Author Topic: Police state interoperable smart grids LOVE the new android from Google  (Read 12357 times)

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Offline Dig

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Google's Nexus One Specs Leaked
http://www.pcworld.com/article/184778/googles_nexus_one_specs_leaked.html
David Ayala, PC World




Even if Google employees have kept mum about Nexus One specifics, ROM hackers have been able to dig deep into the phone's system files to reveal the list of hardware we can expect from the Nexus One.

The clever folks at These Are The Droids have analyzed the Android 2.1 ROM for the Nexus One and discovered specs for the Nexus One, including a proximity and ambient light sensor, an accelerometer, a magnetic compass, WiFi, a stereo FM speaker, a noise-cancellation chipset, OpenGL ES 2.0-capable graphics, and references to an auto-focus camera with LED flash. These are Droids also notes that the ROM 2.1 hints at a Snapdragon processor inside.

The Snapdragon is capable of clock speeds that top 1GHz--nearly double the processor speed of Motorola's DROID. The OpenGL ES 2.0 support should also satisfy gamers, and put the Nexus One on par with the iPhone in terms of graphical power.

Another interesting feature is the purported FM tuner which was also to be included in the Motorola Sholes Tablet specs that leaked out earlier this month (here's hoping we get some iPod Nano-style live radio control!). These Are Droids also reports that the Nexus One will have an 802.11n chipset (most smart phones currently support 802.11g); WiFi N may be overkill for this little machine, but at least it will be able to fit nicely into a dedicated Wireless-N environment.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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Re: Interoperability police state authority LOVES the new android from Google
« Reply #1 on: December 16, 2009, 04:46:27 am »
Nexus One Hardware Running List
http://www.thesearethedroids.com/2009/12/14/nexus-one-hardware-running-list/
Posted by Android 1 in Google Phone, HTC Passion, Nexus One


I spent some time yesterday, the 14th and the morning of the 15th going through all the library files and various other system files from the Nexus One ROM and I have put together a running list of the hardware I found referenced in there.  Here is what I have found so far. I will update with more as I find it. UPDATE: Snapdragon Specific Libraries found.

Proximity Sensor/Light Sensor: Capella CM3602 per sensors.mahimahi.so in Nexus One ROM Dump.
Accelerometer: BMA150 3-axis Accelerometer per sensors.mahimahi.so in Nexus One ROM Dump.
Magnetic Compass:  AK8973 3-axis Magnetic field sensor/AK8973 Orientation sensor per sensors.mahimahi.so in Nexus One ROM Dump.
Wifi Radio / Bluetooth / FM: BCM4329 in lib/modules
In libaudio.so I found “Routing audio to Speakerphone with back mic” reference.
In libaudio.so I found “Stereo FM speaker” also referenced.
Audience A1026 Noise Canceling Chip – No link but here is the A1024 found in libaudio.so
Qualcomm QSD8K Specific hardware libs in lib/hw (QSD8250 Probably)
Adreno 200 Graphics Core with OpenGLES 2.0 – Part of Snapdragon?
Camera Info Vague, found some references to auto focus, flash, white balance and anti-banding in libcamera.so

I am interested mostly in the BCM4329 as it has support for 802.11n and FM Tx and Rx. I’m not sure 802.11n would really be necessary, but it’s good to know it’s there, just in case someone wants exploit that. I did see a screen shot not too long ago of the Motorola Sholes with an FM software app in Android, so that is a possibility.
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Re: Interoperability police state authority LOVES the new android from Google
« Reply #2 on: December 16, 2009, 04:47:28 am »
Proximity Sensor   
http://www.capellamicro.com.tw/EN/products_view.php?id=45&mode=16
Product Brief:   

      
    
Device Name: CM3602 Short Distance Proximity Sensor with Ambient Light Sensor   
    Package:OPLGA-6   
    Power supply(V):2.6 - 3.6   
    ALS Intensity(Lux):0 - 1000   
    PS Distance:over 2cm   
    Output Type:Digital for PS; Analog for ALS   
    Output Range:0 - VDD; 0 - 1.5 (V)   


CM3602 is a highly integrated design for a distance detection and ambient light sensing solution. It incorporates a photodiode, amplifiers, and analog/digital circuits into a single chip by the CMOS process. CM3602 offers outstanding optical precision by O-TrimTM packaged-level trim. O-TrimTM It allows trimming to include other system variations.

CM3602’s adoption of the Filtron™ technology allows the closest ambient light spectral sensitivity to real human eye responses. CM3602 has an excellent temperature compensation capability for keeping the output stable under various temperature configurations. The robust refresh rate setting does not need an external RC low pass filter. Shutdown mode is available as a power saving requirement. CM3602’s operation voltage ranges from 2.6V to 3.6V and can detect a wide range of ambient light power. The maximum detecting light strength is over 1K Lux.
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Re: Interoperability police state authority LOVES the new android from Google
« Reply #3 on: December 16, 2009, 04:48:37 am »
BCM4329 - Low-Power 802.11n with Bluetooth® 2.1 + EDR and FM (Tx and Rx)
Low-Power 802.11n with Bluetooth® 2.1 + EDR and FM (Tx and Rx)
http://www.broadcom.com/products/Bluetooth/Bluetooth-RF-Silicon-and-Software-Solutions/BCM4329


The Broadcom BCM4329 integrates a complete IEEE 802.11 a/b/g/n system (MAC/baseband/radio) with Bluetooth® 2.1 + EDR (Enhanced Data Rate), and FM radio receiver and transmitter. By combining several proven wireless technologies onto a single silicon die, the BCM4329 enables mobile devices to support today's toughest media applications -- without impacting device size or battery life.

