Author Topic: Absolute proof CSIS is planning the next 9/11 attacks to usher in new government  (Read 51270 times)

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Offline Dig

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The Path to 9/11 (Part Three):
ChoicePoint/CSIS/Markle Foundation Connections
23rd May 2008 By Alex Constantine

From: Adnan Khashoggi Linked to 911 Terrorists (2005), by Alex Constantine


“What is frightening and depressing is that a pseudoscientific propaganda word like terrorism’ has come to have such a hypnotic effect on public debate … a word featured constantly in the anti-partisan communiqués of the Third Reich … Should we not be wary of a term with which rulers fool themselves and by which history is abolished and language debased? Don’t we fool and console ourselves enough as it is?”
– Christopher Hitchens, Harper’s, September 1986

The mingling of Enterprise operatives with Middle Eastern radicals – discussed abstractly in the Iran-contra hearings – was completely acceptable to the Congressional quislings charged with oversight. Of the 26 committee members, 17 had voted in favor of funding the contras. The majority of “Select” Congressmen entrusted with deconstructing the secret sale of arms to Iran marched in step with the accused. Chairman Lee Hamilton admonished North: “This secret policy of selling arms to Iran damaged US credibility.” But he had to admit, “there are parts of your testimony that I agree with. I agree with you that our government needs the capability to carry out covert actions. During my six years on the Intelligence Committee, over 90 percent of the covert actions that were recommended to us by the president were supported and approved.” In 1988, Berkeley researcher Peter Dale Scott saw an “explicit agreement on the need to continue covert operations, many of which (especially those in ANGOLA and AFGHANISTAN) had support arrangements entangled with North’s Iran-contra Enterprise.” These “support arrangements” continued through 911 to the present day. Dr. Scott noticed that Hamilton’s panel “mostly averted its eyes from the broader extent of the North-Secord-Hamilton consensus” and that fraternal consensus smiled on North, Secord, Armitage, Khashoggi, bin Laden, Zawahiri and their narcotics-tainted, genocidal paramilitary interventions around the globe.1

The oily CEO of The Enterprise was George H.W. Bush (with North as chief operating officer), who brought terrorism home in 1976. Bush was implicated first by journalists, then federal investigators, in a terrorist attack in the nation’s capital – the fatal car-bombing of Chilean activist Orlando Letelier and co-worker Ronni Moffitt in 1976. The case was reopened and the CIA planned on letting go of a report that would have brought the name Bush to the surface … but insisted on releasing it only after the 2000 election. And as the Washington Post reported on October 24, release of the report would certainly face imposing “obstacles” should Son of Bush defeat Son of Gore.

Full exposure of Iran-contra was hindered by a cover-up culture in Congress. George H.W. Bush was snared in the investigative net, so he enlisted the aid of a trusted ally in the House, Rep. Dick Cheney of Wyoming. Cheney was the ranking Republican in the Iran-contra probe. Robert Parry reports that Cheney “smartly exploited his relationship with Rep. Lee Hamilton,” who “gave Bush a pass.” The narrow, penlight focus of the investigation was the work of Cheney and Hamilton, who steered it away from “sensitive areas, such as contra-drug trafficking and the public diplomacy operation.” (Iran-contra’s Otto Juan Reich was tarred by the Orwellian “public diplomacy” scandal under Reagan. A Cuban exile with a sordid history of romancing repressive Latin American regimes, he followed Armitage to the State Department, was appointed to the office of Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs in January 2002, under Powell.)

“Despite surrendering to Cheney’s demands time and again, Hamilton failed, in the end, to get a single House Republican to sign the final report. Only three moderate Republicans on the Senate side – Warren Rudman, William Cohen and Paul Trible – agreed to sign the report, after extracting more concessions.” Cheney and a few fellow Republicans filed “a minority report with the Committee that denied any significant wrongdoing had occurred.”2

As a result, more significant wrongdoing was inevitable. Political assassinations. Secret wars. ChoicePoint. CP Directors Kenneth Langone and John J. Hamre are trustee and CEO/president respectively of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in the District of Columbia, where the late Dr. Ray Cline, another Iran-contra veteran, made a substantial contribution to the international game plan that led to 911 and the ensuing clash of civilizations. But before turning to Dr. Cline and his own significant evil, we should pause to reflect for a moment on John Hamre, a bundle of revelations in a portly package. Hamre is the aforementioned ChoicePoint connection to ITT (see part one) – the communications and Chilean coup-plot people – where he has been a director since 00. This was the same year he became chairman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) – agent in place. Before joining CSIS, Hamre was U.S. deputy secretary of defense, 1997-2000 … under William Cohen, one of the Senate Republicans who signed Lee Hamilton’s martinized Iran-contra report – and under-secretary of defense/comptroller from 1993 to 1997. Before joining the DoD, Dr. Hamre was on the staff of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 1984-1993, with responsibilities for oversight of weapons R&D and assorted defense budget issues. From 1978 to 1984, he was deputy assistant director for national security and international affairs at the Congressional Budget Office. Dr. Hamre is a director of MITRE Corp. and Integrated Nano-Technologies LPC. He’s a Rockefeller Fellow at Harvard Divinity School, and received a Ph.D. in 1978 from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies.3

Dr. Hamre is also board chairman of the John and Mary R. Markle Foundation. The list of Markle grant recipients and partners includes CNN, The Children’s Television Workshop, Infonautics, Crossover Technologies, M.I.T., The RAND Corporation, Carnegie-Mellon University and The Brookings Institute. Some members of the “philanthropic” Markle foundation under Dr. Hamre:

-Philip Zelikow: executive director of the 911 Commission.
-Judith A. Miller: The New York Times reporter whose articles on Saddam Hussein’s WMD program proved to be fictional.
-Stewart A. Baker: Chief counsel, NSA.
-William P. Crowell: CEO of Cylink, Inc. in Santa Clara, California. Crowell came to Cylink from the NSA, where he had a series of senior positions, including deputy director of operations and deputy director.
-Eric Benhamou: vice chairman, Israel21c, a non-profit organization that seeks, according to its website, to “promote the 21st century Israel that exists beyond the conflict.”
-Paul Schott Stevens: Under President Reagan, special assistant for national security affairs, executive secretary and legal adviser of the NSC.
-Robert M. Bryant: former assistant director of the FBI, CEO of the National Insurance Crime Bureau. In November 1999, after 31 years of service, he retired as deputy director of the FBI, where he presided over the Bureau’s strategic plan, and served as the agency’s chief operations officer. While at the FBI, he directed a number of high-profile investigations, including the Aldrich Ames spy case, the Oklahoma City bombing and the Montana Freeman standoff.
-John O. Marsh: Former Secretary of the Army and Virginia Congressman. A member of the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction. Recently, the Panel released its second annual report entitled “Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.”
-Morton Halperin: Director of the Washington office of the Open Society Institute. Halperin is a director of policy planning staff at the Department of State. He was special assistant to President Clinton and a senior director at the NSC, 1994-1996. Other positions include director of the Center for National Security Studies, and director of the ACLU’s Washington D.C. office.
-Margaret Hamburg, MD: VP of biological programs at the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
-Wesley Clark: War profiteer and former “liberal” presidential candidate.
-Gilman Louie: President and CEO of In-Q-Tel, a CIA front, delivers new technologies to the intelligence community.
-Michael Okerlund Leavitt: Republican governor of Utah, first elected in 1992. Leavitt resigned his office in November 2003, and was sworn in as the administrator of the EPA under Bush the next day. He was confirmed to this office on October 28, 2003. Leavitt also serves on the Homeland Security Advisory Council.
-Ashton Carter: Ford Foundation Professor of Science and International Affairs, International Security Program.

The Markle Foundation, according to its website, was established in 1927 “to promote the advancement and diffusion of knowledge…and the general good of mankind…”

1) Peter Dale Scott, “Northwards without North: Bush, Counterterrorism, and the Continuation of Secret Power,” International Center for Development Policy, author’s draft, March 12, 1988.
2) Robert Parry, “History will be on the ballot Nov. 7,” Consortium, November 5, 2000.
3) “John J. Hamre,”
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately


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Remember I told you that John J. Hamre was a very significant individual?  He might as well be as significant as Henry Kissinger as far as I am concerned:

Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn and CSIS President and CEO John Hamre at International Councillors Meeting

The Privatization of National Security

 Last Updated: May 01, 2008

Since leaving his post as deputy secretary of defense, Hamre has become a professional board member with a knack for picking controversial and compromised companies. He sits on the boards of ITT Industries, Inc., ChoicePoint, Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) and the MITRE Corporation – the last thre exposed for degrees of inepitude, fraud or graft that compromise American security.

Hamre spent his early career working on defense budgets at the Congressional Budget Office and the Senate Armed Services Committee. In 1997, he was promoted to U.S. deputy secretary of defense. He left government in 2000 to join the Center for Strategic & International Studies. CSIS is a strong supporter of the Saudi government.

SAIC, which Hamre joined in 2005, was hired by the FBI in June 2001 to create a computer network for the agency. After five years and $170 million the FBI discovered that SAIC’s system was riddled with failures. According to the Washington Post, “the system delivered by SAIC was so incomplete and unusable that it left the FBI with little choice but to scuttle the effort altogether.” Today, agents still rely on the same paper system used since the 1930s. But the FBI debacle hasn’t hurt the company or Hamre’s finances: SAIC came in 5th on Washington Technology’s list of top defense contractors, with $4.3 billion dollars from federal contracts in 2007.

Since 2002, Hamre has been a director of ChoicePoint, where he chairs the company’s privacy committee. In 2005, ChoicePoint mistakenly sold the personal financial records, military records, and social security numbers of more than 163,000 consumers to inadequately vetted fake businesses. The mistake resulted in at least 750 cases of attempted identity theft. The FTC accused ChoicePoint of violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act, despite getting subpoenas from federal government since 2001 alerting it to fraudulent activities. In 2006, the company paid $15 million to settle the FTC claims.

ChoicePoint’s mistakes pre-date the subpoenas. In 2000, ChoicePoint complied the faulty list of 94,000 "felons" purged from Florida’s voter rolls before the presidential election.

Choicepoint uses the Sybase software program for its data-mining operations. Winston Partners, co-founded by Marvin Bush, owns a large portion of Sybase. Choicepoint and Sybase provide programs for many of the world’s financial companies to comply with the Patriot Act’s requirements.

Federal agencies have spent at least $117 million on contracts with ChoicePoint since the company's inception in 1997, according to procurement data stored by the U.S. General Services Administration. The company has worked on many high-level government projects, including tracking the 19 al Qaida bombers responsible for the September 11 attacks.

Hamre also sits on the board at ITT Industries Inc., which is relatively scandal-free. The company is a top contractor, coming in 16th on the Washington Technology list with $865,350,426 from federal contracts in 2005.

He is on the board of MITRE, which shared offices with the FAA and Ptech before September 11. Ptech, an information technology company, supplied software to many government agencies before September 11 including the FBI and the Pentagon. In 2002, it was raided by government officials, which suspected the company of being a terrorist financer. Saudi founder Yassen Al Qadi is a designated terror financer who funneled $3 million to Osama bin Laden.

In 2002, Hamre co-authored the President's Commission on the Future of the US Aerospace Industry - Final Report: Anyone, Anything, Anytime, Anywhere. He was also a member of the exercise staff of Operation Dark Winter, a bio-terror attack simulation conducted in June 2001.


    * “Feds probe IT sector links to al-Qaeda,” Computerworld, 12/9/02.
    * “$170 Million Bought FBI an Unusable Computer System,” Washington Post, 8/18/06.
    * “2006 Top 100 List,” Washington Technology, 5/15/06.
    * “Government Employing Brokers as Data Posse,” The Palm Beach Post, 4/24/2005.
    * “Officials Wary of Felon Purge,” St. Petersburg Times, 5/19/2004.
    * Hamre bio on CSIS website:,com_csis_experts/task,view/type,/id,14 5/

People, Companies, and Others Supporting World ID card aka "National ID card [FROM 2005]

List for research, will expand with time and you'll find many of these companies have been purchased by Choicepoint.  There are many who support NID's because they will benefit financially in big ways.  As we move on with this, we'll have a pretty good web of people.

Choicepoint of course:
Alternate Names for Choicepoint: Pinkerton Services Group, Attest National Drug Testing Inc. (Merger) , IntelliSys Inc , DBT Online Inc., Magnify, Inc., i2, a Cambridge, England-based global provider of visual investigative and link analysis software for intelligence, law enforcement, military and large commercial applications; Priority Data Systems, InsurQuote, Inc., ProID Voice, Investigation Technologies, LLC-Rapsheets which  Strengthens Online Criminal Search Capabilities, ScreenNow Financial,  ADREM Profiles, Inc, Superior Information Services, LLC, and Charles Jones, LLC, Service Abstract Corp.,iMapData Inc, Templar Corporation, Applicant Screening And Processing, and many, many more!

Here's an important one for the NID:
ChoicePoint, Inc.and Digimarc Team to Provide Verification Solutions for the Driver License Market

Orion Scientific
12 Datamining Company
Verint Systems
Price Waterhouse Coopers
BTI Employee Screening
National Data Retrieval
Systems Research and Development Company
Docusearch, INC.
Applied Digital

More to come, but maybe someone can dig the dirt on some of the folks who run these companies and keep tabs on where they go in this game of musical data companies.
__________________________________________________________Yeah, that'd be Dr. Joseph Atick, eh?

Another little tidbit from No Place to Hide was Aticks discovery/invention of the skin print. I should've stuck a bookmark on that page of the book, to make sure there isn't another Atick to watch. But his early claim to fame was face recognition. But he's expanded his orginal company (whose name I now forget) mostly by acquisitions of other biometric companies, and I guess changed the name along the way to Identix.

BTW, there isn't a whole lot in that Google search, but there is a patent, which I didn't look at.

I'm not much in the mood for research tonight, but mining a Google search for "face recognition" brings up some ads, and I'd guess most of those companies are in favor of RealID.
More companies that would love to see a NID who either have contracts, will be used for datamining, or already have something to do with it.  I'll be adding some backround to each of these over time.- listed alphabetically for the most part:

Abacus Direct Corporation
Accurint and Accurint Law Enforcement
AFIS-  AFIS is an organization devoted to automated fingerprinting. American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators- I've mentioned these folks in many threads
DataQuick List Service
Partners' Marketing
American Data Resources
Applicant Screening And Processing
BehaviorTrack™- is a Video Intelligence Module™ designed to detect user-defined objects and their movements within a particular camera view (referred to as a region of interest)
Biometric Access Corporation-  Where you are the key!
CLUE (Comprehensive Loss Underwriting Exchange) -Part of Choicepoint as are some others.

Check out anything related to Casinos as they tend to share all of their information and tools with the government.


Civitas Group- provides help to Homeland security
CRONUS- TransUnion Credit Reporting Online Network Utility System
DBT online- Choicepoint puppet Database Technologies
Dunhill Lists
Experian Marketing Service

Faceit- Identix, INC-FaceIt® ARGUS Features and Benefits:
Integrates into any size CCTV system and easily expands as cameras are added.
Central database administration provides ease of data sharing and management.
Overcomes human inability to recognize large numbers of unfamiliar faces and distraction in control room environments.

