Brainwashed - Sub-Replacement Fertility - The Second Demographic Transition

[TahoeBlue]

Originally : Brainwashed - One in five childbearing women childless (double from 1 in 10)

They trumpet their success at destroying the family unit:

http://www.foodconsumer.org/newsite/Non-food/Lifestyle/one_in_five_childbearing_women_childless_2606101047.html
One in five childbearing women childless

About 20 percent of child-bearing women choose to be childless today compared to 10 percent in the 1970s, according to a new study.

The trend was the same for all ethnic groups.  But among women with a Ph.D. or master degree, the rate of childless women has been on the decline from 31 percent in 1994 to 24 percent in 2008.

In the study, child-bearing women are those younger than 40 to 44 years.

The study was based on census data and released Friday by the Pew Researcher Center. The findings suggest some social and cultural shifts, Washington Post reports.

The shifts include better contraceptive measures and more career opportunities for women among other things.

Women today are much busier than their counterparts in the past. They are busy with their jobs, fun activities the new age can provide them like cell phone and internet etc. Many of them may not have time to raise a child.

One possible reason for some women to choose to be childless could be their fear of weight gain associated with having a baby.

Brown W.J and colleagues from the University of Queensland in Australia published a study in the Feb 2010 issue of American Journal of Preventive Medicine saying that partnered women with babies tend to gain more weight over a period of 10 years.

Brown and colleagues studied 6,458 Australian women aged 10 to 23 years in 1996 and found that women gained weight at the rate of 0.93 percent of their body weight per year or 605 grams per year.

They found that over a 10-year period, partnered women with one baby gained almost 4 kilograms. In comparison, those with one partner but no baby gained merely 1.8 kilograms over the same period.

Early studies have found more women have a child now at an older age than their counterparts in the past.

Childless women and those who give birth at an older age are at higher risk of breast cancer.

A recent study confirmed that late age at first birth was associated with increased risk of all subtypes of breast cancer - ductal, lobular, and mixed ductal-lobular breast cancers.

The study was conducted by Phipps A.I. and colleagues from Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Center and published in the June 2010 issue of Cancer Epidemiology, Biomarkers & Prevention.

By Jimmy Downs

http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1642/more-women-without-children
More Women Without Children
by Gretchen Livingston and D’Vera Cohn, Pew Research Center
June 25, 2010




http://pewresearch.org/assets/publications/1642-2.png


http://pewresearch.org/assets/publications/1642-3.png

Nearly one-in-five American women ends her childbearing years without having borne a child, compared with one-in-ten in the 1970s. While childlessness has risen for all racial and ethnic groups, and most education levels, it has fallen over the past decade for women with advanced degrees.

The most educated women still are among the most likely never to have had a child. But in a notable exception to the overall rising trend, in 2008, 24% of women ages 40-44 with a master's, doctoral or professional degree had not had children, a decline from 31% in 1994.

By race and ethnic group, white women are most likely not to have borne a child. But over the past decade, childless rates have risen more rapidly for black, Hispanic and Asian women, so the racial gap has narrowed. By marital status, women who have never married are most likely to be childless, but their rates have declined over the past decade, while the rate of childlessness has risen for the so-called ever-married -- those who are married or were at one time.

Among all women ages 40-44, the proportion that has never given birth, 18% in 2008, has grown by 80% since 1976, when it was 10%. There were 1.9 million childless women ages 40-44 in 2008, compared with nearly 580,000 in 1976.

This report is based mainly on data from the June fertility supplement of the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey. The main comparisons use combined data from 2006 and 2008 (referred to in the report as "2008") and from 1992 and 1994 (referred to as "1994"). Two years of data are combined for each time point so as to have adequate sample size for detailed analysis. This report uses the standard measure of childlessness at the end of childbearing years, which is the share of women ages 40-44 who have not borne any children.1

Attitudes and International Comparisons
Over the past few decades, public attitudes toward childlessness have become more accepting. Most adults disagree that people without children "lead empty lives," a share that rose to 59% in 2002 from 39% in 1988, according to the General Social Survey. In addition, children increasingly are seen as less central to a good marriage. In a 2007 Pew Research Center survey, 41% of adults said that children are very important for a successful marriage, a decline from 65% who said so in 1990.

As for the impact on society, attitudes are more mixed. About half the public -- 46% in a 2009 Pew Research Center poll -- say it makes no difference one way or the other that a growing share of women do not ever have children. Still, a notable share of Americans -- 38% in that 2009 survey -- say this trend is bad for society, an increase from 29% in a 2007 Pew Research survey.

Compared with other developed nations, childless rates in the United States are on par with some nations and higher than others, according to data compiled by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.

Among women born in 1960, 17% in the U.S. were childless at approximately age 40, compared with 22% in the United Kingdom, 19% in Finland and the Netherlands, and 17% in Italy and Ireland. Rates ranged from 12% to 14% for Spain, Norway, Denmark, Belgium and Sweden, and from 7% to 11% for several Eastern European countries and Iceland.

...

[hal 9000]

They have done a magnificent job at keeping the population growth of the plebes in check. Just try surfing channels on the boob tube and you will immediately see the mind pattern programming at work. Young women are invariably portrayed as aloof, independent shrews, or ambitious career driven ice queens. Not that I am saying a woman shouldn't have the right to a career if she so chooses, but there is a definite depopulation agenda going on, no doubt about it.

CIA funded depopulation/radical feminist agent Gloria Steinem proudly wears pro - abortion tee shirt -



And don't get me started on the push to turn young people into homosexuals and lesbians. That agenda is all over the media as well -


http://www.philly.com/philly/news/local/20100614_A_rainbow_of_lifestyles_at_Gay_Pride_Parade.html

excerpt

"Anne Scull said her stepson was one of the first to perform in what was once an all-girl troop at Upper Moreland High. A Temple University graduate, Craig Scull lives in Collingswood and teaches dance at two locations in South Jersey and introduced a "homorobics" class at the Camac Center in the Gayborhood, whose nexus is 13th and Locust Streets.

"Unfortunately, he came out to us late, after he endured quite a bit of teasing in high school," his father said. "And that's a shame because we could have told him he was gay long before that."

As the father of two other sons, Nicholas Scull said he could see that Craig had favored his feminine side.

"Not to stereotype, but Craig did love Cabbage Patch dolls."

If I exhibited feminine characteristics as a boy growing up, my Dad and brothers would have slapped me upside the head so that I would not grow up to be a homosexual. Articles like this are programming us to embrace the disorder known as homosexuality. All part of the eugenics population control agenda. It makes me sick.

[TahoeBlue]

http://transitions2adulthood.com/2010/06/17/recessions-effects-on-marriage-plus-new-data-on-whos-marrying-and-for-how-long/
Recession’s effects on marriage plus new data on who’s marrying and for how long
June 17, 2010 ·

A record four-in-ten births were to unmarried women in 2008, according to a Pew study, including most births to women in their early 20s. In 1990, 28% of births were to unmarried women.

The National Center for Health Statistics recently published some new data on marriage and relationships, findings that shed some light on the unmarried births.

The study focused on men and women aged 15-44 in 2002. At that time, 42% of men and 46% of women were married, and about 9% were living together in a sexual relationship. That might suggest that some of those unmarried births are to cohabiting couples.

Cohabitation is increasingly an option for young people as they delay marriage. However, there are some distinctions in who opts to live together. The more education, the less likely one is to cohabit, according to this study. Likewise, the more religious individuals are, the less likely they are to live together–with the exception of black women, for whom religion made little difference in their choice.

On the surface, marriage appears more stable than living together. More marriages were still intact five years later than were cohabitations. But, the reason for this is because cohabitation tended to end…in marriage.  Most stints of living together converted to marriage in five years–65% of those in their first cohabitation had married within five years.

Regardless of whether the union began as a live-in relationship, there were clear distinctions in marriage rates. The study found that whites were more often married, followed in order by Hispanics and non-Hispanic blacks. Among women, for example, 51% of whites  45% of Hispanics, and 26% of blacks were married. Among men, the pattern was similar, but the percentages were quite different. Forty-four percent of white men were married, lower than the marriage rates of white women at 51%. However, a greater share of black men were married than black women: 32% versus 26% of black women. (Hispanic men and women married at about the same rate–43-45%).

Hispanic men also take the prize for commitment: they were more likely than their white or black peers to still be married ten years later.

Education is perhaps the more important factor in marriage rates. Those with a BA or higher were both more likely to be married, less likely (by far) to cohabit, and their marriages lasted longer.

Is the Recession a Downer for Marriage?

Not surprisingly, more solid finances makes marriages more stable and lasting, according to the 2009 State of Our Unions report by the National Marriage Project. Therefore, the current Great Recession might be bad news for marriages. But as it turns out, it’s a little more complicated than that: As Alex Roberts says in his essay in the report, economic recessions can also deter divorce (and marriage).

Almost without exception this body of research points to one conclusion: Both marriage and divorce rates tend to fall when the economy heads south and then rise when good times return.

… The most common explanation for the tendency of recessions to inhibit family formation and dissolution is fairly simple: Marriage and divorce are, in a word, expensive.

But that’s not to say the economic stress of unemployment and other woes during a recession don’t stoke the demand for divorce. Thus, when the economy begins to recover, divorce rates often tick up.  Marriage follows suit. Because many don’t like to marry without their financial house in order, recessions tamp down marriage plans. But once the income is on the upswing, the wedding is back on.

When the U.S. unemployment rate receded between 1989 and 1991, marriages rates ticked upward. When unemployment shot back up in the early 1990’s, marriage rates fell. The prosperity of the late 1990’s corresponded to relatively high rates of marriage, and so on.

In this recession, there’s evidence that divorce rates fell with the Dow. According to Roberts’ estimates, the divorce rate fell to 16.9 per 1,000 married women
in 2008, down from 17.5 in 2007. By many accounts, that rate continued to fall in 2009.

While recessions might produce a blip on the marriage/divorce radar, all in all, they don’t alter the course in a big way. As Roberts says, a recession “might push [marriage rates] around a bit, but does not determine their general direction.”

Interestingly, the effects of the economy on marriage have lost some of their punch over the years. Roberts thinks this is because of the changing nature of marriages. Today’s marriages are more about emotional support than economic support and economic specialization. Women can earn their own way, and men can microwave their dinners if need be. Economics is not the bottom line it once was. Instead, marriages are more about finding a soulmate. Furthermore, with the rise of cohabitation, some of those who once married (perhaps on shaky grounds) are now just living together. As Roberts says:

Many of those couples that would once have delayed marriage or divorce due to an economic downturn are now cohabiting. Because these couples are not entering the ranks of the married, the impact of recessions on their relationships will not affect marriage and divorce rates.

So, bottom line? Expect to see a slight uptick in marriage and divorces once the recession lifts, but don’t expect as big a bang as there once was.

http://www.coloradoconnection.com/news/story.aspx?id=272784
Recession takes toll on marriages, but divorce rate falls
by Craig Coffey 
Posted: 03.12.2009  

COLORADO SPRINGS, COLO. -- Our country's recession might be affecting more than just your wallet. Your marriage might also be at risk during this economic turndown.

According to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, the jobless rate among married men and women has increased in the new year.

Here's the part that might surprise you. With all this financial stress, the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers reports it's seeing divorce rates fall during the recession.

One of the reasons, it actually makes more financial sense to stay married and not divide financial assets.

"We know that one of the biggest conflicts couples have between the ages of 18 to 45 is over money, and when you have an economic downturn like this it puts added stress. And if a marriage is already having conflict, it can really bring things to the boiling point," said Focus on the Family psychologist Bill Maier.