The BCM4329 eliminates the barriers of adding the latest wireless connectivity features to small, battery-operated devices. In addition to bringing greater Wi-Fi throughput and coverage to mobile consumer electronics, the BCM4329 is Broadcom's smallest and lowest cost dual-band 802.11n solution. It features integrated 2.4 GHz and 5 GHz WLAN CMOS power amplifiers, which reduce BoM costs while maintaining superior performance. The BCM4329 also utilizes advanced design techniques and process technologies to reduce active and idle power consumption and extend battery life.
Features
Applications
Broadcom's most integrated 65 nm single-chip combo device with single-band (2.4 GHz) 802.11b/g/n or dual-band (2.4 GHz and 5 GHz) 802.11a/b/g/n, plus Bluetooth 2.1 + EDR and FM receiver and transmitter features
Offers one of the industry's most advanced Bluetooth/Wi-Fi coexistence technologies to ensure the best possible user experience
Full featured, on-chip Power Management Unit supporting direct battery (2.3V to 5.5V) connection
Bluetooth Core Specification Version 2.1 + EDR compliant with provisions supporting future specifications and Bluetooth Class 1 or Class 2 transmitter operation
Supports 802.11n performance and range features, such as Space Time Block Coding (STBC), Short Gual Interval (SGI), A-MPDU aggregation, Block Ack, Greenfield, RIFS
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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Re: Interoperability police state authority LOVES the new android from Google
« Reply #4 on: December 16, 2009, 04:50:07 am »
Audience Voice Processor
http://www.audience.com/product-A1024.html


Instantaneously Suppresses Noise
Voice Processor
A1024
A1010
Technology
Applications
Consumer Products
Availablility
Demo
A1024 Performance Specifications

Transmit Noise Suppression

   Handheld Mode (Close-Talk)
Up to 35 dB suppression of stationary noise sources
Up to 30 dB suppression of non-stationary noise sources
Convergence: 500 ms startup, 5 msec continuous
MOS Improvement: Average +0.77 @ SNR range of 0 to 12 dB

   Speakerphone/Video Telephony Mode (Far-Talk)
Up to 25 dB suppression of stationary noise sources
Up to 18 dB suppression of non-stationary noise sources
Convergence: 500 ms startup, 5 msec continuous

Receive Noise Suppression
Up to 20 dB suppression of stationary noise sources
Up to 18 dB suppression of non-stationary noise sources

Acoustic Echo Cancellation
Convergence Time: < 80 msec
Type 1 per ITU P.340 specifications in speakerphone mode
Echo Return Loss Enhancement (ERLE): >35 dB
Echo Tail Length: Up to 1000 ms

Voice Equalization
SNR Target: 15 dB or less
Performance: Maintains SNR within +/- 2 dB for 15 dB SNR Range

Processor
Custom low power DSP with built-in program and data memories
High performance voice processing architecture
Software selectable features via host interface

Control Interface
I²C Slave (7-bit & 10-bit address)

Audio Interfaces
Analog (2 channel in/1 channel out)
Digital bi-directional PCM audio (2 channels)
Dual Digital Microphone (PDM) Interface

Clock and Power Management
Clock input: 12MHz to 26MHz
1.8V~3.3V I/O
Built-in 1.2V LDOs for analog and digital core operation
Two power modes: active and sleep

Package
40-pin (2.7mm x 3.5mm) WLCSP, 0.5mm bump pitch
RoHS Compliant
A1024 Block Diagram
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Re: Police state interoperable smart grids LOVE the new android from Google
« Reply #5 on: December 16, 2009, 04:51:53 am »
Mobility without Compromise
http://www.qctconnect.com/products/snapdragon.html


Qualcomm's Snapdragon™ platform offers an unprecedented combination of processing performance and optimized power consumption for the new generation of smart mobile devices. With Snapdragon chipsets, devices are always connected and aware and can offer all the communications users demand, including 3G mobile broadband, WiFi, Bluetooth® and GPS. Snapdragon-based devices are thin, ultra-portable and easy to use, with an intuitive user interface and mobile OS.



With powerful 1GHz-plus processors, Snapdragon-powered devices are bringing a new type of user experience to market, redefining mobility for consumers around the world. Mobile devices based on the Snapdragon family of chipsets deliver real-time ubiquitous communication, high-performance multimedia, location-aware content, Internet browsing and productivity applications, all with the lowest levels of power consumption for all-day battery life and always-on connectivity.

Snapdragon technology is the next step in the evolution of mobility that Qualcomm brings to market.