FinCEN- Fincancial Crimes Enforcement Network- Detroit
Hicks and Associates
IBIS- Identification based information system
InfoBase® TeleSource-Contact Your Customers with Confidence
Information Exploitation Initiative
Then there's Fair, Isaac, and Co.

The head honcho as Systems Research & Development Corp. is Jeff Jonas. 
Iridian Technologies
JRIES- Joint Regional Information Exchange System
LEIN- Law Enforcement Information Network
LexisNexis Special Services, INC.
McLarty Management Company
Mitre Corporation
Naviant- bought by Equifax

Yes Fair Isaac- big time bastards!

Orion Scientific Systems- SRA International, INC.- Big work with government.
TARGUSinfo -exists for one purpose: Providing intelligence delivered in real-time about the people that are contacting you — bringing all of your transactions to life.

Pinkerton Services Group/Securitas Security Services USA, INC
Proactive Exploitation Group (PEG) - Works on Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) with FBI and other Fed agencies.

P-Trak- LexisNexis
R.L. Polk and Company
Raytheon Communications-Raytheon Awarded Intelligence System Contract by the Massachusetts State Police.

SafeTzone System- RFID, amusement parks, lost kids and things
SAIC- SAIC Named 2005 Homeland Security Company of the Year by Frost & Sullivan
SAMSys Tech.- Passive RFID Readers

SearchSpace- The Searchspace solution has been developed to interpret every transaction, dollar or non dollar, as it occurs and assess whether it represents a risk or an opportunity to your business.  Solutions * Anti Money Laundering * Fraud Management
* Operational Risk * Event Based Marketing

Biometrica Systems, Inc.
Surveillance Information Network (SIN)
SRDS Direct Marketing
Systems Research and Development Company- offers radio frequency
identification systems for supply chain management

Transcore- EZ pass type things:  TransCore is also a leader in the field of intelligent transportation systems (ITS) and provides traffic management systems and services around the world.  This means driving or moving about the country.

Verified Identity Pass, INC.
Viisage- other names too
visionics corp.

Biometric Consultants

    * Acuity Market Intelligence
    * AuthX Corporation
    * Emerging Technology Services
    * EPolymath Consulting
    * Fulcrum Strategic Partners, Inc.
    * Higgins & Associates International
    * IDcrypt Solutions
    * Infodata
    * International Biometric Group, Inc.
    * Optimum Biometric Labs

Biometric Middleware Providers

    * Bionetrix
    * BIO*GATE by Janus
    * Infodata
    * SAFLink

Biometric Large Scale Storage Solutions

    * Wam!net Government Services

Biometric/Cryptographic Countermeasures

    * COMSEC Solutions


    * Applied DNA Sciences

Biometric Vendors/Consultants (Finger Geometry)

    * BioMet Partners, Inc.

Biometric Vendors/Consultants (Facial Recognition)

    * AcSys Biometrics
    * Animetrics
    * BioID
    * CJIS
    * Cognitec Systems GmbH
    * C-VIS
    * Digimarc
    * Dream Mirh

    * Eyematic
    * FaceKey
    * Geometrix
    * Iconquest
    * Identix
    * Imagis
    * Infodata
    * Intelligent Vision Systems
    * Universal Biometric
    * Viisage Technology
    * Visionsphere Technologies
    * XID Technologies
    * ZN Vision Technologies

Biometric Vendors/Consultants (Finger Imaging)

    * ActivCard
    * Atmel Grenoble
    * AuthenTec, Inc.
    * Axis Software Pvt
    * BeAdvance
    * Bioenable Technologies
    * BIO-key
    * Biometric Access Corp.
    * Biometrics 2000
    * Biometrics India
    * Biometric Verification, Inc.
    * Bioscrypt
    * Bio Security Technology
    * BPI - Biometric Partners, Inc.
    * Bromba GmbH
    * Cambridge Neurodynamics
    * Cogent Systems
    * Compaq
    * Cross Match Technologies, Inc.
    * Darkwood Consulting
    * Digimarc
    * Digital Persona
    * East Shore Technologies
    * Evive Tech
    * Eyenetwatch, Ltd.
    * Fingerprint Technologies
    * Fingerprint USA
    * Golwala Technologies
    * Griaule
    * IDeas International
    * Identification Systems
    * identiMetrics
    * Identitas
    * Identix
    * ImEdge - Edgelit Holography Fingerprint Imaging
    * Infineon
    * Infodata
    * I/O Software, Inc
    * ISA Automation (Only U)
    * Kronos
    * Labcal
    * Lenel Systems
    * M2Sys
    * Mantra Technologies
    * Mentalix, Inc.
    * Mitsubishi Electric Corp.
    * Net-ID, Inc.
    * Northrup Grumman
    * Optel Research & Development
    * Precise Biometrics
    * Printrak International
    * Printscan International
    * Proglobo
    * Polaroid Corporation
    * RaviRaj Technologies
    * Ringdale
    * Sagem Morpho, Inc.
    * Secugen
    * Simple Technology
    * Smiths Heimann Biometrics
    * Spica International
    * Startek Engineering, Inc.
    * TBS North America
    * ST Microelectronics
    * TST Group
    * Universal Biometric
    * UNISYS, Inc
    * Ultra-Scan
    * Validity, Inc.
    * Veritouch
    * Vitrix, Inc.

Gesture Recognition

    * Netface

Biometric Vendors/Consultants (Handwriting)

    * CIC
    * CyberSign
    * e-Com Asia Pacific
    * Handwriting Recognition Group
    * Infodata
    * Quintet Signature Verification
    * Security Biometrics
    * Signature-Scan
    * Universal Biometric

Biometric Vendors/Consultants (Hand Geometry)

    * Infodata
    * Recognition Systems
    * Sundial Time Systems

Biometric Vendors/Consultants (Hand Vascular Recognition)

    * European Biometrics & Security
    * Neusciences
    * Techsphere

Biometric Vendors/Consultants (Iris Recognition)

    * Argus Solutions
    * BeAdvance
    * Infodata
    * Iridian
    * IriTech
    * LG Electronics

Biometric Vendors/Consultants (Keystroke Recognition)

    * BioNet Systems

Biometric Vendors/Consultants (Retinal Recognition)

    * Retinal Technologies

Biometric Vendors/Consultants (Voice Recognition)

    * BioID
    * Configate Ltd.
    * iBiometrics
    * Infodata
    * Intelitrak Technologies, Inc.
    * J. Markowitz, Consultants
    * Keyware USA
    * Nuance
    * OTG
    * Persay Ltd.
    * SpeakerKey, Inc.
    * VeriVoice, Inc.
    * Voicevault

Multiple Biometrics

    * Biocom
    * Biometric Solutions Group
    * Daon
    * Dartagnan Biometric Solutions
    * Identalink
    * Janus Associates
    * Secure Tech Solutions

Biometric Vendors/Consultants (other)

    * BioconX
    * Infodata
    * Security Biometrics

Biometric Recruiters

    * Northstar

International Association of Chiefs of Police International Biometric Group
Infocorp Computer Solutions Ltd- partners with Digimarc ID systems.

Digimarc ID Systems- "is based in Bedford, Mass. and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Digimarc Corp. Digimarc ID Systems is the leading producer of drivers' licenses in the U.S., providing systems and services to 37 states. Internationally, Digimarc ID Systems produces identification documents for governments in various countries around the world.

Digimarc has an extensive intellectual property portfolio, with 51 issued U.S. patents with more than 1,000 claims, and 305 pending applications for U.S. patents, in digital watermarking and related technologies. Please go to for more information about the company."

Holder   Shares   Reported
MONEGO, PHILIP J., SR.   238,605        11-Jun-03
MONEGO, PHILIP SR.   228,605        15-Jun-04
DAVIS, BRUCE W            175,035   1-Mar-05
CONWELL, WILLIAM Y.   2,250          1-Jun-04
DAVIS, BRUCE W.              59,035   28-May-04

Vice President   


Vice President   Acquisition



Chief Financial Officer   

Director   Sale


Officer   Acquisition

Vice President   

Chief Financial Officer   Acquisition



Vice President
And, last post for a while- I'll be editing the previous posts.  This should be fitting as Viisage is a big dealer.  Let's start out with their support of the National ID shall we, btw, this is for informational purposes only and Viisage is a public company!

"Viisage News And Media Releases

Viisage Announces Support for REAL ID Act with Proven Secure Driver's License Solutions to Assist States with New Standards

Viisage Identity Solutions Suite and Viisage PROOF™ Available to Help States Implement the Most Advanced and Secure Drivers' Licenses

BILLERICA, Mass.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--May 24, 2005--Viisage (Nasdaq: VISGE), a leading provider of advanced technology identity solutions, today announced that its proprietary Identity Solutions fulfill the standards for U.S. drivers' licenses set by the REAL ID Act(1). Launched in late 2004, Viisage PROOF™ was designed to meet the anticipated requirements of the REAL ID initiative.

The mandates set forth in the Act include document authentication, document image capture, identity verification, and digital facial image capture. Viisage has proven its capabilities in all of those areas with implementations around the world that address each of these requirements collectively and individually. The Company's experience with the U.S. driver's license issuing agencies makes Viisage uniquely positioned to help states reach compliance, maintain efficient processes and manage any incremental costs resulting from compliance with the new legislation.

The REAL ID Act, signed into law by President George W. Bush on May 11, 2005, is designed to improve security for drivers' licenses and personal ID cards. Part of the legislation defines standards for US drivers' licenses, including a prerequisite for verifying an individual's identity before issuing a driver's license. Viisage PROOF meets each of the specifications, and further provides instant analysis of a claimed identity using document authentication, biometric technology and verification of the person's information such as past addresses. This automated process allows jurisdictions to meet the new standards without slowing down the driver's license issuing process.

At the upcoming American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) regional and international events, Viisage will discuss and demonstrate the ways in which the Company's technology and solutions can enable REAL ID compliance in a timely manner.

"Viisage's experience with the driver's license issuing agencies has confirmed the need to combine off-the-shelf products with process and integration services," said Bernard Bailey, president and CEO of Viisage. "Using our experience, we can assist agencies with improving their efficiency while tackling the complexity of the verification and authentication processes. Viisage is already working with several states on advanced security programs that will help them comply with the Real ID Act to implement more secure systems."

The Viisage Identity Solutions Suite addresses the problems of providing secure driver's license credentials to residents. Specifically, the solutions Viisage delivers use the Company's proprietary identity verification, document authentication and biometrics as tools in the secure driver's license enrollment and issuance process as recommended in the Real ID Act.

These solutions combine integration services with document scanners, facial imaging equipment and software tools, which enables states to implement secure authentication and identification processes. Viisage's identity solutions range from complete turnkey operations for secure driver's licenses to customized advanced solutions for identity proofing and biometric face recognition and fingerprint identification. This approach offers states the opportunity to advance the security and compliance aspects of their driver's license programs.

(1) The REAL ID Act is a provision of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief Act, 2005 (HR 1268).

About Viisage

Viisage (NASDAQ: VISGE) delivers advanced technology identity solutions for governments, law enforcement agencies and businesses concerned with enhancing security, reducing identity theft, and protecting personal privacy.

Viisage solutions include secure credentials such as passports and drivers' licenses, biometric technologies for uniquely linking individuals to those credentials, and credential authentication technologies to ensure the documents are valid before individuals are allowed to cross borders, gain access to finances, or granted other privileges. With over 3,000 installations worldwide, Viisage's identity solutions stand out as a result of the Company's industry-leading technology and unique understanding of customer needs. Viisage's product suite includes FaceTOOLS® SDK, Viisage PROOF™, FaceEXPLORER®, iA-thenticate®, BorderGuard®, FacePASS™ and FaceFINDER®.

CONTACT: Viisage
Maureen Todaro, 978-932-2438
PAN Communications
Tara Murray, 978-474-1900
SOURCE: Viisage

"Safe Harbor" Statement under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995: Statements in this press release regarding Viisage's business which are not historical facts are "forward-looking statements" that involve risks and uncertainties. For a discussion of such risks and uncertainties, which could cause actual results to differ from those contained in the forward-looking statements, see "Risk Factors" in the Company's Annual Report or Form 10-K for the most recently ended fiscal year.

List of Viisage Partners:
(link doesn't work)   

Viisage Management and Board of Directors:
Viisage Board of Directors:

Denis K. Berube, Chairman
Mr. Berube has been the Chairman of the Board of Directors of Viisage Technology since the Company's incorporation in 1996. He is Executive Vice President and Chief Operating Officer of Lau Technologies, or Lau.

B.G. Beck, Vice Chairman
Mr. Beck was the President and Chief Executive Officer of Trans Digital Technololgies Corporation from 1998 until its acquisition by Viisage in February 2004. Mr. Beck currently serves as a consultant to Viisage.

Bernard C. Bailey
Mr. Bailey joined Viisage in August 2002 as Chief Executive Officer. From January 2001 through August 2002, Mr. Bailey served as the Chief Operating Officer of Art Technology Group.

Charles E. Levine
Mr. Levine has served as a director of Viisage since 1998. He retired in September 2002 from his position as President of Sprint PCS, a position he had held since January 1997.

Harriet Mouchly-Weiss
Ms. Mouchly-Weiss has served as a director of Viisage since its incorporation in May 1996. She founded Strategy XXI Group, an international communications and consulting firm, in January 1993 and has served as its managing partner since that time.

Peter Nessen
Mr. Nessen has served as a director of Viisage since its incorporation in May 1996. Since July 2003, Mr. Nessen has served as the President of Nessen Associates Ltd., a non-profit consulting company.

Paul T. Principato
Mr. Principato has served as a director of Viisage since May 2001 and as Chief Financial Officer of Lau since its incorporation in March 1990.

Thomas J. Reilly
Mr. Reilly has served as a director of Viisage since its incorporation in May 1996. He has been a self-employed financial consultant since December 1994.

Marcel Yon
Mr. Yon was appointed a director of Viisage in June 2004. He was a founder of ZN Vision Technologies AG, or ZN, and served as Chief Executive Officer from its inception in April 2000 until its acquisition by Viisage in January 2004.

      Viisage Board of Directors

Bernard C. Bailey, President & CEO
Bernard C. Bailey   
Bernard Bailey brings to Viisage more than 20 years of management experience in the high technology industry, including executive positions with International Business Machines (IBM) and Art Technology Group (ATG). Immediately prior to joining Viisage, Bernard served as the Chief Operating Officer for ATG, a leading provider of online Customer Relationship Management software.

Iftikhar A. Ahmad, Senior VP of ID Services   
Ifti Ahmad has been with Viisage since 1995. He joined as a Senior Systems Consultant, was promoted to Applications Engineering Director and later became an officer of the company as VP of Engineering and Programs. Ifti has over 28 years of business, project, product and plant management experience. For the last 22 years he has led the development and systems integration of large and complex mission critical systems for fortune 500 companies and public/government sector.

