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Offline Dig

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WikiLeaks: Educating Americans About Open Society
« on: December 08, 2010, 11:01:55 pm »
WikiLeaks: Educating Americans About Open Society

Open society

The open society is a concept originally developed by philosopher Henri Bergson and then by Austrian and British philosopher Karl Popper. In open societies, government is responsive and tolerant, and political mechanisms are transparent and flexible. It is as opposed to closed society. The state keeps no secrets from itself in the public sense; it is a non-authoritarian society in which all are trusted with the knowledge of all. Political freedoms and human rights are the foundation of an open society. In Karl Popper's definition, found in his two-volume book The Open Society and Its Enemies, he defines an "open society" as one which ensures that political leaders can be overthrown without the need for bloodshed, as opposed to a "closed society," in which a bloody revolution or coup d'état is needed to change the leaders.

He further describes an open society as one "in which individuals are confronted with personal decisions" as opposed to a "magical or tribal or collectivist society."[1]

In this context, tribalistic and collectivist societies do not distinguish between natural laws and social customs. Individuals are unlikely to challenge traditions they believe to have a sacred or magical basis. The beginnings of an open society are thus marked by a distinction between natural and man-made law, and an increase in personal responsibility and accountability for moral choices. (Note that Popper did not see this as incompatible with religious belief.[2]) Popper argues that the ideas of individuality, criticism, and humanitarianism cannot be suppressed once people become aware of them, and therefore that it is impossible to return to the closed society.[3]

Popper's concept of the open society is epistemological rather than political.[4] When Popper wrote The Open Society and its Enemies he believed that the social sciences had failed to grasp the significance and the nature of fascism and communism because these sciences were based on faulty epistemologies.[5] Totalitarianism forced knowledge to become political which made critical thinking impossible and led to the destruction of knowledge in totalitarian countries.[6] Popper's theory that knowledge is provisional and fallible implies that society must be open to alternative points of view. An open society is associated with cultural and religious pluralism; it is always open to improvement because knowledge is never completed but always ongoing.

Closed society claims to certain knowledge and ultimate truth lead to the attempted imposition of one version of reality. Such a society is closed to freedom of thought. In contrast, in an open society each citizen needs to engage in critical thinking, which requires freedom of thought and expression and the cultural and legal institutions that can facilitate this.[7]

Democracies are examples of the "open society,"

whereas totalitarian dictatorships, theocracy, and autocratic monarchies are examples of the "closed society."

Humanitarianism, equality and political freedom are fundamental characteristics of an open society. This was recognised by Pericles, a statesman of the Athenian democracy, in his funeral oration: "... advancement in public life falls to reputation for capacity, class considerations not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor again does poverty bar the way, if a man is able to serve the state, he is not hindered by the obscurity of his condition. The freedom which we enjoy in our government extends also to our ordinary life."[8]

George Soros, a student of Karl Popper, has argued that the sophisticated use of powerful techniques of deception borrowed from modern advertising and cognitive science by political operatives such as Frank Luntz and Karl Rove casts doubt on Popper's original conception of open society.[9] Because the electorate's perception of reality can easily be manipulated, democratic political discourse does not necessarily lead to a better understanding of reality.[10] Soros argues that besides the requirements for the separation of powers, free speech, and free elections, we also need to make explicit a strong commitment to the pursuit of truth.[11] "Politicians will respect, rather than manipulate, reality only if the public cares about the truth and punishes politicians when it catches them in deliberate deception."[12]

Organisations such as the Open Society Institute and Open Society Foundation of South Africa aim to actively promote the open society through lobbying and public involvement.

In 1947, Popper founded with his close friend Friedrich Hayek, Milton Friedman, Ludwig von Mises and others the Mont Pelerin Society to defend classical liberalism, in the spirit of open society.

George Soros

George Soros (Hungarian: Soros György; pronounced /ˈsɔroʊs/ or /ˈsɔrəs/,[2] Hungarian: [ˈʃoroʃ]; born August 12, 1930, as Schwartz György) is a Hungarian-American financier, businessman and notable philanthropist focused on supporting liberal ideals and causes.[3] He became known as "the Man Who Broke the Bank of England" after he made a reported $1 billion during the 1992 Black Wednesday UK currency crises.[4][5] Soros correctly anticipated that the British government would have to devalue the pound sterling.[6]

Soros is Chairman of the Soros Fund Management and the Open Society Institute and a former member of the Board of Directors of the Council on Foreign Relations. He played a significant role in the peaceful transition from communism to capitalism in Hungary (1984–89)[5] and provided Europe's largest-ever higher education endowment to Central European University in Budapest.[7] Later, the Open Society Institute's programs in Georgia were considered by Russian and Western observers to have been crucial in the success of the Rose Revolution. In the United States, he is known for donating large sums of money in an effort to defeat President George W. Bush's bid for re-election in 2004. In 2010, he donated $1 million in support of Proposition 19, which would have legalized marijuana in the state of California. He was an initial donor to the Center for American Progress, and he continues to support the organization through the Open Society Foundations. The Open Society Institute has active programs in more than 60 countries around the world with total expenditures currently averaging approximately $600 million a year.

In 2003, former Federal Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker wrote in the foreword of Soros' book The Alchemy of Finance.

Open Society: Reforming Global Capitalism by George Soros

According to the CIA in May 2001 as dictated by John C. Gannon, CIA and Advisor of the ANSER Homeland Security Institute (established officially 5 months before 9/11 attacks)...

Mastering open source information will be an imperative, not an option, for the intelligence business because it will increasingly contain the answers to critical national security questions.

So what do they mean by "OPEN"?

They mean controlled, they mean your mind is OPEN to their manipulation and not CLOSED to it. They talk about it as a revolution in thinking, it is not, it is a revolution in controlling the mind, the codes, the sources of everything. OPEN means OPEN to the I-BEAM, PROJECT BLUEBEAM, MK ULTRA, MASS MIND CONTROL...

You are being psyopped by "invasive measures" to accept "non-invasive" ones

...such as "non-invasive" MIND CONTROL

Here's a brief synopisis:

You know how they can fly planes by remote control... dropping bombs on innocent people thousands of miles away?


Now, subsitute the plane with a human being.

They want to remote control human beings, and whatever devices are attached to human beings, by using remote control via computers that can communicate directly with your central nervous system.  You are a node on the network. You will be controlled by a computer programmed to make the most of what you have to offer in terms of your biological ability: you can be made to put a nail into a piece of wood, the same way, all day, every day... or you can be made to fire a gun at an enemy you may not even be aware of - you won't have to think about that, the computer will decide for you. You may not even be aware of what you're doing - they have an app for that. You might be watching reruns of American Idol on your embedded display unit (your eyes), while the computer uses your body to wage war.

It seems clear that the latest and greatest technology is developed for the military; for applications of dominance and control. The only time we see 'helpful' applications of this technology is when they need some positive PR to get continued funding. The slide below is presenting the real agenda:

*  Use brain activity to control an existing machine
So someone (or something) will "USE" your brain activity to control an "existing machine". There's nothing that says it couldn't be a machine using your brain to control another machine. Your brain will provide the right feedback information needed by the controlling machine in order to decide what the right next step will be.

Machine A --------> You and your brain ------------> Machine B

I don't know why people in the military can't see that they are the "brain" in the middle.  Their brains are needed -- but NOT because of their intelligence or ability to think strategically -- that strategic thinking, experience and intelligence won't be necessary. The brain is necessary only because it functions to process signals; it's a cpu without need for a disk full of information; relying only on bootup code - because the intelligence is in the offsite remote computer that drives the brain. Literally - it will drive the brain. The only reason the brain is needed is because it processes signals and will provide feedback to the controlling computer, like running your pc's resident applications but using a remote server to do the grunt work.  You are the device, the remote server. You will be accessed remotely and driven by algorithms that use your feedback to calculate next steps and give you further instructions.  This use of your brain's intellect brings too much risk to the 'mission'. If you are using your brain to THINK, then your decisions will be susceptible to influence by your emotions: compassion, pity, fear, joy, love, jealousy, bravery. They don't want that to affect your decisions; they want ONLY that part of your brain that is the primitive automatic/autonomic response mechanism built into your central nervous system, where there is no concept of 'conscience'.






Pentagon's militarization of social networks will be the goal of next false flag

U.S. forced to 'Connects The Dots' To Win in Iraq and Afghanistan
by Tom Gjelten December 3, 2010
Marines on patrol in Afghanistan's Helmand province walk near a blast crater from a homemade explosive device. Roadside bombs are the leading killer of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. The American military has turned to mathematics and social network analysis to help identify bombers and their supporters. With his doctorate from Princeton, Army Gen. David Petraeus, the U.S. commander in Afghanistan, has become the prime example of a special breed of soldier: the warrior-scholar, trained in history and politics as well as how to fight wars. Now there's a variation on the theme: the warrior mathematician, adept in the complex modeling that has become a key part of military planning. With roadside bombs the leading killer of U.S. troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, military commanders have turned increasingly to the use of social network analysis to identify the key players in the groups responsible for the bombs, which the military calls improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. The approach is rooted in the belief that a roadside bomb is never the work of one individual alone.

'Attack The Network'
"Someone has to build it, someone has to place it, someone has to do surveillance on the place where you place it," said Kathleen Carley, a professor of computer science at Carnegie Mellon University and the unofficial godmother of social network analysis as applied to the IED problem. "If you're trying to defeat IEDs, what you're talking about is understanding that whole process — who is involved, how they are connected to each other — so that you can figure out where the best place is to intervene," Carley said. The idea is that an analysis of the social network behind roadside bombing attempts will make it possible to identify which members of the group are most vital to the operation and most important to stop, in order to disrupt the entire network. "Any organization has relationships," said Army Maj. Ian McCulloh, deputy director of the Counter-IED Operations Integration Center in Baghdad and one of Carley's former students. "Civilian firms have used social network analysis for decades to map out those relationships and identify the organization's vulnerabilities. The same principles apply to threat networks. This helps us identify their vulnerabilities," he said.  The U.S. military's biggest success so far in the use of network analysis was the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003. He was found after soldiers diagrammed the social networks of his chauffeurs and others close to him. The technique is now used extensively to identify the key figures in insurgent groups in both Iraq and Afghanistan. "Attack the Network" is the motto of the anti-IED effort. Much is at stake. Of 3,486 U.S. service members killed in Iraq since 2003 by hostile action, 2,196 have died as a result of IED explosions, according to figures released by the Pentagon and other sources. In Afghanistan, nearly 90 percent of U.S. military deaths due to hostile action — 1,075 as of Dec. 2 — have been caused by IEDs.

