)  In the year and a half since he took office,
President Calderon has taken aggressive steps to turn around
an increasingly difficult domestic security situation -- one
characterized in recent years by growing narco-related
violence and the government's loss of initiative and ground
to organized crime.   The president has launched anti-drug
operations in more than ten states, raised pay for the
military, and replaced numerous high-ranking federal police
officers.  He initiated sweeping operational reforms among
police elements and successfully sought legislation unifying
federal police forces and reforming the criminal justice
system.  These actions and enhancements, when fully
implemented, will strengthen GOM security capabilities
across-the-board, make it more responsive to a wide variety
of security threats and considerably strengthen the bilateral
security partnership.
 
¶3.  (U)  Calderon has placed a premium on strengthening law
enforcement cooperation with the U.S.  Early during his term,
he significantly expanded the number of criminal
extraditions, instructed key members of his security team to
build on his predecessor's already positive record of
engagement with USG counterparts and worked closely with us
to develop a joint response to the illegal counter-narcotics
trade based on shared responsibility.   The Merida Initiative
under discussion in our congress this month is only the
highest profile element of an emerging pattern of cooperation
across the board, which is likely to take on momentum in
coming years.
 
Mexican Military Assumes a Pivotal Role
 
¶4.  (SBU)  Mexico's military is pivotal to both Calderon's
overall counter-narcotics strategy, and to the evolving
bilateral security relationship.  Mexicans traditionally have
held the institution in high regard (it consistently polls as
the country's most respected).  They also expect much of it;
soldiers and sailors perform a variety of civic action
oriented tasks ranging from manning polling stations during
elections to mounting responses to natural disasters. With
many civilian law enforcement institutions frankly in
disarray, or compromised outright by narco-traffickers,
Mexico's military provides Calderon a natural choice as his
initial counter-narcotics spearhead.
 
¶5.   (SBU) Large-scale military deployments throughout the
country have raised concerns, to be sure.  Some argue that
resource and personnel strains will undermine the
institution's overall effectiveness.  Others worry that
counter-narcotics operations will expose officers and
enlisted men to the corrosive temptations of corruption.
Sporadic human rights abuses by soldiers in the past year
occasioned heightened concern about this dimension to
military action.
 
¶6.  (SBU) Senior officers recognize all these concerns and
have taken counter-measures, such as mobile, limited-duration
deployments, astute personnel rotations and the establishment
of a human rights ombudsman.    Loyal to their president,
they remain committed to remaining at the forefront of the
counter-narcotics battle until a reformed civilian police
structure is ready to assume the lead.
 
 
MEXICO 00001082  002 OF 004
 
 
And Contemplates Closer Mil-Mil Ties.
 
¶7.  (C) As their role in defending their country from one
potent transnational threat broadened in the past year,
Mexican military officials also looked beyond Mexico's
landscape at other such threats and began to acknowledge the
importance of increased security cooperation with the U.S.
Top military officials have in recent months told us
President Calderon had instructed them to reach out to the
U.S.  They have shown interest in increasing training
opportunities for their soldiers and sailors, asked us to
broaden intelligence and information sharing and expressed
their desire, to a variety of USG interlocutors, to find
concrete ways to improve military to military ties while
respecting national sovereignty.
 
¶8.  (C) Both national security secretariats, SEDENA and
SEMAR, played key roles in crafting the Merida Initiative
package of GOM resource requests, participating fully in a
lengthy inter-agency process that our civilian contacts told
us was a milestone both in terms of getting military buy-in
(SEDENA's in particular) for strengthened bilateral
cooperation as well as advancing ties among often-competing
law enforcement and security elements within the executive
branch here.
 
Residual Attitudes Complicate Dialogue, However
 
¶9.  (SBU) Despite their interest in strengthening ties to the
U.S., you should know that many members of Mexico's armed
forces remain wary of too closely identifying with U.S.
security interests.  We are making progress, but it will take
time to overcome the historic and political differences have
long inhibited military cooperation. This country's extensive
experience with foreign interventions and the loss of over
half of its territory to the U.S. following the
Mexican-American War created permanent scars on the Mexican
psyche, generating a sense of national insecurity and
suspicion about American motives.
 
¶10.  (SBU) Mexico's post-World War II foreign policy has
reinforced these characteristics, placing a higher premium on
nonintervention and sovereignty than on confronting and
resolving issues.  This has often put Mexico at odds with the
U.S. and limited our sense of common cause even as awareness
here has increased that the U.S. and Mexico share
vulnerabilities in the areas of international terrorism,
narcotics trafficking, human smuggling and natural disasters.
 Many of your interlocutors will have well-defined
perspectives on the global and regional security environments
that do not reflect our own thinking.
 
¶11.  (SBU) Mexico does not, for example, share our position
on the need for robust, forward-based defense of our security
interests in the Near East or South Asia.  It places less
emphasis on the potential threat to the region emanating from
groups such as Al-Qaida. It is less nervous about Iranian
diplomatic, economic and political outreach in the region
than we are.  Closer to home, Mexico has long sought to play
a regional role that is independent of the U.S.  With the
exception of the Fox administration, Mexican governments --
including Calderon's -- have generally sought to maintain
warm ties with Cuba.  Similarly, the GOM has sought to avoid
high-profile conflicts with the current Venezuelan
government.  Mexican officials and citizens alike have viewed
the activities of populist governments, and even certain
armed groups, in the region as relatively benign, thinking
consistent with their country's own revolutionary past.
 
Key Goals for Your Visit
 
¶14.  (CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE PARAGRAPH)  That said, there are
many concrete areas where you can make headway in moving key
aspects of the bilateral military relationship forward.
During your visit, I hope you can address the following
issues:
 
--Intel/Information Sharing.  We want to respond positively
to the Mexican military's interest in improving our
intelligence/information interface but need to enact formal
agreements that safeguard sensitive material.   I would
 
MEXICO 00001082  003 OF 004
 
 
encourage you to press forward on GIOSOMIA agreements, and
assure our contacts of  our willingness to do so; SEMAR is
ready to sign but SEDENA is well behind.
 
-- Counter-Terrorism Assistance:   In addition to potential
Merida Initiative assistance, we have an immediate
opportunity to use FY 08 1206 funds to boost the Mexican
military's counter terrorism capabilities.   This proposed
$30.0M support includes light surveillance aircraft,
protective equipment, inflatable boats, and forensics
training and equipment.  It complements the support now being
considered under the Merida Initiative and helps meet
critical challenges posed by organized criminal networks
employing terror tactics and which could be potentially
exploited by global terrorist organizations.  You should take
the opportunity to underscore our desire to make this
equipment available soonest, stressing that now is the time
to move forward on an updated 505 agreement to make it
possible.  (Foreign Assistance Act Section 505 sets the terms
and conditions regarding the use and inspection of
transferred U.S. defense articles to which the Government of
Mexico must adhere.)
 