Bill Aulet, Chief Financial Officer and Senior VP
Bill Aulet joined Viisage in February 2003 as Chief Financial Officer, bringing more than two decades of operational experience in the technology sector. He most recently served as President of SensAble Technologies, a 3D force feedback systems company, where he handled all operational aspects of the company, including the role of CFO.

James P. Ebzery, Senior VP Sales
James P. Ebzery   
Jim Ebzery joined Viisage in November 2002, bringing 20 years of senior national sales management experience. Jim most recently served as Vice President of Operations for Internet Capital Group (ICG), where he provided operational leadership, focused on delivering top-line growth, to a diverse portfolio of venture backed companies including multiple startup and emerging businesses.

Dr. Mohamed Lazzouni, Chief Technology Officer and VP Engineering
Dr. Mohamed Lazzouni joined Viisage Technology in November 2002. He has nearly two decades of expertise with technology companies. He worked with companies such as Nexaweb Technologies, Inc., EMC Corporation and SIA Technology Corporation.

Elliot Mark, General Counsel and VP
Elliot Mark joined Viisage in August 2003 as the company's first in-house counsel. He has more than 13 years experience counseling technology companies in all aspects of their legal affairs, particularly mergers and acquisitions, securities law, intellectual property and international business operations.

Mary Jo Porcello, VP of Human Resources   
Mary Jo Porcello joined Viisage in April 2004 as the Vice President of Human Resources bringing more than 19 years of overall HR experience and 7 years within the technology sector. She recently served as an HR Director at Documentum/EMC (formerly eRoom Technology) where she handled all aspects of HR particularly mergers and acquisitions, international HR and the general management and operations of the HR function.

Kenneth C. Scheflen, Senior VP and General Manager of Federal Solutions
Ken Scheflen joined Viisage in July 2004, bringing more than 30 years of experience in the federal government sector. Prior to joining Viisage, he served as director of the Department of Defense’s (DoD) Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) since 1977.

One More:
Imagis Technologies Inc:
Chairman: Oliver B. (Buck) Revell III
•   President, CEO, and Director: Roy D. Trivett
•   VP, Finance and COO: Wayne Smith
Imagine all the people, recognizing everyone. Imagis Technologies provides image identification software based on biometric facial technology. The company's software is used by law enforcement agencies, transportation firms, and security agencies, and can be found in airports, government offices, casinos, and correctional institutions.

Imagis also offers services such as consulting and support, as well as software applications for searching criminal databases of images, tracking and investigating child abuse cases, and monitoring airports. Imagis' software has been installed in more than 100 locations, including Oakland International Airport.
__________________________________________________________Ok fine, some more
Cogent Inc
209 Fair Oaks Avenue
South Pasadena, CA 91030
Phone: 626-799-8090

Cogent, Inc. provides automated fingerprint identification systems (AFIS) and other fingerprint biometrics solutions to governments, law enforcement agencies, and other organizations worldwide.

Mr. Ming Hsieh , 49
Chairman, Chief Exec. Officer and Pres   $ 329.00K   
Mr. Paul Kim , 37
Chief Financial Officer, Principal Accounting Officer and Sec.   $ 275.00K   
Mr. Michael Hollowich , 58
Exec. VP of Operations   $ 245.00K   
Mr. Wally Briefs , 56
VP of International, Head of Bus. Devel. and Head of Marketing and Sales   
Mr. James Jasinski , 55
Exec. VP of Federal and State Systems   $ 246.00K   

Digimarc:   Digimarc supplies secure driver's license issuance systems that produce two-thirds of all U.S. driver's licenses.
"Comply with REAL ID and AAMVA Guidelines:
Digimarc ID Validation Suite is designed to help issuers of government IDs combat the use of fraudulent identity documents by ensuring that both "breeder" documents and the documents created from them meet strict guidelines for authenticity. Using Digimarc IDVS, DMVs, for example, can support both the authentication and archiving requirements of the REAL ID Act and the ID security measures of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) guidelines."

Management Team at Digimarc:
    * Bruce Davis, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
    * Michael McConnell, Chief Financial Officer and Treasurer
    * Robert P. Chamness, Vice President Human Resources, Chief Legal Officer and Secretary
    * Reed Stager, Vice President, Corporate Licensing, Marketing and Public Policy
    * Robert Eckel, President of Digimarc ID Systems
    * J. Scott Carr, President of Digimarc Watermarking Solutions

Board of Directors:

    * Bruce Davis
    * Brian J. Grossi
    * Philip J. Monego, Sr.
    * James T. Richardson
    * Jim Roth
    * Peter Smith
    * Alty van Luijt

Bruce Davis

Chairman and Chief Executive Officer

Bruce Davis has served as Digimarc's chief executive officer and director and was elected chairman in May 2002.

Before joining Digimarc, Mr. Davis was president of Prevue Networks, Inc., the leading supplier of electronic program guides and program promotion services to the cable and satellite television markets. Prior to that, he founded and served as president of TV Guide On Screen, a joint venture of News Corporation and TCI that supplied electronic program guides and navigational software for the cable television market, and was merged with Prevue Networks. A pioneer in the development of the video game industry, Mr. Davis served as chairman and CEO of Activision, and   served five years as a member of the Software Publishers Association board of directors before beginning his pioneering work in TV program guide development. 

The holder of more than 20 patents, Mr. Davis is well acquainted with the need to protect intellectual property. Mr. Davis started his career as an intellectual property attorney. He holds a JD from Columbia University, and both a BS in accounting and psychology and an MA in criminal justice from the State University of New York at Albany.

Brian J. Grossi

Brian J. Grossi has served as one of our directors since July 1996, when he led the first professional investment round in the Company. In 1994, Mr. Grossi co-founded AVI Capital, a venture capital firm specializing in high-technology companies. From 1982 to 1992, Mr. Grossi was a co-founding general partner with Alpha Partners, an early-stage venture capital firm in Silicon Valley. From 1976 to 1982, he worked at the Stanford Research Institute as a research engineer and project leader. From 1973 to 1976, he worked at Hewlett Packard HPA and HP Labs as a design engineer. Mr. Grossi received a B.S. with Distinction and an M.S. in mechanical engineering from Stanford University.

Philip J. Monego, Sr.

Philip J. Monego, Sr. was our Chairman of the Board of Directors from 1996 to May 2002. Mr. Monego is the managing partner of Technology Perspectives. He was a founder, chief executive officer and chairman of the Board of Directors of Voquette, Inc., an enterprise content management software company from May 1999 to August 2002, at which time Voquette, Inc. was merged with Protégé Group, Ltd. to a create a new entity, Semagix Group, Ltd., for which Mr. Monego served as non-executive chairman of the board until October 2003.

Prior to that, Mr. Monego was co-founder, president and chief executive officer of NetChannel, Inc., an Internet information delivery service, from May 1996 to June 1998. Prior to that, Mr. Monego was interim president and chief executive officer of Yahoo! Corporation from April 1995 to September 1995. During his over 30 years in the information technology industry, Mr. Monego has been a founder, CEO, senior executive and investor in more than two dozen companies.

As the president and founder of Technology Perspectives, a Strategic Management Consulting Firm, started in 1987, he has served as a strategic advisor to chief executives for some of the world's largest information technology and media companies. He is the Managing Partner of Technology Perspectives Partners, LLC a private equity investment fund focused on early stage technology companies and a venture partner in the Media Technology Venture family of funds. He is chairman of the Board of Directors of Mediabolic, Inc. a digital media networking company and a director on the Board of Directors of Café Press, Inc. Mr. Monego earned a B.A. in management from LaSalle University in 1972.

James T. Richardson

James T. Richardson was elected to our Board of Directors in March 2003. Mr. Richardson is a director of and consultant to companies in the high-technology sector and has served as chief financial officer and chief administrative officer for five global technology companies ranging in size from $20 million to $300 million in annual revenue. Functional responsibilities have included controllership, treasury, corporate communications, operations, business development (mergers & acquisitions), information systems, human resources and legal affairs.

His most recent executive post was as senior vice president and chief financial officer at WebTrends Corp., now a division of NetIQ (Nasdaq: NTIQ), from July 1998 to April 2001. Prior to that, he was senior vice president - corporate operations and chief financial officer at Network General Corporation (which has since merged with McAfee to form Network Associates) from April 1994 to January 1998; vice president finance and administration and chief financial officer at Logic Modeling Corp. (which has since been acquired by Synopsys) from July 1992 to March 1994; vice president finance and administration and chief financial officer at Advanced Logic Research, Inc. (which has since been acquired by Gateway) from November 1989 to July 1992; and similar posts in finance.

Mr. Richardson currently serves as a member of the Boards of Directors for three other companies, including FEI Company (Nasdaq: FEIC) (audit committee chair), Plumtree Software (Nasdaq: PLUM) (compensation committee chair, audit committee member), and Tripwire, a Portland, Oregon-based network security company (audit committee chair). Mr. Richardson received a B.A. in finance and accounting from Lewis and Clark College, an M.B.A. from the University of Portland, and a J.D. from the Lewis and Clark Law School. He graduated from Stanford Directors' College in 2001 and is both a C.P.A. and attorney in Oregon.

Jim Roth

Jim Roth was elected to our Board of Directors in February 2003. Mr. Roth is a retired corporate executive with forty-five year's experience in the aerospace, defense and several related high technology sectors. He currently serves as a director for Titan Corporation (NYSE: TTN) (a provider of systems solutions and services to the U.S. Department of Defense, intelligence agencies and other government clients) and EDO Corporation (NYSE: EDO) (an engineered defense products company). Past directorships include membership on the Board of Directors of Sure Beam Corporation (Nasdaq: SURE).

Mr. Roth retired in 1998 as President and CEO of GRC International Inc., positions that he held since 1992, and where he also served as chairman of the Board of Directors of the corporation in 1997. GRC International Inc., formerly a publicly traded (NYSE) professional services company serving an array of government and private-sector clients with the majority of its revenues derived from the military, space and classified communities, was acquired by AT&T subsequent to Mr. Roth’s retirement.

Mr. Roth joined GRC International Inc. (then General Research Corporation) in 1974 as the director of Los Angeles operations. Prior to his retirement, Mr. Roth also served on the President’s Council of Competitiveness, as director of the Northern VA Technology Council and the Professional Services Council and as an advisor for the Engineering College at the University of California at Santa Barbara. Mr. Roth received a B.S. in electrical engineering from the University of Toledo and an M.S. in electrical engineering from the University of Akron

Peter Smith

Peter Smith was elected to our Board of Directors in April 2000. Mr. Smith is currently retired. Most recently, Mr. Smith served as president of News Technology for News America from January 1998 to February 2000. In that capacity, he coordinated technology throughout News Corporation and served as a technology advisor to its Board of Directors. From January 1996 to January 1998, Mr. Smith served as its executive vice president, television.  Prior to that, Mr. Smith held the position of director, technology, for News International (UK). Both News Technology and News International (UK) are News Corporation companies. Mr. Smith received a B.E. and B.Sc. from the University of Sydney, with first class honors.

Alty van Luijt

Alty van Luijt was elected to our Board of Directors in December 2000. Mr. van Luijt was originally selected by Koninklijke Philips Electronics N. V. (“Philips”) and elected to our Board of Directors pursuant to a right granted to Philips as part of our private placement transaction with Philips in 2000. The right to designate a board representative expired after three years. Mr. van Luijt was reelected by the shareholders in 2003 independent of the rights agreement.

Currently, Mr. van Luijt is the senior vice president for business development with Philips Corporate Technologies, a unit of Philips, which remains a significant stockholder in the Company. Prior to that, he was senior vice president for strategy and business development with Philips Corporate Research from April 2000 until January 2004, and was senior vice president for Philips Digital Networks from May 1999 through April 2000. He has held various positions within Philips since 1977. Mr. van Luijt holds an M.S. in electronics from Eindhoven University of Technology in the Netherlands.

ChoicePoint’s Board of Directors is comprised of respected leaders from business, finance and social services and is committed to maintaining the highest standards of corporate behavior and corporate governance.
   Derek V. Smith
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer – ChoicePoint Inc.
   Thomas M. Coughlin
Retired Vice Chairman – Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
   Douglas C. Curling
President and Chief Operating Officer – ChoicePoint Inc.
   James M. Denny
Retired Vice Chairman – Sears, Roebuck & Co.
   Dr. John J. Hamre
President and Chief Executive Officer – Center for Strategic and International Studies
   Kenneth G. Langone
Chairman, President and Chief Executive Officer – Invemed Associates LLC
   John B. McCoy
Retired Chairman – Bank One Corporation
   Terrence  Murray
Retired Chairman – FleetBoston Financial Corporation
   Ray M. Robinson
Chairman, East Lake Community Foundation and President, East Lake Golf Club
   Charles I. Story
President and Chief Executive Officer – INROADS, Inc.

The Board of Directors has determined that all of the directors are independent under the New York Stock Exchange listing standards, with the exception of Derek V. Smith and Douglas C. Curling, both of whom are considered inside directors because of their employment with ChoicePoint.

Thomas M. Coughlin was elected by the non-management directors as lead director, whose primary responsibility is to preside over the regular executive sessions of the Board of Directors in which management directors and other members of management do not participate.

Shareholders wishing to communicate with the Board of Directors, any of its committees, or one or more individual directors regarding issues relating to ChoicePoint business or who wish to make concerns regarding ChoicePoint known to the non-employee directors as a group, should send all written communications to:

ChoicePoint Inc.
1000 Alderman Drive
Alpharetta, Georgia 30005
Attn: Corporate Secretary

Written correspondence will be forwarded to the appropriate directors.