Connecting The Dots
McCulloh, who received his doctorate in network science from Carnegie Mellon, is an expert in the application of relational algebra to the study of IED networks. He teaches other soldiers in the analytical techniques. While on leave last month from his post in Baghdad, McCulloh taught a one-week class in "Advanced Network Analysis and Targeting" to a group of Iraq-bound soldiers at Fort Bragg in North Carolina. Each of the soldiers was to be involved with the anti-IED effort in Iraq, primarily in the selection of targets for military operations. In this case, Habib Muhammed, who is connected to three others in the network, is the "most central" node. One of the goals listed in McCulloh's course guide is to help soldiers "mathematically quantify influential network nodes ... in order to provide warfighters with objective measures for the relative values of various potential targets." For many of the soldiers in the course, the mathematics instruction was daunting. "I took some math in high school, but mainly it was statistics," said Chief Warrant Officer John Fleshman, an 18-year Army veteran. "Fortunately, Major McCulloh breaks it down to high school level." Fleshman, an artillery targeting officer, said the mathematics he learned in his Fort Bragg class made it easier to identify the most important targets for anti-IED and other counterinsurgency operations. "You have to know where to look, and this helps you know where to look," he said. In McCulloh's class, "connecting the dots" is taken literally. He shows his students how to visualize a network of all of the people involved in an IED cell. On a computer screen, each individual is a "node,"
displayed as a dot linked by lines to other dots.
Some nodes are more important than others,

depending on their "betweenness" scores, determined, basically, by how well connected an individual is to others in the network. "From these guys and these guys, it's a lot shorter to go through D than it is to go through E and F," McCulloh points out to one of his soldier students. "So that's what gives D high betweenness centrality. He also has an average shorter distance to everybody, so in many ways, D is the highly central node."  When the U.S. military is looking for key people to capture or kill, you do not want to be identified as "a highly central node."

Same Conclusions, But Faster
Military commanders and intelligence analysts have long understood the need to study relationships among individuals on the enemy side. What's new is how sophisticated and mathematical the process has become. McCulloh, a brainy young officer who also teaches at West Point, thinks the Army needs more warrior-mathematicians like himself. Still, the lanky redhead had to learn some humility when he went to work a couple of years ago in Afghanistan alongside grizzled intelligence veterans. "I thought I was going to go in there with my network analysis and my academic background, and I was going to find all of the hidden nodes, the key guys," McCulloh says. "I was going to find bin Laden and all the guys that were leading the terrorism. And I was actually a little disappointed to find that everybody I found in any of the data sets that I looked at, we already knew about." The veterans had used hunches and intuition to figure out the networks. But McCulloh says his math and computer science training did help him work more quickly than the old-timers could. "The first network I looked at probably had about 200 to 300 nodes in it," he says. "It took an analyst with 26 years of experience about five days to look through it and identify where they felt the key vulnerabilities were. I was able to put it into the software that I use and do some basic network analysis and in about 15 to 20 minutes I had the same conclusion."

Advantages To Mathematical Precision
As with any computer operation, the quality of the analysis depends on the quality of the data going in. Carley, the Carnegie Mellon University professor who has been working with the military since she got out of college, says if soldiers are to understand a roadside bombing network, they need information — from people they capture, from informants and from intercepted phone calls. "You try to find things about who else they know," Carley says, "who they're related to, where they've been in the past, where were they trained, what other kind of groups did they belong to, things like that." In this regard, Carley says, network analysis presents yet another advantage. A computer-generated network diagram can help soldiers "see" what data they are missing and still need to gather. The mathematical precision that comes with this analysis also gives soldiers more confidence in their judgments than might be the case with hunches and intuition. That's important to military lawyers who have to approve an operation to capture or kill someone. Maj. Eugene Vindman, a JAG officer, or judge advocate general, says McCulloh's network analysis course put him and other military lawyers in a better position to carry out oversight responsibilities in Iraq. "[You could] maybe do a little bit of analysis on your own or ask some intelligent questions of the targeteers," Vindman says, "to make sure that the target they've identified is not a guy that might have made a wrong phone call to a bad guy but actually has enough links to that bad guy through other activities to actually be a bad guy and therefore be a legal military target."

The Problem: Assessing The Enemy
Soldiers who will be involved in the effort to prevent roadside bombs, known as improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, are presented with the following scenario:
You are an infantry patrol leader and your unit encounters the following chain of events:Raheim, a known enemy operative, was found carrying a cell phone which he has used to maintain constant contact with two individuals, Jalil Al Tikrit and Farrah Imir. Text messages on Raheim's phone reveal a plot by Jalil Al Tikrit and another unknown individual to place an IED in a culvert along a supply route commonly used by U.S. forces. Raheim is immediately taken into custody and handed over to local authorities. Hours later, a local shopkeeper named Ibraheem is seen talking to a man named Habib Muhammed, but Ibraheem was not seen with anyone else.  Later, an unidentified individual and Habib Muhammed are captured in a culvert.  Habib Muhammed was found to be carrying a credit card owned by Farrah Imir along with a list of supplies in Farrah Imir's handwriting that seems to be a manifest for building and placing an IED. As you ponder the events of the day, it dawns on you that the unknown individuals are not unknown at all. You know their identities. The task: Build a model of the network of individuals and use it as part of your analysis to develop a target.

Answer: The Network
In the exercise above and the solution below, each individual is a "node," displayed as a dot linked by lines to other dots. Some nodes are more important than others, depending on their "betweenness" scores, determined, basically, by how well connected an individual is to others in the network.

When a "highly central node" emerges, that is a person the military may try to capture or kill.

Courtesy of Kathleen Carley and Course Guide,

Advanced Network Analysis and Targeting:  
A Social Networks Approach to Targeting,

by Ian McCulloh, Anthony Johnson, and Helen Armstrong.

So what the hell are they talking about...

HIGHLY CENTRAL NODE = Node that can influence others outside of the Central Control Perception Management Messaging Systems.

HIDDEN NODE = Closed "node" or someone who does not wish to be a mind controlled slave in the so called "OPEN SOCIETY".

MEASURING BETWEENNESS = IBM Analytics to do continual loop sense and response autonomy based on trillions of data gathering censors interoperably capable of information flow.

All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: WikiLeaks: Educating Americans About Open Society
« Reply #1 on: December 08, 2010, 11:50:49 pm »
From George Soros himself

George Soros
George Soros is Chairman of Soros Fund Management and of the Open Society Institute.

From Karl Popper to Karl Rove – and Back
George Soros


NEW YORK -- In his novel 1984 , George Orwell chillingly described a totalitarian regime in which all communica­tion is controlled by a Ministry of Truth and dissidents are persecuted by political police. The United States remains a democracy governed by a constitution and the rule of law, with pluralistic media, yet there are disturbing signs that the propaganda methods Orwell described have taken root here.

Indeed, techniques of deception have undergone enormous improvements since Orwell’s time. Many of these techniques were developed in connection with the advertising and marketing of commercial products and services, and then adapted to politics. Their distinguishing fea­ture is that they can be bought for money. More recently, cogni­tive science has helped to make the techniques of deception even more effective, giving rise to political professionals who concentrate only on “get­ting results.”

These professionals take pride in their ac­complishments, and may even enjoy the respect of an American public that admires success no matter how it is achieved. That fact casts doubt on Karl Popper’s concept of open society, which is based on the recognition that, while perfect knowledge is unattainable, we can gain a better understanding of reality by engaging in critical thinking.

Popper failed to recognize that in democratic politics, gathering public support takes prece­dence over the pursuit of truth. In other areas, such as science and industry, the impulse to impose one’s views on the world encounters the resistance of external reality. But in politics the electorate’s perception of reality can be easily manipulated. As a result, political discourse, even in democratic societies, does not necessarily lead to a better understanding of reality.

The reason democratic politics leads to manipulation is that politicians do not aspire to tell the truth. They want to win elections, and the best way to do that is to skew reality to their own benefit.

This insight should lead us not to abandon the concept of open society, but to revise and reaffirm the case for it. We must abandon Popper’s tacit assumption that political discourse aims at a better understanding of reality and reintroduce it as an explicit requirement. The separation of powers, free speech, and free elections alone cannot ensure open society; a strong commitment to the pursuit of truth is also required.

We need to introduce new ground rules for political discourse. These cannot be identi­cal to scientific method, but they should be similar in character, enshrining the pursuit of truth as the criteria on which political views are to be judged. Politicians will respect, rather than manipulate, reality only if the public cares about the truth and punishes politicians when it catches them in deliber­ate deception. And the public should care about the truth because deception misleads people in choosing their representatives, distorts policy choices, undermines ac­countability, and destroys trust in democracy.

Recent history provides convincing evidence that policies based on a misrepresenting reality backfire. The Bush administration’s response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 – declaring a War on Terror and treating criticism as unpatriotic – succeeded in gathering public support, yet the results were the exact opposite to what the Bush administration intended, both for itself and the United States.

The practical difficulty is in recognizing when political profes­sionals are distorting reality. There is an important role here for the media, the political elite, and the educational system, which must all act as watchdogs. In addition, the public needs to be inoculated against the various tech­niques of deception. The most ef­fective techniques operate at the subconscious level. When emotions can be aroused by methods that bypass consciousness, the public is left largely defenseless. But if the public is made aware of the various techniques, it is likely to reject them.

One influential technique – which Republican pollster Frank Luntz says that he learned from 1984 - simply reverses meanings and turns reality on its head. Thus, Fox News calls itself “fair and balanced,” and Karl Rove and his acolytes turn their opponents’ strongest traits into their Achilles’ heels, using insinuations and lies to portray the opponents’ achievements as phony. That is how insinuations of cowardice and foul play helped defeat two highly decorated Vietnam War veterans, Senator Max Cleland in 2002, and John Kerry in 2004, while Bush and Vice President Dick Cheney – both of whom avoided military service ­– were portrayed as true patriots.

Another technique is transference: accusing opponents of having motives or using methods that characterize the accuser himself. For example, David Horowitz, who accuses me of being “the Lenin of the anti-American conspiracy,” is a former Trotskyite for whom opponents are never adversaries to be debated, but rather enemies to be crushed.

The American public has proven remarkably susceptible to the manipulation of truth, which increasingly dominates the country’s political discourse. Indeed, a whole net­work of publications, some of which manage to parade as mainstream media, is devoted to the task. Yet I believe that it is possible to inoculate the public against false arguments by arousing resent­ment against Orwellian Newspeak. What is needed is a concerted effort to iden­tify the techniques of manipulation – and to name and shame those who use them.

