Author Topic: NWO to execute CYBER FALSE FLAGS for Trump's MANUFACTURED CRISIS Presidency  (Read 12052 times)

0 Members and 1 Guest are viewing this topic.


  • Guest
WTF is this?:

Committee Membership Information

Project Title:    Forecasting Future Disruptive Technologies

PIN:                 AFSB-J-07-02-A       

Major Unit:       Division on Engineering and Physical Sciences

Sub Unit:        Air Force Studies Board

RSO:               Talmage, Daniel

Subject/Focus Area:     Computers and Information Technology; Engineering and Technology; National Security and Defense; Science: Past and Future

Committee Membership
Date Posted:   07/29/2008

Mr. Gilman G. Louie - (Chair)
Alsop Louie Partners

Gilman Louie (Chair)is a partner of Alsop Louie Partners a venture capital company. Mr Louie is a former president and CEO of In-Q-Tel, the venture capital group helping to deliver new technologies to the CIA and Intelligence Community. Before helping found In-Q-Tel, Louie served as Hasbro Interactive's chief creative officer and as general manager of the group, where he was responsible for creating and implementing the business plan for Hasbro’s Internet games site. Prior to joining Hasbro, he served as chief executive of the Nexa Corporation, Sphere, Inc., Spectrum HoloByte, Inc.

As a pioneer in the interactive entertainment industry, Gilman’s successes have included the Falcon, F-16 flight simulator, and Tetris which he brought over from the Soviet Union. Louie has served on the board of directors of Wizards of the Coast, Total Entertainment Network, Direct Language, and FASA Interactive. He is an active member of the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security and the Information Age, and a member of the board of New

Dr. Prithwish Basu
BBN Technologies

Prithwish Basu is a Scientist in the Network Research group at BBN in Cambridge, Massachusetts. He is the innovations lead at BBN on the DARPA DTN project and a lead researcher on the CTA and ITA projects funded by the Army Research Lab. His current research interests include theoretical as well as practical aspects of disruption tolerant networking; energy efficient MAC, routing and synchronization in wireless ad hoc and sensor networks; and robot networking. He is also exploring the use of biological metaphors for developing new networking algorithms. Prithwish received a BTech degree in Computer Science and Engineering from IIT Delhi (India), and MS (1999) and PhD (2003) degrees in Computer Engineering from Boston University.

Prithwish has co-authored several conference and journal articles, and two invited book chapters, and has two patents pending. He was recently named on MIT Technology Review's list of "Top Innovators under 35" in 2006. Prithwish is a member of the IEEE and the ACM, and Sigma Xi, and has served/is serving on technical program committees and organizing committees of several networking conferences. He is currently the TPC co-chair for BodyNets 2007 and a TPC member for ACM CHANTS 2007. Dr. Basu is nominated because he is a futurist with expertise in communications and networking, in particular wireless and sensor networking.

Mr. Harry Blount
Lehman Brothers

Harry Blount is CEO, and President of Blount Ventures, a company he founded in February 2008. He currently serves on the National Academy of Science Committee on Forecasting Future Disruptive Technology. Mr. Blount spent 21 years on Wall Street where he was a leading analyst in multiple consumer and enterprise technology disciplines including: internet, wireless, PCs, servers, storage, hard drives, telecommunications, IT distribution, as well as environmental services and convertible securities. Prior to founding Blount Ventures, Mr. Blount worked at a variety of firms including: Lehman Brothers; Credit Suisse First Boston; Donaldson Lufkin & Jenrette; and CIBC Oppenheimer.

Mr. Blount was named to the Institutional Investor All-American analyst teams in 2006 in Information Technology Hardware and in 2000 and 2001 for Internet Infrastructure Services. In 2002, Mr. Blount received his third Wall Street Journal award for stock picking in the Computer Hardware sector. From 2002 to 2006 (while at Lehman Brothers), Mr. Blount served as an outside advisor to Nokia Innovent, a Nokia Ventures Organization company. Innovent evaluated emerging digital home and data center technologies and business models including dynamic mesh networks, peer-to-peer computing, and intelligent agents.

He has spoken at numerous events including: World Economic Forum IT track, JIEDDO task force (a DoD initiative on Consumer Electronics), the Carlyle Group Global Partners meeting, Storage Visions, IDEMA (the Hard Disk Drive Industry Association), the Digital Home Developers Conference, and internal leadership events at Sun Microsystems, Hewlett Packard, and Seagate among others. He has frequently appeared on CNBC and Bloomberg and has been quoted in numerous publications including the Wall Street Journal, Barrons, Forbes, Fortune, and Business Week.

Mr. Blount is a Chartered Financial Analyst. He earned a bachelor’s degree in finance from the University of Wisconsin – La Crosse in 1986. While in school, Mr. Blount worked in the information technology department of G. Heileman Brewing Company. Mr. Blount was selected to the committee because he is a futurist with expertise in electronics, enterprise and consumer technology convergence, internet infrastructure, and networking.

Dr. Ruth A. David
ANSER (Analytic Services Inc.)

Ruth David (NAE) is the president and chief executive officer of ANSER, an independent, not-for-profit, public service research institution that provides research and analytic support on national and transnational issues. In November 1999, Dr. David initiated Analytic Services’ Homeland Defense Strategic Thrust to address the growing national concern of multidimensional, asymmetric threats from rogue nations, substate terrorist groups, and domestic terrorists.

In May 2001, the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security was established to enhance public awareness and education and contribute to the dialog on the national, state, and local levels. In April 2004, the corporation was selected by the Department of Homeland Security to establish and operate a new federally funded research and development center, the Homeland Security Institute. From September 1995 to September 1998, Dr. David was Deputy Director for Science and Technology at the Central Intelligence Agency.

As Technical Advisor to the Director of Central Intelligence, she was responsible for research, development, and deployment of technologies in support of all phases of the intelligence process. She represented the CIA on numerous national committees and advisory bodies, including the National Science and Technology Council and the Committee on National Security. Upon her departure from this position, she was awarded the CIA's Distinguished Intelligence Medal, the CIA Director's Award, the Director of NSA Distinguished Service Medal, the National Reconnaissance Officer's Award for Distinguished Service, and the Defense Intelligence Director's Award.

Previously, Dr. David served in several leadership positions at the Sandia National Laboratories, where she began her professional career in 1975. Most recently, she was Director of Advanced Information Technologies. From 1991 to 1994, Dr. David was Director of the Development Testing Center that developed and operated a broad spectrum of full-scale engineering test facilities. Dr. David has also been an adjunct professor at the University of New Mexico. She has technical experience in digital and microprocessor-based system design, digital signal analysis, adaptive signal analysis, and system integration.

Dr. David is a member of the Department of Homeland Security Advisory Council, the National Academy of Engineering (NAE), and the Corporation for the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory, Inc. She is Chair of the National Research Council (NRC) Committee on Technology Insight-Gauge, Evaluate, and Review and Vice Chair of the HSAC Senior Advisory Committee of Academia and Policy Research. She also serves on the National Security Agency Advisory Board, the Department of Commerce Deemed Export Advisory Committee, the NRC Committee on Scientific Communication and National Security, the NRC Committee on Information for Terrorism Prevention,, the Jet Propulsion Laboratory's Technical Division's Advisory Board, the National Advisory Committee for the Wichita State University Foundation, and is a Director of the Hertz Foundation.

Dr. David previously served on the President's Homeland Security Advisory Council, the NRC Naval Studies Board, the AAAS Committee on Scientific Freedom and Responsibility, the Defense Science Board, the Department of Energy Nonproliferation and National Security Advisory Committee, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Technical Advisory Group and the Securities and Exchange Commission Technical Advisory Group. Dr. David is an Associate Fellow of AIAA, a Class Director for the AFCEA International Board of Directors, and a member of Tau Beta Pi Engineering Honor Society and Eta Kappa Nu Electrical Engineering Society.

Dr. David received a B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering from Wichita State University (1975), an M.S. degree in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University (1976), and a Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from Stanford University (1981). Dr. David frequently provides speeches, interviews, lectures, briefings, and articles on the many facets of homeland security. She is the coauthor of three books on Signal Processing Algorithms and has authored or coauthored numerous papers. Dr. David is nominated for her expertise in military weapons systems, electronics, sensors, and non-lethal weapons.

Dr. Michelle Gelfand
University of Maryland, College Park

Michele Gelfand is professor of Organizational psychology at University of Maryland, College Park. Her research interests include cross-cultural social/organizational psychology; cultural influences on conflict, negotiation, justice, revenge, and leadership; discrimination and sexual harassment; and theory and method in assessing aspects of culture (individualism-collectivism; cultural tightness-looseness).

She received her PhD from University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign in 1996, and has been published in many top journals including Academy of Management Review, Academy of Management Journal, Journal of Applied Psychology, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. She also recently published an Annual Review of Psychology chapter on cross-cultural OB with Miriam Erez and Zeynep Aycan. Dr. Gelfand is nominated because of her expertise in cross cultural communications.

Dr. Jennie S. Hwang
H-Technologies Group, Inc.

Jennie S. Hwang (NAE) is President and CEO of H-Technologies and has had a wide-ranging career encompasses international collaboration, corporate and entrepreneurial businesses, research management, innovative research and product development, technology transfer, bringing innovations to commercialization, global leadership positions, as well as corporate and university governance. Her work is highlighted by numerous national and international awards and honors, as well as distinguished Alumni Awards. Hwang is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and inducted into Women in Technology International Hall of Fame, and named the R&D-Stars-to-Watch.

Citations by the U.S. Congressional Certificates of recognition, Honorary Doctoral degree, YWCA Women Achievement Award, Ohio Women Hall of Fame are among other honors and awards. Her formal education includes a Ph.D. in Materials Science & Engineering, two M.S. degrees in Chemistry and Liquid Crystal Science, respectively, a bachelor's in Chemistry, and Harvard Business School Executive Program. In her 30-year career, she has built new businesses in the Corporate America having held senior executive positions with Lockheed Martin Corp., SCM Corp., Sherwin Williams Co. (1976-1990) and co-founded entrepreneurial businesses (1991-present). Currently, her company provides business, technology and manufacturing solutions to the global industry.

She is internationally recognized as a pioneer and long-standing leader in the fast-moving infrastructure development of electronics miniaturization and environment-friendly manufacturing. She is also an invited distinguished adj. professor of the Engineering School of Case Western Reserve University. She is the author of 300 publications including several books. Dr. Hwang is nominated because of her expertise in nanotechnology, military weapons systems development, coatings and materials, electronics, cross cultural communications, global competitiveness, global market economy, manufacturing infrastructure, and electronics industry forecast.

Dr. Anthony K. Hyder
University of Notre Dame

Anthony Hyder is associate vice president for graduate studies and research and professor of physics at the University of Notre Dame. Dr. Hyder’s research is in the interaction of spacecraft with the space environment. His recent work has focused on the design of spacecraft systems, especially the electrical power and thermal management subsystems, and on the operation of high sensitivity ir sensors aboard spacecraft. He has continued work also in the physics of high-brightness particle accelerators.

He has been appointed to a number of national and international panels and advisory boards including the NATO Sensors panel, the Defense Intelligence Agency Scientific Advisory Board, the Advisory Board for the Missile Defense Agency, and the Army Science Board. Dr. Hyder is a graduate of Notre Dame with a B.S. in Physics. He holds an M.S. in Space Physics and a Ph.D. in Nuclear Physics from the Air Force Institute of Technology. He received the Air Force Institute of Technology (AFIT) Distinguished Alumnus title in 2005. Dr. Hyder is nominated for his expertise in military weapons systems development, electronics, sensors, non-lethal weapons, WMD, space systems, and data fusion.

Mr. Fred Lybrand
Parish Capital

Fred Lybrand is VP, N. America for Elmarco, the first equipment provider for industrial scale production of nanofibers, where he is responsible for new markets, sales and production strategy. He has transitioned between the finance and technology sector several times including: raising and investing $2 Bn into private equity and venture capital funds on behalf of state pension plans with Parish Capital, managing sales and business development with a private equity-backed semiconductor manufacturer and financing a number of mid-market and seed stage transactions as part of Wachovia Securities. Mr. Lybrand holds an undergraduate degree in biology from the University of Virginia, an MBA from the University of North Carolina, and the CFA and LIFA charters. He currently serves on the Committee on Forecasting Future Disruptive Technologies for the National Academies.

Mr. Peter Schwartz
Global Business Network

Peter Schwartz is cofounder and chairman of Global Business Network, a Monitor Group company, and a partner of the Monitor Group, a family of professional services firms devoted to enhancing client competitiveness. An internationally renowned futurist and business strategist, Peter specializes in scenario planning, working with corporations, governments, and institutions to create alternative perspectives of the future and develop robust strategies for a changing and uncertain world.

His current research and scenario work encompasses energy resources and the environment, technology, telecommunications, media and entertainment, aerospace, and national security. Mr. Schwartz is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and a member of the board of trustees of the Santa Fe Institute, the Long Now Foundation, the World Affairs Council and Human Rights Watch. He is the author of Inevitable Surprises (Gotham, 2003), a provocative look at the dynamic forces at play in the world today and their implications for business and society.

His first book, The Art of the Long View (Doubleday Currency, 1991; audio tape, 1995; paperback, 1996), is considered a seminal publication on scenario planning and has been translated into multiple languages. He is also the co-author of The Long Boom (Perseus, 1999), a vision for the world characterized by global openness, prosperity, and discovery; When Good Companies Do Bad Things (Wiley, 1999), an examination of, and argument for, corporate social responsibility; and China's Futures (Jossey-Bass, 2001), which describes very different scenarios for China and their international implications. He publishes and lectures widely and served as a script consultant on the films "The Minority Report," "Deep Impact," "Sneakers," and "War Games." Mr. Schwartz received a B.S. in aeronautical engineering and astronautics from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Mr. Schwartz is nominated because he is a futurist.

