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Offline birther truther tenther

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"Identity Dominance"
« on: September 28, 2010, 04:28:26 am »
Just assume that the entire document is in red highlighting because it is a bombshell in our research.

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Document Retrieved from:
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/milreview/woodward.pdf


FULL TEXT:


Using Biometrics to Achieve Identity Dominance in the Global War on Terrorism

John D. Woodward, Jr.
[writing for MILITARY REVIEW September-October 2005]


A fingerprint match identified the 20th hijacker. In December 2001, U.S. military forces detained Mohamed Al Kahtani as an enemy combatant on the field of battle in Southwest Asia. During repeated interrogations Kahtani denied being a combatant and offered an innocent explanation
for his presence in the region. While Kahtani was in military custody, an FBI team fingerprinted him in much the same way law-enforcement officials
routinely fingerprint criminal suspects in the United States. They took Kahtani’s 10 “rolled” fingerprints; that is, one fingerprint of each digit recorded from nail to nail. This collection of biometric data eventually led U.S. investigators to believe Kahtani was the missing 20th hijacker in the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. The 9/11 Commission concluded that Kahtani was “[t]he operative likely intended to round out the team” for Flight 93, which crashed in Somerset County, Pennsylvania.
Kahtani was identified because U.S. authorities matched the fingerprints taken from him in December
2001 to his fingerprints of 4 August 2001, when he arrived at Orlando International Airport on a Virgin Atlantic flight from London. During the immigration inspection at the airport, Kahtani, despite holding a valid U.S. visa, raised the suspicions
of an alert immigration official. According to the 9/11 Commission, “Kahtani was denied entry by immigration officials because he had a one-way ticket and little money, could not speak English, and could not adequately explain what he intended to do in the United States.” He received a “voluntary
departure,” which, in practical terms, meant officials placed him on a flight and returned him to Dubai. As part of the voluntary departure process, officials took prints from his two index fingers.
Once U.S. authorities biometrically linked Kahtani, the detainee in December 2001, to Kahtani, the foreigner who tried to enter the United States in August 2001, they had a valuable lead to pursue for counterterrorism and homeland security purposes. The Kahtani match raised an intriguing possibility: Investigators knew Mohamed Atta had been in Florida in August 2001. Could Atta be linked to Kahtani? Based on their review of surveillance camera footage taken at the airport on 4 August 2001, investigators matched a license plate to a car rented by Atta. Other corroboration established that Atta was at the airport terminal at the time Kahtani’s flight arrived. Of course, Kahtani never volunteered this information during his many military interrogations. He stuck to his cover story. The fingerprint match provided the necessary actionable intelligence.4 As a result, a person the military encountered on a foreign field of battle was linked to a terrorist activity—the 9/11 attacks. This case study illustrates the importance of “identity dominance,” which the U.S. military must embrace.

What is Identity Dominance?
Just as the U.S. military has established its superiority in other arts of war, now, working with other U.S. Government organizations, it must strive for identity dominance over terrorist and national-security threats who pose harm to American lives and interests. In the context of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT), identity dominance means U.S. authorities could link an enemy combatant or similar national-security threat to his previously used identities and past activities, particularly as they relate to terrorism and other crimes.
The U.S. military needs to know whether a person encountered by a warfighter is a friend or foe. To do so, we need to answer the following questions: Has the person previously—
• Been arrested in the United States or other countries?
• Used aliases or fraudulent “official” documents?
• Been detained by U.S. or coalition forces?
• Been refused entry into the United States?
• Been linked to a terrorist activity?
• Had his fingerprints found on the remnants of an improvised explosive device (IED)?
• Been seen within a crowd committing terrorist
acts?
To the extent the U.S. military is forced to rely solely on a purported name or on “official” documents provided by someone, answers to these questions remain elusive. We cannot reliably find the answers if we use only the name the person provides and his “official” documents. Foes, particularly
terrorists, will provide aliases and will often have the necessary fraudulent documents to back them up. A terrorist will also have a cover story that explains his actions in seemingly harmless terms. Fortunately, biometric technologies, based on a person’s physiological or behavioral traits, can indelibly link a person to an identity or event. Names can be changed and documents forged, but a biometric is much less susceptible to alteration and forgery. Moreover, although many people have the same or similar names and many documents look alike, a person’s biometrics tend to be robust and distinctive. [/b][/color]

Biometric Technology Support
To achieve identity dominance, the U.S. military must make maximum use of biometric information and the technologies that collect, process, store, and search data. The military must work in cooperation with other U.S. Government partners, most notably the FBI, the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of State, and the intelligence community. Cooperation must also extend to state and local law-enforcement officials, who serve on the front lines of homeland security, and to our international allies as well.

Identifying individuals. Biometric technologies take automated measurements of certain physiological or behavioral traits for purposes of human
recognition. Human recognition consists of verification: Is this person who he claims to be? and identification: Who is this person? These technologies can search a biometric data-base to verify a person’s identity by doing a one-on-one match: Does this needle match that needle? And they can identify a person by doing a one-to-many search: Is this needle in any haystacks? This identification capability is critical for identity
dominance because finding terrorists is like finding a needle in the midst of many haystacks.
Thanks to advances in computer technologies, pattern recognition, and algorithm development, some biometrics can search through large databases
reliably and quickly. For example, the FBI’s Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System (IAFIS), established in 1999, contains in an electronic database the 10 rolled fingerprint records of approximately 48 million individuals who have been arrested in the United States on felony or serious misdemeanor charges. When police make an arrest, they routinely submit the arrestee’s fingerprints to IAFIS to determine if the person has a prior criminal record. The FBI processes an average of 25,000 such criminal identification submissions daily. Over 95 percent of the time, the search result is returned to the police in less than 2 hours. Just as fingerprints can be found at crime scenes, fingerprints can be found at terrorist sites. Forensic examiners can harvest these latent prints and search them against the IAFIS database and its counterparts. Because a latent fingerprint contains much less data than a set of 10 rolled fingerprints, the system returns a candidate list of possible matches as opposed to a firm, highly reliable, match/no match result. A latent fingerprint examiner must then review the list for a final determination. The IAFIS experience is instructive for the Department
of Defense (DOD). Just as domestic law enforcement takes 10 rolled fingerprints (and other biometrics) from arrestees, U.S. military units must take 10 rolled fingerprints (and other biometrics) from Red Force members (enemy combatants and national security threats). Just as IAFIS stores arrestees’ fingerprints in an interoperable format, DOD must store Red Force biometric data. Just as law-enforcement officials routinely search arrestees’
fingerprints against IAFIS, so too must DOD routinely search Red Force members’ fingerprints (and other biometric information) against all relevant
databases to find the terrorist “needle.”
The military needs reliable answers to several questions to enable it to identify people who are or might be national security threats. To get such reliable answers regarding previously used names and past activities, the U.S. military, working with other U.S. Government organizations and allied governments, must fully leverage the power of biometrics to ensure identity dominance. In doing so, some important and related functions would be served:
• Force protection—keeping U.S. and coalition personnel safer.
• Actionable intelligence—gaining information to use to detect, detain, disrupt, and deter terrorists.
• Law enforcement—recording legally admissible
evidence to use to prosecute terrorists through the judicial system, if that path is pursued.
• Homeland security—safeguarding Americans and the Nation.

Emerging foes. The U.S. military has always faced the challenge of identifying friend or foe. In the GWOT, this challenge is all the more difficult because we face a highly mobile, elusive enemy who deliberately engages in tactics to conceal his true affiliation and allegiance. Terrorists use aliases to hide who they really are, and they have fraudulent official documents to support their claimed identities. Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Security Paul McHale explains: “Our enemy today is no longer in uniform, our enemy today is no longer in combat formation. Our enemy is probably wearing civilian clothes and is virtually indistinguishable from innocent counterparts throughout civilian society."
The mobility of terrorists poses a serious challenge for the United States and its allies. Terrorists have demonstrated they can enter Western countries, blend into society, and remain elusive. They take advantage of our free and open societies to plot and carry out operations intended to destroy our countries. The 9/11 plotters planned and supported their attacks from the United States, Germany, Spain, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, and other free countries.

Ensuring Identity Dominance
How can we better identify and target this elusive enemy? The Defense Science Board Task Force on Identification Technologies recently advised Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that “the [GWOT] cannot be won without a ‘Manhattan Project’-like tagging, tracking, and locating” program for national security threats. A critical component for identifying national security
threats is for the U.S. military to process biometric data taken from Red Force members using the Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS), an interoperable enterprise approach modeled after and interoperable with the FBI’s highly successful IAFIS.7 This approach is multitheater, multiservice, multifunctional, and multibiometric.

Multitheater. The ABIS capability must reach across all theaters of operation for the U.S. military and international allies. Biometric data must be taken to standards that ensure interoperability so biometric data collected in any theater of operation can be searched against all relevant databases for possible matches.

Multiservice. DOD cannot afford to permit each military service to do its own thing with respect to biometric data. For example, U.S. Army troops in Najaf should take biometric data from Red Force members and forward it to the central ABIS database;
Navy units performing maritime interception operations in the Persian Gulf or U.S. Marines patrolling in Fallujah could later access and search the same biometric data.

Multifunctional. The ABIS approach serves multiple functions, which means U.S. military forces can gather biometric data for use by a Department
of Homeland Security inspector at a port of entry for foreigners visiting the United States, by a Department of State diplomat issuing visas, or by law-enforcement personnel carrying out arrests.
Because it contains biometric data taken from Red Force members, the ABIS is a true national resource for homeland security purposes.

Multibiometric. The ABIS approach must include multiple biometric records or modalities, such as fingerprints; mug shots (face); DNA; and iris, voice, and palm prints. DOD’s immediate focus must be on fingerprints as the essential modality for an identity-dominance capability. (See figure 1.)



Several factors account for this focus on fingerprints:
• Established biometric. Since the late 19th century,
fingerprints have been recognized as distinctive,
ubiquitous, and robust. Nearly everyone has fingerprints, fingerprints do not change over time, and the legal system has long accepted fingerprints as evidence of identity.
• Established technology. Since 1999, searching and matching fingerprint data has become a highly accurate, automated process based on a standard that ensures interoperability. The keystone to this process is the FBI’s IAFIS.
• Established databases. There are already many fingerprint databases. IAFIS, with its computerized records on approximately 48 million people, is the leading example. Many states have their own fingerprint databases. Moreover, many foreign countries have national fingerprint databases.
• Established benefits. Fingerprints might be left behind at criminal or terrorist sites. Forensic investigators routinely harvest latent fingerprints from such sites, which are subsequently searched against databases for possible matches.
While face-recognition technology does not perform as well as fingerprint technology, it is improving and can be used as a valuable screening
mechanism. With state of the art surveillance cameras, we can capture an image of a person’s face clandestinely and from a distance. As with fingerprints, there are many legacy databases of mug shots, which are routinely taken during the police booking process and used for many other forms of vetting, such as visa applications.

Other biometric modalities, such as iris images, palm prints, and voiceprints, should also be incorporated into the ABIS approach. Doing so would improve and expand our identity-dominance capability by allowing our allies and us to search multiple biometric modalities on suspected national security threats.
A multimodal approach maximizes the use of biometric data, but identity dominance requires a single, virtual database in the form of a network of interoperable databases. For example, the IAFIS and ABIS databases must be interoperable. This seamless approach would make any standard query from another entity transparent. That is, it would be forwarded to the portal of the national security database and then searched among all relevant
databases. The response would be returned to the user in a similarly transparent fashion.
(See figure 2.)