-- Disaster Planning:  Mexico provided disaster assistance to
New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina, and building our
disaster relief cooperation is a common goal.  Last year
SEDENA specifically asked us for consultations related to
crisis planning/preparedness.  You should encourage this
interest.
 
-- Status/accreditation for Military Exchange Officers:
Placement of both SEDENA and SEMAR officers in U.S. military
facilities (including NORTHCOM) marks an extremely positive
development.  We have similar officers working within Mexican
institutions.  However, our bilateral military education
programs are at risk because of a disagreement over the
nature of accreditation for our respective exchange officers,
notwithstanding a 1994 Memorandum of Understanding.  This
issue needs to be worked out in our own interagency, as well
as with the GOM, but you can signal our strong desire to
resolve it in the interest of strengthening exchanges in the
future.
 
--Peace Keeping:  Mexico is beginning to consider deploying
its military in support of peace keeping operations -- a
significant step forward in broadening the mission of the
country's armed forces and developing an over-the-horizon
worldview.  Mexico is campaigning for election to the UN
Security Council in 2009, and needs to demonstrate a greater
commitment to international engagement.  You should encourage
your counterparts to begin seriously considering when they
can engage in international peace keeping operations.  You
can also offer to help the Mexican army and navy develop
their interoperability and other skills to prepare for
eventual participation in IPOs.
 
¶15.  (SBU) Comment:  The Calderon administration has
committed to significantly strengthening the security
relationship with the United States.  While it remains keen
to balance this effort against its desire to be seen in the
region as an influential -- and independent -- actor, U.S.
and Mexico cooperation in broad areas of law enforcement has
already deepened considerably under this dynamic president.
The more we work together on such initiatives, the more we
will develop shared outlooks on the range of security issues
we face in the world.  Your visit will punctuate an exciting
juncture in the bilateral relationship and will significantly
build momentum to even deeper military-to-military
cooperation.  Please let me know what I and my staff at the
Embassy can do to make your time in Mexico as productive as
possible.  GARZA

Offline birther truther tenther

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Cable: All of the violence at US-Mexico border doesn't count as terrorism
« Reply #2 on: February 12, 2011, 07:01:38 pm »
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2010/01/10MEXICO27.html

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SIPDIS
 
STATE FOR S/CT - RHONDA SHORE AND WHA/MEX
 
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PTER ASEC PGOV MX
SUBJECT: MEXICO - COUNTRY TERRORISM REPORT FOR 2009
 
REF: STATE 109980
 
¶1. No known international terrorist organizations have an
operational presence in Mexico and no terrorist incidents
targeting U.S. interests/personnel have occurred on or
originated from Mexican territory. Mexico continues to
confront well-armed, organized crime elements in several
regions of the country and traditional hot spots for
narcotics trafficking have seen record levels of violence.
Small and weak anti-social groups perpetrated isolated acts
of vandalism with the intention of disrupting commercial
stability and raising awareness of their cause. Although no
international terrorist organizations have sought to use
Mexico as a haven for operations, the organized crime
syndicates and the consequent security problems on the border
pose a vulnerability that could allow for a future terrorist
transit point into the U.S. The Mexican Government remains a
highly committed partner and shows no sign of complacency in
its fight against organized crime and remains vigilant
against domestic and international terrorist threats.
 
¶2. Although incidents of domestic terrorism have not
increased over the past year, Mexico received threats from a
previously active group and witnessed the emergence of a new
element. El Ejercito Popular Revolucionario (EPR) dissolved
talks with the Government of Mexico in April and threatened
to reemploy violent measures to force a response to its
demands for a government investigation into the disappearance
of two of its members. In 2007, it launched two attacks on
petroleum pipelines. In 2009, no acts of terrorism were
attributed to the EPR. From May to August, the animal
liberation front, ALF, claimed responsibility for attacking
banks and commercial sites throughout Mexico,s capital city
using propane tank bombs. Three bombs were discovered
unexploded, while another three caused property damage but no
casualties.
 
¶3. Levels of organized crime and narcotics violence rose
significantly in the traditional hot spots along the border
and in marijuana cultivation regions. Cartels increasingly
use military-style terrorist tactics to intimidate Mexican
security forces and establish dominance in specific regions.
In June, the Michoacan-based La Familia organization carried
out a series of retaliatory attacks that killed 12 federal
police personnel in response to the apprehension of a
high-level drug trafficker. The speed, precision, and tactics
used by several groups indicated that the actions were well
coordinated and the perpetrators well trained. The state of
Chihuahua experienced an increase in narcotics-related deaths
as rival cartels used sophisticated communications procedures
and military weaponry to target and assassinate rival cartel
members. There is no apparent evidence of ties between
Mexican organized crime syndicates and international
terrorist groups. The violence attributed to organized crime
groups on the border, however, continues to strain Mexico,s
law enforcement capacities creating potential vulnerabilities
in terms of terrorist exploitation seeking access to the U.S
through Mexico.
 
¶4. Currently, there is no indication that terrorist
organizations are using Mexico as a conduit for illicit
activities. Nevertheless, Mexico,s still nascent capacity to
counter money laundering suggests a potential vulnerability.
The Mexican Attorney General,s (PGR) Organized Crime
Division,s (SIEDO) money laundering unit investigates and
prosecutes money laundering crimes in Mexico with mixed
results. The majority of its investigations are linked to
organized crime and drug proceeds. Currently, drug proceeds
in Mexico are laundered primarily in the form  bulk currency
movements or through currency exchange houses, such as casas
de cambio and smaller centros cambiarios. In order to combat
the illegal movement of funds, Mexican financial institutions
typically follow international standards such as &know your
customer8 and due diligence advocated by the Financial
Action Task Force (FAFT) Recommendations. These institutions
also terminate the accounts of individuals and entities
identified on international country lists such as the Office
of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC) Specially Designated National
and Blocked Persons List. Furthermore, Mexican financial
institutions follow the Ley de Institciones de Crdito,
Artculo 115, Disposicin 68 y 41 (Law of Credit
 
MEXICO 00000027  002 OF 003
 
 
Institutions, Article 115, Sub article 68 and 41) as ordered
by the Mexican Treasury and supervised by the CNBV or
Comisin Nacional Bancaria y de Valores (National Bank and
Securities Commission). This law requires banks to consult
recognized international and country lists of individuals
involved in terrorism or other illicit activities and submit
a &suspicious activities report8 within 24 hours to the
Mexican Department of Treasury,s Financial Intelligence Unit
(UIF) on the activities of any individual on that list.
 
