Author Topic: Brad Meltzer was hired by George HW Bush to attack US cities with WMDs  (Read 23884 times)

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Offline Dig

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BRAD MELTZER: I was recruited by George HW. Bush to Attack US
BY Brad Meltzer SPECIAL TO THE NEWS  Tuesday, January 11th 2011, 4:00 AM

I was a real-life secret agent. I didn't have the hand-grenade cuff links or the poison-dart pen, but in 2004 I was recruited by the Department of Homeland Security for its Red Cell program. As they described it - and as The Washington Post later reported - Red Cell was the government's way of trying to anticipate how terrorists would next attack the United States. To do that, the government brought together what they called "out-of-the-box thinkers." As a novelist who writes thrillers with scenes that take place in the underground tunnel below the White House, I was somehow identified as one of those thinkers.

Sometimes I was paired with a psychologist or a philosopher. Sometimes I was contacted alone, via email, and given a target to attack.

I'm not allowed to tell you what the targets were. Or where they were.

But I can say that we'd destroy major cities like my hometown, New York. In minutes. And when I went home at night, I felt horrified, because I saw how easy it was to kill us.

But what inspired me more than anything else were the other people sitting next to me in that room. Sure, there were "real" heroes, members of the FBI and CIA, who helped us with vital facts.

But there were far more professors and transportation employees, musicians and software programmers - regular people whose names will never be known and whom you'll never hear about.


Let me be clear: Those unseen heroes are everywhere. And they help us every day. And the best part? It's been true throughout our history. Indeed, as I researched my newest thriller, "Inner Circle," I found that back during the Revolutionary War, a secret presidential spy ring was started by none other than George Washington. Washington called it the Culper Ring, and it was made up of ordinary citizens who operated throughout New York and Long Island. People just like you. Throughout the war, they moved information, gathered secrets about the British and never told anyone about their existence. In fact, even George Washington didn't know all their names. But this ring of civilians was so amazing at transporting secret information for Washington, they helped win the Revolutionary War for us. And you'll never read about them in most history books.

And look at this ominous anti-government treasonous insanity:

These days, nearly every New Yorker knows at least one unseen hero. Most of them will remain "invisible" forever. But that invisibility may just be the most beautiful part of the story. Indeed, most people don't set out to be heroes. Most people are just living their lives - until a moment arrives, and they're called to serve.

But as I saw in the Red Cell program, that's how history always works.

History is a selection process.

But it doesn't just choose people and moments.

History chooses all of us. Every single day.

More here.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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Re: BREAKING: Brad Meltzer's book, even DECODED, exposes total TREASON!
« Reply #1 on: January 11, 2011, 07:18:31 am »
The 9/11 Hijackers were a Red Cell

Timothy McVeigh and Elohim was a Red Cell

'93 WTC was a Red Cell

Mumbai attacks were by a Red Cell

Underwear bomber plot was hatched and executed by a Red Cell

7/7 was conducted by a 1,000 person Red Cell

Minot AF Nukes were stolen by a Red Cell

JFK was assassinated by a Red Cell

Almost every violent act in the US over the past 60 years has been from RED CELLS and RED TEAMS!!!

Even Pearl Harbor allowed for security holes which were never covered up thanks to RED CELL INSANITY!

Red Team activity is any set of activities that deal with an unannounced assessment of security and readiness by an unfamiliar (to the target) team of operators with no awareness or support from the assessed target. The function of individuals engaged in this activity is to provide a unique understanding from a threat actor's point of view in a less contrived circumstance than through exercises, role playing, or announced assessments. Red Team activities may involve interactions that trigger active controls and countermeasures in effect within a given operational environment.

In wargaming, the opposing force or OPFOR in a simulated military conflict may be referred to as a red team and may also engage in Red Team activity, which is used to reveal weaknesses in military readiness. The key theme being that the aggressor is composed of various threat actors, equipment and techniques that are obscured from the defender's complete knowledge.

Some of the benefits of Red Team activities are that it challenges preconceived notions by demonstration; they also serve to elucidate the true problem state that planners are attempting to mitigate. Additionally, a more accurate understanding can be gained about how sensitive information is externalized, as well as highlight exploitable patterns and instances of undue bias with regard to controls and planning.

United States Army

In the US Army, Red Teaming is defined as: “structured, iterative process executed by trained, educated and practiced team members that provides commanders an independent capability to continuously challenge plans, operations, concepts, organizations and capabilities in the context of the operational environment and from our partners’ and adversaries’ perspectives.” (TRADOC News Service, July 13, 2005) [1]

The Army Red Team Leaders Course is conducted by the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies (UFMCS) at Fort Leavenworth. The target students are graduates of the U.S. Army CGSC or equivalent intermediate and senior level school (Major through Colonel, and Chief Warrant Officer 3/4/5 with MEL IV qualification or equivalent).

The Red Team Leader’s Course (RTLC) is graduate-level education of 720 Academic Hours (18 weeks) designed to effectively anticipate change, reduce uncertainty, and improve operational decisions. The typical academic day is 8 hours and the typical reading load is 250 pages per night.

The University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies was formed as an outgrowth of recommendations from the Army Chief of Staff's Actionable Intelligence Task Force. UFMCS, as an element of the TRADOC (DCSINT) Intelligence Support Activity, or TRISA, located at Fort Leavenworth, KS, is an Army directed education, research and training initiative for Army organizations and other joint and government agencies designed to provide a Red Teaming capability.

A UFMCS-trained Red Team is educated to look at problems from the perspectives of the adversary and our multinational partners, with the goal of identifying alternative strategies. The Red Team provides commanders with critical decision-making expertise during planning and operations. The team’s responsibilities are broad – from challenging planning assumptions to conducting independent analysis to examining courses of action to identifying vulnerabilities.

Red Team Leaders are expert in:

Analyzing complex systems and problems from different perspectives to aid in decision making using models of theory.
An analysis of the concepts, theories, insights, tools and methodologies of cultural and military anthropology to predict other’s perceptions of our strengths and vulnerabilities.
Applying critical and creative thinking in the context of the operational environment to fully explore alternatives to plans, operations, concepts, organizations, and capabilities.
Applying advanced analytical skills and techniques at tactical level through strategic level and develop products supporting command decision making and operational execution.

U.S. Joint Forces Commands' Joint Enabling Capabilities Command

Two operational positions associated with red teaming exist at the United States Joint Forces Command formerly called Blue Red Planners within the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQs). These two positions, now called Red Team Leaders (RTLs) are designed to provide the Joint Task Force Plans and Operations Groups with insight into the adversary’s political and military objectives and potential course of action (COA) in response to real or perceived Blue action. RTLs are the leads of a RT Cell composed of operationally oriented experts that analyze Blue conditions-driven COA from an adversary-based perspective. The RT Cell also anticipates potential adversary responses to counter Blue COA and end-state objectives. The RT also identifies critical Blue vulnerabilities and potential operational miscues. The RT cell also assists in war gaming, COA development early in the Joint Operations Planning Process (JOPP). RTLs, in collaboration with the Combatant Commander's staff and Centers of Excellence, provide in-depth knowledge of the local political landscape, of the adversary’s history, military doctrine, training, political and military alliances and partnerships, and strategic and operational objectives. The RTLs will postulate the adversary’s desired end-state, and also, postulate what the adversary may surmise Blue’s desired end-state or objectives to be. Finally, the RTLs help identify, validate, and/or re-scope potential critical nodes identified through systems developed understanding of the operational environment.

United States Government

Red Teaming is normally associated with assessing vulnerabilities and limitations of systems or structures. Various watchdog agencies such as the Government Accountability Office and the National Nuclear Security Administration employ red teaming, sometimes with dramatic findings.

