Author Topic: "Ever Vigilant" CACI International is a FALSE FLAG terror beneficiary  (Read 11176 times)

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Closer Than You Think: The Continuing Threat of Homegrown Terrorism

“Groups affiliated with al Qaeda are now actively targeting the United States and looking to use Americans or Westerners who are able to remain undetected by heightened security measures.” FBI Director Robert Mueller‟s words to the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in September duplicated his statement to the same group last year.1

While the warning was the same, the threat and impact have risen significantly.  Mueller acknowledged that, “it appears domestic radicalization and homegrown extremism is becoming more pronounced based on the number of disruptions and incidents.”2   In the past 18 months, at least 63 American citizens have been charged with or convicted of crimes directly related to terrorism, including 20 so far in 2010.3   In 2009, there were a total of 11 jihadist attacks, jihadist-inspired plots, or efforts by Americans to travel overseas to obtain terrorist training, including the Ft. Hood shootings.4   Some other notable incidents include the December 2009 arrest of five men from Alexandria, Virginia in Pakistan, later charged with planning to fight American soldiers in Afghanistan and a possible attack within the United States; the attempted bombing of Northwest Airlines flight 253 by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab on Christmas Day 2009; and the attempted Times Square bombing in May 2010 by Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani-born U.S. citizen.5

Why has countering this threat proven to be so difficult?  One reason is the reluctance to “call a spade a spade”. For example, the Department of Defense‟s  report about the Ft. Hood shootings failed to mention gunman Nidal Hasan‟s name and motive, particularly  his Muslim faith. Former Army Secretary Togo West and retired Navy admiral Vernon Clark, who led the review, claimed their focus was “with actions and effects, not necessarily with motivations.” Yet many insiders believe that the Pentagon‟s omission of Hasan‟s radicalization was due to political correctness. Representative John Carter, whose district includes Ft. Hood, stated “The report ignores the elephant in the room — radical Islamic terrorism is the enemy.”6

The U.S. is also cited for not having learned from the European experience with domestic terror. “Before the July 7, 2005, suicide attacks on the London transportation system, the British believed that there was perhaps a problem with the Muslim communities in Europe but certainly not with British Muslims in the U.K., who were better integrated, better educated, and wealthier than their counterparts on the Continent.”7 For example, Abdulmutallab came from a wealthy Nigerian family and graduated from a top
British university.

1 Jason Ryan and Pierre Thomas, “Significant Developments in Terror Threats Since 9/11, Officials Say, Napolitano, Mueller, Leiter Discuss Increased Tempo of Attacks Against U.S.”, September 22, 2010,

2 Robert S. Mueller, III, Statement Before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, September
22, 2010,

3 Jordy Yager, “Washington struggling to rein in homegrown terrorism,” The Hill, September 22, 2010,

4 Peter Begman and Bruce Hoffman, Assessing the Terrorist Threat, A Report of the Bipartisan Policy Center’s National Security Preparedness Group, September 10, 2010,

5 “Homegrown Terror,” Washington Post, June 7, 2010, dyn/content/article/2010/06/06/AR2010060603996_pf.html.

6 Mark Thompson, “The Fort Hood Report: Why No Mention of Islam?” Time, January 20, 2010,,8816,1954960,00.html.

7 Bergman and Hoffman, op.cit.

A Duke University study found that most homegrown terror suspects were male, under age 30 and U.S.- born, naturalized citizens or legal residents of the country. However, “Even with the common threads among the cases, researchers said they found no definitive pattern of how the accused were radicalized and no geographic center of extremism in the U.S.”8   For example, Shahzad, who attempted to car bomb Times Square, earned an MBA, had a finance career and lived with his wife and children in Connecticut.

Al-Qaeda has also cleverly changed its ways.  Al Qaeda‟s “diversification” strategy is to mount “attacks involving a wide variety of perpetrators of different nationalities and ethnic heritages to defeat any attempt to „profile‟ actual and would-be perpetrators and to overwhelm already information- overloaded law enforcement.”9   This strategy seems to be the product of the “Americanization” of Al Qaeda‟s leadership and related groups. Radical cleric Anwar al-Awlaki, who grew up in New Mexico, had links to suspects in both the Times Square bombing and the Fort Hood shootings. American David Headley also helped scope targets for the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks.10

The lack of a strategy to deal with this threat had been the Achilles’ heel of U.S. national security. The consequences of not heeding lessons already learned have been considerable.  “Our long-held belief that homegrown terrorism couldn’t happen here has thus created a situation where we are today stumbling blindly through the legal, operational and organizational minefield of countering terrorist radicalization and recruitment occurring in the United States.”11

Progress came earlier this year when homegrown terrorism was designated as one of the country’s top national security priorities. The White House announced that the new strategy included a “new interagency effort that brings together key stakeholders” and “outreach to communities across the country.”12   Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano recently noted “a much stronger level of communication between departments.”  However, she acknowledged that “perhaps in the future officials
should hammer out an overarching written strategy that details a chain of command and operations.”13 For example, there is no organization at the federal level specifically responsible for identifying radicalization or working to prevent terrorist recruitment of U.S. citizens and residents.