¶5. The Government of Mexico has stepped up efforts to improve
interagency coordination as part of its campaign to combat
crime and prevent terrorism. It has created a national
database known as Plataforma Mexico designed to promote
greater information exchange and overall interoperability
across Mexico,s numerous and disparate police entities.
Tactical Intelligence Operations Units (UNITO) represent a
new Government of Mexico mechanism that brings together all
federal agencies in a given state to coordinate intelligence
and operations.  Command, control, communications, and
computer centers (also known as C-4 centers) located in
several states vary in capabilities from simple call centers
to analytical cells that produce analysis and support the
development of operations. The U.S. directly supports
programs to help both the Secretariat for Public Security
(SSP) and the PGR train federal investigators and facilitate
greater operational coordination and effectiveness.
 
¶6. The U.S. and the Government of Mexico worked together to
address a number of challenges in connection to Mexico,s
southern and northern borders in 2009. The U.S. deployed two
teams to Mexico,s southern border to conduct assessments.
Its border with Guatemala and Belize remains very porous and
poses a vulnerability in terms of serving as potential
terrorist transit point. The U.S. is working with the
Government of Mexico to address resource requirements and
offer some best practices applied effectively at other ports
of entry. The U.S. and the Government of Mexico agreed to
coordinate actions at the northern border ports of entry in
order to obstruct the flow of illegal arms and currency
across the U.S./Mexico border. Pilot programs in Nogales and
Eagle Pass are proving to be successful by increasing the
number of vehicles inspected while lowering the wait time at
the border crossing. The U.S. supported the establishment of
the Mexico Targeting Center, modeled after the CBP National
Targeting Center-Cargo (NTC-C) which should strengthen
Mexico,s ability to target suspicious or illicit cargo
entering or leaving Mexico. The Advance Passenger Information
system (APIS) supports targeting efforts, increases
information sharing, and enhances intelligence capabilities
in identify special interest aliens (SIA) at ports of entry.
The U.S. and the Government of Mexico also commenced the
Joint Security Program (JSP) for Travelers, a pilot program
that promotes exchanges of immigration officials as part of
an effort to streamline the APIS referral process, and seeks
to identify and track suspected terrorists, fugitives, or
smugglers.
 
¶7. In June 2008, President Calderon signed into law a number
of security and justice reforms. The security reforms granted
police greater investigative authorities and facilitated the
ability of law enforcement officials to seize the assets of
individuals implicated in criminal activity. The justice
reforms effected constitutional changes that provide for a
presumption of innocence in criminal and civil prosecutions
and allow for evidence-based oral trials promoting greater
transparency and more confidence in the judicial system. The
law provides for the identification of &control judges8
invested with the authority to issue expeditious warrants for
wiretaps or the arrest of targets of interest. Although these
measures are primarily aimed at organized crime groups, the
legislation also supports investigations against domestic or
international terrorists. The government has eight years to
implement the justice reform legislation adopted in 2008; to
date, implementation has been slow and uneven.
 
¶8.  The U.S. and the Government of Mexico have worked closely
to implement a robust Diplomatic Security Anti-Terrorism
Assistance (ATA) program with associated funding levels
expected to rise from $503,000 in 2008 to $6 million in 2010.
In 2009, ATA programs provided training for 300 Mexican
 
MEXICO 00000027  003 OF 003
 
 
security officials in 18 courses or seminars on matters
ranging from VIP protection to digital security and forensics.
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American
Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap /
PASCUAL

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Cable: 9/11 got Mexico on board with NORTHCOM/SPP mil-mil takeover
« Reply #3 on: February 12, 2011, 07:04:32 pm »
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2006/04/06MEXICO1889.html

60015
2006-04-10 19:22:00
06MEXICO1889
Embassy Mexico
CONFIDENTIAL

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FM AMEMBASSY MEXICO
TO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
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INFO RUEHXC/ALL US CONSULATES IN MEXICO COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USNORTHCOM

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MEXICO 001889
 
SIPDIS
 
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016
TAGS: MARR MASS PREL MX
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE RUMSFELD'S
APRIL 17-18 VISIT TO MEXICO
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Antonio O. Garza for reasons 1.4 (b,d)
 
¶1.  (C)  Summary:  Mexico is the essential partner in U.S.
homeland defense, and while the Mexican Navy (Marina)  has
been an enthusiastic  player, the Mexican military (SEDENA)
has only recently begun to acknowledge the benefits of
cooperation.  This visit marks the opportunity to realign our
own posture vis-a-vis Mexico to give it the stature it merits
in our own security strategies, but also to build Mexico's
acceptance of its strategic role in North America.   What we
do in the coming months is crucial foundation for the
military-to-military opportunities we can forge with Mexico's
incoming civilian and military leaders.  End Summary
 
Two Services, Two Approaches
 
¶2.  (C)  Mexico generally remains cognizant of historical
military confrontations with the U.S. and extremely sensitive
to perceived slights or embarrassments.  Within the military
Marina has been most able to overcome that, especially post
9/11, and has quickly embraced the need for close cooperation
on counter-terrorism, narcotics interdiction, potential
interception of weapons of mass destruction, and the range of
missions necessary to keep North America secure.  SEDENA has
traditionally been suspicious and aloof, in part to disguise
lack of capability.  In recent months, however, we have seen
a new openness within SEDENA to accepting a relationship with
NORTHCOM, observing U.S. military exercises, and of course
providing unprecedented assistance during Hurricane Katrina
relief efforts.  This visit gives us the opportunity to
recognize Marina's ongoign partnership and open the door to a
similar relationship with SEDENA.  The tools we suggest:
 
--  Waiver for American Servicemembers' Protection Act
(ASPA)/Nethercutt Sanctions:  Mexico ratified the Treaty of
Rome in 2005, and as required by ASPA/Nethercutt we have
terminated ESF, IMET and FMF, the latter two targetted
primarily towards Marina.  These programs were essential to
Marina's counter-terrorism preparedness which benefits not
only Mexico but the U.S.  President Fox, Foreign Minister
Derbez, and both houses of the Mexican Congress have resolved
not to sign an Article 98 agreement with the U.S.  A waiver
directly serves our security interests.
 
-- Major Non-NATO Ally Status:  President Bush met last week
with President Fox and Canadian Prime Minister Harper to
discuss regional security and prosperity.  Our regional
security efforts are enhanced if all three partners have the
opportunity and responsibility to be equal players.  The U.S.
and Canada are, of course, NATO members.  Making Mexico a
Major Non-NATO Ally opens up additional resources for
cooperation, training and engagement.  It also provides
Mexico with a status nearer to that of Canada and the U.S. --
and a greater responsibility to improve its capabilities to
meet the common standard.  While the foreign Ministry (SRE)
has signalled sensitivty to becoming a formal "ally" of the
United States, careful explanation of what being a Major
Non-NATO Ally entails should help mitigate that.  We have
informally raised this with military leaders who have
encouraged us to raise the possibility with President Fox.
 