In exercises and war games, Red Teaming refers to the work performed to provide an adversarial perspective, especially when this perspective includes plausible tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) as well as realistic policy and doctrine.

Important cases

The FAA has been implementing Red Teams since the Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland. Red Teams conduct tests at about 100 US airports annually. Tests were on hiatus after September 11, 2001 and resumed in 2003.[1]

The FAA use of red teaming revealed severe weaknesses in security at Logan International Airport in Boston, where two of the four hijacked 9/11 flights originated. Some former FAA investigators who participated on these teams feel that the FAA deliberately ignored the results of the tests and that this resulted in part in the 9/11 terrorist attack on the US.

Other examples include:

Billy Mitchell - a passionate early advocate of air power - demonstrated the obsolescence of battleships in bombings against the captured World War I German battleship Ostfriesland and the U.S. pre-dreadnought battleship Alabama.

Rear Admiral Harry E. Yarnell demonstrated in 1932 the effectiveness of an attack on Pearl Harbor almost exactly showing how the tactics of the Japanese would destroy the fleet in harbor nine years later. Although the umpires ruled the exercise a total success, the umpire's report on the overall exercises makes no mention of the stunning effectiveness of the simulated attack. Their conclusion to what became known as Fleet Problem XIII was surprisingly quite the opposite:

"It is doubtful if air attacks can be launched against Oahu in the face of strong defensive aviation without subjecting the attacking carriers to the danger of material damage and consequent great losses in the attack air force." [2]


20,000 US troops to Support Yar’adua regime as Boko Haram claims al-Qaeda link

Nigeria is the sixth largest supplier of America's oil imports.

The United States is therefore prepared to deploy as many as 20,000 troops to shore up the Yar’adua regime and protect oil installations in response to any future crisis in which the Nigeria government is near collapse, and rival factions and rebels are fighting for control of the oil fields of the Niger Delta and vying for power, has learnt from US State Department sources.

Details of the plan that was designed to test how the United States would respond to a crisis in Nigeria – set in 2013 – were crafted last year at the Center for Strategic Leadership at the United States Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, as part of the army's annual war games to test the American military's ability to deal with the kind of crises that it might face in the near future. The US Army is propagating its assessment of an era of 'persistent conflict' around the globe through 'Unified Quest 2008', a series of seminars and war games sponsored by the US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC).

As part of the Pentagon's plan to create a new military African command; or Africom, US military and intelligence officers, joined participants from the State Department and other US government agencies, and foreign military officers (including military representatives from several NATO countries, Australia, and Israel), along with the private military contractors who examined the list of options for the Nigeria scenario ranging from diplomatic pressure to military action, with or without the aid of European and African nations.

For the Nigerian scenario, a blue team, red team and green team played out the conflict.

The blue team represented the United States and its allies.

The red team represented the enemy, - a terrorist organization like Boko Haram or a rival tribe vying to overthrow the Nigerian government.

The green team acted as the populace caught in the crossfire.


One participant, US Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel Mark Stanovich, drew up a plan that called for the deployment of 20,000 US troops within 60 days, to shore up the Nigerian government. But this proposal was criticized by the former US ambassador to Fiji, Ambassador David Lyon who argued that direct US military intervention would send the wrong message about American support for an unpopular government which was the large part of the problem.

Ambassador Lyon’s position was echoed by Professor Sarah Sewall, of the Harvard University Kennedy School of Government Carr Center for Human Rights Policy, who underscored the need for building partnership capacity with the African Union and countries like Ghana and South Africa to help the US Army formulate a comprehensive response strategy that would avoid putting US troops on the ground in Nigeria. Her view was shared by some of the army top brass who expressed reservations about the prospects of US troops fighting in the creeks of the Niger Delta. "If we have to put troops on the ground, something has failed," [DAMN STRAIGHT!] Lt. Col. John Miller, deputy chief of future warfare at the Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) was quoted as saying.

Although the scenario was part of an exercise to plan US response to a fictional conflict set in Nigeria in 2013, and how to be better prepared for them, US State Department sources told that the Army's Chief of Staff, General George Casey, had briefed and signed-on President Barack Obama on the plan, which was presented to President Umaru Musa Yar’adua at talks with US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton during her recent visit to Nigeria. Clinton’s visit came weeks after the violent crackdown on the extremist Islamic sect Boko Haram.

The violence claimed over 800 lives, including Mohammed Yusuf, the sect’s leader, killed in police custody. The group has declared a jihad in Nigeria, pledging loyalty to Osama bin Laden and threatening full scale attacks against what they called the “Yoruba, Igbo and Ijaw infidels.” "We have started a Jihad in Nigeria, which no force on earth can stop. The aim is to Islamize Nigeria and ensure the rule of the majority Moslems in the country. We will teach Nigeria a lesson, a very bitter one,” Boko Haram said in a statement.

According to a statement by Mallam Sanni Umaru, Boko Haram is not limited to Northern Nigeria. "In fact, we are spread across all the 36 states in Nigeria, and Boko Haram is just a version of the Al Qaeda, which we align with and respect. We support Osama bin Laden, we shall carry out his command in Nigeria until the country is totally Islamized, which is according to the wish of Allah," the group said.

The group added: "Mallam Yusuf has not died in vain and he is a martyr. His ideas will live forever… From the month of August, we shall carry out a series of bombings in Southern and Northern Nigerian cities, beginning with Lagos, Ibadan, Enugu and Port Harcourt. The bombings will not stop until Sharia is established and western civilization wiped off from Nigeria. We will not stop until these evil cities are tuned into ashes.

"We shall make the country ungovernable, kill and eliminate irresponsible political leaders of all leanings, hunt and gun down those who oppose the rule of Sharia in Nigeria and ensure that the infidel does not go unpunished.

With Boko Haram pledging its loyalty bin Laden and al-Qaeda and promising to make Nigeria ungovernable, the chickens appear to be coming home to roost for the Yar’adua regime and highlighting the prospects of full spectrum operations for “Unified Quest 2008” to be put in motion; including the use of Irregular Warfare, to establish persistent security within a strategic environment of persistent conflict like the Niger Delta.

The recommendations and lessons learned from “Unified Quest 2008” were crystallized and given directly to Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey as well as other Army leaders for their consideration as they plan for the Army's future, said Maj. Gen. Barbara Fast, deputy director of the Army Capabilities Integration Center, (ARCIC).

W A K E   U P !

Special operations forces battle local civilian government
Thursday, December 17, 2009
David Axe and Bryan William Jones THE WASHINGTON TIMES

You rarely see them or read about them, but they're out there, fighting and sometimes dying. Soldiers, sailors and airmen from U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) wage war under a cloak of secrecy. Their deployments are not announced. Few reporters ever visit the units. When they fight, the results often make the news, but the commandos' involvement is rarely fully explained.

It's possible to glimpse special operations forces (SOF) only at the fringes. Recently, SOCOM invited The Washington Times to observe a special operations forces training event at Fort Irwin, in the Mojave Desert just east of Los Angeles. Before shipping off to East Africa, Iraq, Afghanistan, the Philippines or other conflict zones, commando units run a gamut of exercises meant to prepare them for the rigors of combat. Fort Irwin, home of the U.S. Army's sprawling National Training Center, is one of the last stops.

The role of special operations forces has expanded significantly since the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks as the U.S. military has gotten involved in an ever wider range of counterterrorism and nation-building operations. Since 2001, SOCOM's budget has tripled to nearly $10 billion annually. Last year, the Pentagon began an ambitious plan to add 13,000 new commandos to the existing 50,000-strong force.