   Derek V. Smith
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
   Douglas C. Curling
President and Chief Operating Officer
   David T. Lee
Executive Vice President
   Steven W. Surbaugh
Chief Financial Officer
   J. Michael de Janes
General Counsel
   David W. Davis
Corporate Secretary and Vice President, Government Affairs
   David E. Trine
Treasurer and Corporate Controller

Outside Directors
Thomas M. Coughlin                   
James M. Denny       Committee Member               
Dr. John J. Hamre     Committee Member  Chairperson
Kenneth G. Langone  Chairperson    Committee Member       
John B. McCoy          Financial Expert    Chairperson    Committee     
Terrence  Murray      Committee Member     Chairperson   
Ray M. Robinson       Committee Member
Charles I. Story       Lead Director    Committee Member    Member       
Inside Directors
Douglas C. Curling   Committee Member
Derek V. Smith       Chairman of the Board

Holder   Shares   Reported
LANGONE, KENNETH G.   763,917   17-Mar-04
CURLING, DOUGLAS C.   169,091   23-Feb-05
LEE, DAVID T.   100,966   1-Feb-05
MARCUS, BERNARD   80,689   11-Dec-03
BARON, RONALD E.   64,179   11-Jun-03

Holder   Shares   % Out   Value*   Reported
Bamco Inc.   8,791,844   9.77   $404,336,905   31-Dec-04
Price (T.Rowe) Associates   6,978,526   7.76   $320,942,410   31-Dec-04
Allianz Global Investors Of America L.P.   4,788,214   5.32   $220,209,961   31-Dec-04
FMR Corporation (Fidelity Management & Research Corp)   4,201,232   4.67   $193,214,659   31-Dec-04
Oppenheimerfunds, Inc.   2,754,300   3.06   $126,670,257   31-Dec-04
Barclays Bank Plc   2,748,177   3.05   $126,388,660   31-Dec-04
Select Equity Group, Inc.   2,285,372   2.54   $105,104,258   31-Dec-04
Capital Research and Management Company   2,150,000   2.39   $98,878,500   31-Dec-04
Harris Associates L.P.   1,951,060   2.17   $89,729,249   31-Dec-04
Friess Associates Inc   1,879,700   2.09   $86,447,403   31-Dec-04
John Hancock Advisers, Inc.   761,700   1.9   $30,551,787   31-Mar-05
Saybrook Capital/Nc   45,000   0.11   $2,069,550   31-Dec-04
Mead, Adam & Co., Inc.   39,050   0.1   $1,566,295   31-Mar-05
Glenmede Trust Company (The)   24,301   0.06   $1,117,602   31-Dec-04
MB Financial Bank N.A.   22,721   0.06   $1,044,938   31-Dec-04
Roosevelt Investment Group Inc.   20,000   0.05   $919,800   31-Dec-04
Wilmington Trust Company   18,265   0.05   $840,007   31-Dec-04
Wisconsin Capital Management   17,100   0.04   $786,429   31-Dec-04
Church Capital Management, Inc.   13,600   0.03   $626,008   30-Dec-04
Dearborn Partners, L.L.C.   12,500   0.03   $574,875   31-Dec-04

ChoicePoint (NYSE: CPS) today announced its acquisition of the Americas and Caribbean operations of EzGov, Inc., an Atlanta-based software and services company that enables the automation of government processes. ChoicePoint currently provides information and technology-based solutions to government customers at the local, state and federal levels. Terms of the acquisition were not disclosed.

"The addition of EzGov further strengthens ChoicePoint's government services strategy of providing integrated end-to-end solutions including data, analytics and services. EzGov has been a terrific ChoicePoint partner and we are looking forward to expanding our market opportunities through this acquisition," said David Keil, vice president and general manager, ChoicePoint Government ServicesTM. "EzGov's strong management team, industry expertise and long-standing customer relationships are a great enhancement to our government services business."

"We are very excited to combine our complement of solutions and our highly skilled employee base with the ChoicePoint Government Services team," said Chris Reed, EzGov executive vice president. "This continues our mission of transforming the business of government by enhancing productivity and service, and will benefit existing and emerging customers."

"ChoicePoint has the right attitude, culture and resources that will allow our associates and customers to reach even higher levels of success," said EzGov Director John Imlay. "I could not be more pleased that EzGov is joining an organization as well managed and successful as ChoicePoint."

EzGov's FlexFoundationTM software platform includes Business Transaction Manager, Payment Manager and Developer Studio, providing a comprehensive suite of applications that integrate people, data and processes in a system that is adaptable to government's current and future infrastructure needs. EzGov's Americas and Caribbean staff of approximately 40 employees is expected to remain with ChoicePoint and will continue to be located in Atlanta, Ga., and Washington, D.C.

The transaction is not expected to have a material impact on ChoicePoint's financial results. ChoicePoint does not expect the acquisition to be dilutive to earnings.

About EzGov
EzGov is a leading software company that enables government transformation by enhancing productivity and service. With EzGov FlexFoundationTM, the company has developed a proven, flexible and secure software solution that enables the rapid automation of government business transaction processes and delivers a substantial return on investment. EzGov is headquartered in Atlanta, Georgia, and has offices in Washington, D.C., Amsterdam, and London. Visit EzGov's website at


  • Guest

Lawrence Summers and Henry Kissinger at International Councillors Dinner                /               Congressional Dialogue: House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer

CSIS hosted a Congressional Dialogue with House Majority Leader Steny Hoyer (D-MD). Congressman Hoyer spoke on “Using All Our Tools: Democrats’ National Security Strategy.” For more information including transcript, audio, and video recordings visit

Undersecretary Flournoy speaks at CSIS on April 21, 2009
Undersecretary of Defense Flournoy to discuss: U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan           Admiral Michael Mullen shakes Brzezinki's hand.

Statesmen's Forum: Admiral Michael Mullen
Mullen with CSIS President and CEO, John Hamre

The Inimitable Admiral Arleigh ‘31 Knots’ Burke: Lessons for Leadership and Strategy Today”

The David M. Abshire Lecture
“The Inimitable Admiral Arleigh ‘31 Knots’ Burke: Lessons for Leadership and Strategy Today”
The Honorable David M. Abshire
President and CEO, CSPC
Co-Founder and Trustee, CSIS
Followed by a discussion with senior strategic leaders including:
Admiral Michael Mullen
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Admiral Gary Roughead
Chief of Naval Operations
Vice Admiral Ann Rondeau
President, National Defense University
Former Senator John Warner

Moderated by
Evan Thomas
Editor at Large, Newsweek
For more information including audio, video, and transcript visit

Offline Satyagraha

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  • Posts: 8,939

Who is John Hamre?

Last Updated: May 01, 2008

Since leaving his post as deputy secretary of defense, Hamre has become a professional board member with a knack for picking controversial and compromised companies. He sits on the boards of ITT Industries, Inc., ChoicePoint, Science Applications International Corp. (SAIC) and the MITRE Corporation – the last thre exposed for degrees of inepitude, fraud or graft that compromise American security.

Hamre spent his early career working on defense budgets at the Congressional Budget Office and the Senate Armed Services Committee. In 1997, he was promoted to U.S. deputy secretary of defense. He left government in 2000 to join the Center for Strategic & International Studies. CSIS is a strong supporter of the Saudi government.

SAIC, which Hamre joined in 2005, was hired by the FBI in June 2001 to create a computer network for the agency. After five years and $170 million the FBI discovered that SAIC’s system was riddled with failures. According to the Washington Post, “the system delivered by SAIC was so incomplete and unusable that it left the FBI with little choice but to scuttle the effort altogether.” Today, agents still rely on the same paper system used since the 1930s. But the FBI debacle hasn’t hurt the company or Hamre’s finances: SAIC came in 5th on Washington Technology’s list of top defense contractors, with $4.3 billion dollars from federal contracts in 2007.

Since 2002, Hamre has been a director of ChoicePoint, where he chairs the company’s privacy committee. In 2005, ChoicePoint mistakenly sold the personal financial records, military records, and social security numbers of more than 163,000 consumers to inadequately vetted fake businesses. The mistake resulted in at least 750 cases of attempted identity theft. The FTC accused ChoicePoint of violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act, despite getting subpoenas from federal government since 2001 alerting it to fraudulent activities. In 2006, the company paid $15 million to settle the FTC claims.

ChoicePoint’s mistakes pre-date the subpoenas. In 2000, ChoicePoint complied the faulty list of 94,000 "felons" purged from Florida’s voter rolls before the presidential election.

Choicepoint uses the Sybase software program for its data-mining operations. Winston Partners, co-founded by Marvin Bush, owns a large portion of Sybase. Choicepoint and Sybase provide programs for many of the world’s financial companies to comply with the Patriot Act’s requirements.

Federal agencies have spent at least $117 million on contracts with ChoicePoint since the company's inception in 1997, according to procurement data stored by the U.S. General Services Administration. The company has worked on many high-level government projects, including tracking the 19 al Qaida bombers responsible for the September 11 attacks.

Hamre also sits on the board at ITT Industries Inc., which is relatively scandal-free. The company is a top contractor, coming in 16th on the Washington Technology list with $865,350,426 from federal contracts in 2005.

He is on the board of MITRE, which shared offices with the FAA and Ptech before September 11. Ptech, an information technology company, supplied software to many government agencies before September 11 including the FBI and the Pentagon. In 2002, it was raided by government officials, which suspected the company of being a terrorist financer. Saudi founder Yassen Al Qadi is a designated terror financer who funneled $3 million to Osama bin Laden.

In 2002, Hamre co-authored the President's Commission on the Future of the US Aerospace Industry - Final Report: Anyone, Anything, Anytime, Anywhere. He was also a member of the exercise staff of Operation Dark Winter, a bio-terror attack simulation conducted in June 2001.

And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40


  • Guest

David Petraeus Speaks at CSIS Military Strategy Forum
The CSIS Military Strategy Forum hosted General David Petraeus for a conversation on issues in CENTCOM. The event was moderated by Maren Leed, senior fellow in the International Security Program.

Military Strategy Forum: Gen. William E. Ward, Commander, U.S. Africa Command

The Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS) hosted a Military Strategy Forum with Gen. William Ward, Commander, U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM).  Gen. Ward delivered remarks and answered questions regarding "U.S. Africa Command – Partnership, Security, and Stability."  He was followed by an expert panel moderated by Jennifer Cooke, director of the CSIS Africa Program.  This event is made possible by Rolls-Royce North America.  For more information including audio, video, and transcript please visit

Can Sanctions on Iran Create the Leverage We Need?

CSIS held a discussion with: Stuart A. Levey, Under Secretary of Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence
“Can Sanctions on Iran Create the Leverage We Need?”

Moderated by

The Honorable Juan C. Zarate
Senior Adviser, CSIS Transnational Threats Project

For more including full event audio and video please visit

Cybersecurity Discussion with General Keith B. Alexander, Director of the NSA, Commander of U.S. Cyber Command

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) hosted an event with keynote speaker General Keith Alexander, Director of the NSA, Commander of U.S. Cyber Command. General Alexander spoke about cyber security and USCYBERCOM.

This event was made possible by support from AT&T

For more information visit

General Xu Caihou speaks at CSIS

A Statesmen’s Forum with

General Xu Caihou
Vice Chairman of the Communist Party of China’s Central Military Commission

Introduction by
John Hamre
President and CEO, CSIS

Moderated by
Charles W. Freeman III
Freeman Chair in China Studies, CSIS

For more information see the Statesmen’s Forum: General Xu Caihou page on the CSIS website.

General Michael Hayden, former NSA, CIA Director

A CSIS-Schieffer Series Dialogues: An Assessment of the Obama Administration's Foreign Policy

The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and TCU’s Schieffer School of Journalism host a session of The CSIS-Schieffer Series Dialogues Presented by United Technologies Corporation (UTC). This session was "An Assessment of the Obama Administration’s Foreign Policy". It was moderated by Bob Schieffer, Chief Washington Correspondent, CBS News; and Anchor, CBS News’ “Face the Nation.” The Panelists were: Steve Coll, President, New America Foundation; Thomas L. Friedman, Foreign Affairs Columnist, The New York Times; and David Ignatius, Columnist and Associate Editor, The Washington Post. For more information including audio, video, and transcript please visit

Statesmen's Forum: Dr. Rajiv Shah, USAID Administrator

CSIS hosted USAID Administrator Rajiv Shah for a speech on global health for full audio, video and transcript visit

John Brennan Speaks at CSIS

CSIS hosted a discussion with John Brennan, the assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism. His speech, "Protecting the American People from Terrorism and Violent Extremism," laid out the president’s comprehensive approach to protecting the American people from terrorism and defeating the near-term threat from al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. For more information visit the CSIS website.

John Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism

CSIS hosted a discussion with John Brennan, the assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism. His speech, "Protecting the American People from Terrorism and Violent Extremism," laid out the president’s comprehensive approach to protecting the American people from terrorism and defeating the near-term threat from al Qaeda and other terrorist groups.

Offline birther truther tenther

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  • Against all forms of tyranny
Re: "Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe" 2008 CSIS White Paper
« Reply #45 on: November 05, 2010, 03:26:44 pm »
Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or not)?

Name of Researcher: Ashanti Z. Corey

Institution: Integrative Center for Homeland Security, Texas A&M University

Date Posted: July 23, 2008

Ashanti Z. Corey

Staff Changes

March 2, 1010

Public Health Regional Surveillance Team 3 has introduced Ashanti Z. Corey, MPH as the team's newest staff member filling their epidemiologist vacancy.

Ms. Corey was most recently a graduate research assistant with the Texas A&M School of Rural Public Health. She also worked with the USA Center for Rural Public Health Preparedness and with Dr. Scott Lillibridge at the National Center for Emergency Preparedness and Response. (Dr. Lillibridge was the founding director of the Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response Program at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and special assistant to the HHS Secretary for National Security and Emergency Management.)

Ms. Corey earned her bachelors degree in Psychology at Louisiana State University and her Master of Public Health at Texas A&M School of Rural Public Health.

She is the "researcher" for a lot of Homeland Security white papers discussing flu pandemics and cybersecurity.

Offline Rebelitarian

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After it is all said and done it'll just be exposed as more of the same....   ::)

Offline birther truther tenther

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  • Against all forms of tyranny

LMAO, I can see why David Icke claims that the world is run by reptilians!  Zbig doesn't even look human.

Sorry, I needed comic relief because this thread is one of the most info-packed ones we've done in a while.

Offline Satyagraha

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LMAO, I can see why David Icke claims that the world is run by reptilians!  Zbig doesn't even look human.

Sorry, I needed comic relief because this thread is one of the most info-packed ones we've done in a while.

When I saw that pic, I thought it was one of the few that showed their 'true' faces; including the slightly dazed "what should I do next, Zbig?" look on Hoyer's face, right behind a revealing candid shot of a disdainful Brzezinski. Listening to Zbig's introduction of Hoyer, you could hear the patronizing tone: he considers politicians his tools.

And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40

Offline Dig

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Sorry, I needed comic relief because this thread is one of the most info-packed ones we've done in a while.

Totally agreed, all the terrorists and their anti-government radical violent fundamentalist plans exposed in one fricking thread.

NRO/NSA/FBI/CIA/DHS/DoD/SS/MI6/Mossad/DIA/Special Branch...


If you do not indict these overtly brazen terrorists who hate us for our freedom then WTF is your entire foundation built on to begin with?

There has never been a better opportunity to justify the entirety of your budgets (open and concealed) than now.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately


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Undersecretary Flournoy speaks at CSIS on April 21, 2009
Undersecretary of Defense Flournoy to discuss: U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan
Chapter 10—
Strengthening Homeland Security

Michèle A. Flournoy

September 11, 2001, pierced the sense of invulnerability that most Americans had come to enjoy in the post-Cold War security environment. Although the sense of security at home waxed and waned with the dynamics of the Cold War—from the “duck-and-cover” drills of the 1950s to the détente in the 1970s—our sense of invulnerability became fairly entrenched after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Russia was no longer our enemy, we were the world’s sole superpower, our military was unsurpassed—we were a nation at peace. If the 1991 Persian Gulf War reminded us that we still faced threats to our national interests, it also reinforced the sense that America’s wars would be fought far from its borders. As one Pentagon strategist noted in the early 1990s, “The American military only plays ‘away games.’”

In the decade following the Gulf War, U.S. national security experts began to worry openly and write about asymmetric threats, including potential threats to the American homeland.1 Over the same period, the Clinton administration launched a number of initiatives to help Federal, state, and local governments enhance their respective capabilities to defend against and respond to potential attacks on U.S. soil and to coordinate their efforts better. But the American people remained largely unaware or unconvinced of the threat, even after the first terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 1993. For many Americans, part of the shock of September 11 was that such attacks had seemed so inconceivable.