Now is an ideal time to begin that effort. Americans are now awakening, as if from a bad dream. What we have learned from recent years’ experience – what we should have known all along – is that the supremacy of critical thought in political dis­course cannot be taken for granted. It can be ensured only by an electorate that respects reality and punishes politicians who lie or engage in other forms of deception.

George Soros is Chairman of Soros Fund Management, and of the Open Society Institute.

Copyright: Project Syndicate, 2007.

Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: WikiLeaks: Educating Americans About Open Society
« Reply #2 on: December 09, 2010, 01:18:27 am »

I Resign From the Mont Pelerin Society

by Paul Craig Roberts

I have come to the conclusion that the Mont Pelerin Society is no longer an effective force for freedom, becoming instead another tool in behalf of US hegemony, ringing Russia with US military bases and puppet governments in the name of "supporting democracy." As far as I am aware, the MPS has not addressed the Bush administration's assault on US civil liberties or the disrespect the Bush administration has shown for the US Constitution and international law, particularly the Geneva Conventions. Nor has the society taken exception to US wars of aggression in behalf of undeclared agendas.

I don't see how the society can function in behalf of liberty when its long-time Treasurer is so closely associated with the Republican Party, now thoroughly neoconized. The alacrity with which the Heritage Foundation jumped on the Bush administration's propaganda bandwagon about "the Russian invasion of Georgia" epitomizes the new association of "freedom" with American hegemony.

As Secretary of State Rice put it (according to Matthew Lee, AP News, August 18, 16:17 EST), "'We are not going to allow Russia to draw a new line at those states that are not yet integrated into the trans-Atlantic structures', she said, referring to Georgia and Ukraine, which have not yet joined NATO or the European Union but would like to."

But, of course, the US and its NATO allies are going to draw a line around Russia.

What does the Caucasus have to do with the North Atlantic? Why is NATO, which was created to keep the Soviet Army out of Western Europe, still around almost two decades after the disappearance of the Soviet Union? Why has its membership doubled, and why is it being extended to the Black Sea? Is Mongolia next? The US strategic objective — to ring Russia with bases and puppet states in order to exercise hegemony over Russia — will lead to war, the destruction of liberty and perhaps life on earth. This gratuitously insane neoconservative foreign policy is one that will lead to nuclear war. It stands in total contradiction to the alleged values of the Mont Pelerin Society.

As every great libertarian and the founding members of the MPS acknowledged, war is the greatest enemy of liberty.

The US used force to rip Kosovo out of Serbia and to hand it to Muslim drug runners in exchange for a US military base. The US bombed Serbian civilians and accused the Serbians of war crimes. South Ossetia has been autonomous since the early 1990s from which date Russian and Georgian peacekeepers have been in S. Ossetia. The US puppet president of Georgia attacked S. Ossetian civilians with his American and Israeli trained and equipped army, killing about 2,000 and driving 30,000 into Russia, and the Georgian peacekeepers turned their weapons upon the Russian peacekeepers. The American puppet, installed by the neocon National Endowment for Democracy, committed this war crime in order to ethnically cleanse S. Ossetia of Russians and to end the separatist movement in order to smooth Georgia's entrance into NATO.

The "Russian invasion" was a response to this US-sponsored war crime. No real fact or truthful account can be found in the Heritage presentation or the US media. I do not want to be associated with an organization that is a front for American hegemony and wars based on propaganda, lies, and deceit. If Milton Friedman and F.A. Hayek were still alive, I am certain they would join me in resignation.

Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: WikiLeaks: Educating Americans About Open Society
« Reply #3 on: December 09, 2010, 01:21:43 am »

About MPS

After World War II, in 1947, when many of the values of Western civilization were imperiled, 36 scholars, mostly economists, with some historians and philosophers, were invited by Professor Friedrich von Hayek to meet at Mont Pelerin, near Montreux, Switzerland, to discuss the state and the possible fate of liberalism (in its classical sense) in thinking and practice.

The group described itself as the Mont Pelerin Society, after the place of the first meeting. It emphasised that it did not intend to create an orthodoxy, to form or align itself with any political party or parties, or to conduct propaganda. Its sole objective was to facilitate an exchange of ideas between like-minded scholars in the hope of strengthening the principles and practice of a free society and to study the workings, virtues, and defects of market-oriented economic systems.

Members who include high government officials, Nobel prize recipients, journalists, economic and financial experts, and legal scholars from all over the world, come regularly together to present the most current analysis of ideas, trends and events.

Offline Dig

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Re: WikiLeaks: Educating Americans About Open Society
« Reply #4 on: December 09, 2010, 06:37:05 pm »
a vital, one in order to understand what is coming if we lose (and indeed some of it is already here)

DARPA Control Grid

DARPA’s iXo Artificial Intelligence Control Grid: ‘The Official Version’

This was constructed almost entirely using government / military quotes, animations, videos, images and photos. The narrative is sourced  ... all » from government quotes from start to finish. It is the “official version”, if you will, but in an unprecedented format.

It unveils the governments numerous and ongoing programs related to A.I., “NBIC”, the “Global Information Grid”, nanotechnology, biotechnology, autonomous drones, “naval sea-bases”, space weapons, weather modification… or more directly: domestic and global totalitarian technological domination. American Imperialism meets Artificial Intelligence.

The only debate is: what are we going to do to stop it? Time’s running out…

It mostly centers around DARPA materials, as they’re the fountainhead of all of this, but this is all a broad multi-agency effort. Some of the video content, the “OS” of the video, was screen captured from the DARPA sites old iXo interactive flash presentation, from almost a yearago, but is now no longer available.

Sources in Darpa IXO

This is the resources page that has all of the narrative quotes, and all the rest that I simply couldn't fit in the video. It will function as the "official" discussion / debate page (like there is any debate?) that will be permanently linked underneath it in my profile or wherever.

"We can no longer avoid the need to be prepared to fight in cities."

"The globalization of the world economy will also continue, with a widening between "haves" and "have-nots.""

"Although unlikely to be challenged by a global peer competitor, the United States will continue to be challenged regionally."

"Failed states have cultures and world views that are vastly different from those of the United States."

"Given the global population trends and the likely strategies and tactics of future threats Army forces will likely conduct operations in, around, and over urban areas – not as a matter of fate, but as a deliberate choice linked to national security objectives and strategy"

[The Government is aimed at] "conflicts in high density urban areas against enemies having social and cultural traditions that may be counter-intuitive to us, and whose actions often appear to be irrational because we don't understand their context."

"The objective of the Urban Reasoning and Geospatial Exploitation Technology (URGENT) program is to develop a 3D urban object recognition and exploitation system"

"Capabilities that, for example, allow us to establish surveillance that provides robust, dynamic situational awareness on all the scales of the city."

"Compared to our current airborne capabilities, the new sensor and surveillance systems required must provide far more detailed and fundamentally different information and coverage."

"In addition, we need a network of nonintrusive microsensors, creating the ability to map an entire city, and the activities within it, in all three dimensions and (all the) time."

"The goal is to extend our awareness to the level of a city block so our forces have unprecedented awareness as the fighting begins, a level of awareness that enables them to shape and control the conflict as it unfolds."

"Because of the shrunken time scale of urban operations, these dynamic capabilities must operate in near-real-time."

"Combat Zones That See (CTS) is a project of DARPA to track everything that moves ",shachtman,45399,1.html

"CTS will produce video understanding A.I. embedded in surveillance systems for automatically monitoring video feeds"

"CTS (develops A.I.) for utilizing large numbers (1000s) of cameras to provide the close-in sensing demanded for military operations in urban terrain."

"Global Engagement combines global surveillance with the potential for a space-based global precision strike capability."

"Biomedical status monitoring is the medical equivalent of the Global Positioning System (GPS)."

"The large investments already present in nano-, info- and biotechnology should be coordinated and coupled with efforts in cognition. DARPA, NASA, NIH, and NSF already have major programs that seek to integrate nano-, bio- and info- research."

"The goal of the human performance augmentation effort is to increase the speed, strength, and endurance of soldiers in combat environments."

"The DARPA Augmented Cognition program promises to develop technologies capable of extending the information management capacity of warfighters."

"The goal of this program is to discover new pharmacologic and training approaches that will lead to an extension in the individual warfighter's cognitive performance capability by at least 96 hours and potentially for more than 168 hours without sleep."

"The intent is to take brain signals (nanotechnology for augmented sensitivity and nonintrusive signal detection) and use them in a control strategy (information technology), and then impart back into the brain the sensation of feedback signals (biotechnology)."

"The future requires a symbiosis of human and machine in a way that synergistically exploits the strengths of each. "

"Two of the critical issues for exoskeletons are power for actuation and biomechanical control integration."

"DARPA has a brain-machine interface program about to start. This program seeks human ability to control complex entities by sending control actions without the delay for muscle activation."

"From local groups of linked enhanced individuals to a global collective intelligence"

"We are not alone. We are interconnected as are our cognitive systems."

"Prolific unattended sensors and uninhabited, automated surveillance vehicles under personal warfighter control will be providing high data streams on local situations."

"We believe that, in the future, artificial cognitive systems will continually monitor, record, and assess a warfighter and his activities."

"Embedded, real-time "cognitive" processing for both the warfighter and associated automated systems will be critical to success"

"The J-UCAS vision is that a collection of unmanned, weaponized, high performance aircraft, equipped with the latest contemporary autonomous capabilities"

"The enemy will be at risk from relatively small, relatively inexpensive, unmanned platforms that bring the fight to the opponent while keeping our capital assets out of harm's way."

"The uninhabited air vehicle will have an artificial brain that can emulate a skillful fighter pilot in the performance of its missions."

"Tasks such as take-off, navigation, situation awareness, target identification, and safe return landing will be done autonomously, with the possible exception of person-in-the-loop for strategic and firing decisions.

"Removing the pilot from assault and fighter aircraft will result in a more combat-agile aircraft with less weight and no g-force constraints, and will reduce the risk of injury or death to highly trained warfighters. American public opinion makes this a clear priority.

"Add mobility, and our autonomous platforms can act, not just observe."

"The fighter airplane will likely derive the greatest operational advantages, but similar benefits will accrue to uninhabited tanks, submarines, and other military platforms."