"I think it does put a stress on a relationship. Money definitely," claimed married couple Katie and Joe Moehring.

Financial stress aggravates other issues already present in relationships, so those problems, along with no communication, plus recession is a lethal combination.

"Then you get into the blaming and character assassination. Before long you have a downward spiral," warned Maier. ...

[rawiron1]

This is why I quit dating Amerikan women especially White women.  They are SO brainwashed.  To them it is all about $$$, car, $$$, house, $$$, clothes, $$$, shoes, $$$, status, $$$, etc.  Their whole idea of what a relationship is suppose to be like is garnered from the boob tube.  Their only interest in a man is for status and $$$.  Well ladies here is a newsflash for you.  Those looks that give you power eventually dry up.  And no amount of $$$ will keep you looking young forever.  One day you will wake up with no spouse, no family, no children, no grandchildren, and be gray, ugly, and wrinkled on top of it.  All your $$$ and toys will not fill the void.  Now us men on the other hand.  The older we get the more distinguished we look and the more $$$ we get.  When I am 50 I could date a 25yr old, a 50yr old, or a 70yr old.  Now let's see you try and do that.  Look at Art Bell.  At age 66 he married a 24yr old and had a kid.  Now let's see a 66yr old women pull that one on a regular basis.  The femies have brainwashed women into thinking that life is a never ending party and that women will look good until they are 100 and that $$$ will make you happy.  There are women that have bought into that lie that finally woke up and have written books and given speeches warning younger women not to buy into the lies of the femies.

That's OK, I'll stick with my Chinese girl.  To her it is about finding a man, getting married, having kids, etc.  Her whole life does not revolve around career, $$$, and the boob tube.

Jason

[hal 9000]

The femies have brainwashed women into thinking that life is a never ending party and that women will look good until they are 100 and that $$$ will make you happy.  There are women that have bought into that lie that finally woke up and have written books and given speeches warning younger women not to buy into the lies of the femies.

True words. The whole intent is to get them to not have a child at their most fertile age (18 to 28 I believe). As they get into their late thirties and forties they are less likely to conceive. That is why college age women are targeted by the feminist programming to focus on career and/or the never ending party life. It's all about keeping the "unwashed masses" from increasing their numbers. We are looked at by the top elite as cockroaches in their kitchen. I don't think that analogy is too much off the mark either.

[TahoeBlue]

What cannot be denied is the fact that the most intelligent people in the western world are NOT having children.

[TahoeBlue]

Below replacement level

Hans Johnson, a demographer at the Public Policy Institute of California, said white women in recent decades have tended to pursue higher-education degrees and stay in the workplace, leading them to have fewer children. The white population is now "below the replacement" level, Johnson said. "They're simply not replacing themselves."

http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2010/06/05/MNSG1DQ1BL.DTL
Whites in [California] state 'below the replacement' level
Justin Berton, Chronicle Staff Writer
Saturday, June 5, 2010

California's white population has declined since 2000 at an unprecedented rate, hastening the day when Hispanics will be the state's largest population group, according to newly released state figures.

There were half a million fewer whites in California in 2008 than in 2000, a period when the state's overall population grew by 4 million to 38.1 million, according to a study released Thursday by the state Department of Finance.

By 2008, whites made up 40 percent of Californians, down from 47 percent at the turn of the century. In 2000, Hispanics comprised 32 percent of the population; that number grew to 37 percent in 2008.

Analysts said the decline can be attributed to two main causes - a natural population decrease as Baby Boomers enter their later years and die at a faster rate than younger whites have children, and a migration from California since 2001 among whites who sought affordable housing as real estate costs soared.

"This is the first decade to see a year-over-year consistent population decrease due to natural causes," said Mary Heim, chief of the Finance Department's demographic research unit.

The study also confirmed projections that a steadily growing Hispanic population will surpass whites as the state's largest racial demographic in 2016. Hispanics are expected to become a majority of all Californians in 2042, Heim said.

Most Bay Area counties reflected the state's shifting numbers - Alameda County, for example, dropped from 41 percent white to 36 percent - while showing spikes in Hispanic, Asian and multirace categories.

Yet, San Francisco's racial mix remained consistent. Forty-four percent of the city was white in 2008, 30 percent was Asian and 14 percent was Hispanic, just as it was in 2000. Only the city's African American population showed a slight decline, from 7 percent to 6 percent.

Below replacement level
Hans Johnson, a demographer at the Public Policy Institute of California, said white women in recent decades have tended to pursue higher-education degrees and stay in the workplace, leading them to have fewer children. The white population is now "below the replacement" level, Johnson said. "They're simply not replacing themselves."

The median age among California's whites is 44, while the median age for the Hispanic population is 28, according to the study.

Stephen Levy, director of the Center for Continuing Study of the California Economy, said the study also reflected how skyrocketing real estate prices pushed workers from California during the housing bubble from 2005 through 2007.

"This is a good look at what happens when your housing prices get way out of line with the rest of the nation," Levy said. "It will be interesting to see what happens when the market corrects itself."

Reverse of a trend
Johnson said migration into California was a national trend until the 1990s, when the number of out-of-state transplants began to decline.

Lower-paid California workers headed to cities like Phoenix, Las Vegas and Seattle, where they could make similar wages but pay less for housing.

"California is no longer attracting large numbers of people from other states," Johnson said. "And a lot of those who did come to California from other states were white, reflecting the ethnic composition of the country as a whole.

"Now," he said, "that flow has dried up."

The decline among whites and increase in other groups in California is a long-standing trend, Johnson said.
"It's just faster now."

[Kakumei]

This is why I quit dating Amerikan women especially White women.  They are SO brainwashed.  To them it is all about $$$, car, $$$, house, $$$, clothes, $$$, shoes, $$$, status, $$$, etc.  Their whole idea of what a relationship is suppose to be like is garnered from the boob tube.  Their only interest in a man is for status and $$$.  Well ladies here is a newsflash for you.  Those looks that give you power eventually dry up.  And no amount of $$$ will keep you looking young forever.  One day you will wake up with no spouse, no family, no children, no grandchildren, and be gray, ugly, and wrinkled on top of it.  All your $$$ and toys will not fill the void.  Now us men on the other hand.  The older we get the more distinguished we look and the more $$$ we get.  When I am 50 I could date a 25yr old, a 50yr old, or a 70yr old.  Now let's see you try and do that.  Look at Art Bell.  At age 66 he married a 24yr old and had a kid.  Now let's see a 66yr old women pull that one on a regular basis.  The femies have brainwashed women into thinking that life is a never ending party and that women will look good until they are 100 and that $$$ will make you happy.  There are women that have bought into that lie that finally woke up and have written books and given speeches warning younger women not to buy into the lies of the femies.

That's OK, I'll stick with my Chinese girl.  To her it is about finding a man, getting married, having kids, etc.  Her whole life does not revolve around career, $$$, and the boob tube.

Jason

Hmm.. I happen to disagree with you, Jason. I am a white female young in age, and I happen to be none of those generalizations. So, just because you came across a few bad apples doesn't mean the rest of us are rotten, too! Although, there are quite a few of those bad apples. o.o

On topic, my body cries out to me to have children. It's a physical need sometimes. But, I'm so afraid to have a child in this type of environment anymore. I don't want them to be involuntarily vaccinated or taken away for some "Rights of the Child" bull. Ah, but I do so want one with my husband.

[freedom_commonsense]

Hmm.. I happen to disagree with you, Jason. I am a white female young in age, and I happen to be none of those generalizations. So, just because you came across a few bad apples doesn't mean the rest of us are rotten, too! Although, there are quite a few of those bad apples. o.o

On topic, my body cries out to me to have children. It's a physical need sometimes. But, I'm so afraid to have a child in this type of environment anymore. I don't want them to be involuntarily vaccinated or taken away for some "Rights of the Child" bull. Ah, but I do so want one with my husband.

Marriage law as it stands isn't particularly great, and I don't immediately see a birth outside marriage as a problem without further context (I don't support single parenthood but that's up to the people concerned). As for women's attitudes, well I'm struggling to find a "traditional" (in terms of wanting children) type on the ground here... maybe I should start up that dating site for truthers I thought about before. 

[TahoeBlue]

http://user.demogr.mpg.de/goldstein/publications/goldstein_lutz_testa.pdf
Population Research and Policy Review 2004

The emergence of sub-replacement family size ideals in Europe
JOSHUA GOLDSTEIN1, WOLFGANG LUTZ2 & MARIA RITA
TESTA2,∗
1Princeton University, NJ 08544, USA; 2Vienna Institute of Demography, Austrian Academy
of Sciences, Vienna, Austria

Abstract. Period fertility started to drop significantly below replacement in most Western European countries during the 1970s and 1980s, while most fertility surveys, value studies and opinion polls have found that the number of children considered ideal for society or for one’s own family has remained above two children per woman.

These surveys have led to the expectation that, sooner or later, period fertility would recover in Europe. The most recent data from the Eurobarometer 2001 survey, however, suggest that in the German-speaking parts of Europe the average ideal family sizes given by younger men and women have fallen as low
as 1.7 children.

This paper examines the consistency and the credibility of these new findings, which – if they are indeed indications of a new trend – may alter the current discussion about future fertility trends in Europe.

We now present the results of the 2001 Eurobarometer round. We focus on women aged 20–34 years.
...
Our main finding is that for younger cohorts ideal family size has fallen well below replacement in Austria and in both the former East and West Germany.

(Germany has consistently had the lowest ideal or desired fertility in the European Union, based on the last surveys conducted on an international scale, such as the Fertility and Family Surveys or the World Value Surveys.)

Figure 1 shows the average ideal family size by age in each of the 15 countries.
The slopes of the lines show the degree of change between younger and older generations. Looking at the younger cohorts, we see that the three German-speaking regions form their own cluster of low fertility ideals, with ideal family size averaging 1.6 in the former East Germany, and about 1.7 in both Austria and the former West Germany (the mean personal ideal family size of Germans and Austrians is statistically different from that of the other countries). No other European country in the Eurobarometer has family size ideals that average below two. In fact, ideals in other low fertility countries like Italy, Spain and Greece are all well above two children.
...
The influences of a cohort’s experience on their present fertility ideals are probably numerous. Young Austrians and Germans are not only more likely than other Europeans to have grown up in smaller families, they are more and more likely to have had friends, classmates, and cousins in smaller families as well.
...
Implications
On average, achieved fertility has always been slightly less than ideal family size in industrial countries. The unexpected obstacles of life, the coordination of couples, career surprises, health difficulties, problems with conception, all combine in a way that populations, on average, rarely have as many children as their members say they prefer. Does this mean that the achieved fertility of young German-speaking cohorts will also be less than their stated ideals? If so, we should perhaps expect further declines in cohort fertility.
...
Conclusions
In the larger debate about below-replacement fertility, childbearing intentions have been largely ignored because they have seemed to be such an unresponsive indicator of changing behaviour. Now, for the first time, we see that fertility ideals really do seem to be changing. Demographers have placed great emphasis on the importance of tempo effects, delayed childbearing, in producing low period fertility rates. The survey results we present here, however, indicate a deeper and more durable societal change, a decline in
family size ideals.

What does this imply about future fertility?

First of all, it would suggest to us that we should not be surprised if fertility declines further in Germany – or fails to increase, as Bongaarts and others have argued. Expected fertility averages 1.5 children per women among the younger cohorts in Austria and Germany. It would not surprise us if cohort fertility does not surpass these levels.

Second, low family-size ideals may create a momentum of their own, making it more difficult for pro-natalist policy makers to raise fertility levels in the future.