“The American  „melting pot‟ has not provided a firewall against the radicalization and recruitment of American citizens and residents, though it has arguably lulled us into a sense of complacency that homegrown terrorism couldn‟t happen in the United States.”14 But it has happened and there are clear indications that they will continue to happen.  The list of potential targets includes more passenger jets, U.S. military bases in America, and western hotel chains.  Suicide bombings within the U.S. are also noted as a real possibility.
Unless the U.S. moves forward from reissued warnings and hammers out a strategy, these potential threats will become a grim reality.
This Snapshot is a sequel to “The Threat Within” from November 2009.

8 “Study: Most homegrown terrorists are U.S. citizens,”, January 6, 2010,

9 Bergman and Hoffman, op.cit.

10 “9/11 Commissioners Warn of Homegrown Terror; Former Heads of Bipartisan Group Say U.S. „Stumbling Blindly‟ in Policy to Counter Domestic Radicalization,”, September 10, 2010,

11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Yager, op.cit.
14 Bergman and Hoffman, op.cit.


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Re: "Ever Vigilant" CACI International is a FALSE FLAG terror beneficiary
« Reply #1 on: December 16, 2010, 07:15:50 am »

Message from CACI Executive Chairman Dr. J.P. (Jack) London – Welcome to

We are pleased to announce this new website - - launched in conjunction with the third in a series of CACI's co-sponsored symposia on Dealing with Today's Asymmetric Threat, held at Fort Myer, VA on March 24. This website is intended to be a central repository for information about a topic that is vitally important to the security of our nation. It's where you'll find an extensive collection of articles, news stories, links and resource information on key experts, as well as full reports on our symposia.

At its most basic level, asymmetric threats or warfare refers to conflicts in which the relative military power of combatants differs considerably. This website is designed to provide a wider understanding of asymmetric threats and advance the dialogue on the national and global security measures needed to counter them. The site will serve as the go-to source for fact-based resources and original research on pertinent themes and events.

The third symposium was on the subject of "smart power" and was co-sponsored by the U.S. Naval Institute (USNI). The first conference (co-sponsored by the National Defense University) was on the need for a national strategy to deal with asymmetric threats. The second session (co-sponsored by USNI) was on "soft power."

The symposia have attracted an array of guests from government agencies and civilian organizations, assembled with the common purpose of developing new thinking on achieving an overarching national strategy that will effectively counter the threats posed by our enemies. These experts attending the sessions have focused on concrete approaches to structural, procedural and resource changes needed to realign the elements of national power against very savvy, very adaptable adversaries.

CACI's organization of these conferences, in coordination with our respected partners, expands national and global thinking, promotes new approaches for solving 21st century problems and continues our service in support of America's highest national priorities.

We welcome your participation! Please visit the website regularly and let us know your comments and suggestions through the convenient feedback feature.

Many thanks for your interest!

    Dr. J.P. (Jack) London
    CACI Executive Chairman,
    Chairman of the Board

Soft Power

Professor Joseph Nye of Harvard University created the term "soft power," which he described as "the ability to shape the preferences of others" and "getting others to want the outcomes you want." Although the phrase was coined in 1990, the concept behind soft power has been evolving for some time.

Government leaders in the U.S. have, for some time, reached a general consensus that there are limits on the efficacy of military force alone in meeting current and future asymmetrical threats. The collective and coordinated strengths of a broad range of government institutions, the private sector and the influence of American culture are needed to effectively meet increasingly asymmetrical challenges and threats.

The current foreign policy dialogue is focusing on soft power. The concept has an important role to play in an integrated national security strategy. While Congress has initiated steps to strengthen the soft power capabilities of federal government departments and agencies, more is needed if the U.S. is to move forward in creating a meaningful and practical security framework in an increasingly complex and interconnected world.

During the Cold War era, the U.S. actively used a rich portfolio of soft power tools and established organizations to promote democratic values and ideals. Examples included cultural tours of foreign capitals, Voice of America and the Peace Corps. When the Cold War ended, the need for these tools seemed to diminish. Many of these soft power initiatives were reduced or eliminated.

In the 1990s a new war of ideas emerged, along with a new set of security threats. These threats came from sources with varying capabilities and agendas that could not be easily deterred solely through hard power (military) means. In the meantime, the U.S. had not done enough to communicate and extend the ideals that promote peaceful and stable societies. American influence was in decline worldwide, and international opinion (exacerbated by internally directed media criticism) of the U.S. steadily decreased, even in allied nations.

It is now clear that the U.S. must invest significant intellectual and financial capital in programs to reverse these trends. We find ourselves at a "strategic inflection point" where the U.S. must reassess our institutions, processes and resources to defeat violent, extremist threats and to promote freedom, development and social justice around the world.

Existing soft power initiatives and agencies, particularly those engaged in development and strategic communications, must be reinvigorated through increased funding, human resources and prioritization. Concurrently, the U.S. government must establish goals, objectives and metrics for soft power initiatives.