In the wake of the worst terrorist attacks in history, homeland security has soared to the top of the U.S. priority list. Before September 11, there was a growing commitment among many in government to take prudent steps to guard against potential threats to the United States; after September 11, there is an urgent public demand and an unprecedented degree of political will to do and spend whatever is necessary, as quickly as possible, to enhance homeland security to the greatest extent we can. Congressional willingness shortly after the September 11 attacks to give President George W. Bush $40 billion in an emergency supplemental—fully twice what he had requested—was indicative of the country’s new mood. The “day after,” everything looks different.

Protecting the U.S. homeland from threats, such as terrorism, cyberattack, and weapons of mass destruction, will be an extremely challenging task, one rendered more difficult by the open nature of American society, the economy’s reliance on international commerce and trade, and the civil liberties that we hold dear. Each day, approximately 1.3 million people cross U.S. borders. Among them may be terrorists who have already demonstrated their ability to enter the United States, often legally, and live among us undetected for a period of years. More than 340,000 vehicles and 58,000 cargo shipments enter the United States daily, and only 1 to 2 percent of these are inspected by customs agents. Each year, there are more than 250,000 attempts to hack into Department of Defense (DOD) computers, which represents only a fraction of the attempted intrusions experienced by the Federal Government and the private sector as a whole.

Enhancing homeland security will be further complicated by the fact that responsibility for dealing with different aspects of these threats cuts across the jurisdictions of more than 40 Federal agencies and 14 Congressional committees, not to mention countless state and local offices, as well as the private sector. As one homeland security expert noted, “We’ve got great athletes. . . . But we don’t have a coach, we don’t have a game plan, and we’re not practicing. How do you think we’re going to do in the big game?”2 Organizing for success will be critical—and also exceedingly difficult.

A Three-Pronged Strategy

Homeland security can be usefully defined as the prevention, deterrence, preemption of, and defense against attacks on the United States and the management of the consequences should one occur. Inherent in this definition are three broad and enduring objectives that should provide the foundation for a new national strategy for homeland security: prevention, protection, and response.3


The first objective is to prevent future attacks on the United States. This objective is preeminent, as it is central to the survival of the open, democratic, market-based way of life that distinguishes American society.

Prevention involves stopping threats to the United States before they become manifest, preferably as far away from American shores and borders as possible. Prevention efforts overseas might include working with allies to roll up terrorist networks abroad, preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and long-range delivery systems, or shutting down hackers conspiring to launch attacks against American computer networks. It might also include more immediate actions inside the United States to stop a terrorist from crossing into the country, boarding a flight, or renting a crop duster or commercial truck. Prevention is by its very nature proactive and often requires taking offensive action to destroy or neutralize a threat before an attack occurs. The Federal Government and leaders must be prepared to act proactively in concert with established coalitions or alliances—and unilaterally, if necessary—to strike against defined, imminent threats to the homeland far from American shores.

Prevention also involves “shaping the security environment to avoid or retard the emergence of threats to the United States,” which can only be achieved through American activities overseas.4 In this regard, the Department of State, Department of Defense, U.S. allies, and foreign law enforcement agencies all play a significant role in defending the American homeland. Thus, prevention may be greatly aided by U.S. engagement abroad. But in the final analysis, the most important element of prevention is the ability to detect threats before they become manifest, with enough specificity and forewarning to permit preventive action.

Indeed, improving U.S. intelligence is the most crucial element of transformation for homeland security; as amplified below, it is the “long pole in the tent.” To prevent attacks on the American homeland, decisionmakers must have not only a general sense of the kinds of attacks that various actors might be willing and able to conduct against the United States but also specific warning as to the nature, location, and timing of anticipated attacks. This requires superior intelligence collection and analysis and, in most cases, substantial sharing of intelligence across agency lines. Given the importance of surveillance and tracking of suspected terrorists within America’s borders, one of the greatest challenges becomes enhancing our situational awareness without becoming a police state. Striking the right balance between intelligence collection within the United States by law enforcement agencies and the protection of the civil liberties that define and distinguish our society is critical.

Because it may not be possible to prevent every attack, the goal in practice should be to minimize the likelihood that the most serious attacks on the United States could be mounted successfully. As Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld has said, “Our victory will come with Americans living their lives day by day, going to work, raising their children and building their dreams as they always have—a free and great people.”5 such attacks in the past by acting rapidly on specific indications and warnings is proof that a degree of prevention is possible.


The second objective is to enhance the ability of the United States to protect itself against attacks. This includes strengthening America’s defenses against a variety of threats to the U.S. homeland that might come from a wide range of directions against any number of targets.

Essential to the protection of American citizens is an effective capability to defeat or neutralize enemy action once an attack is launched. Whether an immediate, responsive defense against an air or missile attack, a rapidly instigated manhunt to find and foil a terrorist cell, or day-to-day security measures to protect borders and critical infrastructure, a broad range of capabilities, including domestic law enforcement, intelligence, military, and public health, will be needed to mount effective barriers to such attacks. This aspect of homeland security is made particularly complex by the wide variety of acknowledged threats, the increasing sophistication displayed by known terrorists, and their ability to adapt concepts of operations to take advantage of new technologies and to exploit weaknesses in whatever security measures are in place.

As a result, U.S. efforts to enhance homeland security should not focus only or even primarily on ensuring that terrorists can never again hijack American commercial airliners and fly them into buildings. The United States must anticipate and be able to protect itself against a much broader range of possible threats—for example, terrorist attacks involving airplanes, missiles, trucks, cars, or ships; attacks involving the release of chemical or biological agents or nuclear materials in major U.S. cities; and both cyber and physical attacks on critical infrastructure. Both lethal, destructive threats and nonlethal, disruptive threats demonstrate the complexity of the problem and the broad range of participants, in public and private sectors, that must be involved in protecting the United States.

This multiplicity and diversity of threats highlight the need for prioritization. The United States cannot afford to give equal weight to strengthening its defenses against every conceivable threat scenario. One of the most important challenges that must be addressed early on is an assessment of the range of potential threats to the American homeland, based on both the likelihood of occurrence and severity of consequences were they to occur, to set priorities for allocation of resources.


The third objective is to improve our ability to respond to and manage the consequences of any attack. First, the United States must have a robust capability to ensure public safety; continuity of government; command, control, and communications; and the provision of essential services. Effective consequence management is also central to maintaining public confidence and reducing the physical and psychological impacts of terrorism. As we witnessed on September 11, state and local “first responders,” such as local firefighters, police officers, and emergency medical teams, are often the most important element of effective consequence management. They must be given the resources, equipment, and training needed to do their jobs and coordinate their efforts well, even under extraordinary conditions such as those following the use of a nuclear, biological, or chemical weapon.

Second, the United States must be able to minimize disruption and restore the functioning of critical infrastructure rapidly in the immediate aftermath of an attack. This might involve restoring telecommunications service, repairing energy production and distribution systems, or providing alternative routes and means of communication and transportation. “Hardening” potential targets, developing contingency plans, and building a degree of redundancy into key systems will be critical to rapid restoration.

Third, the Federal Government must be prepared to take rapid steps to stabilize American financial markets and manage the immediate economic and financial consequences of an attack. This must involve relevant agencies, such as the Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve System, but should be done in partnership with major players in the private sector.

Fourth, Federal, state, and local agencies, as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), must be prepared to provide immediate assistance to the victims of an attack, their families, and affected communities.

Central to success in both protection and response are advance planning, exercises, and simulations to identify problems and refine plans, as well as coordination across the Federal Government with state, local, private sector, and NGO representatives to prepare for future attacks.


As we consider the long campaign against terrorism before us and the prospect of additional attacks against the United States, intelligence will be the indispensable element of the campaign on which the success of all others will depend.

Intelligence enables all other components of the campaign against terrorism to be effective: homeland security, law enforcement, military and covert operations, and coalition building. Decisionmakers in each of these areas must rely on information that is gathered, analyzed, and provided by the intelligence community. Meeting the multifaceted challenges associated with intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination will be daunting, as each element of the campaign against terrorism poses unique intelligence requirements.

Given the nature of potential adversaries, there are no guarantees that the quality of our intelligence on terrorist organizations such as Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network will substantially improve without significant operational changes and sustained effort by the intelligence community. As a flat organization comprising small cells of individuals in more than 60 countries, Al Qaeda has demonstrated its ability to use a wide range of communications, from low-tech means such as face-to-face meetings to high-tech means such as encrypted messages. When its communications have been intercepted, it has been extremely agile in changing its modus operandi to evade Western intelligence collection.

Terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda do not rely on the kind of infrastructure that makes other intelligence targets such as governments easier to penetrate. Under these circumstances, national technical means of collection (for example, satellites, electronic eavesdropping, surveillance aircraft, and the like) are less effective. Furthermore, the extremist ideology that motivates recruits and cements an otherwise loose network together makes it extremely difficult—indeed, almost impossible—for Western agents to infiltrate. Due to the strength of their convictions, members are unlikely to defect, even if offered substantial incentives. Given these factors, the campaign against terrorism may pose the biggest intelligence challenge for the United States and its allies since the Cold War.

Homeland security presents a particular set of intelligence requirements. Those responsible for homeland security need to have a general understanding of the types of attacks that various terrorist organizations are interested in and capable of launching against America. If indicators suggest that such an attack is imminent, authorities also need specific warning information about the proposed location and type of attack so as to enhance law enforcement, security, and consequence management efforts. Such warning information is unlikely to emerge unless there is extensive information sharing and fusion across bureaucratic lines to facilitate synthesis of relevant information from the overwhelming amount of data collected by a variety of agencies and means into a coherent, timely picture of what is likely to happen.

One of the greatest challenges that we face in the homeland security arena is enhancing our situational awareness (that is, the ability to know what terrorists are doing inside our borders) without becoming a police state. Consider the fact that the planners and perpetrators of the September attacks lived, prepared, and hid among American citizens for several years, yet we were largely unaware of their activities. One of the things that stands out about that terrorist episode is how little actionable intelligence was available prior to that date and how much various intelligence and law enforcement agencies have gathered since then. How could this have happened?

One answer is that the system was not “tuned” to collect the right data and evaluate it properly. This suggests the need to redesign data collection and analysis priorities and strategies for the intelligence and law enforcement communities. Another answer is that relevant bits of information were available within various agency files but remained stray needles in the enormous haystack of intelligence data. This suggests the need for new technologies to organize, store, and retrieve information that the Federal Government already collects. A third answer is that individual agencies may have identified key pieces of information but failed to share and correlate this data in a way that enabled anyone to put all the pieces together and see the larger picture. This suggests the need to enhance data sharing and correlation across agency lines. But this inevitably raises the specter of intelligence agencies collecting information within U.S. borders, something that has long been seen as a threat to the basic privacy and political rights of Americans.

Being effective in the campaign against terrorism will require coming to terms with this difficult issue. Creating the situational awareness now deemed essential will require developing new methods for lawful surveillance of American citizens and foreigners living in America, while creating adequate oversight mechanisms to ensure that new methods are not used inappropriately. In short, we must do more to find and track terrorists on American soil while also protecting the civil liberties that are essential in our society.

Because better intelligence is the indispensable element of the campaign against terrorism, it is imperative that the United States act quickly and wisely to identify and address the most serious intelligence problems in the counterterrorism campaign. For starters, the President should call for a comprehensive assessment to identify shortfalls in intelligence policy, capabilities, practices, and resources that could hamper the future effectiveness of the campaign against terrorism. Based on these assessments, the administration should then develop a multiyear action plan to address priority issues and shortfalls.

Second, the President should give high priority to strengthening bilateral intelligence-sharing and cooperation with countries that have the most to offer the United States on the terrorist organizations of greatest concern. Since September 11, such intelligence arrangements have become defining political issues in American relations with many other countries. One of our central diplomatic goals in the months and years to come should be to broaden and deepen these arrangements as a cornerstone of bilateral relations with key countries. This should include seeking greater international cooperation in surveillance and tracking of the financial transactions of various terrorist organizations.

Third, Congress should substantially increase the resources devoted to the intelligence community in general and to the campaign against terrorism in particular. This will be essential to address critical shortfalls in a timely manner in areas such as human intelligence, covert operations, analysts, linguists and area specialists, and the integration of new technologies.

Fourth, the guidelines and processes for intelligence sharing within the United States need to be overhauled to enable more rapid and effective intelligence fusion and to ensure adequate situational awareness. This needs to occur not only at the Federal level but also between Federal, state, and local agencies. American lives are on the line, and there is simply no excuse for bureaucratic infighting that compromises our ability to exploit the intelligence we have.

This will be no small challenge. It will require a shift in focus from a case file approach to more fundamental and proactive data analysis. Where are the terrorists likely to be hiding among us, and how will we find them? How can we distinguish suspicious activities in our complex and dynamic society? It will also require substantial investment in data correlation and analysis capabilities, as well as a new willingness to share data across bureaucratic lines. Improving our ability to correlate data will inevitably require us to reevaluate the rules and procedures governing the gathering of intelligence on American citizens and others living in the United States. Specifically, the United States should create new combined-agency investigation centers that are supervised on an ongoing basis by an officer appointed by the court authorized by the Federal Intelligence Surveillance Act, who would essentially serve as a real-time privacy ombudsman to ensure that there is no inappropriate use of new investigative techniques.

Fifth, the intelligence and law enforcement communities need to undertake more simulations—for example, “red-teaming” and “If I were a terrorist...” exercises—to develop a better understanding of the types of attacks terrorist groups might be willing to contemplate and how they might respond in various situations. Though imperfect, at best, such exercises can be very useful in exposing gaps in thinking and shortcomings in preparation.

Finally, the intelligence community cannot and should not be expected to solve all its problems on its own. It should pursue new public-private partnerships to engage the best technologists in the country to help it surmount its most substantial technological hurdles. Particular emphasis should be placed on investment in new technologies to organize, store, and retrieve information. After September 11, it should not be difficult to find private-sector partners. More broadly, the intelligence community should seek to leverage America’s diversity and openness at every opportunity, engaging experts and linguists outside the narrow confines of the Federal Government through a combination of outreach and outsourcing.

Since September 11, the intelligence and law enforcement communities have been recognized as both crucial and in need of additional resources and reform. Nothing will be more important to the success of the campaign against terrorism and to U.S. homeland security than meaningfully improving the capabilities and performance of these two communities.

Bioterrorism and Attacks on Critical Infrastructure

és the United States develops a national strategy for homeland security, particular attention should be paid to two threats that pose the greatest danger to our basic way of life: bioterrorism and attacks on critical infrastructure.

Whereas an effective terrorist attack involving chemical agents could produce tens or hundreds of thousands of casualties, an effective attack using biological pathogens could result in millions. It is well established that members of Al Qaeda have sought to obtain biological means of attack and have contacts with states that have biological weapons programs. The anthrax attacks that followed the September 11 attacks effectively ended the debate about whether individual or small groups of terrorists could obtain and use biological agents. They have and they will.