Dr. Nathan P. Siegel
Sandia National Laboratories

Nathan Siegel is a Senior Member of the Technical Staff at Sandia National Laboratories. He received a B.S. in Mechanical Engineering in 1998 from the California State and Polytechnic Institute at San Luis Obispo. He attended San Diego State University from 1998 until 2000, graduating with an M.S. in Mechanical Engineering. During this time he was employed at General Atomics in La Jolla and worked in the field of inertial confinement fusion energy, the subject of his Master’s thesis. He attended Virginia Tech from 2000 until 2004 when he graduated with a Ph.D. in Mechanical Engineering.

His research at Virginia tech focused on the development and validation of advanced computational models of PEM fuel cells. Nathan has been employed at Sandia National Labs since graduating from Virginia Tech. His current research activities focus primarily on the development of solar interfaces for high temperature hydrogen-producing thermochemical (TC) cycles and on the experimental validation of novel TC cycles. He has also recently been involved in PEM fuel cell research using neutron radiography to study two-phase flow within an operating fuel cell. Dr. Siegel is nominated for his expertise in energy systems, fuell cells, solar energy, and hydrogen.

Mr. Alfonso Velosa, III
Gartner, Inc.

Alfonso Velosa, III graduated from Columbia University with a B.S. in Materials Science Engineering, from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute with a M.S. in Materials Science Engineering, and from Thunderbird, the Garvin School of International Management with a M.I.M. in International Management. Mr. Velosa is currently research director for semiconductors at Gartner. In this position, he focuses on semiconductor supply chain research, with a particular focus on global manufacturing and semiconductor consumption trends by electronic equipment manufacturers. Mr. Velosa previously worked for or consulted to Intel, NASA LeRC and NASA HQ, Mars & Co, and IBM Research. Mr. Velosa is nominated because of his expertise in electronics, outsourced electronics manufacturing, EMS, ODM, and semiconductor consumption.

Dr. Stephen W. Drew
Drew Solutions LLC

Stephen W. Drew, NAE, holds consultancies with a variety of pharmaceutical and biotechnology organizations and is a Founder and Principle of Drew Solutions LLC. Until 2000, he worked with Merck & Company, Inc., in a series of increasingly responsible positions culminating with distinguished senior scientist. He held vice presidential positions including vice president of Vaccine Science and Technology, vice president of Vaccine Operations, and the vice president of Technical Operations and Engineering.

Prior to joining MMD in 1987, he was the senior director of Biochemical Engineering in the Merck Research Laboratories (MRL), a department that he started in 1981. Dr. Drew received his Ph.D. in biochemical engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Drew is member of the National Academy of Engineering (NAE). He has served in several capacities within the NAE and assisted numerous National Research Council committees. He currently serves on the TIGER Standing committee. He was chair of the advisory committee to the Engineering Directorate of the National Science Foundation.

Dr. Paul Saffo

Paul Saffo is a forecaster with over two decades experience exploring long-term technological change and its impact on business and society. He advises private and governmental clients worldwide, and teaches at Stanford where he is a Consulting Associate Professor in the Engineering School and a Visiting Scholar in the Media-X Program. He is a Fellow of the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences.

Mr. Saffo was the founding Chairman of the Samsung Science Board, and serves on a variety of other boards including the Long Now Foundation, and the Singapore National Research Foundation Science Advisory Board. Paul writes a column on technology issues for and essays have appeared in publications from The Harvard Business Review, Foreign Policy, Fortune, Wired, The Los Angeles Times, to Newsweek, The New York Times and the Washington Post. Paul holds degrees from Harvard College, Cambridge University, and Stanford University.

Committee Membership Roster Comments
Dr. Drew was added to the committee on 07/08/2008.
Dr. Saffo was added to the committee on 07/29/2008.

Live Webcast Today on U.S. Use of Cyberattack

A new report will discuss the technological, policy, legal, and ethical issues involved in the use of offensive cyberattack. Listen to the live audio webcast of the public briefing from 1 p.m. to 2 p.m. EDT April 29.

Please refresh this page after 12:55 p.m. for a link to the webcast audio.

Reports of cyberespionage -- such as the computer breach in the Pentagon’s Joint Strike Fighter project reported recently -- raise questions regarding the United States' ability to defend against cyberattacks. Less frequently discussed, however, is whether the U.S. should be employing cyberattack offensively, as a component of the national military and intelligence arsenal. A new report from the National Research Council, TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, LAW, AND ETHICS REGARDING U.S. ACQUISITION AND USE OF CYBERATTACK CAPABILITIES, discusses issues surrounding U.S. use of offensive information warfare, and makes recommendations on the development of national policies regarding cyberattack.

The report will be released at a one-hour public briefing beginning at 1 p.m. on Wednesday, April 29, in the Zenger Room of the National Press Club, 529 14th St., N.W., Washington, D.C. Those who cannot attend may listen to a live audio webcast and submit questions using an e-mail form that will become available at the start of the briefing at <>.

Participating from the committee that wrote the report:
-- William Owens (co-chair), admiral, U.S. Navy (retired), former vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and former vice chairman and CEO of Nortel Corp.
-- Kenneth Dam (co-chair), Max Pam Professor Emeritus, American and Foreign Law, University of Chicago School of Law, Chicago

Advance copies will be available to reporters only starting at noon EDT on Tuesday, April 28. THE REPORT IS EMBARGOED AND NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE BEFORE 1 P.M. EDT ON WEDNESDAY, APRIL 29. To obtain a copy of the report or attend the briefing, reporters should contact the Office of News and Public Information; tel. 202-334-2138 or e-mail <[email protected]>.

Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities

Wednesday, April 29, 2009 1:00 PM Eastern

Admiral William A. Owens (USN Retired) and
Kenneth W. Dam (former Deputy Secretary of State)
will brief the report.

The National Research Council was organized by the National Academy of Sciences in 1916 to associate the broad community of science and technology with the Academy’s purposes of furthering knowledge and advising the federal government. Functioning in accordance with general policies determined by the Academy, the Council has become the principal operating agency of both the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering in providing services to the government, the public, and the scientific and engineering communities. The Council is administered jointly by both Academies and the Institute of Medicine.

Cyberattack refers to deliberate actions to alter, disrupt, deceive, degrade, or destroy computer systems or networks or the information and/or programs resident in or transiting these systems or networks. This report focuses on the use of cyberattack as an instrument of U.S. national policy.


  • Guest



Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release                         April 27, 2009


National Academy of Sciences
Washington, D.C.

9:12 A.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT:  Well, thank you so much for the wonderful welcome.  To President Cicerone, thank you very much for your leadership and for hosting us today.  To John Holdren, thanks, John, for the outstanding work that you are doing.

I was just informed backstage that Ralph and John both are 1965 graduates of MIT -- same class.  And so I'm not sure this is the perfectly prescribed scientific method, but they're sort of a control group -- (laughter) -- who ages faster:  The President's Science Advisor or the President of the Academy?  (Laughter.)  And we'll check in in a couple of years.  But it is wonderful to see them.

To all of you, to my Cabinet Secretaries and team who are here, thank you.  It is a great privilege to address the distinguished members of the National Academy of Sciences, as well as the leaders of the National Academy of Engineering and the Institute of Medicine who've gathered here this morning.

And I'd like to begin today with a story of a previous visitor who also addressed this august body.  In April of 1921, Albert Einstein visited the United States for the first time.  And his international credibility was growing as scientists around the world began to understand and accept the vast implications of his theories of special and general relativity.  And he attended this annual meeting, and after sitting through a series of long speeches by others, he reportedly said, "I have just got a new theory of eternity."  (Laughter.)  So I will do my best to heed this cautionary tale.  (Laughter.)

The very founding of this institution stands as a testament to the restless curiosity, the boundless hope so essential not just to the scientific enterprise, but to this experiment we call America.

A few months after a devastating defeat at Fredericksburg, before Gettysburg would be won, before Richmond would fall, before the fate of the Union would be at all certain, President Abraham Lincoln signed into law an act creating the National Academy of Sciences -- in the midst of civil war.

Lincoln refused to accept that our nation's sole purpose was mere survival.  He created this academy, founded the land grant colleges, and began the work of the transcontinental railroad, believing that we must add -- and I quote -- "the fuel of interest to the fire of genius in the discovery... of new and useful things."

This is America's story.  Even in the hardest times, against the toughest odds, we've never given in to pessimism; we've never surrendered our fates to chance; we have endured; we have worked hard; we sought out new frontiers.

Today, of course, we face more complex challenges than we have ever faced before:  a medical system that holds the promise of unlocking new cures and treatments -- attached to a health care system that holds the potential for bankruptcy to families and businesses; a system of energy that powers our economy, but simultaneously endangers our planet; threats to our security that seek to exploit the very interconnectedness and openness so essential to our prosperity; and challenges in a global marketplace which links the derivative trader on Wall Street to the homeowner on Main Street, the office worker in America to the factory worker in China -- a marketplace in which we all share in opportunity, but also in crisis.

At such a difficult moment, there are those who say we cannot afford to invest in science, that support for research is somehow a luxury at moments defined by necessities.  I fundamentally disagree.  Science is more essential for our prosperity, our security, our health, our environment, and our quality of life than it has ever been before.  (Applause.)

And if there was ever a day that reminded us of our shared stake in science and research, it's today.  We are closely monitoring the emerging cases of swine flu in the United States. And this is obviously a cause for concern and requires a heightened state of alert.  But it's not a cause for alarm.  The Department of Health and Human Services has declared a public health emergency as a precautionary tool to ensure that we have the resources we need at our disposal to respond quickly and effectively.  And I'm getting regular updates on the situation from the responsible agencies.  And the Department of Health and Human Services as well as the Centers for Disease Control will be offering regular updates to the American people.  And Secretary Napolitano will be offering regular updates to the American people, as well, so that they know what steps are being taken and what steps they may need to take.

But one thing is clear -- our capacity to deal with a public health challenge of this sort rests heavily on the work of our scientific and medical community.  And this is one more example of why we can't allow our nation to fall behind.

Unfortunately, that's exactly what's happened.

Federal funding in the physical sciences as a portion of our gross domestic product has fallen by nearly half over the past quarter century.  Time and again we've allowed the research and experimentation tax credit, which helps businesses grow and innovate, to lapse.

Our schools continue to trail other developed countries and, in some cases, developing countries.  Our students are outperformed in math and science by their peers in Singapore, Japan, England, the Netherlands, Hong Kong, and Korea, among others.  Another assessment shows American 15-year-olds ranked 25th in math and 21st in science when compared to nations around the world.  And we have watched as scientific integrity has been undermined and scientific research politicized in an effort to advance predetermined ideological agendas.

We know that our country is better than this.  A half century ago, this nation made a commitment to lead the world in scientific and technological innovation; to invest in education, in research, in engineering; to set a goal of reaching space and engaging every citizen in that historic mission.  That was the high water mark of America's investment in research and development.  And since then our investments have steadily declined as a share of our national income.  As a result, other countries are now beginning to pull ahead in the pursuit of this generation's great discoveries. 

I believe it is not in our character, the American character, to follow.  It's our character to lead.  And it is time for us to lead once again.  So I'm here today to set this goal:  We will devote more than 3 percent of our GDP to research and development.  We will not just meet, but we will exceed the level achieved at the height of the space race, through policies that invest in basic and applied research, create new incentives for private innovation, promote breakthroughs in energy and medicine, and improve education in math and science.  (Applause.)

This represents the largest commitment to scientific research and innovation in American history.

Just think what this will allow us to accomplish:  solar cells as cheap as paint; green buildings that produce all the energy they consume; learning software as effective as a personal tutor; prosthetics so advanced that you could play the piano again; an expansion of the frontiers of human knowledge about ourselves and world the around us.  We can do this.

The pursuit of discovery half a century ago fueled our prosperity and our success as a nation in the half century that followed.  The commitment I am making today will fuel our success for another 50 years.  That's how we will ensure that our children and their children will look back on this generation's work as that which defined the progress and delivered the prosperity of the 21st century.

This work begins with a historic commitment to basic science and applied research, from the labs of renowned universities to the proving grounds of innovative companies.

Through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, and with the support of Congress, my administration is already providing the largest single boost to investment in basic research in American history.  That's already happened.

This is important right now, as public and private colleges and universities across the country reckon with shrinking endowments and tightening budgets.  But this is also incredibly important for our future.  As Vannevar Bush, who served as scientific advisor to President Franklin Roosevelt, famously said:  "Basic scientific research is scientific capital."

The fact is an investigation into a particular physical, chemical, or biological process might not pay off for a year, or a decade, or at all.  And when it does, the rewards are often broadly shared, enjoyed by those who bore its costs but also by those who did not.

And that's why the private sector generally under-invests in basic science, and why the public sector must invest in this kind of research -- because while the risks may be large, so are the rewards for our economy and our society.

No one can predict what new applications will be born of basic research:  new treatments in our hospitals, or new sources of efficient energy; new building materials; new kinds of crops more resistant to heat and to drought.

It was basic research in the photoelectric field -- in the photoelectric effect that would one day lead to solar panels.  It was basic research in physics that would eventually produce the CAT scan.  The calculations of today's GPS satellites are based on the equations that Einstein put to paper more than a century ago.

In addition to the investments in the Recovery Act, the budget I've proposed -- and versions have now passed both the House and the Senate -- builds on the historic investments in research contained in the recovery plan.

So we double the budget of key agencies, including the National Science Foundation, a primary source of funding for academic research; and the National Institute of Standards and Technology, which supports a wide range of pursuits from improving health information technology to measuring carbon pollution, from -- from testing "smart grid" designs to developing advanced manufacturing processes.

And my budget doubles funding for the Department of Energy's Office of Science, which builds and operates accelerators, colliders, supercomputers, high-energy light sources, and facilities for making nano-materials -- because we know that a nation's potential for scientific discovery is defined by the tools that it makes available to its researchers.

But the renewed commitment of our nation will not be driven by government investment alone.  It's a commitment that extends from the laboratory to the marketplace.  And that's why my budget makes the research and experimentation tax credit permanent.  This is a tax credit that returns two dollars to the economy for every dollar we spend, by helping companies afford the often high costs of developing new ideas, new technologies, and new products.  Yet at times we've allowed it to lapse or only renewed it year to year.  I've heard this time and again from entrepreneurs across this country:  By making this credit permanent we make it possible for businesses to plan the kinds of projects that create jobs and economic growth.