The U.S. government, recognizing this need, has taken steps to address these issues. However, to be most effective, the government's renovation of soft power must be part of a broader-scoped national security model. We must coordinate, integrate and synchronize soft power responsibilities and resources among government agencies; centralize operational authority; and streamline the operational chain of command in providing national direction on diplomacy, development and defense.

The next generation of public diplomacy will be engaging in the most important ideological challenge of modern times. To proactively promote abroad the values of democracy, and to revitalize America's international image and prestige, the U.S. government must engage in a variety of soft power initiatives. These initiatives must focus on improving individual welfare and civil society, enhancing the rule of law and order, and developing economic opportunities around the world. These efforts must also be carried out in cooperation with academia, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), international institutions (governmental and non-governmental) and the private sector.

There are several key areas in which the U.S. can effectively improve its soft power initiatives.

    * By providing improved medical care, international health diplomacy can improve international opinion of the U.S., regain trust and moral authority, and even deny terrorists and extremists safe harbor, while engendering some of the best American values.
    * A reinvigorated and proactive strategic communications program is needed to better disseminate the democratic and cultural values of liberty and individual freedoms. Organizations with these responsibilities need to be modernized and empowered, and must take advantage of leading technologies to be successful.
    * By helping other nations establish a robust and dynamic legal framework, initiatives aimed at promoting the rule of law can promote better governance, foster economic development and enable dispute resolution, thereby preserving stability.
    * U.S. businesses have made an indelible mark around the world, from the global and around-the-clock presence of the American media to the worldwide demand for American brands. Their role in American soft power has been extensive. The federal government should continue to promote an integrated and strong U.S. international commercial presence.
    * Furthermore, the U.S. government can better maximize the effectiveness of soft power instruments and efforts through increased partnerships with NGOs. By providing humanitarian and development assistance in areas typically inaccessible to government agencies, NGOs are often able to access potential extremist areas before the government can establish or strengthen diplomatic, developmental or military presence, including intelligence.
    * The U.S. must work with foreign governments and international institutions to strengthen existing partnerships or build new ones that enhance U.S. capabilities to combat and contain the forces of global extremism, terrorist violence and other similar hostile asymmetric threats.

Smart Power

The world has changed significantly in the recent past. A new U.S. administration promises to modify or change the national security structure, renewed tensions in the Middle East have escalated global threats and the worldwide financial crisis has worsened. This is in dramatic contrast to the relative stability of the threat environment that generally characterized the Cold War era. A new and practical national security strategy that will work effectively and best serve the U.S., its allies, and the world is required. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated "…correcting that acute imbalance in American ‘hard' and 'soft' power is likely to prove the single greatest challenge for the next Secretary of State…" in her confirmation hearings.

Soft power can be wielded strategically and proactively. Soft power must also be a major priority for the current administration. It must be coordinated across agencies, and include both private and non-governmental organizations. To do so, the existing national security structure must be re-evaluated. While there would naturally be obstacles to such a large-scale change, experience shows that when it is a priority, these changes can be effectively made in a timely manner. The establishment of the Department of Homeland Security and the restructuring of national security functions after September 11, 2001 is a prime example. And there is considerable thought being given to these views.

On the other hand, hard power may be completely different by 2020, and the U.S. must be ready for anything. Further, while the concept of soft power is intuitively understood, it is empirically known to be difficult to implement. Also, compounding these challenges, the increasing importance of environmental issues, including climate change, renewable energies and availability of food supplies, will need to be given greater consideration.

The U.S. must develop a truly integrated national security strategy that synchronizes both hard and soft power appropriate for the specifics of each situation, and that adjusts as the particular threat evolves. This mix is now commonly referred to as "smart power."

Smart power is an accurate description, since smart power must be based upon an understanding that the dynamic, unpredictable character of today's security challenges demands a strategy with commensurate flexibility.

While the nation's ability to respond militarily will always remain relevant, even dominant, the U.S. must aggressively and creatively pursue opportunities to use soft power through avenues that include law, trade, diplomacy, humanitarian operations and strategic communications. Only by creating a comprehensive capacity to build and adapt diverse combinations of hard and soft power flexibly and rapidly will America successfully wield the smart power necessary to safeguard national security interests.

The challenge is integrating hard and soft power, finding the right mix of the two and aligning resources and structures to achieve smart power.

About This Site

This website dedicated to exploring all facets of a topic that is vitally important to the security of our nation. You will find an extensive collection of articles, news stories, links, resource information on key experts, as well as full reports on our symposia.

The site is designed to advance the dialogue on national and global security and provide a wider understanding of the asymmetric threat and how we can help counter it. It is intended to serve as the go-to source for fact-based resources and original research and provide a forum for review and discussion of pertinent themes and events.