-- Joint Political-Military Talks:  Mexico is one of the few
countries in the region to still have a military Defense
Secretary, and that is unlikely to change soon.   As our
 
SIPDIS
homeland security, disaster relief and counter-terrorism
missions and scenarios bridge the military and civilian
sectors, we believe building dialogue and cooperation between
civilian and military experts is a valuable tool for both
countries.  Mexico has just scheduled Pol-Mil talks with
Canada, setting a precedent we would like to follow.
 
Non-Proliferation
 
¶3.  (C)  Mexico is generally a strong proponent of
non-proiferation.  In January it signed the International
Convention for the Repression of Nuclear Terroist Acts.  We
have pressed the Secretary of Foreign Relations to endorse
the Proliferation Security Initiative, (PSI), so far without
result although they have no raised specific objections.  .
 
Political Constraints
 
¶4.  (C)  Mexico is in the last two months of an historic
presidential campaign which any one of the three major
parties could win -- polls have them in a technical tie at
this point.  The outcome is unlikely to change military
missions dramatically:  All three presidential candidates
favor continued military participation in drug eradication
and interdiction, and have postulated an increased military
role in border security.  Two of the three candidates would
 
MEXICO 00001889  002 OF 002
 
 
probably continue Mexico's resistance to getting involved in
international peacekeeping operations.  If the National
Action Party (PAN) is re-elected it would certainly press for
a greater military role in PKOs.  Regardless of who wins,
General Vega will resign and the incoming president will
select a new Secretary of Defense from the ranks of the
lieutenant generals (generales de division).   Under General
Vega SEDENA has suggested it is politicians who set
constraints on what the military can do.  However, in the
last year NORTHCOM has hosted two Mexican Senate delegations
the members of which seemed very open to increased engagement
with the U.S.  A new Mexican Secretary of Defense may provide
us the opportunity to open up unprecedented military
cooperation with Mexico if we have put the tools in place.
 
¶5.  (C)  These are crucial last months of the Fox
administration, as the Mexican President looks to fortify his
legacy as the leader who brought democratic transition and
modernization to Mexico.  Fox must be politically cautious
not to "surrender" to the U.S.  He is also eager for
recognition for his administration's unprecedented
counter-terrorism and security cooperation with us.
Spiraling violence on the border shadows real progress on
other fronts.  The three initiatives suggested above could
find a receptive audience with President Fox, and could lay
the foundation for a new, invigorated military-to-military
relationship with the incoming administration.
 
 
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity
 
GARZA

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Cable: President Fox's legacy to merge Mexico into the SPP cybernetic grid
« Reply #4 on: February 12, 2011, 07:10:50 pm »
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2006/10/06MEXICO6085.html

83079
2006-10-25 17:05:00
06MEXICO6085
Embassy Mexico
UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
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RHEHOND/DIR ONDCP WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USNORTHCOM
RUEWMCS/US MARSHALS SERVICE WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/CDR USSOUTHCOM MIAMI FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEAHLA/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MEXICO 006085
 
SIPDIS
 
SENSITIVE
SIPDIS
 
E.O. 12958: N/A
TAGS: PREL PGOV KCRM SNAR PTER SMIG MX
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT FOX'S NATIONAL SECURITY LEGACY
 
REF: A. MEXICO 3296
     ¶B. MEXICO 3117
     ¶C. MEXICO 3297
     ¶D. MEXICO 3305
 
-------
Summary
-------
 
¶1. (SBU) This is the first in a series of four cables
assessing the key accomplishments of President Vicente Fox
Quesada during his six years in office, including the
expansion of bilateral cooperation that helped Mexico advance
in areas of greatest interest to the USG.
  It focuses on
progress made in national security; the economy and social
welfare; governance, human rights and foreign policy; and the
environment.  Fox's record--which will not be complete until
December 1, 2006 when he leaves office--was far from perfect,
and while a brief assessment of Fox's failures or
shortcomings is included at the end of each report, the
emphasis of these cables is on the principal achievements
that moved Mexico forward between 2000 and today.
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary continued: During the Fox years, Mexico made
steady progress in the area of national security, and the
level of USG-GOM law enforcement cooperation was
substantially improved when compared with the situation prior
to Fox's election.  After September 11, 2001, the GOM
responded to USG requests to prioritize counterterrorism (CT)
cooperation, which resulted in an increased emphasis on
border security projects focused, inter alia, on special
interest aliens (SIAs) and alien smuggling.  The GOM expanded
and solidified the professionalization of federal law
enforcement institutions, and Fox oversaw a dramatic increase
in arrests of drug kingpins.  Drug interdiction also
improved.  The number of annual extraditions nearly tripled
from the beginning to the end of his presidency, and
deportations increased markedly.  This paper does not address
bilateral military cooperation, and a discussion of Mexico's
persistent security deficiencies is limited to the comment
paragraph.  End summary.
 
------------------------------------------
Law Enforcement Infrastructure Development
------------------------------------------
 
¶3. (SBU) During the Fox sexenio, Mexico restructured and
strengthened the institutions directly responsible for
fighting organized crime.  The GOM pushed forward with
reforms aimed at establishing more professional police
institutions and promoting greater accountability and
transparency.  It created the Federal Investigative Agency
(AFI) and further developed the Federal Preventive Police
(PFP), which have both worked closely with U.S. law
enforcement.  New legislation gave the Attorney General's
Office (PGR) and AFI more autonomy to investigate, arrest and
prosecute major criminals.  Several PGR entities established
professional cadres of investigators, analysts, and
technicians, and AFI agents played a central role in the
investigation and arrest of drug traffickers, violent
kidnappers, and corrupt officials.  As a result of
coordination and cooperation between the USG and PGR/AFI
Special Investigative Units (SIUs), there were approximately
19 DEA tier 1 and tier 2 targets arrested between 2002 and
¶2006.
 
--------------------------------------
Border Security and Safety Cooperation
--------------------------------------
 
¶4. (SBU) Under Fox, USG-GOM law enforcement cooperation
became more effective and more routine, characterized by
enhanced communication channels and greater
information-sharing, including about SIAs.  The Mexico-U.S.
Border Partnership signed in March 2002 served as an initial
framework to institutionalize border security cooperation and
was later incorporated into the Security and Prosperity
Partnership (SPP).  Under the Smart Border Action Plan, Fox's
government implemented the Advance Passenger Information

 
MEXICO 00006085  002 OF 005
 
 
System (APIS) in 2004, establishing an important screening
and enforcement tool that allows the USG and GOM to exchange
"real time" information regarding airline passengers
perceived as threats to national security.  The GOM's
continued cooperation in APIS has led to the capture of
approximately 50 fugitives and represents a significant step
in coordinating aviation and border security
.
 
¶5. (SBU) In August 2005, the USG and GOM also implemented the
Operation Against Smugglers Initiative on Safety and Security
(OASSIS), a standardized prosecution program to identify and
prosecute smugglers and human traffickers on both sides of
the border and save lives of migrants put at risk by criminal
organizations.  The USG has turned over to the GOM 497 cases
to date for prosecution (approximately 300 cases have been
accepted), demonstrating its value as a tool that reduces the
number of human smugglers operating along the border.
 