"The Government's vision of an ultimate prompt global reach capability (circa 2025 and beyond) is engendered in a reusable Hypersonic Cruise Vehicle (HCV). This autonomous aircraft would be capable of taking off from a conventional military runway and striking targets 9,000 nautical miles distant in less than two hours. It could carry a 12,000-pound payload consisting of Common Aero Vehicles (CAVs), cruise missiles, small diameter bombs or other munitions. This HCV will provide the country dominant capability to wage a sustained campaign from CONUS on an array of time-critical targets that are both large in number and diverse in nature while providing aircraft- like operability and mission recall capability."

"The BICA program intends to develop artificial systems that can respond to a variety of situations by simulating human cognition that will enable it to learn from experience, reflect on current strategies and adjust them if necessary, and mentally simulate alternate plans and decisions. As the use of autonomous, unmanned, and intelligent systems in the military increases, the need for systems that can understand and respond to new and unique situations is growing dramatically."

"Space provides 24/7, latent, global persistence, just what we need for low-intensity conflicts and the Global War on Terror."

"Space Power  (systems, capa-bilities, and forces) will be increasingly leveraged to close the ever-widening gap between diminishing resources and increasing military commitments."

"For most of history -the Greek, Roman, Spanish and British empires- to be a great power meant to be a sea-faring nation. Maritime dominance remains a critical way to project power. But, for all the reasons just discussed, if the United States is to be a superpower in the 21 st century, we must keep our lead as the world's premier space-faring nation."

[It will] "Strengthen the nation's space leadership and ensure that space capabilities are available in time to further U.S. national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives;"

"Enable unhindered U.S. operations in and through space to defend our interests there;"

"The use of space nuclear power systems shall be consistent with U.S. national and homeland security, and foreign policy interests, and take into account the potential risks."

"Control of Space is the ability to assure access to space, freedom of operations within the space medium, and an ability to deny others the use of space, if required."

"We have to retain this high ground, just as we must retain our maritime superiority."

"The world's oceans cover two-thirds of our planet."

"The sea offers strategic, operational, and tactical mobility to those who control it."

"Maritime dominance remains a critical way to project power. "

"It's the medium over which no sovereign can veto our movements. And it's the medium in which US dominance is exercised globally, with stealth."

"If we're to maintain maritime supremacy with a leaner Navy, it must be done by employing diverse contingents of autonomous offboard systems together with the capital platforms of the future Navy. Our naval force will be multiplied by having these systems interconnected by a robust, seamless maritime network that operates above the water, on the water, and in the water."

"Let's envision the future Naval Force. There will be fewer ships casting a wide net over the vast maritime battlespace; a net that's extendable, flexible, and impenetrable; a net that's extendable, flexible, and impenetrable -fleets, squadrons, or units- of autonomous systems distributed around the world doing their jobs."

"the extended reach of networked weapons and sensors will tremendously increase the impact of naval forces in joint campaigns."
"A U.S. warship is sovereign U.S. territory -------------, whether in a port of a friendly country or transiting international straits and the high seas. U.S. naval forces, operating from highly mobile "seabases" in forward areas, are therefore free of the political encumbrances that may inhibit and otherwise limit the scope of land-based operations in forward theaters."
"the extended reach of networked weapons and sensors will tremendously increase the impact of naval forces in joint campaigns. The will be realized by exploiting the largest maneuver area on the face of the earth: the sea."
"SEABASE serves as the foundation from which offensive and defensive fires are projected making SEA STRIKE and SEA SHIELD realities."
"SeaBasing capitalizes on the freedom of action achieved through sea control, and is vital to this nation's ability to fully exploit its unprecedented and unequaled military strength in support of an over-arching national security strategy.
"SeaBasing, which refers to the ability of naval forces to operate at sea, as sovereign entities, free from concerns of access and political constraints associated with using land bases in other countries."

"…[We must] leverage information technology and innovative network-centric concepts of operations to develop increasingly capable joint forces.Our ability to leverage the power of information and networks will be key to our success"
--Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz

"Network Centric Warfare the key to DoD dominating future military operations."

"The Global Information Grid (GIG) vision implies a fundamental shift in information management, communication, and assurance"
--Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz

"The next-generation DoD enterprise network will be taking in sensor information from a variety of sources ?satellites in space, manned and unmanned systems in the air, at sea and on the ground, soldiers in the field, and intelligence from a variety of places, all being transmitted to and from its edge nodes."
"the Global DoD Enterprise Network forms the backbone of the DoD Global Information Grid (GIG)."

"The Net-Centric Enterprise Services (NCES) program will provide secure, collaborative information-sharing environment and unprecedented access to decision-quality information. NCES will enable decision-making superiority that results in increased mission effectiveness and enhanced process execution. It is based upon an emerging concept in the DOD called "net-centricity," which enables systems to provide the right information to the right person at the right time.""

"The implementation must allow both human users of the GIG, and automated services acting on behalf of GIG users, to access information and services from anywhere, based on need and capability. "
--Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz

"Transforming the network from a weapons support system into a weapon itself, that is the thread that runs through the programs that we pursue."

"we must enable the network to defend itself against those adversaries who seek to deny us the use of this valuable combat resource."

"This research thrust area will show automated cyber immune response and system regeneration. The technical approach will include biologically-inspired response strategies, machine learning, and cognitively-inspired proactive automatic contingency planning."

"Desired capabilities include self-optimization, self-diagnosis, "Cognitive immunity" and self-healing."
"As we move to an increasingly network-centric military, the vision of intelligent, cooperative computing systems responsible for their own maintenance is more relevant than ever."

"We need to move from a conventional view of data processing to a cognitive view, one that will allow our systems to be more responsible for their own configuration and maintenance and less vulnerable to failure and attack."

"Simultaneously, the network is invoking its memory, calling up huge databases and vast stores of knowledge. And, it is transmitting all of this to the various brains, the computers, which, in this case, may be distributed around the world."

"Artificial minds will be housed in artificial brains, and we may need some radical changes in our computing foundations to get there."

"These "fourth-generation" technologies will bring attributes of human cognition to bear on the problem of reconstituting systems that suffer the accumulated effects of imperfect software, human error, and accidental hardware faults, or the effects of a successful cyber attack."
"new fourth generation technologies will draw on biological metaphors such as natural diversity and immune systems to achieve robustness and adaptability; the structure of organisms and ecosystems to achieve scalability; and human cognitive attributes (reasoning, learning and introspection) to achieve the capacity to predict, diagnose, heal and improve the ability to provide service."

"The program concentrates on research needed to develop large-scale intelligent systems that can address practical Air Force needs."

"This cognitive program I told you about is actually showing that it is learning, and it is learning in a very difficult environment. This is the program Stanford Research runs for us. "
"We've got the technology to the point where we can now apply it in Iraq to a system that we also developed called CPOF, Command Post of the Future. It is a distributed command and control system."
"The cognitive program's whole purpose in life is really to increase the tooth-to-tail ratio [military-speak for the number of combat troops to the number of support troops]."
"Our cognitive programs whole aim is to have a computer "learn you," as opposed to you having to learn the computer."
"Cognitive computers can be thought of as systems that know what they're doing. Cognitive computing systems "reason" about their environments (including other systems), their goals, and their own capabilities. They will "learn" both from experience and by being taught. They will be capable of natural interactions with users, and will be able to "explain" their reasoning in natural terms."

"ACIP will incorporate biological, cognitive algorithm, and DoD mission challenge clues as inputs to establish the concepts of the effort."

"The goal of the BICA program is to develop integrated psychologically-based and neurobiology-based cognitive architectures that can simulate human cognition in a variety of situations."
"The BICA program intends to develop artificial systems that can respond to a variety of situations by simulating human cognition that will enable it to learn from experience, reflect on current strategies and adjust them if necessary, and mentally simulate alternate plans and decisions."

"The Integrated Learning program seeks to achieve revolutionary advances in Machine Learning by creating systems that opportunistically assemble knowledge from many different sources in order to learn."

"The goal of the Transfer Learning Program solicited by this BAA is to develop, implement, demonstrate and evaluate theories, architectures, algorithms, methods, and techniques that enable computers to apply knowledge learned for a particular, original set of tasks to achieve superior performance on new, previously unseen tasks."

"[They] Will be aware of themselves and able to reflect on their own behavior

{One product of this broad multi-agency initiative is NASA's "Intelligent Archives"}
"Stated goals of NASA's I.A.:
"adapting to events and anticipating user needs"
"Continuously mining archived data searching for hidden relationships and patterns"
"Identifying new data sources and information collaborators, and using available resources judiciously"
"aware of its own data content and usage"
"can extract new information from data Holdings"
"large scale data mining"
"acting on information discovered"
"extracting new information from its data holdings"
"coordination between intelligent archives and intelligent sensors"
"advanced weather prediction"


++++++++++WEATHER CONTROL++++++++++
"In the tele-immersive room, the scientists plan their research forecasts by summoning a vivid holographic 3-D projection of the Earth, and accessing projections of scaled real-time weather conditions."
"Space-based, airborne, and terrestrial sensors will produce weather-related data with varied resolutions, rates, bands, parameters, and volumes."
"Key aspects of a visionary system for advanced weather model building and operation would include:"
"Flexible, intelligent global observing system"
"Cyber infrastructures will comprise distributed system components (e.g., sensors, services, modeling, information & knowledge discovery tools) operating in a high-speed intelligence-based computing environment.
"This interconnected computing environment, in which I.A.'s also operate, provides the collective processing, data management, data persistence, and data interchange services necessary to meet the near-real-time requirements for advanced weather prediction.

"Weather as a Force Multiplier: Owning the Weather in 2025"
"US aerospace forces can "own the weather," as they "own the night" now."
"It could have offensive and defensive applications and even be used for deterrence purposes."
"Though a high-risk effort, the investment to do so would pay high rewards."
"Weather modification offers both the commercial sector and the military greatly enhanced capabilities."
"Its application in the military arena is a natural development as well. Weather modification will become a part of domestic and international security and could be done unilaterally"
"The ability to generate precipitation, fog, and storms on earth or to modify space weather, and the production of artificial weather all are a part of an integrated set of technologies to achieve global awareness, reach, and power."
"For this to occur, technology advancements in five major areas are necessary. These are advanced nonlinear modeling techniques, computational capability, information gathering and transmission, a global sensor array, and weather intervention techniques. All of these will be greatly enhanced as we approach 2025. Current demographic, economic, and environmental trends will create global stresses that create the necessary impetus for weather modification to become a reality in the commercial sector. Its application in the military arena is a natural development as well. Weather modification will become a part of domestic and international security and could be done unilaterally, through alliance networks—particularly regional ones—or through an ad hoc coalition or a UN framework. It could have offensive and defensive applications and even be used for deterrence purposes. The ability to generate precipitation, fog, and storms on earth or to modify space weather, improve communications through ionospheric modification (the use of ionospheric mirrors), and the production of artificial weather all are a part of an integrated set of technologies which can provide substantial increase in US, or degraded capability in an adversary, to achieve global awareness, reach, and power. Weather modification will be a part of 2025 and is an area in which the US must invest if only to be able to counter adversaries seeking such a capability."