Finally, if the generational lag in fertility preferences is correct, this would imply that we will see falling family size ideals in other lowfertility countries, like Italy and Spain, in the decade or so ahead.

[TahoeBlue]

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0066434/quotes
Memorable quotes for THX 1138
SRT: How shall the new environment be programmed? It all happened so slowly that most men failed to realize that anything had happened at all.

They have a name for the phenomenon - SDT - Second Demographic Transition
A must read:

http://sdt.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/presentations/Unfolding_2010.pdf




The Unfolding Story of the Second Demographic Transition.
Ron Lesthaeghe
Royal Belgian Academy of Sciences.
Paper to be presented at the Conference on “Fertility in the History of the 20th Century
– Trends, Theories, Public Discourses, and Policies.”
Akademia Leopoldina & Berlin-Brandenburgische Akademie.
Januari 21-23, 2010.

Abstract.
This paper presents a narrative of the unfolding of the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) since the theory was first formulated in 1986. The first part recapitulates the foundations of the theory, and documents the spread of the SDT to the point that it now covers most European populations. Also for Europe, we focus on the relationship between the SDT and current period fertility levels. It is shown that
the positive relationship between these two is not a violation of the SDT-theory, but the outcome of a “split correlation” with different sub-narratives concerning fertility postponement and recuperation respectively for two parts of Europe.

The second part of the paper addresses the issue of whether the SDT has spread or is currently doing so in industrialized Asian countries. Evidence gathered for Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan is being presented. That evidence pertains to both the macro-level (national trends in postponement of marriage and parenthood, rise of cohabitation) and the micro-level (connections between individual
values orientations and postponement of parenthood). Strong similarities are found with SDT-patterns in Southern Europe, except for the fact that parenthood is still very rare among Asian cohabiting partners.
...
The first signs of the SDT emerge already in the 1950s: divorce rates were rising, especially in the US and Scandinavia, and the departure from a life-long commitment was justified by the logic that a “good divorce is better than a bad marriage”. Later on and from the second half of the 1960s onward, also fertility started falling from its overall “baby boom” high. Moreover, the trend with respect to ages at first marriage
was reversed again, and proportions single started rising. Soon thereafter it became evident that premarital cohabitation was on the rise and that divorce and widowhood were followed less by remarriage and more by post-marital cohabitation. By the 1980s even procreation within cohabiting unions had spread from Scandinavia to the rest of Western Europe. Both France and the UK now have more than 40 percent of
all births occurring out of wedlock. In 1960 both had 6 percent.

The notion of a second demographic transition, introduced in 1986 by Dick van de Kaa and myself in a short article in the Dutch sociology journal “Mens en Maatschappij”, has been criticized from different angles.

First, the SDT would merely be the continuation of the one and only transition (e.g. Cliquet, 1992).
Second, according to David Coleman (2003), it would not be a “second transition”, but merely a “secondary feature”. The SDT would, still according to Coleman, not even be demographic in nature, but only a “partial analysis of life style preferences”.

Third, a more common argument, particularly in the 1990s, has been that the SDT is an archtypical Western European (+ Canadian, Australian) feature which would not spread to the US nor to Southern, Central and Eastern Europe.

Instead, the demographic changes in the latter parts of Europe could be accounted for by the economic crisis associated with the transition from Communist to market economies, without involving the operation of a cultural shift at all.

In the US, solid Christian values would stem the tide and strengthen American “exceptionalism” as for instance exhibited by the absence of sub-replacement fertility.

Fifth, it was suggested that the SDT overemphasized the link between the transformation in family relationships (especially cohabitation) and the prevalence of sub-replacement fertility. Along the same path, the SDT theory could not account for the great variety of levels of fertility from barely below replacement to “lowest low”. And finally, questions inevitably arose about the universality of the SDT: could its features spread further to Asia or other continents as societies grow richer and initiate a Maslowian preference drift?

Or is the SDT merely a western idiosyncracy and bound to remain only that?

These six questions set the agenda for the present paper.
...

The SDT starts with a multifaceted revolution, and all aspects of it impact on fertility.

Firstly, there was a contraceptive revolution with the invention of the pill and the reinvention of IUDs. All of these were perfected very rapidly, and particularly hormonal contraception was suited for postponing and spacing purposes. A.J. Coale’s 1974 “learning curve” of contraception, which was monotonically increasing with age and which fitted the FDT experience so well, was no longer applicable in the West. After an interim period with increased incidence of “shotgun marriages” (often 1965-75), the use of highly efficient and reliable contraception starts at young ages and permits postponement of child-bearing as a goal in its own right.

Secondly, there was also a sexual revolution, and it was a forceful reaction to the notions that sex is confined to marriage and mainly for procreation only. The younger generations sought the value of sex for its own sake and accused the generation of their parents of hypocrisy. Ages at first sexual intercourse decline during the SDT.

Thirdly, there was the gender revolution. Women were no longer going to be subservient to men and husbands, but seize the right to regulate fertility themselves. They did no longer undergo the “fatalities of nature”, and this pressing wish for “biological autonomy” was articulated by subsequent quests for the liberalization of induced abortion. Finally, these “three revolutions” fit within the framework of an overall rejection of authority and of a complete overhaul of the normative structure. Parents, educators, churches, army and much of the entire State apparatus end up in the dock. This entire ideational reorientation, if not revolution, occurs during the peak years of economic growth, and
shapes all aspects of the SDT.

The overall outcome with respect to the SDT fertility pattern is its marked degree of postponement. Mean ages at first parenthood for women in sexual unions rise quite rapidly and to unprecedented levels in several Western European populations.

The net outcome is sub-replacement fertility: without the ethnic component (such as Hispanics and Blacks in the US or Maoris in New Zealand) all OECD countries have subreplacement fertility.
...

The SDT, on the other hand, is founded on the rise of the “higher order needs” as is defined by Maslow (1954). Once the basic material preoccupations, and particularly that of long term financial security, are satisfied via welfare state provisions, more existential and expressive needs become articulated. These are centered on selfactualization in formulating goals, individual autonomy in choosing means, and
recognition for their realization. These features emerge in a variety of domains, and this is why the SDT can be linked to such a wide variety of empirical indicators of ideational change.

In the political sphere such higher order or “post-materialist” (Inglehart, 1970) needs deal, inter alia, with the quest for more direct, grassroots democracy, openness of government, rejection of political patronage, decline of life-long loyalty to political or religious pillars (= “depillarization”), and the rise of ecological and other quality rather than quantity oriented issues on the political agenda. The downturn of it all is
rising distrust in politics and institutions and growing political anomy that can fuel right wing extremism. The state is no longer viewed in terms of a benign provider, but again more as an Orwellian “big brother”. A corollary thereof is the disengagement from civic, professional and community oriented networks (e.g. Putnam, 2000).
...
5. Can the SDT also spread to non-Western populations?
At present everyone has come to terms with the fact that the FDT is a worldwide phenomenon. Furthermore, everyone equally realizes that the FDT can take-off at just about any level of economic development, and in strictly rural as well as urban societies. But, will the SDT be equally universal? Or indeed, as David Coleman expects, remain a regional idiosyncrasy?  Obviously, if we wish to address this
question on a global scale, we can only speculate about the probabilities of such a “universal” diffusion, in the same way that one could only speculate in the 1950s and 1960s about the eventuality of pervasive fertility control emerging in the then developing countries. However, if we are looking for SDT evidence beyond the European cultural spheres but in countries that are wealthy enough to have undergone
some Maslowian drift, we may indeed find suitable testing grounds. Several industrialized and urbanized Asian countries are therefore of direct relevance.

Before considering the detailed evidence, one should be reminded of the fact that the SDT diagnosis requires the presence of several features:
(i) Sub-replacement fertility is not enough, but must be linked to postponement;
(ii) Ages at marriage must rise and reflect a growing prominence of free partner
choice and female autonomy;
(iii) Premarital cohabitation must become more common and more acceptable.
(iv) Not only evidence at the macro-level must be mustered, but also at the individual
level connections between the demographic features and values orientations must
exist.

Note, however, that the demographic characteristics of the SDT features are not necessarily occurring simultaneously, but that lags are likely to emerge. Premarital cohabitation and parenthood among cohabitors, for instance, typically constitute lagging features, since they often run counter to existing moral codes (cf. supra RWAmodel applied to US and Belgium).

...

At this point, we feel sufficiently secure about the fact that several advanced Asian populations have joined the set of SDT countries, since all characteristics except for one (procreation among cohabitants) have emerged. Moreover, the scarce Asian micro-level data for Japan, South Korea and Singapore are in line with what was repeatedly found in the European examples.

Admittedly it will remain difficult to make a neat separation between the effects of structural factors and ideational ones respectively on marriage postponement and low fertility. But that has never been easy, not even in the case of the FDT, in the first instance because these sets of factors are often causally interconnected. Furthermore, one should also realize that mass media are producing a “world culture” in which individual autonomy and self-actualization have a very prominent, if not dominant place, and that these provide both motivations and justifications for the onset of the SDT.

Political, religious and ideological backlashes are of course always possible (e.g. both Christian and Muslim fundamentalist reactions), but at least up till now the experience has been that such reactions have not been strong enough to cause decisive trend reversals in countries with democratic credentials.

[PullMyFinger]

Hmm.. I happen to disagree with you, Jason. I am a white female young in age, and I happen to be none of those generalizations. So, just because you came across a few bad apples doesn't mean the rest of us are rotten, too! Although, there are quite a few of those bad apples. o.o

On topic, my body cries out to me to have children. It's a physical need sometimes. But, I'm so afraid to have a child in this type of environment anymore. I don't want them to be involuntarily vaccinated or taken away for some "Rights of the Child" bull. Ah, but I do so want one with my husband.

I have never been a part of those generalizations either.Makes you're heart kinda break because I see many young men make the same genneralizations.I am older though so that might be why.
Is your husband of a like mind with you?If so, maybe a serious discussion on your fears of having a child and options to make sure your child(ren) will have the upbringing you want for them would help.

[TahoeBlue]

Now that I'm looking - I keep finding them....
http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0066434/quotes
OMM: Let us be thankful we have commerce. Buy more. Buy more now. Buy. And be happy.

http://www.popcouncil.org/who/history.asp

In 1952, the world was awakening to the rapid growth in population that was occurring around the globe. Impressed by the complexities of population issues, convinced of their fundamental significance for human well-being, and undeterred by the sensitivity then associated with birth control, John D. Rockefeller 3rd convened a group of scientists to discuss the implications of the dramatic demographic change. They met in Williamsburg, Virginia, under the auspices of the National Academy of Sciences, and after two and a half days agreed on the need for a new institution that could provide solid science to guide governments and individuals in addressing population questions.

According to Rockefeller, the reason to care about population was "to improve the quality of people's lives, to help make it possible for individuals everywhere to develop their full potential." That vision has motivated the Population Council throughout its 56-year history, even though the circumstances facing the world have changed substantially.

No country has transitioned back to replacement-level fertility (for any five-year period) once falling below it.

Both the current prevalence of low fertility and its persistence are unprecedented (see Frejka & Ross 2001, Population Reference Bureau 2004, Stark & Kohler 2002).

Note that Wilson (2004) has estimated that more than half of the world's population now lives in countries with sub-replacement fertility. Further,

note that only 3% of the world's population now lives in countries that have not begun fertility decline (Morgan 2003),

and that past research suggests that once a fertility transition has begun, it does not stop until birth rates of 2 or below have been achieved (Bongaarts & Bulatao 2000, Bongaarts & Watkins 1996).