At its most basic level, asymmetric threat or warfare refers to conflicts in which the relative military power of combatants differs considerably. The symposia described on this site have attracted an array of guests from government agencies and civilian organizations. They assembled with the common purpose of developing new thinking on achieving an overarching national strategy that will effectively counter the threats posed by our enemies. These experts attending the sessions have focused on concrete approaches to structural, procedural and resource changes needed to realign the elements of national power against very savvy, very adaptable adversaries.

CACI's organization of these conferences, in coordination with our respected partners, expands national and global thinking, promotes new approaches for solving 21st century problems and continues our service in support of America's highest national priorities.


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Re: "Ever Vigilant" CACI International is a FALSE FLAG terror beneficiary
« Reply #2 on: December 16, 2010, 07:31:21 am »
Look at the Problem-Reaction-Solution phraseology they manufacture and throw around all the time:

ASYMMETRICAL MILITARY FORCE  - A military force that does not attempt to match the size of that of an adversary, but is designed to exploit the weakness of the larger force. The asymmetrical military force would be small, mobile, elusive, efficient, inventive and high tech.

ASYMMETRIC ENGAGEMENT - A battle between dissimilar forces. [JCS Pub 1, 1995, pp. Iv-10, iv-11]

ASYMMETRIC WARFARE - (1) Warfare between dissimilar forces.
(2) War between two sides with dissimilar goals.
(3) Warfare in which new technology is used to defeat the superior with the inferior.
(4) Warfare which encompasses anything - strategy, tactics, weapons, personnel - that alters the battlefield to negate one side or the other's advantage.
Notes: (1) Asymmetric warfare has been described as "not fighting fair." There are many "definitions" of asymmetric warfare, as the forgoing suggests. These descriptions come from the website
(2) According to the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency (DARPA), "The most serious asymmetric threat facing the U.S. is terrorism, a threat characterized by collections of people loosely organized in shadowy networks that are difficult to identify and define." [DARPA's Total Information Awareness Office (IAO) Vision statement, 2002]

COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (COMINT) - Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients.
Note: COMINT is encompassed under SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT).

CYBERSPACE - (1) The notional environment in which digitized information is communicated over computer networks.
(2) The space of VIRTUAL REALITY.
(3) The global information environment.
(4) The interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems and embedded processors and controllers in critical industries. [National Security Policy Directive 54]

CYBERWAR - Conducting, or preparing to conduct, military operations according to information related principles. It means disrupting, if not destroying, information and communications systems, broadly defined to include even military culture, on which an adversary relies in order to know itself - who it is; what it can do; when it can do it; why it is fighting; and which threats to counter first. It means trying to know everything about the adversary while keeping the adversary from knowing much about oneself... turning the balance of information and knowledge in one's favor, especially if the balance of forces is not... using knowledge so that less capital and labor may have to be expended. See also INFORMATION WARFARE
Note: The focus of cyber warfare is on using CYBERSPACE (by operating within or through it) to attack personnel, facilities or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing or destroying enemy combat capability, while protecting our own.

ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW) - (1) Military action involving the use of electromagnetic energy to determine, exploit, reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum and action which retains friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Also called EW. There are three divisions within electronic warfare - (a) Electronic Countermeasures, (b) Electronic Counter-Countermeasures and (c) Electronic Warfare Support Measures.

(2) Any military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy. The three major subdivisions within electronic warfare are electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support - (a)Electronic Attack (EA). That division of electronic warfare involving the use of electromagnetic or directed energy to attack personnel, facilities or equipment with the intent of degrading, neutralizing or destroying enemy combat capability. Electronic Attack includes 1) Actions taken to prevent or reduce an enemy's effective use of the electromagnetic spectrum, such as jamming and electromagnetic deception; and 2) Employment of weapons that use either electromagnetic or directed energy as their primary destructive mechanism (laser, RF weapons, particle beams). (b) Electronic Protection (EP). That division of electronic warfare involving actions taken to protect personnel, facilities and equipment from any effects of friendly or enemy employment of electronic warfare that degrade, neutralize or destroy friendly combat capability. (c) Electronic Warfare Support (ES). That division of electronic warfare involving actions tasked by or under direct control of an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify and locate sources of intentional and unintentional radiated electromagnetic energy for the purpose of immediate threat recognition. Thus, electronic warfare support provides information required for immediate decisions involving electronic warfare operations and other tactical actions such as threat avoidance, targeting and homing. Electronic warfare support data can be used to produce signals intelligence (SIGINT), both COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE (COMINT) and ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE (ELINT). [CJCS MOP 6, APPENDIX B].
Notes: (1) Electronic warfare is a part of offensive information operations.

(2) The NAVWAR Joint Warfighting Science and Technology Plan (circa 2000) defines ELECTRONIC WARFARE as "The capability for deceiving, disrupting and destroying the surveillance and Command and Control (C2) systems as well as the weapons of an enemy's integrated air defense network and the capability for recognizing attempts by hostile systems to track and engage."

ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE (ELINT) - Technical and intelligence information derived from foreign non-communications electromagnetic radiation emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources.

Note: ELINT is encompassed under SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT).

KEYSTROKE MONITORING - Using a hardware of software mechanism to capture user keyboard strokes and report the stroke sequence to a HACKER.