Second, in no area will innovation be more important than in the development of new technologies to produce, use, and save energy -- which is why my administration has made an unprecedented commitment to developing a 21st century clean energy economy, and why we put a scientist in charge of the Department of Energy.  (Applause.)

Our future on this planet depends on our willingness to address the challenge posed by carbon pollution.  And our future as a nation depends upon our willingness to embrace this challenge as an opportunity to lead the world in pursuit of new discovery.

When the Soviet Union launched Sputnik a little more than a half century ago, Americans were stunned.  The Russians had beaten us to space.  And we had to make a choice:  We could accept defeat or we could accept the challenge.  And as always, we chose to accept the challenge.

President Eisenhower signed legislation to create NASA and to invest in science and math education, from grade school to graduate school.  And just a few years later, a month after his address to the 1961 Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, President Kennedy boldly declared before a joint session of Congress that the United States would send a man to the moon and return him safely to the Earth.

The scientific community rallied behind this goal and set about achieving it.  And it would not only lead to those first steps on the moon; it would lead to giant leaps in our understanding here at home.  That Apollo program produced technologies that have improved kidney dialysis and water purification systems; sensors to test for hazardous gasses; energy-saving building materials; fire-resistant fabrics used by firefighters and soldiers.  More broadly, the enormous investment in that era –- in science and technology, in education and research funding –- produced a great outpouring of curiosity and creativity, the benefits of which have been incalculable.  There are those of you in this audience who became scientists because of that commitment.  We have to replicate that.

There will be no single Sputnik moment for this generation's challenges to break our dependence on fossil fuels.  In many ways, this makes the challenge even tougher to solve –- and makes it all the more important to keep our eyes fixed on the work ahead.

But energy is our great project, this generation's great project.  And that's why I've set a goal for our nation that we will reduce our carbon pollution by more than 80 percent by 2050. And that is why -- (applause) -- and that is why I'm pursuing, in concert with Congress, the policies that will help meet us -- help us meet this goal.

My recovery plan provides the incentives to double our nation's capacity to generate renewable energy over the next few years -- extending the production tax credit, providing loan guarantees and offering grants to spur investment.  Just take one example:  Federally funded research and development has dropped the cost of solar panels by tenfold over the last three decades. Our renewed efforts will ensure that solar and other clean energy technologies will be competitive.

My budget includes $150 billion over 10 years to invest in sources of renewable energy as well as energy efficiency.  It supports efforts at NASA, recommended as a priority by the National Research Council, to develop new space-based capabilities to help us better understand our changing climate.

And today, I'm also announcing that for the first time, we are funding an initiative -- recommended by this organization -- called the Advanced Research Projects Agency for Energy, or ARPA-E.  (Applause.)

This is based, not surprisingly, on DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, which was created during the Eisenhower administration in response to Sputnik.  It has been charged throughout its history with conducting high-risk, high-reward research.  And the precursor to the Internet, known as ARPANET, stealth technology, the Global Positioning System all owe a debt to the work of DARPA.

So ARPA-E seeks to do the same kind of high-risk, high-reward research.  My administration will pursue, as well, comprehensive legislation to place a market-based cap on carbon emissions.  We will make renewable energy the profitable kind of energy.  We will put in place the resources so that scientists can focus on this critical area.  And I am confident that we will find a wellspring of creativity just waiting to be tapped by researchers in this room and entrepreneurs across our country.  We can solve this problem.  (Applause.)

Now, the nation that leads the world in 21st century clean energy will be the nation that leads in the 21st century global economy.  I believe America can and must be that nation.  But in order to lead in the global economy and to ensure that our businesses can grow and innovate, and our families can thrive, we're also going to have to address the shortcomings of our health care system.

The Recovery Act will support the long overdue step of computerizing America's medical records, to reduce the duplication, waste and errors that cost billions of dollars and thousands of lives.

But it's important to note, these records also hold the potential of offering patients the chance to be more active participants in the prevention and treatment of their diseases.  We must maintain patient control over these records and respect their privacy.  At the same time, we have the opportunity to offer billions and billions of anonymous data points to medical researchers who may find in this information evidence that can help us better understand disease.

History also teaches us the greatest advances in medicine have come from scientific breakthroughs, whether the discovery of antibiotics, or improved public health practices, vaccines for smallpox and polio and many other infectious diseases, antiretroviral drugs that can return AIDS patients to productive lives, pills that can control certain types of blood cancers, so many others.

Because of recent progress –- not just in biology, genetics and medicine, but also in physics, chemistry, computer science, and engineering –- we have the potential to make enormous progress against diseases in the coming decades.  And that's why my administration is committed to increasing funding for the National Institutes of Health, including $6 billion to support cancer research -- part of a sustained, multi-year plan to double cancer research in our country.  (Applause.)

Next, we are restoring science to its rightful place.  On March 9th, I signed an executive memorandum with a clear message: Under my administration, the days of science taking a back seat to ideology are over.  (Applause.)  Our progress as a nation –- and our values as a nation –- are rooted in free and open inquiry.  To undermine scientific integrity is to undermine our democracy.  It is contrary to our way of life.  (Applause.)

That's why I've charged John Holdren and the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy with leading a new effort to ensure that federal policies are based on the best and most unbiased scientific information.  I want to be sure that facts are driving scientific decisions -- and not the other way around. (Laughter.)

As part of this effort, we've already launched a web site that allows individuals to not only make recommendations to achieve this goal, but to collaborate on those recommendations.  It's a small step, but one that's creating a more transparent, participatory and democratic government.

We also need to engage the scientific community directly in the work of public policy.  And that's why, today, I am announcing the appointment -- we are filling out the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology, known as PCAST, and I intend to work with them closely.  Our co-chairs have already been introduced -- Dr. Varmus and Dr. Lander along with John.  And this council represents leaders from many scientific disciplines who will bring a diversity of experiences and views. And I will charge PCAST with advising me about national strategies to nurture and sustain a culture of scientific innovation.

In addition to John -- sorry, the -- I just noticed that I jumped the gun here -- go ahead and move it up.  (Laughter.)  I'd already -- I'd already introduced all you guys.

In biomedicine, just to give you an example of what PCAST can do, we can harness the historic convergence between life sciences and physical sciences that's underway today; undertaking public projects -- in the spirit of the Human Genome Project -- to create data and capabilities that fuel discoveries in tens of thousands of laboratories; and identifying and overcoming scientific and bureaucratic barriers to rapidly translating scientific breakthroughs into diagnostics and therapeutics that serve patients.

In environmental science, it will require strengthening our weather forecasting, our Earth observation from space, the management of our nation's land, water and forests, and the stewardship of our coastal zones and ocean fisheries.

We also need to work with our friends around the world. Science, technology and innovation proceed more rapidly and more cost-effectively when insights, costs and risks are shared; and so many of the challenges that science and technology will help us meet are global in character.  This is true of our dependence on oil, the consequences of climate change, the threat of epidemic disease, and the spread of nuclear weapons.

And that's why my administration is ramping up participation in -- and our commitment to -- international science and technology cooperation across the many areas where it is clearly in our interest to do so.  In fact, this week, my administration is gathering the leaders of the world's major economies to begin the work of addressing our common energy challenges together.

Fifth, since we know that the progress and prosperity of future generations will depend on what we do now to educate the next generation, today I'm announcing a renewed commitment to education in mathematics and science.  (Applause.)  This is something I care deeply about.  Through this commitment, American students will move from the middle of the top -- from the middle to the top of the pack in science and math over the next decade  -- for we know that the nation that out-educates us today will out-compete us tomorrow.  And I don't intend to have us out-educated.

We can't start soon enough.  We know that the quality of math and science teachers is the most influential single factor in determining whether a student will succeed or fail in these subjects.  Yet in high school more than 20 percent of students in math and more than 60 percent of students in chemistry and physics are taught by teachers without expertise in these fields. And this problem is only going to get worse.  There is a projected shortfall of more than 280,000 math and science teachers across the country by 2015.

And that's why I'm announcing today that states making strong commitments and progress in math and science education will be eligible to compete later this fall for additional funds under the Secretary of Education's $5 billion Race to the Top program.

And I'm challenging states to dramatically improve achievement in math and science by raising standards, modernizing science labs, upgrading curriculum, and forging partnerships to improve the use of science and technology in our classrooms.  (Applause.)  I'm challenging states, as well, to enhance teacher preparation and training, and to attract new and qualified math and science teachers to better engage students and reinvigorate those subjects in our schools.

And in this endeavor, we will work to support inventive approaches.  Let's create systems that retain and reward effective teachers, and let's create new pathways for experienced professionals to go into the classroom.  There are, right now, chemists who could teach chemistry, physicists who could teach physics, statisticians who could teach mathematics.  But we need to create a way to bring the expertise and the enthusiasm of these folks –- folks like you –- into the classroom.

There are states, for example, doing innovative work.  I'm pleased to announce that Governor Ed Rendell of Pennsylvania will lead an effort with the National Governors Association to increase the number of states that are making science, technology, engineering and mathematics education a top priority. Six states are currently participating in the initiative, including Pennsylvania, which has launched an effective program to ensure that the state has the skilled workforce in place to draw the jobs of the 21st century.  And I want every state, all 50 states, to participate.

But as you know, our work does not end with a high school diploma.  For decades, we led the world in educational attainment, and as a consequence we led the world in economic growth.  The G.I. Bill, for example, helps send a generation to college.  But in this new economy, we've come to trail other nations in graduation rates, in educational achievement, and in the production of scientists and engineers.

That's why my administration has set a goal that will greatly enhance our ability to compete for the high-wage, high-tech jobs of the future –- and to foster the next generation of scientists and engineers.  In the next decade –- by 2020 –- America will once again have the highest proportion of college graduates in the world.  That is a goal that we are going to set. And we've provided tax credits and grants to make a college education more affordable.

My budget also triples the number of National Science Foundation graduate research fellowships.  (Applause.)  This program was created as part of the space race five decades ago. In the decades since, it's remained largely the same size –- even as the numbers of students who seek these fellowships has skyrocketed.  We ought to be supporting these young people who are pursuing scientific careers, not putting obstacles in their path.

So this is how we will lead the world in new discoveries in this new century.  But I think all of you understand it will take far more than the work of government.  It will take all of us.  It will take all of you.  And so today I want to challenge you to use your love and knowledge of science to spark the same sense of wonder and excitement in a new generation.

America's young people will rise to the challenge if given the opportunity –- if called upon to join a cause larger than themselves.  We've got evidence.  You know, the average age in NASA's mission control during the Apollo 17 mission was just 26. I know that young people today are just as ready to tackle the grand challenges of this century.

So I want to persuade you to spend time in the classroom, talking and showing young people what it is that your work can mean, and what it means to you.  I want to encourage you to participate in programs to allow students to get a degree in science fields and a teaching certificate at the same time.  I want us all to think about new and creative ways to engage young people in science and engineering, whether it's science festivals, robotics competitions, fairs that encourage young people to create and build and invent -- to be makers of things, not just consumers of things.

I want you to know that I'm going to be working alongside you.  I'm going to participate in a public awareness and outreach campaign to encourage students to consider careers in science and mathematics and engineering -- because our future depends on it.

And the Department of Energy and the National Science Foundation will be launching a joint initiative to inspire tens of thousands of American students to pursue these very same careers, particularly in clean energy.

It will support an educational campaign to capture the imagination of young people who can help us meet the energy challenge, and will create research opportunities for undergraduates and educational opportunities for women and minorities who too often have been underrepresented in scientific and technological fields, but are no less capable of inventing the solutions that will help us grow our economy and save our planet.  (Applause.)

And it will support fellowships and interdisciplinary graduate programs and partnerships between academic institutions and innovative companies to prepare a generation of Americans to meet this generational challenge.

For we must always remember that somewhere in America there's an entrepreneur seeking a loan to start a business that could transform an industry -- but she hasn't secured it yet.  There's a researcher with an idea for an experiment that might offer a new cancer treatment -– but he hasn't found the funding yet.  There's a child with an inquisitive mind staring up at the night sky.  And maybe she has the potential to change our world  –- but she doesn't know it yet.

As you know, scientific discovery takes far more than the occasional flash of brilliance –- as important as that can be. Usually, it takes time and hard work and patience; it takes training; it requires the support of a nation.  But it holds a promise like no other area of human endeavor.

In 1968, a year defined by loss and conflict and tumult, Apollo 8 carried into space the first human beings ever to slip beyond Earth's gravity, and the ship would circle the moon 10 times before returning home.  But on its fourth orbit, the capsule rotated and for the first time Earth became visible through the windows.

Bill Anders, one of the astronauts aboard Apollo 8, scrambled for a camera, and he took a photo that showed the Earth coming up over the moon's horizon.  It was the first ever taken from so distant a vantage point, and it soon became known as "Earthrise."

Anders would say that the moment forever changed him, to see our world -- this pale blue sphere -- without borders, without divisions, at once so tranquil and beautiful and alone.

"We came all this way to explore the moon," he said, "and the most important thing is that we discovered the Earth."

Yes, scientific innovation offers us a chance to achieve prosperity.  It has offered us benefits that have improved our health and our lives -- improvements we take too easily for granted.  But it gives us something more.  At root, science forces us to reckon with the truth as best as we can ascertain it.

And some truths fill us with awe.  Others force us to question long-held views.  Science can't answer every question, and indeed, it seems at times the more we plumb the mysteries of the physical world, the more humble we must be.  Science cannot supplant our ethics or our values, our principles or our faith.  But science can inform those things and help put those values -- these moral sentiments, that faith -- can put those things to work -- to feed a child, or to heal the sick, to be good stewards of this Earth.

We are reminded that with each new discovery and the new power it brings comes new responsibility; that the fragility, the sheer specialness of life requires us to move past our differences and to address our common problems, to endure and continue humanity's strivings for a better world.