Smartbooks: The New Breed of Mobility and Ability

Snapdragon chipsets power smartbooks*, a new breed of mobile devices that merge the intuitive, instant-on and always-connected user experience of smartphones with the versatility and power of a laptop in a smaller and thinner design than the traditional or mini-notebook. Smartbooks offer high-quality multimedia performance with 3D graphics, HD video, built-in GPS and more. Smartbooks let you enjoy movies, stream videos, play games, surf the web and social networking sites, connect and locate friends and places and more-wherever you are. A sizable high-resolution display and all the high-performance advantages of Snapdragon chipsets round out an incomparable mobile experience in a sleek and slim form factor. A wide variety of Snapdragon-based smartbooks are already in design today.

Smartphones: Now Smarter and More Powerful

Powered by Snapdragon chipsets, smartphones now coming to market are lighter and more powerful than ever. With larger, high-resolution display screens and faster processing, smartphones give you reliable voice, data, Internet, and GPS navigation-but now in an even thinner form factor that still fits in your pocket. With Snapdragon power in your Smartphone, you can quickly access all your favorite applications and take advantage of 3G mobile broadband connectivity and an extended battery life.
Benefits

Devices based on Qualcomm's SnapdragonTM  platform deliver:
Optimized power management for all-day battery life
Ubiquitous, real-time connectivity
Rich Internet browsing experience
Access to real-time, personalized and location-aware content
Streaming and playback of locally stored high-definition video content
High performance 3D UIs, games, maps and more
High-quality still pictures and video clips
Access to social networks through instant messaging, video conferencing and chat
Technical Features for QSD8x50 chipsets

The QSD8x50 platform consists of the QSD8250™ which supports GSM, GPRS, EDGE, HSPA networks while the QSD8650™ supports CDMA2000 1X, 1xEV-DO Rel 0/A/B, GSM, GPRS, EDGE and HSPA networks. Both chipsets include:
1 GHz CPU
600MHz DSP
Integrated 3G mobile broadband
Support for Wi-Fi® and Bluetooth® connectivity
Built-in seventh-generation gpsOne®  engine with Standalone-GPS and Assisted-GPS modes
High-definition (720p) video decode, and multiple video codec support
High-performance 3D graphics – up to 22M triangles/sec and 133M 3D pixels/sec
High-resolution up to WXGA (1280x720) display support
12-megapixel camera support
Multiple audio codecs: (AAC+, eAAC+, AMR, FR, EFR, HR, WB-AMR, G.729a, G.711, AAC stereo encode)
Support for mobile broadcast TV (MediaFLO™, DVB-H and ISDB-T)
Support for Windows Mobile®, Android, and a number of Linux®-based operating systems
Qualcomm’s hybrid mode alternative solution
Technical Features for QSD8672 chipsets

The single-chip, dual-CPU QSD8672™ includes most of the above features, in addition to:
Dual CPUs, up to 1.5 GHz for faster response and processing
Low-power 45nm process technology for higher integration and performance
Higher-resolution WSXGA (1440 x 900) display support
High-definition (1080p) video recording and playback
Support for HSPA+ networks - 28 Mbps downloads and 11 Mbps uploads
Supports CDMA2000 1X, 1xEV-DO Rel 0/A/B networks
Improved 3D graphics - up to 80M triangles/sec and 500M+ 3D pixels/sec
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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Re: Police state interoperable smart grids LOVE the new android from Google
« Reply #6 on: December 16, 2009, 04:56:36 am »
http://www.bosch-sensortec.com/content/language1/downloads/BMA150_Flyer_Rev1.3_14JAN2008.pdf.


Bosch Sensortec
BMA150
Digital, triaxal acceleration sensor
General description
The BMA150 is an LGA packaged triaxial, low-g
acceleration sensor with digital output. Offering
many smart functional features the BMA150 is
aimed for consumer market applications. It allows
measurements of accelerations in 3 perpendicular
axes. An evaluation circuitry converts the output of a
three-channel micromechanical acceleration sensing
structure that works according to the differential
capacitance principle.
The base of the micromachining technology has
proven its capability in more than 100 million Bosch
accelerometers and gyroscopes so far. The modular
ASIC design provides a flexibility to react quickly to
customer needs for additional sensor functionality in
the future.
The BMA150 package and interface have been defi-
ned to match a multitude of hardware requirements.
Since the sensor has a flat, small footprint package it
is attractive for mobile applications. The sensor can
be programmed to optimize functionality, perfor-
mance and power consumption in customer specific
applications.
The BMA150 senses tilt, motion, and vibration in
cell phones, handhelds, computer peripherals,man-
machine interfaces, virtual reality features and game
controllers.
BMA150 target applications
Advanced power management for mobile devices
f
HDD protection
f
Drop detection for warranty logging
f
Menu scrolling, tip-tap function
f
Step-counting
f
Display profile switching (portrait/landscape)
f
Detection
f
Gaming
f
* ±1.5g, ±2g or ±8g variants available
Key features BMA150
Switchable g-range and bandwidth
f
Low-power consumption
f
SPI (3-wire/4-wire) and I²C interfaces
f
Programmable interrupt feature for mobile
f
wake-up or free-fall detection
Ultra-low-power self-wake-up mode
f
Self-test capability
f
Absolute temperature output
f
LGA package (footprint 3mm x 3mm, height
f
0.9mm)
RoHS compliant
f
Technical data
BMA150
Sensitivity axes
Measurement range
Sensitivity
(calibrated)
Resolution
Nonlinearity
Axes mixing
Zero-g offset
(calibrated)
Zero-g offset tempera-
ture drift
Noise
Bandwidth
Digital input / output
Supply voltage
Current consumption
Idle current
Wake-up time
Temperature range
x/y/z
±2g, ±4g, ±8g
(switchable via SPI/I
2
C)
2g: 256LSB/g
4g: 128LSB/g
8g: 64LSB/g
10bit  4mg (±2g range)
±0.5% FS
2%
±60mg
1mg/K
0.5mg/√Hz
25Hz … 1500Hz
(switchable via SPI/I²C)
SPI & I²C, Interrupt pin
2.4 … 3.6V, 1.62 … 3.6V
IO
200µA
1µA
1ms
-40°C … +85°CPage 2