The good news is that biological pathogens are generally difficult to weaponize; it is difficult to take them from a laboratory petri dish or vial, produce them in large quantities, and put them in a form that can be effectively dispersed to cause mass casualties. The bad news is that terrorists would need only a small quantity of a highly contagious pathogen such as smallpox to infect enough people to create a mass-casualty event. Each infected individual would become, in effect, a walking biological weapon. This is a danger whose dimensions are magnified in our mobile society. A local bio-attack could quickly become a national crisis with the potential to cripple the country. The United States should therefore give highest priority to keeping pathogens that could be used in such attacks out of the hands of terrorists and to enhancing our ability to deal with such attacks should they occur.

Today, security measures at American and foreign facilities are not adequate to prohibit theft of dangerous pathogens. In the United States, samples of some pathogens such as smallpox are kept under very tight security, but samples of others, such as anthrax, are found in research laboratories across the country that have only minimal security. Across the former Soviet Union, literally tons of Cold War-era biological weapons agents remain housed in nonsecure facilities.

In addition, we are ill prepared to prevent the dire consequences of a large-scale bioterrorism attack. The United States currently lacks the stockpiles of vaccines and antibiotics, as well as the means of rapid distribution, that would be required for an effective response. We lack an adequate cadre of first responders who are trained and equipped to deal with such a crisis.

The Federal Government also lacks adequate management strategies, plans, and information systems to cope with a bioterrorism assault. Today, senior leaders would simply not receive the intelligence and expert advice that they need to make informed decisions. As a result of these shortfalls, Federal and state officials could find themselves in the untenable position of having to impose forcible constraints on citizens because they lack other viable tools to contain a crisis. This would pose enormous challenges to civil liberties and horrific choices for decisionmakers. Indeed, the less prepared we are for a bioterrorism event, the greater the panic that is likely to ensue, and the more threats there will be to the civil liberties of average Americans.

To address this situation, the President, working with Congress and with state and local governments, should launch a major public-private initiative on the scale of the Apollo Program to enhance the Nation’s capabilities to prevent and respond to biological terrorism. The focus of this project should be fortifying and equipping the public health system to limit the potentially catastrophic effects of bioterrorism.

Substantial investments are needed to strengthen public health expertise, infrastructure, and early warning systems. New approaches must be developed to deal with the diseases that might be used as weapons of terror, especially stockpiling vaccines and antibiotics, strengthening regional and national distribution mechanisms, and researching and developing other means of facilitating rapid, effective disease control, such as funding the development of easily deployed diagnostic tools using new biotechnologies. The Bush administration’s decision to create a stockpile of 300 million smallpox vaccines was a step in the right direction, but much more needs to be done. Particularly important will be developing an appropriate regulatory process to ensure the safety of new vaccines and antibiotics, as well as providing the medical and pharmaceutical industries with the necessary incentives, such as liability protection, to rise to this national challenge.

This modern-day Apollo Program also should include:

    * development and implementation of an effective security protocol for all U.S. laboratories that store pathogens that could be used effectively in a terrorist attack
    * extensive analysis, simulation, and exercise programs to improve understanding of the challenges that we would encounter in the event of such an attack
    * identification and prioritization of shortfalls that need to be addressed
    * development of detailed plans and decisionmaking protocols for dealing with a bioterrorism event, including clarification of jurisdictional issues between Federal and state entities
    * development at all levels of government of the information systems that would be needed to manage such a crisis.

In addition, the United States must make reducing the biological weapons legacy of the former Soviet Union through cooperative threat reduction programs an even higher priority on the foreign policy agenda. It also should seek to reinvigorate and reorient the Biological Weapons Convention process to take the new bioterrorism threats into account. Only in preparing for this worst-case scenario can we hope to limit its consequences.

Enhancing the security of America’s critical infrastructure—those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government—is another central challenge in reducing the risks and consequences of future terrorist attacks. Vast disruption and panic would ensue if an aircraft breached the containment structure of a nuclear power plant, a major city’s power supply was shut down, or the New York Stock Exchange’s computer system was sabotaged.

Critical infrastructure includes telecommunications, electrical power systems, gas and oil infrastructure, banking and finance, transportation, water systems, and emergency services, 80 to 90 percent of which is owned or operated by private firms. With the advent of new information technologies, much of the Nation’s critical infrastructure has become increasingly automated in recent years, bringing not only new efficiencies but also new vulnerabilities, including vulnerability to cyber attacks. As in the case of biodefense, an active and sustained partnership between the government and the private sector will be essential to address these problems.

Significant progress has been made in recent years, including the establishment of Information Sharing and Analysis Centers by the Federal Government, in partnership with the private sector, to address electronic threats, vulnerabilities, incidents, and solutions for a number of sectors. To date, however, these efforts have focused primarily on cyber rather than physical threats. Given that terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda have demonstrated their interest in producing highly visible mass-casualty events, cyber strikes may not be their preferred mode of attack. The Bush administration would be wise to broaden its work on critical infrastructure protection to include a greater emphasis on physical vulnerabilities and threats in various sectors.

This will require not only new threat and vulnerability assessments but also a clearer delineation of who has the responsibility and who has the authority to enhance security measures against physical attacks on various elements of critical infrastructure. For example, who is responsible for providing adequate security at the 103 nuclear power plants operating in the United States? Is it the private utility companies who operate the plants, local law enforcement, or perhaps National Guard units under the control of the state governors? These issues urgently need to be addressed in a coordinated manner through consultations between Federal, state, local, and industry officials.

Private sector firms will have a particularly important role to play in this regard, in activities ranging from designing new facilities to better withstand attack, to enhancing physical security systems at existing facilities.

Organizing for Success

How should the U.S. Government be organized for homeland security? This question—at the heart of virtually every policy discussion since September 11—was debated in depth for months and even years before.

Three basic options were discussed most frequently: give the entire homeland security mission to one existing agency or another, such as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or the Department of Defense; create a new agency by merging together elements of existing organizations and missions;6 or create a strong coordinator in the White House.7 President Bush seems to have settled the debate, at least for his tenure, by appointing Tom Ridge to be Assistant to the President for Homeland Security. In essence, the President chose the third option, a national coordinator in the White House charged with bringing together the assembled resources of the entire government. Yet within hours of the announcement, debate resumed over whether Director Ridge had been given the legal and budgetary authorities and institutional standing that he needs to be effective in his new post.

President Bush’s decision was the right decision for now, but it is inadequate for the longer term. The precise structure of the long-term organizational solution is probably unknowable at this point, but changes will surely be needed.

Designing a long-term, integrated, effective response to the complicated problem of international terrorism waged on American soil requires understanding three fault lines that fracture the U.S. Government.8 The first is divided Federal Government: the system of checks and balances that the founders put in place to preclude abuses of power and that is the very essence of American constitutional democracy. Over time, the U.S. Government has evolved to become enormously complex and redundant; nearly every major department and bureau has some relevant role in homeland security. The second constitutionally grounded fault line is American federalism: the way in which authority is divided between the national level and the state and local levels of government. Coordinating a nationwide response to terrorism requires vertical coordination between various levels and agencies of government to bridge these gaps. The third fault line is more cultural than constitutional: the separation between our foreign and domestic security apparatus. American political culture has always been wary of excessive government power, and this has limited the role of military and intelligence agencies inside the borders of the United States. The military’s role within the United States is highly circumscribed by the doctrine known as posse comitatus; the U.S. intelligence community cannot spy on American citizens, and the domestic surveillance activities of Federal law enforcement bodies are constrained by fairly strict operational restrictions and judicial oversight. When it comes to fighting terüorism, however, this division between foreign security and domestic security creates dangerous vulnerabilities. For example, in the past, the terrorist use of modern communications networks to leap across political jurisdictions allowed them to operate within the United States in ways that forced intelligence agencies to abandon the chase at the border. This foreign-domestic security fault line creates operational barriers to cooperation between military forces, intelligence, and law enforcement that must constantly be surmounted.

As if this picture were not sufficiently bleak, it should be noted that many other democracies are equally fractured in their government structures. The discontinuities on the American scene are also found among our partner states, complicating the problem of international information sharing and coordination.

A National Coordinator for Homeland Security

In light of the deep divisions that mark American culture and constitutional governance, a national coordinator is currently the best and only solution to the problem of homeland security. However, Director Ridge has been assigned the most difficult job imaginable: to coordinate a vast and complex government and to instill the focus and agility required to stay ahead of small bands of ruthless terrorists. His task is further complicated by the inherent advantage that the terrorists have of hiding inside an America that values its diversity and its openness and that embraces transnational business practices and social interactions.

Given these challenges, Director Ridge should approach his mission at a strategic level. Virtually every major department of the Federal Government, and certainly the law enforcement and emergency response elements of the state and local governments, all have crucial roles to play in the homeland security mission. The national coordinator cannot run the daily operations of such a vast and disparate array of agencies and bureaus. Instead, he should use his power and influence to shape the priorities, plans, and future competencies of the government to deal with terrorism.9 This requires establishing an overall strategy.

First, as mentioned above, the United States must resist the trap of preparing to fight the last war. It is unlikely that terrorists will attempt a strike that resembles the events of September 11, and if they do, we undoubtedly will be better prepared to foil their plans. Instead, terrorists are more likely to attack in unanticipated ways: airplanes one day, anthrax the next, and something else on the following. Therefore, the first task of the national coordinator is to think like a terrorist. He should establish a terrorism assessment unit that is specifically designed to strategize as a terrorist would and to research ways in which American security could be breached. This should not be an unbounded exercise of human imagination, but rather a disciplined review of intelligence assessments, more systematic and thorough analysis of terrorist doctrine and techniques, and a deliberate reasoning about the goals and effects intended by various terrorist organizations. The terrorist assessment unit should draw widely on the research community in the United States and in other countries as well as less conventional sources, such as Hollywood and the broader creative community. Its aim should be to challenge and shape the planning and programming priorities of the various departments and bureaus that share the homeland security task.

Second, the national coordinator should institute an extensive program of wargaming and simulation. For years, DOD has conducted so-called tabletop exercises to test assumptions and plans. Other elements of the government also have some forms of assessment, but most do not have the same degree of discipline or sophistication. Wargames serve five primary purposes: to uncover discontinuities in planning for unexpected events; reveal insights into the complexity of problems that cannot be developed by reading reports; establish operational working relationships among participants in peacetime that become crucial for communication and trust in crisis situations; help suspend the typical turf battles when organizations confront just what they can and cannot do, as well as what other organizations bring to the table in a time of crisis; and reveal critical shortfalls in processes and capabilities that need to be addressed.

A comprehensive antiterrorism wargaming program should include periodic training sessions for the President and his Cabinet. The wargaming program must contemplate different scenarios and spontaneous developments. The terrorism assessment unit described above would be instrumental in designing the scenarios and identifying the key learning points for each exercise.

Third, the national coordinator should establish an advanced concepts office for homeland security. This office would be chartered to develop new approaches to government operations that would bridge the discontinuities and address the shortfalls identified in the wargaming process. It would utilize current operations research techniques to identify alternative concepts of operations and help the national coordinator provide guidance to the Nation’s various departments and bureaus to develop new capabilities.

Fourth, Director Ridge should conduct a homeland security strategy review—on the scale of a national security strategy review or the recent Quadrennial Defense Review—to define and prioritize objectives, develop a strategy to meet those objectives, and develop a concept of operations that clearly assigns responsibilities to specific agencies and actors for various aspects of the strategy. This planning process should include a comprehensive assessment of current U.S. capabilities to deal with the full range of threats to the American homeland. The objective should be to identify and prioritize shortfalls in national capabilities that should be addressed, based on a combination of the likelihood of the threat and seriousness of potential consequences.

Informed by this strategy review, the national coordinator, on behalf of the President, should develop a multiyear interagency action plan. The plan should specify short-term actions to be taken on a priority basis, long-term investments to be made to enhance capabilities in critical areas, and a clear division of labor, including lead agency responsibility for specific areas and actions. This plan should be issued over the President’s signature to guide resource allocation for homeland security across the Federal Government. It should be a living document that is reviewed and revised on an annual basis. The process of developing this plan should include every Federal agency that will be assigned responsibility for an element of homeland security, as well as close consultations with key state and local agencies and actors. Both the assessment and the development of an integrated action plan will be important to ensure that the United States gets the highest possible returns on what is likely to be tens of billions of dollars invested in homeland security over the next several years.

Once this plan is in place, the national coordinator should establish a program and budget review process, whereby the activities and expenditures of relevant Federal agencies are reviewed annually in light of the requirements defined in the multiyear plan. This review process would provide a mechanism for ensuring that agency actions accord with the President’s guidance and would provide the national coordinator with a critical mechanism for enforcing the President’s priorities. Here, consistent and unwavering Presidential backing will be essential to the national coordinator’s success. The President must effectively communicate to the various agencies that Director Ridge’s decisions are his decisions and that there will be no appeals.

The national coordinator must also take steps to integrate Federal programs and plans more fully with those of state and local governments and to aid state and local authorities in enhancing their homeland security capabilities. Because state and local governments are likely to be the first to respond to an attack, they will bear the lion’s share of responsibility in implementing decisions made in Washington. They also will feel the immediate impacts of any attack most acutely. These constituencies will have to be included in discussions and decisions if the United States is to succeed in strengthening security at home. The same is true of key parts of the private sector, particularly firms involved in operating or securing the Nation’s critical infrastructure.

In the short run, a strong national coordinator for homeland security is the right answer. In the long run, however, we must develop new approaches to government that will bridge these fault lines more effectively. At this stage, it is not possible to determine with precision what new structures are required. This should logically emerge after insights are gained from the study-exercise-innovate-review process described above.

In the interim, Congress should refrain from passing legislation that would make the new Office of Homeland Security a Cabinet-level department or fundamentally reorganize the U.S. Government for homeland security. If history is any guide, such organizational change would be, at this time, both unnecessary and premature. Lessons from World War II and since suggest that the keys to success in organizing the Federal Government for any prolonged and complex campaign or effort—in this case, sustained homeland security operations—are full Presidential empowerment of one person under the Chief Executive to “drive the train”; institutional flexibility to adapt and change as the operations unfold; and ensuring that the empowered individual is focused on setting priorities, on determining who should be responsible for what, and on applying pressure where necessary to ensure that the President’s priorities are actually implemented, rather than on conducting day-to-day operations. President Bush’s conception of Ridge’s role as Director of the Office of Homeland Security appears to be consistent with this model; establishing a new Cabinet-level Homeland Security Agency would not be.

In addition, major institutional change at this stage would risk diverting the attention and energy of both leaders and operators from the task at hand, away from taking concrete steps to improve our immediate capacity to deal with further terrorist attacks at home, to fighting rear-guard actions to protect agency turf from encroachment by a new department. A time of crisis is not the best time to undertake a fundamental reorganization. Furthermore, we should not commit ourselves to legislated institucional change before we have enough experience to know what we really need to meet new challenges.

In time, a reorganization may be necessary; if so, Congress and the executive branch would need to work in partnership to define the best course of action. But it is simply too early to know what form such change should take. For now, Congress should give the President the time and discretion to try organizational and process innovations within the White House and departments. As the results come in, Congress and the executive branch should open a dialogue on whether and how the Federal Government should be fundamentally reorganized for homeland security missions over the long haul.