"In contrast to incremental or evolutionary military change brought about by normal modernization efforts, defense transformation is more likely to feature discontinuous or disruptive forms of change."

"The end result of these enablers and concepts is Full Spectrum Dominance."

"Computing is a key element in this revolution." - Newt Gingrich

"We want to live forever, and we're getting there." -Bill Cinton

"This funding will support the work of America's most creative minds as they explore promising areas such as nanotechnology, supercomputing..."
"Dubya" - 2006 State of the Union Address

{In 2001, Bush & the DOD blocked a congressional bill that would have made, space weapons, weather modification and other"exotic weapons" illegal}
Title: To preserve the cooperative, peaceful uses of space for the benefit of all humankind by permanently prohibiting the basing of weapons in space by the United States, and to require the President to take action to adopt and implement a world treaty banning space-based weapons.
Sponsor: Rep Kucinich, Dennis J. [OH-10] (introduced 10/2/2001)      Cosponsors (None)
Latest Major Action: 4/19/2002 House committee/subcommittee actions. Status: Unfavorable Executive Comment Received from DOD.
(B) Such terms include exotic weapons systems such as--
(i) electronic, psychotronic, or information weapons;
(ii) chemtrails;
(iii) high altitude ultra low frequency weapons systems;
(iv) plasma, electromagnetic, sonic, or ultrasonic weapons;
(v) laser weapons systems;
(vi) strategic, theater, tactical, or extraterrestrial weapons; and
(vii) chemical, biological, environmental, climate, or tectonic weapons.
(C) The term `exotic weapons systems' includes weapons designed to damage space or natural ecosystems (such as the ionosphere and upper atmosphere) or climate, weather, and tectonic systems with the purpose of inducing damage or destruction upon a target population or region on earth or in space.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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Re: WikiLeaks: Educating Americans About Open Society
« Reply #5 on: December 09, 2010, 07:34:59 pm »
14th ICCRTS: C2 and Agility

Cdr Simon Reay Atkinson, RN, [email protected]
Mr Steve Lesher, [email protected]
Professor Dale Shoupe, [email protected]

Point of Contact: Simon Reay Atkinson, BSc MPhil (Cantab) CEng FIET  PhD Researcher Dynamic social Networks, CUED-EDC UKDA Senior Research Fellow - Asymmetrics ARAG Scholar Practitioner - Dynamic social Networks Cdr, RN Advanced Research Assessment Group Defence Academy Faringdon Road Shrivenham Swindon, Wilts  SN6 8TS  (+44)01793-788819  96161-8819 (mil)  Paper ID 194

Track 4: Collective Endeavors
Commander Simon Reay Atkinson 1, Royal Navy, Mr Steve Lesher 2, Professor Dale Shoupe UK Defence Academy, Research & Assessment Branch, University of Cambridge, 2Deputy Chief J6, USCENTCOM,3MAXWELL USAF, Air Education and Training Command, Air War College {[email protected], [email protected], [email protected]} This paper represents the unclassified deliberati ons of Atkinson, Lesher and Shoupe emerging from Phases I-III of the US CENTCOM [Joint Strategic] Assessment Team, C2 & KM C ell, Oct – Dec 08.

This assessment, under the lead of General David Petraeus and C olonel ‘H.R.’ McMaster, was established in the Fall of 2008; running through to Spring 2009. Its purpose was to provide US / Coalition views on the CENTCOM AOR. As part of this work, Atkin son, Lesher and Shoupe were attached to the C2 & KM Cell w here th eir initia l appreciation beg an with an examination of the principles of Knowledge Management. It was their assessment that, despite the recommendations arising from both the 9/11 and Butler reports, that there had been in sufficient analysis, modelling and work done to develop what the 9/11 report righ tly observes as the ‘Need-to-Know; Need-to-Share; Need-to-Use’ model (we called the Three Needs M odel (3NM)) and which both reports recom mend, within ‘trust based, virtual networks’ that encour age interaction, ‘dissent and alternative or minority hypotheses, or uncertainty’ to majo rity reporting. This we judged to be the hallmarks of a healthy organisation where dissent is seen also to be an expression of loyalty to the organisations represented and their people; to be encouraged. Moreover, it is also our assessment that the Need-to-Know model is not replaced by the Three Needs Model. Or ganisations and states have certain knowledge – the crown jewels – that they have every right to protect. Our assessment suggested that there is a need to develop new methodologies for sharing and using information – creating transparencies as opposed to transparency – across domains, which we describe in terms of new unde rstandings for Knowledge Management, Communities of Interest and Information Capture and Knowledge Exchange (ICKE).

1. Been There
The 9/11 Report [1] writes: ‘as presently configured, the national security institutions of the U.S. government are still the institutions constructed to win the Cold War. The United States confronts a very different world today. Instead of facing a few very dangerous adversaries, the United States confronts a number of less visible challenges that surpass the boundaries of traditional nation-states and call for quick, imaginative, and agile responses[1:399]’. It is our assessment that similar configurations have continued to impair Unity of Effort and Command in our operational theaters; most notably in Coalition enterprises where international legitimacy is often sacrificed at the expense of efficiency and effectiveness – and so unity of effort. ‘The problem is nearly intractable because of the way the [national government and international institutions are] currently structured. Lines of operational authority run to the expanding executive departments, and they are guarded for understandable reasons….The result is that each agency or department needs its own intelligence apparatus to support the performance of its duties. It is hard to “break down stovepipes” when there are so many stoves that are legally and politically entitled to have cast-iron pipes of their own. Recalling the Goldwater-Nichols legislation of 1986, Secretary Rumsfeld reminded us that to achieve better joint capability, each of the armed services had to “give up some of their turf and authorities and prerogatives.” Today, he said, the executive branch is “stove-piped much like the four services were nearly 20 years ago.” He wondered if it might be appropriate to ask agencies to “give up some of their existing turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient government wide joint effort [2].”[1:403]’. The 9/11 Commission went on to observe [1:417] that the: ‘…system …requires a demonstrated “need to know” before sharing.

This approach assumes it is possible to know, in advance, who will “need to use” the information. Such a system implicitly assumes that the risk of inadvertent disclosure outweighs the benefits of wider sharing. Those Cold War assumptions are no longer appropriate. The culture of agencies feeling they own the information they gathered at taxpayer expense must be replaced by a culture in which the agencies instead feel they have a duty to the information—to repay the taxpayers’ investment by making that information available…Each agency’s incentive structure opposes sharing, with risks (criminal, civil, and internal administrative sanctions) but few rewards for sharing information. No one has to pay the long-term costs of overclassifying information, though these costs—even in literal financial terms— are substantial. There are no punishments for not sharing information. Agencies uphold a “need-to-know” culture of information protection rather than promoting a “need-to-share” culture of integration’. A recommendation arising from the 9/11 Commission was that: ‘The President should...coordinate the resolution of the legal, policy, and technical issues across agencies to create a “trusted information network.” [1:418]’ In the UK and as a result of the investigation into Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction, the Butler Report [3] was commissioned. Building on the ‘need-to-share’, the report stated: ‘…it will be essential to continue to bring to bear all sources of intelligence in a coordinated way. We have noted…that success in the cases we studied came through close collaboration between all involved to piece together the intelligence picture, with teams able to have shared access to all available intelligence’.

The report went on to say:, ‘However we consider that it would be helpful through day-to-day processes and the use of new information systems to create a ‘virtual’ network bringing together the various sources of expertise in Government on proliferation and on activity to tackle it, who would be know to each other and could consult each other easily [3:142]’. The Butler Report also raised the question of ‘better machinery for bringing to the attention of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) dissenting opinions’ and recommended, inter alia, the: ‘consideration of the provision of proper channels for the expression of dissent within the UK MOD Defence Intelligence Service through the extension of the remit of the Staff Counsellor, who provides a confidential outlet for conscientious objection or dissent within the intelligence agencies, to cover DIS civilian staff and the Assessments Staff [3:143]’.

The Report went on to state: ‘…we note that the US Government does from time to time attach degrees of confidence and notes of dissent to its National Intelligence Estimates. These may help to prevent readers from attaching more certainty to judgments than is justified and intended. While not arguing for a particular approach to the language of…assessments and the way in which alternative or minority hypotheses, or uncertainty, are expressed, we recommend that the intelligence community review their conventions again to see if there would be advantage in refreshing them.[3:145]’

1.2 Knowledge Management and Communities of Interest
An understanding derived from the US Army [4] by the C2 & KM Cell for Knowledge Management was as: ‘A cross-disciplinary organic enterprise connecting and integrating social, cultural, communication and technical processes – including trust, obligation, commitment, and accountability – to facilitate creative learning and adaptation and leverage information capture and knowledge exchange (ICKE) by connecting communities ‘who-need to-know’ with those ‘who-need-to-share’ with those ‘who-need-to-use’. Based upon DoD CIO Memorandum [5], DoD 8320.02-G [6], the UK MoD's Applied Research Programme, Shared Information Environment work [7], Markham [8], Tirrell [9], Fischer [10], Chirala [11] and Atkinson and Moffat [12] COIs were considered to be: For the information technology architecture, see Ruth David 9/11 Report interview (June 10, 2003). For the necessity of moving from need-to-know to need-to-share, see James Steinberg 9/11 testimony, Oct. 14, 2003. The Director still has no strategy for removing information-sharing barriers and—more than two years since 9/11—has only appointed a working group on the subject. George Tenet prepared 9/11 statement, Mar. 24, 2004, p. 37. Page 4

‘Distributed, collaborative and inclusive groupings working to discover, synthesize and exchange knowledge through the sharing of information in order to: take better decisions; implement change and create effects.’

As we envisaged, Communities of Interests form in order to ‘discover, synthesise and exchange knowledge through the sharing of information’ and it is the role of Knowledge Management to facilitate, aid and support these, principally, social processes in order to ‘facilitate…learning and adaptation’.