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2849172/

Low Fertility at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century
S. Philip Morgan1 and Miles G. Taylor2
1Department of Sociology, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina 27708
2Carolina Population Center, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, North Carolina
S. Philip Morgan: [email protected]; Miles G. Taylor: [email protected]

Abstract

In the past few decades, demographic concerns have shifted from rapid population growth fueled by high fertility to concerns of population decline produced by very low, sub-replacement fertility levels.

Once considered a problem unique to Europe or developed nations, concerns now center on the global spread of low fertility. Nearly half of the world's population now lives in countries with fertility at or below replacement levels.

Further, by the mid-twenty-first century three of four countries now described as developing are projected to reach or slip below replacement fertility. We review the research on low fertility through the predominant frameworks and theories used to explain it. These explanations range from decomposition and proximate determinant frameworks to grand theories on the fundamental causes underlying the pervasiveness and spread of low fertility. We focus on the ability of theory to situate previous and future findings and conclude with directions for furthur research.

...

What We Know
The elaborate description captured in the decompositions and frameworks above outlines what we know. We extract from these frameworks a set of low fertility axioms.6

Fertility postponement lowers current period measures of fertility relative to cohort measures or to period measures not adjusted for these timing shifts. Thus, timing shifts, which are time-limited phenomena,7 are a significant part of contemporary low fertility.

Fertility timing (the age at which women have children) may have consequences for the number of children that individual women will bear. Specifically, in the aggregate, fertility postponed implies some fertility foregone.

Women's (men's and couple's) fertility histories unfold in tandem and in interaction with human capital formation, mental and physical health trajectories, and other key aspects of their life course and that of their partners. The life course perspective is the unquestioned, appropriate analytic frame for contextualizing fertility intentions and behavior.

Parents incur high direct and indirect costs in having and rearing children in most contemporary contexts. Indirect costs are substantial and reflect primarily the mother's foregone earnings due to pregnancy, childbirth, and childrearing (see DiPrete et al. 2003). Direct costs are also substantial and are more easily and regularly calculated (see Lino 2004).

Dominant norms and cultural schemas legitimate active birth control (i.e., it is widely accepted that the quantum and timing of children impact individual and family well-being and that strategizing and acting on this belief is legitimate).

Low parity births (especially the first and having a sibling for the first child) remain strongly normative and fulfill women's/couples' desire to be parents and have a family. Ideal and intended family sizes of young women are usually two, with three being the second most popular choice. Childlessness and one-child families are not seen as ideal and are not commonly intended (see Bongaarts 2001, Hagewen & Morgan 2005).8

High parity births are increasingly rare and non-normative; given the other axioms discussed and especially the high costs of children (see axiom 4 above), high parity births may be viewed as disadvantageous for parents, siblings, and society more generally.
...
This new schema is consistent with Giddens's (1991) description of the deinstitutionalized modern life course. The choices to have children and when become ones that women/couples make as they construct stimulating and meaningful lives. Caring for children remains important but in a context in which the decision to have children is optional and parenthood should contribute to individual self-actualization.

Note that this reflexive or postmodern cultural schema is consistent with the behavioral components of the second demographic transition: fertility delay, decisions to forego childbearing, cohabitation, union instability, etc.

This emphasis on changed cultural schema does not deny structural changes, including economic globalization. But the fundamental change, according to van de Kaa and Lesthaeghe, was a shift in the dominant interpretative frame through which these changes were viewed.

Van de Kaa's and Lesthaeghe's argument was developed to account for pervasive changes that occurred in the West, so the initial implied scope of their argument is limited.

However, low fertility is not just a Western phenomenon, as we have noted. Thornton (2005) argues that a powerful cultural frame or schema, developmental idealism, conflates Western wealth and power with Western family forms and Western cultural forms.

Thus, these ideas have power by association, and Western conceptions of the family follow or precede economic globalization. These sets of ideas can have powerful effects on individuals. Combining the arguments of van de Kaa, Lesthaeghe, and Thornton, one can imagine shifts in cultural schema that could help explain patterns of low fertility on a global scale.
...
A key area of technological change involves contraceptive technology and infertility treatments. These technologies play a secondary role in many explanations of fertility change. But they can be seen as playing a fundamental role. An extreme example is Potts's (1997, p. 5) sweeping evolutionary argument: He claims that humans have a set of biological predispositions that, in our hunting and gathering past, would have jointly produced high reproductive fitness (i.e., above replacement-level fertility). He claims that humans are genetically predisposed to seek sexual relations, to love and support our own children once they are born, and to be socially and sexually competitive. In the absence of contraception and abortion, these predispositions assure that babies are born, that they are cared for after birth, and that the most able (in terms of accumulating wealth and status) will have the most surviving offspring.

In contrast, in contemporary contexts the link between sex and reproduction can be severed by contraception and abortion, which are key technological/social innovations. Potts argues that evolution has provided us with no gene for a certain number of children.

Once the link between sex and reproduction is broken, what will provide the motivation for children? From this perspective, effective contraception plays a key role in fertility decline and sub-replacement fertility.
...
We challenge claims that fertility researchers “really don't know why fertility fell from high levels (6–8 children per woman) to two children” or that we “really don't understand the postwar baby boom and bust” or that “we don't really know why very low fertility exists in some societies and why fertility levels approximate replacement elsewhere.”

In fact, at certain levels of abstraction (at the level of decomposition and the proximate determinants), we have frameworks to answer all these questions, and we can provide the specific details that make the explanations compelling (e.g., see Hobcraft & Kiernan 1995, pp. 23–27; Cherlin 1992, pp. 31–65). Much of what critics mean when they say we don't understand is probably unknowable—both now and in the future—because the answers they seek imply a level of determinism that does not exist.

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http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/completingfertility/4RevisedBASUpaper.PDF
ON THE PROSPECTS FOR ENDLESS FERTILITY DECLINE IN SOUTH ASIA
Alaka Malwade Basu*

In the demographic literature, the semantics of fertility decline have led to some interesting
confusion. In particular, confusion has been caused by the tendency to use interchangeably the terms
“global fertility decline” and “global convergence in fertility”. But the two are not the same thing at all.

While it is true that it now appears that the whole world has embarked on a process of fertility decline, it does not follow from this that the whole world is headed to exactly the same eventual fertility levels or that all societies do/will reach eventual low fertility by the same means. There is sufficient variation even
within the countries currently in “post-transition” to belie this conclusion.

Two empirical findings have probably contributed to this confusion between ‘global decline’ and
‘global convergence’. First, there is now enough evidence that non-academic populations have never
heard of something called ‘replacement level fertility” and thus do not take this into consideration in
planning their fertility at the family level.

In country after country in the industrialized world, fertility declines have plummeted well below the replacement mark and thrown much planning based on past population projections out of gear. Population projectors of the past have by now received plenty of criticism for treating replacement level fertility as some kind of sacrosanct end point in the fertility transition. By now, it is well accepted that the magical total fertility rate (TFR) of around 2.1 is little more than a convenient analytical device. With this recognition, population projections of recent times have been boldly assuming eventual fertility levels that would laugh at the forecasters of population doom of the last century.

Having discarded the logic of replacement level fertility as a plausible end-point in the fertility
transition for the developed world, it naturally followed that there was nothing sacrosanct about this end
point for the developing world either. This intuition has been strengthened by the second empirical
finding in recent years. This finding is that the process of fertility decline is much better explained by
theories of diffusion (which are essentially theories of copycat behavior) than by theories built around
structural factors that affect the costs and benefits of childbearing.

The great range of conditions under which fertility has begun to fall all over the developing world, and the most potent correlates of such decline – education, exposure to the mass media, exposure to the ideologies (rather than the material trappings) of modernization – strongly suggests that the urge to control fertility and to have fewer children than one’s parents comes largely from wanting to do what others do.

But do diffusion theories of fertility decline and the irrelevance of the concept of replacement
fertility really imply that eventual stable fertility levels will be globally similar? Do the structural and
cultural circumstances of individual societies not have any power to decide on the finer details of fertility
change? My own feeling is that this might be the case “eventually”, if “eventually” is defined lengthily
enough; but that in the relative short-term of a few decades, even as many as five decades, perhaps
geographical and cultural variation will temper the move to global convergence.
...
What lessons do these non-marriage rates suggest for South Asia? The variations in this measure
in the low fertility world suggest that there is little reason to expect non-marriage to become common in
all parts of the developing world too. Even within South Asia, can one anticipate a similar “retreat from
marriage” (Becker, 1981)? If this did occur, it would lead to a decline in TFRs faster than that anticipated
merely by looking at changes in marital fertility.
...
All the evidence suggests that once childlessness is removed, TFRs of around 2 continue to be
common; that is, the majority of women who bear one child go on to bear a second one, even in subreplacement fertility societies, it is the proportion of third order births that has continued to fall steadily.
...
But if childlessness represents a deliberate choice (as is also possible in a world of increasing
sensitivity to what may be called a child-unfriendly world – that is, women may choose not to reproduce
as often for their unborn children’s sakes as for their own convenience), then one needs to make some
educated guesses about the rise of voluntary childlessness in the developing world. And one’s guess
based on the cultural imperatives in most of the developed world is that voluntary childlessness is
unlikely to become the defining feature of any significant sub-group of the developing world of today, at
least over the next several decades.
...
THE ‘SPEED’ OF FERTILITY DECLINE

It is worth noting that even if fertility decline has been smooth and linear in the developed countries and in those developing countries which have begun a fertility transition, it need not remain to be smooth all the way to below replacement or even replacement levels.
...
India comes particularly to mind. There is some indication that while survey respondents in India are perfectly willing to not have 4-5 children as child mortality falls and contraceptive services become easily available, they are not willing to do this endlessly. In particular, they are not willing to forego the one (and preferably two) sons that they see as essential for economic, spiritual and social salvation.

[TahoeBlue]

Ok so how about Mexico and Latin America? Well they are not immune to the SDT globalization effect either. And Mexico's EM-migration of the working age male's has reduced the countries fertility rate

http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1094/is_3_43/ai_n29477450/
Economic implications of Mexico's sudden demographic transition: the next 20 years offer particular risks and opportunities
by Fernando Sedano | July, 2008

Mexico is in the midst of an unprecedented demographic transition that is changing the size and age structure of its population. The most salient demographic change--and clearly the precursor of most other demographic changes--is the abrupt decline in the country's fertility rate from 6.5 in the early 1970s to the current 2.2 mark, one of the fastest declines in the world.

This dramatic reduction of fertility rates has created a "boom generation" that is currently in its prime working years and that will gradually age and retire. As Mexico experiences sub-replacement fertility rates over the next decades, old-age dependency ratios will escalate to unprecedented levels, carrying significant economic implications, both in Mexico and in the United States. After reviewing the economic literature on the link between demographics and economics, this paper attempts to shed some light on the relationship between Mexico's demographics patterns and economic development since 1950, offering possible explanations for the apparent lack of an expected connection. The paper then discusses the implications of Mexico's demographic projections on both sides of the border.
...

Of particular importance is the fact that the fertility decline seen in Mexico is one of the fastest in the world. In fact, the plummeting of the country's fertility rate from 6.5 in 1970 to 2.2 at present in much more drastic than the world's average decline from 4.5 to 2.5 during the same time frame. Over the next decades, Mexico will face sub-replacement fertility rates--patterns of childbearing that, holding all other factors constant, will result in an indefinite population decline--which will lead to a gradual aging of the population. Indeed, estimates from the United Nations Population Division (UNPD) suggest that Mexico could face population declines by as early as 2030.
...
The consequences of Mexico's demographic transition extend well beyond its own economy. Given the central role that Mexico is playing in the current U.S. immigration debate, a full understanding of the complex population dynamics south of the border is necessary for meaningful and valuable policy recommendations.
...
In additional to the typical explanation for declining fertility rates and the emergence of a demographic transition, there are two Mexican-specific developments that have likely exacerbated the magnitude of the country's demographic change. One key factor is the General Population Law (Ley General de Poblacion) of 1974, which was the government's attempt to reduce fertility rates by subsidizing the use of contraceptives, implementing education programs, and through advertisement.