Other Organizational Innovations

Given both the importance and the likely longevity of homeland security as an issue, Congressional leadership should convene a panel of members to evaluate and recommend options for reorganizing Congressional committees to enable more effective oversight of cross-cutting issues such as homeland security. Some 14 Congressional committees currently claim jurisdiction over some aspect of homeland security. In practice, this means that Congress is essentially trying to provide oversight by looking at the problem vertically through 14 different soda straws. Given that it has the power of the purse as well as the last word on how the Federal Government actually expends resources, Congress can have an enormous impact—positive or negative—on the coherence of an activity.

Within DOD, at least two proposals should be considered. The first proposal is for the Secretary of Defense to establish a new Commander in Chief (CINC) for Homeland Defense. The U.S. military must be better organized to support homeland defense. Historically, assigning responsibility for an area or function to a CINC has been the most effective way to ensure that it receives priority attention in military planning, training, and resource allocation. Creating a new CINC for Homeland Defense would put all or most of the military assets required to support homeland security under the command of a single four-star general or admiral. It would create a senior “go-to” person within the military whose sole job, day and night, is to prepare the military for operations to protect against or respond to threats to the American homeland. Currently, no such person or focal point exists, although a proposal to create a new Northern Command is being actively considered. The challenge in creating a new homeland defense CINC will be to balance the desire to put all military homeland defense missions under the control of one CINC against the need to ensure that the resulting CINC has a manageable set of missions and span of control.

The second proposal is for DOD to make homeland defense the primary mission of the Army and Air National Guard and for elements of the Guard to be reorganized, properly trained, and fully equipped to undertake this mission. Specifically, the Air National Guard should be given air and missile defense of the United States as its primary mission and should be restructured accordingly. The Army National Guard should be reoriented, reorganized, trained, and equipped to focus on consequence management in the event of a major terrorist attack, especially one involving chemical or biological agents. This includes maintaining civil order and augmenting civilian capabilities for protecting critical infrastructure. Geographically dispersed, with deep ties to local communities and well-established relationships with state governments, the National Guard is ideally suited to be the military’s primary contributor to these missions. Reorienting the Army National Guard in this way would reorder its current priorities, making its role as a strategic reserve in the event of a long or difficult major war overseas a secondary rather than a primary mission. Over the longer term, the strategic reserve mission might be assigned to a restructured Army Reserve.

The administration should also give priority to strengthening the Federal Emergency Management Agency to be the permanent connection between the Federal Government and state and local governments for dealing with the consequences of terrorism on American soil. FEMA has an excellent track record of coordinating the national response to natural disasters, such as hurricanes and floods; however, prior to September 11, it was extremely reluctant to take on post-terrorism consequence management. As a result, it currently lacks personnel with the requisite skills for this mission. Rather than assign the Federal coordination role to another agency, the President, working with Congress, should strengthen FEMA to undertake this task, with considerable investment in new staff and training activities.

Finally, the government should create opportunities for national service in the area of homeland security. The attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon led to an outpouring of national volunteering and participation in the recovery effort. Across the Nation, Americans are looking for ways to help. This offers an opportunity that should not be wasted. The President should create a task force to explore the creation of a Homeland Security Service Corps for Americans, young and old alike, who are prepared to give 2 years to help protect the Nation. Volunteers would be trained to serve in a variety of fields, including the Public Health Service, airport security, and the National Guard and Reserve. Modeled after the Peace Corps and AmeriCorps, this Corps could make suitable educational and financial benefits available to volunteers. The program would be likely to have strong bipartisan commitment from the President and Congress. The task force could also explore the merits of mandatory national service.

The Imperative to Prevail

Homeland security is now front and center in America’s consciousness, and it is likely to stay there for quite some time, especially if further attacks occur. Unlike the 100-hour Gulf War or even the Cold War, the war against terrorism will not have a clear end point. Rather, it will be more like the wars on crime or drugs or poverty. Because the problem can never be entirely eliminated, victory becomes defined in terms of managing the level of risk down to acceptable levels. In short, the need to strengthen homeland security will present not only a multifaceted set of requirements but also an enduring one.

The Federal Government, in partnership with state and local agencies and the private sector, must do everything in its power to enhance our homeland security capabilities if we are to prevail in this long war on terrorism. It should start by identifying critical shortfalls in capability, prioritizing those shortfalls, and then addressing them, starting with the most important items and working its way down the list. It also must establish new ways of doing business to better integrate policies, programs, and budgets across bureaucratic divides. This will require enormous political will and leadership on the part of America’s elected officials and perhaps historic levels of resolve on the part of our Nation. But transforming on the home front is not just an option; it is an imperative if we are to prevail.


 1.  Most notable are the U.S. Commission on National Strategy in the 21st Century (the Hart-Rudman Commission), Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change (Wilkes-Barre, PA: Kallisti Publishing, 2002), and the Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction (the Gilmore Panel), Second Annual Report, Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, accessed online at <>. These, among others, reflect detailed consideration of homeland security and made numerous recommendations in this area.

 2. Randall Larsen as quoted in Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Shoring Up America,” National Journal, October 19, 2001.

 3. These objectives were inspired by the three-part framework of prevention, protection, and response that was originally laid out by the Hart-Rudman Commission in Road Map for National Security, Phase III Report, January 31, 2001, 12-14.

4. Michael Dobbs, “Homeland Security: New Challenges for an Old Responsibility,” Journal of Homeland Security, March 2001.

5.Donald H. Rumsfeld, “A New Kind of War,” The New York Times, September 27, 2001.

6. The Hart-Rudman Commission recommended the creation of a new Homeland Security Agency that would include the Federal Emergency Management Agency, Coast Guard, Border Patrol, and Customs. See Road Map for National Security, 15-16 and 21.

7. See, for example, the Gilmore Panel, Toward a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 7; Joseph J. Collins and Michael Horowitz, Homeland Defense: A Strategic Approach (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, December 2000), 42.

8. Much of this discussion is drawn from unpublished work by John Hamre, president and chief executive officer of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, in Washington, DC.


Offline citizenx

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Saw a video in the bargain bin in the bookstore in Seoul today.

"In Der Heimat:

A Romance of World War II"

"In Der Heimat"  =  "In the Homeland"

Offline Dig

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Reuben Jeffery III:
The Goldman Sachs/CSIS/Rockefeller/9-11/Iraq connection

Reuben Jeffery III
Senior Adviser, President's Office

Reuben Jeffery III most recently served as U.S. under secretary of state for economic, energy, and agricultural affairs, the senior economic position at the State Department. He advised the secretary of state on international economic policy and led the work of the department on issues ranging from trade and investment to agriculture and aviation to bilateral economic relations. He was also the department’s coordinator for international energy affairs. Prior to joining the State Department, Mr. Jeffery was chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, the federal agency that regulates commodity futures and options on futures trading. In that capacity he was as a member of the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets. He served previously as special assistant to the president and senior director for international economic affairs at the National Security Council. He also acted as representative and director of the Coalition Provisional Authority Office at the Pentagon. He began his government service as special adviser to the president for Lower Manhattan Development, where he was responsible for coordinating ongoing federal efforts in support of the long-term recovery and redevelopment of Lower Manhattan in the aftermath of September 11, 2001.

Mr. Jeffery worked for 22 years on Wall Street before joining the government, specializing in the financial services sector and working with companies and governments on privatizations, capital markets, and merger and acquisition activities. He spent 18 years at Goldman, Sachs & Co., where he was managing partner of Goldman Sachs in Paris (1997–2001) and of the firm’s European Financial Institutions Group (1992–1997) in London. Prior to joining Goldman Sachs, he worked as a banking and securities lawyer at Davis Polk & Wardwell in New York and as a commercial banker at Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New York. Mr. Jeffery is currently a member of the Board of Visitors of Stanford Law School, the President’s Council on International Activities at Yale, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the World Economic Forum’s Council on Systemic Financial Risk. He is a recipient of the Department of Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service (2004) and the Secretary of State’s Distinguished Service Award (2009). He received his J.D. and M.B.A. degrees from Stanford University and his B.A. degree in political science from Yale University.


Audio: The Responsible Resources Trade
May 18, 2010
DURATION: 01:02:35

Video: The Responsible Resources Trade
May 18, 2010
DURATION: 1:03:18

Reuben Jeffery III

Born             1953
Nationality   American
Education   B.A. in Political Science 1975
                    M.B.A. 1981
                    J.D. 1981
Alma mater   Yale University
                    Stanford Graduate School of Business
                    Stanford Law School
Employer   United States Department of State
Known for   Diplomat
Title             Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs
Term             June 27, 2007 — January 20, 2009
Predecessor   Josette Sheeran
Successor   Robert D. Hormats

Reuben Jeffery III (born 1953) is the former United States Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs, having been appointed to that position by United States President George W. Bush in June 2007.

Jeffery attended Yale University, receiving a B.A. in Political Science in 1975. Upon graduation, he joined the management program at Morgan Guaranty Trust Company in New York City. He then moved to Stanford University, where he received both an M.B.A. and a J.D. in 1981 (as part of the joint program between the Stanford Graduate School of Business and Stanford Law School).

Jeffery initially accepted an offer from Davis Polk & Wardwell, before moving on to Goldman Sachs in 1983. He became Managing Partner of Goldman Sachs's European Financial Institutions Group in London in 1992, and then Managing Partner of the Goldman Sachs Paris office in 1997.

Jeffery supported the candidacy of George W. Bush in the 2000 presidential election. In the wake of 9/11, President Bush appointed Jeffery as his Special Advisor on Lower Manhattan Development, and in 2002, Jeffery left Goldman Sachs to take on this responsibility. In 2003, Jeffery became a Special Advisor to L. Paul Bremer, head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq and then became the Representative and Executive Director of the Coalition Provisional Authority Office in The Pentagon. He served as a member of the United States National Security Council until 2005, as a Senior Director responsible for International Economic Affairs.

In 2005, Jeffery was named the chairman of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission.

President Bush nominated Jeffery as Under Secretary of State for Economic, Business, and Agricultural Affairs on April 16, 2007 and he was confirmed by the United States Senate on June 21, 2007. He was sworn in by United States Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice on June 27, 2007.

Currently Reuben Jeffery III serves as senior advisor at CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies).

On July 27, 2010, Jeffery was hired to be CEO of Rockefeller & Co., a NYC-based asset manager with $27 billion under management.

What happened to the last CEO of Rockefeller & Co.?

CEO of "ROCKEFELLER & CO." and board member of "CITI" is SILENCED
September 15, 2009

Witness of Rockefeller Co.'s CEO's "suicide" is product of Bankster Eugenics
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline birther truther tenther

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Beyond Goldwater-Nichols
Part of the:  U.S. Defense and National Security

A major study over a four-year period, the BG-N project makes recommendations for adapting the U.S. national security structure to meet the challenges of a new strategic era.

Beyond Goldwater-Nichols:
U.S. Government and Defense Reform

for a New Strategic Era
Phase 2 Report
Lead Investigators
Clark A. Murdock
Michèle A. Flournoy

Principal Authors
Clark A. Murdock
Michèle A. Flournoy
Kurt M. Campbell
Pierre A. Chao
Julianne Smith
Anne A. Witkowsky
Christine E. Wormuth

Mac Bollman
Jeremiah Gertler
Adam N. Marks
Noah J. Richmond
David R. Scruggs
Richard Weitz