As President Kennedy said when he addressed the National Academy of Sciences more than 45 years ago:  "The challenge, in short, may be our salvation."

Thank you all for all your past, present, and future discoveries.  (Applause.)  May God bless you.  God bless the United States of America.  (Applause.)

9:52 A.M. EDT

Offline lordssyndicate

  • Moderator
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 1,141
  • Stop The New World Order
    • LinkedIn Profile
So, we have Dr. "Death" David leading her team of evil mad scientists -- publicly stating we must UPGRADE our combat systems, so that we can carry out more perfect cyber false flags globally.

The summary of what they are really saying is this:

"We must insure that we the American people which are a threat that we're crushed now before it is too late...
We must crush them and crush the net before it kills us.
We Must act today! NOW NOW NOW! We Made sure this only was given out today 30 minutes prior to our webcast because we know they are watching us nearly as hardcore as we are watching them. They know what we are up to, and we must kill them and their internet NOW! We have no time left to waste  and we cannot let it exist in this current state a moment longer!"

People need to wake up - this is the NWO's top scientists freaking out saying they must stop the internet yesterday!

Not me -- them. They are freaking out saying they must do everything to advance their offensive capabilities and kill this internet  as fast as they can.

Ok, I hope you guys get it THEY are shitting themselves and saying THEY want the internet gone... Yesterday even...
"Biotechnology it's not so bad. It's just like all technologies it's in the wrong HANDS!"- Sepultura


  • Guest

Terrorism in the Age of Technology: Profs Discuss Biothreats and Cyber Warfare

NOVEMBER 11, 2009

While once considered unconventional, cyber attacks and biological warfare have become an increasing threat to security and a tactic of rising concern. Spanning the areas of computer science, technology and government, technological warfare elucidates the importance of functioning computer networks, screening technologies and the danger that such an attack could pose.

On Oct. 15, Herbert Lin, chief scientist at the Computer Science and Telecommunications Board, National Research Council of the National Academies, presented his work as part of the Peace Studies Program seminar series, housed in the Mario Einaudi Center for International Studies. He was quick to make the distinction between a cyber attack and cyber exploitation, a legal and operational distinction. A cyber attack is “an action to destroy, degrade and disrupt an adversary through information technology.” Both remote and close-access attacks can harm technology through a virus or by launching a cyber attack via Wi-Fi or compromising a supply chain through a sensitive computer. Cyber exploitation is the means by which an adversary can quietly obtain information through eavesdropping “into the ether” or installing a Trojan horse to exfiltrate data.

Such techniques under the purview of offensive cyber exploration. Lin focused on cyber attacks within the domestic sphere and how to use U.S. policy to promote cyber deterrence and prevent cyber conflict. Cyber attacks indirectly affect attacked computers, through cascading effects. Collateral damage is difficult to anticipate, and even assessing the damage can be complicated.

Cyber attacks are complex to plan and execute, as well as easy to deny. Moreover, while the analysis of cyber attacks requires specialized knowledge, some cyber attack weapons are relatively inexpensive while others, like sending a virus, only require basic knowledge.

Lin discussed the potential applications of international cyber attacks, including the suppression of adversary air defenses, influencing foreign elections, altering the electronic medical records of military leaders, disrupting plans for military deployment and disrupting foreign infrastructure for censorship. Cyber attacks are used covertly, in part because they are difficult to operate. The U.S. may know that they have been attacked without knowing who it was that attacked them.

In 2006, the Department of Defense came out with an unclassified national military strategy for cyberspace operations that discussed threats and vulnerabilities, strategic considerations and a military framework for action. “Cyber deterrence should not be conceptualized as being separate from other spheres of conflict,” Lin said.

According to Lin, international cyber crime does not get the attention it deserves, and the U.S. is relatively dependent on information technology. Restrictions on cyber attacks would disproportionately benefit the U.S. since they have more to lose, yet these restrictions will not stop other nations from developing cyber attack capabilities. Restrictions on cyber attacks may prevent strikes on power grids just as international charters do not allow “kinetic attacks on hospitals” or the “use of lasers to blind soldiers.” In the world of cyber attacks, complicating factors include non-state actors, the widespread diffusion of relevant technology and private sector ownership.

Prof. Kathleen Vogel, science and technology studies and faculty member of the Peace Studies Program, gave a lecture on Nov. 9 on the issue of biothreats and policy logistics. According to Vogel, the critical questions that frame the understanding of biological weapons include what biological weapons threaten the U.S.; how the threats have changed after the Cold War, September 11 and the development of biotechnology; and how to better assess such threats for biodefense policy. Throughout history and across the world there have been analytical failures in detecting and assessing the scope of bioweapons programs, be they in the Soviet Union, Iraq, Japan, Afghanistan or the United States. “There’s this growing, elusive, more technologically advanced set of bioweapons threats due to the increasing pace and infusion of biotechnology,” Vogel said.

Vogel approaches U.S. bioweapons assessments as the result of a “sociotechnical assemblage” made up of narratives and accounts. The early 1990s brought about geopolitical changes with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Rogue states, such as Iraq, arose, creating concern in the U.S. over the difficulty of detecting covert weapons programs.

The 1995 Tokyo subway attack raised concerns in the U.S. because it demonstrated the capacity of a non-state actor to perform a chemical activity on a large scale.

The 2001 anthrax attacks underscored the need for more information, especially as weapons technology becomes increasingly accessible. Until U.S. military forces found an Al Qaeda makeshift lab in Afghanistan, the U.S. was unsure who had performed the attack. “We didn’t know that Al Qaeda was trying to do this in Afghanistan and this, once again, indicated that the US intelligence committee has underestimated another bioweapons threat,” Vogel said.

Scientific literature on pathogen research raises concerns about the accessibility of scientific knowledge to dangerous sources. Both speakers emphasized the growing threat of non-state actors and how difficult enacting preventative measures and policy becomes because of the stealth-like nature of the attacks.

New technical analytic units have arisen because of this increasing concern, such as directorates in the CIA and the Weapons, Intelligence, Nonproliferation and Arms Control Center in 2001. Even earlier, the Nonproliferation Center was founded in 1992, creating new science advisory groups to increase biological expertise at the same time that the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency increased their focus on biochemistry. In the early 2000s, there was increased support for “science-based” threat assessments in intelligence in the policy arena. The focus was on biological and genetically-engineered agents, and technical assessments were separated from the notion of an adversarial attack.


  • Guest

Cross-Domain Response to Cyber Attacks and the Threat of Conflict Escalation


At a time when it seems impossible to avoid the seemingly growing hysteria over the threat of cyber war,[1] network security expert Marcus Ranum delivered a refreshing talk recently, “The Problem with Cyber War,” that took a critical look at a number of the assumptions underlying contemporary cybersecurity discourse in the United States.  He addressed one issue in partiuclar that I would like to riff on here, the issue of conflict escalation–i.e. the possibility that offensive use of cyber attacks could escalate to the use of physical force.  As I will show, his concerns are entirely legitimate as current U.S. military cyber doctrine assumes the possibility of what I call “cross-domain responses” to cyberattacks.

Backing Your Adversary (Mentally) into a Corner

Based on the premise that completely blinding a potential adversary is a good indicator to that adversary that an attack is iminent, Ranum has argued that

“The best thing that you could possibly do if you want to start World War III is launch a cyber attack. [...] When people talk about cyber war like it’s a practical thing, what they’re really doing is messing with the OK button for starting World War III.  We need to get them to sit the f-k down and shut the f-k up.” [2]

He is making a point similar to one that I have made in the past: Taking away an adversary’s ability to make rational decisions could backfire. [3]  For example, Gregory Witol cautions that “attacking the decision makers ability to perform rational calculations may cause more problems than it hopes to resolve. Removing the capacity for rational action may result in completely unforeseen consequences, including longer and bloodier battles than may otherwise have been.” [4]

Cross-Domain Response

So, from a theoretical standpoint, I think his concerns are well founded.  But the current state of U.S. policy may be cause for even greater concern.  It’s not just worrisome that a hypothetical blinding attack via cyberspace could send a signal of imminent attack and therefore trigger an irrational response from the adversary.  What is also cause for concern is that current U.S. policy indicates that “kinetic attacks” (i.e. physical use of force) are seen as potentially legitimate responses to cyber attacks.  Most worrisome is that current U.S. policy implies that a nuclear response is possible, something that policy makers have not denied in recent press reports.

The reason, in part, is that the U.S. defense community has increasingly come to see cyberspace as a “domain of warfare” equivalent to air, land, sea, and space.  The definition of cyberspace as its own domain of warfare helps in its own right to blur the online/offline, physical-space/cyberspace boundary.  But thinking logically about the potential consequences of this framing leads to some disconcerting conclusions.

If cyberspace is a domain of warfare, then it becomes possible to define “cyber attacks” (whatever those may be said to entail) as acts of war.  But what happens if the U.S. is attacked in any of the other domains?  It retaliates.  But it usually does not respond only within the domain in which it was attacked.  Rather, responses are typically “cross-domain responses”–i.e. a massive bombing on U.S. soil or vital U.S. interests abroad (e.g. think 9/11 or Pearl Harbor) might lead to air strikes against the attacker.  Even more likely given a U.S. military “way of warfare” that emphasizes multidimensional, “joint” operations is a massive conventional (i.e. non-nuclear) response against the attacker in all domains (air, land, sea, space), simultaneously.

The possibility of “kinetic action” in response to cyber attack, or as part of offensive U.S. cyber operations, is part of the current (2006) National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations [5]:

Of course, the possibility that a cyber attack on the U.S. could lead to a U.S. nuclear reply constitutes possibly the ultimate in “cross-domain response.”  And while this may seem far fetched, it has not been ruled out by U.S. defense policy makers and is, in fact, implied in current U.S. defense policy documents.  From the National Military Strategy of the United States (2004):

“The term WMD/E relates to a broad range of adversary capabilities that pose potentially devastating impacts.  WMD/E includes chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and enhanced high explosive weapons as well as other, more asymmetrical ‘weapons’.   They may rely more on disruptive impact than destructive kinetic effects.  For example, cyber attacks on US commercial information systems or attacks against transportation networks may have a greater economic or psychological effect than a relatively small release of a lethal agent.” [6]

The authors of a 2009 National Academies of Science report on cyberwarfare respond to this by saying, “Coupled with the declaratory policy on nuclear weapons described earlier, this statement implies that the United States will regard certain kinds of cyberattacks against the United States as being in the same category as nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons, and thus that a nuclear response to certain kinds of cyberattacks (namely, cyberattacks with devastating impacts) may be possible.  It also sets a relevant scale–a cyberattack that has an impact larger than that associated with a relatively small release of a lethal agent is regarded with the same or greater seriousness.” [7]

Asked by the New York Times to comment on this, U.S. defense officials would not deny that nuclear retaliation remains an option for response to a massive cyberattack:

“Pentagon and military officials confirmed that the United States reserved the option to respond in any way it chooses to punish an adversary responsible for a catastrophic cyberattack. While the options could include the use of nuclear weapons, officials said, such an extreme counterattack was hardly the most likely response.” [8]

The rationale for this policy:

“Thus, the United States never declared that it would be bound to respond to a Soviet and Warsaw Pact conventional invasion with only American and NATO conventional forces. The fear of escalating to a nuclear conflict was viewed as a pillar of stability and is credited with helping deter the larger Soviet-led conventional force throughout the cold war.  Introducing the possibility of a nuclear response to a catastrophic cyberattack would be expected to serve the same purpose.” [9]

Non-unique, Dangerous, and In-credible?

There are a couple of interesting things to note in response.  First is the development of a new acronym, WMD/E (weapons of mass destruction or effect).  Again, this acronym indicates a weakening of the requirement of physical impacts.  In this new definition, mass effects that are not necessarily physical, nor necessarily destructive, but possibly only disruptive economically or even psychologically (think “shock and awe”) are seen as equivalent to WMD.

This new emphasis on effects, disruption, and psychology reflects both contemporary, but also long-held beliefs within the U.S. defense community.  It reflects current thinking in U.S. military theory, in which it is said that U.S. forces should be able to “mass fires” and “mass effects” without having to physically “mass forces.”  There is a sliding scale in which the physical (often referred to as the “kinetic”) gradually retreats–i.e. massed forces are most physical; massed fire is less physical (for the U.S. anyway); and massed effects are the least physical, having as the ultimate goal Sun Tzu’s “pinnacle of excellence,” winning without fighting.

But the emphasis on disruption and psychology in WMD/E has also been a key component of much of 20th century military thought in the West.  Industrial theories of warfare in the early 20th century posited that industrial societies were increasingly interdependent and reliant upon mass production, transportation, and consumption of material goods.  Both industrial societies and the material links that held them together, as well as industrial people and their own internal linkages (i.e. nerves), were seen as increasingly fragile and prone to disruption via attack with the latest industrial weapons: airplanes and tanks.  Once interdependent and fragile industrial societies were hopelessly disrupted via attack by the very weapons they themselves created, the nerves of modern, industrial men and women would be shattered, leading to moral and mental defeat and a loss of will to fight.

Current thinking about the possible dangers of cyber attack upon the U.S. are based on the same basic premises: technologically dependent and therefore fragile societies populated by masses of people sensitive to any disruption in expected standards of living are easy targets.  Ultimately, however, a number of researchers have pointed out the pseudo-psychological, pseudo-sociological, and a-historical (not to mention non-unique) nature of these assumptions. [10]  Others have pointed out that these assumptions did not turn out to be true during WWII strategic bombing campaigns, that modern, industrial societies and populations were far more resilient than military theorists had assumed. [11]  Finally, even some military theorists have questioned the assumptions behind cyber war, especially when assumptions about our own technology dependence-induced societal fragility (dubious on their own) are applied to other societies, especially non-Western societies (even more dubious). [12]

Finally, where deterrence is concerned, it is important to remember that a deterrent has to be credible to be effective.  True, the U.S. retained nuclear weapons as a deterrent during the Cold War.  But, from the 1950s through the 1980s, there was increasing doubt among U.S. planners regarding the credibility of U.S. nuclear deterrence via the threat of “massive retaliation.”  As early as the 1950s it was becoming clear that the U.S. would be reluctant at best to actually follow through on its threat of massive retaliation.  Unfortunately, most money during that period had gone into building up the nuclear arsenal; conventional weapons had been marginalized.