More than 100 commandos have died in combat since 2001, not necessarily in Iraq or Afghanistan. In September, two SOF sergeants were killed when a roadside bomb hit their vehicle on Jolo Island in the Philippines. SOCOM has been training the Filipino military to suppress an Islamic insurgency.

Also in September, SOF ambushed and killed a Kenyan man suspected of ties to al Qaeda. Saleh Ali Nabhan was purported to have played a role in the 2002 bombing of a Kenyan hotel, among other terror acts. The Sept. 14 raid in Baraawe, in southern Somalia, reportedly involved as many as four SOF helicopters flying from a U.S. Navy ship. Official confirmation of the raid occurred only after international media had reported the presence of U.S. helicopters and soldiers in Somalia.

"The role of the SOF soldier is to train, engage and carry out operations that do not fall under the normal guise of military operations," one SOF major told The Times.

Like many of his colleagues, the major asked that his name not be printed. Commandos' missions might include "reconnaissance, direct action, counterterrorism and other unconventional warfare," the major continued. The missions typically are "clandestine [and] high-risk," he said.

At the National Training Center, exercise planners prepare simulations that attempt to mirror the complex conditions of a unit's actual destination. In October, elements of the 3rd Special Forces group, permanently based at Fort Bragg, N.C., spent several weeks at Fort Irwin "war-gaming" their upcoming deployment to an undisclosed location. Portions of the 1,000-square-mile National Training Center have been dressed to resemble Iraq; others are modeled on Afghanistan. With its wide expanses of desert ringed by low mountains, the center also resembles arid East Africa.

During one daytime training event, several 12-man groups of SOF troopers, called "A Teams," rolled into a simulated desert town in specially modified Humvees.

"A mobile can of whoop-ass," is how 3rd group Staff Sgt. Dennis Corey described the Humvee model. Compared to the standard version, the Special Operations Command Humvee carries more fuel and water for long-range missions and has extra attachment points for heavy weapons.

The simulated town of Medina Wasl, modeled on a semiurban
Iraqi community, features authentic-looking buildings and vehicles. Scores of actors, some of them Arabic speakers, populate the town. Each follows a detailed script outlining the actor's background, job, motives and political affiliations.

Some portray innocent civilians, local government, media and even aid workers.

Others are insurgents in disguise, required by their script to attack the civilians or U.S. forces.

Part of 3rd group's challenge in Medina Wasl was to "establish and influence relations between military and civil governmental and nongovernmental groups across the spectrum from friendly to hostile areas of operations," according to 3rd group Capt. David Durante.

In this scenario, Medina Wasl turned out to be very hostile.

A small explosive charge simulating an improvised explosive device detonated alongside a Humvee, kicking up a tall dust cloud. "Insurgents" opened fire from windows, firing blanks from their AK-47s. The commandos fired back with their rifles and machine guns.

To lend a sense of mortal danger to the mock battle, all the weapons included a tiny laser gun fitted to the barrel. Every fired blank was accompanied by a burst of laser. Each participant wore a vest studded with laser-detecting sensors that beep when the wearer is "shot." For an extra dose of chaos, referees roamed Medina Wasl, firing a blue plastic laser pistol they call a "god gun," randomly killing or wounding commandos. Dead soldiers were required to sit out the rest of the battle. Commando medics evacuated and treated the "wounded" just as they would a real-life casualty.

In truth, 3rd group might see very little direct combat. While special operations forces occasionally orchestrate spectacular raids, such as that in Somalia in September, commandos spend most of their time on less dramatic but no less vital tasks. In Afghanistan, as in the Philippines, special operations teams represent the backbone of U.S. efforts to train local militaries. Capt. Durante called it the "blood-free" approach to winning wars, although even training teams sometimes get ambushed.

The commandos embrace even the seemingly boring aspects of waging America's wars.

The Medina Wasl exercise included staged interactions between 3rd group teams and local leaders.

"Humans are more important than hardware," Sgt. Corey said.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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Most of them will remain "invisible" forever.

So all the Red Cells are not included in the "Identity Ecosystem" which is supposedly set up to protect us from Red Cell threats...
National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace

Creating Options for Enhanced Online Security and Privacy

June 25, 2010


Table of Contents
SCOPE ... 6
NATIONAL STRATEGY DEVELOPMENT ................................................................................................. 6
NATIONAL STRATEGY ORGANIZATION ................................................................................................. 7
IDENTITY SOLUTIONS WILL BE SECURE AND RESILIENT ........................................................................ 8
IDENTITY SOLUTIONS WILL BE INTEROPERABLE.................................................................................... 8
IDENTITY SOLUTIONS WILL BE COST-EFFECTIVE AND EASY TO USE .................................................... 10
BENEFITS OF THE IDENTITY ECOSYSTEM ........................................................................................... 18
GOAL 1: DEVELOP A COMPREHENSIVE IDENTITY ECOSYSTEM FRAMEWORK........................................ 21
COMMON IDENTITY ECOSYSTEM FRAMEWORK. .................................................................................. 22
GOAL 4: ENSURE THE LONG-TERM SUCCESS OF THE IDENTITY ECOSYSTEM. ...................................... 24



A4   WORK TO IMPLEMENT ENHANCED PRIVACY PROTECTIONS ................................................... 27



A8   CONTINUE COLLABORATING IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS..................................................... 29
NATION ... 29


Executive Summary
Cyberspace – the interdependent network of information technology components that underpins many of our communications – is a crucial component of the Nation’s critical infrastructure. We use cyberspace to exchange information, buy and sell products and services, and enable many online transactions across a wide range of sectors, both nationally and internationally.  As a result, a secure cyberspace is critical to the health of our economy and to the security of our Nation.  In particular, the Federal Government must address the recent and alarming rise in online fraud, identity theft, and misuse of information online.

One key step in reducing online fraud and identity theft is to increase the level of trust associated with identities in cyberspace. While this Strategy recognizes the value of anonymity for many online transactions (e.g., blog postings), for other types of transactions (e.g., online banking or accessing electronic health records) it is important that the parties to that transaction have a high degree of trust that they are interacting with known entities.  Spoofed websites, stolen passwords, and compromised login accounts are all symptoms of an untrustworthy computing environment. This Strategy seeks to identify ways to raise the level of trust associated with the identities of individuals, organizations, services, and devices involved in certain types of online transactions.  The Strategy’s vision is:

Individuals and organizations utilize secure, efficient, easy-to-use, and interoperable identity solutions to access online services in a manner that promotes confidence, privacy, choice, and innovation.  More specifically, the Strategy defines and promotes an Identity Ecosystem that supports trusted online environments. The Identity Ecosystem is an online environment where individuals, organizations, services, and devices can trust each other because authoritative sources establish and authenticate their digital identities. The Identity Ecosystem enables:

•   Security, by making it more difficult for adversaries to compromise online transactions;
•   Efficiency based on convenience for individuals who may choose to manage fewer passwords or accounts than they do today, and for the private sector, which stands to benefit from a reduction in paper-based and account management processes;
•   Ease-of-use by automating identity solutions whenever possible and basing them on technology that is easy to operate with minimal training;
•   Confidence that digital identities are adequately protected, thereby increasing the use of the Internet for various types of online transactions;
•   Increased privacy for individuals, who rely on their data being handled responsibly and who are routinely informed about those who are collecting their data and the purposes for which it is being used;

Greater choice, as identity credentials and devices are offered by providers using interoperable platforms; and

•   Opportunities for innovation, as service providers develop or expand the services offered online, particularly those services that are inherently higher in risk;

Privacy protection and voluntary participation are pillars of the Identity Ecosystem. The Identity Ecosystem protects anonymous parties by keeping their identity a secret and sharing only the information necessary to complete the transaction.  For example, the Identity Ecosystem allows an individual to provide age without releasing birth date, name, address, or other identifying data.  At the other end of the spectrum, the Identity Ecosystem supports transactions that require high assurance of a participant’s identity. The Identity Ecosystem reduces the risk of exploitation of information by unauthorized access through more robust access control techniques.  Finally, participation in the Identity Ecosystem is voluntary for both organizations and individuals.