¶6. (SBU) The Border Security and Public Safety Working Group
formed in March 2006 has become another important tool for
bilateral cooperation, establishing protocols between both
governments to respond to critical incidents and emergencies
along the border.  It remains in the pilot stage.  The USG
was able to further develop its border security relationship
with the GOM under President Fox through training programs,
which focused on using non-intrusive inspection equipment,
detecting weapons of mass destruction, and identifying
fraudulent documents.
 
-----------------
Counter-Terrorism
-----------------
 
¶7. (SBU) Information sharing on CT issues under the Fox
administration has been commendable (ref A).  USG law
enforcement agencies have enjoyed particularly strong
relationships with the Center for National Security
Investigations (CISEN--the GOM civilian intelligence and
security service) and the National Migration Institute (INM).
 The GOM worked with the USG to enhance aviation, border,
maritime, and transportation security, secure critical
infrastructure, and combat terrorism financing.  The March
2005 launching of the SPP, which consists of ten
security-related goals within its Security Pillar,
institutionalized mechanisms for information exchange across
agencies and levels of our respective governments.
 
¶8. (SBU) Among the most important new efforts developed, the
GOM coordinated with the USG on information sharing of
APIS-derived data and the use of its Integrated System for
Migratory Operations (SIOM).  Efforts are now underway to
expand the dissemination of the APIS-derived information
automatically and directly to CISEN.  The USG and GOM also
agreed to share on an ad hoc basis biometric data for
inclusion in the Integrated Automated Fingerprint
Identification System (IAFIS).
Under President Fox, there
were no incidents detected in which terrorists sought to
exploit Mexican territory to attack the U.S. or U.S interests.
 
-----------------
Counter-Narcotics
-----------------
 
¶9. (SBU) The Fox administration has been especially effective
in stepping up Mexico's efforts against narcotrafficking and
the cartels it regards as national security threats.  Between
2000 and 2005, GOM authorities arrested more than 57,000 drug
traffickers, including kingpins such as Osiel Cardenas
Guillen of the Gulf Cartel and Benjamin Arellano Felix of the
Tijuana Cartel, in ongoing efforts to dismantle major drug
organizations operating in Mexico.  Most major indicators of
counter-narcotics effectiveness increased during the Fox
administration when compared to statistical data for the
preceding Zedillo government.  Average annual eradication of
opium poppies increased from 16,002 hectares during 1995-2000
to 19,168 hectares during 2001 to 2005 (complete data is not
yet available for 2006).  Eradication of marijuana rose
markedly, from 26,437 (1995-2000) to 31,550 hectares
(2001-2005).  Average annual heroin seizures totaled 324
 
MEXICO 00006085  003 OF 005
 
 
kilos (2001-05) versus 221 kilos (1995-2000).  The annual
rate of cocaine seizures is the only major indicator that
decreased slightly during the Fox years compared to the
previous administration, at 24.5 tons versus 25.9 tons.
(Note: Since cocaine is not produced in Mexico, however, this
variation may be attributable to changes in international
trafficking patterns.  End note).
 
¶10. (SBU) Under President Fox, the GOM and the USG achieved
unprecedented levels of cooperation in deploying
infrastructure to inhibit illicit narcotics trafficking (ref
B).  Using a combination of GOM and State/INL funds, Mexico
installed 86 contraband detection units using sophisticated
gamma ray technology at strategic points along our common
border.  Other INL-funded efforts led to the addition of new
and refurbished helicopters to augment the PGR's interdiction
fleet; provision of vehicles and training to AFI for use in
safe destruction of clandestine methamphetamine and other
drug laboratories; the furnishing of telecommunications,
computer and command/control infrastructure to various
components of the PGR; and specialized training for thousands
of Mexican law enforcement and aviation support officers in
anti-narcotics operations and techniques.
 
----------------
Money Laundering
----------------
 
¶11. (SBU) The USG developed strong working relationships with
the Financial Intelligence Unit of the PGR and its companion
unit in the Mexican Treasury (Hacienda) in combating money
laundering, terrorist financing, and narcotics trafficking.
Notable was the task force deployment to the Mexico City
airport that included elements from AFI, Mexican customs, and
prosecuting attorneys from the PGR's anti-money laundering
criminal prosecution section.  The Bulk Currency Smuggling
Initiative was launched in July 2002 and has resulted in $57
million in seizures of bulk cash transfers at Mexican ports
of entry, including seizures associated with tax evasion,
narcotics trafficking, public corruption, bank fraud, and
alien smuggling.  These seizures have resulted in the
identification and dismantling of several money laundering
cells.  Under Fox, the first joint U.S.-GOM wire intercept
investigation was also initiated targeting a money laundering
group in Mexico with connections to the U.S.
 
¶12. (SBU) Despite excellent USG-GOM cooperation, money
laundering remains a significant problem in Mexico, and the
USG would like to see more Mexican resources dedicated to
tackling the problem.  While our cooperation with the Fox
administration reached new heights, the underlying legal
framework remains inadequate, and the Fox administration was
unable to improve that framework for a variety of political
reasons.  Specifically, the Embassy would like to see changes
being made to the judicial processes required for Hacienda's
Financial Intelligence Unit to certify money laundering
crimes, prosecutorial ability to "layer" or "stack" several
related charges including money laundering, better efforts to
stop federal income tax evasion in association with major
narcotics trafficking and other federal crimes, and the
establishment of a specific Mexican penal charge against
money laundering connected with terrorism.
 
----------------------------------------
Extradition under the Fox Administration
----------------------------------------
 
¶13. (SBU) Bilateral cooperation in returning fugitives to the
United States by extradition and other legal means increased
significantly under Fox.  Although extradition in Mexico is a
judicial process often delayed by a defendant's right to
appeal, the GOM has advocated strongly on behalf of the USG
before the Mexican courts.  In the phase of the extradition
process requiring a decision from the executive, the GOM also
has made clear its firm policy to grant the extradition of
criminals, regardless of their nationality, to face justice
where they have committed crimes.  The GOM has used its
immigration laws to expeditiously deport fugitives to the
U.S. in lieu of the often lengthy extradition process.
 
MEXICO 00006085  004 OF 005
 
 
 
¶14. (SBU) This improved cooperation can be seen in the annual
numbers of fugitives extradited by Mexico to the U.S., which
have increased in each of the last six calendar years:
 
--2001 = 17 fugitives extradited
--2002 = 25 fugitives extradited
--2003 = 31 fugitives extradited
--2004 = 34 fugitives extradited
--2005 = 41 fugitives extradited
--2006 = 50 fugitives extradited (January - October 24)
 
Of the 198 fugitives extradited by Mexico during the Fox
sexenio, 120 have been Mexican citizens, with the majority
wanted in the U.S. for the most serious of crimes.  By
comparison, only 68 fugitives, including 8 Mexican citizens,
were extradited by Mexico to the U.S. during the Zedillo
administration (1995-2000).
 