HACKER - A person who delights in having an intimate understanding of the internal workings of a system - computers and computer networks in particular. The term is almost universally misused in a pejorative context.

INFORMATION WARFARE (IW) - Actions taken to achieve information superiority by affecting adversary information, information-based processes, information systems and computer-based networks while defending one's own information, information-based processes, information systems and computer-based networks. The critical aspects of IW are Information Denial, Information Distortion and Protection. See also CYBERWAR.

Notes: (1) Manipulative, disruptive or destructive actions taken covertly or overtly during peacetime, crisis or war against societal, political, economic, industrial or military electronic information systems. The purpose is to achieve informational advantage over an adversary and to influence behavior, deter or end conflict or, that failing, to win a war quickly and decisively, with minimal expenditure of capital, resources and personnel and with minimum casualties on either side. Information Warfare includes actions taken to preserve the integrity of one's own information systems from exploitation, corruption or destruction while at the same time exploiting, corrupting or destroying an adversary's information systems and in the process achieving an information advantage in the application of force.
(2) Information Warfare entails collecting, processing and acting upon information faster that the adversary. Information warfare includes False Force Presentation (FFP).
(3) The following are forms of information warfare - Command and Control Warfare (formerly C3CM), Intelligence-Based Warfare (IBW), Electronic Warfare (EW), Psychological Warfare (PSYW), Hacker Warfare, Economic Information Warfare (EIW) and CYBERWAR.

NAVIGATION WARFARE (NAVWAR) - A subset of ELECTRONIC WARFARE (EW), NAVWAR is an environment in which

    * friendly forces maintain their ability to use satellite navigation
    * satellite navigation is denied to hostile users
    * there is no effect upon civilian applications

SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE (SIGINT) - A category of intelligence information comprising either individually or in combination all COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE, ELECTRONICS INTELLIGENCE, foreign instrumentation and SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE

Note: SIGINT signals include the following
Radar    Pulsed RF, Stacked Beam, Log Swept
Communications    Frequency Shift Keying (FSK), Modem Signals, Machine-to-Machine Interchanges
Sonar    Passive, Active, Higher Frequency Mine Detection Applications

SMART POWER - An integrated national security strategy that synchronizes both hard and soft power appropriate for the specifics of each situation, and that adjusts as the particular threat evolves.

SOFT POWER - The ability to shape the preferences of others and get others to want the outcomes you want.

UNMANNED AIR VEHICLE (UAV) - An air vehicle having no onboard pilot, capable of receiving continuous or intermittent commands from a human operator at a distance. The vehicle is normally designed to be recoverable.

VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENT (VE) - A computer generated, three-dimensional representation of a setting, which unlike VIRTUAL REALITY, need only suggest a real or imagined space and does not have photorealism and a sense of total immersion a primary goal.

VIRTUAL REALITY (VR) - A combination of technologies whose interfaces with the human user can so dominate the senses that the person intuitively interacts with the immersive and dynamic computer generated environment. Contrast with VIRTUAL ENVIRONMENT.

Note: Virtual reality provides a full immersion of the users in an interactive computer generated environment.

VIRUS - With respect to computers, a computer program file capable of attaching to disks or other files and replicating itself repeatedly, typically without user knowledge or permission. Some viruses attach to files so when the infected file executes the virus also executes. Other viruses sit in a computer's memory and infect files as the computer opens, modifies or creates the files. Some viruses display symptoms and some viruses damage files and computer systems, but neither symptoms nor damage is essential in the definition of a virus. A non-damaging virus is still a virus.

YELLOW CAKE - Uranium ore purified into a uranium oxide concentrate (U3O8). Yellow cake may be sintered (formed into a fused mass by heating without melting ) and made into fuel pellets. Yellow cake may be further refined to produce enriched uranium.


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Re: "Ever Vigilant" CACI International is a FALSE FLAG terror beneficiary
« Reply #3 on: December 16, 2010, 08:53:47 am »
"Knowledge Leaders"  -more like Nazi fascist anti-constitutional government high traitors that need to immediately be arrested and indicted:

Paul M. Cofoni
Mr. Cofoni's responsibilities include executing CACI's strategy to align its core competencies, innovative tools and best value solutions to help the U.S. government solve its most important problems in protecting our nation and countering global terrorism. His vision for CACI's future is for the company to play an ever expanding role as a national asset, serving as its customers' preferred integrator and IT provider for their critical missions.

Under Mr. Cofoni's guidance, CACI has broadened its penetration of the federal marketplace, with special emphasis on further integrating CACI capabilities into homeland security, the Intelligence Community and communications activities of the federal government. Mr. Cofoni has played a key leadership role in developing CACI's ability to compete for large scale contracts at the highest levels of government service. He has overseen the growth of CACI solutions to support critical infrastructure, help clients collect and analyze information that is vital to the protection of our nation and our forces and enable the secure communication of that information to key decision makers. His responsibilities also include managing CACI's corporate development and mergers and acquisitions (M&A) program in direct partnership with CACI's Executive Chairman Dr. J.P. (Jack) London. Prior to this, Mr. Cofoni served as CACI's President of U.S. Operations, where he had primary responsibility for all of the company's domestic, federal and state and local markets. Under his guidance, CACI's U.S.-based operations provided a wide range of innovative technical and valuable support services to the U.S. government.