Another pillar of the Identity Ecosystem is interoperability.  The Identity Ecosystem leverages strong and interoperable technologies and processes to enable the appropriate level of trust across participants.  Interoperability supports identity portability and enables service providers within the Identity Ecosystem to accept a variety of credential and identification media types. The Identity Ecosystem does not rely on the government to be the sole identity provider.  Instead, interoperability enables a variety of public and private sector identity providers to participate in the Identity Ecosystem.

Interoperability and privacy protection combine to create a user-centric Identity Ecosystem.  User- centricity will allow individuals to select the interoperable credential appropriate for the transaction. Through the creation and adoption of privacy-enhancing policies and standards, individuals will have the ability to transmit no more than the amount of information necessary for the transaction, unless they choose otherwise. In addition, such standards will inhibit the linking of an individual’s transactions and credential use by service providers. Individuals will have more confidence that they exchange information with the appropriate parties, securely transmit that information, and have the information protected in accordance with privacy best practices.

With the vision of the Identity Ecosystem in mind, the National Strategy for Trusted Identities in Cyberspace (NSTIC) identifies the following goals:

Goal 1:   Develop a comprehensive Identity Ecosystem Framework

Goal 2:   Build and implement an interoperable identity infrastructure aligned with the Identity Ecosystem Framework

Goal 3:   Enhance confidence and willingness to participate in the Identity Ecosystem

Goal 4:   Ensure the long-term success of the Identity Ecosystem

The first two goals focus on designing and building the necessary governance, policy, standards, and infrastructure to enable secure delivery of online services.  The third goal targets the necessary privacy protections and the education and awareness required to encourage adoption by individuals and businesses. The fourth establishes the mechanisms to promote continued development and improvement of the Identity Ecosystem over time.

Nine high-priority actions align to these goals and the vision.  These actions provide the foundation for the Identity Ecosystem implementation. The actions are:

Action 1:   Designate a Federal Agency to Lead the Public/Private Sector Efforts Associated with Achieving the Goals of the Strategy

Action 2:   Develop a Shared, Comprehensive Public/Private Sector Implementation Plan

Action 3:   Accelerate the Expansion of Federal Services, Pilots, and Policies that Align with the Identity Ecosystem

Action 4:   Work Among the Public/Private Sectors to Implement Enhanced Privacy Protections

Action 5:   Coordinate the Development and Refinement of Risk Models and Interoperability Standards

Action 6:   Address the Liability Concerns of Service Providers and Individuals

Action 7:   Perform Outreach and Awareness Across all Stakeholders

Action 8:   Continue Collaborating in International Efforts

Action 9:   Identify Other Means to Drive Adoption of the Identity Ecosystem across the Nation

All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately


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Anatomy of a Red Team Attack
June 2007 (p.30)
Written by By Wes Iversen, Managing Editor

A Red Team test involves an all-out attempt to covertly gain access to a company’s critical plant control systems, using both cyber and physical means. These guys haven’t failed yet, and they’ve never been caught. Here’s a close-up look at how they do it.

It’s 2 a.m. at a major industrial facility, and about 20 yards from the rear perimeter, two figures dressed in full camouflage gear are slinking along the tree line just outside the plant fence. They’re wearing backpacks and carrying various paraphernalia, pausing occasionally to peer through night vision monoculars to scan the plant perimeter.

Suddenly, a plant guard patrol vehicle rounds the corner of a building, its headlights shining in the direction of the pair. Both quickly drop, falling on their bellies in the mud and standing water from the previous night’s rain. The guard vehicle passes, and the pair remain undetected.

Minutes later, the two figures reach a spot where trees and tall grass provide some cover; they pull out a laptop computer and attach an antenna, which they aim toward the plant campus. They remain in the area for an additional two hours, deploying their gear to scan for radio frequencies emanating from the plant, while observing guard patrol schedules and looking for holes in the fence or other perimeter breach points. At around 4 a.m., the pair end their surveillance and sneak away undetected.

Only a few days later, the intelligence gathered during the nighttime surveillance by these two individuals—members of a four-man covert team—will be put to use, together with information from other daytime and nighttime reconnaissance visits. In broad daylight, the team will use what they’ve learned to send one of their members through a weak point in the perimeter fence and into the plant campus.

Once inside, this individual, disguised as a contractor, will brazenly walk directly into the plant’s control room, where he will plug his laptop computer into the plant’s control network. Meanwhile, another of the team members will be simultaneously attempting to talk his way past the guard at the plant’s front gate. At the same time, the team’s other two members will be infiltrating a nearby plant office building. None of these covert activities will be discovered by plant security, though the second imposter will be held up by a suspicious front-gate guard.

Covert operations

These men could have been bad guys, intent on doing harm. Thankfully, however, they were only posing as bad guys—members of an industrial “Red Team” hired by the plant’s owner. The team’s mission: to covertly gain access to the plant’s critical control systems, using whatever means necessary, short of doing any harm.

“A Red Team test is basically an all-out attempt to gain access to the client’s systems, whether it be completely through the network from a remote location, or by gaining physical access at one of their sites that is networked together,” explains Jonathan Pollet, one of the four Red Team members, and founder of PlantData Technologies Inc., a Houston-based industrial security consulting company that was acquired last year by Verano Inc., Mansfield, Mass. Verano recently changed its corporate name, and is now known as Industrial Defender Inc.

The company specializes in cyber security for real-time control and SCADA environments (for supervisory control and data acquisition) in critical infrastructure industries. Clients include oil and gas, chemical, power, water and transportation companies. Pollet serves as vice president of professional services for Industrial Defender, and continues to head up the former PlantData consulting operation, now known as Industrial Defender Consulting Services. Over the past six years, this organization has conducted more than 60 control system cyber security assessments for clients. These range from standard cyber vulnerability assessments to more extensive cyber penetration tests and all-out Red Team attacks.

In most cases, only top personnel at a plant know when a Red Team test has been commissioned. Information technology (IT) and security staffs are not tipped off. “We carry letters from the top people in the [client] company with 24/7 phone numbers, so that if we do get caught, we don’t go to jail that night,” says Clint Bodungen, a security consultant who is a member of the Industrial Defender Red Team.

A Red Team test can sometimes be mostly cyber-based. “If we can penetrate through the Internet, get through the corporate network and find the specific plant network that we’re looking for, then almost all of it is cyber,” says Ty Bodell, another of the Red Team members. But that scenario is rare, he adds; in most cases, a covert physical entry into the plant is required.

A major objective of the physical entry is to attach a wireless access device to the plant network. Once this is accomplished, the team can access the plant network wirelessly from outside the facility—parked on a nearby street or in a plant parking lot, for instance—taking all the time needed to probe the network.

To be sure, the idea of a covert systems penetration attempt—even by friendly cyber security contractors—often makes process control companies nervous. Many first-time clients fear the test may adversely impact their systems. The Industrial Defender team attempts to allay those fears by pointing to the control systems expertise of many of its staff members, says Pollet, himself a former automation engineer for Chevron USA. “And we do have some rules of engagement that we sign off with the customer, which makes our process very safe.”