¶15. (SBU) Excellent cooperation between the USG and the INM
and AFI, as well as Mexican authorities' aggressive use of
their immigration laws to deport foreign fugitives to the
U.S., resulted in an unprecedented 198 fugitives being
deported to the U.S. in 2005.  Although exact figures are not
available, this speedy alternative to extradition was used
much more sparingly in previous administrations.
 
¶16. (SBU) In 2006, the Mexican Supreme Court issued landmark
decisions removing significant obstacles to extradition,
including a former prohibition on the extradition of
fugitives who faced life imprisonment without the possibility
of parole in the United States.  In 2001, the Mexican Supreme
Court reaffirmed the executive's exclusive discretion to
grant or deny extradition based on the Mexican nationality of
the defendant, a right which the GOM made full use of.
 
¶17. (SBU) The Fox government did not extradite a major
narcotics cartel leader to the United States.  While
important leaders of Mexican drug cartels were arrested in
Mexico, they face Mexican criminal charges in addition to
extradition requests by the U.S. (Note: Mexico has extradited
high-profile fugitives including Francisco Rafael Arellano
Felix, cop-killer Raul Gomez Garcia, and even drug
traffickers charged under the U.S. Kingpin Statute (21 USC
848).  However, none of these individuals would be considered
top-level leaders of Mexican drug cartels.  End note).
Pending extradition reform legislation, when enacted, would
mitigate delays by allowing the surrender of such fugitives
to the U.S. before completion of their Mexican sentences.
 
-------
Comment
-------
 
¶18. (SBU) At the beginning of the Fox administration, the
U.S. sought more effective law enforcement cooperation with
the GOM, rapid moves to extradite a number of major criminals
and to deport American fugitives, less corrupt Mexican law
enforcement institutions, and better GOM control of Mexico's
southern border.  After September 11, 2001, the focus on
intensifying USG-GOM security cooperation grew, especially
regarding CT, and Mexico largely responded to the challenge,
although specific improvements are still needed (ref A).
 
¶19. (SBU) Despite initial delays, the GOM also cooperated in
extraditing important criminals and deporting American
fugitives, although these extraditions have not yet yielded a
major cartel leader.  Notwithstanding the Fox
administration's significant accomplishments in arresting
drug kingpins and other traffickers, Mexico faces a crisis in
narcotics-related violence along the border (as well as
domestic insecurity more generally) that requires urgent
attention (ref C).
 
¶20. (SBU) The GOM's record at rooting out endemic corruption
among its law enforcement entities has been targeted toward
units with which the USG cooperates, but has been
unremarkable otherwise.  The GOM achieved significant
progress in establishing more effective, professional
 
MEXICO 00006085  005 OF 005
 
 
enforcement institutions through the creation and development
of AFI and PFP, respectively.  Nevertheless, Mexican law
enforcement agencies, including AFI and PFP, too often fail
to coordinate horizontally across other Mexican law
enforcement entities, placing significant but artificial
limits on what has otherwise been remarkable progress.  The
GOM has also done little to secure its southern border and
even less to reduce violence and illegal migration and
promote interdiction along the northern border (ref D).
While the Fox government has made important advances in
national security relative to its predecessors, Mexico still
has a long way to go.
 
 
Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity
GARZA

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Cable: SPP used to go after online piracy in Mexico
« Reply #5 on: February 12, 2011, 07:17:09 pm »
http://213.251.145.96/cable/2007/12/07MEXICO6229.html

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 MEXICO 006229 

SIPDIS 

SENSITIVE
SIPDIS 

STATE FOR WHA/MEX WOLFSON AND EEB/TPP/MTA/IPC URBAN AND WALLACE
STATE PASS USTR FOR EISSENSTAT/MELLE/SHIGETOMI/BAE/MCCOY/GARDE STATE PASS COPYRIGHT OFFICE
COMMERCE FOR ITA/JACOBS/WORD/WILSON/WRIGHT/ISRAEL
COMMERCE PASS USPTO FOR MORALES/BERDUT/RODRIGUEZ/MERMELSTEIN JUSTICE FOR CCIPS/MERRIAM/KOUAME/GARLAND DHS FOR CBP/RANDAZZO AND ICE/JLOZANO  E.O. 12958: N/A

TAGS: KIPR ETRD PINS MX

SUBJECT: MEXICO IPR: 301 UPDATE; INTERNATIONAL POSTURE; USG PROGRAMS  REF: (A) SECSTATE 158938 (B) SECSTATE 107629 (C)       MEXICO 4467 (D) MEXICO 6196 

Summary and Comment ------------------- 

¶1. (SBU) There has been some progress on a number of concerns included in the Mexico Special 301 Initiative demarche (e.g., increased enforcement activity, improved cooperation with local governments, no new patent linkage problems), but other concerns remain unaddressed (e.g., ex officio authority and data protection for pharmaceuticals).  Mexican IPR officials have been keen to highlight their increasingly active role in the international arena, stressing their willingness to join the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) negotiations and their push-back against Brazilian efforts to undermine IPR in international health organizations.  The U.S. Mission, together with Washington-based agencies, recently organized U.S. participation in a judicial event on trademarks and hosted a workshop in Monterrey aimed at encouraging greater federal-local cooperation in IPR protection in northern Mexico.  Spring 2008 will be even busier, with a PTO training course on patent issues planned for January, a customs IPR training course scheduled for early February, a State-sponsored voluntary visitor program for Mexican legislators to visit Washington at the invitation of their U.S. congressional counterparts to discuss IPR in mid-February, an international judges forum on IPR issues being hosted by Mexico in late February, and DoJ assistance on computer forensics and writing an IPR handbook for prosecutors to take place sometime in the first half of the year.  These exchanges are proving very useful in advancing U.S. interests in Mexico, particularly with regard to raising IPR consciousness among Mexican judges.  End summary and comment.  301 Update ---------- 

¶2. (U) Enforcement: Mexican IPR prosecutors from the Office of the Attorney General of the Republic (PGR - rough equivalent of U.S. Department of Justice) have recorded increased arrests and seizures of pirates, counterfeiters, and infringing products this year, and have obtained four convictions as of December 18, 2007, versus two for all of 2006 (see http://pirateria.prg.gob.mx for stats and other IPR info in Spanish).  Mexican IPR prosecutors have registered 166 indictments so far this year (including the first ever against an on-line pirate) versus 158 in all 2006.  Many of those indicted are in jail while awaiting a judge's final ruling.  While these numbers are headed in the right direction, they are still small compared to the rampant scale of commercial piracy and counterfeiting here.  Lack of ex officio authority to go after infringers (see following para), conflicting interpretations who has legal standing to represent right-holders, and lack of IPR awareness on the part of many judges continue to hamper criminal enforcement. On the administrative enforcement side, the Mexican Institute of Industrial Property (IMPI - rough equivalent of USPTO) reports that it has conducted 3,642 inspection visits (including an aggressive campaign against cyber-cafes involved in Internet piracy), levied USD 2.8 million in fines, and confiscated another USD 1 million in infringing products through November of this year.  We understand that these numbers are higher than last year's (we are still trying to get IMPI's 2006 enforcement statistics) and reflect IMPI's increased enforcement manpower (IMPI hired dozens of new personnel for its enforcement division this year), but administrative enforcement continues to suffer from relatively light fines available under current law, the seemingly endless process of legal appeals that malefactors can take advantage of to avoid penalties for years, and lack of IPR awareness on the part of many judges.