BMA150
© Bosch Sensortec GmbH reserves all rights in the event of industrial property rights. We reserve all rights of disposal such as copying and passing on
to third parties. BOSCH and the symbols are registered trademarks of Robert Bosch GmbH, Germany.
Specification subject to change without notice
Version_1.3_012008
Bosch Sensortec
2
Headquarters
Bosch Sensortec GmbH
Gerhard-Kindler-Strasse 8
72770 Reutlingen · Germany
Telephone +49 7121 3535 900
Fax +49 7121 3535 909
[email protected]
www.bosch-sensortec.com
Sensor operation
The function and performance of the BMA150 can
be programmed to match customer specific applica-
tions by means of parameter and control settings.
The BMA150 provides a digital 10bit output signal in
SPI or I²C format. Via serial interface command the
full measurement range can be chosen to ±2g, ±4g
or ±8g. A second-order filter with a pole-frequency
of 1500Hz is included to provide preconditioning
of the measured acceleration signal. The maximum
data conversion rate is 3KHz.
Additional digital filtering is possible to improve S/N
ratio (down to 25Hz bandwidth). Typical noise level
and quantization lead to a resolution of 4mg.
The current consumption is typically 200µA at a
supply voltage of 2.5V. In addition there are several
features implemented to support the host system in
reducing power consumption.
Parallel to normal operation where acceleration
values are provided to the output registers the
BMA150 is capable to perform internal compu-
tations of the results. The customer is enabled
to define specific criteria, e.g. high-g or low-g
thresholds but also criteria for the recognition of
smooth motion profiles. The sensor can inform the
host system about the violation of one of these
criteria via an interrupt pin. This feature can be used
for many purposes, e.g. to wake-up the host system
from a global sleep mode, to signalise a shock
situation or to indicate free fall.
The BMA150 also features self-test capability. Thus,
it allows for testing of the complete signal evaluation
path including the micromachined sensor structure
and the evaluation ASIC.
The sensor comes in a land-grid array (LGA) type
package with a footprint of 3mm x 3mm and a height
of merely 0.9mm.
Please contact us for further details. We are happy
to provide more information.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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Re: Police state interoperable smart grids LOVE the new android from Google
« Reply #7 on: December 16, 2009, 05:16:16 am »
3-axis Electronic Compass

AK8973 is a geomagnetism detection type electronic compass IC. The small package of AK8973 integrates magnetic Sensors for detecting geomagnetism in the X-axis, Y-axis, and Z-axis, and arithmetic circuit for processing the signal from each Sensor AK8973 outputs four data in total as 8-bit digital values respectively: 3-axis magnetic Sensor measured values and Temperature Sensor read value. By processing the magnetic Sensor measured values with an external CPU, azimuth data CAN be obtained. By using AK8973 integrated into the system, a navigation system is achieved with reduced space in portable equipment such as PDA or mobile phone incorporating the GPs function. By AKM Semiconductor, Inc.AK8973's Packages   AK8973's pdf datasheet
   
AK8973 pdf datasheet download www.ic-on-line.cn/iol/datasheet/ak8973_4138699.pdf



To understand what the azimuth data is used for, here is an idea:


A Comparison of Strategies for Processing Azimuth Data from Multi-station Radio-tracking Systems
http://www.npwrc.usgs.gov/resource/wildlife/telemtry/azimuth.htm
Dean E. Biggins, U.S. Geological Survey, Biological Resources Division, Midcontinent Ecological Science Center, 4512 McMurray Avenue, Fort Collins, CO 80525-3400 USA, Marc R. Matchett, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Charles M. Russell National Wildlife Refuge, Lewiston, MT 59457 USA, and Jerry L. Godbey, U.S. Geological Survey, Biological Resources Division, Midcontinent Ecological Science Center, 4512 McMurray Avenue, Fort Collins, CO 80525-3400 USA