Enhancing Identity Dominance

To enhance its identity dominance capability, DOD must take immediate steps in four critical areas: standards, policy, operations, and architecture.

Standards. First and foremost, military units processing Red Force members must collect fingerprints in the correct internationally accepted format—the 10 rolled fingerprints. Fingerprints taken in this way are interoperable with other fingerprint databases, such as ABIS and IAFIS. In February 2004, the DOD chief information officer mandated that DOD organizations conform to the Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification (EFTS) derived from American National Standards Institute/National Institute of Standards and Technology, ITL 1-2000.9 In response, Lieutenant General Steven Boutelle, the executive agent for biometrics, issued new standing operating procedures (SOPs) for biometric collection from detainees that requires collecting EFTS-compliant fingerprints, mug shots based on NIST best practices, and DNA samples from detainees. The SOP also encourages collecting iris patterns and voice recordings from Red Force members. My hope is that we can expand this biometric collection in the future. The military should also collect additional modalities such as palm prints and voice recordings from Red Force members.

Policy. Thanks to McHale’s leadership, DOD has a policy in place to permit routine sharing of Red Force biometric data with the FBI. This policy needs to be broadly applied to permit other organizations to submit searches to ABIS. For example, federal, state, and local law-enforcement officials submit approximately 25,000 criminal search requests per day to IAFIS. These front-line responders should be able to search the fingerprints of criminal arrestees against ABIS.  DOD policy must also encourage military units to collect biometric data from foreigners who access U.S. installations in places like Iraq or who interact with U.S. forces. In this way these foreigners, known as Grey Force, can be better vetted as security risks. Similarly, DOD policy must enable military services, like the Navy, to collect biometric data from foreign seafarers stopped in international waters as part of maritime interception operations. This data could then be rapidly searched against ABIS, IAFIS, and related databases for matches. Ideally, the Navy’s biometric capability also would be integrated into a U.S. Coast Guard biometric capability. As an urgent priority, DOD also needs a policy to ensure effective use of biometric data it collects from Red Force members. Specifically, the military should not release a detainee from custody until the detainee’s fingerprints have been searched with negative results against ABIS (to identify recidivists or match fingerprints left at a terrorist scene) and IAFIS (to identify someone who has a U.S. arrest record). In this way, the military could show that it recorded the detainee’s fingerprints to FBI standards and received the results of a search (negative ABIS; negative IAFIS). Thus, DOD would ensure it has a good set of fingerprints before releasing a detainee from custody. This approach will also quickly identify detention centers in places like Iraq and Afghanistan that have not been upgraded with proper equipment and/or training. If a police department in the United States did not take fingerprints of arrestees, it would be committing a dereliction of duty. There is a lesson in this for DOD.

Operations. The military must exploit biometric data left behind on IEDs and in terrorist safe houses and other terrorist sites. The military should use both U.S. and foreign forensic investigators to harvest latent fingerprints found at terrorist scenes and routinely search latent prints against ABIS and IAFIS for possible matches, indicating, for example, that the same person was involved in multiple IED bombings. Such pattern analysis would provide useful intelligence.

Architecture. In 2004, the DOD Biometrics Fusion Center, with the support of the U.S. Northern Command, the Army Chief Information Officer/G6, DOD leaders, and other organizations, established the DOD ABIS, which is interoperable with IAFIS. DOD has a state-of-the-art system in place to process biometric data. DOD now needs to improve ABIS to push its capabilities closer to the warfighter, which would mean DOD must encourage development of rugged, lightweight, portable biometric-collection devices that can capture and transmit biometric data for rapid searching. The next generation of devices must also be fairly easy to use. As recent experience in Iraq demonstrates, it is extremely difficult for the military to provide extensive training during hostilities. Therefore, the devices must be intuitive and reliable.

The Future
In the GWOT, the relevance of biometric technology has grown exponentially. The military must achieve identity dominance, where military forces have the distinct ability to separate friend from foe by linking people to their previous identities and past terrorist or criminal activities. We can use biometric technology to achieve identity dominance and must deploy it to meet the requirements of force protection, actionable intelligence, and law enforcement. Establishing identity dominance through a comprehensive ABIS will enable the U.S. military to identify friend or foe to keep America safer.




Offline chris jones

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Re: "Identity Dominance"
« Reply #1 on: September 28, 2010, 07:06:22 am »

I bet they have a team soley for the puropose of coming up with these phrases. Though This one hits on it,,..dominance.
Well, they have the domestic front covered, of course they dont give us the speel or one of their  clever titles for DARPA. That in depth profile of every facet in regards to a citizen, both public and private life.


Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: "Identity Dominance"
« Reply #2 on: September 28, 2010, 02:08:56 pm »


http://www.dtic.mil/ndia/2007disrupt/Dee.pdf


Excerpts:













Read this thread that discusses the technologies featured in this powerpoint:

http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=187471.0







Offline Dig

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Re: "Identity Dominance"
« Reply #3 on: September 28, 2010, 03:36:56 pm »


Christopher Clark, Fmr Officer in Department of Homeland Security
Used IBM Electronic Dog Collars to Create a Sex Slave

http://www.courthousenews.com/2010/08/31/29997.htm

"Clark also wanted to see how good plaintiff's tongue was and that he was attracted to the plaintiff," according to the complaint. Dahl claims Clark traveled to Montana on Aug. 8 "under the guise of an official business trip" and asked her to meet him. She says he made her feel "that she did not have a choice but to do whatever he suggested or he would fire her." That night Clark took her back to his hotel room "where he demanded to have sex and forced himself on her and, after initially attempting to fight him off, she gave up and he had his way," the complaint states. It adds: "The sex was not of her free will and was unwelcomed." A week later, she says, Clark e-mailed her the lyrics to Jimmy Buffett's song "Come Monday" and wrote about "loving" her. Dahl claims Clark met her in Minneapolis to join her for her move to Washington and "demanded sex" on each of the four nights they spent on the road. Once in Washington in her new job, she says she tried to refuse to have sex with him, but "Clark exhibited an attitude including body language which conveyed that he was entitled to have sex with the plaintiff if she wanted to maintain her job and it so scared the plaintiff that she backed off her stance and even suggested make-up sex."

Clark also monitored her in Washington, "particularly her movements and communications with other people and he sought to restrict, insulate and isolate the plaintiff so as to maintain and continue his control and dominion over her," she claims. "There was an expectation that the plaintiff would be providing Clark sex and he treated the plaintiff as if she was his sex slave," the complaint states.




“The technotronic era involves the gradual appearance of a more controlled society. Such a society would be dominated by an elite, unrestrained by traditional values. [...] The capacity to assert social and political control over the individual will vastly increase. It will soon be possible to assert almost continuous surveillance over every citizen and to maintain up-to-date, complete files, containing even most personal information about the health or personal behavior of the citizen in addition to more customary data. These files will be subject to instantaneous retrieval by the authorities.”
https://www.mega.nu/ampp/privacy.html
-Zbigniew Brzezinski




Hey DHS...what you are doing right now is so f**king illegal it is not even funny. You guys have gone so far off the reservation, you are creating actual damages to humanity. Same as the Nazis did, same as Mao did, same as Pol Pot did. Wake up and realize what is going on. In the end they will turn the grid on you too. It is in the plans. IBM's system will require no humans, it will be sense and response without any human intervention. You are giving IBM all the data it needs to put the same electronic dog collar that psychopath used automatically. They will not need 500 humans in a room looking at computer screens. You are logging everything you think is suspicious. That is getting fed into IBM's analytics so that they no longer need you. It works on the same principals as Google's Human Tabulation Workshop. Watch this video and you should be able to see what you are doing for the beast behind the scenes: http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=-8246463980976635143

And of course the psycho used the system to create a continually monitored and stalked sex slave. This was by design, it is so easy to do at that level and there is no oversight so of course he decided to get himself a sex slave, his profile probably showed he would do it, that is why he was hired. Don't you guys notice the type of people hired as your co-workers? Doesn't it freak you the f**k out sometimes?
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: "Identity Dominance"
« Reply #4 on: September 28, 2010, 07:23:47 pm »
This following powerpoint slide reminds me of this one that Anti_Illuminati posted:
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=185631.0





GIG, Enterprise Architecture, Net-centric, biometrics, and fusion centers all in one pic.  A hardcore global enslavement nightmare hell on earth.





Retrieved from:
http://biometrics.org/bc2009/presentations/tuesday/Boyd_NAVY%20BR%20A%20Tue%201117-1126.pdf





Navy Contributions to Identity Management
CAPT John M. Boyd
Director, Dept of the Navy
Identity Management Capability
Biometric Consortium Conference –22 September 2009

more slide excerpts:





Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: "Identity Dominance"
« Reply #5 on: September 28, 2010, 09:30:03 pm »
The definition of Identity Dominance:

Quote
Identity Dominance is defined as the operational capability to achieve an advantage over
an adversary by denying him the ability to mask his identity and/or to counter our biometric
technologies and processes. This is accomplished through the use of enabling
technologies and processes to establish the identity of an individual and to establish a
knowledge base for that identity. This includes denying an adversary the ability to identify
our protected assets.


Retrieved from:
BIMA: Biometrics Glossary Version 4.0  16 March 2010
http://biometrics.dod.mil/Files/Documents/Standards/BioGlossary.pdf





Check Out Biometrics Identity Management Agency (BIMA)'s website:
http://www.biometrics.dod.mil


BIMA FAQs

   1. When did BTF make its official transition as the Biometrics Identity Management Agency (BIMA)?

      The Department of the Army General Order (DAGO) 2010-06, signed by the Secretary of the Army (SecArmy), redesignated BTF as the Biometrics Identity Management Agency (BIMA) on 23 March 2010.
   
2. What is the brief history behind BTF’s transition to BIMA?

      Since Congress first designated SecArmy as the Executive Agent (EA) for biometrics information assurance programs within the Department of Defense (DoD) in July 2000, the Army had not formally established an enduring biometrics organization to fully execute the SecArmy’s EA responsibilities. The Army initially established a Biometrics Management Office with Chief Information Officer (CIO)/G-6 oversight. SecArmy later shifted oversight from CIO/G-6 to the Deputy Chief of Staff (DCS), G-3/5/7 in June 2006. Upon this transition, DCS, G-3/5/7 established the BTF as a subordinate element within the U.S. Army Operations and Plans Support Group.

      To establish a formal organization type and reporting process for the BTF, the organization began laying a foundation for the BIMA transition as early as 2007. In October 2009, the Vice Chief Staff of the Army (VCSA) approved a decision paper recommending redesignation of the BTF as BIMA, and establishment of BIMA as a Field Operating Agency (FOA) within G-3/5/7. The Office of Institutional Army Adaptation submitted the BIMA DAGO packet on 16 October 2009 and the Office of the Judge Advocate General completed legal review on 4 January 2010, with no legal objections. Effective 23 March, BTF was officially redesignated as BIMA. Going forward, the organization’s further evolution to a FOA requires a change to Defense appropriations legislative language. We are working with the G-3/5/7 Congressional Affairs Contact Officer (CACO) to do so.
   