1.3 Integration versus Interaction
Many social scientists call for integration without really understanding the costs of integration and when, in actuality, they are calling for a new model to replace an existing model that has failed in some way [13]. This form of assimilation – often based upon non causal and non-empirical ‘evidence’ – essentially replaces integration with what might be termed multi-modelling. Work undertaken by UK MoD [14], considered the following idea for integration, which was used in preparing the Defence

Strategic Guidance, 2005:

‘The ability of networked systems, units or forces to provide and accept services from other systems, units or forces by uniting procedures, rules and information so that, when formed, the force operates together more effectively, capably and seamlessly as a whole.’ Nonetheless, Integration comes at a cost very often of flexibility and agility as one moves from high end interactivity within groups and across their seams and boundaries to a position where substitution – or interoperability – is no longer an option. For example, in a Coalition Enterprise certain nations may bring specific capabilities or permissible means of approaching issues or problems that would be impermissible and, or, not tenable within an integrated environment, as expressed below:

Figure 1: The Arc of Interoperability

The above Arc of Interoperability suggests that for many organisations, ‘high-end Interaction’ is the best that they might achieve – even within national institutions – and that integration (which essentially means becoming subordinate in some way) is a step too far. We see this not just between intelligence organizations and states but also between the military and other Inter Agencies; between coalition partners and frequently between the Inter Agencies and NGOs and NGOs and the Military. The fact that Integration, however defined, comes at a cost means that most organisations will be willing to share information if it is to be used for a common understandable purpose but are not willing for their partners to know all they have to know about subjects and matters that represent and define their own Intellectual Property. It is these networks we assess that both the Butler and 9/11 Reports had in mind when they spoke of ‘trust based, virtual networks’ that, in our view, encourage interaction. It is exactly this type of healthy interaction that we had in mind with regard to the combination of COI and KM. As we envisage, Communities of Interests form in order to ‘discover, synthesise and exchange knowledge through the sharing of information’ and it is the role of Knowledge Management to facilitate, aid and support these, principally, social processes in order to ‘facilitate…learning and adaptation’.

2. Transparencies, Needs and Exchanges
When many of us older soldiers, sailors, Marines and airmen grew up, we used acetates to build up complex operational pictures. In effect, this was achieved by building up different operational layers by laying transparencies on top of each other to build up the final picture. This was through a process of interactive information exchange and knowledge capture (ICKE), that we see as being typical within a Community of Interest. Essentially, each picture – acetate or view-foil – was declaratory of the position of a particular agency with regard to a specific objective or target. Information was declared so as to de-conflict activities and, more specifically, to avoid conflict (for example blue-on-blue). This was an interactive process that enabled integration of resources for a specific purpose, often geographically and temporally defined. It did not mean full access to every one’s information or a right to know by all parties to everything known by each other. Indeed such systems, where they exist, are rapidly swamped by information to the point where they can often barely deconflict; sometimes resulting in so called, ‘friendly fire’ incidents. Calls for transparency, we therefore concluded, are often misplaced and even nonsensical when what may actually be needed is ‘transparencies; not transparency, per se’. In other words, the building up of an integrated picture through the interactive-declared ‘transparencies’ of individual positions – through a COI – rather than demanding transparency from, by and to all. This leads to an integrated approach to a specific problem – without the costs of global integration, which will nearly always be impossible to achieve in any case.

2.1 Needs
As identified, we assessed that there was an increasing need to re-examine existing and develop new methods for information capture and knowledge exchange as also mandated in the 9/11 [1] and Butler (UK) [3] Reports. This needs to find ways of respecting rights and privileges established previously in terms of need-to-know, whilst developing procedures for sharing and for using. This, in turn, led us to the concept of the Three Needs Model (3NM) described in terms of Need-to-Know; Need-to-Share and Need-to-Use – as identified but not specified in the 9/11 Report. Previous recommendations had been made to move from ‘need-to-know’ to ‘need-to-share’ but we concluded that little work had been done to develop these concepts, or implement them, whilst recognising and preserving understandable need-to-know rights and privileges. It was our assessment, that Communities of Interest as we consider them to be, have a specific role to play regarding information capture and knowledge exchange, as supported by Knowledge Management. Furthermore, we envisaged effective Communities of Interest combining 2 Although interestingly it was observed that, probably for reasons of proximity, relations between NGOs and the Military at the tactical and operational levels were often far closer and more understanding than between NGOs and their Inter Agency contacts. the three needs: ‘Need-to-Know (N2K); Need-to-Share (N2S) and Need-to-Use (N2U)’ within their constructs, building upon and from their ‘declared transparencies’ to achieve an integrated picture.

Need to Share Type B
Need to Share Type B
Need to Know Type A
Need to Use Type C


Figure 2: Need-to-Know; Need-to-Share; Need-to Know (3NM) Model Communities of Interest can exist to Know or to Share or to Use Information and exchange Knowledge.

It was our opinion that they can only be effective when all three come together in a COI. As example, during the Foot and Mouth epidemic in the UK in 2001, the UK Government was able to combine its departments in order that they knew what was happening and could share information between them at the strategic level. The problem was that they did not have the ‘doers’ at the operational and tactical levels to implement change and so affect the course of the infection. This was ultimately and largely supplied by the British Army (with sailors and airmen); frequently operating at the junior officer and corporal level. This remains the case when comparing military organisations, who have depth at the strategic, operational and tactical levels; with Inter Agencies, who frequently have depth at the strategic level but patchily at the operational and little at the tactical levels; with NGOs, who are often tactically rich but operationally constrained. If we can find ways of combining these different needs to know, share and use within a COI, it should be possible to affect the changes we all know and desire to deliver.

2.2 Exchanges
Proposals were developed for what was termed an ‘information vectored exchange’ which sought to identify and so, to an extent, distinguish between different types of information and opportunities for exchange. The model also built upon concepts for the serial vectoring opportunities [15] for such information exchange, to develop a seven stage IVE model (in GMS) detailed in Figure 3. This model, in turn, combined notions for Type A (Control); Type B (Command) and Type C (Informal) networks in terms of Need-to-Know (A); Need-to-Share (B) and Need-to-Use (C) [16]. In this model, Figure 2, the Command function is seen to both connect and arbitrage between the Need-to-Know (Type A) and Need-to-Use (Type C), i.e. between Control and Informal Networks. In an effective and competent Graphical Modeling System (GMS) developed by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) and being taken forward in collaborative partnership with, amongst others, SPAWAR, Dstl and the UK Defence Academy. The idea for different forms / types of networks (A, B and C) is emerging from work undertaken by Simon Reay Atkinson as part of his PhD Research at the University of Cambridge, Engineering Department. organisation, Type B networks are seen to have emergent properties resulting from and contributed to by healthy interaction between Type A and Type C Networks. The Three Needs Model shows both multi-loop exchange and the push and pull of information, see Figure 2.

Figures 2 and 3 examine what a 3NM and IVE model might look like and how it may possibly operate.

The Need-to-Share network is shown acting as the vectoring component within the model; pulling, pushing and so enabling information flow from and between the Need-to-Know and Need-to-Share models shown in Figure 2. Essentially, the Need-to-Share network is shown acting as the vectoring component within the model; pulling, pushing and so enabling information flow from and between the Need-to-Know and Need-to-Share models shown above. Figure 3 below suggests such a seven layered IVE model for information and exchange.

Figure 3: Information Vectored Exchange (IVE) for Information Capture and Knowledge Exchange

The IVE Model developed in Table 1 and Figure 3 posits a way of moving towards a more inclusive exchange of information between tightly controlled Type A Networks (N2K) and the informal and less controlled Type C Networks (N2U) – whilst protecting and preserving rights and privileges. Command and Control, Coordination, Focus and Convergence – CFC vice C2 – Type B (N2S) Networks are seen to occupy the vital space between the N2K and N2U models. The main intention of the N3 model is to provide the informal-formal processes and protocols for resolving factional differences that exist in any healthy organisation.

Informal Non-formalised information
Ad hoc meetings, gatherings, gossip
Freely accessible information
Non-exclusive gatherings
Formalised information (papers, news etc)
Inclusive Membership
Information streams – newscasts etc Streamed (consecutive-temporal) meetings
Vectored Calibrated / directed Information
Calibrated / directed meetings and discussions
Classified Codified information
Meetings held in camera at pre-determined
Limited access information
Limited access meetings

Table 1: Information Exchange

3. Organising for Information Capture and Knowledge Exchange
It is feared that widescale ignorance of the principles of data, information, knowledge and their communication has probably bedevilled many IT programmes. Yet still there is pressure for these programmes to be made yet bigger and more global. Why and at what cost? This ignorance extends to issues of command and control; often making it harder to command. Managerialism in its various constructivist-methodological guises, from the Soviet Union onwards, has wished to impose centrality and control – orthodoxy – upon people and organisations. In many organisations, IT systems have essentially taken the pay, promotion and reporting structures from individual managers and leaders and placed them with the information-data-entities under the tag of KM. Promotion, pay and selection can only now occur within and in adherence to these processes and compliance with them. The very core tenets and rational of many successful organisations may have been ceded to process – command has essentially been lost. There is no room here for adaptation – field promotion – or selection / promotion of those who do not fit the process-mold. Agility has essentially been squeezed out by the conjoining processes of evidence-basing and performance management. Essentially, these processes have locked such organisations into a process of metricated-reductionism; rewarding, principally, process and adherence to it. Dissent is not seen to be an expression of loyalty to be encouraged. This is not the fault of processes or systems per se but of the ways in which training, methods, processes and centralising ambitions have been used to subordinate and control. This has been exacerbated by the lack of technical knowledge within many senior managers and leaders and their inability to recognise what is being done to them and their failure to work the processes or do anything about them. As a result, ‘ruthlessness is reaching its most sublime levels’ [17]. Of equal concern, it should be recognised that such organisations may ‘no longer be under command’.

3.1 The Costs of Enterprise
Just as many organisations have apparently embarked upon the almost wilful dereliction of duty they may have also embarked on exercises of knowledge and information destruction. As example, taking Bunge’s social-knowledge model – ‘…cognition is personal, but knowledge is social [18]’ – and applying it to many organisations, for years there has been downward pressure on numbers. This, in turn, has led to the displacement of people – through re-location and redundancy. Up and until the late 1990s, information was stored in the tactile – frangible – form of paper, files / packs. These packs were stored in local cabinets – in the ‘custody of’ originators and ‘librarians / registries’ alike. They were occasionally weeded by an expert and, as occasionally, sent off for archiving. Knowledge was ‘held in being’ by the organisation; its people and the mental-physical (paper and cabinet) datums established. People knew where to look – they were situation aware. Sold the myth of ‘knowledge management [19]’, senior management were persuaded that they could recreate their ‘networks-in-being’ [16] by a) getting rid of the people (experts and librarians) and b) scanning all the old frangible packs to create new, ‘exciting’ KM data bases, with access to all. Now, no one knows where to look – they can no longer sensemake [20] – and staff officers are left frequently either a) recreating the wheel or b), spending hours trawling old data bases. Inevitably, it is easier for them to build new models – multi-modelling – which the organisation prefers them to do. So careers are advanced; billions wasted and lives lost.