July 2005

Executive Summary
The world has changed substantially since the Goldwater-Nichols defense reforms of
1986, and even since the issuance of CSIS’ first Beyond Goldwater-Nichols report in early 2004.
In preparing for Phase 2 of its Beyond Goldwater-Nichols effort, it was evident to the study team
that the goals of Goldwater-Nichols could not be achieved by focusing exclusively on the
Department of Defense or its implementation of BG-N Phase 1 recommendations. Those
changes required a broader view of national security and in some cases a re-evaluation of
Goldwater-Nichols itself.
This report brings the BG-N approach to bear on the entire U.S. national security
structure. It proceeds from a number of overarching principles, but perhaps the most relevant is
that in an era of fast-moving, unpredictable challenges, government should be more agile – that
facilitating action is preferable to incentivizing inaction. Toward that end, the BG-N study team
sought to eliminate redundancies that produce inefficiency and conflict, while assuring
maximum alignment of authority and accountability, including clear political accountability to
the public through the President and Congress.
Functionally, the report is divided into two parts. Chapters 2-5 address ways to improve
national security policymaking and execution on an interagency basis, while chapters 6-12 focus
on the Department of Defense.
The interagency recommendations share a broad theme: They aim to get the many
disparate parts of the U.S. national security structure to row together, in both planning and
execution. The study team’s challenge was to identify ways to better integrate efforts while
retaining the goodness inherent in agencies' distinctive knowledge and approaches to issues.
Creating a More Integrated and Effective National Security Apparatus
Interagency operations are no longer rare. Yet crises are still managed largely on a case
by case basis, with interagency coordination mechanisms reinvented each time. While such ad
hoc processes are agile, they are neither coherent nor durable. Since there is no reason to believe
that today's crisis will be the last, it makes sense to plan for the next one. So increasing the
effectiveness of national security efforts begins by institutionalizing strategic planning for
national security.
The BG-N study team recommends the first step be a Quadrennial National Security
Review to develop U.S. national security strategy and determine the capabilities required to
implement the strategy. That this seems familiar from DoD practice is no accident; DoD
currently has the most robust planning process, and the issues it faces are shared by the entire
national security structure.
Unified effort requires unified guidance, and the report advocates creation of a classified
National Security Planning Guidance to be signed by the President in the first year of a new
administration and updated biannually. The development and refinement of this guidance would
be informed by semi-annual “over the horizon” reviews for agency deputies to anticipate potential future national security challenges and stimulate proactive policy development, and an annual table-top exercise program for senior national security officials to practice managing such
challenges and identify those capability shortfalls that need to be addressed. This entire process
would be overseen and coordinated by an NSC Senior Director and office dedicated to strategic
When the same words and ideas mean different things to different agencies, coordination
and cooperation are difficult at best. The BG-N study team identified a number of opportunities
to eliminate barriers preventing effective interagency operations in key mission areas, including
codifying common terminologies, interagency concepts of operations, and an agreed set of
interagency roles and responsibilities in a series of National Security Presidential Directives,
with those that are likely to be enduring also embodied in legislation.
In order to ensure that budgets reflect national security priorities, the study team
recommends joint NSC/OMB mission area reviews for national security priorities that require
interagency implementation. And interagency “concepts of operation” for each mission area
would be a key element in strengthening the links between policy, resource allocation, and
As Goldwater-Nichols-inspired joint assignments in DoD have shown, one of the best
ways to create greater jointness is to establish incentives for people to gain education and
experience outside their home organization. Therefore, the BG-N study team recommends that,
working with the Office of Personnel Management and Congress, national security agencies
develop a national security career path that would give career professionals incentives to seek out
interagency experience, education, and training.
The study team also recommends ways to integrate day to day policy execution around
the world. These include developing a common U.S. government template for dividing the
world into regions in order to reduce friction and unnecessary seams between agencies, and
enhancing information sharing and collaboration among agencies working on shared missions.
The study also recommends conducting regular NSC-chaired interagency “summits” in each
region to de-conflict the efforts of various agencies, identify opportunities to shape the
environment and prevent crises.
Unifying Effort in Interagency Operations
As unity of effort requires coordination from the top, the BG-N study team recast the
NSC from its traditional role of preparing decisions for the President to more active involvement
in ensuring that Presidential intent is realized through USG actions. A stronger NSC role in
providing policy oversight during planning and execution, however, does not mean that the NSC
staff should be involved in the conduct of operations. Rather, the study team recommends that
the NSC establish a new NSC Senior Director and office responsible for developing the
Presidential guidance for complex contingency operations and ensuring that interagency
planning for these operations is fully integrated. One of the most important initial
responsibilities of this new office would be to develop and codify a standard approach to
interagency planning at the strategic level.  The study team also recommends enhancing planning capacity for complex contingency
operations in civilian agencies and creating rapidly deployable Interagency Crisis Planning
Teams, comprised of regional and functional experts from all of the participating agencies,
charged with developing truly interagency campaign plans.
Because early integration can forestall subsequent problems, the report also recommends
that for any operation involving security, stability, transition and reconstruction operations, the
COCOM and his CJTF should fully integrate these elements into their campaign plan. The
COCOM should also designate a subordinate commander to lead the military’s participation in
the interagency planning process. A standing Interagency Task Force headquarters core element
would be ready to deploy to an operation on short notice, and once on the ground would integrate
the day to day efforts of all USG agencies. The IATF would be lead by a senior civilian
appointed by the President and the CJTF, supported by a fully integrated civil-military staff.
These efforts would be supported financially through more flexible contracting
authorities responsive to the operational environment, and by amending Titles 10 and 22 to
permit DoD to directly fund training and equipping indigenous security forces.
Building Operational Capacity Outside the Department of Defense
It is a simple fact that today, U.S. operational capability rests almost entirely in the
Department of Defense. Enhanced coordination, planning, and outreach among non-DoD
agencies are of little use until they can be translated into operations – yet that capability exists in
very few agencies today, and even then in little quantity.
The establishment of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
(S/CRS) in the State Department was an important first step, and this report makes a number of
recommendations to build on this effort, including fully funding the recommendations outlined
in the Lugar-Biden Initiative to create rapidly-deployable civilian capabilities. The study team
also recommends strengthening existing operational capacities at the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID). These capabilities could be further enhanced through
creation of a new Training Center for Interagency and Coalition Operations, which could be part
of the National Security University recommended later in the report.
Elevating and Strengthening Homeland Security Policy
While “national” security and “homeland” security tasks, forces, and authorities differ,
they are both part of the government’s Constitutional duty to secure Americans’ life, liberty, and
property. Given the seamless nature of the threat, our policy approaches to national and
homeland security should be seamless as well. Therefore, the BG-N study team sought to
eliminate artificial divisions between them and increase efficiency.
In this area, the team’s most significant recommendation would unify government efforts
from the top by merging the Homeland Security Council into the National Security Council. The  NSC would then take on a much greater role in coordinating national security policy and overseeing its execution, regardless of what U.S. government agency was responsible for action.
Other reforms aimed at unifying homeland security policy across the U.S. Government follow the recommendations for national security, such as developing common terminology and an interagency concept of operations for homeland security, based on a comprehensive risk assessment and including clear interagency roles and responsibilities. As the Department of Defense has the most robust strategic planning process in government, the study team recommends leveraging that expertise to assist NSC and DHS in developing a concept of
operations and associated requirements.
Despite many official statements proclaiming the importance of defending the homeland
and DoD’s integral involvement in a wide range of important homeland security initiatives, DoD
has been slow to develop an overarching strategy and programming priorities to guide its homeland defense and civil support activities. The study team recommends that an agreed set of DoD requirements for homeland defense and civil support be formalized, and forces allocated accordingly through the Global Force Management process. A significant part of that process
will include defining the role of the National Guard and Reserves in these missions, to include
guidance on required capabilities and desired organizational relationships.
Taken separately, many of the study team's recommendations regarding the interagency
process may seem innocuous or obvious. But taken together, they create a unified U.S.
Government national security approach where none now exists. By planning together, training
together, and operating together, the U.S. agencies involved in national security could for the
first time bring to bear coherent capabilities far greater than the sum of their parts.

= = =

The challenges facing the Department of Defense are broadly similar, yet differ in almost
every detail. DoD faces massive pressure posed by tightening budget constraints. The squeeze
between expenses for continuous operations and soaring personnel costs require efficiency at
every level, from streamlined headquarters operations to maximizing the return on the cost of
training each individual in uniform. (This is particularly challenging when expanding on
Goldwater-Nichols, because cost control was not an original G-N design issue.)
The BG-N study team chose to look at how to maximize the effectiveness of what DoD
already has in place instead of creating big and expensive new structures. To reduce duplication
of effort, the recommendations consciously shift technology and business practices to enterprisewide
solutions. While many past reform efforts have focused on changes to DoD planning and
programming processes, the BG-N study team paid especial attention to how those policies are
executed, maximizing efficiency of the “E” in PPBES.
The study team also paid attention to reducing redundant efforts between the military and
civilian sides of DoD. For example, this report recommends retaining the Joint Staff elements that support the Chairman in his role as principal military advisor to the Secretary, but
consolidating its operational functions like logistics – where duplication serves no functional
purpose – with their civilian counterpart agencies.
Determining Joint Capability Requirements
A core principle of BG-N Phase 2 is that the structures of advocacy in government must
be clear. In the DoD context, this means that those charged with executing missions should set
the requirements for the capabilities they need. As Goldwater-Nichols gave the Combatant
Commanders responsibility for operations, the study team recommends that the process for
identifying and advocating joint capability requirements be restructured around the COCOMs,
with Services competing to supply the capabilities that the COCOMs determine are necessary.
This would entail a more “joint” JROC, on which Service Vices are replaced by COCOM
Deputies, and adding civilians responsible for requirements policy. Long-term capability needs
should be the responsibility of the functional commands, with JFCOM taking on the role of a
Joint Capabilities Command.

Reforming Defense Acquisition for the 21st Century
While the “21st Century” is often cited as a new era in defense, that is particularly true in
acquisition. Thanks to budgetary pressures and the emergence of lower-tech adversaries, the
number of major procurements has been significantly reduced. Today's challenge for the
acquisition system is not how to manage a plethora of programs, but how to efficiently oversee
those that remain.
This Phase 2 report begins by restoring strategic direction to acquisition. Fundamentally,
the task of managing yesterday’s acquisitions has been allowed to take over the time and
attention of those who should be focusing on what to buy next. Determining future requirements
and envisioning optimal ways to meet them require vision and creativity. Managing the process
of acquisition does not. The nation has historically done best when bright minds were free to
seek out the next goal.
Toward that end, the study team borrows a page from the past in restructuring the office
of the Undersecretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (AT&L) to put technology first,
as in the days when the Director of Defense Research & Engineering was the chief architect of
future capabilities. The new Undersecretary for Technology, Logistics, and Acquisition Policy,
with the DDR&E becoming Principal Deputy Undersecretary, would focus on how technology
could be used to address future challenges, and how it should be procured – but not manage the
procurement. Concomitantly, authority over executing acquisition programs would be returned
to the Service Chiefs, who are legally responsible for supplying capabilities and who have a
proven ability to execute programs efficiently.
The study team also observed the changes in procurement processes brought about by the
need to meet urgent warfighter requirements. In order to bring the benefits of that experience to
mainstream procurements, the report recommends expanding and rationalizing rapid acquisition
processes.  Together, refocusing USD(Technology, Logistics, and Acquisition) to recapture the “big
picture” technology planning of DDR&E days, moving procurement management to the
Services, and expanding rapid acquisition should result in better, more effective capabilities
acquired more efficiently and in the hands of warfighters sooner.
Organizing for Logistics Support
Proceeding from the observation that rapid and efficient movement of materiel is an
asymmetrical American advantage, and in keeping with the study goal of reducing duplicative
effort, the BG-N study team recommends fusing logistics and transportation functions into an
integrated U.S. Logistics Command, and merging much of J-4 with its OSD counterpart, the
Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Logistics & Material Readiness) into a unified office
reporting to the Undersecretary(TL&A).
Improving the Governance of Defense Agencies
The BG-N study team believes this framework for leading and supervising the
commercial-like defense agencies is inherently flawed, and that the agencies suffer from a lack
of sufficient accountability and focus on policy execution and program execution. The Office of
the Secretary of Defense still is not structured to provide effective oversight of these agencies, as
the Assistant- and Undersecretaries are principally policy advocates, not line managers. The
BG-N study team does not make specific recommendations for each of the commercial-like
defense agencies, in part because it did not have the time or resources for a task of this
However, the team does recommend putting these agencies under professional
management by establishing an Undersecretary of Defense for Management (USD(M)) who
would manage all the commercial-like agencies, as well as any programs currently being
managed by OSD, and be responsible for OSD management and administrative activities,
including the consolidated DoD property book.
Transferring governance of the commercial-like defense agencies and all OSD-managed
programs to a USD(M) should enhance accountability and improve performance in the Agencies
and DoD-wide programs. Establishing this position should also allow the assistant and
undersecretaries to focus on their policy roles.
Updating the Officer Management System
Personnel issues have evolved significantly even in the year since the BG-N Phase 1
report was issued. The rapidly rising cost of military manpower and a more difficult recruiting
environment have made retention of skilled personnel more urgent. As personnel costs will
grow significantly faster than other components of defense spending, it is plainly necessary for
DoD to maximize its return on the investment made in each Service member.  Yet, due largely to legislation and policies aimed at optimizing a Cold War-era military,
the systems for both officer management and professional military education are “one-size-fitsall,”
requiring the same path to command for each officer, rather than maximizing their skills and
career paths for the benefit of the nation. The study team sought opportunities to increase
flexibility in the system, both to allow officers to gain greater expertise and increase the retention
of those personnel whose skills are most needed today. This report advocates moving to longer
careers with more careful selection of those the military wishes to keep, while training and
educating them more efficiently and individually. This approach also addresses recruiting
shortfalls by making the best use of each individual.
The recommended approach begins with a comprehensive human resources strategy that
anticipates the looming manpower crisis. It includes modifying the “one-size-fits-all” personnel
system to ensure retention of critical front-line operators and key specialists, including incentives
based on changes in compensation and retirement benefits and eliminating the “up or out”
promotion system.
The study team also addressed shortcomings in the management of joint officers,
recommending broader and more equitable standards for awarding joint credit and integrated
assignment and education paths for joint careers in critical MOSs. The report advocates a system
for tracking joint service and further study of the implications of both joint promotion boards and
what functions might be best served by a “purple” uniform.

Modernizing Professional Military Education
The study team was encouraged to find real progress in making professional military
education (PME) relevant to today’s challenges – so much so, in fact, that its principal
recommendation is to endorse the Chairman’s vision for PME and develop a comprehensive
strategy to meet it. As part of that strategy, the team recommends that DoD establish a “Joint
Virtual University” able to deliver education to increasingly-deployed forces wherever they may
be. Smaller, reinvigorated senior Service schools will focus their efforts on those officers most
able to benefit from their curricula and committed to continued service. And the study team
advocates creation of more outside educational opportunities, particularly as careers lengthen.
A final recommendation is relevant to both DoD and other agencies. By converting the
National Defense University into a National Security University, representatives from all the
national security agencies can study common curricula and develop common approaches to
issues while imparting unique agency perspectives. Much of the BG-N process aims to create a
unified U.S. government national security team, and this means training together as you want to
operate together.

Organizing for Space and Cyberspace
While the study team found both the theory and organization of space and network
operations insufficiently developed to make concrete recommendations, it is clear that DoD will
increasingly require capabilities to operate in these new domains of warfare, as adversaries are  already doing. It is necessary to transition fully from treating these domains as support functions
to treating them as essential elements in the joint war-fight.

The Quest for Reform
Finally, a review of previous defense reform efforts and their results offers readers a view
of not only how the Department evolved to the present day, but the key elements that lead to
successful and sustained reform. These lessons – including the important roles of Congress,
selected critical individuals, and, unfortunately, calamities in ensuring lasting reform – are
instructive to anyone interested in implementing the reforms suggested in this report or any that
may follow.
Much of the United States’ national security structure was built in an era of predictable,
relatively static threats. Today we face adaptive, highly-agile opponents with flexible doctrine,
short chains of command, and rapid internal processes.
Coherence and agility are natural enemies, and it is no small trick to make any structure
the size of the U.S. government either coherent or agile. This report offers ways to increase both
at once, because in an age of continuous threat, nothing less will suffice.

Chapter 1


Offline birther truther tenther

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  • Against all forms of tyranny
Since 2002, Hamre has been a director of ChoicePoint, where he chairs the company’s privacy committee. In 2005, ChoicePoint mistakenly sold the personal financial records, military records, and social security numbers of more than 163,000 consumers to inadequately vetted fake businesses. The mistake resulted in at least 750 cases of attempted identity theft. The FTC accused ChoicePoint of violating the Fair Credit Reporting Act, despite getting subpoenas from federal government since 2001 alerting it to fraudulent activities. In 2006, the company paid $15 million to settle the FTC claims.

ChoicePoint’s mistakes pre-date the subpoenas. In 2000, ChoicePoint complied the faulty list of 94,000 "felons" purged from Florida’s voter rolls before the presidential election.

Choicepoint uses the Sybase software program for its data-mining operations. Winston Partners, co-founded by Marvin Bush, owns a large portion of Sybase. Choicepoint and Sybase provide programs for many of the world’s financial companies to comply with the Patriot Act’s requirements.

Federal agencies have spent at least $117 million on contracts with ChoicePoint since the company's inception in 1997, according to procurement data stored by the U.S. General Services Administration. The company has worked on many high-level government projects, including tracking the 19 al Qaida bombers responsible for the September 11 attacks.

Companies Now Using Software to Analyze What Kind of Employee You Are.

ChoicePoint is used in most Employee Background checks by the Fortune 500 in the United States.

It's the ultimate "blacklist".

Offline Rebelitarian

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If America does get false-flagged again who will believe it to be from an actual enemy ??


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How do dumb people end up in positions of power?




Offline Geolibertarian

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Absolute proof CSIS is planning the next 9/11 attacks to usher in new government

And why do so many people refuse to face this proof even when it's been spoon fed to them?

Because psychologically they're still in high school, and are consequently so terrified of being ridiculed or laughed at by whoever they perceive as the "in-crowd," that they literally would rather see their own children turned into deeply-impoverished, militarily-repressed slaves to a handful of parasitic robber barons than risk being called a (gasp!) "conspiracy theorist."  ::)

To call such people "cowards" would be a gross understatement.
"Abolish all taxation save that upon land values." -- Henry George

"If our nation can issue a dollar bond, it can issue a dollar bill." -- Thomas Edison

Offline Effie Trinket

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Bump in light of recent CSIS (CSIS is headed by Kissinger and Brzezinski, among others, fyi) sponsored false flag shooting in Florida.