3. How is BIMA different from BTF?

      BIMA is a permanent organization, rather than a temporary task force. This permanent status ensures that biometrics endures as an enabling capability for DoD.

      In addition, redesignation as BIMA is a critical milestone in the organization’s history because it enables funding and manning authority. As BIMA, we now have fund certification authority, along with manpower management authority to establish and secure the resources needed to fulfill Executive Manager responsibilities.
   
4. Will the organization’s structure change?

      BIMA will continue to report to G-3/5/7, and the Director remains the Executive Manager for DoD Biometrics.
   
5. What is the significance of the name change?

      The name BIMA is significant because it conveys that the organization coordinates and integrates the biometrics component of the more holistic DoD Identity Management (IdM) strategy. In 2007, the Defense Science Board (DSB) identified a migration from “biometrics” to a broader scope of IdM. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration subsequently led development of an IdM Strategic Plan that defined IdM “as the combination of technical systems, policies, and processes that create, define, govern, and synchronize the ownership, utilization, and safeguarding of identity information” and recognized biometrics as a key component of IdM.

      Biometrics enables IdM across four domains: Warfighter, Business, Intelligence, and Security & Law Enforcement. As its name signifies, BIMA will facilitate coordination of biometrics activities within this overarching context of DoD IdM.







Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: "Identity Dominance"
« Reply #6 on: September 29, 2010, 02:28:18 am »
Bio for CAPTAIN John M. Boyd, the author of these PowerPoint slides about the Identity Dominance System (IDS).

(Not to be confused with the John Boyd 1927-1997 who developed the OODA Loop)


Retrieved From:
http://biometrics.org/bc2008/profiles/johnboyd.html


Biometric Consortium 2008 Conference
John Boyd
US Navy/Office of the Secretary of the Navy

[Pentagon Office]

Title:
Navy Contributions to Identity Management
 
Abstract:
The Department of the Navy (DoN) is working closely with DoD partners to advance Identity Management (IdM) capabilities across the Joint force. Under the Secretary of the Navy’s personal leadership, the DoN is placing significant intellectual resources in the area of biometrics-enabled operations with the goal of rapidly delivering IdM solutions to warfighters. This includes a number of Continuous Process Improvement projects related to IdM in support of military operations. Four points highlight development of IdM processes and solutions in the DoN over the past year. 1. We must advance IdM holistically across the aspects of policy, training & education, as well as technology. Emphasis in all three areas is imperative to successful institutionalization of IdM concepts. 2. Capability development over the past year centered on standards-based biometrics collection and matching in austere environments supporting military operations. Additional development focused on an authoritative "Blue Force" biometrics & matching repository as well as the capability to characterize personnel asserting their identities to access our installations. Future capabilities will address shortfalls in logical access controls, as well as business functions. 3. Solutions are not developed in isolation/within DoN only. Leadership clearly guided efforts to be as inclusive as possible with all relevant stakeholders, leading to solutions that are interoperable, scaleable and extensible to an array of DoD and interagency missions. 4. Due regard for the legal rights and privacy of individuals is maintained across the range of IdM-related solutions.
 
Biography:
CAPT John Boyd is the Project Manager for Naval Identity Management Capability, serving on the staff of Secretary of the Navy. He leads efforts in the development of biometrics for strong identification of personnel and using the identity information to inform decision making in military operations, access control, and law enforcement operations. In the Navy Reserves, he previously commanded the OPNAV N1 reserve unit in Washington, DC and the Naval Submarine Support Center reserve unit in New London, CT. He spent 12 of his 26 years on active duty serving in nuclear-powered submarines. In his civilian career, he initially managed operations at chemical plants around the country. Later, he worked in the Joint Requirements Office for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense, leading information systems requirements generation and resource efforts as the Shape Action Officer. As a project manager, he recently led a team at OPNAV N867 in the identification and resourcing of capabilities required to fight the Global War on Terrorism in the maritime domain. CAPT Boyd holds a Bachelor of Science in Physics (Academically Distinguished) from the Virginia Military Institute, a Master of Science in Operations Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a Master of Arts in National Security and Strategic Studies (With Highest Distinction) from the Naval War College.






An article about JIPAC/IDS/USNORTHCOM with CAPT John Boyd being interviewed.

Retrieved from:
http://www.dodeaformda.navy.mil/contentview.aspx?id=634



Navy Moving Forward With Tactical (biometric) Identity Management System
By Bruce B. Stubbs and Elizabeth Clapp
Published, October 14, 2009

(DEFENSE DAILY 14 OCT 09) Based on the development and testing of a series of prototype tactical biometric collection and matching devices the past few years, the Navy is moving toward a program of record for the Identity Dominance System (IDS), which aimed at denying anonymity to adversaries at sea and on land, a Navy official tells TR2.

The focus of the IDS is to find adversaries "and to help sailors and Marines make decisions faster on the battlefield and at sea," says Capt. John Boyd, director, Department of Navy, Identity Management Capability. "So that runs the range from personnel on surface combatants, expeditionary strike groups, carrier strike groups performing maritime inspection operations; It can involve Naval Expeditionary Combat Command, riverine operations, Marines performing a raid in theater or in other areas."

Boyd also says that even humanitarian assistance missions have been discussed as possible applications. "The broader aspect of being able to make decisions faster could be used for friendly personnel as well as adversaries," he says.

In addition the Capabilities Development Document that was approved for IDS also includes the needs of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service, Boyd says. NCIS has law enforcement responsibilities. The service has also kept in touch with the Coast Guard, which has deployed biometrics at sea in the Florida Straits and Mona Passage.

"As we develop the IDS we want to make sure that it can be used for the military type operation and law enforcement operations," Boyd says.

The IDS will be a handheld, multi-modal biometric collection and matching system. It follows a line of rapid deployment and prototype efforts including the Expanded Maritime Interception Operations Identity Dominance Toolset, the Tactical Biometric Collection and Matching System, and SIIMON (System for Intelligence and Identity Dominance) Blocks I and II. Testing of SIIMON Block II began over the summer (TR2, May 14).

"We've made great strides in developing the technology that can be transitioned to the full program of record, and it's at the point now that the program office is more tailoring what they need for the remaining capability gaps," Boyd says. The program is working toward a March 2010 decision to begin Engineering and Manufacturing Development, which is Milestone B in Pentagon acquisition parlance. Before arriving at Milestone B the Navy must have an acquisition strategy approved Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics.

"Throughout this program, the Navy Department expects to engage heavily in small businesses to fulfill the program requirements, leading to a production contract award in 2012," Boyd says in a follow-up written reply to questions. "The production contract is expected to be a small business innovation research (SBIR) Phase III award to take advantage of the competitive SBIR Phase II work that will begin in Jan. 2010."

The budget request for IDS in FY '10 is $4.8 million for research, development, testing and evaluation. The program received $2.8 million in FY '09. In addition to the development work, the funding also supports the acquisition documentation such as the test and evaluation master plan and the acquisition strategy and management plan, Boyd says. While IDS is the identity management system furthest along in terms of being a program, the Navy and Marine Corps are leading a joint effort tentatively called the Joint Identity Enabled Physical Access Control Capability (JIPAC). JIPAC is focused on improving the ability of the armed forces to authenticate and authorize personnel coming onto bases and installations, Boyd says.

The JIPAC effort is the concept phase, gathering requirements and putting together small pilot projects to test concepts that would include biometrics and other capabilities, Boyd says. In addition to being able to more accurately authenticate and authorize personnel, it's also important that the information be "rapidly" transmitted to anyone that has the authority to see it, such as a gate guard or base security, he adds.

"What we're trying to do is develop the architecture from a holistic standpoint and make sure that we've really accurately determined the operational requirements, add that to the architecture, and develop a program so that we can determine the best of the best and coalesce those technologies into a full program of record," Boyd says. "Hopefully that will be delivered jointly."

U.S. Northern Command and the Joint Staff Force Structure, Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J8) are key proponents of the JIPAC effort, he says.

Policy work behind JIPAC is as important as making sure the technology is available. Boyd says that the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence has the lead for developing the access control policy.

Boyd also says that cyber security has emerged as a key facet of any discussion on identity management. That's because of the need for secure communications the need to protect biometric data and also to ensure the integrity of anyone involved in a system, he says.


Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: "Identity Dominance"
« Reply #7 on: September 29, 2010, 02:56:04 am »
Since National Defense Magazine is definitely not a "mainstream media" site, I will repost this entire article with proper citation, and commentary, because it is very relevant to what I am presenting.  I will interject my commentary with [brackets].

retrieved from:
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2009/January/Pages/DefenseDepartmentUnderPressuretoShareBiometricData.aspx





Defense Department Under Pressure to Share Biometric Data
January 2009

By Stew Magnuson

TAMPA, Fla. — Within minutes of knocking down the door of a suspected bomb maker in Iraq, U.S. troops can fingerprint everyone they find inside, send the scans across a satellite link, and find out if the subjects are suspected terrorists. [see as here: http://i53.tinypic.com/11hcsgx.png]

Military police in the Middle East who are manning checkpoints or sifting through job applicants for local hires can use the same technology.

Biometrics — the science of identifying a person through his unique body measurements such as fingerprints, iris scans, voice prints or even DNA — has come into its own. Operations in urban areas against enemies who don’t wear uniforms make identifying friends and foes more important than ever.

Technologies that allow investigators to identify suspected terrorists have been sped into the field, but these efforts are not being well coordinated, and that can lead to critical information gaps, and so-called stovepipes, the common term for information and communication systems that cannot link to each other, experts at the Biometrics Consortium conference said. [read about "stovepipes" here: http://armedservices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/PRT_Report.pdf  (I could do a whole thread on that PDF alone!)]

There are signs that progress is being made, government officials said. A presidential directive that was signed last year will help federal agencies sort out who does what in terms of identity management. The Naval Post Graduate School announced that it will begin a master’s level program in identity management. And Customs and Border Protection is now collecting 10 fingerprints from visitors arriving from foreign countries.

But is all this enough?

“We are still in the throes of a paradigm shift,” said Donald Loren, deputy assistant secretary of defense for homeland security integration.

When he walks into the Pentagon, he still flashes an ID badge with a mug shot.

“That’s identification. That’s not identity management,” he said. [see as here: http://img25.imageshack.us/img25/9019/armingwi04.png AND this thread that image is contained in: http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=165688.0]

Biometrics is the science behind the larger issue of “identity management.” Collecting a fingerprint is fine, but how should the government store, secure and share — when necessary — the biometric data it collects?

Along with the military services, entities such as the State Department, the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, the Department of Justice and its law enforcement arms such as the FBI — are involved in collecting biometric data.

“The Defense Department is still in the discovery phase of interagency, international and civil support activities” when it comes to biometrics and identity management, said Loren.
“We have to continue to work out the problems,” he added.

The release of National Security Presidential Directive 59 outlined the steps the federal government must take to coordinate all these efforts. [read that national Security PDD 59 down below]

The Defense Department has also set up several working groups and committees to tackle the problem. The National Science and Technology Council subcommittee on biometrics and identity management and the Defense Department’s biometrics readiness group are among them.

“We don’t have a single belly button for biometrics in the Defense Department,” said Tom Dee, who is the point man for the field in the Director of Defense Research and Engineering office. He is charged with keeping an eye on all these programs and ensuring there is a “unity of effort.”