3.2 ICKE – A New Razvédka Bóyem
Information and data give the impression of being without cost or value. Neither is true. Szilard [21] maintains that ‘information is costly to acquire and use’. Combining this with Bunge’s observation, the following useful maxim is seen to apply: ‘that knowledge is social and, like information, it is costly to acquire and use [22]’. It is this idea of both cost and thereby value in its wider social sense that led to a re-examination of Soviet, Red Army concepts for Razvédka Bóyem. In the initial sense, this was taken to describe intelligence gathering through battle. In its wider understanding, as possibly applied to Cyber-, it may be thought of as ‘the gathering, testing and assessment of information and knowledge through exploration and exploitation (battle)’. This line of thinking has led to the concept of ‘Information Capture and Knowledge Exchange (ICKE)’, as developed by the C2 and KM Cell, with its emphasis upon the active capture of information and social exchange of knowledge. There is a considerable way to go before these ideas and concepts are understood let alone adopted or taken up by senior management for education, training and application. At the same time, displacement activities continue apace while the unforeseen consequences of actions driven more often by despair than knowledge, further limit the capacity and will to act. Put simply, we have frequently been blinded by our own processes and this, in turn, may be further encouraging the flight to Cyber-.

3.3 Organising for ICKE
Type A (Control) Networks outlined previously, see also Keller et al [16], lend themselves to technological applications, specifically where rules and procedures are required to determine and protect information flows. Over the past fifteen years or so, technology has often been seen to drive the science, with the result that data-based-technologies have been seen more as ‘ends in themselves’ than as means. More an end result than an aid to achieving it. This has had the effect of displacing the social dimensions of the network: increasingly, Type A networks have become unknowing and, worse perhaps, unknowable. And as this has occurred, the opportunities for leaking or suborning the system may have increased. Almost the reverse has been the case for Type C (Informal) networks which have exploded because they are seen as a means and not an end to communication and social interaction, for example Facebook.

Most governments have, in their being, departments that occupy part of the Need-to-Share networks, such as StratCom. A perceived problem is that frequently these departments / agencies may not be part of a comprehensive, ‘whole’ programme. They are often individually located, poorly structured and  controlled in such a way that they are made more ‘pink than green – closed than open’ (see Figure 3).

In such an environment, they are rarely respected (or trusted) and can frequently become the scapegoats – useful messengers to be shot. Consistency of message and continuity of people becomes erratic and difficult to sustain – further disrupting and weakening the narrative. This has been exacerbated by the apparent dysfunctional nature of many institutions, reaction to failure has rarely been to ‘learn and adapt’ but rather to ‘react and control’.

In actuality, it is our assessment that Type B Need-to-Share Networks exist on the edge of Type A, Need-to-Know, networks and, similarly, on the edges of Type C networks (not centrally as shown): they are ‘double-edge’ networks. Other work has possibly identified that Type B networks have 5 Alberts [14]: ‘Planning is part of Sensemaking.’

emergent properties – emerging from the combination of functional Type A and Type C networks. When Type A and C networks are non-functional and interaction between the two is constrained and untrusting, it has been observed that functional Type B networks may not emerge. Moreover, whilst an organisation might determine its Type A networks it can, at best, only influence its Type C networks. Therefore, through its Type A Networks, the main responsibility for creating Type B edge-networks probably rests more with the organisation itself.  To place people on the edge of an organisation and keep them there, three principle requirements are seen to exist – each of which has to be operating, simultaneously:

➢ There needs to be underlying (extra-organisational) ‘societal’ trusts in processes, procedures and protocols – in some instances rules – to encourage and protect edge-individuals. Current mandated (what is not prohibited is permissible type) legislation does not achieve or provide for this.

➢ Organisations need to be able to recognise, create, reward and promote ability within their formal, ranked structures – to be, primarily, ability as opposed to rank conscious – and to identify, recruit and select individuals on the basis of ‘capability not preference’. Specifically, these individuals need to be protected and separated from formal career lines and processes – in some cases individual managers. On selection and appropriate positioning, organisations then need to create ‘secure, sure and safe’ reporting and ‘handling lines’ that will enable edge-individuals and their associated networks and programmes to exist – ‘to be’ – over the long term.

➢ Individuals need to be identified, educated, trained and kept alive but, at the end of the day, their organisation needs to understand that only a small percentage of people, perhaps between 2-10%, can or indeed would wish to work in such domains. And they can easily be prevented from doing so. Their reward is often little more than ‘being’ enabled and allowed to be members of such networks.

3.3 Needing to Know, Share and Use
Need-to-Share networks, working essentially between and across the ‘open-to-closed’ information domains, need to have certain protected privileges, protocols and processes. This is essentially what is meant by vectoring. In other words, contained within the serial streams are meta-state vectors that relate directly – and so can be immediately distinguished – to the meta-datums [23] established within both the Type A and Type B networks. In this way, information can be processed and acted upon accordingly; knowledge formed and information exchanged [24]. Simply creating an organisation and placing it on the edge without previously establishing appropriate meta-datums within both networks and the connecting meta-state vectors (protocols, processes and procedures) will not allow for the organisation as a whole to function. The Type B networks will quickly be killed off. Similarly, expecting the Type B networks to cover the complete edge without concentrating on key nodes, will spread resources too thinly and lead to dis-functionality. The solution would appear to be to create the conditions from which Type B networks might emerge and be scaled and then coupled appropriately.  Bletchley Park is a case in point. Created very much to work on-the-edge (as a Type B network), by all accounts it functioned brilliantly from its inception up and until 1942. Then it went into sharp decline and, by the end of the war, was a shadow of its former self. Why? Four reasons appear uppermost: first, its very success caused jealousies within the otherwise privileged Type A communities; secondly, these jealousies led to rules and processes being introduced that, thirdly, acted to prevent the Type B networks forming and so, fourthly, inhibited the sharing and using of information and so the exhibiting of emergent behaviour. This may also have been impacted by the US infusion occurring at around same time (change on change); the organisational-cultural changes this brought with it and the weakness of Churchill’s position in 1942 (after Singapore). The combined effect was to reduce the trusts and increase the controls and rules placed upon Bletchley Park – although, interestingly, its outstations were largely unaffected and, it is our assessment, some continued to perform well long after the end of WWII.

4. A Call for Re-Integration
Significant questions remain regarding system identification, enabling and disabling and composition and de-composition. As has been suggested, organisations have often not done the vital system
identification work, first, in terms of what is incoming and outgoing and what is wanted and, as importantly, not wanted. Equally, peoples’ perceptions of information and information systems vary significantly, frequently to the detriment of the organisation as a whole. For example, the development of Strategic Communications within government structures. At the same time, a lack of scientific [decompositional] understanding (when it comes to the creation and sustaining of successful edge-networks capable of undertaking this type of work effectively) has led to stasis and sometimes worse. Effectively, organisations and networks have been disabled rather than enabled. Re-integration will require a scientific understanding of what we want to do in terms of system identification; broken down further with respect to enabling / disabling and composition / decomposition. A better understanding of information; what it represents and how it is exchanged will greatly assist this work. It is our assessment that, whilst more work is required to develop the above models – including moving from transparency to transparencies and from value to values based judgements – that the above models, including our understanding of Communities of Interest and Knowledge Management offer us a way to re-engage our institutions in ways and means that might truly deliver Unity of Effort; Unity of Command and so Unity of Action.

[1] 9/11 Commission Report (2004).
[2] Donald Rumsfeld prepared statement to 9/11 Commission, Mar. 23, 2004, p. 20.
[3] Review of Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors. (2004). Chairman: The Rt Hon The Lord Butler of Brockwell KG GCB CVO Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed 14th July 2004.
[4] US Army CIO/G-6.(2008).KM Principles. Army Knowledge On-Line (AKO).
[5] DoD CIO Memorandum.(2003).DoD Net centric Data Strategy. May 9, 2003.
[6] DoD 8320.02-G.(2006).Guidance for Implementing Net-Centric Data Sharing. April 12, 2006.
[7] Johnson, K. (2001).Initial Version of the Information Concept (Shared Information Environment). QINETIQ/KI/SEB/CR010172, October 2001.
[8] Markham, G.(2004).Communities and their contribution to agile mission grouping. 2004 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium.
[9] Tirrell, R.P., Lt Col USMC.(2001).Amphibious Expeditionary Warfare C4I Modernization. 2001 Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium.
[10] Fischer, G.(2001) Communities of Interest. Department of Computer Science and Institute of Cognitive Science University of Colorado, Boulder24th Annual Information Systems Research Seminar In Scandinavia (IRIS'24), Ulvik, Norway, August 2001.
[11] Chirala, R.C.(2004). A Service-Oriented Architecture-Driven Community of Interest Model. Department of Computer Science & Engineering Arizona State University.
[12] Atkinson S.R. and Professor J. Moffat.(2005).The Agile Organization. CCRP.
[13] Tooby, J. and L. Cosmides.(1992).The Psychological Foundations of Culture. Chapter 2 in: The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture. Editors, Jerome, H., L. Cosmides and J. Tooby, OUP, p. 2, 3, 27.
[14] As Briefed (2002) in: The Policy Perspective. UK MOD, DFD, 20021031_NEC_Presentation.
[15] Logan, B and P.J. Moreno.(1997).Factorial Hidden Models for Speech recognition: Preliminary Experiments. Cambridge Research Laboratory, Technical Report Series, CDR 97/7 September 1977.
[16] Keller, R., N Carrigan, S. Reay Atkinson, P. Johnson and P.J. Clarkson (2008). Collaboration and Information Sharing in NEC Networks. NECTISE Conference, Leeds University, Oct 08.
[17] Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. Wiley, New York, NY.
[18] Bunge, M. A. (2000). Ten Modes of Individualism - None of Which Works - And Their Alternatives. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 30(3): 384-406.
[19] Wilson, T.D.(2002).The nonsense of Knowledge Management. Information Research, Vol. 8, No.1, October 2002.
[20] Alberts, D. S. and R. E. Hayes (2007). Understanding Command and Control. DoD Command and Control Research Program, CCRP publications, p. 63.
[21] Szilard, L.(1964 (1929)).One the Increase of Entropy in a Thermodynamic System by the intervention of Intelligent Beings – the Critique.(Rapoport A. and M. Knoller trans.). Behavioural Science 9:302-2310.
[22] Atkinson, S.R.(2008).The Study and Instrumentation of Decision Taking in Dynamic Social Networks. University of Cambridge Engineering Department-EDC First Year Report, p. 51.
[23] McOwat, D. and D.J. Holland Smith.(2003).A Business Model for Knowledge Services. P
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Critical Infrastructure Protection Series
Session One: Information & Communications Infrastructure
February 08, 2002
8:00 - 11:30 AM
B1 Conference Center
1800 K Street NW, Washington, DC