Thus, the U.S. had built a force it was likely never to use.  So, the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s saw the development of concepts like “flexible response” and more emphasis on building up conventional forces.  This was the big story of the 1980s and the “Reagan build-up” (not “Star Wars”).  Realizing that, after a decade of distraction in Vietnam, it was back in a position vis-a-viz the Soviets in Europe in which it would have to rely on nuclear weapons to offset its own weakness in conventional forces, a position that could lead only to blackmail or holocaust, the U.S. moved to create stronger conventional forces. [13]  Thus, the question where cyber war is concerned:

If it was in-credible that the U.S. would actually follow through with massive retaliation after a Soviet attack on the U.S. or Western Europe, is it really credible to say that the U.S. would respond with nuclear weapons to a cyber attack, no matter how disruptive or destructive?

Beyond credibility, deterrence makes many other assumptions that are problematic in the cyber war context.  It assumes an adversary capable of being deterred.  Can most of those who would perpetrate a cyber attack be deterred?  Will al-Qa’ida be deterred?  How about a band of nationalistic or even just thrill-seeker, bandwagon hackers for hire?  Second, it assumes clear lines of command and control.  Sure, some hacker groups might be funded and assisted to a great degree by states.  But ultimately, even cyber war theorists will admit that it is doubtful that states have complete control over their armies of hacker mercenaries.  How will deterrence play out in this kind of scenario?


Ultimately, there is much more that can, should, and will be said (I’m currently writing a paper about these issues for the next Association of Internet Researchers conference) about the underlying assumptions and shortcomings of contemporary cyber war discourse in the United States, assumptions and shortcomings that lead to the possibility of escalation via cross-domain response to cyber attacks, including in-credible threats of nuclear retaliation, as well as the dubious framing of cyber war in terms of Cold War nuclear deterrence between superpowers.  At this point, from what I can see, we do not need yet another cyber/network/computer/etc. security “expert” making fantastic claims about the imminent threat of a “cyber Pearl Harbor,” “cyber Katrina,” or “cyber 9/11,” but rather, more of these experts like Ranum who are willing to take a critical view, even though that might not net them as many dollars in government contracts for cybersecurity work.


[1] For example, see Gertz, Bill. “China Blocks U.S. From Cyber Warfare.  Washington Times, May 12, 2009, available from; Markoff, John, and Thom Shanker.  “Panel Advises Clarifying U.S. Plans on Cyberwar.  New York Times, 30 April, 2009, available from; and Sanger, David E., John Markoff, and Thom Shanker.  “U.S. Steps Up Effort on Digital Defenses.  New York Times, April 28, 2009, available from

[2] Marcus J. Ranum, CSO, Tenable Network Security, “The Problem with CyberWar,” presentation at DojoSec Monthly Briefings (March 2009), available from

[3] Sean Lawson, “Virtual Mind Control: Nonviolence as the Pinnacle of Excellence for Information Age Conflict, Technoscience (Fall 2004: Vol 20, Num 3), 9-13. Download

[4] Gregory Witol, “International Relations in a Digital World.  In Cyberwar 2.0: Myths, Mysteries, and Reality, edited by Alan D. Campen, and Douglas H. Dearth, 65-76. Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1998.

[5] The National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations. Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2006, p.15.

[6] The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; a Vision for Tomorrow. Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2004, p.1.

[7] Owens, William A., Kenneth W. Dam, and Herbert S. Lin. Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities. Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2009, p.178.

[8] Markoff, John, and Thom Shanker.  “Panel Advises Clarifying U.S. Plans on Cyberwar.  New York Times, April 30, 2009, available from

[9] Ibid.

[10] Freedman, Lawrence.  “Strategic Terror and Amateur Psychology.  The Political Quarterly 2 (2005): 161-70.

[11] Biddle, Tami Davis. Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas About Strategic Bombing, 1914-1945. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 2002.

[12] Dunlap Jr, Charles J.  “How We Lost the Hi-Tech War of 2007.  The Weekly Standard 1 (1996); Dunlap, Jr, Charles J.  “Sometimes the Dragon Wins: A Perspective on Info-Age Warfare.   Phil Taylor’s Web Site (1996).

[13] Tomes, Robert R. U.S. Defense Strategy From Vietnam to Operation Iraqi Freedom: Military Innovation and the New American Way of War, 1973-2003. London: Routledge, 2007.

Technorati Tags: cyberwar, cyberwarfare, cyberattack, cybersecurity


  • Guest
Session I: Continuity of Operations for Critical Missions


Successfully defending the Information Environment from sophisticated adversaries is a serious challenge. How do we ensure mission success when networks, are down, degraded or untrusted? Partnership between the DoD and our industry allies is critical to ensure survivability for our National Security Missions in the face of sophisticated cyber threat. Industry Considerations: Increased Participation in Exercises (Cyber storm III). Technology and consulting to enable mission focused network operation. Intelligence sharing on threats, dependencies and cascade effects. Increased focused on knowing dependencies, failure modes & cascade effects.

Mr. Perry Luzwick
Mr. Anthony Bargar, OASD/NII
Mr. Bill Neugent, MITRE
Mr. Don O'Neill, President, Center for National Software Studies
Prof. Russell Rochte, Joint Military Intelligence College
To what extent does DOD dependence on the Private Sector exceed Private Sector commitment?
The government with its dependence on the industrial base finds itself in the mesh of the critical infrastructure, but is the government just another sector or does it have a governance and oversight role?

Anthony Bargar comments:
Threats have shifted from random attacks and "pranks" to a more organized and focused effort, coordinated across dispersed resources, aimed at financial and political targets.
GIG Mission Assurance - Making sure the GIG "works under fire", and that data is not only accurate, but we can recover from successful attacks. We can't make everything resilient and redundant, so we have to decide on "mission Essential Functions".

DoD IG Report - 60% of programs lack contingency plans, and of those that have one, 80% have not tested them.
Don O'Neill comments: This is all a management question.

Preparation, Opportunity, and Cleanup costs drive decisions in the private sector. We are not hearing the discussion framed in this way. We are instead, we are hearing stovepiped discussions about resources not under our actual control. Industry infrastructure is comprised on an accidental system of systems, and the government is in the mesh of this system.
It is time for the government to play a supernumerary role before the system is no longer controllable or manageable.
We simply don't understand how dependent the DoD is on the private we have to guess. Real answers are not known with certainty. The protection model is not appropriate to the challenge.

We need to move beyond the combination lock to a strategy more like a chess game - with some flexibility, and move the locus of control from protection to resilience.

Critical Infrastructure holders have not coordinated recovery time objectives - no incentive to do so. How do you measure immediacy of needs, and reconcile and prioritize them?

Resiliency and recovery times need to be measured and updated at least annually.

BASE DEFINITION OF RESILIENCY Resiliency is the ability to anticipate, avoid, withstand, minimize, and recover from the effects of adversity, whether natural or manmade, under all circumstances of use.

The full text of Don O’Neill’s comments are found at: Framing the Issue and Vision For Resiliency, Don O’Neill, Center for National Software Studies,

Bill Neugent comments:

We're naked in cyberspace...tests show a 98% success rate of bad guys penetrating our networks. Perhaps we should rethink our expectations...we are getting a 2, and they are getting a 98. Maybe this is a fight we should not expect to win...but change our way of thinking. Assume they are inside, and assure the mission instead of the system.

We need to exercise for real - tabletop or otherwise, let's stop pretending the adversary has no cyber forces. What do we realyl need to protect? Have we thought through requirements for mission resilience? How do we reconstitute our infrastructure. This is different thinking from that of the past.

When we fight, we sould go after the networks...we would want to "own" the networks, not in an obvious wouldn't they want to do that to us? How would you defend against that? A public/private partnership is the only way to defend against this threat.

We need to think longer term...we could be losing a war 20 years from now and not even know it.

Q - Characteristics of an exercise? A - Need to involve the user, and to plan for three events: Safety of flight (so to speak), Protect the exercise from adversaries so they can't exploit our training, and keep costs under control so as not to bust the budget day one. We need better playbooks, better and more realistic scenarios.

Q - Business Practices - what about protection? And how do I talk to leadership about the urgency of this problem to the laymen (non-IT or IA people) who make the decisions? A1 - Shape the discussion in terms of TCO or other business models that address cost in terms they understand (keep the technology out of the discussion). A2 - Problem is that Federal Government gets it but the private sector does not always get it.

Prof Russ Rochte comments:

Most critical aspect ot Resiliency must account for personal and corporate psychological resilience...the people involved. Second, people are networks, and human-centric networks don't have firewalls. RUMINT, the media, etc. will all serve to make the fear factor worse. Third - failing to plan for a train the people can doom otherwise elegant technological solutions. All plans begin and and with the people.

Q - Is there an existing forum for engagement on this subject for hte private sector? How do we make the business case - is the greatest threat the overabundance of capacity which has lulled us into complacency? A1 - Little cross-sector interaction, but rich discussion within stovepipes. People don't mind talking about their common problems, but are reluctant to stand "naked to the world". A2 - At the national level, there is some cooperation starting, but within sectors. There needs to be a framework to shape the discussion. We also need to raise awareness across constituents. A3 - We owe a lot to our adversaries, who have helped us to get better at becming aware.

Comment - there actually is a lot of discussion and good work going on, across all 18 sectors of critical infrastructure. Dureing hurricane Gustav, we (for the first time) had a cross-sector group involved to inform decision makers.
Q - We used to do "red team" attackson bases back in the SAC days (Global Shield) - do we still do that? A1 - There is some thinking-through type exercises going on, but not to the extent of the GS exercises 9it is not what it needs to be). A2 - It comes down to better plans and exercises.

Q - Different forces use the network and IA in different ways - do our adversaries have the same dependencies as we do? Is there a balance of power? A1 - We haven't seen a real adversary in a full-on attack yet. We need to compartmentailze our capabilities in order to build resiliency. A2 - WalMart and eBay...we are about hte most IT dependent country in the world. There are a lot of places that are becoming more IT dependent. A3 - Assumption is that we proceed in a lawful manner, but our adversaries may (probably won't) play by the same rules. What if VISA couldn't process transactions on Black Friday? What will our response be? A4 - Resileincy as a means of deterrence...we can take a hit and then come back and and counter-attack. Concern is attribution and whether we can respond kinetically to a cyber attack.

Q - What is the best deterrence? A1 - Cross-sector collaboration in event of attack, can we leverage the other elements of national power...because we share the commoon infrastructure. A2 - Lots of work being done at the national level to solve this problem...and by nature this is not something we want to talk about publicly.

Q - OK, so the adversary is in the network...what are we doing, and how do we act - differently, or the same? A1 - We need to shake the foundation of our processes on this. We can't keep them out, so we need to position ourselves to fight them in our space. We need to look at investing in fallback capabilities - this all costs money. We have to get past these notions that cyber will be done cheaply. Requirements need to address resiliency - including unit readiness. A2 - Increased intel sharing and fusion are part of the strategy.

Q - Is there a training initiative in this space? How do we traing people? A1 - NMIC is exploring an educational program, but trianing is not my AOR (Rochte) so I prefer not to comment on that. A2 - Work is being done on an IO/IA cyber range - to practice and test as part of training and exercises.

Q - Resiliency vs redundancy...what is the difference and is there a debate? A1 - Redundancy is backup to a system. Resiliency is more the system of systems approach, to offset propagating and crosscut effects. Hard to backup a system of systems. A2 - We need to ask, "what do we want to happen..." in order to decide how to prepare. A3 - Resiliency is not just technology - it is people, processes, doctrine, DOTMLPF, all of that in order to review risk management models, etc., in order to protect what is key. A4 - Which functions do I preserve? That is the very basic question we need to answer. We need to retain those folks who have the skills necessary in a non-cyber environment...break out the slide rules... A5- Preserving trust aspects...opening the doors tomorrow is important, and mught be the key driver for decisions.

Q - Intel support to IO and resiliency - how do we quantify or profile the adversary like we do kinetic there something we can do to answer a Commander's PIRs and IRs. A1 - Everyone is naked in ther eis a lot of collecting we can do. A2 - Alerts based on traffic, etc. that can key assets.

Q - JTF maneuver environment - network opns - info flowing - how do we compartmentalize to our advantage? A1 - Mr. Lentz' strategy is to understand the local requirements at the tactical level in order to come up with solutions that allow the sharing of info.

Q - Are there investments in the operational world that can speed restoration of combat power in this space? Is there an "idiot light" for knowing when to fix/invest/etc? A1 - It would be good to have a way to do that - to understand what and when to do something based on a pre-planned protocol. It is likely not money-related...more so capability related. Maybe we need some sort of SWAT team for situations like this. A2 - The military does a good job of measuring, so there must likely be a way to apply that mindset.

To what extent does DOD possess an awareness of Private Sector readiness?

What is the plan to deploy resiliency in the critical infrastructure?

To what extent can public policy measures serve as an instrument of deployment?

Specifically, what actions are needed in preparation, operations, and reconstitution?
See link for Bio's:

SOLUTIONS Series: Information Assurance Program

Track 1: Assured Information Access
How do we achieve effective assured information sharing in light of the increasing threat? How do we address the secondary challenge of identifying break through technologies on the horizon that will enable robust information sharing (Virtualization) and MLS operations?

Tuesday 1000-1200, Protecting the Core Networks
How do we protect Core Networks while enabling collaboration with key partners? Have an industry/government panel to review refined architecture coming out of NITT and Initiative 7.

Moderator: Dr. Dan Wiener, Vice President and CTO, BAE Systems
Panelist: Mr. Bob Gleichauf, VP/CTO Enterprise Services & Security, Cisco | BIO
Panelist: Col. Barry Hensley, Director AGNOSC, JTF GNO | BIO
Panelist: Maj. David Partridge, JTF-GNO, J35, USA
Panelist: Mr. Marcus Sachs, Executive Director of Government Affairs for National Security Policy, Verizon | BIO

Tuesday 1500-1700, Assured Collaboration
How do we protect data across the enterprise to include Multi Domain Dissemination System (MDDS), encryption, identity assurance/network access control (NAC), and metadata tagging?