The deputy secretary of defense signed a directive in February defining roles and responsibilities in the Defense Department. The Army remains the executive agent for biometrics, even though that doesn’t mean it is buying systems for the Navy or other services, Dee said.

Two recent Government Accountability Office reports called into question the effectiveness of these Defense Department efforts.

“While the {Defense Department} has stated some general goals for biometrics, such as providing recognized leadership and comprehensive planning policy, it has not articulated specific program objectives, the steps needed to achieve those objectives and the priorities, milestones, and performance measures needed to gauge results,” said the report titled “DoD Needs to Establish Clear Goals and Objectives, Guidance and a Designated Budget to Manage its Biometrics Activities.”

As the title suggests, the Defense Department needs a designated budget for biometrics — a “program of record” — that links resources to specific objectives and provides a consolidated view of the resources devoted to such activities, the report said.

So far, the Pentagon is relying on initiative-by-initiative requests for supplemental funding, the report said.

A second report, “DoD Can Establish More Guidance for Biometric Collection and Explore Broader Data Sharing,” gave a clear example of how the lack of a cohesive strategy for the use of biometrics can undermine military operations.

U.S. forces encountering hostile individuals in Iraq and Afghanistan collect different biometric data. It’s up to the battlefield commanders to decide whether they want to collect fingerprints, iris scans or both. “Allowing for this flexibility results in the collection of different data that are not necessarily comparable to each other,” the October report said.

“Broader national security implications can arise, such as military personnel’s inability to identify someone who has harmed or attempted to harm U.S. or coalition forces,” the report added.

Despite a memo declaring the Defense Department would share all its unclassified biometric information in the spirit of interagency cooperation in the war on terrorism, the Department of Homeland Security complains that it is not receiving regular updates of data it could use, the report said.

Al Miller, a consultant to the office of homeland defense and America’s security affairs, said at the conference that the FBI spent one year trying to track down who in the Defense Department could sign off on a biometrics information sharing agreement.

In written responses to the September GAO report, the Defense Department said it is moving toward making its biometrics efforts programs of record, although not all technologies will neatly fit into one line in the budget. It expects this to happen in the fiscal year 2010 budget request.

As for a lack of data sharing, the Defense Department maintains its own watch list, and said it is sending all the information in it to DHS when the law allows.

Meanwhile, the fight to rid Iraq of roadside bombs is showing how effective biometrics can be in an insurgency, said Konrad Trautman, director of intelligence at Special Operations Command.

Biometric tools, when used on raids on suspected bomb makers’ safe houses, have helped to kill or capture individuals who are involved in the construction of improvised explosive devices at the average rate of two per day for the last two years.

“How many bombs would have been made by those individuals if they were still on the battlefield?” he asked.

The goal is to rapidly exploit the evidence found on a raid site including everything the suspects have touched. There might be five men who claim to be innocent bystanders on the scene. But one might be the operation’s paymaster. All that has to be sorted out as soon as possible, Trautman said.

Collector ID kits are used to gather fingerprints and mugshots. Those records are sent via a small satellite dish to three databases at the Defense Department’s biometrics fusion center, the Army’s national ground intelligence center, and the FBI’s automated fingerprint identification system.

The Defense Department has about 2.2 million files, and the FBI has another 58 million.

Through September, special operations forces have sent 28,000 submissions, with 8,000 matches coming back. And 1,722 of them positively identified the subject as part of an IED cell.

The goal is to receive a response back within 15 minutes. In fact, the usual response time is much quicker — about four and a half minutes, Trautman said.

Other tools, such as link analysis software, can begin to build pictures of a bomb-making network. If intelligence officers can establish a link to another suspect, and they know where he lives, the goal is to launch a second raid within an hour, Trautman said.

This all works great in Iraq where U.S. forces have a free hand, and there isn’t an American Civil Liberties Union lawyer in sight. They can collect biometric data — even their DNA in some cases — from about anyone they encounter from a known or suspected terrorist, a job applicant or a petty thief.
But when operating in other nations, U.S. forces cannot count on having this kind of freedom.

There are no international treaties covering such matters, said Dee.

There are “shady areas” when it comes to collecting biometrics, he admitted. It will depend mostly on bilateral agreements. “It would be up to the host nation for what we’re permitted or not permitted to do,” he said.

Two advocacy groups, Human Rights Watch and Privacy International, wrote a joint letter to Defense Secretary Robert Gates in July 2007 questioning the collection of biometric data from ordinary Iraqi citizens, who aren’t suspected of breaking any laws.

“We recognize the strategic military importance of identifying threats to American military personnel,” the letter said. “However, these tactics also strip away a substantial privacy measure for Iraqi citizens in the midst of a conflict that flows from deep religious and ethnic division.”

The letter questioned what would happen if the data were turned over to Iraqi authorities and then later misused.

“The massive aggregation of secret files on Iraqis, linked to permanent biometric identifiers, creates an unprecedented human rights risk that could easily be exploited by a future government,” the letter said.

William Gravell, special adviser to the secretary of the Navy for identity management, and several other Defense Department officials, acknowledged that if privacy is not protected, then public acceptance for biometrics will evaporate. It will become one of those technologies that works well, but is not acceptable to use.
“Strong identity management does not necessarily mean weak privacy,” he said.

Capt. John Boyd, the Navy’s program manager for identity management capability, said the Navy during the last two years has collected only a few hundred mugshots and fingerprints.
The rules for what the Navy can do when boarding a foreign vessel “are totally different from Iraq or Afghanistan,” he said.

Trautman said that having the right policies, techniques and procedures in place for partner nations will become vital.

“The policy allows us to lash that together, not just for the domestic intelligence concerns but international policy as well or bi-national policy,” he said.

Miller said the United States has bi-lateral agreements to share biometric data with about 25 countries. Every time a foreign leader has visited Washington during the last few years, the State Department has made sure they sign such an agreement.

He expressed some concern that the momentum for identity management within the federal government, and the efforts to sign these agreements, will falter with the change in administration in 2009.

“Today’s policies are stressing the negative — who are the bad guys,” Miller added.

“We have to look at some goodness at what we are doing — protecting those on bases and their families with biometrics.” [more tyranny= safer, logical fallacy]



PDD 59 was mentioned in this article, so here is its full text retrieved from here:
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nspd/nspd-59.html


NSPD-59 / HSPD-24

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
June 5, 2008

National Security Presidential Directive and Homeland Security Presidential Directive

      NATIONAL SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/NSPD -- 59
      HOMELAND SECURITY PRESIDENTIAL DIRECTIVE/HSPD -- 24

SUBJECT: Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security

Purpose

This directive establishes a framework to ensure that Federal executive departments and agencies (agencies) use mutually compatible methods and procedures in the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information of individuals in a lawful and appropriate manner, while respecting their information privacy and other legal rights under United States law.

Scope

(1)  The executive branch has developed an integrated screening capability to protect the Nation against "known and suspected terrorists" (KSTs).  The executive branch shall build upon this success, in accordance with this directive, by enhancing its capability to collect, store, use, analyze, and share biometrics to identify and screen KSTs and other persons who may pose a threat to national security.

(2)  Existing law determines under what circumstances an individual's biometric and biographic information can be collected.  This directive requires agencies to use, in a more coordinated and efficient manner, all biometric information associated with persons who may pose a threat to national security, consistent with applicable law, including those laws relating to privacy and confidentiality of personal data.

(3)  This directive provides a Federal framework for applying existing and emerging biometric technologies to the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of data in identification and screening processes employed by agencies to enhance national security, consistent with applicable law, including information privacy and other legal rights under United States law.

(4)  The executive branch recognizes the need for a layered approach to identification and screening of individuals, as no single mechanism is sufficient.  For example, while existing name-based screening procedures are beneficial, application of biometric technologies, where appropriate, improve the executive branch's ability to identify and screen for persons who may pose a national security threat. To be most effective, national security identification and screening systems will require timely access to the most accurate and most complete biometric, biographic, and related data that are, or can be, made available throughout the executive branch.

(5)  This directive does not impose requirements on State, local, or tribal authorities or on the private sector.  It does not provide new authority to agencies for collection, retention, or dissemination of information or for identification and screening activities.

Definitions

(6)  In this directive:

    (a)  "Biometrics” refers to the measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioral characteristics that can be used for automated recognition; examples include fingerprint, face, and iris recognition; and

    (b)  "Interoperability" refers to the ability of two or more systems or components to exchange information and to use the information that has been exchanged.

Background

(7)  The ability to positively identify those individuals who may do harm to Americans and the Nation is crucial to protecting the Nation.  Since September 11, 2001, agencies have made considerable progress in securing the Nation through the integration, maintenance, and sharing of information used to identify persons who may pose a threat to national security.

(8)  Many agencies already collect biographic and biometric information in their identification and screening processes. With improvements in biometric technologies, and in light of its demonstrated value as a tool to protect national security, it is important to ensure agencies use compatible methods and procedures in the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric information.

(9)  Building upon existing investments in fingerprint recognition and other biometric modalities, agencies are currently strengthening their biometric collection, storage, and matching capabilities as technologies advance and offer new opportunities to meet evolving threats to further enhance national security.

(10) This directive is designed to (a) help ensure a common recognition of the value of using biometrics in identification and screening programs and (b) help achieve objectives described in the following:  Executive Order 12881 (Establishment of the National Science and Technology Council); Homeland Security Presidential Directive‑6 (HSPD‑6) (Integration and Use of Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism); Executive Order 13354 (National Counterterrorism Center); Homeland Security Presidential Directive‑11 (HSPD‑11) (Comprehensive Terrorist Related Screening Procedures); Executive Order 13388 (Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to Protect Americans); National Security Presidential Directive‑46/Homeland Security Presidential Directive‑15 (NSPD-46/HSPD-15) (U.S. Policy and Strategy in the War on Terror); 2005 Information Sharing Guidelines; 2006 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism; 2006 National Strategy to Combat Terrorist Travel; 2007 National Strategy for Homeland Security; 2007 National Strategy for Information Sharing; and 2008 United States Intelligence Community Information Sharing Strategy.

Policy

(11) Through integrated processes and interoperable systems, agencies shall, to the fullest extent permitted by law, make available to other agencies all biometric and associated biographic and contextual information associated with persons for whom there is an articulable and reasonable basis for suspicion that they pose a threat to national security.

(12) All agencies shall execute this directive in a lawful and appropriate manner, respecting the information privacy and other legal rights of individuals under United States law, maintaining data integrity and security, and protecting intelligence sources, methods, activities, and sensitive law enforcement information.

Policy Coordination

(13) The Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, in coordination with the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, shall be responsible for interagency policy coordination on all aspects of this directive.

Roles and Responsibilities

(14) Agencies shall undertake the roles and responsibilities herein to the fullest extent permitted by law, consistent with the policy of this directive, including appropriate safeguards for information privacy and other legal rights, and in consultation with State, local, and tribal authorities, where appropriate.

(15) The Attorney General shall:

    (a)  Provide legal policy guidance, in coordination with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security and the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), regarding the lawful collection, use, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information to enhance national security; and

    (b)  In coordination with the DNI, ensure that policies and procedures for the consolidated terrorist watchlist maximize the use of all biometric identifiers.