8:00 AM   Welcome and Introductions
Dr. John J. Hamre, President and CEO, CSIS

8:15 AM   Keynote Address: “Restoring and Protecting Telecommunications
Infrastructure in the Wake of September 11”
Mr. Charles R. Lee, Chairman and Co-CEO, Verizon Communications

9:15 AM   Break

9:30 AM   Panel Discussion

Mr. Frank Cilluffo, Special Assistant to the President, Office of Homeland Security

Dr. John C. Gannon, Vice Chairman, Intellibridge Corporation

Mr. Ted McLaughlan, Director of Knowledge Management and Collaborative Technologies, Accenture

Dr. Barbara T. Reagor, Executive Partner, Homeland Security & Government Solutions, Telcordia Technologies

Mr. Leif C. Ulstrup, Vice President and Homeland Security Task Force Leader, American Management Systems

11:30 AM   Conclusion
Discussion Framework
Public - Private Partnership

Much of America’s strength rests on its privately-owned critical infrastructure.  Up until the tragic events of September 11, many believed that geography placed the United States outside the reach of most physical threats to the homeland’s critical infrastructure. Periodic reviews of national security policy, including antiterrorism policy, have historically considered protecting critical infrastructure and searched for methods to minimize their vulnerability.  American critical infrastructure presents terrorists with a variety of attractive targets that, to this day, remain vulnerable. In many ways this vulnerability stems from what has made the Nation great - the openness inherent in American society.  President Bush cautioned in his State of the Union address that officials found diagrams in Afghanistan of American nuclear plants and public water supplies. The FBI warned law enforcement agencies earlier this month to be especially vigilant around utilities, nuclear plants and water facilities.

The private sector is now more aware of threats to the homeland but has limited experience with how to protect infrastructure at risk. Despite their lack of experience, the private sector is responsible to their stockholders for protecting critical infrastructure and to their customers who depend on them to support the American way of life. The protections put in place by the private sector are essential, however, they cannot deal with all the challenges by themselves therefore a partnership between government and business should be part of the solution.  The federal role in infrastructure protection is complex. The federal government is bound by the Constitution to provide for the common defense of the United States but in dealing with critical infrastructure attacks on the private sector, faces a different set of challenges. The federal government rightfully should share the burden for critical infrastructure protection - but can only help through effective cooperation with the private sector.

A recent example of effective public-private partnership is emerging in New York. The New York Office of Public Security is coordinating the development of a Counter-Terrorism Network (CTN) designed by IBM to disseminate terrorism-related information. During the second phase of CTN implementation, the network will be expanded to 543 police departments, as well as other important offices and locations like the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, the nuclear energy industry and large corporations. Information could be shared over the two-way CTN, which would connect over 70,000 law enforcement officials in New York. When a terminal receives terrorism information, a flashing screen alerts users, who can then retrieve the password-protected information. The CTN mirrors the national effort to coordinate anti-terror initiatives among state, local, federal, and private sector organizations to achieve maximum efficiency and avoid duplication of effort.

Information and Communications Infrastructure Protection

Commercial communications have become critical to everyday life in the United States. Interlinked computer networks regulate the flow of power, water, financial services, medical care, telecommunications networks and transportation systems. More than 90 percent of essential military communications are carried over the public switched network. Without a conscious societal or political decision, we have forged public and private dependencies on computer- based, interlinked information systems. The profitability and viability of many businesses, American economic strength, and national global competitiveness depend on the continuous and successful operation of complex Information and Communications infrastructure.

Potential sources and forms of attack on Information and Communications infrastructure include both traditional “physical” attacks such as bombings, and electronic, or “cyber” attacks.  The Associated Press reported last week that the FBI (NIPC) said Al Qaeda terrorists may have been studying American dams and water-supply systems in preparation for new attacks and sought information on the Internet about insecticides and pest-control products. Investigators said law-enforcement and intelligence agencies also received indications that Al Qaeda terrorists have sought information on automated systems, called supervisory control and data acquisition networks, controlling water supplies and wastewater facilities in the United States and overseas.

Public and private sector actions designed to identify and minimize vulnerabilities of Information and Communications infrastructure will include technology as a key part of any solution and in this regard, the private sector has a long history of stepping up to contribute to solving national security challenges.

Keynote Speaker
Chairman and Co-Chief Executive Officer, Verizon Communications

Charles R. Lee is chairman and co-CEO of Verizon, the company formed by the merger of GTE and Bell Atlantic. Before the merger, Lee was chairman and chief executive officer of GTE Corporation. Prior to that, he was chairman and chief executive officer-elect since December 1991. Lee had served as president, chief operating officer and a director of GTE Corporation since December 1988. Previously, he was senior vice president - finance and planning since March 1986, and senior vice president - finance from 1983 to 1986. Lee joined GTE from Columbia Pictures Industries Inc., where he was senior vice president - finance from 1980 to 1983. Before joining Columbia Pictures, Lee served as senior vice president - finance for Penn Central Corporation and in other financial management positions with that company and its subsidiaries beginning in 1971. He began his business career with United States Steel Corporation in 1964 and served in a number of financial and management positions with that company until 1971.

A native of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, Lee received a bachelor’s degree in metallurgical engineering from Cornell University in 1962 and a master’s degree from the Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration in 1964. Lee is a Director of USX Corporation, United Technologies Corporation and the Procter & Gamble Company. He is a member of the President’s National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee and the Advisory Committee to the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. Lee is also a member of the New American Realities Committee of the National Policy Association and is a Trustee Emeritus and Presidential Councilor of Cornell University. He serves on the Board of Directors of the Stamford Hospital Foundation and the New American Schools Development Corporation. He is a member of the Business Roundtable, The Business Council and the Financial Executives Institute. He and his wife, Ilda, have five children.


Special Assistant to the President
Office of Homeland Security

Frank J. Cilluffo joins the Office of Homeland Security from the Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS), a Washington based “think tank”. Over the course of eight years at CSIS, Mr. Cilluffo chaired or directed numerous committees and task forces on homeland defense, counterterrorism, transnational crime, and information warfare and information assurance. In addition to publishing extensively in professional journals, magazines and newspapers worldwide, Mr. Cilluffo is co-author and editor of Combating Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Terrorism: A Comprehensive Strategy (2001); Cyber Threats and Information Security: Meeting the 21st Century Challenge (2001); Russian Organized Crime & Corruption: Putin’s Challenge (2000); Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism, Cyberwarfare (1998); Russian Organized Crime (1997); and Global Organized Crime: The New Empire of Evil (1994). He has testified before the United States Congress on a number of occasions and has served on various national security related committees sponsored by the U.S. government, non-profit organizations such the Council on Foreign Relations and the World Economic Forum.

Vice Chairman, Intellibridge Corporation

Dr. Gannon serves as Vice-Chairman of the Intellibridge Corporation, a Washington, D.C.-based provider of customized, Internet-based intelligence and advisory solutions for major corporations and government organizations. Mr. Gannon oversees all analytical and client services for the company. He has served in the most senior analytical positions at CIA and in the Intelligence Community as Deputy Director for Intelligence (DDI) at CIA, July 1995-July 1997, Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (NIC), July 1997-June 2001, and Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, July 1998-June 2001.

Director, Knowledge Management and Collaborative Technologies Accenture

Mr. McLaughlan developed and currently heads the Knowledge Management and Collaborative Technologies Practice of Accenture’s Government Center in Reston, Virginia. The Government Center is Accenture’s Knowledge and Delivery hub for distributed eGovernment Portal and Knowledge Management/Collaboration (KM&C) activities at Federal, State and Local clients. Over the past three years, Mr. McLaughlan specifically helped manage the technical implementations of eGovernment and KM&C Portals and Prototypes in New York City, the IRS, the District of Columbia, the Department of State and the State of Delaware, and provided technical oversight to over 40 other eGovernment implementation efforts.

Executive Partner, Homeland Security & Government Solutions Telcordia Technologies

Dr. Reagor coordinates the development, marketing, sales and program management of Solutions for the Broadband Networking, Enterprise Management & e-Business with a leading role at Telcordia Technologies in the evolution of the Next Generation Networks and the convergence of Broadband, Internet and Voice. She has over 32 years experience in the fields of Broadband Networking, Enterprise Management Solutions, e-Business Solutions, Community Notification (Reverse 9-1-1), Disaster Prevention & Recovery, Crisis Management, Chemical Contamination, Network Reliability and Network Risk Assessment associated with telecommunications and information technology systems. During the past 3 years, Dr. Reagor lead the research, development and commercialization of an advanced messaging platform ideally suited for Public Safety Notification for large and small-scale emergencies, including hurricanes, floods, gas leaks and missing children. The patented “Community Notification Solution” capitalizes on digital technology in the public switched telephone network allowing for notification of very small to very large populations, in specific geographic areas of varied size and shape, at speeds previously unattainable.

Vice President, Homeland Security Task Force Leader
American Management Systems (AMS)

Mr. Ulstrup leads the AMS Homeland Security Task Force with responsibility for marketing, content development, business development, and coordination of government relations relative to homeland security. Additionally, Mr. Ulstrup leads AMS’ Public Sector Customer Relationship Management (CRM) practice and is responsible for managing the AMS strategic alliance with Siebel Systems in the public sector. Previously, he led the Enterprise Solutions consulting and systems practice that includes expertise in Business Process Renewal (BPR), change management, enterprise-wide software systems implementation, and internet-based solutions. From 1994-2000, Mr Ulstrup led the AMS-wide BPR Knowledge Center. Prior to joining AMS, he developed artificial intelligence technology to meet DOD command, control, communications, and intelligence needs while at TRW.