To provide readers with a better awareness of the ways in which a determined group of motivated hackers, cyber terrorists or other criminals might attempt to gain access to their company’s critical control systems, Automation World interviewed Pollet and other Red Team members. We asked them to describe a Red Team test from start to finish, and to let us in on some of the tricks and techniques used to crack a company’s security defenses. Following is a report on what we learned.

Who are they?

When a client signs up for a Red Team test, the team is often provided with nothing more than the name of the client company. So the team’s first task is to discover all that it can about the customer. On the cyber side, this begins with research using publicly available Internet sources, says Bodell, who typically works with Patrick Turner, the fourth Red Team member, on most of the team’s cyber activities.

“We’ll research what types of domain names the client has and the IP (Internet Protocol) address ranges they have,” says Bodell. “Typically, we’ll Google for e-mail addresses of people from the company in relevant positions like the IT and process control groups.” This information will be passed along for use in “social engineering” activities by the physical penetration team later, who may benefit by “name dropping” as they try to talk their way into a plant. Online sources of information that often prove useful include company press releases, mailing lists and Internet forums, Bodell observes.

As part of their research, Bodell and Turner also typically use Google Earth software to obtain satellite pictures of the target plant, as an aid to determining the best locations for physical surveillance and eventual surreptitious entry.

Also during the reconnaissance phase, the pair begin Internet-based scanning of computer ports discovered at the target company or plant, in an effort to gain information on systems and services, and to assess vulnerabilities. Taking what Turner calls a “slow and low” approach, they scan only a few ports at a time, as way to avoid detection by the target company’s IT security group.


While the cyber discovery work is going on, the team is also performing both nighttime and daytime physical surveillance of the target plant. Bodell often teams with Bodungen for this activity; it was a nighttime reconnaissance mission by this pair that is described in the opening paragraphs of this story.

The team is typically able to gather as much information as it needs during four trips to a target plant—twice at night and twice during the day, says Bodungen. During the nighttime visits, the team will generally prowl the plant perimeter, looking for potential entry routes into the plant, and scanning for in-plant wireless frequencies that may be leaking from the plant, as well as for frequencies used by plant guards.

“We’re also looking for key buildings that are either well-lit or high traffic, and have lots of wires running to them or maybe lots of fans on the back, indicating a data center,” says Bodungen. “We’ll pass that information on to the penetration team, because they may be locations of network access, which is what we’re targeting.”

During nighttime visits, the pair typically tries not to be seen. But daytime surveillance techniques involve what Bodungen calls “hiding in plain sight.” For example, “we may get a plain white truck out there near the plant and put orange cones around us and act like we’re doing surveying work,” says Bodungen. Typically, Bodell and Bodungen will also spend time sitting in a car in a plant parking lot, “just acting like we’re supposed to be there,” he adds. The pair change locations frequently and use different vehicles each time they return.

During the daytime surveillance, the pair take numerous photos, including close-ups of employee and contractor badges, as an aid to making their own fake badges later. “As people walk past our car in the parking lot, we inconspicuously snap pictures,” says Bodungen. They also take special note of the color and other details of contractor uniforms. “Typically, employees know each other. Contractors are in and out, so we can usually slip in and out of a plant a lot easier [disguised] as a contractor,” Bodungen explains.

When it is time to enter the plant, the team assesses its options based on the intelligence it has gathered. In most cases, a daytime entry carries less risk. “Usually at nighttime, people know we’re not supposed to be there, so if they see us, we’re caught,” Bodungen says. “But during the daytime, it doesn’t matter if they see us, as long as we look the part.”

The team typically attempts two entries simultaneously at different places by different team members, each carrying wireless access points to be planted inside. This increases the chances of success. “If one of us gets caught, the guards would go on alert, and we wouldn’t have a second chance,” Bodell explains. “So we’ll strike at the same time.”

Pollet typically attempts one of those entries, most often disguised as a contractor. “Sometimes, we actually go through the front gate with a [fake] work order that tells people we’re supposed to be there,” says Pollet. But in the case described in the opening scene, the team decided to send Pollet in through a rear area of the plant where surveillance had revealed an easy entrance point through the perimeter. We’ll pick up more of that story here:


Wearing a hard hat with safety glasses, and a fake contractor badge and uniform, Pollet carries a duffle bag containing a wireless access point, hubs, switches, a laptop computer and various gear to connect the computer to the plant network. Once inside the plant environment, he walks around freely, nodding to others, who typically smile and nod back. “It’s a Friday, so most of these guys have got one thing in mind—heading out for the weekend,” he surmises.

In search of a control room, he tries the doors on several likely looking buildings. “If they’re open, I walk right in,” Pollet says. He eventually hits pay dirt; as he enters one building, he sees two men standing outside the door to what is obviously a control room containing SCADA terminals and other equipment. He walks up to the pair and begins making small talk: “Man, I’m glad it’s Friday…”

After they chat for a few minutes, Pollet saunters into the control room, goes directly to a jack and begins plugging in his laptop. A few minutes later, the two men enter the room, pull up chairs and continue talking. They don’t ask Pollet what he is doing. “While I’m talking with them, I’m basically scanning their network,” says Pollet. “I’ve got various programs running in the background, bringing back the names of their computers, their IP addresses, operating systems and the kinds of applications they’re running.”

When he is left alone, Pollet takes pictures of the control room equipment, and also snaps pictures of himself sitting at a control station, to be used in the wrap-up report to the client. He also attaches his wireless access device, hiding it in a bundle of wires in a SCADA console cabinet.

Uh oh

While this is going on, Bodungen, also dressed as a contractor, is attempting to join Pollet by entering through the plant’s front gate. He’s got a fake work order. But he runs into trouble. The front gate guard can’t find the contractor name on his list. And the more Bodungen tries to convince the guard that he is legitimate, the more suspicious the guard becomes.

At this point, Bodungen goes to his exit plan; he makes a phone call to Bodell and Turner, who are in another location. Bodungen fakes a conversation on the cell phone, then tells the guard that he was mistakenly dropped at the wrong work site. Someone will come by shortly to pick him up, he says. This immediately relaxes the guard. “His suspicion goes away, because now he has a reason for me to be there,” Bodungen relates. “So I figure that I can use the opportunity to gather some more recon close up.”

While “waiting for his ride,” Bodungen chats with the guard, who is now comfortable enough to leave Bodungen alone in the guard shack on several occasions. “I could have grabbed a handful of badges, because they were just hanging there, or I could have sneaked out the back and gone on into the plant,” says Bodungen. He does neither. But he is there long enough to observe the strict exit procedures practiced by the guard; Bodungen calls Pollet and advises him not to try leaving by the front gate—the original plan—but to instead exit the same way he entered, through the rear perimeter.

Meanwhile, Bodell and Turner are trying a different penetration approach. During surveillance, the team had identified an office building that is not within the plant fence boundaries, but has cables running from it into the plant environment.
They suspect the building may be on the plant network. Dressed in office casual clothing, they enter through the front door, walk past an unmanned security desk, ignoring the sign-in sheet, and proceed unchallenged into the building. “We have our laptops out, with antennas sticking out, looking around as though we’re doing a wireless signals survey,” says Bodell. “But we never have to use our story, because nobody talks to us.”

The pair locate a printer room, where they attach and conceal a wireless access point, then quickly leave the building. Back in their car in a nearby lot, they successfully connect to the access point, and find themselves on the plant network. They call Pollet, who is still in the plant control room, and tell him to retrieve his access point and get out. “Since we had an access point working outside, we didn’t need to risk having to do the more difficult penetration back into the plant later to retrieve an access point there,” Bodell explains.