(16) Each of the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, the DNI, and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall:

    (a)  Develop and implement mutually compatible guidelines for each respective agency for the collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information, to the fullest extent practicable, lawful, and necessary to protect national security;

    (b)  Maintain and enhance interoperability among agency biometric and associated biographic systems, by utilizing common information technology and data standards, protocols, and interfaces;

    (c)  Ensure compliance with laws, policies, and procedures respecting information privacy, other legal rights, and information security;

    (d)  Establish objectives, priorities, and guidance to ensure timely and effective tasking, collection, storage, use, analysis, and sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information among authorized agencies;

    (e)  Program for and budget sufficient resources to support the development, operation, maintenance, and upgrade of biometric capabilities consistent with this directive and with such instructions as the Director of the Office of Management and Budget may provide; and

    (f)  Ensure that biometric and associated biographic and contextual information on KSTs is provided to the National Counterterrorism Center and, as appropriate, to the Terrorist Screening Center.

(17) The Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretaries of Defense and Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and the DNI, shall coordinate the sharing of biometric and associated biographic and contextual information with foreign partners in accordance with applicable law, including international obligations undertaken by the United States.

(18) The Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, through the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), shall coordinate executive branch biometric science and technology policy, including biometric standards and necessary research, development, and conformance testing programs.  Recommended executive branch biometric standards are contained in the Registry of United States Government

Recommended Biometric Standards and shall be updated via the NSTC Subcommittee on Biometrics and Identity Management.

Implementation

(19) Within 90 days of the date of this directive, the Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the DNI, and the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, shall, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, submit for the President's approval an action plan to implement this directive.  The action plan shall do the following:

    (a)  Recommend actions and associated timelines for enhancing the existing terrorist-oriented identification and screening processes by expanding the use of biometrics;

    (b)  Consistent with applicable law, (i) recommend categories of individuals in addition to KSTs who may pose a threat to national security, and (ii) set forth cost-effective actions and associated timelines for expanding the collection and use of biometrics to identify and screen for such individuals; and

    (c)  Identify business processes, technological capabilities, legal authorities,  and research and development efforts needed to implement this directive.

(20) Within 1 year of the date of this directive, the Attorney General, in coordination with the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Homeland Security, the DNI, and the heads of other appropriate agencies, shall submit to the President, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, a report on the implementation of this directive and the associated action plan, proposing any necessary additional steps for carrying out the policy of this directive.  Agencies shall provide support for, and promptly respond to, requests made by the Attorney General in furtherance of this report.  The Attorney General will thereafter report to the President on the implementation of this directive as the Attorney General deems necessary or when directed by the President.

General Provisions

(21) This directive:

    (a)  shall be implemented consistent with applicable law, including international obligations undertaken by the United States, and the authorities of agencies, or heads of such agencies, vested by law;

    (b)  shall not be construed to alter, amend, or revoke any other NSPD or HSPD in effect on the effective date of this directive;

    (c)  is not intended to, and does not, create any rights or benefits, substantive or procedural, enforceable by law or in equity by a party against the United States, its departments, agencies, instrumentalities, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, or any other person.

     

GEORGE W. BUSH


Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: "Identity Dominance"
« Reply #8 on: October 23, 2010, 03:37:26 am »
Face-recognition systems for airports derided

Friday November 2, 4:52 PM

Read article here:
http://web.archive.bibalex.org/web/20011104064541/sg.news.yahoo.com/011102/12/1ne83.html

Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: "Identity Dominance"
« Reply #9 on: October 27, 2010, 01:20:39 am »


Read article here:
http://www.prweb.com/releases/prweb2010/10/prweb4695484.htm



http://usa.maxidcorp.com/idl500.php

Quote
iDL500 - Rugged Mobile Computer
About

The iDL500 multimodal, rugged mobile computer offers a complete set of features for virtually any identity management challenge. On-board contact card, contactless card, barcode, and optical fingerprint readers combined with a digital camera, GPS, and comprehensive wireless communications make the iDL500 truly unique!

The iDL500 integrates enhanced features for the widest range of identity management applications. Additional card reading capabilities are provided by the combined contactless & smart card reader which is FIPS-201 compliant and has iClass® capabilities. Optional magnetic swipe & OCR/MRZ accessories allow the operator to screen credentials, including passports, e-passports, Transportation Worker’s Identification Credentials (TWIC), Common Access Cards (CAC), First Responder Authentication Cards (FRAC), Personal Identity Verification (PIV), driver’s license and other documents. The latest digital camera technology offers fast acquisition of FIPS-201 compliant facial images even under low-light levels.

This powerful set of personal identity validation features are complemented by GSM/GPRS/EDGE, 802.11b/g WiFi, and Bluetooth wireless communications capabilities. Running Microsoft® Windows CE .NET 5.0 and 6.0, the iDL500 offers an open, flexible platform. It is supplied with a comprehensive Software Development Kit to enable fast and easy application development.

While the entire device weighs less than two pounds, the high-impact ABS plastic case is shock tested to survive repeated drops of more than three feet to concrete and is designed to withstand ingress of water and dust. At only 9.2” by 4.2” by 2.3”, the unit’s compact size still allows for a 3.5” color TFT LCD display at 320x240 resolution that is readable in sunlight. An integrated 40-key QWERTY keyboard also includes several programmable function keys. The high capacity Lithium-Ion battery is designed to last a full typical shift. It is hot swappable and easily changed to allow continuity of operation during periods of intensive or extended use.

Ergonomically designed to sit easily in the operator’s hand, the iDL500 is lightweight and provides a truly mobile and flexible multimodal identity management tool.

Read more here:
http://usa.maxidcorp.com/idl500.php

Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: "Identity Dominance"
« Reply #10 on: December 01, 2010, 02:15:50 pm »
http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/SMA/ispab/documents/minutes/2007-12/ISPAB-IDManagement-MHymes.pdf

Identity Superiority
NIST, DoD, NSA, DISA

Excerpts of this powerpoint converted to PDF:


Use of the INTERNET

Use of Internet has exploded over the last 20 years

Global War on Terrorism (Iraq/Afghanistan)

First extensive use of Internet

Adversaries also using Internet

Trust is most critical element in use of modern communication systems

Challenge is identifying Red Force from Blue Force on the Internet,

but, Internet was not designed with Identity in mind



Key Tenets
1. Manage -

Use identity more effectively in identifying people, system, services and devices

Use identity more effectively to share information and for Force Protection
2. Dominate -

Discover/Generate identities of unknown individuals or resources both passively and actively
3. Assure -

Build a robust ID Superiority Infrastructure that protects individual information and counters anticipated threats



Challenges to Identity in Cyber World

Privacy

American Citizens are very skittish about the government maintaining vast repositories of information for identifying individuals

John Poindexter – Total Information Awareness

Foreign Countries have laws regarding asking or storing privacy information on citizens

Internet not designed with individual identity in mind

Identity extends to devices and information

Trusted Infrastructure to support an identity capability not widely established



Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: "Identity Dominance"
« Reply #11 on: December 01, 2010, 02:19:27 pm »
Biometric Enabling Capability (BEC)
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/land/wsh2011/42.pdf

MISSION
Serves as the Department of Defense
authoritative biometric repository
enabling identity superiority.

DESCRIPTION
Biometrics Enabling Capability (BEC)
(formerly the Biometric Enterprise
Core Capability [BECC]), using
an Enterprise System-of-Systems
architecture, will serve as DoD’s
biometric repository, enabling multimodal
matching, storing, and sharing
in support of identity superiority across
the department.

SYSTEM INTERDEPENDENCIES
In this Publication
Joint Personnel Identification version 2
(JPIv2)
Other Major Interdependencies
Automated Identity Management
System (AIMS), Biometric
Identification System for Access
(BISA), Detainee Reporting System
(DRS), Department of Homeland
Security IDENT, FBI Integrated
Automated Fingerprint Identification
System (IAFIS), Identity Dominance
System (IDS), Special Operations
Identity Dominance (SOID)
PROGRAM STATUS
• 4QFY08: DoD Biometrics
Acquisition Decision Memorandum
(ADM) directs Milestone B no later
than FY10
• 1QFY09: Biometrics in support
of Identity Management Initial
Capabilities Document approved
by Joint Requirements Oversight
Council
• 4QFY09: DoD Biometrics ADM
directs Analysis of Alternatives
(AoA) to be completed 2QFY10
• 3QFY10: DoD Biometrics ADM
approved name change from
Biometric Enterprise Core Capability
(BECC) to Biometric Enabling
Capability (BEC)
• 4QFY10: DoD Biometrics ADM
approved Biometric AoA final
report; ADM also directed the
current operational Next Generation-
Automated Biometric Identification
System to a full deployment decision
(BEC Increment 0) in FY11
• 4QFY10: DoD Biometrics ADM
directs Milestone B for BEC
Increment 1 in FY12
PROJECTED ACTIVITIES
• 1QFY11: NG-ABIS Capability
Production Document approved
• 2QFY11: Biometrics BEC Increment
1 Capability Development Document
approved
• 3QFY11: Full deployment decision
for BEC Increment 0
• 3QFY12: Milestone B for BEC
Increment 1, i.e., permission to
enter system development and
demonstration
Biometric Enabling Capability (BEC)

FOREIGN MILITARY SALES
None
CONTRACTORS
Program Management Support
Services:
CACI (Arlington, VA)
The Research Associates (New York, NY)
System Development and Integration:
To be determined pending Milestone B

Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: "Identity Dominance"
« Reply #12 on: December 01, 2010, 02:28:31 pm »
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/852101p.pdf