Moderator: Dr. Dan Wiener, Vice President and CTO, BAE Systems
Panelist: Mr. Bruce Brody, Vice President for Cyber Security and Chief Security Officer, The Analysis Group, LLC | BIO
Panelist: Mr. Bill Ross, Director, IA Systems and Programs, General Dynamics C4 Systems | BIO
Panelist: Dr. Ed Siomacco, Director OIAC, USA

Wednesday 1000-1200, Optimizing A Secure Mobile Environment/Tactical Edge
Optimizing Secure Mobile Environment/Tactical Edge (WLAN, WiMAX, SME/PED). How pervasive will this solution be throughout NSS community?

Moderator: Dr. Dan Wiener, Vice President and CTO, BAE Systems
Panelist: Mr. Carey Bandler, Defense Programs, World Wide Technology
Panelist: Mr. Greg Gordon, Wireless Engineering Specialist, Cisco Systems | BIO
Panelist: Dr. L. Fred Horney, Cryptographic Modernization Project Management Office, USA
Panelist: Mr. Matt Quick, Chief of the secure wired/wireless division, NSA | BIO

Track 2: Network Resiliency and Globalization
Missions are increasingly dependent on the information & communications technology (ICT) underpinnings provided by our shared critical information infrastructures. The effects of Globalization, Network Convergence, and an increasingly net-centric information environment are our strategic advantages as well as our achilles heel. We share risks and vulnerabilities, and benefits between the Government and Private sector, how will we collaborate on protecting and defending this vital resource?

Tuesday 1000-1200, Continuity of Operations for Critical Missions
Successfully defending the Information Environment from sophisticated adversaries is a serious challenge. How do we ensure mission success when networks, are down, degraded or untrusted? Partnership between the DoD and our industry allies is critical to ensure survivability for our National Security Missions in the face of sophisticated cyber threat. Industry Considerations: Increased Participation in Exercises (Cyber storm III). Technology and consulting to enable mission focused network operation. Intelligence sharing on threats, dependencies and cascade effects. Increased focused on knowing dependencies, failure modes & cascade effects.

Moderator: Mr. Perry Luzwick
Panelist: Mr. Anthony Bargar, OASD/NII | BIO
Panelist: Mr. Bill Neugent, MITRE
Panelist: Mr. Don O'Neill, President, Center for National Software Studies | BIO
Panelist: Prof. Russell Rochte, Joint Military Intelligence College

Tuesday 1500-1700, Global Infrastructure Resiliency for National Security Missions
National Security depends on assured global information infrastructures that are reliable and resilient. Real-time risk management and situational awareness between the government and private sector are essential to responding to a cyber crisis, as is the consideration of what national security missions are affected, potential cascade effects, and the prioritized approaches for restoration.

Moderator: Mr. Perry Luzwick
Panelist: Capt. Daryl Caudle, JCS/J5
Panelist: Ms. Kathryn Condello, IES Chair/NSTAC, Qwest
Panelist: Mr. Lawrence Hale, Chief, Customer Service Branch, National Communications System, DHS | BIO

Wednesday 1000-1200, Information and Communications Technology and the Global Marketplace
The global information and communications technology (ICT) marketplace brings innumerable benefits to the DoD and the extended Defense Industrial Base. Unknown supply chains have created an environment where trustworthiness in commercial products are no longer implicit. Risk and risk mitigation must be considered across the entire lifecycle of the product or system, from requirements development to retirement and requires close partnership between the USG and industry.

Moderator: Mr. Perry Luzwick
Panelist: Mr. Robert Dix, Juniper Networks
Panelist: Mr. Richard Hale, Chief Information Assurance Executive, Defense Information Systems Agency | BIO
Panelist: Mr. Mitch Komaroff, OASD/NII
Panelist: Ms. Cheri McGuire, Principal Security Strategist, Microsoft | BIO

Track 3: Risk Management
How do we move from a reactive risk adverse culture to a risk managed Net Centric environment?

Tuesday 1000-1200, Enhanced Compliance/Security Best Practices
There is an on-going U.S. Government multi-agency initiative to enable automation and standardization of technical security operations. This is a large effort that encompasses understanding and implementation of vulnerability management, measurement and policy compliance. Ensuring that government agencies are correctly implementing and complying with security best practices is at the forefront of this initiative. What established standards and models are recommended for meeting today's organizations unique security needs? How do you implement enhanced security best practices without creating excessive management complexity? What are today’s biggest security challenges? Do you think they can be overcome with more wide spread use of enhanced compliance/security best practices? What does an enhanced compliance/security best practices implementation look like in today's world? Architecture: How can vendors be encouraged to implement best security practices into their development lifecycle? How much is risk reduced by implementing enhanced compliance technologies? Is there a commonly agreed upon list of security best practices?

Moderator: CAPT, USNR Joe Grace, President and Chief Executive Officer, Grace & Associates | BIO
Panelist: Mr. Andrew Bove, CTO, Secure Elements
Panelist: Mr. David Hollis, Senior CyberSpace and IA Program Manager, ASD NII/DoD CIO, DASD IIA | BIO
Panelist: Mr. Richard Marcell, CIV, USA, DCS G-2
Panelist: Mr. Ron Ross, NIST

Tuesday 1500-1700, How do we Measure Risk?
Incumbent in the concept of Risk Management is the notion of being able to measure risk. This panel session will explore the ability to effectively measure the risk of posture of IT networks and the value of doing so. How can the risks associated with IT networks be measured? What are the key factors to be considered? Given that a single vulnerability in a network can lead to compromise, is the notion of risk measurement & risk management meaningful? Do risk measurement techniques have sufficient granularity to allow insight into the relative advantage between alternate countermeasures? Are there tools or specific techniques that are viewed as being of particular utility in considering these factors when one is designing a network architecture? Are there any insights into how to consider the value of intellectual property, historical transaction data, business continuity, and other non-tangible assets when measuring risk?

Moderator: CAPT, USNR Joe Grace, President and Chief Executive Officer, Grace & Associates | BIO
Panelist: Mr. Curtis Levinson, CSO & Director, Information Assurance, Qwest Government Services, Inc. | BIO
Panelist: Ms. Anna Noteboom, IA Solutions Architect, Avaya Federal Solutions | BIO
Panelist: Mr. Trent Pitsenbarger, Technical Director, Systems and Network Analysis Center, NSA | BIO
Panelist: Ms. Margaret Salter, IA Directorate, Vulnerability Analysis and Operations, NSA | BIO
Panelist: Mr. Jeff Waters, Director of Federal Operations, Securify

Wednesday 1000-1200, Enterprise Security Management
What are the next generation threats in your systems and how do you recommend protecting against them? How do you recommend pinpointing future potential breaches in your implemented tools? Do you think common solutions should be considered to address some of the security challenges today? What is the state of standards related to enterprise security management. Is there a lack of standards that hinders implementation or forces vendor specific stove-piped solutions? Are there technologies like Active Management Technology (AMT) and Trusted Platform Modules (TPM) playing a big role in Enterprise Security Management?

Moderator: CAPT, USNR Joe Grace, President and Chief Executive Officer, Grace & Associates | BIO
Panelist: Mr. John Abeles, President & CEO, System 1
Panelist: Mr. Ron Knode, Director, Global Security Solutions, CSC | BIO
Panelist: Mr. Rich Mangan, Manager, Key & Identity Management, General Dynamics C4 Systems | BIO
Panelist: Ms. Marcia Weaver, Chief of Enterprise Security Management Special Program Office, NSA | BIO

Track 4: Enabling a US Government Cyber Workforce
How do we improve capability of the current USG cyber security workforce to effectively defend our nation in cyberspace? How do we strengthen the cyber security workforce pipeline for the future? How do we extend cyber awareness and literacy to other disciplines beyond Information Security/Information Technology?

Tuesday 1000-1200, Building Cyber Security Professionals for Today
How do we improve capability of the current USG cyber security workforce to effectively defend our nation in cyberspace? What is the state of the current cyber workforce? How do we institutionalize workforce management and career progression opportunities? How can Government foster a continuum of learning activities? Are current training methods raising professionalism? How do we continually evaluate and measure the workforce to enforce minimum capability standards? (for example, using certifications or certificates) What methods should be in place to exercise and augment workforce performance on a continuous basis?

Moderator: Ms. Kat Hollis, Principal, Booz Allen Hamilton
Panelist: Mr. Donald Adams, Technical Director, Training and Workforce Development Center, NSA
Panelist: Mr. George Bieber, Director, IA Workforce Improvement Program, DIAP | BIO
Panelist: Dr. Gil Duval, NDU
Panelist: Mr. Brian Wolsencroft, IA Engineering Manager, Raytheon | BIO

Tuesday 1500-1700, Growing Cyber Security Professionals for Tomorrow
How do we strengthen the cyber security workforce pipeline for the future? How can government effectively recruit/ provide qualified candidates with access to opportunities and compelling incentives for Federal service? What professional development initiatives should be in place for prospective personnel to develop cyber related skills? What must be done to bring cyber curriculum into the 21st Century? How do we encourage community colleges/technical schools in addition to higher education to produce new and qualified candidates for federal service?

Moderator: Ms. Kat Hollis, Principal, Booz Allen Hamilton
Panelist: Mr. Ted Dmuchowski, Acting Principal Director, Army CIO/G-6 | BIO
Panelist: Dr. Don Goff, Vice President, Criterion Systems | BIO
Panelist: Mr. Walt Hare, Cyber Security CoP Lead, SRA | BIO
Panelist: Dr. Jane Homeyer, Director of Competencies and Standards, ODNI
Panelist: Mr. John Lainhart, Partner, IBM Global Business Services | BIO

Wednesday 1000-1200, Awareness and Literacy for Government in the Cyber Age
How do we extend cyber awareness and literacy to other disciplines beyond Information Security/Information Technology? How do we get US government leadership “hooked” on cyber security? What methods will “raise the bar” on cyber awareness and literacy for all personnel across government? How do we measure the impact of sensitizing users to evolving cyber security issues? How can we support outreach to industry, state and local government, and allies to understand and support USG cyber security mission and vision? How can government promote academic excellence: cyber research and educational opportunities for teachers and academics?

Moderator: Ms. Kat Hollis, Principal, Booz Allen Hamilton
Panelist: Dr. Pete Fonash, Director, National Command and Coordination Capability, DHS
Panelist: Ms. Susan Hansche, Director, IA Training Programs, Nortel Government Solutions | BIO
Panelist: Dr. Margaret Myers, Assistant Director, Information Technology and Systems Division, Institute for Defense Analyses | BIO
Panelist: Lt Col Joseph Trechter, USAF

Offline Satyagraha

  • Global Moderator
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 8,941
This quote from an article published appx. 1 year ago...

Cross-Domain Response to Cyber Attacks
and the Threat of Conflict Escalation


At a time when it seems impossible to avoid the seemingly growing hysteria over the threat of cyber war,[1] network security expert Marcus Ranum delivered a refreshing talk recently, “The Problem with Cyber War,” that took a critical look at a number of the assumptions underlying contemporary cybersecurity discourse in the United States.  He addressed one issue in partiuclar that I would like to riff on here, the issue of conflict escalation–i.e. the possibility that offensive use of cyber attacks could escalate to the use of physical force.  As I will show, his concerns are entirely legitimate as current U.S. military cyber doctrine assumes the possibility of what I call “cross-domain responses” to cyberattacks.

His description of "cross-domain responses" (e.g, the US response to a cyber attack could be in another 'domain' - air, land, sea - militarily) was recently supported by the Obama Administration's Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, in the following post:

U.S. Cyber Command: Waging War In World’s Fifth Battlespace

May 26, 2010

U.S. Cyber Command: Waging War In World’s Fifth Battlespace
by Rick Rozoff

On May 21 U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced the activation of the Pentagon’s first computer command. And the world’s first comprehensive, multi-service military cyber operation.

U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM), initially approved on June 23, 2009, attained the status of what the Pentagon calls initial operations capability eleven months afterward. It is to be fully operational later this year.

CYBERCOM is based at Fort Meade, Maryland, which also is home to the National Security Agency (NSA). The head of the NSA and the related Central Security Service is Keith Alexander, U.S. Army lieutenant general on the morning of May 21 but promoted to four-star general before the formal launching of Cyber Command later in the day so as to become its commander.

The U.S. Senate confirmed Alexander for his new position on May 7. In written testimony presented to Congress earlier, he stated that in addition to the defense of computer systems and networks, “the cyber command would be prepared to wage offensive operations as well….” [1] Two days before his confirmation the Associated Press reported that Alexander “said the U.S. is determined to lead the global effort to use computer technology to deter or defeat enemies.” [2] The conjunction “and” would serve the purpose better than “or.”

The day Alexander assumed his new command Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn “called the establishment of U.S. Cyber Command at Fort Meade, Md., today a milestone in the United States being able to conduct full-spectrum operations in a new domain,” adding that the “cyber domain…is as important as the land, sea, air and space domains to the U.S. military, and protecting military networks is crucial to the Defense Department’s success on the battlefield.” [3]

The Pentagon’s second-in-charge is not the only person to refer to cyber warfare as the world’s fifth battleground after those of land, sea, air and space, nor to link the first with the other four.

Indeed, the Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review released earlier this year focuses on “a broader range of military responsibilities, including defending space and cyberspace,” [4] and the Pentagon’s space operations are now grouped with cyber warfare as the new Cyber Command is subsumed under U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), which is in charge of the militarization of space as well as the global interceptor missile project, information warfare and related missions.