The second major development--and probably the most significant--that has reduced Mexican fertility rates is the separation of a large number of families due to the massive emigration of working-age male Mexicans to the United States. Aydemir and Borjas (2007) estimated that Mexico has experienced a 14.6 percent reduction in the size of its potential male workforce between 1980 and 2000, a process that has remained unabated since then.
...

http://www.profam.org/pub/fia/fia_1504.htm
World Population in the 21st Century: Last One Out Turn Off the Lights?   
By Nicholas Eberstadt
 ...
The Longevity Explosion

To estimate population trends, it is necessary first to understand the forces that in turn generated the explosive acceleration, the peak, and the decline in world population growth during this century.

The population explosion was entirely the result of health improvements and the expansion of life expectancy. Between 1900 and 2000, life expectancy at birth at least doubled–from something like 30 years to 63 years. Indeed, all other things being equal, that health explosion would have resulted in an even greater growth of human numbers than has actually been witnessed. Rough calculations suggest that the world’s population would be over fifty percent larger today if our century’s recorded revolution in longevity had unfolded in the absence of other demographic changes.

Secular Fertility Decline

The world’s population currently totals about six billion rather than nine billion because fertility patterns were also changing over the century. Of all the diverse changes in fertility trends registered over the past hundred years, the most significant has been "secular fertility decline"–that is to say, sustained and progressive reductions in family size due to deliberate birth control.

In historic terms, this trend is a very new phenomenon: it apparently had not occurred in any human society until about two centuries ago. France, where the trend began by the early 19th century, was the first country to experience the sustained decline. Since that beginning, the decline has spread steadily, if unevenly, across the planet, embracing an ever rising fraction of the global population and depressing voluntary childbearing in the affected societies to successive record lows.

A milestone in the process was passed during the era between the World Wars. Fertility rates in industrialized countries during peacetime dropped below the "net replacement" level–below the level necessary for long-term population stability.

The inter-war fertility dips proved to be temporary, neither sufficiently prolonged nor sufficiently deep to bring on actual population decline. In the last quarter-century, however, sub-replacement fertility has come back with a vengeance, slipping to levels previously unimaginable in prosperous societies at peace. Sub-replacement fertility has now been experienced over a generation or more in a growing number of countries, and it has come amazingly close to becoming the norm the world over. Indeed, almost half of the world’s population lives in societies that aren’t having enough babies to sustain their numbers.

In the early 1950s, the planet-wide "total fertility rate"–the average number of children per woman per lifetime–is thought to have stood at about five.

For the year 2001, the global TFR will likely be below 2.8. That dramatic reduction in four decades has already curbed the relative and absolute pace of world population growth, in spite of increasing life expectancy. Even more dramatic changes–changes never contemplated by Malthusians–lie ahead.

The past generation demonstrated that it is possible for fertility levels to fall with startling speed, even in low-income societies. While we now know that countrywide fertility levels can plunge well below replacement and remain there for decade after decade, we do not yet know how low they can go. It is entirely possible that, contrary even to quite recent expectations, sub-replacement fertility will soon typify the world as a whole. Were that to occur, the 21st century could turn out to be a time in which world population peaked and thereafter diminished.

The population has fallen before–in the 14th century, for example. Those earlier reductions, however, were the consequence of catastrophes: bubonic plague decimated societies across Asia, Europe, and North Africa between 1333 and 1355. The 21st-century population implosion, by contrast, would take place under conditions of steadily improving life expectancy and living standards.

Even so, such a depopulation would confront the world with its own socioeconomic challenges–quite possibly formidable ones. Though negative population growth is not yet imagined to be a problem, we must now recognize that it is possible that this, rather than Malthusian overpopulation, will emerge as the great demographic issue of the coming century.

[TahoeBlue]

Related:

http://www.usasurvival.org/ck061903.shtml
Hillary Clinton’s Global Agenda - By Cliff Kincaid

...

In the same way that Mrs. Clinton promoted a federal takeover of the health care system, her promotion of feminism and “children’s rights” serves to promote government control of family life and the raising of children. Mrs. Clinton, whose book, It Takes a Village, promotes less parental involvement with children,  shares Abzug’s belief in a national network of federally-financed day-care centers where professional bureaucrats and “educators” take control of the lives of the young.

It is significant that Mrs. Clinton, in a speech to a U.N. conference on population issues, also spoke favorably of Margaret Sanger, the founder of Planned Parenthood, for her  “family planning” work.  [55] Although Sanger has been portrayed as a fighter for women’s rights, she abandoned her family while her marriage was collapsing in order to push the birth control cause. Sanger was a Socialist and a racist,  having made brazen pronouncements in favor of population control programs targeting blacks and other minorities as “human weeds.” A central focus of her work was getting the U.S. Government to endorse and promote her work.

The clear intention of the birth control movement from the start was not to give individuals the right to make decisions, in the privacy of their own bedrooms, but rather to empower government to regulate and control human beings.

The radical feminists do not support family planning but family control. The real purpose of so-called “reproductive rights” is to control the size of families. When the feminists talk about “educating” young women about their rights, the aim is to made sure that they choose contraception, abortion or sterilization, and avoid motherhood. Another popular U.N. phrase, “improving women’s status,” is another way of saying that women will be less likely to have children if they are forced into the career world. 

Under the Clinton Administration, the U.S. funded Mrs. Clinton’s pet project, UNIFEM, whose main goal was described as the  “integration of women into the national economies of their countries.” This is another way of saying that women shouldn’t be home having and raising children.

Global Fertilty rates

[TahoeBlue]

Reference Materials:


From the First to the Second Demographic Transition:
An Interpretation of the Spatial Continuity of Demographic Innovation in France,
Belgium and Switzerland.

The questions

Much of the debate on the topic of the second demographic transition concentrates on the issue whether there are two sufficiently distinct development phases worthy of a separate numbering, or whether the second one is merely a further unfolding of the first (e.g. Cliquet, 1992). Also in the original article that used the notion of a second transition (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986), there were doubts, and the article title “Two demographic transitions?” contained a question mark. The authors noted that there was no clear cesure in time between the two transitions, and writing in the middle of the 1980s, they worried about the distinction between period-induced effects and longer term pattern development (ibidem:15). The latter worry can now be abandoned: the demographic developments of the early 1980s in Western Europe were not just a response to the 1976-86 economic depression, but they continued their progression
throughout the 1990s as well.

Yet, the question regarding the degree of distinctness of the two transitions remains a salient one. In the second section of this paper we shall elaborate this issue by drawing up a checklist of contrasting trends in nuptiality and fertility, and by linking these to the underlying societal changes, both of a structural and of a cultural nature.

...

During the FDT the Malthusian marriage pattern weakens, mainly as a consequence of the growth of wage earning labour.2 This trend continues all the way till the early 1960s, and it was only interrupted during periods of crises (wars, 1930s depression)...Both Church and State considered these customs as immoral and not in line with ordered and well-behaved family life. Roughly from the end of the 19th
century onward, illegitimacy declines in these areas, and this trend speeds up during the 20th. In many cases, but not all, these earlier pockets of high cohabitation and/or illegitimacy had completely disappeared by the 1950s.
...
Roughly from the end of the 19th century onward, illegitimacy declines in these areas, and this trend speeds
up during the 20th. In many cases, but not all, these earlier pockets of high cohabitation and/or illegitimacy had completely disappeared by the 1950s.

The SDT, then, is characterised by exactly the opposite trend, and the new rise in both cohabitation and out-of-wedlock fertility constitutes a "revenge of history" in a double sense. Firstly, these practices have largely been restored in many areas where they had survived during the 19th century, and secondly, they tend to spread from such areas to others that had no such  historical precedents.
...
new societal developments as well, such as a second secularisation wave, the rise of "post-materialist"
values and the increase in female economic autonomy. In short, the FDT and the SDT are characterised by opposite trends in mean ages at marriage, cohabitation and illegitimacy.

SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION

The first or “classic” demographic transition refers to the historical declines in mortality and fertility, as witnessed from the 18th Century onward in several European populations, and continuing at present in most developing countries.

The end point of the first demographic transition (FDT) was supposed to be an older stationary and stable population corresponding with replacement fertility (i.e. just over 2 children on average), zero population growth, and life expectancies higher that 70 years. As there would be an ultimate balance between deaths and births, there would be no “demographic” need for sustained immigration. Moreover, households in all parts of the world would converge toward the nuclear and conjugal types, composed of married couples and their offspring.

The second demographic transition (SDT), on the other hand, sees no such equilibrium as the end-point. Rather, new developments bring sustained sub-replacement fertility, a multitude of living arrangements other than marriage, the disconnection between marriage and procreation, and no stationary population.

Instead, populations would face declining sizes if not complemented by new migrants (i.e. “replacement migration”), and they will also be much older than envisaged by the FDT as a result of lower fertility and additional gains in longevity. Migration streams will not be capable of stemming aging, but only stabilize population sizes. Nonetheless, the outcome is still the further growth of “multicultural societies.”

On the whole, the SDT brings new social challenges, including those associated with further aging, integration of immigrants and other cultures, less stability of households, and high levels of poverty or exclusion among certain household types (e.g. single persons of all ages, lone mothers).

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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science_and_environment/10578484.stm

Global population study launched by Royal Society -  12 July 2010
"The world's population has risen from two billion in 1930 to 6.8 billion now, with nine billion projected by 2050"
"The Royal Society's study is launched on World Population Day (July 11 ), and is expected to conclude in early 2012."

Amazing - thanks for that find. - There is NO POPULATION EXPLOSION - There is an LONGEVITY EXPLOSION.  

see:
Brainwashed - SDT - The Second Demographic Transition - One in five childbearing women childless (double from 1 in 10)

Almost everywhere that the fertility rate is over 2-3 (like Africa) there is war, famine and AIDS , wherever "Globalization" /IMF/WHO tread the fertility rate falls. Mexico's fertility rate has dropped from 6 to 2.5 and is in "freefall" .
If there is a "pandemic" that takes out the people over age 50 - that will take out 1-2 Billion people.
Current projections are that the population is already leveling and won't go over 8 billion.

"Of particular importance is the fact that the fertility decline seen in Mexico is one of the fastest in the world. In fact, the plummeting of the country's fertility rate from 6.5 in 1970 to 2.2 at present in much more drastic than the world's average decline from 4.5 to 2.5 during the same time frame. Over the next decades, Mexico will face sub-replacement fertility rates--patterns of childbearing that, holding all other factors constant, will result in an indefinite population decline--which will lead to a gradual aging of the population. Indeed, estimates from the United Nations Population Division (UNPD) suggest that Mexico could face population declines by as early as 2030. "

"For the year 2001, the global TFR will likely be below 2.8. That dramatic reduction in four decades has already curbed the relative and absolute pace of world population growth, in spite of increasing life expectancy. Even more dramatic changes–changes never contemplated by Malthusians–lie ahead."

" The population has fallen before–in the 14th century, for example. Those earlier reductions, however, were the consequence of catastrophes: bubonic plague decimated societies across Asia, Europe, and North Africa between 1333 and 1355. The 21st-century population implosion, by contrast, would take place under conditions of steadily improving life expectancy and living standards.