Department of Defense
DIRECTIVE
NUMBER 8521.01E

February 21, 2008
USD (AT&L)
SUBJECT: Department of Defense Biometrics
References: (a) Section 113 of title 10, United States Code
(b) Section 112 of the Emergency Supplemental Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-246, July 13, 2000
(c) DoD Directive 8500.01E, “Information Assurance (IA),” October 24, 2002
(d) DoD Directive 1000.25, “DoD Personnel Identity Protection (PIP) Program,” July 19, 2004
(e) through (z) see Enclosure 1
1. PURPOSE
Under the authority vested in the Secretary of Defense by Reference (a) and consistent with Reference (b), this Directive:
1.1. Establishes policy, assigns responsibilities, and describes procedures for DoD biometrics.
1.2. Designates the Director, Defense Research & Engineering (DDR&E), under the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD(AT&L)), as the Principal Staff Assistant (PSA) responsible for oversight of DoD biometrics programs and policy, to include interagency coordination.
1.3. Designates the Secretary of the Army as the DoD Executive Agent (EA) for DoD biometrics. Supersedes the designation of the Secretary of the Army as the EA for the integration of common biometric technologies throughout the Department of Defense under Reference (c).
1.4. Reinforces responsibilities and authorities assigned under Reference (d) and DoD Directive (DoDD) 5400.11 (Reference (e)) to support the Personnel Identity Protection and Privacy Programs.
1.5. Supersedes Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandums (References (f) and (g)) and conflicting portions of Reference (c). Additionally supersedes all other DoD issuances and other conflicting guidance regarding DoD biometrics.
DoDD 8521.01E, February 21, 2008
2. APPLICABILITY AND SCOPE
This Directive applies to:
2.1. The Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Military Departments, the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General of the Department of Defense, the Defense Agencies, the DoD Field Activities, and all other organizational entities within the Department of Defense (hereafter referred to collectively as the “DoD Components”). The term “Military Services,” as used herein, refers to the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.
2.2. The development and sustainment of biometric capabilities that support the collection, storage, use, and sharing of biometric data across the Department of Defense and interagency enterprise for purposes of both military operations and business functions.
2.3. This Directive does not apply to the Armed Forces Repository of Specimen Samples for Identification of Remains.
3. DEFINITIONS
Terms used in this Directive are defined in Joint Publication 1-02 and the National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee on Biometrics Glossary (References (h) and (i)), and are listed in Enclosure 2.
4. POLICY
It is DoD policy that:
4.1. Biometrics is an important enabler that shall be fully integrated into the conduct of DoD activities to support the full range of military operations.
4.2. DoD biometrics programs shall be designed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of biometrics activities throughout the Department of Defense by eliminating unwarranted duplication and overlap of technology development and information management efforts. For this purpose, all DoD Components’ biometrics activities shall be coordinated through the DoD Biometrics Executive Committee (EXCOM).
4.2.1. Joint, Service, or common biometrics products, systems, and services shall be coordinated with the DoD EA for DoD Biometrics and acquired in accordance with procedures consistent with DoDD 5000.1 and DoD Instruction 5000.2 (References (j) and (k)). Consideration shall be given to available Government-wide and DoD enterprise acquisition vehicles and contracts when acquiring biometric products, systems, and services. 2
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4.2.2. Biometrics capabilities determined to be Service-specific, and coordinated with the DoD Biometrics EXCOM, can be acquired through Military Service channels.
4.3. Biometric collection, transmission, storage, caching, tagging, and use shall be controlled through the use of DoD-approved national, international, and other consensus-based standards, protocols, best practices, and equipment to ensure consistency and support interoperability.
4.4. Biometric capabilities shall be developed to be interoperable with other identity management capabilities and systems, both internal and external to the Department of Defense, to maximize effectiveness. System development and capability implementation strategies shall be harmonized, integrated, and unified with identity protection and management stakeholder organizations to ensure consistency with DoD identity management principles, directives, and vision.
4.5. Development and deployment of biometric capabilities and systems shall consider privacy implications and comply with the requirements of Reference (e) and DoD 5240.11-R (Reference (l)), and support the programs outlined in Reference (d) and DoD 5240.1-R, DoDD 5200.27, DoDD 5015.2, and DoD 5200.08-R (References (m), (n), (o), and (p), respectively).
4.6. Biometric data is normally unclassified, in accordance with Reference (m); Homeland Security Presidential Directives (HSPDs) 6 and 11 (References (q) and (r)); and section 534 of title 28, United States Code (Reference (s)). However, elements of the contextual data, information associated with biometric collection, and/or associated intelligence analysis may be classified.
4.7. Authoritative sources of biometric data, associated information, and the means to exchange the data and information with Federal, State, local, tribal, territorial, and foreign governmental or multinational agencies shall be maintained.
4.8. Continuity of operations and disaster recovery plans for all biometrics-related missions and capabilities shall be developed and maintained by the responsible DoD Components.
4.9. The geographic Combatant Commander’s biometric policies relative to installation access take precedence over biometric policies of any DoD Component operating in that command’s area of responsibility (AOR).
4.10. In instances where a primary DoD point of contact with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies and international entities has already been established by existing authorities or statutes, the Biometrics PSA shall be consulted on corresponding activities that impact DoD biometrics.
4.11. DoD biometrics programs shall fully support the Information Sharing Environment (ISE) in accordance with the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Reference (t)).
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4.12. All biometric data and associated information collected as a result of DoD operations or activities shall be maintained or controlled by the Department of Defense, unless otherwise specified by the DoD EA for DoD Biometrics.
5. RESPONSIBILITIES
5.1. The DDR&E, under the USD(AT&L), shall:
5.1.1. Serve as the PSA for DoD biometrics programs, initiatives, and technologies (hereafter referred to as the Biometrics PSA).
5.1.2. Oversee the activities of the DoD EA for DoD Biometrics.
5.1.2.1. Assess periodically, but at least annually, the assignments and arrangements made by the DoD EA for DoD Biometrics for continued effectiveness in satisfying end-user requirements. Recommend to the Secretary of Defense the establishment, continuation, modification, or cancellation of such assignments and arrangements, as appropriate.
5.1.2.2. Review the adequacy of biometrics funding across the Department of Defense, in support of Joint Requirements Oversight Council-validated requirements, and approved standards and architectures in order to determine whether they meet DoD biometrics program requirements and objectives.
5.1.3. Provide oversight of all biometrics-related strategy, standards, policy, and concept development activities.
5.1.4. Coordinate with all DoD executive level identity management boards and/or committees.
5.1.5. Report annually to the Secretary of Defense on the status of the DoD Biometrics Program.
5.1.6. Serve as Chair of the DoD Biometrics EXCOM with responsibilities as outlined in Enclosure 3.
5.1.7. Serve as the primary DoD point of contact with other USG agencies and international entities on all biometrics-related activities unless otherwise specified in this directive or existing statute.
5.2. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) shall:
5.2.1. Support DoD biometrics with overall policy development, implementation, and oversight of biometrics matters, to include international biometrics activities, homeland defense, stability operations, detainee affairs, counterterrorism, critical infrastructure protection, force
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protection, anti-terrorism, special operations and low intensity conflict missions, and other areas under the cognizance of the USD(P).
5.2.2. In coordination with the Biometrics PSA, prepare and issue interagency and international cooperation agreements for biometrics activities as appropriate.
5.2.3. Review all proposed biometrics-related USD(P) acquisition programs and budget submissions. Through USD(P) participation in the DoD Biometrics EXCOM, coordinate with the Biometrics PSA on such programs and submissions.
5.3. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)) shall:
5.3.1. Ensure that DoD intelligence, security, and counterintelligence policies and procedures address current biometric capabilities and conform to DoD established standards for their application.
5.3.2. Direct policy development and implementation for the application of biometrics to defense intelligence, counterintelligence, and established security requirements, as needed.
5.3.3. Ensure that biometric-related intelligence information is accessible through an intelligence sharing environment to tactical and operational users as well as the USG-wide intelligence, counterintelligence, foreign intelligence (as appropriate under existing policy and statutes), and security communities.
5.3.4. Serve as the principal advisor to the Biometrics PSA on all biometrics-related intelligence activities.
5.3.5. Provide oversight of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)-led development of a DoD biometrically-enabled watchlist.
5.3.6. Review all proposed biometrics-related intelligence acquisition programs and budget submissions. Through USD(I) participation in the DoD Biometrics EXCOM, coordinate with the Biometrics PSA on such programs and submissions.
5.4. The Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness (USD(P&R)) shall:
5.4.1. Ensure personnel, readiness, identity protection, and management policies and procedures address current biometric capabilities and conform to DoD established standards for their application.
5.4.2. Direct policy development and its implementation for the application of biometrics to Defense personnel, readiness, identity protection, and management as well as established security requirements, as needed. Oversee collection of biometrics used for the issuance of identity credentials to DoD personnel in accordance with Reference (d).
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5.4.3. Lead the DoD efforts in meeting all requirements for the implementation of HSPD-12 (Reference (u)) in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Networks and Information Integration/DoD Chief Information Officer (ASD(NII)/CIO). Provide periodic updates to the DoD Biometrics EXCOM. Retain oversight on the fielding of the personal identity verification credentials and all other biometric issues pertaining to Reference (u) compliance.
5.4.4. Maintain the authoritative source and reference archive for biometric information collected from friendly individuals issued a DoD credential in accordance with References (d) and (e).
5.4.5. In coordination with the Director of Administration and Management (DA&M), ensure compliance with privacy and security policies and procedures to protect personal privacy consistent with law and policy. Additionally collaborate with the DoD EA for DoD Biometrics on the development of non-U.S. person privacy policies.
5.4.6. Review all proposed biometrics-related USD(P&R) acquisition programs and budget submissions. Through USD(P&R) participation in the DoD Biometrics EXCOM, coordinate with the Biometrics PSA on such programs and submissions.
5.4.7. Ensure biometric technologies developed within and for the medical community are coordinated and integrated into the overall DoD biometrics strategy.
5.5. ASD(NII)/CIO shall:
5.5.1. Ensure that biometrics technologies for logical access control are developed, effectively integrated into information assurance efforts, and made available for physical access control and other identity protection and management applications across the Department of Defense, to include DoD contractors.
5.5.2. Ensure that the Global Information Grid supports biometric operational requirements and that biometric solutions operate optimally in a net-centric information environment and adhere to information assurance architectural standards and security requirements.
5.5.3. Provide acquisition oversight, as delegated by the USD(AT&L) in accordance with References (j) and (k), for all biometrics major automated information systems and biometrics acquisition of services initiatives.
5.5.4. Support DoD efforts, in coordination with USD(P&R), for the implementation of Reference (u).
5.5.5. Review all proposed biometrics-related ASD(NII)/CIO acquisition programs and budget submissions. Through ASD(NII)/CIO participation in the DoD Biometrics EXCOM, coordinate with the Biometrics PSA on such programs and submissions.
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5.6. The DoD General Counsel shall:
5.6.1. Provide legal advice on all matters related to biometrics and, when appropriate, consult with relevant DoD Component counsels.
5.6.2. Review DoD biometrics acquisition matters and policy decisions.
5.7. DA&M shall:
5.7.1. Ensure that DoD biometrics policies and procedures are consistent with the requirements of References (e) and (l).
5.7.2 Review and address all biometric issues pertaining to the Privacy Act and Freedom of Information Act.
5.8. The Director, DIA, under the authority, direction, and control of USD(I), shall:
5.8.1. Partner with other members of the DoD intelligence community to develop implementing instructions as required to direct the applications of intelligence resources to support biometrics-related intelligence processing and analysis of all-source products for tactical, operational, and strategic customers.
5.8.2. Ensure DoD Intelligence Components develop collection and analysis capabilities to incorporate biometrics-derived contextual information.
5.8.3. Provide recommendations, through USD(I), to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff pertaining to the planning, programming, budgeting, and use of intelligence resources to support biometrics capabilities.
5.8.4. Develop, maintain, and share a DoD biometrically-enabled watchlist.
5.8.5. Ensure joint intelligence policy and doctrine addresses biometrics-related intelligence functions, to include coordination and interaction among DoD Intelligence Components.
5.8.6. Advise the DoD EA for DoD Biometrics and USD(P) on foreign reliability of intelligence information, such as contextual data associated with biometrics data collection.
5.8.7. Develop a multi-discipline intelligence strategy for the current and near-term application of Defense intelligence community resources in support of biometrics capabilities.
5.8.8. In coordination with the Biometrics PSA, USD(P), USD(I), and USD(P&R), establish and maintain an intelligence-related biometrics sharing agreements with coalition partners and other international allies, as appropriate.
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5.8.9. Serve as the Defense intelligence authority for certifying biometric systems on DoD intelligence information systems in coordination with the Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) as the DoD interoperability certification authority.
5.8.10. Develop, maintain, update, and publish a list of real and potential security threats to DoD biometric technologies and systems.
5.9. The Director, DISA, under the authority, direction, and control of the ASD(NII/CIO), shall:
5.9.1. Provide collateral level, and below, DoD transport services used for voice, data, and video services and ensure the security of DoD biometrics enterprise systems by setting the conditions for proactive protections, attack detection, and performing other necessary security functions throughout the Department of Defense.
5.9.2. Serve as the DoD authority for certifying the interoperability of biometric systems.
5.9.3. As the EA for information technology (IT) standards, per Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum (Reference (v)), track, coordinate, and integrate all DoD IT standards activities, including the harmonization and consolidation of IT standards agreements for the purpose of nation-to-nation multinational systems interoperability.
5.10. The Heads of the DoD Components shall:
5.10.1. Coordinate all Component biometrics strategies, concepts, and requirements with the DoD Biometrics EXCOM through the DoD EA for DoD Biometrics prior to acquisition program initiation to ensure that all Component biometrics programs:
5.10.1.1. Conform to an overall DoD biometrics architecture.
5.10.1.2. Do not duplicate other programs.
5.10.1.3. Are developed fully compliant with DoD-approved standards.
5.10.2. Plan, program, and budget for DoD Component-required biometric capabilities, including capabilities to meet Joint Service or common biometrics and Component-specific capabilities.
5.10.3. Comply with DoD-approved policies, standards, processes, and procedures for collection, transmission, storage, archiving, caching, tagging, retrieval, and interoperation of biometric capabilities.
5.10.4. Ensure that DoD Component-level biometric training, direction, and implementation guidance is developed and implemented, as required.
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5.11. The Secretaries of the Military Departments shall:
5.11.1. Designate a DoD Biometrics EXCOM member, who shall be a general or flag officer (G/FO) or Senior Executive Service (SES) equivalent, with responsibilities to identify Service biometrics requirements, coordinate Service programming for these requirements, and negotiate and resolve issues on behalf of their Services.
5.11.2. Coordinate all Service biometrics strategies, concepts, standards, and requirements with the DoD Biometrics EXCOM through the DoD EA for DoD Biometrics prior to program initiation or procurement actions to ensure that all Service biometrics programs:
5.11.2.1. Conform to an overall DoD biometrics architecture.
5.11.2.2. Do not duplicate other programs.
5.11.2.3. Are developed fully compliant with DoD-approved standards.
5.11.3. Plan, program, and budget for Service-specific and, where appropriate, joint and common biometric capabilities.
5.11.4. Comply with DoD-approved policies, standards, processes, and procedures for collection, transmission, storage, archiving, caching, tagging, retrieval, and interoperation of biometric capabilities.
5.11.5. Ensure that DoD Component-level biometric training, direction, and implementation guidance are developed and implemented, as required.
5.11.6. Support the geographic Combatant Commanders as they exercise overall responsibility for force protection in the AOR relative to compliance with Reference (p), by ensuring that sufficient resources are programmed in Military Department budgets to implement and synchronize Combatant Commander AOR-wide installation access requirements.
5.11.7. Review all proposed biometrics-related Service acquisition programs and budget submissions. Through Service participation in the DoD Biometrics EXCOM, coordinate with the Biometrics PSA on such programs and submissions.
5.12. The Secretary of the Army is hereby designated the DoD EA for DoD Biometrics in accordance with DoDD 5101.1 (Reference (w)) and, in addition to the responsibilities in paragraph 5.11, shall:
5.12.1. Execute responsibilities of the DoD EA for DoD Biometrics in accordance with Reference (w) and this Directive.
5.12.2. Appoint an Executive Manager for DoD Biometrics, who shall be a G/FO or SES equivalent, with responsibilities as outlined in Enclosure 4.
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5.12.3. Provide for, manage, and maintain a biometrics center of excellence.
5.12.4. Appoint a single Program Management Office, under the authority of the Army Acquisition Executive, responsible for the development, acquisition, and fielding of common biometrics enterprise systems to support common, Service, and joint requirements.
5.12.5. In accordance with References (j), (k) and, when applicable, DoDD 5200.39 (Reference (x)), make recommendations to USD(AT&L) concerning acquisition category and milestone decisions for all biometric acquisition programs.
5.12.6. Program for and budget sufficient resources to support common enterprise requirements documentation, architecture development, materiel development, test and evaluation, lifecycle management, prototyping, exercises, records management, demonstrations, and evaluations to include efforts at maturing viable technologies and standards.
5.12.7. Program for and budget sufficient resources to support common biometric data management, training, operations, and lifecycle support.
5.12.8. Coordinate all component biometric requirements with DoD Component members of the DoD Biometrics EXCOM.
5.12.9. Develop, publish, and update as appropriate a DoD Biometrics Security Classification Guide.
5.13. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff shall:
5.13.1. Validate joint requirements for biometrics capabilities, to include biometrics-related intelligence, for the Joint Force.
5.13.2. Review and assess the adequacy of biometrics acquisition programs and budgets to support joint objectives and operational plans, as well as ensure the integration of biometrics into strategic and operational plans as applicable.
5.13.3. Represent the biometrics program interests of the Combatant Commanders.
5.13.4. Coordinate with the Biometrics PSA and the DoD EA for DoD Biometrics to ensure the biometrics capability supports National Military Strategy and Combatant Commander requirements.
5.13.5. Serve as one of two Vice-Chairs of the DoD Biometrics EXCOM with responsibilities as outlined in Enclosure 3.
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5.14. The Combatant Commanders shall:
5.14.1. Identify joint warfighting requirements, support the development of theater-specific operational policy and concepts of operations, and support the development and integration of theater strategic, campaign, and operational plans.
5.14.2. Make recommendations to the Biometrics PSA, the DoD EA for DoD Biometrics, and USD(P) on biometrics-related policies regarding functional needs and systems as required. Additionally advise the Biometrics PSA, DoD EA for DoD Biometrics, and USD(P) of strategic, operational, and tactical lessons learned with respect to the acquisition, installation, and employment of biometric programs, systems, and devices.
5.14.3. Geographic Combatant Commanders shall coordinate biometric policies and acquisition programs that support the protection of DoD elements and personnel in their AOR with the Heads of the Military Services, DoD EA for DoD Biometrics, Biometrics PSA, and across the interagency.
5.14.4. Identify, document, validate, prioritize, and submit to the Joint Staff the resource requirements necessary to achieve biometric acquisition program objectives for each geographic Combatant Commander. Work with the Joint Staff and the Service component commands to ensure provision of necessary acquisition program resource requirements.
5.15. The Commander, U.S. Joint Forces Command, through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in addition to the responsibilities in paragraph 5.14., shall:
5.15.1. Ensure biometrics systems support joint interoperability and joint warfighting capabilities consistent with DoDD 4630.05 (Reference (y)).
5.15.2. Support the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in developing operational joint doctrine and training related to biometrics capabilities.
5.15.3. Ensure joint force- and Service-related exercises and experiments consider biometrics interoperability and supportability.
5.16. The Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), in addition to the responsibilities in paragraph 5.14., shall:
5.16.1. Designate a DoD Biometrics EXCOM member, who shall be a G/FO or SES equivalent, with responsibilities to identify USSOCOM biometrics requirements, coordinate USSOCOM programming for these requirements, and negotiate and resolve issues on behalf of USSOCOM.
5.16.2. Coordinate all USSOCOM biometrics strategies, concepts, and requirements with the DoD Biometrics EXCOM through the DoD EA for DoD Biometrics prior to acquisition program initiation to ensure that all USSOCOM biometrics programs:
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5.16.2.1. Conform to an overall DoD biometrics architecture.
5.16.2.2. Do not duplicate other programs.
5.16.2.3. Are developed fully compliant with DoD-approved standards.
5.16.3. Plan, program, and budget for USSOCOM-required biometric capabilities, including capabilities to meet joint Service or common biometrics and USSOCOM-specific capabilities.
5.16.4. Comply with DoD-approved policies, standards, processes, and procedures for collection, transmission, storage, archiving, caching, tagging, retrieval, and interoperation of biometric capabilities.
5.16.5. Ensure that DoD Component-level biometric training, direction, and implementation guidance is developed and implemented, as required.
6. RELEASABILITY. UNLIMITED. This Directive is approved for public release. Copies may be obtained through the Internet from the DoD Issuances Web Site at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives.
7. EFFECTIVE DATE
This Directive is effective immediately.
-Gordon England