¶3. (SBU) Ex Officio: A legislative amendment to make  MEXICO 00006229  002 OF 005   commercial IPR infringement an ex officio offense remains pending in the Chamber of Deputies after having been approved by the Senate earlier this year.  The Chamber of Deputies Justice Commission has had its hands full the last several months with a major presidential initiative to overhaul Mexico's criminal justice system, which will be voted on when Congress re-convenes in February 2008 (REF D).  PGR and the movie and music industries are strong supporters of the ex officio amendment, which would allow PGR to investigate and prosecute cases even without specific right-holder complaints, which are required under current law.  It would also end the currently legal practice whereby a right-holder can settle with and pardon an infringer, regardless of where a PGR case stands in the penal process.  Other industry groups and most IPR attorneys are either ambivalent or opposed to the amendment, citing corruption as a good reason to leave the steering wheel in the hands of the right-holders and/or their lawyers.  Beyond concerns of official corruption, though not admitted out loud, there is reason to believe that IPR lawyers would lose a bit of business in filing complaints were the amendment to pass.  Passage of ex officio will not be a panacea for Mexico's IPR enforcement woes, but Post continues to believe that without more latitude to enforce Mexican IPR laws, we cannot expect PGR to significantly ramp up deterrence.  In the meantime, PGR and Customs are reaching out on a more systematic basis to right-holders to seek industry complaints when they encounter infringing goods or suspicious shipments and to discourage pardons for defendants whose cases PGR is already in the process of prosecuting. 

¶4. (SBU) State/local cooperation: Mexico has earned strong marks in this area.  This past year has seen the State of Mexico and the Municipality of Toluca sign anti-piracy agreements under which they have pledged to work with the federal government and right-holders in combating commercial infringement and re-capturing local markets for legal commerce.  In recent months both governments have been actively engaged in IPR protection activities, winning praise from a number of industry representatives.  The industry coalition that has been promoting these state and municipal-level agreements is hoping to get several more states to jump on-board in 2008.  Mexico City has not signed such an agreement, but has also engaged in unprecedented cooperation this year with federal officials and right-holders in trying to rein in the city's sprawling informal economy.  The State of Jalisco, together with the Business Software Alliance (BSA) and IMPI, launched a campaign this year called ""Cleaning House"" under which it has agreed to have an outside auditor check the computer programs being used in state government offices and to work with BSA and its member companies to bring all state government software users into compliance. 

¶5. (SBU) WIPO Implementation: The new head of the National Copyright Institute (INDAUTOR), Manuel Guerra, told Post that his agency would analyze current Mexican law to determine whether there are still gaps in implementation of the WIPO Internet Treaties.  Guerra would not offer a timeline for the completion of this analysis - it certainly will not be completed in 2007 - but said INDAUTOR would push for legislative fixes if and when gaps were identified.  6. (U) Data protection: Despite pressure from the Embassy, the European Union, the international R and D pharmaceutical industry, and the Ministry of Economy (under which IMPI falls), the Health Ministry did not include data protection rules in recent changes to its health inputs regulations, due in large part to pressure from domestic generic producers. The Health Ministry response has been that, since Mexico considers international treaties to have the force of law, the relevant NAFTA provisions (1711.5 and 1711.6) are self-executing in Mexico and thus data protection does not need to be incorporated into new regulations unless the R and D industry can demonstrate cases in which its data was used  MEXICO 00006229  003 OF 005   by third parties to obtain marketing approval.  On December 14, the Health Ministry convened representatives of the R and D industry, the national generic makers, the Ministry of Economy, and IMPI to discuss the pros and cons of regulations on data protection.  At the meeting, the representative of the R and D industry lobbied for a clearer data protection regime, but failed to identify specific violations of data protection.  Embassy awaits further clarification from the R and D industry on whether there have been concrete cases of NAFTA non-compliance. 

 ¶7. (U) Patent link: The pharmaceutical R and D industry reports that there have been no repeat occurrences of the patent link failures that took place in 2006, giving Mexico a good grade on this issue. 

International Profile --------------------- 

¶8. (SBU) Mexico has been actively engaged in the work of the IPR Working Group under the Security and Prosperity Partnership this year, hosting the WG's trilateral meeting in Cancun earlier this year. Mexico also agreed in 2007 to participate in negotiating an Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement for enhanced IPR enforcement.  IMPI officials have also stressed to Post that they have taken fire from both domestic critics and other developing countries for their opposition in recent months to Brazilian government initiatives to undermine patent rights in various international health fora, such as the Pan-American Health Organization. 

¶9. (SBU) On the other hand, Mexico stayed on the sidelines in the imbroglio involving the tarnished Director General of the World Intellectual Property Organization Kamil Idris.  Post has heard rumors that Mexico was not averse to seeing Idris resign, but did not want to appear to be ""piling on"" because Jorge Amigo, IMPI's longstanding Director General, might want to throw his hat into the ring as a possible successor. Consequently, Mexico did not want to anger African nations who took exception with the way Idris' indiscretions were handled. 