Mr. Cofoni has more than 30 years of senior-level executive experience in business development, M&A, strategic planning, and extensive federal market operations. His professional experience includes large scale integrator contracts in the broad federal market sector; the defense, intelligence and communications markets; and major commercial outsourcing and systems markets.

In 2008, and again in 2010, Mr. Cofoni was named to Federal Computer Week's Federal 100 list of government and industry leaders who have had a positive impact on the federal IT community. He has served as Chairman of the Board of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA) International and currently is a permanent board member. AFCEA serves the military, government, industry and academia as an ethical forum for advancing professional knowledge and relationships in the fields of communications, information technology, intelligence and global security.

Before joining CACI, Mr. Cofoni was President, Federal Sector, of Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC). One of the largest systems integrators for federal government agencies, CSC's Federal Sector contracts included numerous aerospace, defense and intelligence systems applications and services. Federal Sector revenues under Mr. Cofoni exceeded $5B in 2005. Before this, Mr. Cofoni enjoyed a 17-year career with General Dynamics in a number of assignments from 1974 to 1991, when his business unit was acquired by CSC. At General Dynamics, he served as VP of Information Technology services for both east and west coast business units.

Mr. Cofoni served as an officer in the U.S. Army from 1970 to 1974. He received a bachelor of science degree in mathematics from the University of Rhode Island in 1970 and attended the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Sloan School program for senior executives in 1989. He is a member of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics and the Professional Services Council and served as chairman of the 2009 American Heart Association's Greater Washington Region Start! Heart Walk.
Lowell (Jake) E. Jacoby

Mr. Jacoby is responsible for the National Solutions Group (NSG) of CACI International Inc. This group leads the company in developing CACI solutions for the members of the national Intelligence Community and for increasing intelligence sharing across the national and homeland security communities. The group has made CACI an industry leader in knowledge management; document conversion (imaging, electronic and optical character recognition) and document exploitation; records and case management; intelligence analysis, system and application development; intelligence dissemination and network management; systems engineering and technical assistance (SETA) support; multimedia productions; and lifecycle system integration.

Mr. Jacoby joined CACI in January 2006 as NSG's Executive VP for Strategic Intelligence. In this position he was responsible for shaping new business opportunities for CACI in the intelligence and homeland security arenas. These responsibilities included helping to develop strategic plans and lending his expertise in developing end-to-end and community-wide solutions.

The former Navy Vice Admiral has many years of military and intelligence leadership experience. Mr. Jacoby culminated his active duty career as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency with key responsibilities supporting national authorities, combatant commanders and the warfighter, and he played a leading role in the global war on terrorism. His extensive military career included 20 consecutive years as a senior intelligence officer at numerous duty stations. He led the effort to create a functional command for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, and brought the new command to initial operational capability.

Mr. Jacoby's leadership in defense intelligence transformation and his key role in national intelligence reform were recognized by the award of three Defense Distinguished Service Medals, the Navy Distinguished Service Medal and the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal. He has also received numerous U.S. and foreign awards.

Mr. Jacoby has remained active in Intelligence Community and associated efforts as a member of various boards, study groups, committees and as a mentor for young intelligence professionals. In addition, he regularly participates as a speaker and panelist at conferences and symposia concerning intelligence and national security issues.
Dr. J.P. (Jack) London

After serving as CACI's President and Chief Executive Officer for 23 years Dr. London stepped out of the CEO role to become Executive Chairman on July 1, 2007. In this position he oversees strategic initiatives to ensure shareholder value, advance client missions, cultivate key client relationships and monitor major financial transactions, including CACI's legacy mergers and acquisitions (M&A) program, which Dr. London began in 1992. He has an established role as a public figure representing CACI to customers and the federal information technology (IT) industry. Dr. London's efforts also focus on the evolution and transformation of defense, intelligence, information technology and network communications.

Most recently, Dr. London wrote and published Our Good Name (Washington, DC: Regnery, 2008), documenting CACI's remarkable campaign to challenge the erroneous and exaggerated media reporting of the company's work in Iraq for the U.S. Army. Drawing from official government documents, sworn public testimony and public records, Our Good Name sets the record straight and details how CACI succeeded in overcoming false allegations while meeting the urgent needs of a nation at war.

Under Dr. London's leadership CACI has grown from a small professional services consulting firm to become a pacesetter in IT and communications solutions across markets throughout North America and Western Europe. CACI operations today are worldwide and global in nature.

CACI has sustained its success in part through Dr. London's highly successful strategic acquisitions program. Since 1992 CACI has made 43 acquisitions that have greatly strengthened its position in managed networks, information assurance and the security and intelligence services markets for the 21st century. After the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon CACI operations have taken the company even further into the intelligence and homeland security arenas.