Enclosures – 5
E1. References, continued
E2. Definitions
E3. DoD Biometrics EXCOM
E4. Responsibilities of the Executive Manager for DoD Biometrics
E5. Mission, Tasks, and Functions of the DoD Biometrics Center of Excellence
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E1. ENCLOSURE 1
REFERENCES, continued
(e) DoD Directive 5400.11, “DoD Privacy Program”, May 8, 2007
(f) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Executive Agent for the DoD Biometrics Project”, December 27, 2000 (hereby canceled)
(g) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Defense Biometrics,” October 4, 2006 (hereby canceled)
(h) Joint Publication 1-02, “Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,” as amended
(i) National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee on Biometrics Glossary, September 14, 2006
(j) DoD Directive 5000.1, “The Defense Acquisition System”, May 12, 2003
(k) DoD Instruction 5000.2 “Operation of the Defense Acquisition System”, May 12, 2003
(l) DoD 5400.11-R, “Department of Defense Privacy Program”, May 14, 2007
(m) DoD 5240.1-R, “Procedures Governing the Activities of DoD Intelligence Components that Affect United States Persons”, December 7, 1982
(n) DoD Directive 5200.27, “Acquisition of Information Concerning Persons and Organizations not Affiliated with the Department of Defense”, January 7, 1980
(o) DoD Directive 5015.2, “DoD Records Management Program”, March 6, 2000
(p) DoD 5200.08-R, “Physical Security Program,” April 9, 2007
(q) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, “Integration and Use of Screening Information,” September 16, 20031
(r) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11, “Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures,” August 27, 20042
(s) Section 534 of title 28, United States Code
(t) Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (PL 108-458), December 17, 2004
(u) Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12, “Policy for a Common Identification Standard for Federal Employees and Contractors,” August 27, 20043
(v) Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “DoD Executive Agent for Information Technology (IT) Standards,” May 21, 2007
(w) DoD Directive 5101.1, “DoD Executive Agent”, September 3, 2002
(x) DoD Directive 5200.39, “Security Intelligence, and Counterintelligence Support to Acquisition Program Protection”, September 10, 1997
(y) DoD Directive 4630.05 “Interoperability and Supportability of Information Technology (IT) and National Security Systems (NSS)”, May 5, 2004
(z) DoD Directive 3020.26, “Defense Continuity Program (DCP),” September 8, 2004
1 Copies of this document can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/09/20030916-5.html
2 Copies of this document can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-7.html
3 Copies of this document can be found at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/08/20040827-8.html
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E2. ENCLOSURE 2
DEFINITIONS
E2.1. Acquisition Program. A directed, funded effort that provides a new, improved, or continuing materiel, weapon, or information system or service capability in response to an approved need.
E2.2. Biometrics. As defined in Reference (i), a general term used alternatively to describe a characteristic or a process.
As a characteristic: A measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioral characteristic that can be used for automated recognition.
As a process: Automated methods of recognizing an individual based on measurable biological (anatomical and physiological) and behavioral characteristics.
E2.3. Biometrics-enabled Intelligence. Intelligence information associated with and or derived from biometrics data that matches a specific person or unknown identity to a place, activity, device, component, or weapon that supports terrorist / insurgent network and related pattern analysis, facilitates high value individual targeting, reveals movement patterns, and confirms claimed identity.
E2.4. Biometric Sample. As defined in Reference (i), information or computer data obtained from a biometric sensor device. Examples are images of a face or fingerprint.
E2.5. Biometrics System. As defined in Reference (i), multiple individual components (such as sensor, matching algorithm, and result display) that combine to make a fully operational system. A biometric system is an automated system capable of: 1. Capturing a biometric sample from an end user; 2. Extracting and processing the biometric data from that sample; 3. Storing the extracted information in a database; 4. Comparing the biometric data with data contained in one or more reference references; 5. Deciding how well they match and indicating whether or not an identification or verification of identity has been achieved. A biometric system may be a component of a larger system.
E2.6. Biometrics Programs. All systems, interfaces, acquisition programs, processes, and activities that are utilized to establish identities of people through the use of biometric modalities.
E2.7. Biometric Data. As defined in Reference (i), computer data created during a biometric process. It encompasses raw sensor observations, biometric samples, models, templates and/or similarity scores. Biometric data is used to describe the information collected during an enrollment, verification, or identification process, but does not apply to end user information such as user name, demographic information and authorizations.
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E2.8. Collect. Capture biometric and related contextual data from an individual, with or without his or her knowledge. Create and transmit a standardized, high-quality biometric file consisting of a biometric sample and contextual data to a data source for matching.
E2.9. Contextual Data. Elements of biographical and situational information that are associated with a collection event and permanently recorded as an integral component of the biometric file.
E2.10. Credential. Information, passed from one entity to another, used to establish the sending entity’s access rights.
E2.11. Friendly. As defined in Reference (h), a contact positively identified as friendly.
E2.12. Information Sharing Environment. An approach that facilitates the means for sharing terrorism information among all appropriate Federal, State, local, and tribal entities as well as the private sector through the use of policy guidelines and technologies.
E2.13. Match. For the purpose of this Directive only, the process of accurately identifying or verifying the identity of an individual by comparing a standardized biometric file to an existing source of standardized biometric data and scoring the level of confidence of the match. Matching consists of either a one-to-one (verification) or one-to-many (identification) search.
E2.14. Share. Exchange standardized biometric files and match results among approved DoD, Interagency, and multinational partners in accordance with applicable law and policy.
E2.15. Store. The process of enrolling, maintaining, and updating biometric files to make available standardized, current biometric information on individuals when and where required.
E2.16. Unknown. As defined in Reference (h), an identity applied to an evaluated track that has not been identified.
E2.17. U.S. Person. A citizen of the United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, or a member of the U.S. Armed Forces.
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E3. ENCLOSURE 3
DoD BIOMETRICS EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
E3.1. PURPOSE
The DoD Biometrics EXCOM serves as the DoD focal point and voice to ensure coordination of biometrics requirements, acquisition programs, and resources in support of the most operationally relevant and sustainable biometric capability across the Department of Defense.
E3.2. MEMBERSHIP
Chairman: Biometrics PSA (DDR&E)
Vice-Chairs: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
(or designated G/FO or SES representative)
Executive Manager for DoD Biometrics (Army General Officer or SES)
Membership:
Department of the Army General Officer or SES
Headquarters Marine Corps General Officer or SES
Department of the Navy Flag Officer or SES
Department of the Air Force General Officer or SES
Joint Staff G/FO or SES
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition & Technology SES
USD(P) SES
USD(P&R) SES
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)/Chief Financial Officer
USD(I) SES
ASD(NII)/DoD CIO SES
General Counsel, DoD
DA&M SES
Director of Program Analysis and Evaluation SES
Combatant Command G/FOs or SESs
E3.3. RESPONSIBILITIES
The DoD Biometrics EXCOM shall:
E3.3.1. Provide oversight, preclude duplication of effort, and undertake resolution of issues across DoD biometrics programs. Advise and make recommendations to USD(AT&L) concerning individual biometrics acquisition programs to ensure no unnecessary duplication of effort related to biometrics occurs across the Department.
16 ENCLOSURE 3
DoDD 8521.01E, February 21, 2008
E3.3.2. Ensure all DoD biometrics acquisition programs conform to an overall DoD biometrics architecture that enables interoperability with DoD-approved national-, international-, and other consensus-based standards.
E3.3.3. Review and approve the DoD biometrics program vision and strategy.
E3.3.4. Review and approve annual program plans and resources to support Service, joint, and common biometric capability requirements. Ensure that EA or DoD Component biometric decisions that create cost, schedule, or performance issues for other Components’ biometric acquisition programs are fully coordinated and issues resolved prior to approval.
17

Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: "Identity Dominance"
« Reply #13 on: December 01, 2010, 02:31:03 pm »
[continued]

DoDD 8521.01E, February 21, 2008
E4. ENCLOSURE 4
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE EXECUTIVE MANAGER FOR DoD BIOMETRICS
The Executive Manager for DoD Biometrics shall:
E4.1. Provide biometrics research, technology, and information management support to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Combatant Commanders, the Military Services, the Defense Agencies, and other DoD Field Activities, as required.
E4.2. Provide DoD biometrics research, technology, and information support to the Department of Justice, the Department of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence, and other USG agencies as directed by the Secretary of Defense.
E4.3. Provide for the standardization of biometric data formats, technical interfaces, conformance methodologies, performance evaluations, and other related areas to permit interoperability, both internal and external to the Department of Defense, and to maximize utilization of DoD resources. Additionally, ensure consistency with approved national and/or international standards applicable to the enterprise. Communicate biometric technology standardization activities to DISA and National Institute of Standards & Technology for integration into overall DoD and USG IT standards processes.
E4.3.1. Provide for participation on national and international standards bodies to influence and accelerate standards development.
E4.3.2. Establish a DoD Biometrics Standards Working Group to coordinate and build consensus on biometrics standards development, recommend standards for DoD adoption, and provide guidance for consistent standards implementation.
E4.3.3. Submit recommendations for DoD adoption of published standards to DISA for review and approval per References (s) and (l).
E4.3.4. Collaborate with interagency community and other mission partners to facilitate consistent implementation and use of biometric standards.
E4.3.5. Provide for the development of tools to facilitate interoperability, both internal and external to the Department of Defense.
E4.4. Develop and maintain, in coordination with the Heads of the DoD Components as appropriate, the policy, processes, and procedures for the collection, processing, transmission, archiving, caching, and tagging of biometric data and associated intelligence.
E4.5. Develop a DoD biometrics vision and strategy, in concert with the Military Services, Joint Staff, and Office of the Secretary of Defense, for annual submission to the Biometrics PSA via the DoD Biometrics EXCOM.
18 ENCLOSURE 4
DoDD 8521.01E, February 21, 2008
E4.6. Coordinate DoD Science and Technology (S&T) plans and develop and maintain a DoD biometrics S&T “roadmap” that clearly demonstrates S&T transition points to acquisition efforts.
E4.7. Provide a means for unified acquisition and procurement of common biometric systems and equipment in accordance with References (j) and (k).
E4.8. Review DoD biometrics program plans for annual submission to the DoD Biometrics EXCOM and to the Secretary of Defense. Provide a report on progress in achieving the DoD policy goal to fully integrate biometrics in support of the full range of military operations and DoD business processes.
E4.9. Serve as one of two Vice-Chairs of the DoD Biometrics EXCOM. (See Enclosure 3.)
E4.10. Provide for the establishment and operation of a governance structure, composed of members from the DoD Components and subordinate to the DoD Biometrics EXCOM, to enable the development and execution of common requirements, standards, architectures, and research and development initiatives to support common and joint requirements.
E4.11. Manage authoritative DoD repositories of biometric samples on those individuals not issued a DoD credential in accordance with References (d) or (e) and act as a hub for biometric data sharing, to include providing for continuity of operations and disaster recovery in accordance with DoDD 3020.26 (Reference (z)).
E4.12. Coordinate all biometric program activities with identity protection and management stakeholder organizations to ensure consistency with DoD identity management principles, directives, and vision.
19 ENCLOSURE 4
DoDD 8521.01E, February 21, 2008
E5. ENCLOSURE 5
MISSION, TASKS, AND FUNCTIONS OF THE DoD BIOMETRICS CENTER OF EXCELLENCE
E5.1. The DoD Biometrics Center of Excellence, as directed by the Secretary of the Army, shall:
E5.1.1. Maintain master repositories of biometric data and non-intelligence associated information, as well as the means to exchange the data and information with other USG agencies and coalition partners, in conformance with existing regulations and statutes governing the release of classified and controlled unclassified data.
E5.1.1.1. Develop standards, processes, and procedures for biometric data archiving, caching, and tagging.
E5.1.1.2. Develop and maintain continuity of operations and disaster recovery for the Biometrics Center of Excellence in accordance with Reference (z).
E5.1.1.3. Maintain capability to rapidly store and match biometric samples submitted by the Department of Defense and other Government agencies.
E5.1.2. Conduct biometrics S&T research and engineering for the Department of Defense and other USG sponsors in support of the DoD S&T roadmap.
E5.1.3. Conduct biometrics test and evaluation activities.
E5.1.3.1. Conduct biometrics standards conformance testing for all products, programs, and services with appropriate test agencies. Relevant conformance tests include, but are not limited to, Electronic Biometric Transmission Specification/Electronic Fingerprint Transmission Specification and evaluations and assessments of biometric-enabled IT devices and systems that interoperate with the authoritative biometric database and other repositories of biometric data as appropriate.
E5.1.3.2. Provide support to DoD acquisition organizations in developmental testing, systems integration, and/or independent verification and validation of biometric systems. Coordinate this support with the appropriate test agencies.
E5.1.3.3. Support DoD operational test agencies for the conduct of operational test and evaluation activities that determine system operational effectiveness and suitability.
E5.1.3.4. Maintain awareness of the biometric marketplace and evaluate products useful to Federal government agencies; acquire and conduct commercial and government-off-the-shelf testing to identify functionality, performance, and conformance to DoD standards.
20 ENCLOSURE 5

Offline birther truther tenther

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Re: "Identity Dominance"
« Reply #14 on: December 01, 2010, 02:45:05 pm »
http://identityeducation.org/linked/20081024%20biometrics%20overview%20brief.ppt

12 page PPT presentation

Excerpts:


Mission and Vision

Mission: The Biometrics Task Force leads Department of Defense activities to program, integrate, and synchronize biometric technologies and capabilities and to operate and maintain DoD’s authoritative biometric database to support the National Security Strategy.

Vision: The Biometrics Task Force is a premier organization dedicated to protecting the nation through the employment of biometric capabilities.














Current Environment
DEPLOYED SYSTEMS
    ABIS - Automated Biometric Identification System
    BAT - Biometrics Automated Toolset
    BISA - Biometrics Identification System for Access
    CROSSMATCH JUMPKITS
    DBIDS - Defense Biometrics Identification System
    DRS - Detainee Reporting System
    HIIDE - Handheld Interagency Identification Detection Equipment

NEAR-TERM IMPROVEMENTS
    Architecture efficiency and sustainability
    Data searches and rapid matching
    More base access systems in CENTCOM AOR
    Support for more collection devices
    Database flexibility
    Untethered collection and verification

RESULTS
    2.75 million ABIS entries
    765,000 ABIS matches
    Federal and DoD sharing
    Watch list matches




DoD Directive 8521.01 provides the guidance and organizational responsibilities for biometrics.

Mission: The Biometrics Task Force leads DoD activities to program, integrate, and synchronize biometric technologies and capabilities and to operate and maintain DoD’s authoritative biometric database to support the National Security Strategy.