In its own words, “USSTRATCOM combines the synergy of the U.S. legacy nuclear command and control mission with responsibility for space operations; global strike; Defense Department information operations; global missile defense; and global command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR), and combating weapons of mass destruction.” [5]

“U.S. CYBERCOM is a sub-unified command under U.S. Strategic Command, of Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. But it will be run out of the super-secretive communications-gathering National Security Agency in Fort Meade, Md.” [6]

Three months ago U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz addressed a conference of the Air Force Association, but he “did not mention fighters, special operations or mobility,” instead concentrating on space and cyberspace. “We have an enduring need for robust space and cyberspace capabilities,” he told the audience.

The Air Force Times provided background information regarding Schwartz’s comments and connected the role of space and cyber warfare: “Space and cyberspace missions were brought together last year, when the service moved many of its communications and computer missions into Space Command and created the 24th Air Force to be the service’s in-house ‘cyber command.’

“At the same time, Space Command’s nuclear missile role was transferred to the new Global Strike Command.” [7]

The 24th Air Force will be joined by the Army Forces Cyber Command and the  10th Fleet and Marine Forces Cyber Command (representing the four main branches of the U.S. armed forces) in providing the first 1,000 personnel for the new multi-service Cyber Command.

The day that CYBERCOM was launched, the Pentagon announced that “The U.S. Army will consolidate 21,000 soldiers in its cyber warfare units under a new unified command led by a three-star general.” Army Forces Cyber Command, ARFORCYBER, “will be fully operational by October at Fort Belvoir, Va., a sprawling base south of Washington,” and will achieve “unprecedented unity of effort and synchronization of Army forces operating within the cyber domain.”  In the words of the Army’s chief cyber commander, Major General Steven Smith, his service is “trying to understand what a cyber warrior should be, and how they should be trained.” [8]

A few days before the Air Force revealed that since last November it has transferred at least 30,000 troops from communications and electronics assignments to “the front lines of cyber warfare.” [9]

Earlier this month Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy James Miller was cited as maintaining that
“The Pentagon would consider a military response in
the case of a cyber attack against the United States.”

He was quoted as proposing a direct military reaction to computer attacks, stating “we need to think about the potential for responses that are not limited to the cyber domain.” [10]

False flag cyber attack on the US Military
Stolen data? Corruption of data? Computers that control critical physical infrastructure disable or destroy infrastructure, Missile launches? Hack into a UAV which is then used to blow up civilian targets (school? shopping mall?) Any number of attack 'types' are possible.

Outrage; heightened if civilian targets are used - shock and awe. The more 'innocent' the target, the greater the reaction. 

Patsy identified in the first few hours; patsy name associated with foreign enemy 'target' (Iran, No.Korea, China, Russia, Pakistan, etc., possibly home-grown 'terrorist' patsy with ties to foreign target (if possible, also use this opportunity to legitimize 'underwear bomber' or Ft.Hood shooting MKUltra victims if possible - "never let a crisis go to waste".)

Lockdown starts - Immediate actions to shut down internet begin; announcements claiming that (as we've already heard from the NWO media outlets - we need to Nationalize the Internet -  which, of course, means "INTERNATIONALIZE" the internet (psyop is that there is still a valid concept of national sovereignty)... which will get all Americans on board (via the shock and awe) with giving up their rights to have free and open communcations via the internet in EXCHANGE for safety.

WWIII: whoever they connect to the patsy, or USE as the patsy, will be the target nation to use for this abomination.

Note: From TODAY's Washington Post: the pre-false-flag positioning statement. They are preparing us for this:

Cyber Command chief says military computer networks are vulnerable to attack
By Ellen Nakashima
Washington Post Staff Writer
Friday, June 4, 2010

The U.S. government is seeing "hints" that adversaries are targeting military networks for "remote" sabotage, the head of the Pentagon's recently launched Cyber Command said in his first public remarks since being confirmed last month.

"The potential for sabotage and destruction is now possible
and something we must treat seriously,"

said Gen. Keith B. Alexander, who also heads the National Security Agency, the nation's largest intelligence agency. "Our Department of Defense must be able to operate freely and defend its resources in cyberspace."

Alexander spoke Thursday before more than 300 people at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.

In remarks afterward, Alexander said he is concerned about the safety of computer systems used in war zones. "The concern I have is when you look at what could happen to a computer, clearly sabotage and destruction are things that are yet to come," he said. "If we don't defend our systems, people will be able to break them."

James A. Lewis, director of CSIS's Technology and Public Policy Program, said advanced militaries are capable of destroying U.S. computer systems. "That wasn't true four years ago, but it's true now and Cyber Command will have to deal with it," he said.

The Cyber Command, launched last month at Fort Meade, was created by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates to streamline the military's capabilities to attack and defend in cyberspace, supported by NSA's intelligence capabilities.

Alexander stressed that the Command will focus on protecting the U.S. military's 15,000 computer networks under oversight of the special Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Congress and the administration. His remarks were aimed at assuaging concerns over the NSA's role in helping to protect civilian and private-sector networks, as well as fears of a "militarization" of cyberspace.

"We spend a lot of time with the court, with Congress, the administration, the oversight committees to ensure they know what we're doing and why we're doing it," Alexander said.

This is done in classified settings, he said, including before the surveillance court, set up as part of the effort to protect Americans from unwarranted government surveillance.

"The hard part is, we can't go out and tell everybody exactly what we did or we give up capability that may be extremely useful in protecting our country and our allies," he said.

Alexander's confirmation was delayed for months by congressional concerns over the command's role and scope of action, how its operations would affect Americans' privacy, and a lack of clarity over rules of the road in cyber warfare.

The rules are still being debated and formulated, he said. So are the rules of engagement for working with the Department of Homeland Security and private industry in protecting the private sector's systems, which is perhaps the most difficult challenge.

But Alexander has his hands full just hardening the military's systems. DOD systems are probed by unauthorized users more than 6 million times a day.

"While our front-line defenses are up to this challenge, we still have to devote too much of our time and resources to dealing with relatively mundane problems," such as poorly engineered software and missing patches, he said.
And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40


  • Guest

Estonia readies for the next cyberattack
Estonia's defense minister says the questions is not if, but when another attacks will occur.

Robert McMillan (IDG News Service) 08 April, 2010 06:49

More than anyone else, Jaak Aaviksoo has first-hand knowledge of what a cyberwar might feel like. In April 2007, Estonia's banking, media and government presence online was disrupted by several waves of distributed denial of service attacks that knocked services offline. The country is heavily wired -- 90 percent of all financial transactions are conducted over the Internet and 70 percent of the population files their tax returns electronically -- so the incident was widely felt by the country's 1.3 million citizens.

Estonia's cyber meltdown coincided with major civil unrest. Protests by Russian nationals, unhappy at the government's decision to relocate a Soviet military war memorial to a less-prominent location, had flooded the streets of Tallinn. The country's Russian embassy was blocked by protesters too.

By hobbling Estonia's online infrastructure at such a time, the cyber-attackers hoped to make it look like the Estonian government was losing its grip on the situation, according to Aaviksoo, who is Estonia's defense minister and managed the country's response to the incident. "The virtual medium has become an inseparable part of real life in real space," he said, speaking earlier this month at Stanford University. "So those attacks ... were aiming at the credibility of the Estonian government."

Security analysts dispute whether the Estonian attacks were, in fact, cyberwar, but in many ways that's beside the point. In the online world, everything is murky. Criminals can hop between countries and launch attacks from hacked machines, making it hard to figure out who they are or even where they come from. According to Aaviksoo, whether the 2007 incident was actually cyberwar is still "an open question."

Has Estonia learned much about this type of warfare in the three years since the attacks? Certainly. But in this edited interview with Aaviksoo, he says that in some ways the country could be doing more to prepare for the next major cyber-incident, which he says will inevitably come about.

IDG News Service: There are regions in the world where it's difficult to get action on cybercrime. What can we do to put pressure on places like Moldova or Ukraine, where hackers are never arrested?

Jaak Aaviksoo: It's not that easy. There are two reasons for that. Some of those countries have many more serious problems than cybersecurity and cybercrime legislation. Secondly, sometimes there are only claims that people are acting from those geographic locations. We can't prove that.

Like there are safe havens for terrorism -- I mean, Afghanistan is one example, Yemen is emerging. We don't know about Nigeria. There are very many more safe havens in cyberspace than in real space. And even the only international working document -- the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime [ ] -- is so far signed and ratified by 50 countries. So there's a long, long way to go, for different reasons. Sometimes there are constitutional limitations for ratifying [cybercrime law], some don't take that seriously. Some may have bad ideas about this Convention altogether.

IDGNS: How important is international cooperation to solving the problem of cybercrime?

Aaviksoo: I think it's extremely important. I don't think that we can achieve anything really without international cooperation. It's not necessarily 100 percent, so that all countries must cooperate. But clearly major countries should cooperate and make life more and more complicated for those who want to evade prosecution.

IDGNS: Did you get much cooperation from your neighbors when the attacks were happening in Estonia?

Aaviksoo: Unfortunately, not from Russia. They introduced formal excuses of not having the appropriate legal agreements in place to look into cybercrime.

IDGNS: Do you feel this has evolved at all since then? If there is another attack, will you get better cooperation?

Aaviksoo: I won't comment further. It's clearly a complicated case, not only in the case of cyberattacks in Estonia, but also in the case of cyberattacks in Georgia during the crisis. And in a few other cases, there is indirect evidence that the willingness to cooperate is not at the level which we would like to see.

IDGNS: From an international perspective, if you were to be attacked again, do you think things would be different? What's changed since then?

Aaviksoo: I think we have many more international agreements in place. We do have technology measures in place. We are able to monitor what's going on. We'd definitely be better in the assignment of the attacks; we can better follow where it's coming from. So we've done a lot of work to prevent similar things happening.

IDGNS: Estonia is the poster-child for this type of attack. What's the thing people are not getting right now? What's the most common strategic mistake that other countries are making with respect to cyberattacks?

Aaviskso: I think the biggest problem is the lack of public awareness, in the broadest sense of the term. Without public awareness and public concern, politicians tend to underestimate the threats. In a democratic society, you respond to what people ask you to do. So there is no strong pressure from the people if the awareness is not there. Somehow they need simple wake-up calls, like what happened in Estonia. And even in the case of Estonia, maybe we were not able to make full use of the momentum we gained in 2007. It's three years ago already, and nothing on that scale has happened since then, and people are saying maybe that was exaggerated, maybe it's not that serious. People are very practical, and they have a number of real-world problems. When they don't see a direct threat from cyberspace, they say maybe it's not there. And that's psychologically understandable, but that doesn't mean that we can underestimate the threats.

IDGNS: I sometimes wonder if the threats are overblown. We've had physical attacks here in the United States; we haven't had that type of paralyzing cyberattack. How much should we be worrying about it?

Aaviksoo: Much of that is hidden. I think this data is not overblown. Identity theft, intellectual property theft, credit card fraud -- it's growing. It's growing at a speed of doubling every year, or something of that kind. So unless you are hit by that kind of crime yourself, I think this is so unreal, something from far away in the expanses of cyberspace. Psychologically it's a much stronger feeling when your purse is stolen from your pocket. That makes these things complicated.

IDGNS: The great fear is that there will be critical infrastructure hit that will cause loss of life. Is that something we should worry about?

Aaviksoo: It is. Direct kinetic damage is also possible. But I don't think we should only think about loss of human lives. If money is being stolen, intellectual property is being stolen, that is also a big problem. This basically means that it drives up costs for cyber security on behalf of the individual players, so I think governments should be made responsible for securing the broader environment. Otherwise the costs by private individuals and industrial or physical people, they simply have to pay too high a price.

IDGNS: What is the chance of a repeat of the 2007 incident?

Aaviksoo: I'd say 100 percent. It depends on what timescale you think of. In the next five years, definitely. Not necessarily for Estonia, but maybe in another country. It depends on a number of circumstances. It's usually not a standalone event.

It may take place anywhere in the world. Of course, in the case of a bigger country, you need more resources to make an international security issue. With a small country, the resources may be more limited, but offensive strategies are also being developed. We know that; we know the countries who invest more. We know countries who haven't done better until recently, but now are developing also offensive capabilities, in order to simulate the offensive environment in order to develop defensive technologies. So it's clearly an emerging battlefield.

IDGNS: Are you developing offensive capabilities?

Aaviksoo: We work on simulating hostile environments. It's like everything -- take biological weapons. You have to know what the threat is, and you have to be able to monitor it.


  • Guest

Why the U.S. Won't Pull a Brazil--Yet
By Shane Harris

When "60 Minutes" reported that computer hackers had shut off the lights in some Brazilian cities, it raised the obvious question of who was behind the alleged attack. The answers aren't clear, but it is clear that many countries are developing the capabilities to attack their adversaries in cyberspace and to do massive damage to critical infrastructures like the electrical grid. The United States already has those capabilities.

In the current issue of National Journal, I tell the story of how the National Security Agency and the U.S. military in Iraq were able to use cyber attacks to penetrate the communications networks of insurgents and foreign fighters. It was a surgical strike, aimed at a discrete target. But it raises an obvious question: Would the United States ever use a more devastating weapon, perhaps shutting off the lights in an adversary nation? The answer is, almost certainly no, not unless America were attacked first.

To understand why, forget about the cyber dimension for a moment. Imagine that some foreign military had flown over a power substation and Brazil and dropped a bomb on it, depriving electricity to millions of people, as well as the places they work, the hospitals they visit, and the transportation they use. If there were no official armed conflict between Brazil and its attacker, the bombing would be illegal under international law. That's a pretty basic test. But even if there were a declared war, or a recognized state of hostilities, knocking out vital electricity to millions of citizens--who presumably are not soldiers in the fight--would fail a number of other basic requirements of the laws of armed conflict. For starters, it could be considered disproportionate, particularly if Brazil hadn't launched any similar sized offensive on its adversary. Shutting off electricity to whole cities can effectively paralyze them. And the bombing would clearly target non-combatants. The government uses electricity, yes, but so does the entire civilian population.

Now add the cyber dimension. If the effect of a hacker taking down the power grid is the same as a bomber--that is, knocking out electrical power--then the same rules apply. That essentially was the conclusion of a National Academies of Sciences report in April. (See the original post in this thread for that report - posted April 29, 2009) The authors write, "During acknowledged armed conflict (notably when kinetic and other means are also being used against the same target nation), cyber attack is governed by all the standard law of armed conflict. ...If the effects of a kinetic attack are such that the attack would be ruled out on such grounds, a cyber attack that would cause similar effects would also be ruled out."