The radio-tracking system for this study consisted of 3 stations with 11-element dual-beam yagi antennas, used simultaneously to track a transmitter whose position was determined at 102 test points (averaging 2,864 m from tracking stations) using a Rockwell HNV560C Global Positioning System (GPS) receiver with advertised accuracy of ±10 m. The study was located at the Arizona black-footed ferret (Mustela nigripes) reintroduction site near Seligman; hilly terrain afforded line-of-sight bearings. Before conducting the tracking simulation, we assessed station accuracy by calculating the standard deviation (SD) of a series of differences between telemetric and transit-surveyed azimuths to a test transmitter moved around the 3 stations (SD [n] = 0.698 [103], 0.405 [58], and 0.703 [116]). We used the SD for each station separately in TRITEL and mean SD for the 3 stations (0.602) for the Maximum Likelihood (MLE) option of LOCATE, which required a single estimate of station accuracy. We "surveyed" the 3 stations and 4 beacon transmitter locations with GPS. Station operators referenced their stations with the beacon transmitters on each of 2 nights of testing. We processed the single data set with two computer programs that generated estimated locations and accuracy. LOCATE produced 3 versions of maximum-likelihood estimates using azimuths from all 3 stations, and estimated accuracy with a confidence ellipse. TRITEL used azimuths from the two stations producing the smallest error quadrangle. Error quadrangles were formed from intersecting, station specific, error arc confidence intervals. We compared GPS locations to corresponding telemetric fixes to evaluate fix accuracy and coverage of error estimators.

We detected no reflected signals, although there was 1 "outlier" azimuth likely due to a reading or recording error. Telemetry estimates were significantly south of GPS locations (Chi-square tests, P < 0.0005), regardless of processing method (Table 1). Likely explanations for this bias are referencing error for 1 or more stations, and/or GPS inconsistencies. Straight-line distances from telemetry to GPS fixes were significantly less with 3-station MLE-type estimates than with the "best" 2-station estimate (Mann-Whitney test, P = 0.0002). Increased linear error should reduce coverage, but 2-station error quadrangles more often contained the corresponding GPS fix than did MLE 3-station ellipses of the same area (Table 1). The Tukey and Huber procedures did not use the overall SD, but based station accuracy on consistency of convergence of the 3 bearings. Resulting ellipses gave about the same coverage (86-87%) as error quadrangles of 1/7 the area (Table 1).

Table 1. Comparison of 2- and 3-station azimuth processing strategies with regard to mean distance between GPS and telemetric fixes on X and Y coordinates (bias), overall separation, and attributes of error figures.
    Telemetry to GPS Fix (m)   Ellipse or Quadrangle
Method   Confidence   X   Y   Separation   ha   % Coverage
2-Station   89.8%   13.3   -38.9   84.4   1.02   59
2-Station   95%   13.3   -38.9   84.4   1.37   72
3-Sta., MLE   95%   18.0   -25.5   63.3   1.02   50
3-Sta., TUKEY   95%   17.9   -26.1   64.3   13.30   86
3-Sta., HUBER   95%   18.1   -25.4   63.5   12.88   86
2-Station   99%   13.3   -38.9   84.4   1.84   87


This exercise was useful in pointing out potential hazards from biases due to surveying and referencing of tracking stations, but such biases reduced our ability to objectively compare the two data processing strategies. Our results suggest relative robustness of the MLE family of estimators to effects of these biases, which probably exist in all field studies using direction-finding, and some routines enable multiple-station systems to ignore outlier azimuths caused by signal reflection. All current systems result in relatively inexact location estimates, underscoring the importance of error estimates. In our tests, error quadrangles of the best 2-station strategy seemed to perform better than the ellipses of 3-station methods. No error estimator, however, provided coverage close to the predicted confidence level, and even these predictions may be optimistic considering the difference between tracking our static targets with relatively matched polarity of receiving and transmitting antennas, and the dynamics of tracking modulating transmitters carried by live animals.


All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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Re: Police state interoperable smart grids LOVE the new android from Google
« Reply #8 on: December 16, 2009, 05:28:37 am »
just to give an overview...

Full GPS location/tracking to less than a foot

Full audio monitoring with noice reduction filtering to zero in on human conversations among an "audience" and/or other activities

Full video monitoring support up to 12 megapixels including highly sensitive light sensoring, movement detection, pattern recognition, characteristics recognition (iris, face, etc.)

Full movement surveillance to understand what activities are being done

Full magnetic detection/positioning 3-axis surveillance system with radio tracking to inches

Multiple methods of temperature evaluation

Fast processing of all information and data mining of the information

Bluetooth, WiFi, 3G pinging and network centric control over all data and capabilities.



All they need is a HAARP mind control plug in and they got themselves a KILLER smart phone.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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Re: Police state interoperable smart grids LOVE the new android from Google
« Reply #9 on: December 16, 2009, 05:53:31 am »
On Locational Privacy, and How to Avoid Losing it Forever
http://www.eff.org/wp/locational-privacy
By Andrew J. Blumberg and Peter Eckersley, August 2009


Over the next decade, systems which create and store digital records of people's movements through public space will be woven inextricably into the fabric of everyday life. We are already starting to see such systems now, and there will be many more in the near future.

Here are some examples you might already have used or read about:
Monthly transit swipe-cards
Electronic tolling devices (FastTrak, EZpass, congestion pricing)
Cellphones
Services telling you when your friends are nearby
Searches on your PDA for services and businesses near your current location
Free Wi-Fi with ads for businesses near the network access point you're using
Electronic swipe cards for doors
Parking meters you can call to add money to, and which send you a text message when your time is running out

These systems are marvellously innovative, and they promise benefits ranging from increased convenience to transformative new kinds of social interaction.