Even so, such a depopulation would confront the world with its own socioeconomic challenges–quite possibly formidable ones. Though negative population growth is not yet imagined to be a problem, we must now recognize that it is possible that this, rather than Malthusian overpopulation, will emerge as the great demographic issue of the coming century"  

http://www.infowars.com/uns-world-population-day-2010-beijing-announces-measures-to-stop-unauthorized-births/
UN’s World Population Day 2010: Beijing Announces Measures to Stop “Unauthorized Births”  
Jurriaan Maessen
Infowars.com
July 12, 2010

Via news outlet the Global Times, the Chinese State laments the “issue of unauthorized births” in light of the UN’s stated goal of “efficient population control.”

The UN’s World population Day, July 11, was originally set up in 1989 by the Governing Council of the United Nations Development Programma to “raise awareness of global population issues.”

“The theme of this year’s 21st World Population Day”, mentions the article, “is “Everyone Counts”, and the activities in China will focus on the 2010 population census and emphasize the right to life.”

“In China”, the article goes on to say, “the issue of unauthorized births is at the forefront of its efforts to control the growth of its population as it undermines the country’s family planning policy, or “one-child policy”, which was implemented in 1980.”

“According to Chinese statistics, the national population reached 1.3 billion at the end of 2008, with 6.7 million born that year. Unauthorized births accounted for a large percentage of those births.”

“Since the family planning policy was implemented, local governments strictly controlled the births of each family, and allowed each couple to have one child, but with a more flexible policy in China’s ethnic minority areas. However, not all couples obeyed the rules (…).”

Besides the horrible “obeyed the rules”, the bone chilling term “unauthorized births” is used several times in the article to describe families exceeding their allowance of babies they decide to put on this earth. As we know, having more than one baby provokes direct interference from the Chinese State, which can tax, fine, threaten and even terminate the new life considered by the all-powerful state to be a burden on the environment.

Unauthorized births. Besides the obvious linguistic horror of the term- the language of tyrants- it’s hard to escape the linkage to “World Population Day” instituted by the United Nations. This year’s theme? Again: “Everyone Counts”, if you can believe it. This is Orwellian doublespeak of the first order, meant to make you think the UN cares, but which really means: every child is one too many. The UN itself explains:

“Counting everyone is an integral part of ensuring that we take everyone into account.”

Speaking of Orwell, another striking similarity with a 1984-type scenario is the principle of people readily spying for the state and ratting each-other out. The article mentions the existence of a “household contract responsibility system”- created nationwide to make sure the population control policies would be strictly carried out. Such a slave-state is exactly what the UN envisions for their desired world government. Although the UN itself tempers the tongue when it comes to their stated goal of reducing the world’s population, the Chinese authorities know exactly what goals the UN expects them to pursue:

“It (the UN) also aims to stress the importance of efficient population control by means of collecting and analyzing the latest data so as to make an impact on decision-making and improve people’s lives.”

The statement, written for World Population Day by the Secretary-General of the UN, goes as follows:

“On this World Population Day, I call on decision-makers everywhere to make each and every person count. Only by considering the needs of all women and men,girls and boys,can we achieve the Millennium Development Goals and advance the shared values of the United Nations.”

These shared values were described in detail by UN’s Agenda 21:

“(…) a profound reorientation of all human society, unlike anything the world has ever experienced: a major shift in the priorities of both governments and individuals and an unprecedented redeployment of human and financial resources. This shift will demand that a concern for the environmental consequences of every human action be integrated into individual and collective decision-making at every level.”

[TahoeBlue]

Notice from NIH.Gov:

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC124271/pdf/pq1102007524.pdf
Contributed by Inder M. Verma, April 5, 2002
...
Worldwide, up to 20% of couples are infertile.

Approximately 30–50% of human infertility is attributable to male infertility,

70–90% of which arises from disrupted or impaired spermatogenesis with a clinical outcome of azoo- or oligospermia

http://www.infertile.com/newtech/preface.htm

THE INFERTILITY EPIDEMIC

Twenty-five percent of couples in their thirties are infertile. Only 1 percent of teenagers are. There is a worldwide, emotionally wrenching epidemic of infertility, making it our nation's number one public health problem. Even in a country like India with severe overpopulation, the most common reason for a visit to the doctor is infertility. From our teen years (when the last thing we really want is a child) to our mid-thirties when we finally feel emotionally and financially secure enough to start our family, there is a twenty-five fold decline in our ability to get pregnant
...
Further analysis of these statistics, however, shows that age is not the only factor. In 1965, 18.4 percent of couples in their thirties were infertile, whereas in 1982, this figure had jumped to 24.6 percent. In younger, less infertile groups ages twenty to twenty-four, in 1965, only 3.6 percent were infertile; and in 3 1982, 10.5 percent were infertile.

So we are no longer in a position of just speculating that there is an infertility problem which is on the rise. Hard, cold statistics show that nearly a quarter of the population that is trying to start a family cannot do so without medical help. A major contribution is the putting off of childbearing until later years, but this alone does not completely explain the increase in infertility because it is on the rise in younger people as well.

http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2009/07/reproductive_roulette.html
...
Reproductive health in the United States is headed in the wrong direction on a host of indicators. Fertility problems, miscarriages, preterm births, and birth defects are all up. These trends are not simply the result of women postponing motherhood. In fact, women under 25 and women between 25 and 34 reported an increasing number of fertility problems over the last several decades. Nor are reproductive health problems limited to women. Average sperm count appears to be steadily declining, and there are rising rates of male genital birth defects such as hypospadias, a condition in which the urethra does not develop properly.
...
As reproductive health has declined, chemical production has increased dramatically. the number of chemicals registered for commercial use now stands at 80,000—a 30 percent increase since 1979. Americans are exposed to these chemicals in a variety of ways, including through industrial releases, contaminated food, household products and cosmetics, and workplaces where chemicals are used. Tests of blood and urine confirm rising and widespread exposure to a chemical soup of metals, pesticides, plasticizers, and other substances, many of which are dangerous to reproductive health. Young children are often exposed to significantly higher levels of these chemicals than adults

[freedom_commonsense]

Well, looks like those vaccines, tainted food and water, TV-led leisure routines and pollution really have screwed the populace eh?

[TahoeBlue]

Well, looks like those vaccines, tainted food and water, TV-led leisure routines and pollution really have screwed the populace eh?

Yes, It's a war on all fronts. Even more alarming with SDT is the de-coupling of man's/woman's biological drive to have and raise families. So they will not even "feel" bad that they cannot have a family.

They have so disrupted the natural human social development that a generation or more people do not have any idea what a family unit is like and had such bad childhoods that they do not only do not look forward to family life , they do not know "how" to conduct family life. It has been implanted in the consciousness that "FAMILY BAD" .

Self -Actualization as a state of perpetual infantilism.  A Peter Pan Neverland 'Never grow up' state

My advice: Encourage your children to marry and have their families early in life.  

[freedom_commonsense]

My advice: Encourage your children to marry and have their families early in life.  

Unfortunately the closest I got to being a father was about 3 years ago and I'm now single again. Like you say, people don't want to enter into long-term relationships\settle down\have children. They've pretty much been programmed to be short-sighted idiots who want instant gratification and surface imagery\features. It's almost at the point where there's no room for the oft-quoted "ladies and gentlemen" (which is more a figure of speech now than a reality). 

[TahoeBlue]

http://www.cnn.com/2010/LIVING/08/19/single.in.america/index.html?eref=rss_us&utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+rss%2Fcnn_us+%28RSS%3A+U.S.%29

Single? You're not aloneBy Linda Petty, CNN
August 20, 2010 12:18 p.m. EDT

(CNN) -- There are 96 million people in the United States who have no spouse. That means 43 percent of all Americans over the age of 18 are single, according to the U.S. Census Bureau.
...
Of the singletons, 61 percent of them have never said "I do." Twenty-four percent are divorced and 15 percent are widowed.

An increasing number of these single Americans -- more than 31 million -- are living alone, according to the census. They make up 27 percent of all households, up from 17 percent in 1970
...
More than half of the unmarried Americans are women. And for every 100 single women, there are 88 unmarried men available

[freedom_commonsense]

Maybe I should try going over to the states  they can't all be bad. Shame about the nazi immigration and airport security though...

[TahoeBlue]

Pew is watching the SDT.... Notice the "New family" definition...

http://pewresearch.org/pubs/1802/decline-marriage-rise-new-families

The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families
November 18, 2010

The transformative trends of the past 50 years that have led to a sharp decline in marriage and a rise of new family forms have been shaped by attitudes and behaviors that differ by class, age and race, according to a new Pew Research Center nationwide survey, conducted in association with TIME magazine, and complemented by an analysis of demographic and economic data from the U.S. Census Bureau.

A new "marriage gap" in the United States is increasingly aligned with a growing income gap.

...

The survey also finds striking differences by generation. In 1960, two-thirds (68%) of all twenty-somethings were married. In 2008, just 26% were.
...
The Impact on Children
The share of births to unmarried women has risen dramatically over the past half century, from 5% in 1960 to 41% in 2008. There are notable differences by race: Among black women giving birth in 2008, 72% were unmarried. This compares with 53% of Hispanic women giving birth and 29% of white women. Overall, the share of children raised by a single parent is not as high as the share born to an unwed mother, but it too has risen sharply -- to 25% in 2008, up from 9% in 1960. The public believes children of single parents face more challenges than other children -- 38% say "a lot more" challenges and another 40% say "a few more" challenges






http://pewsocialtrends.org/2010/11/18/the-decline-of-marriage-and-rise-of-new-families/2/

[Geolibertarian]

Excellent thread.

Bookmarked for later.

[TahoeBlue]

http://hosted.ap.org/dynamic/stories/E/EU_POPE_CROATIA?SITE=AP&SECTION=HOME&TEMPLATE=DEFAULT&CTIME=2011-06-05-06-29-42
Pope denounces 'disintegration' of Europe families  -  Jun 5, 2011

ZAGREB, Croatia (AP) -- Pope Benedict XVI wrapped up his visit to Croatia on Sunday by denouncing the "disintegration" of family life in Europe and calling for couples to make a commitment to marry and have children, not just live together.
...
It was Benedict's first visit as pope to Croatia, an overwhelmingly Catholic Balkan nation that is poised to soon join the European Union. The Vatican has strongly supported its bid, eager to see another country with shared values join the 27-member bloc and help Benedict's project of rekindling Europe's sense of its Christian heritage.

Yet while Croatia is nearly 90 percent Catholic, it allows some legal rights for same-sex couples and, thanks to leftover communist-era legislation, permits abortion up to 10 weeks after conception and thereafter with the consent of a special commission of doctors. Elsewhere in Europe, including in Italy, marriages are on the decline as more and more people choose to just live together.

In his homily, Benedict lamented the "increasing disintegration of the family, especially in Europe" and urged young couples to resist "that secularized mentality which proposes living together as a preparation, or even a substitute for marriage."

[TahoeBlue]

http://sdt.psc.isr.umich.edu/
Project
This project examines the Second Demographic Transition (SDT) in the U.S. Regional patterns and trends are documented for key indicators of the SDT, including marriage and fertility postponement and rising cohabitation rates. This project also looks at correlates with ideational changes, in particular in politics and religion.

http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/abs.html?ID=4052
The "Second Demographic Transition" in the U.S.: Spatial Patterns and Correlates
Publication Abstract
Lesthaeghe, Ron J., and Lisa Neidert. 2006. "The "Second Demographic Transition" in the U.S.: Spatial Patterns and Correlates." PSC Research Report No. 06-592. March 2006.