The United States has never argued that the laws of armed conflict don't apply in cyberspace. Indeed, the military has operated under the assumption--based on experience--that cyber weapons can be so devastating that they must be used sparingly. According to a report in The Guardian, military planners refrained from launching a broad cyber attack against Serbia during the Kosovo conflict for fear of committing war crimes. The Pentagon theoretically had the power to "bring Serbia's financial systems to a halt" and to go after the personal accounts of Slobodan Milosevic, the newspaper reported. But when the NATO-led bombing campaign was in full force, the Defense Department's general counsel issued guidance on cyber war that said the law of (traditional) war applied.

The military ran into this same dilemma four years later, during preparations to invade Iraq in 2003. Planners considered whether to launch a massive attack on the Iraqi financial system in advance of the conventional strike. But they stopped short when they realized that the same networks used by Iraqi banks were also used by banks in France. Releasing a vicious computer virus into the system could potentially harm America's allies. Some planners also worried that the contagion could spread to the United States. It could have been the cyber equivalent of nuclear fallout.

The reported conclusions of Pentagon lawyers and planners find echoes in the Academies report: "The fact that an attack is carried out through the use of cyber weapons rather than kinetic weapons is far less significant than the effects that result from such use." That's the critical question facing the United States military as it stands up a new Cyber Command: What real world effect would hacking a power grid have? What disruption to civilian life would corrupting a bank's databases cause? The United States has apparently concluded that the repercussions would be profound, widespread, and unjust.

A year and a half ago, I asked the head of counterintelligence for the United States, Joel Brenner, what kinds of cyber attacks would qualify as acts of war. He'd clearly given the question some thought.
If another nation took out a piece of our power grid,
that would qualify, he said. No different than if they'd
attacked it with explosives. 

In May, the current director of the National Security Agency, Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, told a congressional panel that cyber attacks in Estonia and Georgia a few years ago, which knocked out public communications and disrupted banking, got close to the definition of cyber war. Alexander didn't say whether the United States would ever engage in such attacks. But it's hard to believe that he would think that's a good idea. Not unless we'd been attacked first, and in similar fashion.
And if that had happened,
the escalation from cyber war into real world war
would be swift and devastating.

This article available online at:

Copyright © 2010 by The Atlantic Monthly Group. All Rights Reserved

Offline Dig

  • All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man.
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 63,090
    • Git Ureself Edumacated
Pira International is prepared to serve your needs...


Pira International provides events, training, online information and publications across a wide range of topical issues affecting varied industries. Our 100% independent products are provided globally 24/7 and delivered by teams of independent experts at sites in London, UK and Portland, Maine, US across 14 key industry sectors. We specialise in providing expert quality information on: disruptive technologies and their application, research and product development, globalisation and new markets; production methods; regulatory and compliance.

They once had a "Global Crop Protection Summit" scheduled but it was cancelled at the last minute:
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

  • All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man.
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 63,090
    • Git Ureself Edumacated
All the clandestine tech companies cannot wait to jump onto this bandwagon...

January 19, 2010
Persistently Forecasting disruptive technological innovation
The National Academies has a 136 page document that examines the better ways to forecast disruptive technological innovation

This is one of the main objectives of Nextbigfuture. Nextbigfuture is trying to act as an Office of Technological Assessment and evaluate what is the best ways to use existing technologies and to forecast disruptive technological innovation potential and opportunities.

Persistent Forecasting of Disruptive Technologies
Technological innovations are key causal agents of surprise and disruption. In the recent past, the United States military has encountered unexpected challenges in the battlefield due in part to the adversary's incorporation of technologies not traditionally associated with weaponry. Recognizing the need to broaden the scope of current technology forecasting efforts, the Office of the Director, Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) tasked the Committee for Forecasting Future Disruptive Technologies with providing guidance and insight on how to build a persistent forecasting system to predict, analyze, and reduce the impact of the most dramatically disruptive technologies. The first of two reports, this volume analyzes existing forecasting methods and processes. It then outlines the necessary characteristics of a comprehensive forecasting system that integrates data from diverse sources to identify potentially game-changing technological innovations and facilitates informed decision making by policymakers.

The committee's goal was to help the reader understand current forecasting methodologies, the nature of disruptive technologies and the characteristics of a persistent forecasting system for disruptive technology. Persistent Forecasting of Disruptive Technologies is a useful text for the Department of Defense, Homeland Security, the Intelligence community and other defense agencies across the nation.

This is the first of two reports on disruptive technology forecasting. Its goal is to help the reader understand current forecasting methodologies, the nature of disruptive technologies, and the characteristics of a persistent forecasting system for disruptive technology. In the second report, the committee plans to summarize the results of a workshop which will assemble leading experts on forecasting, system architecture, and visualization, and ask them to envision a system that meets the sponsor requirements while incorporating the desired attributes listed in this report.

The value of technology forecasting lies not in its ability to accurately predict the future but rather in its potential to minimize surprises. It does this by various means:
• Defining and looking for key enablers and inhibitors of new disruptive technologies,
• Assessing the impact of potential disruption,
• Postulating potential alternative futures, and
• Supporting decision making by increasing the lead time for awareness

The Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Defense Warning Office (DWO) asked the National Research Council (NRC) to set up a committee on forecasting future disruptive technologies to provide guidance on and insight into the development of a system that could forecast disruptive technology.

Several pioneering systems already exist that attempt to forecast technology trends, including TechCast, Delta Scan, and X2.

Analysis of these systems offers important insights into the creation of persistent forecasts:
• TechCast (1998). Voluntary self-selecting of people who examine technology advances on an ad hoc basis. The system’s strengths include persistence, quantification of forecasts, and ease of use.
• Delta Scan (2005). Part of the United Kingdom’s Horizon Scanning Centre, organized with the goal of becoming a persistent system.
• X2 (2007). Persistent system with a novel architecture, qualitative assessment, and integration of multiple forecasting techniques.


• Openness. An open approach allows the use of crowd resources to identify potentially disruptive technologies and to help understand their possible impact. Online repositories such as Wikipedia and have shown the power of public-sourced, high-quality content.

• Persistence. In today’s environment, planning cycles are highly dynamic, and cycle times can be measured in days instead of years. For this reason it is important to have a forecasting system that monitors, tracks, and reformulates predictions based on new inputs and collected data.

• Transparency. The contributors and users of the system need to trust that the system operators will not exploit personal or other contributed information for purposes other than those intended. The system should publish and adhere to policies on how it uses, stores, and tracks information.
• Structural flexibility. This should be sufficient to respond to complexity, uncertainty, and changes in technology and methodology.
• Easy access. The system should be easy to use and broadly available to all users.
• Proactive bias mitigation. The main kinds of bias are cultural, linguistic, regional, generational, and experiential. A forecasting system should therefore be implemented to encourage the participation of individuals from a wide variety of cultural, geographic, and linguistic backgrounds to ensure a balance of viewpoints. In many fields, technology is innovated by young researchers, technologists, and entrepreneurs. Unfortunately, this demographic is overlooked by the many forecasters who seek out seasoned and established experts. It is important that an open system include input from the generation most likely to be the source of disruptive technologies and be most affected by them.
• Incentives to participate.
• Reliable data construction and maintenance.
• Tools to detect anomalies and sift for weak signals. A weak signal is an early warning of change that typically becomes stronger when combined with other signals.
• Strong visualization tools and a graphical user interface.
• Controlled vocabulary. The vocabulary of a forecast should include an agreed-upon set of terms that are easy for both operators and users to understand.

Benchmarking and a process for building a persistent forecasting system are discussed.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately


  • Guest

Cyber Command nominee lays out rules of engagement

Choice to lead new organization explains under which authorities the command would operate

By Ben Bain
Apr 16, 2010

The Defense Department wants to integrate its cyberspace operations under a new Cyber Command, but the command’s role in cyber defense would depend on the dynamics of an attack scenario, the nominee to lead the new organization has testified.

Army Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander, the nominee who also heads the National Security Agency, explained the authorities and roles of the Cyber Command in different hypothetical scenarios presented by Senator Carl Levin (D-Mich.), who chairs the Armed Services Committee, during the NSA chief's confirmation hearing.

That exchange before Levin's panel  on April 15, demonstrated how the command could support cyber defense in foreign and domestic settings, with the United States at peace or war. The questioning also provided a glimpse into the complex policy and legal questions that swirl around establishing the command.

To demonstrate how the command would operate, Levin asked Alexander about how it could respond in different attack scenarios:

Support during a traditional armed conflict

Levin: Assume the following: That U.S. forces are engaged in a traditional military conflict with a country – we’ll call it Country C – now how would you conduct cyber operations in that country in support of the combatant commander? Under what authorities, processes, and borders would you be operating in that particular scenario?

Alexander: We would be operating under Title 10 authorities under an execute order supporting, probably, that regional combatant commander. The execute order would have the authorities that we need to operate within that country and we’d have a standing rules of engagement of how to defend our networks. I think that’s the straightforward case, [it] would be an execute order that comes down that regional combatant commander that includes the authorities for cyber [that] are parsed out and approved by the president.

The complexity of neutrality and third parties

Levin: Now the second hypothetical, I want to add a complicating factor to the scenario. Assume that an adversary launches an attack on our forces through computers that are located in a neutral country. That’s what you determine – the attack is coming from computers in a neutral country – how does that alter the way you would operate and the authorities that you would operate under?

Alexander: So that does complicate it. It would still be the regional combatant commander that we’re supporting under Title 10 authorities. There would be an execute order. In that execute order…the standing rules of engagement, it talks about what we can do to defend our networks and where we can go and how we can block. The issue becomes more complicated when on the table are facts such as: We can’t stop the attacks getting into our computers, and if we don’t have the authorities…we’d go back up to a strategic command, to the [defense secretary], and the president for additional capabilities to stop [the attack]. But right now the authorities would be to block it in theater in the current standing rules of engagement, and it would be under and execute order, and again, under Title 10 in support of that regional combatant command.

Levin: Is that execute order likely to have any authority to do more than defend the networks or would you have to, in all likelihood, go back for that authority…?

Alexander: It would probably have the authority to attack within the area of conflict against the other military that we are fighting, and there would be a rules of engagement that articulate what you can do offensively and what you can do defensively…what you would not have the authority to do is reach out into a neutral country and do an attack, and therein lies the complication for a neutral country…

Levin: And neutral being a third country presumably, is that synonymous or does the word neutral mean literally neutral?

Alexander: Well it could be either, sir, it could be a third country or it could be one that we don’t know. I should have brought in [to the conversation] attribution, because it may or may not be a country that we could actually attribute [an attack] to, and that further complicates this. And the neutral country could be used by yet a different country, the adversary, and it’s only a path through. In physical space this is a little bit easier to see, firing from a neutral country, I think the Law of Armed Conflict has some of that in it. It’s much more difficult and this is much more complex when a cyberattack could bounce through a neutral country…

The complicated case of homeland security assistance

Levin: Now a third scenario, more complicated yet. Assume you’re in a peacetime setting [and] all of the sudden we’re hit with a major attack against the computers that manage the distribution of electric power in the United States. Now, the attacks appear to be coming from computers outside the United States, but they’re being routed to computers that are owned by U.S. persons located in thee United States, the routers [are] in the United States. How would [Cyber Command] respond to that situation and under what authorities?

Alexander: That brings in the real complexity of the problem...because there are many issues out there on the table that we can extend, many of which are not yet fully answered. Let me explain: First, the [Homeland Security Department] would have the responsibility for defense of that working with critical infrastructure. [DHS] could through the defense report for civilian authorities [construct] reach out to the Defense Department and ask [for] support. And, sir, one of our requirements in the unified command plan is to be prepared for that task. So we would have that responsibility if asked to do that, again we’d get an execute order and we’d have the standing rules of engagement that we operate under all the time. The issues now [however] are far more complex because you have U.S. persons, civil liberties and privacy all come into that equation, ensuring that privacy while you try to, on the same network potentially, take care of bad actors. A much more difficult problem.

As a consequence you have a joint interagency task force, the FBI [that] has a great joint-cyber investigative task force that would be brought in, all of these come to bear. This is the hardest problem because you have attribution issues, you have the neutrality issue that we mentioned in the second scenario, you have [interagency groups] working together with industry, and I think that’s one of the things that [President Barack Obama] is trying to address with DHS and with [DOD]: how do we actually do that with industry. That’s probably the most difficult and the one that we’re going to spend the most time trying to work our way through: How does the [DOD] help [DHS] in a crisis like that.

Editor's note: The exchanges were edited for clarity.

Offline Joseon

  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 1,062
Most important points:

But energy is our great project, this generation's great project.  And that's why I've set a goal for our nation that we will reduce our carbon pollution by more than 80 percent by 2050. And that is why -- (applause) -- and that is why I'm pursuing, in concert with Congress, the policies that will help meet us -- help us meet this goal.

that means us humans and the post industrial society.

get includes $150 billion over 10 years to invest in sources of renewable energy as well as energy efficiency.  It supports efforts at NASA, recommended as a priority by the Nation
My budal Research Council, to develop new space-based capabilities to help us better understand our changing climate.
tax payer money of course, who voted this guy in.

So ARPA-E seeks to do the same kind of high-risk, high-reward research.  My administration will pursue, as well, comprehensive legislation to place a market-based cap on carbon emissions.  We will make renewable energy the profitable kind of energy.  We will put in place the resources so that scientists can focus on this critical area.  And I am confident that we will find a wellspring of creativity just waiting to be tapped by researchers in this room and entrepreneurs across our country.  We can solve this problem.  (Applause.)
with a drastically reduced population, only then is sustainable development possible.

Key words    "We cans solve this problem" of overpopulation not explicit

Drink distilled water for Pure Health:

Detox with cilantro:

Omura determined that cilantro could mobilize mercury and other toxic metals rapidly from the CNS.96 97

Spread the Word.