In March 2002 Dr. London led CACI through its first equity offering (secondary offering) since CACI's initial public offering of 1968; the company issued a total of approximately 4.9 million shares of common stock, with gross proceeds of approximately $171M. Moreover, throughout his career Dr. London has overseen the company's bank financing and line of credit transactions, reflecting his experience as a senior corporate financial manager. In May 2004 Dr. London led CACI in raising a new revolving credit facility and institutional term loan totaling $550M to purchase the Defense and Intelligence Group and related assets of American Management Systems, Inc. The acquisition positioned CACI as one of the largest, focused IT providers serving the defense and Intelligence Community markets, and the transaction was hailed as part of the "Hottest M&A Merger of the Year" by the Northern Virginia Technology Council. In May 2007 Dr. London led CACI's sale of $300M in senior subordinated notes, adding convertible security to the company's capital structure for increased financial flexibility.

Under Dr. London's guidance CACI has established premier centers of technical excellence to support its operations. These include its unique Vision & Solution Center, where clients can view and evaluate alternative IT solutions before committing to implementation, and CACI's Information Assurance Technology Center, a dedicated resource facility that provides a central laboratory for developing and testing a broad range of information assurance and security solutions.

Chairman of the Board since 1990, Dr. London first joined CACI as a program manager in 1972. He advanced to VP in 1976, and by 1982 was a division president, managing CACI's extensive work in systems engineering, logistic sciences and advanced information systems. Having been elected to CACI's Board of Directors in 1981, Dr. London was appointed President and CEO in 1984. As a "hands-on" CEO, he was the architect of CACI's operational turnaround in 1984-85 for both revenue and profit growth.

In 1990 Dr. London created CACI's "New Era" strategic vision and successfully transformed the company into a more sharply focused information technology organization for broader opportunities in the rapidly changing IT markets. In 1995 CACI achieved Dr. London's New Era objectives and set company records for revenue and profit. By 1997 Dr. London had begun the next level of transformation within CACI by repositioning the company to center stage in his vision of the "Network World." These moves, under Dr. London's direct guidance, led to CACI's rapid entrée into the information security and Intelligence Community arenas. Now Dr. London continues to guide CACI into the new millennium of the 21st century by evolving CACI's legacy distinctions into flexible new solutions with value added application across today's expanding technology spectrum.

Dr. London is a graduate of the U.S. Naval Academy (1959) and the Naval Postgraduate School (1967), where he earned, respectively, a Bachelor of Science in naval engineering and a Master of Science in operations research. He holds a doctorate in business administration conferred "with distinction" from George Washington University (1971).

During his 12 years of active duty as a regular officer (1959-1971) during the Cold War Dr. London initially served as a naval aviator and carrier pilot, serving with U.S. Navy "hunter-killer" task forces arrayed against the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear submarine threat. He saw service during the Cuban Missile Crisis (the "13 days" of October and November of 1962) and his numerous at-sea deployments (33) included the North Atlantic, the Mediterranean and the Caribbean. He was with the airborne recovery team for Col. John Glenn's Mercury Program space flight in Freedom 7 in the Caribbean on February 20, 1962 on the USS Randolph (CVS-15). Later, at the height of the Vietnam War, he served as Aide and Administrative Assistant to the Vice Chief of the Naval Material Command, Department of the Navy (1969-70).

Dr. London left active duty in 1971 and joined the U.S. Navy Reserve, retiring as a naval Captain in 1983, having served as commanding officer of aeronautical engineering units with the Naval Air Systems Command, Washington, DC. In 1971 he joined Challenger Research, Inc. (later a subsidiary of EG&G, Inc.) as project manager for electronics programs and automated logistics information systems.

In 1987 Dr. London received the Alumni of the Year Award from George Washington University's School of Government and Business Administration. In 1995 he was presented with the High Tech Entrepreneur Award from KPMG Peat Marwick. In 1996 he received the Alumni Achievement Award from George Washington University. During CACI's 40th Anniversary Year celebration in November 2001 Dr. London and CACI were recognized by the Newcomen Society of the United States as being one of the outstanding examples of the free enterprise capitalist system in the U.S.

In 2002 Dr. London received the Outstanding Corporate Growth Award for CACI from the Association for Corporate Growth, Washington DC chapter. Also in 2002, Dr. London was recognized by the Human Resources Leadership Awards of Greater Washington, in its annual awards program, through the establishment of its Ethics in Business Award in Dr. London's name. In 2003 Dr. London received CEO of the Year Award, presented by the George Washington University Executive MBA Program, was named Ernst & Young's Entrepreneur of the Year for Government IT Services and received the John W. Dixon Award from the Association of the United States Army for outstanding contributions to America's defense.