This paper examines the spatial patterns and correlates of fertility among non-Hispanic white women in the United States. While the United States is often discussed as an exception to the below-replacement-fertility patterns of Europe, our analysis documents that marriage and fertility postponement and premarital cohabitation in the US are following the same trends as in western Europe. In fact, several Northeastern states in the US show age-specific fertility trends that are in line with the Netherlands, which has the latest age schedule of fertility in Europe.

The United States is well on its way to a second demographic transition (SDT) with rising ages at marriage, growing rates of cohabitation, increases in single person households, declining remarriage rates, a trend towards fertility postponement, and higher rates of childlessness.

However, just as in Europe, major regional leads and lags in patterns of reproduction and political values are present in the United States. The states in the Northeastern US as well as those on the west coast and along the Great Lakes, exhibit family formation and fertility patterns that are very similar to those of Europe, while much of the South, the Great Plains, and some Mountain states, exhibit traditional patterns of fertility based on early marriage and childbearing, and high teen and non-marital fertility.

The same states that score high on the SDT factor are also the “blue” states of the last few political elections.

The second demographic transition is clearly correlated with religious and political dimensions. After controlling for structural, ethnic, and religious factors, we find that the SDT patterning is co-responsible for the political divide and election results in the US.

http://www.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/pdf/rr06-592.pdf

...

The SDT- Bush Connection
On occasion demographers have been quite successful in predicting election results, although their preoccupation goes in the opposite direction: linking demographic outcomes to cultural and political indicators. Examples are the strong relations between voting for secular parties and the speed of the fertility decline during the first demographic transition (e.g. Lesthaeghe and Wilson, 1986) or the prediction of the regional outcomes in the Italian divorce referendum of the 1970s on the basis of the
timing of the same historical fertility transition 40 years earlier (Livi Bacci, 1977). But the very strong negative correlation found here between the SDT dimension (i.e. factor 1 in Table 2) and the percentage votes for G.W. Bush is to our knowledge one of the highest spatial correlations between demographic and voting behavior on record.
...

Conclusions
In a very recent article on the website of the Family Research Council (Dec. 14, 2005), Allan C. Carlson argues that, in comparison to the rest of the industrialized world, the US pattern of family formation and fertility is unique mainly because of its maintenance of fertility at replacement level. This would not be due to the contribution of ethnic minorities, black or Hispanic, but to white fertility itself. This, in its turn, is caused by the fact that the US retained religious ethics to a much higher degree than the rest of the
industrialized world. In other words, according to Carlson, there is an “American Exceptionalism”, which is furthermore rooted in the ideology of the nation’s founding fathers, and could possibly be the cause of the US political and economic, not to mention military, supremacy today (Carlson, 2005: 8-10).

Is there “American Exceptionalism” among the non-Hispanic white population? If judging solely on the basis of TFRs, the answer is negative since only 4 states with small populations have fertility levels above replacement.

But if we take a more balanced view based on multiple indicators, the answer is a double one.

Yes, there is an “American Exceptionalism” among a considerable section of the population. That section is mainly located in the mid-west, the great plains and the south. It is much more rural than metropolitan, lower educated, adheres to Evangelical Christianity, and tends to have high teenage fertility (also whites !), and more divorce.

And “No” there is no or little “American Exceptionalism” in the remainder of the US, mainly residing along the northern Atlantic, the Pacific, the great lakes and the less religious west (Arizona, Colorado). This is America where the SDT features such as lower and later fertility and tolerance for cohabitation have been emerging in very much the same way as in western Europe and Canada (see Juby and Le Bourdais, 2005, for recent Canadian figures). This is the America with higher education and higher incomes, more concentrated in metropolitan areas, with high abortion figures but also much lower teenage fertility.

Hence, the bottom line of this investigation is that the picture in the US would be described much better by the term “American Duality” than by “American Exceptionalism.” The strong correlation between this demographic duality and the current political one is just a striking illustration of this point.

[TahoeBlue]

Exactly - There was the FDT - "First Demographic Transition" already in motion from 1880's-1945

This is not new - I researched and explained this in Brainwashed - SDT - The Second Demographic Transition - One in five childbearing women childless (double from 1 in 10)

They have a name for the phenomenon -  SDT - Second Demographic Transition
http://sdt.psc.isr.umich.edu/pubs/presentations/Unfolding_2010.pdf

Population Research and Policy Review 2004
The emergence of sub-replacement family size ideals in Europe
http://user.demogr.mpg.de/goldstein/publications/goldstein_lutz_testa.pdf

SECOND DEMOGRAPHIC TRANSITION
http://dmo.econ.msu.ru/teaching/L2/TrDemo/final_textSDTBasilBlackwellEncyclop.pdf



The SDT, on the other hand, is founded on the rise of the “higher order needs” as is defined by Maslow (1954). Once the basic material preoccupations, and particularly that of long term financial security, are satisfied via welfare state provisions, more existential and expressive needs become articulated.

These are centered on selfactualization in formulating goals, individual autonomy in choosing means, and recognition for their realization. T

hese features emerge in a variety of domains, and this is why the SDT can be linked to such a wide variety of empirical indicators of ideational change.

Global Bastardization:



Notice that Greece had the lowest - Who is broke now?

[TahoeBlue]

http://apnews.myway.com/article/20110623/D9O1HG5G0.html
Census shows whites lose US majority among babies
Jun 23, 2011 - 6:40 AM (ET)
By HOPE YEN

WASHINGTON (AP) - For the first time, minorities make up a majority of babies in the U.S., part of a sweeping race change and growing age divide between mostly white, older Americans and predominantly minority youths that could reshape government policies.
...
Demographers say the numbers provide the clearest confirmation yet of a changing social order, one in which racial and ethnic minorities will become the U.S. majority by midcentury.
...
We're moving toward an acknowledgment that we're living in a different world than the 1950s, where married or two-parent heterosexual couples are now no longer the norm for a lot of kids, especially kids of color," said Laura Speer, coordinator of the Kids Count project for the Baltimore-based Annie E. Casey Foundation.
...
Currently, non-Hispanic whites make up just under half of all children 3 years old, which is the youngest age group shown in the Census Bureau's October 2009 annual survey, its most recent. In 1990, more than 60 percent of children in that age group were white.
...
Among African-Americans, U.S. households headed by women - mostly single mothers but also adult women living with siblings or elderly parents - represented roughly 30 percent of all African-American households, compared with the 28 percent share of married-couple African-American households. It was the first time the number of female-headed households surpassed those of married couples among any race group, according to census records reviewed by Frey dating back to 1950.

[TahoeBlue]

http://www.demogr.mpg.de/Papers/workshops/010623_paper19.pdf
Paper presented at the EURESCO Conference “The second demographic transition in Europe”, Bad Herrenalb, Germany, 23-28 June 2001 - SECOND DRAFT, July 2001

Do you believe in the second demographic transition?

Fifteen years since Ron Lesthaeghe and Dirk van de Kaa first presented their notion of the second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe and van de Kaa, 1986), this concept remains both attractive and controversial. Though many demographers now commonly use the term ‘second demographic transition’ as a label, description and even explanation of various population trends in many European countries, there are only few researchers outside Europe, who have started to use this term.

And even in Europe, if you would ask the question “Are European populations undergoing second demographic transition?”, many demographers would provide negative answer, using various arguments why they do not
subscribe to this concept (see for instance Cliquet, 1991). However, you could find yourself terribly confused if you would continue asking those giving positive answer in a following way:

“What are the most important features of the second demographic transition?”.

At this moment, you could discover that there are many different “second demographic transitions” and each of the persons addressed is emphasising different changes and various underlying mechanisms.


Maslow  - Human Needs Pyramid

http://www.ced.uab.es/butlleti/num49_files/Lesthaeghe3.pdf
2010 - Revisiting the SDT 25 years later :Some questions (and partial answers too …)

1.Revisiting the sources.
2.The spread of SDT : way beyond “a provincial northwestern European idiosyncracy” (D.Coleman’s quote).
3.SDT and Fertility : tempo-quantum interaction, or the simple question of differential catching up.
4.Former Communist countries after ’89 : just crisis-led ?
5.An Asian SDT in the making ?
6.Conclusions + expectations.

SDT
•LATER MARRIAGE
•RISE COHABITATION, RISE SINGLE LIVING
•RISE DIVORCE
•LOW REMARRIAGE
•FERTILITY POSTPONEMENT
•EFFICIENT CONTRACEPTION
•RISING EXTRA-MARITAL FERTILITY
•HIGHER CHILDLESSNESS
...

Conclusions and expectations :

1.SDT clearly spread beyond northwestern Europe and their overseas counterparts (Canada, Australia, New Zealand, USA) to Mediterranean countries, all the formerly Communist ones, and even to the Far East.

2. New contexts obviously translate into greater pattern heterogeneity, as was plainly evident during the First DT

3. The motor of the SDT –the Maslowian mechanism –is a universal one, and the global development of the SDT in the 21st Century is therefore likely to broadly follow the increases in both GDP AND the spread of democracy [ or really spread of NWO ? ] .

[TahoeBlue]

Shock of Gray

http://www.cbc.ca/books/2010/12/shock-of-grey-ted-fishman-on-our-rapidly-aging-population.html
Shock of Grey: Ted Fishman on our rapidly aging population
On December 17, 2010 11:06 AM

We are all getting older. Today, a baby boy in Canada can expect to live to age 80, almost twice the life expectancy of 47 in 1900. By 2005, the fastest growing segment of the U.S. population will be people over the age of 85. And in China, the number of people over the age of 60 will double between 2005 and 2015 from 100 to 200 million.

This rapidly aging global population has often been referred to as something we will have to deal with in the future. But according to the writer of a new book, that future is now.

Shock of Grey, the latest book from China, Inc. author Ted Fishman, argues that those long-anticipated social fractures are already here, and their political, economic and social effects on our future should be given the same importance as global warming and peak oil.

"The big thing that concerns me," Fishman said to Q host Jian Ghomeshi in a recent interview, "is that people aren't prepared for how the relationships in their life will change. And it's very hard to think of an important relationship that all of us have that won't be changed."

True, life expectancy has increased dramatically, but that's not the only factor behind the graying of our population. At the same time as populations are aging, birthrates have steadily declined, whether due to individual choice or government policy, as in China.

As a result, the world is more frequently encountering something that Fishman calls the 4 - 2 -1 problem — four grandparents produce two parents who produce one child. It's a situation that puts enormous pressures on that one child, who faces the prospect of supporting six adults.

It's not surprising, then, that a large percentage of those parents and grandparents are staying in the workforce much longer. After all, they're confronting the very real possibility of outliving their savings. This creates a type of generational conflict. Young people just entering the workforce are competing with older boomers whose pension or savings make it possible for them to work for the same competitive wages.

http://www.amazon.com/Shock-Gray-Population-Against-Company/dp/1416551026
Shock of Gray: The Aging of the World's Population and How it Pits Young Against Old, Child Against Parent, Worker Against Boss, Company Against Rival, and Nation Against Nation [Hardcover]
Ted C. Fishman

Armageddon looms thanks to increasing longevity, according to this fretful jeremiad. Fishman (China, Inc.) visits a number of locales--luxury retirement communities in Sarasota, Fla.; the rust-belt city of Rockford, Ill.; a village in Spain; Beijing--and everywhere finds a skyrocketing population over 65 with attendant problems: soaring medical costs, overwhelmed caretakers and government pension systems, and oldsters who feel sad and neglected. Fishman weaves these findings with all manner of demographic, economic, and cultural discontents, including plummeting birth rates, environmental degradation, underpaid immigrants, American industrial decline, globalization, and outlandish teen fashions. Unfortunately, conflating all this under the rubric of aging's "shockwave" obscures more than it reveals; while focusing on an unsolvable existential predicament--you can't keep people from aging--Fishman avoids investigating solutions to specific problems he raises, which are mainly issues of trade, industrial policy, and economic inequality, not necessarily longevity.

http://www.booktv.org/Program/12648/Shock+of+Gray.aspx

Ted Fishman appeared at the Chicago Tribune Printers Row Lit Fest to talk about his book,

"Shock of Gray: The Aging of the World's Population and How It Pits Young Against Old, Child Against Parent, Worker Against Boss, Company Against Rival, and Nation Against Nation."  