Unfortunately, these systems pose a dramatic threat to locational privacy.
What is "locational privacy"?

Locational privacy (also known as "location privacy") is the ability of an individual to move in public space with the expectation that under normal circumstances their location will not be systematically and secretly recorded for later use. The systems discusssed above have the potential to strip away locational privacy from individuals, making it possible for others to ask (and answer) the following sorts of questions by consulting the location databases:
Did you go to an anti-war rally on Tuesday?
A small meeting to plan the rally the week before?
At the house of one "Bob Jackson"?
Did you walk into an abortion clinic?
Did you see an AIDS counselor?
Have you been checking into a motel at lunchtimes?
Why was your secretary with you?
Did you skip lunch to pitch a new invention to a VC? Which one?
Were you the person who anonymously tipped off safety regulators about the rusty machines?
Did you and your VP for sales meet with ACME Ltd on Monday?
Which church do you attend? Which mosque? Which gay bars?
Who is my ex-girlfriend going to dinner with?

Of course, when you leave your home you sacrifice some privacy. Someone might see you enter the clinic on Market Street, or notice that you and your secretary left the Hilton Gardens Inn together. Furthermore, in the world of ten years ago, all of this information could be obtained by people who didn't like you or didn't trust you.

But obtaining this information used to be expensive. Your enemies could hire a guy in a trench coat to follow you around,but they had to pay him. Moreover, it was hard to keep the surveillance secret — you had a good chance of noticing your tail ducking into an alley.

In the world of today and tomorrow, this information is quietly collected by ubiquitous devices and applications, and available for analysis to many parties who can query, buy or subpeona it. Or pay a hacker to steal a copy of everyone's location history.

It is this transformation to a regime in which information about your location is collected pervasively, silently, and cheaply that we're worried about.
Threats and opportunity

Some threats to locational privacy are overt: it's evident how cameras backed by face-recognition software could be misused to track people and record their movements. In this document, we're primarily concerned with threats to locational privacy that arise as a hidden side-effect of clearly useful location-based services.

We can't stop the cascade of new location-based digital services. Nor would we want to — the benefits they offer are impressive. What urgently needs to change is that these systems need to be built with privacy as part of their original design. We can't afford to have pervasive surveillance technology built into our electronic civic infrastructure by accident. We have the opportunity now to ensure that these dangers are averted.

Our contention is that the easiest and best solution to the locational privacy problem is to build systems which don't collect the data in the first place. This sounds like an impossible requirement (how do we tell you when your friends are nearby without knowing where you and your friends are?) but in fact as we discuss below it is a reasonable objective that can be achieved with modern cryptographic techniques.

Modern cryptography actually allows civic data processing systems to be designed with a whole spectrum of privacy policies: ranging from complete anonymity to limited anonymity to support law enforcement. But we need to ensure that systems aren't being built right at the zero-privacy, everything-is-recorded end of that spectrum, simply because that's the path of easiest implementation.
Location Based Services That Don't Know Where You Are

Surprisingly, modern cryptography offers some really clever ways to deploy road tolls and transit tickets and location searches and all the other mobile services we want, without creating a record of where you are. This isn't at all intuitive, but it's really important that policymakers and engineers working with location systems know about it. This section lists just a few examples of the kinds of systems that are possible.
Automated tolling and stoplight enforcement

In many metropolitan areas, drivers are encouraged to use small electronic transponders (FastTrak, EZpass) to pay tolls at bridges and tunnels. As momentum builds behind nuanced usage tolling and congestion pricing schemes, we expect to see an explosion of such devices and tolling methods.

For simple point tolls (e.g. bridge tolls), protocols that cryptographers call electronic cash are an excellent solution. In its cryptographic sense, electronic cash refers to means by which an individual can pay for something using a special digital signature which is anonymous but which guarantees the recipient that the can redeem it for money; it acts just like cash! See this paper for the details of a modern implementation. Thus, a driver "Vera" would buy a wad of electronic cash every few months and "charge up" her transponder. As Vera drives over bridges and through tunnels, the tolling transponder would anonymously pay her tolls.

For more complicated tolling systems (in which the price depends on the specific path taken), a somewhat more involved implementation can be used (discussed in detail in this technical paper).

Straightforward but privacy-insensitive implementations of congestion-pricing systems simply track drivers and use the tracking information to generate tolls. For instance, you might have all of the cars using a little radio gadget to report their location all the time. As Vera drives throughout the congestion pricing area (e.g. down a street in central London), the gadget says "Hi, this is Vera's car." That creates a record of everywhere Vera went. Equivalently, one might put cameras everywhere which record Vera's license plate as she drives and keeps track of everywhere she goes to subsequently compute his tolls. Both of these solutions violate Vera's locational privacy.

The less obvious but much better way to run such tolls is to have Vera's gadget commit to a secret list of "dynamic license plates" — a long list of random-looking cryptographic numbers. This commitment takes the form of a digital signature given to the tolling authority. As Vera drives through the tolling region, her gadget cycles through these numbers rapidly, sending the current number to the monitoring devices she passes. None of those numbers actually identifies Vera, and since they keep changing there's no way to string them together to track her.