Recent IPR Capacity Building Programs ------------------------------------- 

¶10. (U) Trademark Roundtable for Judges: The Mexican judiciary and IMPI, together with the Embassy and the Mexican bar association, organized a November 8-9 roundtable in Mexico City on the likelihood of confusion in trademark law. Embassy worked with USPTO to provide three U.S. speakers for the program: U.S. District Court judge Ronald Lew; USPTO Trademark Trial and Appeal Board administrative judge David Mermelstein; and attorney-adviser Jackie Morales from USPTO's Office of Enforcement.  Over the course of five panel discussions, consensus emerged on the following critiques of the Mexican system: 1) the criteria Mexican judges use to evaluate likelihood of confusion vary significantly and are insufficiently developed; 2) it is administratively difficult for IMPI to cancel a registered mark that is similar to a pre-existing one; 3) repeated recourse to constitutional appeals (amparos) as currently allowed under the law can delay final resolution of administrative and civil trademark proceedings and imposition of penalties (which are too light in any case) for years, thus fostering impunity; and therefore 4) there is little incentive for parties to settle, as the alleged infringer has little to fear in either the short or medium term.  Several of the Mexican speakers, including top IMPI officials and circuit court judges, noted that strong IPR protection is essential for competing in today's global economy and admitted that Mexico is falling short, inasmuch as Mexican trademark proceedings are lengthy, expensive, and highly uncertain.  They called for legislative amendments to increase penalties and limit repeat appeals  MEXICO 00006229  004 OF 005   (amparos de rebote).  Judge Mermelstein explained that in the United States the criteria for examining the similarity of marks are detailed and consistent among USPTO examiners and administrative judges as well as federal appeals judges. Judge Lew commented on how he had used the criteria Judge Mermelstein had described to decide specific civil and criminal trademark cases, and emphasized the importance of making administrative and judicial rulings, as well as their underpinning logic, accessible to the public in order to provide greater transparency and predictability.  All the Mexican participants (judges, IMPI officials, right-holders and lawyers) expressed great appreciation for the U.S. speakers and said that they drew very helpful contrasts between the two countries' IPR regimes. 

¶11. (U) Workshop on Cooperation in Protecting IPR: The Embassy and Consulate General Monterrey organized a three-day event December 3-5 that brought together PGR, IMPI, tax officials, federal judges, economic and law enforcement officials from Mexico's key northern states and cities, USG experts from DoJ and ICE, and right-holders.  The workshop aimed at fostering cooperation among federal IPR agencies, state and local governments, and affected industries. Right-holders and academics expounded on the economic and safety risks that result from widespread IPR violations. Mexican federal officials discussed their respective roles in enforcing IPR, and together with speakers from the BSA, the State of Mexico, and Mexico City, reported on their recent collaborative initiatives described in para 4 above.  A week later one of the participants -- the Director of Economic and Financial Affairs for Ciudad Juarez -- announced that the city government would seek to sign a municipal-level anti-piracy agreement with right-holders and the federal IPR agencies in early 2008. 

Upcoming IPR Capacity Building Programs --------------------------------------- 

¶12. (U) USPTO Patent Course: In January 2008, USPTO will conduct a three-day capacity-building exercise with IMPI counterparts on patent-related issues. 

¶13. (U) Customs Training Course: The Embassy will hold a customs training course at the Port of Manzanillo February 5-8, 2008.  This course will be patterned on the one we did at the Port of Veracruz in July 2007.  In addition to speakers from CBP, ICE, DOJ, and the World Customs Organization, we also plan to have PGR, IMPI, and Customs officials who attended the Veracruz training give presentations.  We hope to arrange a live-time tracking exercise of suspicious inbound containers. 

¶14. (U) Legislative Exchange Visit: The bicameral, bipartisan U.S. Congressional Anti-Piracy Caucus has invited eight Mexican legislators who head IPR-related committees in both the upper and lower chambers of the National Congress to visit Washington DC February 11-13 to meet with their U.S. legislator counterparts, USG experts, and right-holders to discuss the importance of strong copyright protection and pending legislative issues in the U.S. and Mexico. 

¶15. (U) International Judicial IPR Forum: The Mexican Judiciary, IMPI, and INDAUTOR are organizing a forum February 26-29 to which they are inviting judges, IPR officials, right-holders and academics from North America (including the U.S.), Latin America, Europe, and WIPO.  The focus will be on international comparative experiences in applying IPR law. We hope to have U.S. federal judges as well as USPTO and DOJ representatives participate. 

¶16. (U) DOJ-PGR Activities: DOJ and PGR plan to hold two additional exercises in the first half of 2008.  The first will be a technical training course on the use of computer/IT forensics in investigating cybercrimes, including Internet piracy.  The second will be a workshop to draft an IPR manual  MEXICO 00006229  005 OF 005   for all PGR prosecutors, especially those assigned to the state delegations (rough equivalents of U.S. district attorneys) with little or no background in IPR crimes. 

Finally Talking with Judges --------------------------- 

¶17. (SBU) As described in paras 10, 11, and 14, we have finally succeeded in re-engaging with Mexican judges on IPR matters.  Those who participated in the Trademark Roundtable were all administrative judges, while the two judges who spoke at the Monterrey Workshop were penal judges, both of whom had participated in the December 2006 seminar on IPR enforcement organized by USPTO for Central American and Mexican judges in Miami.  The nascent dialogue between the judiciary and other stakeholders is welcome and important, but to date has illustrated the many shortcomings of Mexico's IPR regime.  Similar to the problems described in para 10 with regard to administrative trademark enforcement, the penal judges in Monterrey (one of whom had previously been a PGR prosecutor) outlined what they considered to be one of the major impediments to obtaining criminal convictions -- an overly cumbersome burden under the law to prove the plaintiff has legal standing to represent an actual right-holder.  On this issue alone the two judges confessed to having thrown out large numbers of cases presented by PGR prosecutors.  PGR prosecutors and private IPR attorneys in the audience protested that the criteria used by different penal judges on the issue of standing vary widely, to which the two judges responded that the system is simply designed that way.  Since the conclusion of the workshop, Post has been consulting with PGR's IPR unit about setting up a judicial exchange event (perhaps modeled on the Trademark Roundtable format) between U.S. and Mexican IPR prosecutors and penal judges to more fully hash out varying legal interpretations of standing requirements.  The February judicial IPR forum in Cancun (which is being organized by the same pro-IPR judges who put together the Trademark Roundtable) will be presided over by the President of Mexico's Supreme Court and might have Mexico's Secretary of Economy and Attorney General in attendance.  This high-level event should send a strong signal to the entire Mexican judiciary of the importance of IPR.  We hope it will also highlight major problems and generate political momentum to address them.  Post will conitnue its efforts to engage both administrative and penal judges in dialogue with enforcement agencies and right-holders.   Visit Mexico City's Classified Web Site at http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/wha/mexicocity and the North American Partnership Blog at http://www.intelink.gov/communities/state/nap / BASSETT

Offline agentbluescreen

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No wonder TV IS SO BAD, all the good fiction writers work for the State Department

Offline Freeski

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From the Obama/Harper Regulatory Cooperation Council (RCC):

On migration policy -- possibly the biggest sticking point -- the declaration states that the two countries will work together "to establish and verify the identities of travellers and conduct screening at the earliest opportunity." The intention is that fingerprints and retinal scans will become routine, leading to the evolution of an integrated entry-exit system, where entry into one country serves to verify exit from the other. This would require an unprecedented exchange of personal information.

http://www.financialpost.com/related/topics/Canada+could+very+different+place/4230233/story.html#ixzz1DmS1a0Qj

http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=200176.msg1197124#msg1197124

The SPP is still very alive.
"He who passively accepts evil is as much involved in it as he who helps to perpetrate it. He who accepts evil without protesting against it is really cooperating with it." Martin Luther King, Jr.