In conversation with Jerome McDonnell, host of WBEZ's "Worldview."

http://www.aspenenvironment.org/speakers/bio/12/402/ted-fishman

Watch video highlights of the 2011 Aspen Environment Forum!

Ted Fishman Author and Speaker
Ted C. Fishman is a veteran journalist and essayist.

His latest book, Shock of Gray, The Aging of the World’s Population and How it Pits Young Against Old, Child Against Parent, Worker Against Boss, Company Against Rival, and Nation Against Nation looks at how the aging of the world propels globalization, redefines nearly every important relationship we have and changes life for everyone young and old.  Shock of Gray is rich in stories and analysis on what an aging world means for us all.  

Fishman is also author of the international bestseller, China, Inc. His writing appears in many of the world's most prominent journals. He also appears frequently on national and international news and public affairs programs.  As a speaker, Ted addresses audiences around the world.

YouTube - How old is the world's population? Ted Fishman guides us towards a SHOCK OF GRAY

YouTube - Global Graying Experts Part 1—Inside E Street

[g1rlg0ne]

Wonderful, informative thread. Thanks.

[TahoeBlue]

It is interesting they announce Seven Billion population on Oct 31 2011 - Halloween - spooky.

Just remember - it's a longevity explosion - not a population explosion

There is a population implosion on the way they are NOT talking about...

Population Control Zealots Going Nuts Over 7 Billion People

NWO acting like 7 billion is a scary number when planet can hold 7 trillion

[TahoeBlue]

Million's are just not dying fast enough to satisfy the bastards...

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/11/us-imf-aging-idUSBRE83A1C020120411
Cost of aging rising faster than expected: IMF
By Stella Dawson
WASHINGTON | Wed Apr 11, 2012


(Reuters) - People worldwide are living three years longer than expected on average, pushing up the costs of aging by 50 percent, and governments and pension funds are ill prepared, the International Monetary Fund said.
 
Already the cost of caring for aging baby boomers is beginning to strain government budgets, particularly in advanced economies where by 2050 the elderly will match the numbers of workers almost one for one.

The IMF study shows that the problem is global and that longevity is a bigger risk than thought.

"If everyone in 2050 lived just three years longer than now expected, in line with the average underestimation of longevity in the past, society would need extra resources equal to 1 to 2 percent of GDP per year," it said in a study to be released in its World Economic Outlook next week.
...

[TahoeBlue]

found a good web page....

http://www.thebyteshow.com/ChrisGerner.html

De-Population Terrorists
http://www.thebyteshow.com/UN_SimulationMap2.jpg

http://www.thebyteshow.com/PDF/NWO_Convention_On_BioDiversity1992.pdf
NWO Convention On BioDiversity 1992.pdf

http://www.thebyteshow.com/PDF/WorldPopulationPlan_UN_Document.pdf
World Population Plan U.N. Document.pdf

http://www.thebyteshow.com/PDF/GlobalPopulation_NSSM2000_Part2.pdf
Global Population NSSM2000 Part2.pdf

http://www.thebyteshow.com/PDF/Ford_Scowcroft_NSD_Memo_314.pdf
Ford Scowcroft NSD Memo 314. pdf

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http://www.thebyteshow.com/PDF/GlobalPopulation_NSSM2000_Part2.pdf

NSSM 200 - PART TWO
...
Thus, at this point we cannot know with certainty when world population can feasibly be
stabilized, nor can we state with assurance the limits of the world's ecological "carrying capability".
But we can be certain of the desirable direction of change and can state as a plausible objective
the target of achieving replacement fertility rates by the year 2000.
...
II. B. Functional Assistance Programs to Create Conditions for Fertility Decline
...
Thus, to assist in achieving LDC fertility reduction, not only should family planning be high up on
the priority list for U.S. foreign assistance, but high priority in allocation of funds should be given
to programs in other sectors that contribute in a cost-effective manner in reduction in population
growth.

There is a growing, but still quite small, body of research to determine the socio-economic aspects
of development that most directly and powerfully affect fertility. Although the limited analysis to
date cannot be considered definitive, there is general agreement that the five following factors (in
addition to increases in per capita income) tend to be strongly associated with fertility declines:

education, especially the education of women;
reductions in infant mortality;
wage employment opportunities for women;
social security and other substitutes for the economic value of children;
and relative equality in income distribution and rural development.

There are a number of other factors identified from research, historical analysis, and experimentation that also affect fertility,
including delaying the average age of marriage, and direct payments (financial incentive) to family planning acceptors.

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Bump - Talked about on AJ's show today

Bill Maher

Bill Maher Believes in NWO Population Control Real Time with Bill Maher New Rules: 6/24/11

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http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/01/world_population_may_actually_start_declining_not_exploding.2.html
About That Overpopulation Problem
Research suggests we may actually face a declining world population in the coming years.
By Jeff Wise|Posted Wednesday, Jan. 9, 2013
...
The way things are going, Western Europe as a whole will most likely shrink from 460 million to just 350 million by the end of the century. That’s not so bad compared with Russia and China, each of whose populations could fall by half. As you may not be surprised to learn, the Germans have coined a polysyllabic word for this quandary: Schrumpf-Gessellschaft, or “shrinking society.”
...

Moreover, the poor, highly fertile countries that once churned out immigrants by the boatload are now experiencing birthrate declines of their own.

From 1960 to 2009, Mexico’s fertility rate tumbled from 7.3 live births per woman to 2.4, India’s dropped from six to 2.5, and Brazil’s fell from 6.15 to 1.9.

Even in sub-Saharan Africa, where the average birthrate remains a relatively blistering 4.66, fertility is projected to fall below replacement level by the 2070s. This change in developing countries will affect not only the U.S. population, of course, but eventually the world’s.

Why is this happening? Scientists who study population dynamics point to a phenomenon called “demographic transition.”

“For hundreds of thousands of years,” explains Warren Sanderson, a professor of economics at Stony Brook University, “in order for humanity to survive things like epidemics and wars and famine, birthrates had to be very high.” Eventually, thanks to technology, death rates started to fall in Europe and in North America, and the population size soared. In time, though, birthrates fell as well, and the population leveled out.

The same pattern has repeated in countries around the world. Demographic transition, Sanderson says, “is a shift between two very different long-run states: from high death rates and high birthrates to low death rates and low birthrates.” Not only is the pattern well-documented, it’s well under way:

Already, more than half the world’s population is reproducing at below the replacement rate.

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http://www.allgov.com/news/top-stories/us-birth-and-abortion-rates-plunge-to-record-lows-121202?news=846360
U.S. Birth and Abortion Rates Plunge to Record Lows
Sunday, December 02, 2012

The U.S. birth rate (measured as the annual number of births per 1,000 women ages of 15 to 44) in 2011 was 63.2, the lowest level since reliable records were established in 1920.
 
The Pew Research Center said the birth rate overall declined 8% from 2007 to 2010, during which time the nation struggled through the Great Recession. The rate dropped even more for foreign-born women (14%) and female Mexican immigrants (23%).
 
Not only did the birth rate drop significantly, but so did the abortion rate, according to new data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.
 
Between 2008 and 2009, the rate at which women aborted pregnancies fell 5%, bringing the rate down to an all-time low. Along with the abortion rate going down, the abortion ratio, which measures the number of pregnancies terminated for every 1,000 live births, declined 2%.

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http://www.telegraph.co.uk/earth/earthnews/9815862/Humans-are-plague-on-Earth-Attenborough.html
David Attenborough - Humans are plague on Earth
By Louise Gray, Environment Correspondent
12:01AM GMT 22 Jan 2013

Humans are a plague on the Earth that need to be controlled by limiting population growth, according to Sir David Attenborough.

The television presenter said that humans are threatening their own existence and that of other species by using up the world’s resources.

He said the only way to save the planet from famine and species extinction is to limit human population growth.

“We are a plague on the Earth. It’s coming home to roost over the next 50 years or so. It’s not just climate change; it’s sheer space, places to grow food for this enormous horde. Either we limit our population growth or the natural world will do it for us, and the natural world is doing it for us right now,” he told the Radio Times.

Sir David, who is a patron of the Optimum Population Trust, has spoken out before about the “frightening explosion in human numbers” and the need for investment in sex education and other voluntary means of limiting population in developing countries
...

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/David_Attenborough
Sir David Frederick Attenborough (pron.: /ˈætənbərə/) OM, CH, CVO, CBE, FRS, FZS, FSA (born 8 May 1926[1]) is a British broadcaster and naturalist.
...
BBC administration
 
Attenborough became the controller of BBC Two in March 1965, but had a clause inserted in his contract that would allow him to continue making programmes on an occasional basis. Later the same year, he filmed elephants in Tanzania, and in 1969, he made a three-part series on the cultural history of the Indonesian island of Bali. For the 1971 film A Blank on the Map, he joined the first Western expedition to a remote highland valley in New Guinea to seek out a lost tribe.
...
In 1969, Attenborough was promoted to director of programmes, making him responsible for the output of both BBC channels. His tasks, which included agreeing budgets, attending board meetings and firing staff, were now far removed from the business of filming programmes. When Attenborough's name was being suggested as a candidate for the position of Director General of the BBC in 1972, he phoned his brother Richard to confess that he had no appetite for the job. Early the following year, he left his post to return to full-time programme-making, leaving him free to write and present the planned natural history epic.
...

Styles and honours
 
David Attenborough, CBE (1974–1983)
 David Attenborough, CBE, FRS (1983–1985)
 Sir David Attenborough, CBE, FRS (1985–1991)
 Sir David Attenborough, CVO, CBE, FRS (1991–1996)
 Sir David Attenborough, CH, CVO, CBE, FRS (1996–2005)
 Sir David Attenborough, OM, CH, CVO, CBE, FRS (2005–)
 
Awards
 1970: BAFTA Desmond Davis Award
 1974: Commander of the Order of the British Empire (CBE)
 1980: BAFTA Fellowship
 1983: Fellow of the Royal Society (FRS)
 1985: Knighthood[50]
 1991: Commander of the Royal Victorian Order (CVO) for producing Queen Elizabeth II's Christmas broadcast for a number of years from 1986
 1991: Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences[51]
 1996: Companion of Honour (CH) for services to nature broadcasting
 1998: International Cosmos Prize
 2003: Michael Faraday Prize awarded by the Royal Society
 2004: Descartes Prize for Outstanding Science Communication Actions
 2004: Caird Medal of the National Maritime Museum
 2005: Order of Merit (OM)[52]
 2005: Nierenberg Prize for Science in the Public Interest
 2006: National Television Awards Special Recognition Award
 2006: Institute of Ecology and Environmental Management[53] - Institute Medal in recognition of his outstanding contribution to the public perception and understanding of ecology
 2006: The Culture Show British Icon Award
 2007: British Naturalists' Association Peter Scott Memorial Award
 2009: Prince of Asturias Award[54]
 2010: Fonseca Prize
 2010: Queensland Museum Medal[55]
 2011: Society for the History of Natural History Founders' Medal
 2012: IUCN Phillips Memorial Medal for outstanding service in international conservation[56]
 Date unknown: RSPB Medal[57]