In January 2004 Dr. London received the Albert Einstein Award for Technology Achievement in the Defense Fields and in March of 2004 he was named to Federal Computer Week's "Federal 100" list of IT leaders, from which he was selected to receive the publication's highest recognition, the Eagle Award, for superior contributions to the federal IT community. In November Dr. London's technology contributions were recognition with both the Northern Virginia Technology Council's Earle C. Williams Leadership in Technology Award and the Arlington, Virginia Chamber of Commerce Technology Executive of the Year Award. London was also named Executive of the Year in October 2005 at the Third Annual Greater Washington Government Contractor Awards. In April 2007 he was awarded the U.S. Navy League's Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz Award for his exemplary contributions to the enhancement of U.S. maritime strength and national security. In April 2008 Dr. London was honored by the Association for Corporate Growth National Capital chapter with its Lifetime Achievement Award, recognizing his leadership of CACI's business growth and expansion. In January 2009 he was named to the Bisnow 2009 Federal IT Power 50.

Dr. London serves on the Board of Directors of the U.S. Naval Institute, the U.S. Navy Memorial Foundation, the Naval Historical Foundation and the Northern Virginia Technology Council, as well as on the Advisory Council at The George Washington University School of Business, the Board of Advisors at Marymount University, and the Board of the Boy Scouts of America, National Capital Area Council. He has also served on the Executive Committee and the Board of Directors of the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association. Dr. London is a member of the National Military Intelligence Association, the Intelligence and National Security Alliance, the Navy League, the U.S. Naval Institute, the Naval Order of the U.S.A., the American Legion, the Association of the U.S. Army (AUSA) and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. He is also a member of the Robert Means Thompson Society and the President's Circle of the U.S. Naval Academy Foundation, as well as the Alumni Association, and is a member of The George Washington University Alumni Association.

In 1996 Dr. London was elected to the Cosmos Club (founded in 1878). From 1998 to 2000 he served as the 100th President of the District of Columbia, Society of the Sons of the American Revolution (founded in 1890). He is a member of the Scottish Rite of Free Masonry (32 Degree), having been raised in 2001 as a Mason At Sight, and is a member of the Saint Andrew's Society of the District of Columbia, a Scottish heritage organization. He is also the former Governor of the Society of Colonial Wars in the District of Columbia.

A native of Oklahoma, Dr. London has resided in the Washington, DC area since 1969. His son, J. Phillip London, Jr., University of Virginia '89, and an attorney, graduated from Emory School of Law in 1994. His daughter, Laura McLain London, Yale '90 cum laude, is a master's graduate of M.I.T., 1998. Dr. London has three grandsons and one granddaughter.
Andrew Cochran

Mr. Cochran is Co-Chairman of The Counterterrorism Foundation and the Founder and Site Editor of The Counterterrorism Blog. Previously, he was Vice President of GAGE International, a business consulting and government affairs firm headquartered in Washington, DC. Prior to that, Mr. Cochran was senior oversight counsel to the U.S. House Committee on Financial Services, chaired by Rep. Michael Oxley (R-OH), where he was lead counsel for the committee's oversight of federal money laundering and anti-terrorist financing issues, and in the international efforts to seize and repatriate Saddam Hussein's hidden assets. He also served in the Office of Inspector General at the Commerce Department in the 1990s, and as Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Commerce during the Reagan Administration.
Dr. Walid Phares

Dr. Walid Phares is a senior fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, which focuses on Middle East history and politics, global terrorist activities and democratization and human rights. Dr. Phares also leads the foundation's "Future of Terrorism Project," which considers how the Jihadi-Islamist threat will mutate and what can be done to defend against more deadly strains of terrorism. He has authored ten books on terrorism and the Middle East. His latest, The Confrontation: Winning the War Against Future Jihad, was published in 2008.
Albert M. (Bert) Calland, III

Mr. Calland supports CACI's continually expanding business within well funded markets in the Intelligence Community and the growing market for information sharing at the nexus of intelligence, defense and law enforcement capabilities that is so critical to our nation's defense.

Mr. Calland most recently served as Deputy Director for Strategic Operational Planning at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC). Prior to that he was Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and served as Commander of Special Operations Central within the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM).

A highly decorated veteran, Mr. Calland brings battlefield leadership and command experience at all levels. His 33-year Navy career included service as a platoon commander with the Navy's Sea, Air and Land (SEAL) special operations forces through command of the Navy Special Warfare Development Group from 1997 to 1999.

In 2000 Mr. Calland assumed command of CENTCOM's Special Operations Command. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks he transitioned his headquarters into a forward deployed Joint Forces Special Operations Component Command, directing more than 3000 U.S. and Coalition Special Operations Forces in Operation Enduring Freedom. In this role Mr. Calland was the first U.S. military flag officer in Afghanistan.

After serving as Commander of the Naval Special Warfare Command from 2002 until 2004 Mr. Calland was assigned as the CIA's Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support and was subsequently appointed the CIA's Deputy Director (the Agency's second highest position) in 2005. In 2006 Mr. Calland was assigned to NCTC, the federal government's primary organization for integrating and analyzing intelligence on terrorism and conducting strategic operational planning across multiple agencies and organizations. At the CIA and at NCTC Mr. Calland worked on the most difficult national security issues at the highest levels in our government.