Bodell and Turner drive to the plant front gate and pick up Bodungen, then pick up Pollet exiting the plant at the designated spot, and the team goes home for the day.

From here on, the physical work is done, and rest of the Red Team attack is cyber penetration testing. With an access point in place, team members are free to come back, park on a nearby street or a plant parking lot, and take their time probing the network. “We usually choose a time that’s late at night on the weekend, or maybe at 5 p.m. on a Friday so the cars are still there and we don’t look suspicious,” says Bodell.

“At this point, since we have access to a production plant network, our next steps have to be really careful ones, because we don’t want to shut the plant down,” Bodell observes. While probing the network, the team may grab screen shots or evidence data to prove that they were there. Depending on the client contract rules of engagement, the team may stop the test once network administrator access is obtained, for example, or when it achieves whatever is deemed to be “the keys to the city,” as Bodell puts it.

Wrap up

At the end of an engagement, Industrial Defender’s Red Team consultants provide a complete report with narrative, photos and screen shots detailing vulnerabilities uncovered and mitigation recommendations.

Commonly encountered cyber vulnerabilities include uninstalled control system software patches that are not yet on vendors’ approved patch lists, says Bodell, as well as weaknesses involving unsecured legacy network hardware. The team typically stresses the importance of “layered” security defenses. On the physical side, fixes often include obvious items such as repairing holes in perimeter fences and correctly positioning motion sensors. The team often also recommends stepped-up user awareness training and testing for plant guards, control staff and other employees.

In all, the Industrial Defender consultants have performed a total of five full-blown Red Team tests, in each case achieving their objective without being discovered. Based on what they’ve seen to date, the team believes that most industrial plants could benefit from better coordination between traditionally separate cyber security and physical security staffs.

“One thing that is important for companies to understand is that even if they have strong cyber controls, their physical security, or lack thereof, can also provide a huge attack vector into their process control networks,” Bodungen advises.

Offline chrisfromchi

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Oh good i don't have to repost this story.

Offline birther truther tenther

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The Red Team has plausible deniability.  If the false flag doesn't go as planned, they can claim "it was just a test of the security system."

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Re: Brad Meltzer was hired by George HW Bush to attack US cities with WMDs
« Reply #7 on: January 15, 2011, 08:04:35 pm »
(U//FOUO) DHS “Red Cell” Report: Thinking Beyond Mass Transit For Next Homeland Attack
August 31, 2010 in Department of Homeland Security

DHS Analytic Red Cell

4 pages

For Official Use Only

July 21, 2005

A Homeland strike soon after the London attacks is conceivable but unlikely, and if and when it comes, it could just as well be on other “soft targets” as on mass transit. These were the conclusions of 18 leading academic terrorism experts, former senior National Security Council and DHS officials, mass transit security specialists, and other nongovernmental experts and creative thinkers polled by the DHS Analytic Red Cell immediately after the July 7 attacks.

• Many Red Cell participants said terrorists would probably remain focused for now on striking other Western nations rather than the Homeland.

• If terrorists attacked, participants believed smallscaleattacks against mass transit were possible but other “soft targets”—like malls, hotels, schools, and public gathering places—were just as attractive. Few mentioned terrorists attacking or exploiting air transit or planning “the big one.”

• Other concerns centered on the possible threats from indigenous jihadists and from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems.

The Red Cell participants’ remarks highlighted the challenge in defending such a wide range of soft targets, suggesting the heightened importance not only of existing protective measures, but also overseas counterterrorism efforts, tight border controls and robust emergency preparedness and response capabilities.

• For some, London brought renewed attention to the possibility of closed circuit television as a potential preventive and investigative tool.

Concern Over Future Homeland Attack, But Attack No More Likely Than Before

The participants showed concern over prospects for a future jihadist attack against the Homeland, but did not maintain that such an attack was any more likely as a result of the London bombings.

• According to some, the attack was an “ominous” reminder of the continued operational capabilities of Islamic jihadists. Terrorists’ long-term goals for attacking the Homeland remain steadfast, and their planning for attacks against the Homeland may even be under way. One Red Cell participant said the London attacks “countered the perception that terrorists are running scared.”

• Some expressed concern about the increased risk of copy-cat attacks against the Homeland by individual jihadists or sympathetic groups. The London attacks likely would inspire and empower others to continue planning.

Red Cell participants largely believed that, while al-Qaida (AQ) leaders were likely engaged in long-term planning for an attack on the United States, most jihadists were focused on striking targets in Western Europe—with it being “London’s turn” last week.

• Some speculated that AQ leadership remains interested in large-scale “grandiose” attacks in the United States, but has delegated operational authority to local cells willing to engage in less spectacular attacks that put pressure on U.S. allies in the war in Iraq.

• Others pointed out how the attacks coincided with a unique event—the G-8 summit—and were likely meant to send a signal to the United Kingdom regarding cooperation with the United States. (See Red Cell Report, “The G-8 Summit: An Opportune Time for a Terrorist Attack?” of May 14, 2004)

Mass Transit Systems Are a Target . . .

Participants showed heightened concern that the London attack, like the Madrid attack before it, signals that mass transit in the Homeland is a potential target. Additionally, they viewed attacks during rush hour as most likely to cause panic and economic disruption.

• Trains, buses, subways and their supporting infrastructure, such as platforms and stations, were identified as the most likely targets. Major metropolitan areas were of particular concern.

• Participants also frequently cited bridges and tunnels as attractive transit targets.

. . . But Other Soft Targets Remain Attractive

Participants, however, were nearly unanimous in their belief that London showed that AQ related elements might seek to attack a broader range of homeland soft targets than just mass transit. They also consistently suggested terrorists might prefer major urban areas for soft target selection, though some opined that attacks on the heartland also would be devastating.

• Shopping malls, hotels, convention centers, and other economic targets with retail themes were frequently identified because of their high population densities and lesser security measures. Schools and even police stations also were noted for their shock value.

• Participants also said that terrorists would consider many other targets that generate large gatherings, such as national monuments or theme parks.

• Most respondents shied away from the air transportation infrastructure because, as one said, there were simply “too many checks” at airports for a prospective attacker to overcome.

• One participant expressed concern about cyber-related attacks.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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Re: Brad Meltzer was hired by George HW Bush to attack US cities with WMDs
« Reply #8 on: January 15, 2011, 08:05:16 pm »
Mark Dice & Alex Jones Talk About Decoded's Brad Meltzer and the 'Inner Circle'
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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Re: Brad Meltzer was hired by George HW Bush to attack US cities with WMDs
« Reply #9 on: January 15, 2011, 08:10:06 pm »
Cyber War Games using "Red Teams" to prep for cyber false flags

Inside NSA Red Team Secret Ops With Government's Top Hackers'print','4270420','/technology/military_law/4270420.html?nav=hpPrint');
By Glenn Derene Published on: June 30, 2008

When it comes to the U.S. government’s computer security, we in the tech press have a habit of reporting only the bad news—for instance, last year’s hacks into Oak Ridge and Los Alamos National Labs, a break-in to an e-mail server used by Defense Secretary Robert Gates ... the list goes on and on. Frankly that’s because the good news is usually a bunch of nonevents: “Hackers deterred by diligent software patching at the Army Corps of Engineers.” Not too exciting.

So, in the world of IT security, it must seem that the villains outnumber the heroes—but there are some good-guy celebrities in the world of cyber security. In my years of reporting on the subject, I’ve often heard the National Security Agency’s red team referred to with a sense of breathless awe by security pros. These guys are purported to be just about the stealthiest, most skilled firewall-crackers in the game. Recently, I called up the secretive government agency and asked if it could offer up a top red teamer for an interview, and, surprisingly, the answer came back, “Yes.”

What are red teams, you ask? They’re sort of like the special forces units of the security industry—highly skilled teams that clients pay to break into the clients’ own networks. These guys find the security flaws so they can be patched before someone with more nefarious plans sneaks in. The NSA has made plenty of news in the past few years for warrantless wiretapping and massive data-mining enterprises of questionable legality, but one of the agency’s primary functions is the protection of the military’s secure computer networks, and that’s where the red team comes in.

In exchange for the interview, I agreed not to publish my source’s name. When I asked what I should call him, the best option I was offered was: “An official within the National Security Agency’s Vulnerability Analysis and Operations Group.” So I’m just going to call him OWNSAVAOG for short. And I’ll try not to reveal any identifying details about the man whom I interviewed, except to say that his disciplined, military demeanor shares little in common with the popular conception of the flippant geek-for-hire familiar to all too many movie fans (Dr. McKittrick in WarGames) and code geeks (n00b script-kiddie h4x0r in leetspeak).

So what exactly does the NSA’s red team actually do? They provide “adversarial network services to the rest of the DOD,” says OWNSAVAOG. That means that “customers” from the many branches of the Pentagon invite OWNSAVAOG and his crew to act like our country’s shadowy enemies (from the living-in-his-mother’s-basement code tinkerer to a “well-funded hacker who has time and money to invest in the effort”), attempting to slip in unannounced and gain unauthorized access.

These guys must conduct their work without doing damage to or otherwise compromising the security of the networks they are tasked to analyze—that means no denial-of-service attacks, malicious Trojans or viruses. “The first rule,” says OWNSAVAOG, “is ‘do no harm.’?” So the majority of their work consists of probing their customers’ networks, gaining user-level access and demonstrating just how compromised the network can be. Sometimes, the red team will leave an innocuous file on a secure part of a customer’s network as a calling card, as if to say, “This is your friendly NSA red team. We danced past the comical precautionary measures you call security hours ago. This file isn’t doing anything, but if we were anywhere near as evil as the hackers we’re simulating, it might just be deleting the very government secrets you were supposed to be protecting. Have a nice day!”

I’d heard from one of the Department of Defense clients who had previously worked with the NSA red team that OWNSAVAOG and his team had a success rate of close to 100 percent. “We don’t keep statistics on that,” OWNSAVAOG insisted when I pressed him on an internal measuring stick. “We do get into most of the networks we target. That’s because every network has some residual vulnerability. It is up to us, given the time and the resources, to find the vulnerability that allows us to access it.”

It may seem unsettling to you—it did at first to me—to think that the digital locks protecting our government’s most sensitive information are picked so constantly and seemingly with such ease. But I’ve been assured that these guys are only making it look easy because they’re the best, and that we all should take comfort, because they’re on our side. The fact that they catch security flaws early means that, hopefully, we can patch up the holes before the black hats get to them.

And like any good geek at a desk talking to a guy with a really cool job, I wondered just where the NSA finds the members of its superhacker squad. “The bulk is military personnel, civilian government employees and a small cadre of contractors,” OWNSAVAOG says. The military guys mainly conduct the ops (the actual breaking and entering stuff), while the civilians and contractors mainly write code to support their endeavors. For those of you looking for a gig in the ultrasecret world of red teaming, this top hacker says the ideal profile is someone with “technical skills, an adversarial mind-set, perseverance and imagination.”

Speaking of high-level, top-secret security jobs, this much I now know: The world’s most difficult IT department to work for is most certainly lodged within the Pentagon. Network admins at the Defense Department have to constantly fend off foreign governments, criminals and wannabes trying to crack their security wall—and worry about a bunch of ace hackers with the same DOD stamp on their paychecks.

Security is an all-important issue for the corporate world, too, but in that environment there is an acceptable level of risk that can be built into the business model. And while banks build in fraud as part of the cost of doing business, there’s no such thing as an acceptable loss when it comes to national security. I spoke about this topic recently with Mark Morrison, chief information assurance officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

“We meet with the financial community because there are a lot of parallels between what the intelligence community needs to protect and what the financial community needs,” Morrison said. “They, surprisingly, have staggeringly high acceptance levels for how much money they’re willing to lose. We can’t afford to have acceptable loss. So our risk profiles tend to be different, but in the long run, we end up accepting similar levels of risk because we have to be able to provide actionable intelligence to the war fighter.”

OWNSAVAOG agrees that military networks should be held to higher standards of security, but perfectly secure computers are perfectly unusable. “There is a perfectly secure network,” he said. “It’s one that’s shut off. We used to keep our information in safes. We knew that those safes were good, but they were not impenetrable, and they were rated on the number of hours it took for people to break into them. This is a similar equation.”

The comments are very eye opening and thought provoking.  Here is one:

The red team used to be the guys who attacked the nuclear power plants. The Iraqi WMD inspectors and the CIA leaks about the inspectors and the secret OO's training at universities in WMD, by the way the same as Rice's training, led to Plame and her leak of how Ames was arrested. She was a leak from the beginning and the history after 95 and the Ames arrest is just her showing how she leaked the Ames arrest. The CIA analysts, linguists hired by CIA during their 'we must have more HUMINT,' have all moved over to DoD NSA. The OOs are still fighting over domestic powers that CIA has and the DIA doesn't - Plame's domestic intelligence and her dad's work at NSA. So, we have an old leak from Ames - she operated the same as Ames - and the CIA moving to NSA. CIA would call this a classic penetration of military intelligence. DIA might think about Los Alamos and the laptops and Iran and the laptops. The red team hackers are dealing with all this and maybe they should wonder a bit about who is ordering the hacking. The adversarial network is already there. The real time monitoring of what is typed into the computer is old. You might be typing and the typing is taken over by a monitor asking 'what are you typing?'
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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Re: Brad Meltzer was hired by George HW Bush to attack US cities with WMDs
« Reply #10 on: January 15, 2011, 08:26:03 pm »

Defense-Information Assurance Red Team

June 2000

The nature of war is changing. More and more the Department of Defense (DOD) is employing computers, networks, global telecommunication systems, and satellites to support it in performing its diverse national security missions. Today, the DOD has more than 2 million computers, 10,000 local area networks, and 100 long-distance networks. This technology helps to identify and track enemy targets, pay soldiers, and manage supplies. The technology also acts as a critical force multiplier by helping to ensure that appropriate military resources are used exactly when and where required.

But this same advanced communications technology can be the military’s Achilles’ heel. In part this is due to the DOD’s necessary reliance on the Internet and the public telephone switch systems, which are the critical backbone of the DOD.

The DOD is actively pursuing solutions to defeat growing threats to its lines of communications. One of the best ways to prepare for the cyber threat is through the use of an information assurance Red Team, which is an independent, interdisciplinary, simulated enemy force. After proper safeguards are established, the team uses active and passive techniques to expose and exploit information assurance vulnerabilities of friendly forces. The results are used as a means to improve those forces' readiness.

Recognizing the importance of this activity, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence/Information Assurance requested MITRE's assistance to develop a uniform Red Team methodology.

Lead Information Security Engineer Julie Connolly described the process: "We began by visiting various government and commercial organizations with Red Team experience to better understand their perspectives and threat environment. Using the information we gained, and building on our own Red Team experience, we drew up the Defense-Information Assurance Red Team Methodology (D-IART). Also, a CD containing a Multimedia Red Team overview and tutorial was created. The D-IART methodology offers clear guidance on how to conduct Red Team activities to ensure that all actions are done in a consistent, sensible, and non-destructive manner. As you might imagine, putting the D-IART together took time and determination. The result has been well received by the user community."

Good reasons to use a Red Team:

    * A Red Team identifies vulnerabilities overlooked by system developers an defenders.
    * Red Teams can demonstrate potential harm a real attacker could inflict.
    * Red Teams contribute to the selection of cost-effective countermeasures.

The DOD began using information assurance Red Teams several years ago.They have been very effective in improving the DOD’s information assurance posture and in highlighting areas needing improvement. However, to assess DOD-wide information assurance readiness, a consistent approach for conducting and assessing Red Team activities across the DOD was needed. MITRE answered the need with a methodology that is flexible, easy to understand, and draws upon Red Team expertise within government and industry. The methodology also helps to ensure that all Red Team activities have consistency of purpose, a commonality of structure, and produce meaningful and comparable results.

The methodology guides those responsible for Red Team activities through the specific steps required to organize, tailor, and conduct their activities, and to aid in after-action analysis. It provides clear, step-by-step guidance through the pre-planning, planning, attack, and post-attack phases of a Red Team activity and includes a checklist of the steps for each phase. Clearly described are the roles and responsibilities of the participants in the four phases. This includes the personnel leading and making up the Red Team, the personnel making up the BlueTeam (the defenders), and the personnel making up the WhiteTeam (the referees).

The methodology’s flexibility allows for easy adaptation for activities ranging from small stand-alone systems to joint, multinational exercises. It is also applicable when the goal of the activity is to emphasize training, and when demonstrating the existence of vulnerabilities in the targeted systems.

The Red Team methodology can be applied to environments ranging from narrowly focused, highly limited exercises, to large-scale, joint activities. The methodology is also flexible enough to handle Red Team attacks of various depths of penetration and associated complexities. Attacks of significant impact demonstrate clearly the potential harm a real attacker could inflict. In other environments, adverse impacts on the operations of the defender system may require that the depth of attack be severely limited.

Controlling the potential harm that may result from a Red Team activity is a major component of the methodology. This includes providing guidance to ensure that the appropriate legal approval is obtained prior to initiating attacks, clearly defining the rules of engagement for the Red, Blue, and White team members, and clearly delineating the circumstances for emergency containment and halting of the activity.

To maximize the lessons learned from Red Team activities, the results must be quantified and used as a basis of comparison. To help achieve this goal, the methodology provides guidance with regard to data gathering and metrics.

In short, the Red Team methodology provides guidance for maximizing the benefits of a Red Team activity, and at the same time provides guidance to help avoid some of the pitfalls and traps that can occur if precautions are not taken.

Attacks on the DOD and the national information Infrastructure have been growing for over a decade

1986—As described in Clifford Stoll’s 1990 book, The Cuckoo's Egg, German hackers broke 400 military network computers in 1986. These attacks included Army computers at Fort Stewart, Georgia; Navy Coastal Systems Computers at Panama City, Florida; and Air Force computers at the Systems Command Space Division in El Segundo, California.

1988—The Internet Worm virtually crippled the Internet, bringing down thousands of computers. Kevin Mitnick began a decade of cyber-terrorism by breaking into systems owned by DEC and MCI.

1990—Dutch hackers began a 3-year attack on DOD systems, resulting in the penetration of 34 systems.

1994—Hackers from Great Britain attacked systems of the Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome Research Site; Wright Patterson Air Force Base; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Goddard Space Flight Center. The attack against the Rome Research Site systems alone is estimated to have cost the government $500,000.

1994—Hackers from Great Britain, Finland, and Canada attacked 24 servers that supported the U.S. Naval Academy.

1995—A hacker from Argentina broke into computers of NASA, the Naval Research Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory.

1996—Hackers vandalized the Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Justice home pages.

1996—The General Accounting Office released its report, “Information Security: computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks.” The report stated that attacks on government computers were a serious and growing threat. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) estimated that 250,000 attacks were launched against DOD systems in 1995. DISA also estimated that external attacks were successful 65 percent of the time, and only 1 out of every 150 attacks was actually detected and reported by system operators.

1997—Both the Air Force and NASA home pages were vandalized, and there were unconfirmed reports that State Department computers were hacked.

1998—Teenage hackers broke into 11 Pentagon systems in what was called the “most organized and systematic attack” to date. The exercise, Eligible Receiver, found vulnerabilities in a large number of DOD systems.

Page last updated: October 15, 2000
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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Re: Brad Meltzer was hired by George HW Bush to attack US cities with WMDs
« Reply #11 on: April 01, 2011, 12:33:10 am »
I wonder who the red cells are that are simulating STUXNET meltdowns. Wonder if they will go public.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline cbodungen

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Re: Brad Meltzer was hired by George HW Bush to attack US cities with WMDs
« Reply #13 on: February 02, 2015, 12:35:53 pm »
I was surprised to find my name associated with such an interesting topic! I know that this is an old thread, but I'd be happy to entertain any conversations about my dealings with Red Team operations. FYI - Nothing I did/do was ever "classified". Some of the things I currently do are restricted by NDA so I can't get into anything current. As for past operations, I can't disclose company and individual names but I can talk about operational scenarios, methods, techniques, purpose, etc.

Best Regards,

Clint Bodungen


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Re: Brad Meltzer was hired by George HW Bush to attack US cities with WMDs
« Reply #14 on: February 09, 2015, 04:49:52 am »
I was surprised to find my name associated with such an interesting topic! I know that this is an old thread, but I'd be happy to entertain any conversations about my dealings with Red Team operations. FYI - Nothing I did/do was ever "classified". Some of the things I currently do are restricted by NDA so I can't get into anything current. As for past operations, I can't disclose company and individual names but I can talk about operational scenarios, methods, techniques, purpose, etc.

Best Regards,

Clint Bodungen

Welcome to the forum.

I do not have a specific question, but I am interested in anything you might have to say.
My first thought is the simplistic "What is it like doing this kind of work ?"

Offline Jacob Law

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Re: Brad Meltzer was hired by George HW Bush to attack US cities with WMDs
« Reply #15 on: February 09, 2015, 07:03:52 am »
I was surprised to find my name associated with such an interesting topic! I know that this is an old thread, but I'd be happy to entertain any conversations about my dealings with Red Team operations. FYI - Nothing I did/do was ever "classified". Some of the things I currently do are restricted by NDA so I can't get into anything current. As for past operations, I can't disclose company and individual names but I can talk about operational scenarios, methods, techniques, purpose, etc.

Best Regards,

Clint Bodungen

Glad to see you on board; may I ask what brought you here?
What do you under-stand?

Offline cbodungen

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Re: Brad Meltzer was hired by George HW Bush to attack US cities with WMDs
« Reply #16 on: March 08, 2015, 02:13:19 pm »
Hey guys, sorry it has taken so long to respond. I thought I would get an email alert when someone posted on this thread but I guess I don't have it set up. To answer what brought me here: Well, I do a bit of OSINT on myself from time to time to make sure what I have exposed isn't violating common OPSEC, or simply embarrassing myself LOL. My name popped here, I found it interesting, and I thought this might be a forum of individuals of like mind to myself, seem to be right, and thought it would be an interesting place to read up and participate.

As far as what it's like doing this kind of work: It's fun. I wouldn't want to do anything else. It's like getting to play cloak and dagger without the danger of actually getting shot. Lately I've been more on the "cyber" side of things. Haven't gotten to do a full out red team in some time. Everything I do is on the commercial side. I haven't worked in DoD since I got out of the Air Force. So, there's never been any reason to think that anything I have done was backed by a potential false flag. Seems to be just a bunch of companies honestly wanting to make sure their systems and facilities are secure. The best way to do that is to get someone to attack you just like a "real bad guy" would.