But, at the end of the month, Vera has to pay her road toll by plugging the gadget in her car into her computer. The computers execute a fancy cryptographic process called a "secure multi-party communication". At the end, her computer proves that she owes $17.00 in road tolls this month, without revealing how she acumulated that total. The committment exchanged at the beginning ensures that Vera can't cheat: she can't prove a lower total if she actually drove across a bridge with the gadget active.

This kind of approach can be used to solve various automated traffic enforcement needs, as well. For instance, every time Vera passes a traffic light a monitoring device can collect the current "dynamic license plate". Although again, the collected data can't be used to track Vera around, if Vera runs a red light the system can detect this and issue Vera a ticket.
Location-based search

A location-based search on a mobile device is another important example. Phones are starting to be able to locate themselves based on the signal strength or visibility of nearby wireless networks or on GPS data. Naturally, companies are also racing to provide search tools which use this data to offer people different search results depending on where they are at any given moment. The naive way to do mobile location search is for the device to say "This is Frank's Nokia here. I see the following five WiFi networks with the following five signal strengths". The service replies "okay, that means you're at the corner of 5th and Main in Springfield". Then your device replies, "What burger joints are nearby? Are any of Frank's friends hanging out nearby?". That kind of search creates a record of everywhere you go and what you're searching for while you're there.

A better way to do location-based services and search is something like this: "Hi, this is a mobile device here. Here is a cryptographic proof that I have an account on your service and I'm not a spammer. I see the following five wireless networks." The service replies "okay, that means you're at the corner of 5th and Main in Springfield. Here is a big list of encrypted information about things that are nearby". If any of that encrypted information is a note from one of Frank's friends, saying "hey, I'm here", then his Nokia will be able to read it. If he likes, he can also say "hey, here's an encrypted note to post for other people who are nearby". If any of them are his friends, they'll be able to read it. (An excellent and detailed discussion of a related approach via secure multi-party computation is presented in this paper.)
Transit passes and access cards

Another broad area of application is for passcards and devices allowing access to protected areas; for instance, passcards which allow access to bike lockers near train stations, or cards which function as a monthly bus pass. A simple implementation might involve an RFID card reporting that Bob has checked his bike into or out of the storage facility (and deducts his account accordingly), or equivalently that Bob has stepped onto the bus (and checks to make sure Bob has paid for his pass). This sort of scheme might put Bob at risk.

A better approach would involve the use of recent work on anonymous credentials. These give Bob a special set of digital signatures with which he can prove that he is entitled to enter the bike locker (i.e. prove you're a paying customer) or get on the bus. But the protocols are such that these interactions can't be linked to him specifically and moreover repeated accesses can't be correlated with one another. That is, the bike locker knows that someone authorized to enter has come by, but it can't tell who it was, and it can't tell when this individual last came by. Combined with electronic cash, there are a wide-range of card-access solutions which preserves locational privacy.
Privacy concerns and anonymized databases

We should note that even the existence of location databases stripped of identifying tags can leak information. For instance, if I know that Vera is the only person who lives on Dead End Lane, the datum that someone used a location-based service on Dead End Lane can be reasonably linked to Vera. This problem is widely acknowledged (and studied) in the context of epidemiological data as well: it turns out to be relatively easy to deduce the identity of individual disease victims from "anonymized" geographic information about the location of cases. Generally speaking, one solution to this problem is to restrict the use of location-based services to high density areas. There are more complicated cryptographic solutions that are also possible. See this paper for a discussion (and proposed solution) to this problem in the context of collection of aggregate traffic statistics, and this paper for discussion of "differential privacy", a formalization of ideal privacy guarantees in the face of the existence of databases.
For more information

Safely and correctly implementing such modern cryptographic protocols can be a substantial engineering challenge. And implementing them efficiently takes work. But it can be done — this is exactly the kind of cryptographic software that protects the security of our financial network (e.g. ATMs), makes it safe for us to buy things online, and encodes our phone calls. Big software contractors (e.g. IBM and Siemens) maintain large staffs of cryptographers.

We've linked to some of the sources that would be useful for engineers who want to understand how these protocols work. But, if you're a policymaker or an engineer and you have questions about how these methods work, don't hesitate to contact us: we can point you at literature and connect you with experts to answer your questions.
Why Should Private Sector Firms Prioritize Locational Privacy?

We believe that governments have a civic responsibility to their citizens to ensure that the infrastructure they deploy protects locational privacy. But there are also financial reasons for the private sector to go to some length to design privacy into the locational systems they build.
Avoid legal compliance costs

If a corporation retains logs that track individuals' locations, they may be subject to legal requests for that information. Such requests may come in different forms (including informal questions, subpoenas or warrants) and from different parties (law enforcement or civil litigants). There are complex legal questions as to whether compliance with a particular request is legally required, optional, or even legally prohibited and a liability risk.

This legal complexity may even involve international law. For instance, US corporations which also have operations in the European Union might be subject to European data protection laws when EU citizens visit the United States and use the US company's services.

Corporations with large locational datasets face a risk that lawyers and law enforcement will realize the data exists and begin using legal processes to obtain it. The best way to avoid this costly compliance risk is to avoid having identifiable location data in the first place.
Obtain a competitive edge

The public is slowly becoming aware of the potential downsides of having their location tracked on a continuous basis. The ability to demonstrate reliable privacy protections will increasingly offer firms a competitive edge if they can persuade individual customers — or government clients — that their product offers more robust and trustworthy privacy protections.
Isn't there an easier/different alternative?

Using cryptography and careful design to protect location privacy from the outset requires engineering effort. So it's important to ask whether there are other adequate ways to preserve privacy in these systems. Unfortunately, we believe the alternatives are unreliable or harder to implement and enforce.
Data retention and erasure

One kind of protection you might hope for is that your location records will be deleted before your adversary gets to them. If the company that's offering you a fancy location search on your cell phone doesn't need to remember your history a week later, perhaps they can be persuaded to forget it quickly. Perhaps they promise that they will.

Unfortunately, there isn't much basis for optimism on the data retention front. Search companies have incentives to keep extensive records of their users' queries, so that they can learn how to improve their results (and sell more effective advertisements). Storage space is cheap and getting cheaper. Tolling agencies have incentives to keep extensive records of toll usage, to settle complaints and provide aggregate statistics and accounting data.

Even if the collecting outfit does promise to delete the data after a set interval, there's no guarantee that they're actually going to do that properly. Firstly, secure deletion tools are necessary to make sure that deleted data is really gone; many sys admins will fail to use them correctly. Secondly, all it takes is the flip of a switch to suddenly change policies from deletion to retention. To make matters worse, there's no guarantee that a government won't suddenly pass a law requiring such companies and government agencies to keep all of their records for years, just in case the records are needed for "national security" purposes. This last concern isn't just idle paranoia: this has already happened in Europe, and the Bush administration has toyed with the same idea.

And as for government agencies, experience so far with data retention has not been reassuring. An interesting example is provided by automated tolling data (records from FastTrak and EZpass). Different states have made different promises about how long they keep the data, and there have been varying degrees of effectiveness in carrying out these promises. Data has often remained available for subpeona after a number of years. Legal penalties for the violation of these promises are currently minimal.

Limiting data retention is an important protection for privacy, but it's no substitute for the best protection: not recording that information in the first place.
Opting out

Sometimes people respond to these sorts of worries with the claim that the free market will solve this problem. "People who are worried about privacy shouldn't use these services," they say. "If people really care, a company offering privacy as an explicit feature will arise."

We don't believe this is an acceptable viewpoint — there is too much coercion in play. Often, there's no adequate replacement for the service in question, and it is or will soon be a dramatic hardship to avoid its use. Suppose that parts of the United States began to adopt mandatory "pay as you drive" insurance, or congestion pricing, that was based on location tracking. In most parts of the United States, it's not really reasonable to suggest that people who are worried about privacy shouldn't drive (or shouldn't drive to their religious institution of choice). And in the case of location-based services, it's clear that the deck is stacked against people choosing to take inconvenient measures to protect themselves: it's too hard to know what is being recorded by whom, too hard to know what options there are to avoid being recorded, and too hard to keep researching these questions as you interact with new pieces of technology. In this environment, people simply haven't adjusted to the potential for the loss of the reasonable expectation of privacy in public places, and our standard intuitions haven't kept up with advances in technology.
Cell phones and credit cards already create a trail

It's true that most cell phones provide some amount of tracking information to the carriers as long as they're on, and that credit card records provide a pervasive trail of activity. This is no reason to surrender further locational privacy, but rather a reason to fight for better practices or laws for cell phone technology and credit card data. The problems we're having now with identity theft make it clear how problematic the handling of sensitive personal data is.
Law-abiding citizens don't need privacy

Another common response to worries about locational privacy is to say that law-abiding citizens don't need privacy. "I don't commit adultery, I don't break the law," people say (and tacitly, "I'm not in the closet, and I don't belong to any non-majority religious or political groups").

One answer to this concern is a reminder that there are more subtle reasons for needing privacy. It's not just the government, or law enforcement, or political enemies you might want to be protected from.
Your employer doesn't need to know things about whether, when, and where you went to church.
Your co-workers don't need to know how late you work or where you shop.
Your sister's ex-boyfriend doesn't need know how often she spends the night at her new boyfriend's apartment.
Your corporate competitors don't need to know who your salespeople are talking to.

Preserving locational privacy is about maintaining dignity and confidence as you move through the world. Locational privacy is also about knowing when other people know things about you, and being able to tell when they are making decisions based on those facts.

Suppose that an insurance company manages to obtain a record of Alice's movements over the past year, and decides that there is some aspect of that record which is grounds for raising her premiums or denying her coverage. The problem with that decision is not just that it is unfair, but that Alice may have no ability to dispute it. If the insurance company's reasoning is misinformed, will Alice have a practical way of knowing that and disputing it?

The "I've got nothing to hide" argument against privacy is criticized at greater length in this article.
Conclusion

In the long run, the decision about when we retain our location privacy (and the limited circumstances under which we will surrender it) should be set by democratic action and lawmaking. Now is a key moment for organizations that are building and deploying location data infrastructure to show leadership and select designs that are responsible and do not surrender the locational privacy of users simply for expediency.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately