Author Topic: Jay Rockefeller-Evidence of Psychosis: I OWN THE INTERNET/OBAMA CAN PULL PLUG  (Read 80568 times)

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Offline oyashango

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BILL WOULD GIVE OBAMA 'EMERGENCY' CONTROL OF INTERNET



August 28, 2009 12:34 AM PDT

Internet companies and civil liberties groups were alarmed this spring when a U.S. Senate bill proposed handing the White House the power to disconnect private-sector computers from the Internet.

They're not much happier about a revised version that aides to Sen. Jay Rockefeller, a West Virginia Democrat, have spent months drafting behind closed doors. CNET News has obtained a copy of the 55-page draft (excerpt), which still appears to permit the president to seize temporary control of private-sector networks during a so-called cybersecurity emergency.

The new version would allow the president to "declare a cybersecurity emergency" relating to "non-governmental" computer networks and do what's necessary to respond to the threat. Other sections of the proposal include a federal certification program for "cybersecurity professionals," and a requirement that certain computer systems and networks in the private sector be managed by people who have been awarded that license.

"I think the redraft, while improved, remains troubling due to its vagueness," said Larry Clinton, president of the Internet Security Alliance, which counts representatives of Verizon, Verisign, Nortel, and Carnegie Mellon University on its board. "It is unclear what authority Sen. Rockefeller thinks is necessary over the private sector. Unless this is clarified, we cannot properly analyze, let alone support the bill."

Representatives of other large Internet and telecommunications companies expressed concerns about the bill in a teleconference with Rockefeller's aides this week, but were not immediately available for interviews on Thursday.

A spokesman for Rockefeller also declined to comment on the record Thursday, saying that many people were unavailable because of the summer recess. A Senate source familiar with the bill compared the president's power to take control of portions of the Internet to what President Bush did when grounding all aircraft on Sept. 11, 2001. The source said that one primary concern was the electrical grid, and what would happen if it were attacked from a broadband connection.

When Rockefeller, the chairman of the Senate Commerce committee, and Olympia Snowe (R-Maine) introduced the original bill in April, they claimed it was vital to protect national cybersecurity. "We must protect our critical infrastructure at all costs--from our water to our electricity, to banking, traffic lights and electronic health records," Rockefeller said.

The Rockefeller proposal plays out against a broader concern in Washington, D.C., about the government's role in cybersecurity. In May, President Obama acknowledged that the government is "not as prepared" as it should be to respond to disruptions and announced that a new cybersecurity coordinator position would be created inside the White House staff. Three months later, that post remains empty, one top cybersecurity aide has quit, and some wags have begun to wonder why a government that receives failing marks on cybersecurity should be trusted to instruct the private sector what to do.

Rockefeller's revised legislation seeks to reshuffle the way the federal government addresses the topic. It requires a "cybersecurity workforce plan" from every federal agency, a "dashboard" pilot project, measurements of hiring effectiveness, and the implementation of a "comprehensive national cybersecurity strategy" in six months--even though its mandatory legal review will take a year to complete.

The privacy implications of sweeping changes implemented before the legal review is finished worry Lee Tien, a senior staff attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation in San Francisco. "As soon as you're saying that the federal government is going to be exercising this kind of power over private networks, it's going to be a really big issue," he says.

Probably the most controversial language begins in Section 201, which permits the president to "direct the national response to the cyber threat" if necessary for "the national defense and security." The White House is supposed to engage in "periodic mapping" of private networks deemed to be critical, and those companies "shall share" requested information with the federal government. ("Cyber" is defined as anything having to do with the Internet, telecommunications, computers, or computer networks.)

"The language has changed but it doesn't contain any real additional limits," EFF's Tien says. "It simply switches the more direct and obvious language they had originally to the more ambiguous (version)...The designation of what is a critical infrastructure system or network as far as I can tell has no specific process. There's no provision for any administrative process or review. That's where the problems seem to start. And then you have the amorphous powers that go along with it."

Translation: If your company is deemed "critical," a new set of regulations kick in involving who you can hire, what information you must disclose, and when the government would exercise control over your computers or network.

The Internet Security Alliance's Clinton adds that his group is "supportive of increased federal involvement to enhance cyber security, but we believe that the wrong approach, as embodied in this bill as introduced, will be counterproductive both from an national economic and national secuity perspective."

http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10320096-38.html

Offline SUPREMEMASTER

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Re: BILL WOULD GIVE OBAMA 'EMERGENCY' CONTROL OF INTERNET !
« Reply #1 on: August 28, 2009, 10:50:47 am »
In my opinion this should of went in the Breaking News/Very Important Threads/Most important issues/Basic Information on the New World Order board.

But instead a bunch of threads just suddenly get on top of this one and start pushing this to the bottom....

EDIT: Actually I just realized that you have to PM a global moderator to add a thread to that board.
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Offline lee51

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Re: BILL WOULD GIVE OBAMA 'EMERGENCY' CONTROL OF INTERNET !
« Reply #2 on: August 28, 2009, 10:53:12 am »
I agree--this is VERY important. The future of the internet is in old Rocky's hands--and he will push it for all it is worth. If this passes--we are in HUGE TROUBLE!!! 

I hope the private internet companies are ready to fight this.

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Re: BILL WOULD GIVE OBAMA 'EMERGENCY' CONTROL OF INTERNET !
« Reply #3 on: August 28, 2009, 10:55:46 am »
I just can't stand the fact that congress is pretty much black-mailed and told what to do (or else)...

How congress is just ceremonial and unnecessary..
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Offline NWOSCUM

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Re: BILL WOULD GIVE OBAMA 'EMERGENCY' CONTROL OF INTERNET !
« Reply #4 on: August 28, 2009, 11:14:01 am »
And so it begins............... :o
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Offline wakingup72

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Re: BILL WOULD GIVE OBAMA 'EMERGENCY' CONTROL OF INTERNET !
« Reply #5 on: August 28, 2009, 11:21:37 am »
Did anyone read the flippin' comments?!?!?

Quote
by 1g2j August 28, 2009 2:11 AM PDT
This is a bill I actually agree with...It makes sense to give the Commander in Chief direct authority to protect the Internet. Now what the president should do is move Cybersecurity under the supervision of the Defense Department.....Just my opinion.


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Re: BILL WOULD GIVE OBAMA 'EMERGENCY' CONTROL OF INTERNET !
« Reply #7 on: August 28, 2009, 11:36:39 am »
Quote from:  "1g2j" on August 28, 2009 2:11 AM PDT
This is a bill I actually agree with...It makes sense to give the Commander in Chief direct authority to protect the Internet. Now what the president should do is move Cybersecurity under the supervision of the Defense Department.....Just my opinion.

PROTECT the Internet?

Wow what would be be protecting the Internet from?
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Anti_Illuminati

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Re: BILL WOULD GIVE OBAMA 'EMERGENCY' CONTROL OF INTERNET !
« Reply #8 on: August 28, 2009, 11:50:50 am »
BILL WOULD GIVE OBAMA 'EMERGENCY' CONTROL OF INTERNET



August 28, 2009 12:34 AM PDT

Internet companies and civil liberties groups were alarmed this spring when a U.S. Senate bill proposed handing the White House the power to disconnect private-sector computers from the Internet.

They're not much happier about a revised version that aides to Sen. Jay Rockefeller, a West Virginia Democrat, have spent months drafting behind closed doors. CNET News has obtained a copy of the 55-page draft (excerpt), which still appears to permit the president to seize temporary control of private-sector networks during a so-called cybersecurity emergency.

The new version would allow the president to "declare a cybersecurity emergency" relating to "non-governmental" computer networks and do what's necessary to respond to the threat. Other sections of the proposal include a federal certification program for "cybersecurity professionals," and a requirement that certain computer systems and networks in the private sector be managed by people who have been awarded that license.

"I think the redraft, while improved, remains troubling due to its vagueness," said Larry Clinton, president of the Internet Security Alliance, which counts representatives of Verizon, Verisign, Nortel, and Carnegie Mellon University on its board. "It is unclear what authority Sen. Rockefeller thinks is necessary over the private sector. Unless this is clarified, we cannot properly analyze, let alone support the bill."

Representatives of other large Internet and telecommunications companies expressed concerns about the bill in a teleconference with Rockefeller's aides this week, but were not immediately available for interviews on Thursday.

A spokesman for Rockefeller also declined to comment on the record Thursday, saying that many people were unavailable because of the summer recess. A Senate source familiar with the bill compared the president's power to take control of portions of the Internet to what President Bush did when grounding all aircraft on Sept. 11, 2001. The source said that one primary concern was the electrical grid, and what would happen if it were attacked from a broadband connection.

When Rockefeller, the chairman of the Senate Commerce committee, and Olympia Snowe (R-Maine) introduced the original bill in April, they claimed it was vital to protect national cybersecurity. "We must protect our critical infrastructure at all costs--from our water to our electricity, to banking, traffic lights and electronic health records," Rockefeller said.

The Rockefeller proposal plays out against a broader concern in Washington, D.C., about the government's role in cybersecurity. In May, President Obama acknowledged that the government is "not as prepared" as it should be to respond to disruptions and announced that a new cybersecurity coordinator position would be created inside the White House staff. Three months later, that post remains empty, one top cybersecurity aide has quit, and some wags have begun to wonder why a government that receives failing marks on cybersecurity should be trusted to instruct the private sector what to do.

Rockefeller's revised legislation seeks to reshuffle the way the federal government addresses the topic. It requires a "cybersecurity workforce plan" from every federal agency, a "dashboard" pilot project, measurements of hiring effectiveness, and the implementation of a "comprehensive national cybersecurity strategy" in six months--even though its mandatory legal review will take a year to complete.

The privacy implications of sweeping changes implemented before the legal review is finished worry Lee Tien, a senior staff attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation in San Francisco. "As soon as you're saying that the federal government is going to be exercising this kind of power over private networks, it's going to be a really big issue," he says.

Probably the most controversial language begins in Section 201, which permits the president to "direct the national response to the cyber threat" if necessary for "the national defense and security." The White House is supposed to engage in "periodic mapping" of private networks deemed to be critical, and those companies "shall share" requested information with the federal government. ("Cyber" is defined as anything having to do with the Internet, telecommunications, computers, or computer networks.)

"The language has changed but it doesn't contain any real additional limits," EFF's Tien says. "It simply switches the more direct and obvious language they had originally to the more ambiguous (version)...The designation of what is a critical infrastructure system or network as far as I can tell has no specific process. There's no provision for any administrative process or review. That's where the problems seem to start. And then you have the amorphous powers that go along with it."

Translation: If your company is deemed "critical," a new set of regulations kick in involving who you can hire, what information you must disclose, and when the government would exercise control over your computers or network.

The Internet Security Alliance's Clinton adds that his group is "supportive of increased federal involvement to enhance cyber security, but we believe that the wrong approach, as embodied in this bill as introduced, will be counterproductive both from an national economic and national secuity perspective."

http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10320096-38.html

Some of this is rather cryptic, but some is clear:

Probably the most controversial language begins in Section 201, which permits the president to "direct the national response to the cyber threat" if necessary for "the national defense and security." The White House is supposed to engage in "periodic mapping" of private networks deemed to be critical, and those companies "shall share" requested information with the federal government. ("Cyber" is defined as anything having to do with the Internet, telecommunications, computers, or computer networks.)  

"Mapping" = blueprinting by AI, it doesn't get anymore obvious.

This is also about getting backdoored architectures installed on ANY SYSTEM THAT HASN'T ALREADY HAD THEM INSTALLED ON THEM YET, THIS IS LIKE THE BANKER TAKEOVER BILL OF ALL REMAINING IT INFRASTRUCTURE THAT WASN'T ALREADY UNDER THEIR CONTROL.

It paralles this exactly:

H.R. 2749 will mandate use of Ptech on YOUR computer or you're a terrorist
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=126482.0

This for now pertains to people who grow food but it will be projected to everyone.  In that bill they are FORCING YOU TO REPORT TO THE GOVT., AND FORCING YOU TO HAVE TO HAVE A DOD FALSE FLAG, BACKDOORED SOFTWARE AI ON YOUR SYSTEM IF YOU ARE A FARMER OR GROW FOOD SO THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE FULL COMMAND AND CONTROL OVER YOUR OWN COMPUTER(S)/NETWORK IN *YOUR* ENTIRE BUSINESS TO DO WITH AS THEY PLEASE.  THIS IS SO OFF THE CHARTS TYRANNICAL IT IS ABSOLUTELY BEYOND WORDS.

Shutting down sections of the Internet tells me that that will be for the purpose of preventing Americans from alerting others of imminent martial law extermination roundups.  Either that or they are putting that in place preemptively so they can claim that they saved the US from a cyber attack that in their words would have been worse if they hadn't had the power to shut down entire IP nodes, exactly akin to how we were supposed to believe that Bush was protecting America by "freezing the funds" of terrorists, and grounding planes, as the latter is even cited in this article--that alone was a huge pysop that permanently imprinted fake legitimacy into the minds of sheep.

This will set the precedent and lay the false reality groundwork that there are supposedly real cyber threats that threaten our very way of life (another new Al-Qaeda, with very visible, manufactured effects (effects based operations).  And once again people in the IT industry will sheepily scramble to do whatever their told by their new "emergency management" overlords, while they are also heavily indoctrinated by The Rendon group, Pentagon, and others that pissed off Americans are causing this (i.e. tea party type computer whizzes or something).  Remember tea party goes have already been projected as terrorists as a psy-op in the season final of Law & Order criminal intent, so that "playing card" is already in your face, on the table already as an option.

There is yet another huge danger with this as well that covers a different angle.

The agenda in this article could also be used to follow the NWO's mantra of "maintaining a consistent message" during their bio-weapon attack--where the NWO may opt to choose to go hellbent against anyone talking about the truth regarding the vaccines/adjuvants, etc.  And portraying the whole thing in the light as if to suggest that people who are propagating the real facts surrounding the long planned flu pandemic are genuinely disrupting "critical emergency response infrastructure/operations".  They can show a plethora of dead bodies, dead children on TV, and say "these crazy anti-vaccine conspiracy theorists are responsible for their deaths", and that will hit a lot of dumbasses at a primitive level and get them fighting mad at other Americans who don;t fall for even the most advanced pysop bullshit.

If the NWO actually utilizes FLU-CASTERS to calm the public, like mass murderer terrorist Dr. David Nabarro of the UN talked about (along with the need for martial law, saying that it was "to protect the people"), THEY SURE AS HELL CANNOT HAVE THE FREE INTERNET AVAILABLE TO DEVASTATINGLY AND IMMEDIATELY DESTROY THE PROPAGANDA OF ANY "EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT" TALKING HEADS ON YOUR TV SCREEN OR RADIO.  THIS IS A PERFECT EXAMPLE OF "INFORMATION ASSURANCE", A HARDCORE NWO TERM WHICH MEANS:  YOU SHUT THE F*CK UP, ONLY WE ARE ALLOWED TO DELIVER INFORMATION, YOU SHUT THE F*CK UP AND DIE, STAND AT YOUR PLASTIC COFFIN AND WAIT FOR THE EXECUTIONER TO COME AROUND TO GET TO YOU TO SHOOT YOU IN THE BACK OF THE HEAD LIKE A GOOD SLAVE."

HEY, AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY, AND GMU, TAKE YOUR "INFORMATION ASSURANCE (IA) AND SHOVE IT THE F*CK UP YOUR CRIMINAL TERRORIST ASS, AND TAKE YOUR OODA LOOP DRIVEN ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE FALSE FLAG CALCULATING SUPER COMPUTERS AND SHOVE THEM UP YOUR F*CKING ASS AS WELL!

Anti_Illuminati

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Re: BILL WOULD GIVE OBAMA 'EMERGENCY' CONTROL OF INTERNET !
« Reply #9 on: August 28, 2009, 12:24:16 pm »
Understand the significance of the AFRL, the Air Force Research Laboratory.  They are every bit as significant as the NRO, because they are some of the engineers of the technology of the technocratic global prison grid infrastructure and heavy collaborators, and in fact originators of much false flag terror.  This document warrants being reposted here, it is a document right from them. I don't remember how I found this, but it was extracted from a PDF.  This document is from before 911, and it shows the AFRL admitting that they needed (and helped create) the 911 blackop to thrust forward their entire agenda.

This is one of the key documents that implicates and exposes the truth about these psychopaths.  It shows that the AFRL, as well as their globalist elite criminal affiliations like the NCOIC, CSIS (NCOIC and CSIS are directly tied into Bilderberg/CFR, etc), and GMU, are the architects of all false flag terror to drive humanity into submission to world government.  The AFRL runs our government much more so than the entire Senate, House, Supreme Court, or executive branch combined.  Some of what you hear when you hear the traitor puppet Obama speak, is watered down full bore military ops directly in line with things like Vision 2010 and Vision 2020 from the AFRL.  Things like this show how very real the control that the military industrial intelligence complex is:

http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=104135.msg699712#msg699712

“CYBER WARRIOR”: INFORMATION SUPERIORITY THROUGH
ADVANCED MULTI-SENSORY COMMAND AND CONTROL
TECHNOLOGIES




GILBERT G. KUPERMAN1
RANDALL D. WHITAKER, Ph.D.2
CAPT SCOTT M. BROWN, Ph.D.1


1 Air Force Research Laboratory, AFRL/HECA, WPAFB, Ohio 45433, USA
2Logicon Technical Services Inc., P.O. Box 317258, Dayton, Ohio, 45431, USA

Abstract.  This paper explores the functions of a conceptual, future “watch center” whose mission is to support Air Force information assurance requirements.  A cognitive systems engineering approach is described through the insertion of multi-sensory, user interface technologies may be accomplished.

Key Words:   Information Warfare, Command and Control, Human System Interface, Cognitive Systems Engineering

1.   INTRODUCTION
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) is reducing the number of its personnel.  As a result, there is a need for amplifying operational efficiency and effectiveness for remaining warfighters.  At the same time, DoD is modernizing its capabilities to meet a diverse spectrum of anticipated missions. These challenges are outlined in Joint Vision (JV) 2010 (Shalikashvili; 1996)—“… the conceptual template for how America’s Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.” Among the emerging warfighting demands, JV2010 emphasizes the importance of information superiority—“the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of information while exploiting or denying an adversary’s ability to do the same.”  Achieving and maintaining information superiority will require both offensive and defensive information operations (IO).  Years of United States Air Force (USAF) analysis and doctrinal development (e.g., Widnall and Fogleman, 1996) have identified some key requirements for achieving information superiority, and USAF efforts now concentrate on achieving three tasks:

generating an overall information operations concept of operations (CONOPS) designating information operations command and control centers at the MAJCOM (major command) and Service levels equipping these centers to handle information operations performance demands The USAF Information Warfare CONOPS (December 1999) addresses the first of these tasks. Effort on the second task has resulted in various information operations centers being identified (e.g., USSPACECOM’s Joint Task Force-Computer Network Defense, MAJCOM network operations and security centers, numbered air forces’ Information Warfare Flights). This article addresses the third required task by outlining the key research topics and introducing our research program (“Cyber Warrior”) to develop advanced technologies enabling information operations staff to achieve information superiority.

2.   THE WATCH CENTER AND ITS FUNCTIONS

These advanced technologies are discussed in the context of a prospective information operations “watch center”providing the Air Force battlespace management capability in overseeing and conducting defensive information warfare (DIW) operations such as (e.g.) attack assessment and response management. Lower echelon centers will report to this center, which will coordinate with its counterparts in the other Services and report upward to one or more DoD-level centers. The watch center’s central position in the USAF IO infrastructure makes it the primary USAF clearinghouse for IO data reachback.

ASC-00-0599, 23 Mar 00

Other USAF operational units will be able to reachback to the watch center to learn of current and projected system status and posture, as well as to maintain situational awareness on relevant events.  In addition, this reachback capability is required for the watch center’s own operations.  Owing to the watch center’s responsibility for global Air Force information operations, its personnel may be detailed anywhere in the world supporting USAF theater missions. Because these “forward deployed” staff will need to draw on watch center resources, the center must afford efficient reachback for its own staff in addition to other USAF units.The watch center would perform its most critical functions during an information attack against Air Force information systems (Kuperman, 1998). Functional requirements can be subdivided into three categories based on the three phases of attack events (pre- / trans- / post-attack).  The following sections provide an overview of watch center functions for each of these three phases.

Pre-Attack Phase: This is the default or background context of continuous watch center operations.  The watch center will monitor and report the current status and readiness of lower echelon systems and networks.  The scope of protective monitoring will be established and maintained through link and node analyses of USAF information assets, prioritized with respect to the assessed mission criticality of the functions they perform.  Intrusion detection sensors installed on USAF information systems will feed a constant stream of data captured and analyzed by intrusion detection, network mapping and monitoring tools.  Any unusual patterns of activity will become the subject of alerts to (e.g.) system administrators. Intelligence and open sources of information indicating changes to threat posture and capabilities will be assessed as evidence for impending attacks.

This assessment will employ threat knowledge bases documenting the capabilities and methods of potential sources of information attack. Trans-Attack Phase: Identifying, characterizing, and assessing the objectives of emergent attacks will be a critical watch center function.  Attacks may be  isolated discrete events or sets of multiple events distributed over both time and space, perhaps  combining multiple attack methods. Incident reports (IRs) from lower echelons will be received, correlated and assessed.  If an attack event is recognized, the watch center will generate a best assessment of its nature, source, and objectives. Minimizing damage to or disruption of USAF information processing capabilities will be the primary criterion in response selection.  Defensive responses appropriate to this criterion in the context of the assessed attack will be recommended and, depending on the rules of engagement, implemented.

Post-Attack Phase: Managing the recovery and reconstitution processes would be the major post-attack function of the watch center.  The direct effects of the attack would be mitigated, information-processing capabilities would be restored, and Air Force mission capabilities would be reestablished. The watch center would provide USAF-wide status information on attacked resources and update its threat (and other) knowledge bases to increase its ability to recognize subsequent operations. The watch center functional characteristics outlined above all pertain to data and information processing. Watch center personnel will be making critical decisions under intense time pressures, relying all the while on the data and information at hand.  As such, watch center operations entail a high degree of cognitive activity on the part of staff members.  The implications of this cognitively intensive work are discussed in the next section.
 
3.   COGNITIVE DEMANDS ON WATCH CENTER WARFIGHTERS  

“Information warfare, in its essence, is about…the way humans think and, more important, the way humans make decisions.” (Stein, 1996) Effective information operations entail some of the most extreme warfighter demands ever encountered. This is especially true for information operations, where the prospects include the fastest, most numerous, most anonymous, and most rapidly reconstitutable attackers in military history. The information operations mission must be accomplished in an environment (“cyberspace”) where “fog” is common and routine access can become pure “friction.” Moreover, the operations tempo is marked in milliseconds, and this makes information operations the warfighting effort most reflective of Col. John Boyd’s (1987) analysis in terms of adversaries’ OODA (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) Loops.

High performance information operations entail global situation awareness (SA), efficient threat identification, and effective attack assessment.  To achieve these ends watch center staff must monitor, manage, and manipulate data streams and information artifacts large in number, high in complexity, and dynamic in the extreme. These activities, like the battlespace itself, are predicated on data, inference, and decision making. Information operations command and control is therefore a cognition-intensive mission—i.e., one whose requisite burdens fall mainly on the abilities of warfighters (individually and in teams) to perceive, characterize, evaluate, and decide responses to threats.


Our brief description of the watch center illustrates a number of areas in which the decision-maker’s cognition is critical to operations.  Moreover, thesekey areas each entail issues that remain open research  topics. The following paragraphs offer an illustrativeselection of cognition-critical areas and issues deriving from relevant research at AFRL/HEC and elsewhere. Effective situational awareness must be obtained and maintained by a watch center staff that may be distributed all around the world.  How effective situation awareness can be assured in this operational context remains an open issue. Bolstad and Endsley (1999) describe the problems associated with shared/distributed situational awareness and posit a research effort directed at their solution.  Prior AFRL/HEC-sponsored analysis of the Air Intelligence Agency’s Information Operations Center (Larsen, 1997) highlights factors impeding team situation awareness (e.g., loss of situational knowledge during shift changes).  One key facilitator of distributed situation awareness—a common information space upon which all team members may focus—mandates watch center technologies configured to provide staff such a shared information asset.

Overall situational assessment will be conveyed by the information condition (INFOCON) level (Harreld, 1998), a progression of assessed threat states. This assessment, based on recognition and characterization of emerging information attacks, will be particularly challenging since attacks may well exhibit multiplicity of time, source, technique, and target.  This challenge is amplified by the fact that understanding the motivations and methods of cyber-attackers is itself a new topic of research (McCloskey and Stanard, 1999).

The pre- and trans-attack phases of watch center operations will require constant vigilance (Grossman, 1999) over information networks watching for perturbations indicative of attack conditions. The importance of even relatively small deviations from normalcy may take on greater weight as the information condition (INFOCON) escalates. Previous decision making studies within the DoD have highlighted some of the issues that must be addressed.  For example, MacMillan et al. (1998) note that “decision makers may lack the subtle vigilance required to detect small deviations from a pattern, and can be lulled into a false sense of security if they have seen a similar pattern many times.”
  
Response selection is a decision making task which will impose significant cognitive burden on watch center staff subject to extremely short response timeframes.  This burden will be exacerbated by the need to deal with necessarily conflicting goals (Flach and Kuperman, 1998). For example, an obvious goal would be to minimize or mitigate damage to own-force information systems, which suggests taking an attacked system offline as soon as possible. This clashes with the goal of allowing the attack to continue so as to gather additional diagnostic data for the purposes of (e.g.) countermeasures selection and/or defensive adaptation.

More generally, decision making is a challenging research domain. In the subject context (defensive response selection) the watch officer is pitted against an adversary of potentially unknown capabilities and intent. Llinas,et al. (1998) explore adversarial  decision making in the context of information warfare.  Their analysis identifies the human-centered issue of trust in automated decision support aids as critical in achieving a robust and acceptable balance in automated versus operator-performed functionalallocation.  More generally, research in naturalistic decision making (Klein, 1997; Klein et al., 1989; Kuperman, 2000) can be leveraged to configure technologies to provide watch center staff with critical cues facilitating fast-paced decision processes.  Moreover, such efforts can lead to more effective specifications for training watch center staff (Pliske et al., 1997)—an important payoff in light of DoD personnel reductions.

Watch center warfighters will need information technologies that facilitate their grappling with the cognitive demands of the IO mission.  This in turn  requires that such technologies been specified with respect to the warfighters’ informational requirements.  The next section will provide a summary review of watch center informational requirements as they relate to specific aspects of information operations.  After this review, we shall introduce and discuss our advanced development project (“Cyber Warrior”), which is planned to meet these information requirements via technologies developed for USAF IO watch centers.
 
4.   A REVIEW: WATCH CENTER INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS

Cognition entails information processing.  Cognitive demands are imposed in proportion to the mass of information with which warfighters must process, and these demands are alleviated to the extent this informational mass is reduced to only that optimum amount necessary to accomplish a given decision making task.  In this section, we shall review some of the key watch center information elements we have already identified as crucial research and development topics.

4.1   The ‘Big Picture’: A Summary View of the Battlespace

A central point of reference in Battle Management/Command, Control, Communications and Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance is a shared or mutually accessible model of the domain in which operations are conducted. Historically, this model has been provided in the form of a geospatial map (e.g., a 2D cartographic product on a wall or a 3D model on a table).  In information operations, the battlefield is that paradoxically non-spatial ‘space’ of objects and actions colloquially labeled ‘cyberspace’.  Modeling ‘cyberspace’ is considerably less straightforward than modeling ‘geospace’. ‘Geospace’ provides for absolute location (i.e., one object in one place at one time).  Such a fixed condition is relatively unknown in cyberspace, unless one prioritizes physical elements (i.e., computers; cables) as the main objects of interest.  For the most part, ‘cyberlocation’ is a matter of changeable and relative coordinates (e.g., IP addresses, domain names, URLs).

What, then, would be the foundation of a useful map of cyberspace?  In information operations, the minimal object of attack is a particular computing platform.  This happens to be the constituent element comprising the maximal object of attack (the network).  Our research testbed includes an interactive Datawall array—a large display/manipulation surface developed at the Air Force Research Laboratory’s Information  Directorate.  The Datawall, as a large display surface, affords us the capacity to present operators with relatively large and complex graphics.  It is straightforward to conclude that a ‘network map’ depiction of own-force computer systems and their interconnections is a good default candidate for a battlespace map. Such a map would be complex given the number of platforms.  Furthermore, operators and analysts will probably need to ‘zoom’ in and out so as to address multiple ranges of network assets based on (e.g.)  extent of attacks or disruption.  The IP addressing  scheme consists of a single composite numerical string subdivided into four segments.  These four segments index network assets (i.e., computing platforms) down to the level of individual computers.

This addressing architecture could be exploited as a simple ‘zoom hierarchy’, by allowing operators to select a representational scope equivalent to one or another of the segments. Because the IP addressing architecture is a strict hierarchy, one should only need to index a higher level to address the entire set of IP addresses subsumed beneath that level.  As a result, the IP architecture provides an organization amenable to ‘drill-down’ using a graphic representation of each level (top to bottom), with specific subsets being addressable via ‘point and click’.   As such, we are focusing upon IP addressing being employed as the default organizational principle for the main Datawall network map.  This does not preclude other options.  However, at this very early stage this option is attractive for its simplicity and universality of application.

4.2   ‘Slicing’ the Big Picture: Different Perspectives on the Network Map

The provision of a network map on a display is helpful, but it is not a complete answer to IO watch center needs.  It is not only the IP address and/or relative position in an interconnected network, which  identify and differentiate the elements of interest (i.e., the computer platforms).  The watch center operator may wish to exploit distinctions that qualify or characterize the general class of ‘all devices with an IP address’.  A (non-exhaustive) list of examples for such distinctions includes:

•   Classification by hardware type
•   Classification by operating system
•   Classification on the grounds of one or moreresident software packages
•   Distinctions between ‘attacked’ and ‘unattacked’ nodes
•   Distinctions among ‘operational’, ‘questionable’, and ‘healthy’ platforms
•   Classification by type of attack
•   Classification by severity of attack / damage
•   Classification by function (in context of operations)
•   Classification by ‘owner’ (in context of organizational units)
•   Classification by military (warfighting or support) mission

It should be clear that the range of possible criteria for sorting and indexing platforms may prove arbitrarily large, as would the number of individual / specialized ‘maps’ necessary to provide each and every such criterion to the operator(s).  It should be similarly clear that trying to provide a huge list of all possibly useful ‘maps’ would prove a cognitive burden on the user as well as a burden to the information technologies handling these materials.  In addition, it is reasonable to suppose that circumstances may warrant combinations of distinctions (e.g., the set of all intellignce platforms subject to a specific type of attack)—a prospect which would radically increase the number of  individual ‘maps’ necessary to address the range of potential situations. What we need is a modular set of ‘overlays’ or ‘filters’ which could be freely combined atop a basic network map to afford operators the ability to rapidly ‘sort’ or ‘slice’ their object(s) of primary reference in accordance with their immediate needs.  The ‘lens’ metaphor developed in the Pad++ system (Bederson and Meyer, 1998) provides a good candidate approach to this problem.  

4.3   INFOCON and THREATCON

The peculiarities of cyberspace preclude strong parallels between defensive details in that domain versus (e.g.) ‘geospace’. There is, however, an obvious parallel involving own-force / own-system defensive posture.  Some clear and unambiguous depiction of current ‘INFOCON’ and ‘THREATCON’ status (and perhaps even “DEFCON”) should be a canonical component of the Datawall data presentation(s).  At the date of this writing, it remains unclear what the final form of USAF INFOCON protocols will be.  Similarly, the optimum means for providing watch center warfighters with THREATCON and INFOCON status is an open issue.  The information and display engineering for effective THREATCON / INFOCON presentation is therefore an important part of our project.

4.4   Information Pertaining to Coordination among IO Warfighters

Any one operations center is not the sole player in USAF information operations.  Within USAF, each center must interact and interoperate with other organizations.  Externally, the “global-level” watch center is the nexus of USAF contact with other non-USAF watch centers, both military (e.g., DISA) and non-military (e.g., FBI).  The extreme speed of changes within the IO battlespace mandates measures to minimize inefficiencies in cross-unit coordination and collaboration.  Further analysis and simulations will be needed to illuminate how watch center technologies can usefully promote ‘cross-agency situation awareness’—e.g., by displaying data relating to what other watch centers are doing.  This could be as simple as a pop-up window showing the INFOCON status of each collaborator located elsewhere than the watch center.

4.5   Allocation of Data and Information among Watch Center Platforms

Another important issue for display planning concerns the distribution / allocation of data rather than the data itself.  In the second-generation JFACC After Next testbed at Rome, the Datawall array is installed at the front of a room populated with several rows of desks, each holding multiple operator workstations.  This testbed was specifically designed to allow for many operators performing individual tasks at individual workstations in addition to whatever was being done with Datawall itself.  Large as it may be, the Datawall does not provide infinite display ‘real estate’.  Furthermore, there may be considerable amounts of data which are specific to one or another operator’s duties, and therefore not appropriate for Datawall display to the overall watch center team.  

It is likely to be a persistent issue as to which and how much data should be allocated to the large / group display, and which and how much data should be allocated for individual operators’ workstations (whatever form those workstations may take).  The allocation of one or another data element / data type to one or another non-Datawall device may shift during the course of the proposed work.  For example, some data initially displayed visually on the large screen may later be delivered to operators via headsets (i.e., as audio streams) or virtual reality apparatus (some years hence). It is also likely that during the projected course of Datawall work, the proportionate ‘mix’ of individual versus group display demands may shift.

In addition, there will be issues regarding the mix of common versus specific data that must be shared among the main watch center and its staff members on station in theaters of operations worldwide.  The data allocation tactics appropriate to those staff members physically co-located in the main watch center do not necessarily pertain to their remotely
located teammates.

4.6   Coordination among ‘Big Picture’ (e.g., Datawall) Users

As a large-scale interface facility in use by a watch center crew, Datawall presents issues of coordination among the people interacting with it.  For example, sharing and/or turn taking protocols regarding remote laser pointers (and subsystem control protocols, in general) need to be both supported and reinforced by the specifics of the array’s functionality.  Unless headsets and microphones are exclusively employed, speech interaction with Datawall may require attention to turn taking to prevent background noise interference with the speech interface’s operation.  A common tactic for maintaining intra-team interpersonal situational awareness has been graphic presentation of data cueing individuals on (e.g.) whose turn it is and/or whether anyone ‘has the conn’ (e.g., a highlighted personal icon indicating whose  turn it is).  The necessity of addressing this issue is clear.  However, a final decision on whether to implement such capabilities and the details of any such capabilities implemented will have to await further clarification of specific applications and modes of operator interaction.

In summary, the general information support requirements of the watch center will be numerous and complex.  The reason we have stated these requirements so generally is that the specifics of their implementation must await and be tailored to fit the details of the relevant CONOPS, tasking, organizational structuring, training, and deployment of USAF IO units.  Because research and development may well proceed in parallel with deployment, programmatic planning must be undertaken with this in mind.  In the next section, we shall introduce our research program (“Cyber Warrior”) and explain how it has been structured toaddress this situation.

5.“CYBER WARRIOR”

Advanced information portrayal and multi-sensory human-computer interfaces offer potential benefits to watch center warfighters.  The Human Effectiveness Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory is seeking to mature and transition these technologies through the mechanism of an advanced development project: “Cyber Warrior.”  “Cyber Warrior’s” objective is to demonstrate a next-generation user-centered suite of technologies to support MAJCOM and global-level DIW functions. The specific target capabilities to be developed and demonstrated include:

Tailored Information Management and Portrayal: Provide the right information to the right decision-maker in the right format by tailoring information to reflect decision makers’ command authority, expertise, preferences, and information needs. Distributed and Collaborative Decision Support Systems and Job Performance Aids:

Support global reachback and forward deployed decision makers by designing for real-time networked operations.

Multi-Sensory User-System Interfaces:  

Provide warfighters with information presentation and manipulation capabilities beyond those currently afforded by workstations (e.g., 3D audio, large-scale group displays, alternatives to the ‘mouse’).

Untethered Engagement with Systems:  

Provide commanders the ability to operate in a natural style unrestrained by proximity to a desktop workstation. These target capabilities are being developed so as to implement two key innovations.  The first innovation pertains to the effort’s products themselves—i.e., to explicitly design systems to support a distributed, collaborative team environment affording warfighters the optimized worldwide situational assessment and risk assessment capabilities required to successfully defend USAF information resources.  The second innovation pertains to the process of achieving the first innovation—i.e., applying a cognitive systems engineering approach (explicitly focusing on human information processing and decision making) to effect human-centered software support via “active user interfaces” (Brown, Santos Jr. and Banks 1999) employing a combination of intelligent agents and user models. “Cyber Warrior’s” payoffs lie in maximizing crew performance through decision-optimized system design. Our project plan delineates “Cyber Warrior”technology development approach as a recursive spiral development process with a ‘cycle time’ of 12 months.  The recursiveness is intended to allow feed-forward of results for incremental improvement.

The 12-month cycle frequency will allow Cyber Warrior to demonstrate its state-of-the-art, integrated hardware and software technologies in warfighter exercises such as JEFX.  “Cyber Warrior’s“ end-state deliverables will include the design processes and a user-centered suite of software applications/tools and user-system interface hardware to support information operations command and control centers. The first step toward these goals is being undertaken in “Cyber Warrior’s” initial FY00/FY01 program, which will set the stage for rapid upgrading of both test bed and operational capabilities to produce and demonstrate significantly more advanced interface technologies than are currently available.  It will position us to specify, design, and test even more sophisticated capabilities in an orderly progressive manner—e.g., 3-D visualization and individual operators’ environments by the close of FY05; distributed collaborative virtual environments and ‘untethered’ operators by the close of FY10.  More importantly, the FY00/FY01 program will generate a series of near-term products valuable to the ramp-up of USAF IO capabilities underway during this period,  and thus contribute to meeting what we now  recognize to be the most dangerous emerging threat to our national security.

The “Cyber Warrior” program has begun the process of conducting a series of field data collections in support of the cognitively based design of a future information operations watch center.  The functions of the watch center are new, complex, and evolving. The elicitation, representation and validation of domain expertise are crucial to achieving “Cyber Warrior’s” advanced development goals. Characteristics of an effective field data collection methodology have been identified to include: capable of capturing (naturalistic) decision making events capable of discriminating between “expert” and “novice” performance based on critical decision making approaches commercial-off-the-shelf maturity (semi-) automated.

In accordance with these criteria, we have selected Klein Associates’ ACTA (Applied Cognitive Task Analysis) package as our primary tool for collating and processing the field data. The results will be fed forward to provide more detailed and structured analytical models for effective watch center operations.  One example is the “Cyber Warrior” goal of generating specifications for the measures of outcomes, effectiveness, and performance most critical to IO functions.  

6.   CONCLUSIONS  

The “Cyber Warrior” program has been planned with primary attention to USAF and DoD requirements for the new century.  Rather than pursuing insertion of selected current technologies into emerging IO watch centers, we have ‘taken the long-term view’ by working from projected watch center needs toward specification of the best support technologies (whether currently deployable or not).  This article’s expository progression has illustrated this line of conceptual development.  Our approach has been qualified with regard to the cognitive (i.e., informational) dimensions of information operations because (a) these are the critical dimensions of the mission and (b) these fall within the purview of AFRL/HE expertise.  We believe Cyber “Warrior’s” project plan is sound because it is grounded in careful analyses of prospective USAF and DoD missions and
requirements.

7.   REFERENCES

Bederson, B. & Meyer, J.,Software: Practice and Experience, 1998 (in press).

Bolstad, C. A. & Endsley, M. R., “Shared Mental Models and Shared Displays: An Empirical Evaluation of Team Performance,Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 43rd Annual Meeting, September 27 – October 1, 1999.

Boyd, J. R. (1987),A Discourse on Winning and Losing, Air University Library, Report No. MU 43947 (unpublished briefing), Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama.

Brown, S.M., Santos Jr., E., & Banks, S.B., “Active User Interfaces for Building Decision-Theoretic Systems”, In Proceedings of the 1st Asia-Pacific Conference on Intelligent Agent Technology, Hong Kong, 1999.  

Flach, J. & Kuperman, G. G.,Victory by Design: War, Information, and Cognitive Systems Engineering,  Technical Report, AFRL-HE-WP-TR- 1998-0074, Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright- Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, February 1998.

Grossman, E., “Air Force’s New ‘Strategic Vision’ To Include Global ‘Vigilance’”, Inside The Pentagon, Washington DC, December 2, 1999 (page 1).
 
Harreld, H., “Cyberattacks spur new warning system,” National Defense, March 23, 1998 (http://csel.cs.colorado.edu/~ife/l14/defense.html)

Klein, G.,Implications of the Naturalistic Decision Making Framework for Information Dominance, Technical Report AL/CF-TR-1997—0155, Armstrong Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, July 1997.

Klein, G. A., Calderwood, R., & MacGregor, D. (1989), “Critical decision method for eliciting knowledge,” IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, 19(3),  462-472.

Kuperman, G. G., “Cognitive Systems Engineering for Battlespace Dominance,”Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Naturalistic Decision Making, The Airlie Conference Center, Warrenton, Virginia, 29 - 31 May 1998.

Kuperman, G. G., “Selection of Field Data Collection  Techniques,”Proceedings of the Fifth Conference on Naturalistic Decision Making, Tammsvik Conference Center, Stockholm, Sweden, 26 – 28 May 2000.

Larsen, G. J.,Event Sequence Analysis of the Air Intelligence Agency Information Operations Center Flight Operations, Technical Report, AFRL-HE-TR-1998-0057, Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, April 1998.

Llinas, J., Drury, C., Bialas, W. & Chen, A.,Studies and Analyses of Vulnerabilities in Aided Adversarial Decision Making, Technical Report AFRL/HE-WP-TR-1998-0099, Air Force Research Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, February 1998.

MacMillan, J., Serfaty, D., Cohen, M., Freeman, J., Klein, G. & Thordsen, M.,Advanced Multimodal Watchstation Project QUICK LOOK: Critical Decisions in the AMMWS Air Dominance Scenario, October 15, 1997

McCloskey, M. J., & Stanard, T., “A Red Team Analysis of the Electronic Battlefield: A Cognitive Approach to Understanding How Hackers Work in Groups,”Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society  43rd Annual Meeting, September 27 – October 1, 1999.

National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST),Integration Definition for Function Modeling (IDEF0), Federal Information Processing Standard Publication 183, 1993 December 21. http://www.idef.com/

Pliske, R., Klinger, D., Hutton, R., Crandall, B., Knight, B., & Klein, G.,Understanding Skilled Weather Forecasting: Implications for Training and the Design of Forecasting Tools, Contractor Report, AL/HR-CR-1997-0003, Armstrong Laboratory, Brooks Air Force Base, Texas, June 1997.

Widnall,  Secretary of the Air Force S., and Chief of Staff of the Air Force Gen R. Fogleman, Global Engagement: A Vision for the 21st Century Air Force, 1996.

Shalikashvili , Gen J. M., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010:America’s Military Preparing for Tomorrow, 1996.

Stein, G. J.,Information Warfare, in Campen, Dearth, and Gooden (Editors), Cyberwar: Security, Strategy, and Conflict in the Information Age (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1996), 175-183.

Whitaker, R. D., & Kuperman, G. G.,Cognitive Engineering for Information Dominance: A Human Factors Perspective, Technical Report, AL/CF-TR-1996-0159, Armstrong Laboratory, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio, October 1996.
 
Biographies

Gilbert G. Kuperman
Mr. Gilbert G. Kuperman is assigned as Principal Mathematician in the Information Analysis and Exploitation Branch, Crew Systems Interface Division, Human Effectiveness Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory.  He has authored more that 140 papers, reports and journal articles.  He has been awarded 10 United States patents.

Scott M. Brown, Capt. USAF, Ph.D.  
Captain Brown is an artificial intelligence researcher assigned to the Information Analysis and Exploitation Branch, Crew Systems Interface Division, Human Effectiveness Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory. He received his Ph.D. in Computer Engineering at AFIT in 1998. His current research interests include user-interface agents, interface agent development environments, expert systems, and information management systems.

Randall D. Whitaker, Ph.D.
Dr. Whitaker is a Senior Scientist with Logicon Technical Services, Inc., supporting the Information Analysis and Exploitation Branch, Crew Systems Interface Division, Human Effectiveness Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory. His research specialties include collaborative information technologies and human interactivity in cyberspace.

luckee1

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Re: BILL WOULD GIVE OBAMA 'EMERGENCY' CONTROL OF INTERNET !
« Reply #10 on: August 28, 2009, 02:15:46 pm »
bump

Anti_Illuminati

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Re: CFR/CSIS/NCOIC/AFRL OPERATING VIA PUPPET OBAMA FOR CYBER TAKEOVER
« Reply #11 on: August 28, 2009, 04:11:44 pm »
Excerpt of the references from above AFRL document:

7.   REFERENCES
 
Harreld, H., “Cyberattacks spur new warning system,” National Defense, March 23, 1998 (http://csel.cs.colorado.edu/~ife/l14/defense.html)

http://md.hudora.de/blog/guids/84/33/1372304128370112.html

Friday, 27. March 1998
Cyberattacks spur new warning system

From: hippyman <[email protected]>
Subject: Cyberattacks spur new warning system

Cyberattacks spur new warning system
by Heather Harreld
MARCH 23, 1998

The Defense Department has created a new alert system to rate the level of threat to its information systems that mirrors the well-known Defense Conditions (DEFCONs) ratings that mark the overall military status in response to traditional foreign threats.

The new Information Conditions, or "INFOCONs," are raised and lowered based upon cyberthreats to DOD or to the U.S. Strategic Command (Stratcom) at Offutt Air Force Base in Nebraska. Stratcom is responsible for deterring any military attack on the United States and for deploying troops or launching nuclear weapons should deterrence fail, a Stratcom spokesman said. As INFOCONs are raised, officials take additional measures to protect information systems.

While DEFCONs have been popularized in movies such as "WarGames" and "The Hunt for Red October," this is the first time electronic threats have been included in the assessment of the nation's overall safety from enemy attacks. The INFOCONs are a response to a recent Defense Science Board report that concluded that reliance on computer systems to operate key infrastructures has "created a tunnel of vulnerability previously unrealized in the history of conflict" and could have a "catastrophic effect on the ability of [DOD] to fulfill its mission."

Stratcom uses five levels to indicate the threat to information technology systems: Normal indicates the lowest IT Defense posture, then the INFOCONs rise to levels labeled Alpha, Bravo, Charlie and Delta, the highest posture. As the threat to systems increases, officials employ more stringent policies and procedures, including, for example, disconnecting from the Internet and monitoring all systems in real time.


"We monitor all known electronic threats to our automated information systems [AISs]," the spokesman said. "With the electronic threat growing every day, the cornerstone of our 'defense-in-depth' IS security program is educating our front-line cyberwarriors. We rely on a myriad of protection methods to protect our systems, including threat notifications by intelligence agencies, information provided by other military computer emergency response teams and monitoring the activities on our firewall. As INFOCON levels increase, we institute physical and electronic protection methodologies to our AISs based upon the threat."

Officials at Stratcom have developed detailed guidelines on raising and lowering INFOCONs based on the threat. Structured, systematic attacks to penetrate systems will result in a higher INFOCON level than when individual, isolated attempts are made, according to Stratcom.

Stratcom officials plan to work with the Justice Department's recently announced initiative to develop a National Information Protection Center so that a systematic notification procedure can be followed when INFOCONs increase. Stratcom officials hope

that by the time the center becomes operational, which is scheduled for next month, the federal government will adopt national-level INFOCONs for all federal organizations.

Barry Collin, senior research fellow at the Stanford, Calif.-based Institute for Security and Intelligence, said that while the INFOCON program was conceived at Stratcom, many other DOD components are excited about the program and are moving to identify their own responses to INFOCON levels.

"Traditional intrusion detection and response has not been a unified process of communications," Collin said. "Until now there has been very little action when a threat has occurred. Traditionally, there was no cross-organizational communications platform. It's moving toward that uniformed cyberthreat posture that the DOD needs."

Collin, who emphasized that Stratcom's most sensitive systems tied to nuclear missile launch are never exposed to the outside world, said this move is in response to the growing number of systematic attacks on DOD computer systems. This is also the first institutionalized program that holds DOD systems administrators accountable for system intrusions by requiring them to put into place procedures to respond to changing INFOCONs, he said.

"These are the guys with the finger on the button; their systems are of particular concern," Collin said. "If you lock everything up on [the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network, DOD's classified network], nothing will get done. What they're looking for is a way to react intelligently to threats. By doing this, then everyone knows 'lock down' and what 'lock down' means to their individual organizations."

Winn Schwartau, an information warfare author and consultant, recently suggested a similar approach in a report he wrote that was requested by DOD. Schwartau suggested an approach that calls for large organizations and enterprises in the commercial sector, including infrastructure operators, to develop with the federal government a means to measure cyberthreats and then develop a response policy to those threats.

Schwartau said he applauds Stratcom's movement toward INFOCONs, but he said that the private sector also needs to be involved in rating the overall health of the nation's information operations because the military is frequently dependent upon private-sector infrastructures.

"The Pentagon, in defiant response to their own internal debates, is now floating the term information operations to explain what they do, but it still is far from [being as] inclusive as many of us would like," according to Schwartau's report, which is scheduled to be published by DOD in June.

"The contention is that the Pentagon is in the physical war business....That contention, too, is a matter of healthy debate when we ask, 'Who protects the private sector from international assaults that do not involve bombs, airplanes and submarines?' "
__________________________________________________________________
http://news.cnet.com/2100-1023-211488.html&st.ne.ni.lh

May 21, 1998 6:15 PM PDT
Clinton to outline cyberthreat policy

By Tim Clark
Staff Writer, CNET News

In a commencement speech at the U.S. Naval Academy tomorrow, President Clinton is expected to highlight cyberthreats to the nation's electronic infrastructure, both from deliberate sabotage and from accidents such as the satellite outage that silenced pagers across the nation this week.

Clinton also is expected to outline two new security directives, one aimed at traditional terrorism and the other at cyberthreats. The cyberthreats directive follows last year's report from the Presidential Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.


But controversy has emerged See roundup: Washington focuses on tech, Net over the policy and how much authority it would give the FBI and Justice Department vs. a broader public-private sector effort that the presidential commission had urged.

"Clinton will announce a new policy for cyberterrorism based on the recommendations of the commission, stressing the fact that we need private-sector help to solve this problem, since the private sector owns 80 to 90 percent of the nation's infrastructure," said P. Dennis LeNard Jr., deputy public affairs officer at PCCIP. Under the new policy, that agency will become the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office, or CIAO.

Clinton also is expected to order federal agencies to come up with a plan within three to five years that identifies vulnerabilities of the nation's infrastructure and responses to attacks as well as creating a plan to reconstitute the U.S. defense system and economy if a cyberattack succeeds, said a former White House staffer familiar with Clinton's speech.

But James Adams, chief executive of United Press International (UPI), blasted the plan in a speech earlier this week, saying the prominent roles given the FBI and Justice Department would prove unworkable and could threaten civil liberties.


"We have two of the most inert bureaucracies trying to control and constrain probably the most energetic and dynamic sector of the private economy," Adams said in an interview today. "This simply doesn't make sense.
You actually need the private sector to say, 'We hear what you say, and here's how it should work.'"

LeNard said the president has multiple options and may not select such a strong role for law enforcement on the issue.

However, Attorney General Janet Reno in February outlined plans for an FBI-run National Infrastructure Protection Center to counter hackers, crackers, and others who commit computer crimes.

Clinton also may name National Security Council staffer Richard Clarke, a former assistant secretary of state, as the White House-based coordinator of both the cyberthreat initiative and a broader antiterrorist effort, which also is part of Clinton's commencement address, according to reports today in the Baltimore Sun and the Los Angeles Times.

The former White House staffer said political infighting may mean Clarke will not be appointed tomorrow and emphasized that Clarke would be a coordinator, not a cyberthreat "czar."

[INSERT:  WHAT THE F*CK?, "CZAR'S" WERE MENTIONED IN 1998, UNDER CLINTON?  T W I L I G H T  Z O N E !]

"He will work with Cabinet-level people to assure that agencies find their own vulnerabilities," said the official, who asked not to be identified.

The same official outlined the essentials of Clinton's policy--subject to the last-minute changes for which the president is famous.

Reno's NIPC, which would include intelligence and military agencies, would work with local law enforcement to monitor classified and public information on vulnerabilities and threats.

A separate center for information-sharing and analysis would be developed with the business community to look at vulnerabilities in the privately owned infrastructure--satellite systems, power grids, telecommunications, water systems, and the like. It also would include a broad public education campaign.


How to share information between private industry on one side and law enforcement and intelligence agencies on the other remains a sticky issue.


[INSERT:  ONE OF THE REASONS YOU NEEDED TO CARRY OUT 911, BECAUSE IT ISN'T "STICKY" ANYMORE NOW IS IT?, WHAT A COINCIDENCE.]

"The Department of Justice is not keen on sharing information that could lead to criminal prosecutions," the official said. "The private sector does not trust the FBI, and the FBI doesn't want to give out secrets. They're afraid that if they share information, they may someday have to testify in court."

Offline Dig

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Re: CFR/CSIS/NCOIC/AFRL OPERATING VIA PUPPET OBAMA FOR CYBER TAKEOVER
« Reply #12 on: August 28, 2009, 04:48:53 pm »
Here is the deal...

The NWO is being found out, it is undeniable.

There has been a 20+ year plan for a combo electronis/bio attack on the civilian population.

Due to risk management systems, full spectrum dominance, and "centric" warfare being exponentially enhanced over the past 10 years we have much to fear.

But in my opinion the jig is up for these psychopaths and they need more than that.

They need the governors, they need the states.

Keep an eye on the governors they are after at the moment.

Understand more about what is going on with governor sanford. Bill Clinton did not resign after cuming all over the face of a teenage girl in the oval office 10 minutes before shaking hands with Arafat. You are going to tell me that Stanford's actions warrant a resignation?

Look at the past 6 months with Blogoyovich, Palin, and Spitzer.  Look at the generals (governors) in place for civil war/shut down of the state...

Swarzenegger, Perry, Corizine.

Notice not only the technology, but also look at the key people in place for allowing US troops into the states.

Barney Frank just said that he will bring HR1207 to a vote in October.

A judge has rules that an immediate audit of the fed takes place.

Over 50% of the American people will refuse vaccines.

The US soldiers are fully waking up as demonstrated by the soldier at the town hall and the one who refused to go to Iraq on birth issues.

Lt. Watada's case was dismissed for refusing service to Iraq because it is an illegal war.

People now know we tortured, hard, sadistic, inhuman.

Blackwater is exposed as a crusade for mass genocide.

Bush = Obama and Obama=Bush - you can say that in any restaurant, barber shop, or community event in america to raging applause.

The deathcare bill is exposed.

The anti-climate bill is exposed.

Mexico has legalized drugs. Canada may follow suit. Argentina did the same.

Our friends across the pond are starting to notice all of the cameras.

Chinese workers are bludgening their CEO's.

Americans now know that Hal Turner was working for the FBI as an agendt provocateur and learning that Glenn Beck is the same.

No one believes the MSNBC/GE/Harriman/Queen Bitch/SPLC plan for civil war/false flag assassination conditioning.

The second amendment conversation has shifted 180 degrees from the right to hunt and protect oneself from an individual burgler to the right to defend life and poverty from government tyranny.

Yes their weapons and plans are scary, but they are cockroaches. Although you may be frightened by one running around your floor, believe me that cockroach is more scared of you than you are of it.

ALSO... I recommend that people understand more about their plans which have shifted from FEMA (federal) to NEMA (national) what is the difference:
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=129160.0
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Anti_Illuminati

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http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9803/18/juvenile.hacker/stern.13.wav

http://www.cnn.com/TECH/computing/9803/18/juvenile.hacker/

Teen hacker faces federal charges


Caused computer crash that disabled Massachusetts airport
March 18, 1998

Web posted at: 10:40 p.m. EST (0340 GMT)

BOSTON (CNN) -- A Massachusetts teen hacker who disabled communications to the air traffic control tower at the Worcester, Massachusetts, airport in 1997 has become the first juvenile charged in federal court with computer hacking.

The boy, whose age, identity and hometown have not been disclosed, has agreed to plead guilty in return for two years probation, a fine and community service, according to documents released Wednesday by the U.S. Department of Justice.

If the plea agreement is accepted by the judge, the teen would also be banned from using a computer with a modem for two years.

"These are not pranks. This is not like throwing spitballs at your teacher," said U.S. Attorney Donald Stern. "Hackers should know that they will be caught and they will be prosecuted."

On March 10, 1997, the unidentified hacker broke into a Bell Atlantic computer system, causing a crash that disabled the phone system at the airport for six hours.

The crash knocked out phone service at the control tower, airport security, the airport fire department, the weather service, and carriers that use the airport. Also, the tower's main radio transmitter and another transmitter that activates runway lights were shut down, as well as a printer that controllers use to monitor flight progress.

The hacking also knocked out phone service to 600 homes in the nearby town of Rutland.


No accidents or close calls resulted from the outage at the airport, which handled 60,000 departures and landings in 1997.

"We dodged a bullet that day," said Joseph Hogan, area manager for the airport's air traffic control company.

Justice Department Correspondent Pierre Thomas contributed to this report.

Offline SUPREMEMASTER

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Re: CFR/CSIS/NCOIC/AFRL OPERATING VIA PUPPET OBAMA FOR CYBER TAKEOVER
« Reply #14 on: August 28, 2009, 06:07:19 pm »
Here is the deal...

The NWO is being found out, it is undeniable.

There has been a 20+ year plan for a combo electronis/bio attack on the civilian population.

Due to risk management systems, full spectrum dominance, and "centric" warfare being exponentially enhanced over the past 10 years we have much to fear.

But in my opinion the jig is up for these psychopaths and they need more than that.

They need the governors, they need the states.

Keep an eye on the governors they are after at the moment.

Understand more about what is going on with governor sanford. Bill Clinton did not resign after cuming all over the face of a teenage girl in the oval office 10 minutes before shaking hands with Arafat. You are going to tell me that Stanford's actions warrant a resignation?

Look at the past 6 months with Blogoyovich, Palin, and Spitzer.  Look at the generals (governors) in place for civil war/shut down of the state...

Swarzenegger, Perry, Corizine.

Notice not only the technology, but also look at the key people in place for allowing US troops into the states.

Barney Frank just said that he will bring HR1207 to a vote in October.

A judge has rules that an immediate audit of the fed takes place.

Over 50% of the American people will refuse vaccines.

The US soldiers are fully waking up as demonstrated by the soldier at the town hall and the one who refused to go to Iraq on birth issues.

Lt. Watada's case was dismissed for refusing service to Iraq because it is an illegal war.

People now know we tortured, hard, sadistic, inhuman.

Blackwater is exposed as a crusade for mass genocide.

Bush = Obama and Obama=Bush - you can say that in any restaurant, barber shop, or community event in america to raging applause.

The deathcare bill is exposed.

The anti-climate bill is exposed.

Mexico has legalized drugs. Canada may follow suit. Argentina did the same.

Our friends across the pond are starting to notice all of the cameras.

Chinese workers are bludgening their CEO's.

Americans now know that Hal Turner was working for the FBI as an agendt provocateur and learning that Glenn Beck is the same.

No one believes the MSNBC/GE/Harriman/Queen Bitch/SPLC plan for civil war/false flag assassination conditioning.

The second amendment conversation has shifted 180 degrees from the right to hunt and protect oneself from an individual burgler to the right to defend life and poverty from government tyranny.

Yes their weapons and plans are scary, but they are cockroaches. Although you may be frightened by one running around your floor, believe me that cockroach is more scared of you than you are of it.

ALSO... I recommend that people understand more about their plans which have shifted from FEMA (federal) to NEMA (national) what is the difference:
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=129160.0

You say good stuff all the time - I just wish it would get noticed more...
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The message has to be put out in the right way.
Website Still Needs to be updated |ActivismOverDrive.comze.net|

Anti_Illuminati

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Re: CFR/CSIS/NCOIC/AFRL OPERATING VIA PUPPET OBAMA FOR CYBER TAKEOVER
« Reply #15 on: August 28, 2009, 06:11:08 pm »
Compare "President William J. Clinton's
National Security Strategy" to http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=91231.msg612333#msg612333

http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-the-National-Academy-of-Sciences-Annual-Meeting/
_____________________________________________________________

http://web.archive.org/web/19990117083354/www.pccip.gov/summary.html

REPORT SUMMARY
The President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection

This report summary is also available in a formatted Acrobat version (30k).
The report itself is also available at this Web site.

 

Critical Foundations
Thinking Differently

    "Our responsibility is to build the world of tomorrow by embarking on a period of construction -- one based on current realities but enduring American values and interests..."

President William J. Clinton
National Security Strategy
Introduction

The United States is in the midst of a tremendous cultural change -- a change that affects every aspect of our lives. The cyber dimension promotes accelerating reliance on our infrastructures and offers access to them from all over the world, blurring traditional boundaries and jurisdictions. National defense is not just about government anymore, and economic security is not just about business. The critical infrastructures are central to our national defense and our economic power, and we must lay the foundations for their future security on a new form of cooperation between the private sector and the federal government.

The federal government has an important role to play in defense against cyber threats -- collecting information about tools that can do harm, conducting research into defensive technologies, and sharing defensive techniques and best practices. Government also must lead and energize its own protection efforts, and engage the private sector by offering expertise to facilitate protection of privately owned infrastructures.

In the private sector, the defenses and responsibilities naturally encouraged and expected as prudent business practice for owners and operators of our infrastructures are the very same measures needed to protect against the cyber tools available to terrorists and other threats to national security.
Venues for Change

Terrorist bombings of US forces in Saudi Arabia, the World Trade Center in New York City, and the federal building in Oklahoma City remind us that the end of the Cold War has not eliminated threats of hostile action against the United States.

In recognition of comparable threats to our national infrastructures, President Clinton signed Executive Order 13010 on July 15, 1996, establishing the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. The Commission was chartered to conduct a comprehensive review and recommend a national policy for protecting critical infrastructures and assuring their continued operation.

 
Our Process -- Who We Are and What We Did
Composition and Operation of the Commission

This was an unusually large commission with broad representation from federal departments and agencies and from the private sector. An Advisory Committee of industry leaders appointed by the President provided the perspective of the infrastructure owners and operators. A Steering Committee, composed of the Commission's Chairman and four top government officials, oversaw the Commission's work on behalf of the Principals Committee, which included Cabinet Officers, heads of agencies, and senior White House staff members.

The Commission generally operated by consensus. Every recommendation was discussed at length with the full Commission and most were revised several times before final approval. No Commissioner agreed completely with all of the recommendations. Nevertheless, each accepted the final report as a reasonable and balanced recommendation to the President.
Sector Studies

The Commission divided its work into five "sectors" based on the common characteristics of the included industries. The sectors are:

   1. Information and Communications
   2. Banking and Finance
   3. Energy, Including Electrical Power, Oil and Gas
   4. Physical Distribution
   5. Vital Human Services

The Commission characterized the sectors, studied their vulnerabilities, and looked for solutions.

We prepared comprehensive working papers for each of the five sectors providing specific recommendations. Other work contains the results of deliberations on issues that are not sector specific. Among them is a paper on Research and Development Recommendations, which outlines a comprehensive set of topics regarding the long term needs of infrastructure protection. The paper on National Structures contains our conclusions and recommendations about the functions and responsibilities for infrastructure assurance and the creation of new units in the federal government and the private sector, and some that are jointly staffed by government employees and representatives of the infrastructure owners and operators. The paper on Shared Infrastructures: Shared Threats is our collected analysis of the vulnerabilities and threats facing the critical infrastructures. We recognize the enormous significance of physical threats, but we have a significant amount of experience in dealing with them. It is the cyber threat that is new. Cyber issues dominate this analysis because networked information systems present fundamentally new security challenges.

Public Hearings and Outreach

We conducted extensive meetings with a range of professional and trade associations concerned with the infrastructures, private sector infrastructure users and providers, academia, different state and local government agencies, consumers, federal agencies, and numerous others. Of special interest were five public meetings in major cities.

We attended dozens of conferences and roundtables with a variety of groups, and we arranged two strategic simulations with participants drawn from across the infrastructures and from all levels of government. We encouraged questions and comments by anyone, and established a World Wide Web site to facilitate contact. Several meetings with Congressional Members and their staffs added a very useful perspective to our research.

Development of our Critical Issues

During the preparation of the sector papers we identified several dozen issues for which recommendations might be appropriate. Each issue was described, relevant observations, findings, and conclusions were collected, and several alternative recommendations were prepared. The Commission then deliberated each issue and selected one of the alternative recommendations.

 
We Found
Increasing Dependence on Critical Infrastructures

The development of the computer and its astonishingly rapid improvements have ushered in the Information Age that affects almost all aspects of American commerce and society. Our security, economy, way of life, and perhaps even survival, are now dependent on the interrelated trio of electrical energy, communications, and computers.

Increasing Vulnerabilities

Classical physical disruptions. A satchel of dynamite or a truckload of fertilizer and diesel fuel have been frequent terrorist tools. The explosion and the damage are so certain to draw attention that these kinds of attacks continue to be among the probable threats to our infrastructures.

New, cyber threats. Today, the right command sent over a network to a power generating station's control computer could be just as effective as a backpack full of explosives, and the perpetrator would be harder to identify and apprehend.

The rapid growth of a computer-literate population ensures that increasing millions of people possess the skills necessary to consider such an attack. The wide adoption of public protocols for system interconnection and the availability of "hacker tool" libraries make their task easier.

While the resources needed to conduct a physical attack have not changed much recently, the resources necessary to conduct a cyber attack are now commonplace. A personal computer and a simple telephone connection to an Internet Service Provider anywhere in the world are enough to cause a great deal of harm.

System complexities and interdependencies. The energy and communications infrastructures especially are growing in complexity and operating closer to their designed capacity. This creates an increased possibility of cascading effects that begin with a rather minor and routine disturbance and end only after a large regional outage. Because of their technical complexity, some of these dependencies may be unrecognized until a major failure occurs.

A Wide Spectrum of Threats

Of the many people with the necessary skills and resources, some may have the motivation to cause substantial disruption in services or destruction of the equipment used to provide the service.

This list of the kinds of threats we considered shows the scope of activity with potentially adverse consequences for the infrastructures, and the diversity of people who might engage in that activity. It may not be possible to categorize the threat until the perpetrator is identified -- for example, we may not be able to distinguish industrial espionage from national intelligence collection.

Natural events and accidents. Storm-driven wind and water regularly cause service outages, but the effects are well known, the providers are experienced in dealing with these situations, and the effects are limited in time and geography.

Accidental physical damage to facilities is known to cause a large fraction of system incidents. Common examples are fires and floods at central facilities and the ubiquitous backhoe that unintentionally severs pipes or cables.

Blunders, errors, and omissions. By most accounts, incompetent, inquisitive, or unintentional human actions (or omissions) cause a large fraction of the system incidents that are not explained by natural events and accidents. Since these usually only affect local areas, service is quickly restored; but there is potential for a nationally significant event.

Insiders. Normal operation demands that a large number of people have authorized access to the facilities or to the associated information and communications systems. If motivated by a perception of unfair treatment by management, or if suborned by an outsider, an "insider" could use authorized access for unauthorized disruptive purposes.

Recreational hackers. For an unknown number of people, gaining unauthorized electronic access to information and communication systems is a most fascinating and challenging game. Often they deliberately arrange for their activities to be noticed even while hiding their specific identities. While their motivations do not include actual disruption of service, the tools and techniques they perfect among their community are available to those with hostile intent.

Criminal activity. Some are interested in personal financial gain through manipulation of financial or credit accounts or stealing services. In contrast to some hackers, these criminals typically hope their activities will never be noticed, much less attributed to them. Organized crime groups may be interested in direct financial gain, or in covering their activity in other areas.

Industrial espionage. Some firms can find reasons to discover the proprietary activities of their competitors, by open means if possible or by criminal means if necessary. Often these are international activities conducted on a global scale.

Terrorism. A variety of groups around the world would like to influence US policy and are willing to use disruptive tactics if they think that will help.

National intelligence. Most, if not all, nations have at least some interest in discovering what would otherwise be secrets of other nations for a variety of economic, political, or military purposes.

Information warfare. Both physical and cyber attacks on our infrastructures could be part of a broad, orchestrated attempt to disrupt a major US military operation or a significant economic activity.
Lack of Awareness

We have observed that the general public seems unaware of the extent of the vulnerabilities in the services that we all take for granted, and that within government and among industry decision-makers, awareness is limited. Several have told us that there has not yet been a cause for concern sufficient to demand action.

We do acknowledge that this situation seems to be changing for the better. The public news media seem to be carrying relevant articles more frequently; attendance at conferences of security professionals is up; and vendors are actively introducing new security products.

The Commission believes that the actions recommended in this report will increase sensitivity to these problems and reduce our vulnerabilities at all levels.

No National Focus

Related to the lack of awareness is the need for a national focus or advocate for infrastructure protection. Following up on our report to the President, we need to build a framework of effective deterrence and prevention.

This is not simply the usual study group's lament that "no one is in charge." These infrastructures are so varied, and form such a large part of this nation's economic activity, that no one person or organization can be in charge. We do not need, and probably could not stand, the appointment of a Director of Infrastructures. We do need, and recommend, several more modest ways to create and maintain a national focus on the issues.

Protection of our infrastructures will not be accomplished by a big federal project. It will require continuous attention and incremental improvement for the foreseeable future.

 
We Concluded

Life on the information superhighway isn't much different from life on the streets; the good guys have to hustle to keep the bad guys from getting ahead.
Rules Change in Cyberspace -- New Thinking is Required

It is not surprising that infrastructures have always been attractive targets for those who would do us harm. In the past we have been protected from hostile attacks on the infrastructures by broad oceans and friendly neighbors. Today, the evolution of cyber threats has changed the situation dramatically. In cyberspace, national borders are no longer relevant. Electrons don't stop to show passports.

Potentially serious cyber attacks can be conceived and planned without detectable logistic preparation. They can be invisibly reconnoitered, clandestinely rehearsed, and then mounted in a matter of minutes or even seconds without revealing the identity and location of the attacker.

Formulas that carefully divide responsibility between foreign defense and domestic law enforcement no longer apply as clearly as they used to. "With the existing rules, you may have to solve the crime before you can decide who has the authority to investigate it." [1]
We Should Act Now to Protect our Future

The Commission has not discovered an imminent attack or a credible threat sufficient to warrant a sense of immediate national crisis. However, we are quite convinced that our vulnerabilities are increasing steadily while the costs associated with an effective attack continue to drop. What is more, the investments required to improve the situation are still relatively modest, but will rise if we procrastinate.

We should attend to our critical foundations before the storm arrives, not after: Waiting for disaster will prove as expensive as it is irresponsible.
Infrastructure Assurance is a Shared Responsibility

National security requires much more than military strength. Our world position, our ability to influence others, our standard of living, and our own self-image depend on economic prosperity and public confidence. Clear distinctions between foreign and domestic policy no longer serve our interests well.

At the same time, the effective operation of our military forces depends more and more on the continuous availability of infrastructures, especially communications and transportation, that are not dedicated to military use.

While no nation state is likely to attack our territory or our armed forces, we are inevitably the target of ill will and hostility from some quarters. Disruption of the services on which our economy and well-being depend could have significant effects, and if repeated frequently could seriously harm public confidence. Because our military and private infrastructures are becoming less and less separate, because the threats are harder to differentiate as from local criminals or foreign powers, and because the techniques of protection, mitigation, and restoration are largely the same, we conclude that responsibility for infrastructure protection and assurance can no longer be delegated on the basis of who the attacker is or where the attack originates. Rather, the responsibility should be shared cooperatively among all of the players.

 
We Recommend
A Broad Program of Awareness and Education

Because of our finding that the public in general and many industry and government leaders are insufficiently aware of the vulnerabilities, we have recommended a broad and continuous program of awareness and education to cover all possible audiences. We include White House conferences, National Academy studies, presentations at industry associations and professional societies, development and promulgation of elementary and secondary curricula, and sponsorship of graduate studies and programs.
Infrastructure Protection through Industry Cooperation
and Information Sharing

We believe the quickest and most effective way to achieve a much higher level of protection from cyber threats is to raise the level of existing protection through application of "best practices." We have accordingly recommended a sector-by-sector cooperation and information sharing strategy. In general, these sector structures should be partnerships among the owners and operators, and appropriate government agencies, which will identify and communicate best practices. We have especially asked the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Security Agency (NSA) to provide technical skills and expertise required to identify and evaluate vulnerabilities in the associated information networks and control systems.

One very effective practice is a quantitative risk-management process, addressing physical attacks, cyber attacks that could corrupt essential information or deny service, the possibility of cascading effects, and new levels of interdependency.

The first focus of sector cooperation should be to share information and techniques related to risk management assessments. This should include development and deployment of ways to prevent attacks, mitigate damage, quickly recover services, and eventually reconstitute the infrastructure.

We suggest consideration of these immediate actions prior to the completion of a formal risk assessment: (1) Isolate critical control systems from insecure networks by disconnection or adequate firewalls; (2) Adopt best practices for password control and protection, or install more modern authentication mechanisms; (3) Provide for individual accountability through protected action logs or the equivalent.

The sector cooperation and information sharing needed to improve risk assessments and to protect against probable attacks may naturally develop into sharing of information on current status. This would permit assessing whether one of the infrastructures is under a coordinated attack -- physical, cyber, or combined. As this process develops, the national center for analysis of such information should be in place and ready to cooperate.
Reconsideration of Laws Related to Infrastructure Protection

Law has failed to keep pace with technology. Some laws capable of promoting assurance are not as clear or effective as they could be. Still others can operate in ways that may be unfriendly to security concerns. Sorting them all out will be a lengthy and massive undertaking, involving efforts at local, state, federal, and international levels. Recognizing the dynamic nature of legal reform, we attempted to lay a foundation through various studies, papers, and a legal authorities database that can aid eventual implementation of our recommendations and assist owners, operators, and government at all levels.

We also offered a number of preliminary legal recommendations intended to jump-start this process of reform. We identified existing laws that could help the government take the lead and serve as a model of standards and practices for the private sector. We identified other areas of law which, with careful attention, can enable infrastructure owners and operators to take precautions proportionate to the threat. We identified still other areas of law that should be molded to enable a greater degree of government-industry partnership in areas such as information sharing.
A Revised Program of Research and Development

The Commission believes that some of the basic technology needed to improve infrastructure protection already exists, but needs to be widely deployed. In other areas, additional research effort is needed.

At the same time the Commission recognizes that we are not now able to deploy several capabilities that we need. We have, therefore, recommended a program of research and development focused on those future capabilities. Among them are new capabilities for detection and identification of intrusion and improved simulation and modeling capability to understand the effects of interconnected and fully interdependent infrastructures.
A National Organization Structure

In order to be effective, recommendations must discuss not only what is to be done, but how it will get done and who will do it. We have recommended the following partnering organizations be established to be responsible for specific parts of our vision:

Sector Coordinators to provide the focus for industry cooperation and information sharing, and to represent the sector in matters of national cooperation and policy;

Lead Agencies, designated within the federal government, to serve as a conduit from the government into each sector and to facilitate the creation of sector coordinators, if needed;

National Infrastructure Assurance Council of industry CEOs, Cabinet Secretaries, and representatives of state and local government to provide policy advice and implementation commitment;

Information Sharing and Analysis Center to begin the step-by-step process of establishing a realistic understanding of what is going on in our infrastructures -- of distinguishing actual attack from coincidental events;

Infrastructure Assurance Support Office to house the bulk of the national staff which is responsible for continuous management and follow-through of our recommendations; and

Office of National Infrastructure Assurance as the top-level policy making office connected closely to the National Security Council and the National Economic Council.

 
Conclusion

It is clear to us that infrastructure assurance must be a high priority for the nation in the Information Age. With escalating dependence on information and telecommunications, our infrastructures no longer enjoy the protection of oceans and military forces. They are vulnerable in new ways. We must protect them in new ways. And that is what we recommend in this report.

The public and private sectors share responsibility for infrastructure protection. Our recommendations seek to provide structures for the partnership needed to assure our future security. Further, they seek to define new ways for approaching infrastructure assurance -- ways that recognize the new thinking required in the Information Age, the new international security environment emerging from our victory in the Cold War and both the promise and danger of technology moving at breakneck speed.

We do not so much offer solutions as directions -- compass headings that will help navigate through a new geography and ensure the continuity of the infrastructures that underpin America's economic, military, and social strength.
Endnotes

1. Senator Sam Nunn, remarks to the PCCIP Advisory Committee. Washington, DC, September 7, 1997.

Offline Harconen

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Re: CFR/CSIS/NCOIC/AFRL OPERATING VIA PUPPET OBAMA FOR CYBER TAKEOVER
« Reply #16 on: August 28, 2009, 06:13:41 pm »
Its all over the web, I found it also here with more info.

Bill would give Obama emergency control of Internet


Declan McCullagh
CNet
Fri, 28 Aug 2009 17:47 UTC


nternet companies and civil liberties groups were alarmed this spring when a U.S. Senate bill proposed handing the White House the power to disconnect private-sector computers from the Internet.

They're not much happier about a revised version that aides to Sen. Jay Rockefeller, a West Virginia Democrat, have spent months drafting behind closed doors. CNET News has obtained a copy of the 55-page draft of S.773, which still appears to permit the president to seize temporary control of private-sector networks during a so-called cybersecurity emergency. The new version would allow the president to "declare a cybersecurity emergency" relating to "non-governmental" computer networks and do what's necessary to respond to the threat. Other sections of the proposal include a federal certification program for "cybersecurity professionals," and a requirement that certain computer systems and networks in the private sector be managed by people who have been awarded that license.

"I think the redraft, while improved, remains troubling due to its vagueness," said Larry Clinton, president of the Internet Security Alliance http://www.isalliance.org/ which counts representatives of Verizon, Verisign, Nortel, and Carnegie Mellon University on its board. "It is unclear what authority Sen. Rockefeller thinks is necessary over the private sector. Unless this is clarified, we cannot properly analyze, let alone support the bill."

Representatives of other large Internet and telecommunications companies expressed concerns about the bill in a teleconference with Rockefeller's aides this week, but were not immediately available for interviews on Thursday.

A spokesman for Rockefeller also declined to comment on the record Thursday, saying that many people were unavailable because of the summer recess. A Senate source familiar with the bill compared the president's power to take control of portions of the Internet to what President Bush did when grounding all aircraft on Sept. 11, 2001. The source said that one primary concern was the electrical grid, and what would happen if it were attacked from a broadband connection.

When Rockefeller, the chairman of the Senate Commerce committee, and Olympia Snowe (R-Maine) introduced the original bill in April, they claimed http://commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=bb7223ef-1d78-4de4-b1d5-4cf54fc38662 it was vital to protect national cybersecurity. "We must protect our critical infrastructure at all costs--from our water to our electricity, to banking, traffic lights and electronic health records," Rockefeller said.

The Rockefeller proposal plays out against a broader concern in Washington, D.C., about the government's role in cybersecurity. In May, President Obama acknowledged that the government is "not as prepared" as it should be to respond to disruptions and announced that a new cybersecurity coordinator position would be created inside the White House staff. Three months later, that post remains empty, one top cybersecurity aide has quit, and some wags have begun to wonder why a government that receives failing marks on cybersecurity should be trusted to instruct the private sector what to do.

Rockefeller's revised legislation seeks to reshuffle the way the federal government addresses the topic. It requires a "cybersecurity workforce plan" from every federal agency, a "dashboard" pilot project, measurements of hiring effectiveness, and the implementation of a "comprehensive national cybersecurity strategy" in six months--even though its mandatory legal review will take a year to complete.

The privacy implications of sweeping changes implemented before the legal review is finished worry Lee Tien http://www.eff.org/about/staff , a senior staff attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation http://www.eff.org/ in San Francisco. "As soon as you're saying that the federal government is going to be exercising this kind of power over private networks, it's going to be a really big issue," he says.

Probably the most controversial language begins in Section 201, which permits the president to "direct the national response to the cyber threat" if necessary for "the national defense and security." The White House is supposed to engage in "periodic mapping" of private networks deemed to be critical, and those companies "shall share" requested information with the federal government. ("Cyber" is defined as anything having to do with the Internet, telecommunications, computers, or computer networks.)

"The language has changed but it doesn't contain any real additional limits," EFF's Tien says. "It simply switches the more direct and obvious language they had originally to the more ambiguous (version)...The designation of what is a critical infrastructure system or network as far as I can tell has no specific process. There's no provision for any administrative process or review. That's where the problems seem to start. And then you have the amorphous powers that go along with it."

Translation: If your company is deemed "critical," a new set of regulations kick in involving who you can hire, what information you must disclose, and when the government would exercise control over your computers or network.

The Internet Security Alliance's Clinton adds that his group is "supportive of increased federal involvement to enhance cyber security, but we believe that the wrong approach, as embodied in this bill as introduced, will be counterproductive both from an national economic and national secuity perspective."

See this link for more info in pdf formate http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-10320096-38.html
Resist. Rebel. Cry out to all peoples and nations from the sky as the lightening flashes from the east to the west and judge the living and the dead.Or choose submission and slavery.

The light shineth in darkness; and the darkness comprehended it not.  (John 1:5)

Anti_Illuminati

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Re: Plan to takeover the Internet was spearheaded over 10 years by the NWO
« Reply #17 on: August 28, 2009, 06:29:12 pm »
For information on the Adminstration's current initiatives in critical infrastructure protection, please refer to the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO).

The PCCIP was formed to advise and assist the President of the United States by recommending a national strategy for protecting and assuring critical infrastructures from physical and cyber threats.

    * Information and Communications
    * Electrical Power Systems
    * Gas and Oil Transportation and Storage
    * Banking and Finance
    * Transportation
    * Water Supply Systems
    * Emergency Services
    * Government Services

To learn more about the PCCIP, please navigate from the menu items at the left or proceed to our Main Menu for an overview of the resources available on our World Wide Web site.
__________________________________________________________________
http://web.archive.org/web/19981212023753/www.ciao.gov/

Critical infrastructure assurance is a new capability that resides right at the point where our national security and economic security merge. The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office (CIAO), announced by President Clinton in May 1998, will facilitate the creation of a national plan to protect the services that we depend on daily: telecommunications, banking and finance, electric power, transportation, gas and oil, emergency services and government services. This initiative will require a new level of commitment to partnership between the public and private sectors, specifically in the areas of policy formation and information sharing.

Fact Sheets

    * Summary of Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63 (May 1998)

http://web.archive.org/web/19990202022310/www.ciao.gov/6263summary.html

Summary of PDD 62 and PDD 63

The following summary of Presidential Decision Directives 62 and 63 was released by the White House in May 1998. We have mirrored this release here at the CIAO Web site to facilitate access to information about these directives.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release    May 22, 1998

SUMMARY OF PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVES 62 and 63

President Clinton today ordered the strengthening of the nation's defenses against emerging unconventional threats to the United States: terrorist acts, use of weapons of mass destruction, assaults on our critical infrastructures and cyber-attacks.

The Combating Terrorism directive (PDD-62) highlights the growing threat of unconventional attacks against the United States. It details a new and more systematic approach to fighting terrorism by bringing a program management approach to U.S. counter-terrorism efforts.

The directive also establishes the office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism which will oversee a broad variety of relevant policies and programs including areas such as counter-terrorism, protection of critical infrastructure, preparedness and consequence management for weapons of mass destruction.

The Critical Infrastructure Protection directive (PDD-63) calls for a national effort to assure the security of the increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures of the United States. Such infrastructures include telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation, and essential government services. The directive requires immediate federal government action including risk assessment and planning to reduce exposure to attack. It stresses the critical importance of cooperation between the government and the private sector by linking designated agencies with private sector representatives.

For more detailed information on Presidential Decision Directive 63, contact the Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office at (703) 696-9395 for copies of the White Paper on Critical Infrastructure Protection.
__________________________________________________________________
http://web.archive.org/web/19990202031844/www.ciao.gov/62factsheet.html

* Combatting Terrorism: PDD 62 (May 1998)

Combatting Terrorism

The following fact sheet on Presidential Decision Directive 62 was released by the White House in May 1998. We have mirrored this release here at the CIAO Web site to facilitate access to information about the directive.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release    May 22, 1998

COMBATING TERRORISM: PRESIDENTIAL DECISION DIRECTIVE 62

Since he took office, President Clinton has made the fight against terrorism a top national security objective. The President has worked to deepen our cooperation with our friends and allies abroad, strengthen law enforcement's counterterrorism tools and improve security on airplanes and at airports. These efforts have paid off as major terrorist attacks have been foiled and more terrorists have been apprehended, tried and given severe prison terms.

Yet America's unrivaled military superiority means that potential enemies -- whether nations or terrorist groups -- that choose to attack us will be more likely to resort to terror instead of conventional military assault. Moreover, easier access to sophisticated technology means that the destructive power available to terrorists is greater than ever. Adversaries may thus be tempted to use unconventional tools, such as weapons of mass destruction, to target our cities and disrupt the operations of our government. They may try to attack our economy and critical infrastructure using advanced computer technology.

President Clinton is determined that in the coming century, we will be capable of deterring and preventing such terrorist attacks. The President is convinced that we must also have the ability to limit the damage and manage the consequences should such an attack occur.

To meet these challenges, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive 62. This Directive creates a new and more systematic approach to fighting the terrorist threat of the next century. It reinforces the mission of the many U.S. agencies charged with roles in defeating terrorism; it also codifies and clarifies their activities in the wide range of U.S. counter-terrorism programs, from apprehension and prosecution of terrorists to increasing transportation security, enhancing response capabilities and protecting the computer-based systems that lie at the heart of America's economy. The Directive will help achieve the President's goal of ensuring that we meet the threat of terrorism in the 21st century with the same rigor that we have met military threats in this century.
The National Coordinator

To achieve this new level of integration in the fight against terror, PDD-62 establishes the office of the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator will oversee the broad variety of relevant polices and programs including such areas as counter-terrorism, protection of critical infrastructure, preparedness and consequence management for weapons of mass destruction. The National Coordinator will work within the National Security Council, report to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and produce for him an annual Security Preparedness Report. The National Coordinator will also provide advice regarding budgets for counter-terror programs and coordinate the development of guidelines that might be needed for crisis management.
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http://web.archive.org/web/19990202042425/www.ciao.gov/63factsheet.html

* Protecting America's Critical Infrastructures: PDD 63 (May 1998)

Protecting America's Critical Infrastructures

The following fact sheet on Presidential Decision Directive 63 was released by the White House in May 1998. We have mirrored this release here at the CIAO Web site to facilitate access to information about the directive.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary
For Immediate Release    May 22, 1998

PROTECTING AMERICA'S CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURES: PDD 63

This Presidential Directive builds on the recommendations of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. In October 1997 the Commission issued its report, calling for a national effort to assure the security of the United States' increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures, such as telecommunications, banking and finance, energy, transportation, and essential government services.

Presidential Decision Directive 63 is the culmination of an intense, interagency effort to evaluate those recommendations and produce a workable and innovative framework for critical infrastructure protection. The President's policy:

    * Sets a goal of a reliable, interconnected, and secure information system infrastructure by the year 2003, and significantly increased security for government systems by the year 2000, by:
          o Immediately establishing a national center to warn of and respond to attacks.
          o Building the capability to protect critical infrastructures from intentional acts by 2003.
    * Addresses the cyber and physical infrastructure vulnerabilities of the Federal government by requiring each department and agency to work to reduce its exposure to new threats;
    * Requires the Federal government to serve as a model to the rest of the country for how infrastructure protection is to be attained;
    * Seeks the voluntary participation of private industry to meet common goals for protecting our critical systems through public-private partnerships;
    * Protects privacy rights and seeks to utilize market forces. It is meant to strengthen and protect the nation's economic power, not to stifle it.
    * Seeks full participation and input from the Congress.


PDD-63 sets up a new structure to deal with this important challenge:

    * a National Coordinator whose scope will include not only critical infrastructure but also foreign terrorism and threats of domestic mass destruction (including biological weapons) because attacks on the US may not come labeled in neat jurisdictional boxes;
    * The National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC) at the FBI which will fuse representatives from FBI, DOD, USSS, Energy, Transportation, the Intelligence Community, and the private sector in an unprecedented attempt at information sharing among agencies in collaboration with the private sector. The NIPC will also provide the principal means of facilitating and coordinating the Federal Government's response to an incident, mitigating attacks, investigating threats and monitoring reconstitution efforts;
    * An Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC) is encouraged to be set up by the private sector, in cooperation with the federal government;
    * A National Infrastructure Assurance Council drawn from private sector leaders and state/local officials to provide guidance to the policy formulation of a National Plan;
    * The Critical Infrastructure Assurance Office will provide support to the National Coordinator's work with government agencies and the private sector in developing a national plan. The office will also help coordinate a national education and awareness program, and legislative and public affairs.

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http://web.archive.org/web/19990202182927/www.ciao.gov/paper598.html

White Paper
The Clinton Administration's Policy on
Critical Infrastructure Protection:
Presidential Decision Directive 63
May 1998


This White Paper explains key elements of the Clinton Administration's policy on critical infrastructure protection. It is intended for dissemination to all interested parties in both the private and public sectors. It will also be used in U.S. Government professional education institutions, such as the National Defense University and the National Foreign Affairs Training Center, for coursework and exercises on interagency practices and procedures. Wide dissemination of this unclassified White Paper is encouraged by all agencies of the U.S. Government.

I. A Growing Potential Vulnerability

The United States possesses both the world's strongest military and its largest national economy. Those two aspects of our power are mutually reinforcing and dependent. They are also increasingly reliant upon certain critical infrastructures and upon cyber-based information systems.

Critical infrastructures are those physical and cyber-based systems essential to the minimum operations of the economy and government. They include, but are not limited to, telecommunications, energy, banking and finance, transportation, water systems and emergency services, both governmental and private. Many of the nation's critical infrastructures have historically been physically and logically separate systems that had little interdependence. As a result of advances in information technology and the necessity of improved efficiency, however, these infrastructures have become increasingly automated and interlinked. These same advances have created new vulnerabilities to equipment failures, human error, weather and other natural causes, and physical and cyber attacks. Addressing these vulnerabilities will necessarily require flexible, evolutionary approaches that span both the public and private sectors, and protect both domestic and international security.

Because of our military strength, future enemies, whether nations, groups or individuals, may seek to harm us in non-traditional ways including attacks within the United States. Our economy is increasingly reliant upon interdependent and cyber-supported infrastructures and non-traditional attacks on our infrastructure and information systems may be capable of significantly harming both our military power and our economy.

II. President's Intent

It has long been the policy of the United States to assure the continuity and viability of critical infrastructures. President Clinton intends that the United States will take all necessary measures to swiftly eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems.

III. A National Goal

No later than the year 2000, the United States shall have achieved an initial operating capability and no later than five years from the day the President signed Presidential Decision Directive 63 the United States shall have achieved and shall maintain the ability to protect our nation's critical infrastructures from intentional acts that would significantly diminish the abilities of:

    * the Federal Government to perform essential national security missions and to ensure the general public health and safety;
    * state and local governments to maintain order and to deliver minimum essential public services;
    * the private sector to ensure the orderly functioning of the economy and the delivery of essential telecommunications, energy, financial and transportation services.

Any interruptions or manipulations of these critical functions must be brief, infrequent, manageable, geographically isolated and minimally detrimental to the welfare of the United States.

IV. A Public-Private Partnership to Reduce Vulnerability

Since the targets of attacks on our critical infrastructure would likely include both facilities in the economy and those in the government, the elimination of our potential vulnerability requires a closely coordinated effort of both the public and the private sector. To succeed, this partnership must be genuine, mutual and cooperative. In seeking to meet our national goal to eliminate the vulnerabilities of our critical infrastructure, therefore, the U.S. government should, to the extent feasible, seek to avoid outcomes that increase government regulation or expand unfunded government mandates to the private sector.

For each of the major sectors of our economy that are vulnerable to infrastructure attack, the Federal Government will appoint from a designated Lead Agency a senior officer of that agency as the Sector Liaison Official to work with the private sector. Sector Liaison Officials, after discussions and coordination with private sector entities of their infrastructure sector, will identify a private sector counterpart (Sector Coordinator) to represent their sector.

Together these two individuals and the departments and corporations they represent shall contribute to a sectoral National Infrastructure Assurance Plan by:

    * assessing the vulnerabilities of the sector to cyber or physical attacks;
    * recommending a plan to eliminate significant vulnerabilities;
    * proposing a system for identifying and preventing attempted major attacks;
    * developing a plan for alerting, containing and rebuffing an attack in progress and then, in coordination with FEMA as appropriate, rapidly reconstituting minimum essential capabilities in the aftermath of an attack.

During the preparation of the sectoral plans, the National Coordinator (see section VI), in conjunction with the Lead Agency Sector Liaison Officials and a representative from the National Economic Council, shall ensure their overall coordination and the integration of the various sectoral plans, with a particular focus on interdependencies.

V. Guidelines

In addressing this potential vulnerability and the means of eliminating it, President Clinton wants those involved to be mindful of the following general principles and concerns.

    * We shall consult with, and seek input from, the Congress on approaches and programs to meet the objectives set forth in this directive.
    * The protection of our critical infrastructures is necessarily a shared responsibility and partnership between owners, operators and the government. Furthermore, the Federal Government shall encourage international cooperation to help manage this increasingly global problem.
    * Frequent assessments shall be made of our critical infrastructures' existing reliability, vulnerability and threat environment because, as technology and the nature of the threats to our critical infrastructures will continue to change rapidly, so must our protective measures and responses be robustly adaptive.
    * The incentives that the market provides are the first choice for addressing the problem of critical infrastructure protection; regulation will be used only in the face of a material failure of the market to protect the health, safety or well-being of the American people. In such cases, agencies shall identify and assess available alternatives to direct regulation, including providing economic incentives to encourage the desired behavior, or providing information upon which choices can be made by the private sector. These incentives, along with other actions, shall be designed to help harness the latest technologies, bring about global solutions to international problems, and enable private sector owners and operators to achieve and maintain the maximum feasible security.
    * The full authorities, capabilities and resources of the government, including law enforcement, regulation, foreign intelligence and defense preparedness shall be available, as appropriate, to ensure that critical infrastructure protection is achieved and maintained.
    * Care must be taken to respect privacy rights. Consumers and operators must have confidence that information will be handled accurately, confidentially and reliably.
    * The Federal Government shall, through its research, development and procurement, encourage the introduction of increasingly capable methods of infrastructure protection.
    * The Federal Government shall serve as a model to the private sector on how infrastructure assurance is best achieved and shall, to the extent feasible, distribute the results of its endeavors.
    * We must focus on preventative measures as well as threat and crisis management. To that end, private sector owners and operators should be encouraged to provide maximum feasible security for the infrastructures they control and to provide the government necessary information to assist them in that task. In order to engage the private sector fully, it is preferred that participation by owners and operators in a national infrastructure protection system be voluntary.
    * Close cooperation and coordination with state and local governments and first responders is essential for a robust and flexible infrastructure protection program. All critical infrastructure protection plans and actions shall take into consideration the needs, activities and responsibilities of state and local governments and first responders.

VI. Structure and Organization

The Federal Government will be organized for the purposes of this endeavor around four components (elaborated in Annex A).

   1. Lead Agencies for Sector Liaison: For each infrastructure sector that could be a target for significant cyber or physical attacks, there will be a single U.S. Government department which will serve as the lead agency for liaison. Each Lead Agency will designate one individual of Assistant Secretary rank or higher to be the Sector Liaison Official for that area and to cooperate with the private sector representatives (Sector Coordinators) in addressing problems related to critical infrastructure protection and, in particular, in recommending components of the National Infrastructure Assurance Plan. Together, the Lead Agency and the private sector counterparts will develop and implement a Vulnerability Awareness and Education Program for their sector.
   2. Lead Agencies for Special Functions: There are, in addition, certain functions related to critical infrastructure protection that must be chiefly performed by the Federal Government (national defense, foreign affairs, intelligence, law enforcement). For each of those special functions, there shall be a Lead Agency which will be responsible for coordinating all of the activities of the United States Government in that area. Each lead agency will appoint a senior officer of Assistant Secretary rank or higher to serve as the Functional Coordinator for that function for the Federal Government.
   3. Interagency Coordination: The Sector Liaison Officials and Functional Coordinators of the Lead Agencies, as well as representatives from other relevant departments and agencies, including the National Economic Council, will meet to coordinate the implementation of this directive under the auspices of a Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG), chaired by the National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism. The National Coordinator will be appointed by and report to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, who shall assure appropriate coordination with the Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs. Agency representatives to the CICG should be at a senior policy level (Assistant Secretary or higher). Where appropriate, the CICG will be assisted by extant policy structures, such as the Security Policy Board, Security Policy Forum and the National Security and Telecommunications and Information System Security Committee.
   4. National Infrastructure Assurance Council: On the recommendation of the Lead Agencies, the National Economic Council and the National Coordinator, the President will appoint a panel of major infrastructure providers and state and local government officials to serve as the National Infrastructure Assurance Council. The President will appoint the Chairman. The National Coordinator will serve as the Council's Executive Director. The National Infrastructure Assurance Council will meet periodically to enhance the partnership of the public and private sectors in protecting our critical infrastructures and will provide reports to the President as appropriate. Senior Federal Government officials will participate in the meetings of the National Infrastructure Assurance Council as appropriate.

VII. Protecting Federal Government Critical Infrastructures

Every department and agency of the Federal Government shall be responsible for protecting its own critical infrastructure, especially its cyber-based systems. Every department and agency Chief Information Officer (CIO) shall be responsible for information assurance. Every department and agency shall appoint a Chief Infrastructure Assurance Officer (CIAO) who shall be responsible for the protection of all of the other aspects of that department's critical infrastructure. The CIO may be double-hatted as the CIAO at the discretion of the individual department. These officials shall establish procedures for obtaining expedient and valid authorizations to allow vulnerability assessments to be performed on government computer and physical systems. The Department of Justice shall establish legal guidelines for providing for such authorizations.

No later than 180 days from issuance of this directive, every department and agency shall develop a plan for protecting its own critical infrastructure, including but not limited to its cyber-based systems. The National Coordinator shall be responsible for coordinating analyses required by the departments and agencies of inter-governmental dependencies and the mitigation of those dependencies. The Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG) shall sponsor an expert review process for those plans. No later than two years from today, those plans shall have been implemented and shall be updated every two years. In meeting this schedule, the Federal Government shall present a model to the private sector on how best to protect critical infrastructure.

VIII. Tasks

Within 180 days, the Principals Committee should submit to the President a schedule for completion of a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan with milestones for accomplishing the following subordinate and related tasks.

   1. Vulnerability Analyses: For each sector of the economy and each sector of the government that might be a target of infrastructure attack intended to significantly damage the United States, there shall be an initial vulnerability assessment, followed by periodic updates. As appropriate, these assessments shall also include the determination of the minimum essential infrastructure in each sector.
   2. Remedial Plan: Based upon the vulnerability assessment, there shall be a recommended remedial plan. The plan shall identify timelines for implementation, responsibilities and funding.
   3. Warning: A national center to warn of significant infrastructure attacks will be established immediately (see Annex A). As soon thereafter as possible, we will put in place an enhanced system for detecting and analyzing such attacks, with maximum possible participation of the private sector.
   4. Response: A system shall develop a system for responding to a significant infrastructure attack while it is underway, with the goal of isolating and minimizing damage.
   5. Reconstitution: For varying levels of successful infrastructure attacks, we shall have a system to reconstitute minimum required capabilities rapidly.
   6. Education and Awareness: There shall be Vulnerability Awareness and Education Programs within both the government and the private sector to sensitize people regarding the importance of security and to train them in security standards, particularly regarding cyber systems.
   7. Research and Development: Federally-sponsored research and development in support of infrastructure protection shall be coordinated, be subject to multi-year planning, take into account private sector research, and be adequately funded to minimize our vulnerabilities on a rapid but achievable timetable.
   8. Intelligence: The Intelligence Community shall develop and implement a plan for enhancing collection and analysis of the foreign threat to our national infrastructure, to include but not be limited to the foreign cyber/information warfare threat.
   9. International Cooperation: There shall be a plan to expand cooperation on critical infrastructure protection with like-minded and friendly nations, international organizations and multinational corporations.
  10. Legislative and Budgetary Requirements: There shall be an evaluation of the executive branch's legislative authorities and budgetary priorities regarding critical infrastructure, and ameliorative recommendations shall be made to the President as necessary. The evaluations and recommendations, if any, shall be coordinated with the Director of OMB.

The CICG shall also review and schedule the taskings listed in Annex B.

IX. Implementation

In addition to the 180-day report, the National Coordinator, working with the National Economic Council, shall provide an annual report on the implementation of this directive to the President and the heads of departments and agencies, through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The report should include an updated threat assessment, a status report on achieving the milestones identified for the National Plan and additional policy, legislative and budgetary recommendations. The evaluations and recommendations, if any, shall be coordinated with the Director of OMB. In addition, following the establishment of an initial operating capability in the year 2000, the National Coordinator shall conduct a zero-based review.

Annex A: Structure and Organization

Lead Agencies: Clear accountability within the U.S. Government must be designated for specific sectors and functions. The following assignments of responsibility will apply.
Lead Agencies for Sector Liaison
Commerce    Information and communications
Treasury    Banking and finance
EPA   Water supply
Transportation   Aviation
Highways (including trucking and intelligent transportation systems)
Mass transit
Pipelines
Rail
Waterborne commerce
Justice/FBI   Emergency law enforcement services
FEMA   Emergency fire service
Continuity of government services
HHS   Public health services, including prevention, surveillance, laboratory services and personal health services
Energy   Electric power
Oil and gas production and storage

Lead Agencies for Special Functions
Justice/FBI   Law enforcement and internal security
CIA   Foreign intelligence
State   Foreign affairs
Defense   National defense

In addition, OSTP shall be responsible for coordinating research and development agendas and programs for the government through the National Science and Technology Council. Furthermore, while Commerce is the lead agency for information and communication, the Department of Defense will retain its Executive Agent responsibilities for the National Communications System and support of the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee.

National Coordinator: The National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection and Counter-Terrorism shall be responsible for coordinating the implementation of this directive. The National Coordinator will report to the President through the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The National Coordinator will also participate as a full member of Deputies or Principals Committee meetings when they meet to consider infrastructure issues. Although the National Coordinator will not direct Departments and Agencies, he or she will ensure interagency coordination for policy development and implementation, and will review crisis activities concerning infrastructure events with significant foreign involvement. The National Coordinator will provide advice, in the context of the established annual budget process, regarding agency budgets for critical infrastructure protection. The National Coordinator will chair the Critical Infrastructure Coordination Group (CICG), reporting to the Deputies Committee (or, at the call of its chair, the Principals Committee). The Sector Liaison Officials and Special Function Coordinators shall attend the CICG's meetings. Departments and agencies shall each appoint to the CICG a senior official (Assistant Secretary level or higher) who will regularly attend its meetings. The National Security Advisor shall appoint a Senior Director for Infrastructure Protection on the NSC staff.

A National Plan Coordination (NPC) staff will be contributed on a non-reimbursable basis by the departments and agencies, consistent with law. The NPC staff will integrate the various sector plans into a National Infrastructure Assurance Plan and coordinate analyses of the U.S. Government's own dependencies on critical infrastructures. The NPC staff will also help coordinate a national education and awareness program, and legislative and public affairs.

The Defense Department shall continue to serve as Executive Agent for the Commission Transition Office, which will form the basis of the NPC, during the remainder of FY98. Beginning in FY99, the NPC shall be an office of the Commerce Department. The Office of Personnel Management shall provide the necessary assistance in facilitating the NPC's operations. The NPC will terminate at the end of FY01, unless extended by Presidential directive.
Warning and Information Centers

As part of a national warning and information sharing system, the President immediately authorizes the FBI to expand its current organization to a full scale National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC). This organization shall serve as a national critical infrastructure threat assessment, warning, vulnerability, and law enforcement investigation and response entity. During the initial period of six to twelve months, the President also directs the National Coordinator and the Sector Liaison Officials, working together with the Sector Coordinators, the Special Function Coordinators and representatives from the National Economic Council, as appropriate, to consult with owners and operators of the critical infrastructures to encourage the creation of a private sector sharing and analysis center, as described below.

National Infrastructure Protection Center (NIPC): The NIPC will include FBI, USSS, and other investigators experienced in computer crimes and infrastructure protection, as well as representatives detailed from the Department of Defense, the Intelligence Community and Lead Agencies. It will be linked electronically to the rest of the Federal Government, including other warning and operations centers, as well as any private sector sharing and analysis centers. Its mission will include providing timely warnings of intentional threats, comprehensive analyses and law enforcement investigation and response.

All executive departments and agencies shall cooperate with the NIPC and provide such assistance, information and advice that the NIPC may request, to the extent permitted by law. All executive departments shall also share with the NIPC information about threats and warning of attacks and about actual attacks on critical government and private sector infrastructures, to the extent permitted by law. The NIPC will include elements responsible for warning, analysis, computer investigation, coordinating emergency response, training, outreach and development and application of technical tools. In addition, it will establish its own relations directly with others in the private sector and with any information sharing and analysis entity that the private sector may create, such as the Information Sharing and Analysis Center described below.

The NIPC, in conjunction with the information originating agency, will sanitize law enforcement and intelligence information for inclusion into analyses and reports that it will provide, in appropriate form, to relevant federal, state and local agencies; the relevant owners and operators of critical infrastructures; and to any private sector information sharing and analysis entity. Before disseminating national security or other information that originated from the intelligence community, the NIPC will coordinate fully with the intelligence community through existing procedures. Whether as sanitized or unsanitized reports, the NIPC will issue attack warnings or alerts to increases in threat condition to any private sector information sharing and analysis entity and to the owners and operators. These warnings may also include guidance regarding additional protection measures to be taken by owners and operators. Except in extreme emergencies, the NIPC shall coordinate with the National Coordinator before issuing public warnings of imminent attacks by international terrorists, foreign states or other malevolent foreign powers.

The NIPC will provide a national focal point for gathering information on threats to the infrastructures. Additionally, the NIPC will provide the principal means of facilitating and coordinating the Federal Government's response to an incident, mitigating attacks, investigating threats and monitoring reconstitution efforts. Depending on the nature and level of a foreign threat/attack, protocols established between special function agencies (DOJ/DOD/CIA), and the ultimate decision of the President, the NIPC may be placed in a direct support role to either DOD or the Intelligence Community.

Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAC): The National Coordinator, working with Sector Coordinators, Sector Liaison Officials and the National Economic Council, shall consult with owners and operators of the critical infrastructures to strongly encourage the creation of a private sector information sharing and analysis center. The actual design and functions of the center and its relation to the NIPC will be determined by the private sector, in consultation with and with assistance from the Federal Government. Within 180 days of this directive, the National Coordinator, with the assistance of the CICG including the National Economic Council, shall identify possible methods of providing federal assistance to facilitate the startup of an ISAC.

Such a center could serve as the mechanism for gathering, analyzing, appropriately sanitizing and disseminating private sector information to both industry and the NIPC. The center could also gather, analyze and disseminate information from the NIPC for further distribution to the private sector. While crucial to a successful government-industry partnership, this mechanism for sharing important information about vulnerabilities, threats, intrusions and anomalies is not to interfere with direct information exchanges between companies and the government.

As ultimately designed by private sector representatives, the ISAC may emulate particular aspects of such institutions as the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that have proved highly effective, particularly its extensive interchanges with the private and non-federal sectors. Under such a model, the ISAC would possess a large degree of technical focus and expertise and non-regulatory and non-law enforcement missions. It would establish baseline statistics and patterns on the various infrastructures, become a clearinghouse for information within and among the various sectors, and provide a library for historical data to be used by the private sector and, as deemed appropriate by the ISAC, by the government. Critical to the success of such an institution would be its timeliness, accessibility, coordination, flexibility, utility and acceptability.

Annex B: Additional Taskings
Studies

The National Coordinator shall commission studies on the following subjects:

    * Liability issues arising from participation by private sector companies in the information sharing process.
    * Existing legal impediments to information sharing, with an eye to proposals to remove these impediments, including through the drafting of model codes in cooperation with the American Legal Institute.
    * The necessity of document and information classification and the impact of such classification on useful dissemination, as well as the methods and information systems by which threat and vulnerability information can be shared securely while avoiding disclosure or unacceptable risk of disclosure to those who will misuse it.
    * The improved protection, including secure dissemination and information handling systems, of industry trade secrets and other confidential business data, law enforcement information and evidentiary material, classified national security information, unclassified material disclosing vulnerabilities of privately owned infrastructures and apparently innocuous information that, in the aggregate, it is unwise to disclose.
    * The implications of sharing information with foreign entities where such sharing is deemed necessary to the security of United States infrastructures.
    * The potential benefit to security standards of mandating, subsidizing, or otherwise assisting in the provision of insurance for selected critical infrastructure providers and requiring insurance tie-ins for foreign critical infrastructure providers hoping to do business with the United States.

Public Outreach

In order to foster a climate of enhanced public sensitivity to the problem of infrastructure protection, the following actions shall be taken:

    * The White House, under the oversight of the National Coordinator, together with the relevant Cabinet agencies shall consider a series of conferences: (1) that will bring together national leaders in the public and private sectors to propose programs to increase the commitment to information security; (2) that convoke academic leaders from engineering, computer science, business and law schools to review the status of education in information security and will identify changes in the curricula and resources necessary to meet the national demand for professionals in this field; (3) on the issues around computer ethics as these relate to the K through 12 and general university populations.
    * The National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering shall consider a round table bringing together federal, state and local officials with industry and academic leaders to develop national strategies for enhancing infrastructure security.
    * The intelligence community and law enforcement shall expand existing programs for briefing infrastructure owners and operators and senior government officials.
    * The National Coordinator shall (1) establish a program for infrastructure assurance simulations involving senior public and private officials, the reports of which might be distributed as part of an awareness campaign; and (2) in coordination with the private sector, launch a continuing national awareness campaign, emphasizing improving infrastructure security.

Internal Federal Government Actions

In order for the Federal Government to improve its infrastructure security, these immediate steps shall be taken:

    * The Department of Commerce, the General Services Administration, and the Department of Defense shall assist federal agencies in the implementation of best practices for information assurance within their individual agencies.
    * The National Coordinator shall coordinate a review of existing federal, state and local bodies charged with information assurance tasks, and provide recommendations on how these institutions can cooperate most effectively.
    * All federal agencies shall make clear designations regarding who may authorize access to their computer systems.
    * The Intelligence Community shall elevate and formalize the priority for enhanced collection and analysis of information on the foreign cyber/information warfare threat to our critical infrastructure.
    * The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service and other appropriate agencies shall: (1) vigorously recruit undergraduate and graduate students with the relevant computer-related technical skills for full-time employment as well as for part-time work with regional computer crime squads; and (2) facilitate the hiring and retention of qualified personnel for technical analysis and investigation involving cyber attacks.
    * The Department of Transportation, in consultation with the Department of Defense, shall undertake a thorough evaluation of the vulnerability of the national transportation infrastructure that relies on the Global Positioning System. This evaluation shall include sponsoring an independent, integrated assessment of risks to civilian users of GPS-based systems, with a view to basing decisions on the ultimate architecture of the modernized NAS on these evaluations.
    * The Federal Aviation Administration shall develop and implement a comprehensive National Airspace System Security Program to protect the modernized NAS from information-based and other disruptions and attacks.
    * GSA shall identify large procurements (such as the new Federal Telecommunications System, FTS 2000) related to infrastructure assurance, study whether the procurement process reflects the importance of infrastructure protection and propose, if necessary, revisions to the overall procurement process to do so.
    * OMB shall direct federal agencies to include assigned infrastructure assurance functions within their Government Performance and Results Act strategic planning and performance measurement framework.
    * The NSA, in accordance with its National Manager responsibilities in NSD-42, shall provide assessments encompassing examinations of U.S. Government systems to interception and exploitation; disseminate threat and vulnerability information; establish standards; conduct research and development; and conduct issue security product evaluations.

Assisting the Private Sector

In order to assist the private sector in achieving and maintaining infrastructure security:

    * The National Coordinator and the National Infrastructure Assurance Council shall propose and develop ways to encourage private industry to perform periodic risk assessments of critical processes, including information and telecommunications systems.
    * The Department of Commerce and the Department of Defense shall work together, in coordination with the private sector, to offer their expertise to private owners and operators of critical infrastructure to develop security-related best practice standards.
    * The Department of Justice and Department of the Treasury shall sponsor a comprehensive study compiling demographics of computer crime, comparing state approaches to computer crime and developing ways of deterring and responding to computer crime by juveniles.

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So the burial continues...................
Spare no cost for truth's sake, neither depart from it for any gain. -Proverbs 23:23

Bestow not the gifts that God has given you to get worldly riches. -Proverbs 23:4

Online Jackson Holly

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SANE:
Quote
Keep an eye on the governors they are after at the moment.

Excellent comments SANE!

Their attack profile is becoming more revealed everyday ... and the final push will necessarily be on the local, neighborhood-by-neighborhood and eventually house-by-house approach ... 'street-by-street' as our loving military calls it.

Cut the communications (internet) while turning up the propaganda heat (media) ...

Bring-on the fog of War (false flags, confuse reality) ... quash dissent ...

Military take-over of infra-structure and supply lines ...

Enforce military rule ... 'Federalize' (take-over) all local government ...

Attack/subdue the population ... surreptitiously at first (soft kill, food and drug) ... then physical force ...

Declare victory for NWO, the New Military World Dictatorship.

~~~~~~~~~~~~

They are pretty far down this list already ... they are attacking on many of these fronts. Many governors no doubt are patriots and will try (are trying) to fight back ... some, by this late date, are fully awake to what is happening, others not.

Some governors (as are congressmen) are full-fledged members of the NWO themselves.

We need to compile a list of present Governors likely to acquiesce without a fight ... the governors control a good deal of military might ... National Guard, etc. We need to get them out of office.

An then there are the MAYORS ... they wield a lot of power ... infrastructure, police forces, local political clout ... we need also to compile a list of present big city mayors likely to give them what they want without a fight.

Many MAYORS are NWO as well ... puppets either put into power by the elite brotherhood or sellouts. When push comes to shove, we MUST have the local forces on our side ... we need to get those mayors out of office.

I believe our victory can be realized without bloodshed if (and only if) our local leaders (from governors to police chiefs) simply refuse to cooperate ... if we, locally, here where the rubber-meets-the-road, and on a massive scale, reject and refuse the NWO ... think Ghandi ... we can retain our freedoms and National identities.

And of course, this is true of all nations ... local, worldwide, organized resistance is the answer.

List of Governors:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_current_United_States_governors

Well, here in New Mexico we have a real ringer as governor ... Bill Richardson. He appears to 100% NWO, a Rothschild/Windsor lapdog if I have ever seen one. But ... he was thrown under the bus for some reason. As soon as he performed his function in this last election, to garner the Latin support for the NWO ... Mr. Smiley-face doughboy ... he was exorcised. I can't figure that out.

Is there a limit to what he will do for them? Is he retreating from the Dark Side?

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

St. Augustine: “The truth is like a lion; you don't have to defend it.
Let it loose; it will defend itself."

Anti_Illuminati

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Umnnn, wow.

So, desertfae - I see you have quite a good bit of evidence to fill in the gaps so to speak.

Not to say that Anti Illuminati hasn't got enough proof here in these threads of who exactly was involved.

But, wow from what I've seen of your site and your docs posted here - it looks like you have some pretty damning / convicting evidence of your own. That has it's own legs - so to speak - even. Also, when combined with what I've already read of Anti Illuminati's research - it adds yet another layer to the onion - proving much of what I have known via classified un-mentionable sources. 

Having worked in Big IT as per the resume shown on the website listed in my profile I have dealt with many things that I have had much trouble proving because I was not aware that any of this was publicly printed in non-secure areas. 

Thanks to Anti Illuminati's ability to find things even on this horribly censored internet we no have - I now have proof that fully documents much of what I have known for a very long through personal experience.

Please people wake up - these companies specialize in developing false flags for our government. Without these people and corporations 9/11 would have never been possible.

Desertfae and Anti Illuminati have research that could both independently bring down the entire Kleptocratic regime. We need to support them.  From what I understand Desertfae already has criminal cases open regarding her research. We need a group of people who understand Anti Illuminati's research to  join me in initiating an investigation based on his research as well. We need Alex to read this and understand how direly important this is before we are all on IPv6 and he has nothing left but a radio audience again.

Alex - if people don't wake up to the fact that what we have here is not only evidence incriminating all the major players in 9/11 and all of their lackeys. But, also evidence showing every one of their upcoming major false flags in exacting details.

WE HAVE THEM BY THE BALLS NOW WITH THIS EVIDENCE. WE CAN CONVICT THEM WITHOUT A SHADOW OF A DOUBT BASED ON WHAT WE NOW HAVE HERE!   Get IT? If We don't do this now  the we will never have another opportunity to expose this!


IPv6 will be implemented very soon. Most likely by the end of this year. Nothing you or any one else can do will stop this.

There is no congressional approval for this. As I said before this was decided by the non-profit org known as ARIN. ARIN is comprised of members who are any valid person or organization  who pays $500 a year and doesn't violate any of ARIN's existing policies. Meaning mainly ISPs and Global Telecom Carriers.  They control ALL IPs - They write the policy. NOT the government.  The internet has been privatized. Meaning the fascist corporations can do what ever they want with it and  congress has  NO say in any of it.


Offline America2

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Many MAYORS are NWO as well ... puppets either put into power by the elite brotherhood or sellouts. When push comes to shove, we MUST have the local forces on our side ... we need to get those mayors out of office.

Having lived in New Orleans when Katrina hit, while I'm not 100% sure, I'm fairly certain that Ray Nagin is NWO.

For the most part, New Orleans politicians are homegrown, come from political families, come from the same culture, etc, etc. However - Nagin is COMPLETELY different - an outsider, had no experience in politics, was a high level executive in a MEDIA company(Cox Cable), etc, etc. During his early years, he was being hyped as "Ray Reagan" b/c supposedly, he, unlike other Big Easy politicians, wasn't taking bribes(i.e. there were reports where he would flush these bribe checks down the toilet at City Hall). He also got alot of attention in the 2003 governor's race when he endorsed "Republican" Bobby Jindal(who's proven to be another NWO tool - he's a Rhodes Scholar, and voted for the Real ID Act in Congress).

And then after Katrina hit, his behavior, attitude, and actions were pretty suspect and suspicious - he pretty much tried to play dumb over alot of the issues going on.

But yeah - he emerged on the scene to run for mayor in late 2001(after, of course, 9/11 happened), and was elected in 2002. Again - NO coincidence.

Offline Dig

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FROM JOSEPH FARAH'S G2 BULLETIN
Giving China help with cyber warfare
Plan may make it easier to hand over militarily critical exports
Posted: August 28, 2009 12:35 am Eastern
http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=107818


The Obama administration is considering easing U.S. export controls to China even though the director for national intelligence is warning about Chinese cyber warfare threats to U.S. military information systems. In addition, there are increasing reports of Chinese military buildup to match U.S. capabilities, according to a report from Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin.

The one group jubilant over the White House decision to undertake yet another comprehensive review of U.S. export control laws toward China is the U.S. business community.

"The U.S. has one of the most robust export control systems in the world," White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said last week. "But it is rooted in the Cold War era of over 50 years ago and must be updated to address the threats we face today and the changing economic and technological landscape."

Bill Reinsch, president of the National Foreign Trade Council and a former U.S. Commerce under secretary who was in charge of export controls, applauded the White House initiative. Through the NFTC, the Coalition for Security and Competitiveness, or CSC, similarly supported the initiative.

(Story continues below)
          


"The coalition strongly supports practical measures aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the export control regime. The need for new policies and processes to advance our national security, foreign policy and economic interests has never been more compelling than it is right now."

Keep in touch with the most important breaking news stories about critical developments around the globe with Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin, the premium, online intelligence news source edited and published by the founder of WND.

CSC members include the Aerospace Industries Association, the Association of American Exporters and Importers, the AMT – Association for Manufacturing Technology, Business Roundtable, the Coalition for Employment Through Exports, the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, the Industrial Fastener Institute, the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Defense Industrial Association, the National Foreign Trade Council, the Satellite Industry Association, The Space Foundation, TechAmerica and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

The question of loosening controls, however, centers on whether rewarding Chinese behavior is appropriate or whether it is oriented more toward aiding business at a time of global economic recession.

Contrary to Gibbs' comments that export controls are "rooted in the Cold War era of over 50 years ago," they have undergone continuous review and liberalization despite increasing targeting of U.S. technology by such countries as China, Russia, Iran and even some western nations for their military.

Throughout the 1990s during President Bill Clinton's two administrations and President George Bush's two terms, export controls especially toward China have been loosened considerably.

The views of those concerned about protecting the militarily critical technology belonging to the United States through this period have taken a back seat to economic interests, especially in the face of mounting trade deficits toward China.

Indeed, Beijing in recent months has been pressing Washington to lift some export controls, suggesting that they would help ease the U.S. trade deficit with China, which reached $268 billion last year.

While China plays the economic card, the national security risk to certain technology exports is going virtually unmentioned.

And now, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair said China also is aggressively waging information warfare and computer attacks on U.S. military information systems, and that action represents a "growing threat."
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Monkeypox

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It's amazing to see all the "awake"  comments there!  And that's on a tech site.

The Info War is having an effect people.  Don't think for a second that it's not.
War Is Peace - Freedom Is Slavery - Ignorance Is Strength


"Educate and inform the whole mass of the people... They are the only sure reliance for the preservation of our liberty."

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Offline Monkeypox

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FROM JOSEPH FARAH'S G2 BULLETIN
Giving China help with cyber warfare
Plan may make it easier to hand over militarily critical exports
Posted: August 28, 2009 12:35 am Eastern
http://www.wnd.com/index.php?fa=PAGE.view&pageId=107818


The Obama administration is considering easing U.S. export controls to China even though the director for national intelligence is warning about Chinese cyber warfare threats to U.S. military information systems. In addition, there are increasing reports of Chinese military buildup to match U.S. capabilities, according to a report from Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin.

The one group jubilant over the White House decision to undertake yet another comprehensive review of U.S. export control laws toward China is the U.S. business community.

"The U.S. has one of the most robust export control systems in the world," White House spokesman Robert Gibbs said last week. "But it is rooted in the Cold War era of over 50 years ago and must be updated to address the threats we face today and the changing economic and technological landscape."

Bill Reinsch, president of the National Foreign Trade Council and a former U.S. Commerce under secretary who was in charge of export controls, applauded the White House initiative. Through the NFTC, the Coalition for Security and Competitiveness, or CSC, similarly supported the initiative.

(Story continues below)
          


"The coalition strongly supports practical measures aimed at improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the export control regime. The need for new policies and processes to advance our national security, foreign policy and economic interests has never been more compelling than it is right now."

Keep in touch with the most important breaking news stories about critical developments around the globe with Joseph Farah's G2 Bulletin, the premium, online intelligence news source edited and published by the founder of WND.

CSC members include the Aerospace Industries Association, the Association of American Exporters and Importers, the AMT – Association for Manufacturing Technology, Business Roundtable, the Coalition for Employment Through Exports, the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, the Industrial Fastener Institute, the National Association of Manufacturers, the National Defense Industrial Association, the National Foreign Trade Council, the Satellite Industry Association, The Space Foundation, TechAmerica and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.

The question of loosening controls, however, centers on whether rewarding Chinese behavior is appropriate or whether it is oriented more toward aiding business at a time of global economic recession.

Contrary to Gibbs' comments that export controls are "rooted in the Cold War era of over 50 years ago," they have undergone continuous review and liberalization despite increasing targeting of U.S. technology by such countries as China, Russia, Iran and even some western nations for their military.

Throughout the 1990s during President Bill Clinton's two administrations and President George Bush's two terms, export controls especially toward China have been loosened considerably.

The views of those concerned about protecting the militarily critical technology belonging to the United States through this period have taken a back seat to economic interests, especially in the face of mounting trade deficits toward China.

Indeed, Beijing in recent months has been pressing Washington to lift some export controls, suggesting that they would help ease the U.S. trade deficit with China, which reached $268 billion last year.

While China plays the economic card, the national security risk to certain technology exports is going virtually unmentioned.

And now, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair said China also is aggressively waging information warfare and computer attacks on U.S. military information systems, and that action represents a "growing threat."

Obama will finish giving away all of our secrets to the Chinese.

American tax dollars and American corporations spent decades and trillions developing our technology.  Now we just give it away to the highest bidder.

Anyone who can't see that our "leaders"  are trying to orchestrate the downfall of The United States is either blind or terminally stupid.
War Is Peace - Freedom Is Slavery - Ignorance Is Strength


"Educate and inform the whole mass of the people... They are the only sure reliance for the preservation of our liberty."

—Thomas Jefferson

Offline Monkeypox

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Obama Puppet:

War Is Peace - Freedom Is Slavery - Ignorance Is Strength


"Educate and inform the whole mass of the people... They are the only sure reliance for the preservation of our liberty."

—Thomas Jefferson

Offline America2

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Obama will finish giving away all of our secrets to the Chinese.

American tax dollars and American corporations spent decades and trillions developing our technology.  Now we just give it away to the highest bidder.

Anyone who can't see that our "leaders"  are trying to orchestrate the downfall on The United States is either blind or terminally stupid.

It's not they can't see it, but it's more so that they're caught up in this Left/Right paradigm.

The "Republicans" say Clinton is completely to blame for the current state of the economy it is in now, while the "Democrats" continue to blame Bush for doing everything to create tyranny in this country. Being a studier of bible prophecy myself, I'm very surprised some of these end times "scholars" are caught up in this paradigm as well(i.e. Hal Lindsey has yet to say ANY NEGATIVE thing about Bush II).

And then, of course, when things go south for one party who currently runs DC, the OTHER party has this "the next guy will save us" mentality(i.e. the GOP thinks Jindal will pretty much save them in 2012).

IOW - as long as we have these 2 groups fighting amongst each other, the bankers et al will have minimum distractions to get their hands dirty.

Anti_Illuminati

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Read these quotes VERY thoroughly.

Great post AI...
As I said before on a couple threads that seem to have all been merged lol...

You are quite right and it is all ready to go at the touch of a button.

I merely add to this the link to the backbone for inet2 . This is what gives it it's security , tracking abilities, and control mechanisms that make it capable of insuring only authrized users get on and everything they do is tracked and  traced and controlled...

http://www.ipv6.org/specs.html

It's already there as part of all current modern operating systems and their initial plan was to have it in place and replacing IPv4 by 2012. Most enterprise companies are testing IPv6 and some even have turned to using it for production systems on an enterprise scale....

If the security concerns of ensuring that every one can work from home is introduced as they intend too they have the perfect reason to shut off IPv4 which essentially kills the internet as we know it and switch to IPv6.

Major ISPs and large enterprises can easily afford to swap out IP space.
At this point IPv6 IPs are free with an ARIN membership.
An ARIN Membership costs about $10,000 a year..... This effectively only will affect small businesses and private hosting companies.

The government already has a membership so if they decide that each individual shall now have an IP coupled to their social security number they easily can do that...

It can easily all be put into effect at a moment's notice with just the few clickity clicks of the keyboard at major ISPs...

We'll say great. Hopefully we can manage to expose this shit enough that they have to re-consider their plans and none of what you described above happens..... But, these bastids are going for broke ..... So, sadly I think they are going to push along unless people get out in mass and demand  / force the current leaders all step down - ie Greece and Iceland....

By a clickity click even ... it's really that simple ...
On windows vista IPv6 is active by default.....


And magically all of the sites spreading trojans and virri go away and ddos botnets become useless and so forth and so the Sheeople all bahhh "We love you obhaaammaaa Intet 2 is The best thing that ever happened to us."

After all they will be able to filter everything on a per host basis because the very nature of IPv6 has been designed to do such as opposed to IPv4  which is effective at limiting large blocks of IP but not single hosts ... hence multi host botnet DDOS is still highly effective ...
I could go on and on about IPv6 but  the url  has it all and Anti Illumanati's articles  have  given us the how  and why it will quickly become standard ushering in the dawn of Inet2

Indeed Anti Illuminati. Indeed.

So they are using these concepts not only to create  virtual viruses etc... But actually also proves they have used the principals they have learned from studying real viruses and  applied it  to create a network that is self aware so to speak  and a slew of other things.....  Basically they have built a system based on the very PRINCIPALS & BASICS of  basic intelligence found in nature ...They've used that and the methodology behind that to create a framework and then standardized this framework and have been using it for quite a while now...  
These docs prove they have developed then implement(ed) this technology and frameworkit to create war game simulations, perform network security evaluations  (of itself even or others - on the fly) , Systems and infrastructure integrations and architecture deployments, and a whole slew of other functions ....
Man wow ...
Now, I get it ...
Very Heavy....


I always knew they had technology like this but have never been able to find the docs to conclusively prove it.
Wow, that rocks (that you found this)........
Kick ass man wow.
:D
Beyond impressed...

 I'll merely ask, do you know how many years I've been digging to find those white papers? Hell, even something solid in the public domain.....

 I have a feeling you know ;-), thanks for the vital info bro....


Amazing find wow...

:D

For the layman, think about taking the concept and abilities of a real virus (ie tthe flu or chickenpox, etc) or any basic entity trying to survive. It can and will adapt and mutate for it's environment doing everything it can to survive and then  applying those concepts and those abilities to not only computer systems but entire infrastructures as a process of creating and doing things... We all know that a few live virus cultures can be used to infect a large section of population just through any means of contamination that virus is capable of...
 Apply that concept to anything you do ....
This is what they are doing  ... and have been  doing... You gain the ability to affect and control systems much the same way viruses do in nature now. IE a virus infects a cell and hijacks that cell then turning it into a factory to produce more viruses... This is how they replicate .... usually ... so apply that to IT, military systems,  warfare strategies, etc...
Now you all should get how powerful the information Anti Illuminati just gave us really is.....At least  I hope you all get it...

Man, Anti Illuminati you rock! Keep up the amazing research ! WOW and thanks agin :).


Just wondering ... I know the topic Anti  Illuminati covered and I expounded upon in my last post is a bit off topic but, does any one get the ramifications of this?

Like Anti Illuminati said in a much earlier post : remember when that chick in terminator 3 injected the nanobots into things and she was able to control those things and then  eventually the virus is able to take over all of the internet and DOD's networks?

Well that's the kind of technology they are not only playing with but apparently have implemented on a large scale even.

They have systems that can essentially infect any other system or network they desire and then hijack it !

Linux, UNIX, MAC OS, Windows, embedded systems, and basically any computerized electronic system of any kind they are all susceptible and there is nothing currently engineered with the ability to stop this stuff. Meaning they can use it to take control of any computer with a network connection regardless of OS on the fly in real time anytime they desire!

Any computer  like system even - can be infected.....via cdrom, serial connection, floppy disk and yes as I said before a network connection  and is therefore at risk to becoming a system they then control and can subvert at any time they choose!

Beyond that it gives them a very powerful strategy in real life warefare that most ennemies will not be able to overcome!

This goes way beyond super flues. Hell this kinda makes super flues seem like a baby's toy in comparison... not to detract from this thread which is of extreme vital importance .

Anti Illuminati - is there another existing thread you have expounded on these docs within?

If so  please link me... Man that's some heavy Sh*T , thanks again for the expose...




It's like a flu virus it has no real truly sentient intelligence other than that which govern the basics of survival ...

They need something THEY can control ... Don't think they haven't learned anything from their own terminator movies ...


So essentially it's job is to infect and do what ever it's handlers have programed it to do...  The AI part comes  because it has a "Survival instinct" that allows it to effectively infiltrate any system by learning how to infect and control it on the fly ...

There are other AI systems that are more like sentient beings not being used for this  but for other nefarious projects... ... But, I have not the public domain proof to back up any of the details I could give you on them ...So, I will merely refrain from  doing such here on this thread...

PM me if you care to hear a few things  - I'll be happy to share my knowledge I have garnished while working in big IT for the past decade....

But yes this is a very heavy matter indeed.


Also while posting this I noticed Anti Illuminati has added yet another interesting and convicting piece of evidence to the pile .... Agreed Anti Illuminati seems they needed to accelerate this (roughly) 3 years ago and that is exactly what they seem to have done :(
  
There has been enourmous ammounts of clatter in recent years about how we need to impliment IPv6 sooner ... and get that ball rolling ... Seem this is where that pressure is comming from ...

So, I have but one minor correction to your hypothetical story :
Since, IPv6 AKA Internet2 is already slated to be in place by 2012 and  many IT companies and carriers are already migrating this last part should read as follow.


...was passed almost unanimously by the House and Senate...

...the new system -which many companies are already transitioning too will utilize IPv6. We will accelerate the existing goals of ARIN, RIPE and APNIC to have this in place by 2012. So that instead due to this dire security threat - we can accomplish this transition within the  next 6 months. This system has been dubbed Inet2 by it's founders ... http://www.internet2.edu/

...though criticized by a small majority, experts say that "Education Net" will offer faster connections, more efficient family filtering and 24/7 monitoring for scams and fraud...

The US government and every ISP / Carrier that has lines into the US has BGPSEC and has had BGPSEC  in place since 2003-05  when all carriers were required to adopt it as a standard and put it in place via legislation that went into place during that time....

Beck Strom is a shill and a puppet  moving the security hacking community into the realm of being useless - ever since he took over black hat. Which he was "forced" to do because  David Maynor  exposed that apple Wifi cards could be trojaned easily remotely without the vicitms knowledge even - and apple sued him and had a gag order placed on him for a year so they could slam him publicly and he couldn't even talk about any of it. Not even how apple knew it was there and didn't bother to fix it till over 2 months after the scandal broke ....  So now that blackhat has become nothing but a bunch of dilly dally know nothings blindly following small potato well known exploit channels... Calling the most advanced intelligent security systems ever developed easily hacked.... The sheeople and the general IT community who are in essence sheeeople believe him.

what a crock...
jeeese ... Beck Strom could barely hack his way out of a paper bag ... take away his nepherness console and his metasploit and he'd be powerless imho ... Isn't that what his testing of government systems proves? I mean he must have hit every single honey pot they wanted him to hit ... Now his box is an NSA trojan distribution center / Virtual Bug and he probably has no clue ....
But then again that's a personal opinion / assumptions and  should not be taken completely as fact ....


What is  a fact is they are indeed setting the stage to take down the internet and it is comming very soon :(....





Everything you just showed proves they are planning this . Please every one read and understand what AI , Sane and I are saying ... This is real and it's coming and we need to stop it now before they push the button and demolition OUR INTERNET.

Our tax dollars paid for DARPA, Our TAX dollars pay to lay the fiber . Then we pay even more on top of it as consumers from ISPs -just to access this system. So, we the people have  paid for the internet essentially - this is OUR internet.


Now they have the balls to try and take it away from us... Man I am hella pissed. Aren't you?

Also, this affects every one who uses the internet worldwide.

So, it's not just us americans who will loose, it's every one who uses the internet globally !!


Agenda item No. 2: Mandate net neutrality in perpetuity
It’s a new age, and with it should come new rights, such as the right to unfettered Internet access. Much as our country was originally founded on beliefs such as the freedom of speech, congregation, and religion, we should be awarded the freedom of information in the form of open network access.

If the major ISPs had their way, access to the Internet would be tiered, exactly like cable television. That is, you’d have a “basic plan” that would let you access only a handful of sites, and a larger plan, with a larger price tag, that would allow you to access more sites. If put into place, it would necessarily destroy the original premise of the Internet as a completely open network of computers, where every system can connect to every other system, regardless of location.

No good can ever come from a tiered Internet, and the government should solidify that as a basic right. This isn’t to say that every citizen should be given free Internet access, but rather that such access should not be filtered, censored, or constrained in any way.

ISPs should be free to sell various packages based on access speed and acceptable-use policies, but federal law should mandate that these services have no filtering whatsoever, including the current practice of blocking certain inbound ports.
This is a bait and switch. In actuality they will use this to implement a fairness doctrine as well as other current limitations on physical free speech. BEWARE OF NET NEUTRALITY LAWS! THE NET SHOULD BE SELF GOVERNING IN THE SAME FASHION AS REAL FREE TRADE AND TRUE  UN-CORRUPTED CAPITALISM  -WOULD BE WITHOUT WORLD BANKERS OF THE NWO TRYING TO F*CK US ALL.

Other key points that they faill to mention. that local and federal tax dollars are paid to these telecom companies to establish and pay for these networks. These networks are then allocated even more tax dollars as part of federal projects that have to pay these same telecom monthly access fees and Bandwidth charges. (Talk about on f*cked paradox)
Then you as a consumer along with every other business pay even more money in monthly access charges and bandwidth fees on top of that equating to nothing but profits for companies like Verizon, Comcast and MA BELL ( AKA SBC/ATT  see: http://www.dvorak.org/blog/2007/01/06/will-ma-bells-reassembly-result-in-the-bride-of-frankinstein/ and  http://techdirt.com/articles/20060306/0122246_F.shtml

Agenda item No. 3: Place restrictions on EULAs
Suppose GM required truck buyers to sign a document stating that the company could claim ownership to any material carried in the truck or that the company was not liable for any claims should the truck spontaneously explode due to a manufacturing defect. That’s the situation we face with software, as companies' use of EULAs (end-user license agreements) to indemnify themselves for anything and everything has spun out of control.

Some EULAs go so far as to claim ownership of any work product created with their software. Couple that with the fact that EULAs have become so onerous that few bother to read them before clicking Agree, and you can fast see disaster in the making.

The fact that these agreements are often difficult to uphold in a court of law begs the question: What is the purpose of making EULAs so wide ranging to begin with? Perhaps a User’s Bill of Rights is in order.

By all means, companies should be allowed to protect themselves with something akin to a EULA. But federally mandated standards and restrictions governing the scope of EULAs will go far in fostering innovation and growth in the software industry, not to mention protecting users from undue provisions.

Under no circumstances should a company be able to claim ownership of end-users' work products, nor should they be able to indemnify themselves from any action due to their own malfeasance in such a document.
This just keeps getting more evil by the LINE even!
This is an all out ploy to destroy the GPL and eliminate free software forever.
Let's read the GPL, PLEASE FOR THE LOVE OF OPEN SOURCE DO NOT SUPPORT THIS! THE GPL IS A EULA and the primary one along with the BSD license that pioneered the very basis of the aforementioned statement that reads
" Some EULAs go so far as to claim ownership of any work product created with their software." for the very reason that it is the ONLY way to insure that GPL code remain GPL , OPEN SOURCE AND FREE TO THE PUBLIC! In fact the GPL goes as far as to say that all one has to do is change 51% of the EXISTING CODE TO BE CONSIDERED A NEW PIECE OF SOFTWARE AND THEREFORE BELONGING TO THE AUTHOR! So, it is self regulating even!As are most freeware and open sources licenses...


http://www.gnu.org/copyleft/gpl.html
GNU GENERAL PUBLIC LICENSE

Version 3, 29 June 2007

Copyright © 2007 Free Software Foundation, Inc. <http://fsf.org/>


Everyone is permitted to copy and distribute verbatim copies of this license document, but changing it is not allowed.
Preamble

The GNU General Public License is a free, copyleft license for software and other kinds of works.

The licenses for most software and other practical works are designed to take away your freedom to share and change the works. By contrast, the GNU General Public License is intended to guarantee your freedom to share and change all versions of a program--to make sure it remains free software for all its users. We, the Free Software Foundation, use the GNU General Public License for most of our software; it applies also to any other work released this way by its authors. You can apply it to your programs, too.

When we speak of free software, we are referring to freedom, not price. Our General Public Licenses are designed to make sure that you have the freedom to distribute copies of free software (and charge for them if you wish), that you receive source code or can get it if you want it, that you can change the software or use pieces of it in new free programs, and that you know you can do these things.

To protect your rights, we need to prevent others from denying you these rights or asking you to surrender the rights. Therefore, you have certain responsibilities if you distribute copies of the software, or if you modify it: responsibilities to respect the freedom of others.

For example, if you distribute copies of such a program, whether gratis or for a fee, you must pass on to the recipients the same freedoms that you received. You must make sure that they, too, receive or can get the source code. And you must show them these terms so they know their rights.

Developers that use the GNU GPL protect your rights with two steps: (1) assert copyright on the software, and (2) offer you this License giving you legal permission to copy, distribute and/or modify it.

For the developers' and authors' protection, the GPL clearly explains that there is no warranty for this free software. For both users' and authors' sake, the GPL requires that modified versions be marked as changed, so that their problems will not be attributed erroneously to authors of previous versions.

Some devices are designed to deny users access to install or run modified versions of the software inside them, although the manufacturer can do so. This is fundamentally incompatible with the aim of protecting users' freedom to change the software. The systematic pattern of such abuse occurs in the area of products for individuals to use, which is precisely where it is most unacceptable. Therefore, we have designed this version of the GPL to prohibit the practice for those products. If such problems arise substantially in other domains, we stand ready to extend this provision to those domains in future versions of the GPL, as needed to protect the freedom of users.

Finally, every program is threatened constantly by software patents. States should not allow patents to restrict development and use of software on general-purpose computers, but in those that do, we wish to avoid the special danger that patents applied to a free program could make it effectively proprietary. To prevent this, the GPL assures that patents cannot be used to render the program non-free.

The precise terms and conditions for copying, distribution and modification follow.
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
0. Definitions.

“This License” refers to version 3 of the GNU General Public License.

“Copyright” also means copyright-like laws that apply to other kinds of works, such as semiconductor masks.

“The Program” refers to any copyrightable work licensed under this License. Each licensee is addressed as “you”. “Licensees” and “recipients” may be individuals or organizations.

To “modify” a work means to copy from or adapt all or part of the work in a fashion requiring copyright permission, other than the making of an exact copy. The resulting work is called a “modified version” of the earlier work or a work “based on” the earlier work.

A “covered work” means either the unmodified Program or a work based on the Program.

To “propagate” a work means to do anything with it that, without permission, would make you directly or secondarily liable for infringement under applicable copyright law, except executing it on a computer or modifying a private copy. Propagation includes copying, distribution (with or without modification), making available to the public, and in some countries other activities as well.

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1. Source Code.

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The Corresponding Source need not include anything that users can regenerate automatically from other parts of the Corresponding Source.

The Corresponding Source for a work in source code form is that same work.
2. Basic Permissions.

All rights granted under this License are granted for the term of copyright on the Program, and are irrevocable provided the stated conditions are met. This License explicitly affirms your unlimited permission to run the unmodified Program. The output from running a covered work is covered by this License only if the output, given its content, constitutes a covered work. This License acknowledges your rights of fair use or other equivalent, as provided by copyright law.

You may make, run and propagate covered works that you do not convey, without conditions so long as your license otherwise remains in force. You may convey covered works to others for the sole purpose of having them make modifications exclusively for you, or provide you with facilities for running those works, provided that you comply with the terms of this License in conveying all material for which you do not control copyright. Those thus making or running the covered works for you must do so exclusively on your behalf, under your direction and control, on terms that prohibit them from making any copies of your copyrighted material outside their relationship with you.

Conveying under any other circumstances is permitted solely under the conditions stated below. Sublicensing is not allowed; section 10 makes it unnecessary.
3. Protecting Users' Legal Rights From Anti-Circumvention Law.

No covered work shall be deemed part of an effective technological measure under any applicable law fulfilling obligations under article 11 of the WIPO copyright treaty adopted on 20 December 1996, or similar laws prohibiting or restricting circumvention of such measures.

When you convey a covered work, you waive any legal power to forbid circumvention of technological measures to the extent such circumvention is effected by exercising rights under this License with respect to the covered work, and you disclaim any intention to limit operation or modification of the work as a means of enforcing, against the work's users, your or third parties' legal rights to forbid circumvention of technological measures.
4. Conveying Verbatim Copies.

You may convey verbatim copies of the Program's source code as you receive it, in any medium, provided that you conspicuously and appropriately publish on each copy an appropriate copyright notice; keep intact all notices stating that this License and any non-permissive terms added in accord with section 7 apply to the code; keep intact all notices of the absence of any warranty; and give all recipients a copy of this License along with the Program.

You may charge any price or no price for each copy that you convey, and you may offer support or warranty protection for a fee.
5. Conveying Modified Source Versions.

You may convey a work based on the Program, or the modifications to produce it from the Program, in the form of source code under the terms of section 4, provided that you also meet all of these conditions:

    * a) The work must carry prominent notices stating that you modified it, and giving a relevant date.
    * b) The work must carry prominent notices stating that it is released under this License and any conditions added under section 7. This requirement modifies the requirement in section 4 to “keep intact all notices”.
    * c) You must license the entire work, as a whole, under this License to anyone who comes into possession of a copy. This License will therefore apply, along with any applicable section 7 additional terms, to the whole of the work, and all its parts, regardless of how they are packaged. This License gives no permission to license the work in any other way, but it does not invalidate such permission if you have separately received it.
    * d) If the work has interactive user interfaces, each must display Appropriate Legal Notices; however, if the Program has interactive interfaces that do not display Appropriate Legal Notices, your work need not make them do so.

A compilation of a covered work with other separate and independent works, which are not by their nature extensions of the covered work, and which are not combined with it such as to form a larger program, in or on a volume of a storage or distribution medium, is called an “aggregate” if the compilation and its resulting copyright are not used to limit the access or legal rights of the compilation's users beyond what the individual works permit. Inclusion of a covered work in an aggregate does not cause this License to apply to the other parts of the aggregate.
6. Conveying Non-Source Forms.

You may convey a covered work in object code form under the terms of sections 4 and 5, provided that you also convey the machine-readable Corresponding Source under the terms of this License, in one of these ways:

    * a) Convey the object code in, or embodied in, a physical product (including a physical distribution medium), accompanied by the Corresponding Source fixed on a durable physical medium customarily used for software interchange.
    * b) Convey the object code in, or embodied in, a physical product (including a physical distribution medium), accompanied by a written offer, valid for at least three years and valid for as long as you offer spare parts or customer support for that product model, to give anyone who possesses the object code either (1) a copy of the Corresponding Source for all the software in the product that is covered by this License, on a durable physical medium customarily used for software interchange, for a price no more than your reasonable cost of physically performing this conveying of source, or (2) access to copy the Corresponding Source from a network server at no charge.
    * c) Convey individual copies of the object code with a copy of the written offer to provide the Corresponding Source. This alternative is allowed only occasionally and noncommercially, and only if you received the object code with such an offer, in accord with subsection 6b.
    * d) Convey the object code by offering access from a designated place (gratis or for a charge), and offer equivalent access to the Corresponding Source in the same way through the same place at no further charge. You need not require recipients to copy the Corresponding Source along with the object code. If the place to copy the object code is a network server, the Corresponding Source may be on a different server (operated by you or a third party) that supports equivalent copying facilities, provided you maintain clear directions next to the object code saying where to find the Corresponding Source. Regardless of what server hosts the Corresponding Source, you remain obligated to ensure that it is available for as long as needed to satisfy these requirements.
    * e) Convey the object code using peer-to-peer transmission, provided you inform other peers where the object code and Corresponding Source of the work are being offered to the general public at no charge under subsection 6d.

A separable portion of the object code, whose source code is excluded from the Corresponding Source as a System Library, need not be included in conveying the object code work.

A “User Product” is either (1) a “consumer product”, which means any tangible personal property which is normally used for personal, family, or household purposes, or (2) anything designed or sold for incorporation into a dwelling. In determining whether a product is a consumer product, doubtful cases shall be resolved in favor of coverage. For a particular product received by a particular user, “normally used” refers to a typical or common use of that class of product, regardless of the status of the particular user or of the way in which the particular user actually uses, or expects or is expected to use, the product. A product is a consumer product regardless of whether the product has substantial commercial, industrial or non-consumer uses, unless such uses represent the only significant mode of use of the product.

“Installation Information” for a User Product means any methods, procedures, authorization keys, or other information required to install and execute modified versions of a covered work in that User Product from a modified version of its Corresponding Source. The information must suffice to ensure that the continued functioning of the modified object code is in no case prevented or interfered with solely because modification has been made.

If you convey an object code work under this section in, or with, or specifically for use in, a User Product, and the conveying occurs as part of a transaction in which the right of possession and use of the User Product is transferred to the recipient in perpetuity or for a fixed term (regardless of how the transaction is characterized), the Corresponding Source conveyed under this section must be accompanied by the Installation Information. But this requirement does not apply if neither you nor any third party retains the ability to install modified object code on the User Product (for example, the work has been installed in ROM).

The requirement to provide Installation Information does not include a requirement to continue to provide support service, warranty, or updates for a work that has been modified or installed by the recipient, or for the User Product in which it has been modified or installed. Access to a network may be denied when the modification itself materially and adversely affects the operation of the network or violates the rules and protocols for communication across the network.

Corresponding Source conveyed, and Installation Information provided, in accord with this section must be in a format that is publicly documented (and with an implementation available to the public in source code form), and must require no special password or key for unpacking, reading or copying.
7. Additional Terms.

“Additional permissions” are terms that supplement the terms of this License by making exceptions from one or more of its conditions. Additional permissions that are applicable to the entire Program shall be treated as though they were included in this License, to the extent that they are valid under applicable law. If additional permissions apply only to part of the Program, that part may be used separately under those permissions, but the entire Program remains governed by this License without regard to the additional permissions.

When you convey a copy of a covered work, you may at your option remove any additional permissions from that copy, or from any part of it. (Additional permissions may be written to require their own removal in certain cases when you modify the work.) You may place additional permissions on material, added by you to a covered work, for which you have or can give appropriate copyright permission.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, for material you add to a covered work, you may (if authorized by the copyright holders of that material) supplement the terms of this License with terms:

    * a) Disclaiming warranty or limiting liability differently from the terms of sections 15 and 16 of this License; or
    * b) Requiring preservation of specified reasonable legal notices or author attributions in that material or in the Appropriate Legal Notices displayed by works containing it; or
    * c) Prohibiting misrepresentation of the origin of that material, or requiring that modified versions of such material be marked in reasonable ways as different from the original version; or
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    * f) Requiring indemnification of licensors and authors of that material by anyone who conveys the material (or modified versions of it) with contractual assumptions of liability to the recipient, for any liability that these contractual assumptions directly impose on those licensors and authors.

All other non-permissive additional terms are considered “further restrictions” within the meaning of section 10. If the Program as you received it, or any part of it, contains a notice stating that it is governed by this License along with a term that is a further restriction, you may remove that term. If a license document contains a further restriction but permits relicensing or conveying under this License, you may add to a covered work material governed by the terms of that license document, provided that the further restriction does not survive such relicensing or conveying.

If you add terms to a covered work in accord with this section, you must place, in the relevant source files, a statement of the additional terms that apply to those files, or a notice indicating where to find the applicable terms.

Additional terms, permissive or non-permissive, may be stated in the form of a separately written license, or stated as exceptions; the above requirements apply either way.
8. Termination.

You may not propagate or modify a covered work except as expressly provided under this License. Any attempt otherwise to propagate or modify it is void, and will automatically terminate your rights under this License (including any patent licenses granted under the third paragraph of section 11).

However, if you cease all violation of this License, then your license from a particular copyright holder is reinstated (a) provisionally, unless and until the copyright holder explicitly and finally terminates your license, and (b) permanently, if the copyright holder fails to notify you of the violation by some reasonable means prior to 60 days after the cessation.

Moreover, your license from a particular copyright holder is reinstated permanently if the copyright holder notifies you of the violation by some reasonable means, this is the first time you have received notice of violation of this License (for any work) from that copyright holder, and you cure the violation prior to 30 days after your receipt of the notice.

Termination of your rights under this section does not terminate the licenses of parties who have received copies or rights from you under this License. If your rights have been terminated and not permanently reinstated, you do not qualify to receive new licenses for the same material under section 10.
9. Acceptance Not Required for Having Copies.

You are not required to accept this License in order to receive or run a copy of the Program. Ancillary propagation of a covered work occurring solely as a consequence of using peer-to-peer transmission to receive a copy likewise does not require acceptance. However, nothing other than this License grants you permission to propagate or modify any covered work. These actions infringe copyright if you do not accept this License. Therefore, by modifying or propagating a covered work, you indicate your acceptance of this License to do so.
10. Automatic Licensing of Downstream Recipients.

Each time you convey a covered work, the recipient automatically receives a license from the original licensors, to run, modify and propagate that work, subject to this License. You are not responsible for enforcing compliance by third parties with this License.

An “entity transaction” is a transaction transferring control of an organization, or substantially all assets of one, or subdividing an organization, or merging organizations. If propagation of a covered work results from an entity transaction, each party to that transaction who receives a copy of the work also receives whatever licenses to the work the party's predecessor in interest had or could give under the previous paragraph, plus a right to possession of the Corresponding Source of the work from the predecessor in interest, if the predecessor has it or can get it with reasonable efforts.

You may not impose any further restrictions on the exercise of the rights granted or affirmed under this License. For example, you may not impose a license fee, royalty, or other charge for exercise of rights granted under this License, and you may not initiate litigation (including a cross-claim or counterclaim in a lawsuit) alleging that any patent claim is infringed by making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing the Program or any portion of it.
11. Patents.

A “contributor” is a copyright holder who authorizes use under this License of the Program or a work on which the Program is based. The work thus licensed is called the contributor's “contributor version”.

A contributor's “essential patent claims” are all patent claims owned or controlled by the contributor, whether already acquired or hereafter acquired, that would be infringed by some manner, permitted by this License, of making, using, or selling its contributor version, but do not include claims that would be infringed only as a consequence of further modification of the contributor version. For purposes of this definition, “control” includes the right to grant patent sublicenses in a manner consistent with the requirements of this License.

Each contributor grants you a non-exclusive, worldwide, royalty-free patent license under the contributor's essential patent claims, to make, use, sell, offer for sale, import and otherwise run, modify and propagate the contents of its contributor version.

In the following three paragraphs, a “patent license” is any express agreement or commitment, however denominated, not to enforce a patent (such as an express permission to practice a patent or covenant not to sue for patent infringement). To “grant” such a patent license to a party means to make such an agreement or commitment not to enforce a patent against the party.

If you convey a covered work, knowingly relying on a patent license, and the Corresponding Source of the work is not available for anyone to copy, free of charge and under the terms of this License, through a publicly available network server or other readily accessible means, then you must either (1) cause the Corresponding Source to be so available, or (2) arrange to deprive yourself of the benefit of the patent license for this particular work, or (3) arrange, in a manner consistent with the requirements of this License, to extend the patent license to downstream recipients. “Knowingly relying” means you have actual knowledge that, but for the patent license, your conveying the covered work in a country, or your recipient's use of the covered work in a country, would infringe one or more identifiable patents in that country that you have reason to believe are valid.

If, pursuant to or in connection with a single transaction or arrangement, you convey, or propagate by procuring conveyance of, a covered work, and grant a patent license to some of the parties receiving the covered work authorizing them to use, propagate, modify or convey a specific copy of the covered work, then the patent license you grant is automatically extended to all recipients of the covered work and works based on it.

A patent license is “discriminatory” if it does not include within the scope of its coverage, prohibits the exercise of, or is conditioned on the non-exercise of one or more of the rights that are specifically granted under this License. You may not convey a covered work if you are a party to an arrangement with a third party that is in the business of distributing software, under which you make payment to the third party based on the extent of your activity of conveying the work, and under which the third party grants, to any of the parties who would receive the covered work from you, a discriminatory patent license (a) in connection with copies of the covered work conveyed by you (or copies made from those copies), or (b) primarily for and in connection with specific products or compilations that contain the covered work, unless you entered into that arrangement, or that patent license was granted, prior to 28 March 2007.

Nothing in this License shall be construed as excluding or limiting any implied license or other defenses to infringement that may otherwise be available to you under applicable patent law.
12. No Surrender of Others' Freedom.

If conditions are imposed on you (whether by court order, agreement or otherwise) that contradict the conditions of this License, they do not excuse you from the conditions of this License. If you cannot convey a covered work so as to satisfy simultaneously your obligations under this License and any other pertinent obligations, then as a consequence you may not convey it at all. For example, if you agree to terms that obligate you to collect a royalty for further conveying from those to whom you convey the Program, the only way you could satisfy both those terms and this License would be to refrain entirely from conveying the Program.
13. Use with the GNU Affero General Public License.

Notwithstanding any other provision of this License, you have permission to link or combine any covered work with a work licensed under version 3 of the GNU Affero General Public License into a single combined work, and to convey the resulting work. The terms of this License will continue to apply to the part which is the covered work, but the special requirements of the GNU Affero General Public License, section 13, concerning interaction through a network will apply to the combination as such.
14. Revised Versions of this License.

The Free Software Foundation may publish revised and/or new versions of the GNU General Public License from time to time. Such new versions will be similar in spirit to the present version, but may differ in detail to address new problems or concerns.

Each version is given a distinguishing version number. If the Program specifies that a certain numbered version of the GNU General Public License “or any later version” applies to it, you have the option of following the terms and conditions either of that numbered version or of any later version published by the Free Software Foundation. If the Program does not specify a version number of the GNU General Public License, you may choose any version ever published by the Free Software Foundation.

If the Program specifies that a proxy can decide which future versions of the GNU General Public License can be used, that proxy's public statement of acceptance of a version permanently authorizes you to choose that version for the Program.

Later license versions may give you additional or different permissions. However, no additional obligations are imposed on any author or copyright holder as a result of your choosing to follow a later version.
15. Disclaimer of Warranty.

THERE IS NO WARRANTY FOR THE PROGRAM, TO THE EXTENT PERMITTED BY APPLICABLE LAW. EXCEPT WHEN OTHERWISE STATED IN WRITING THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND/OR OTHER PARTIES PROVIDE THE PROGRAM “AS IS” WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE ENTIRE RISK AS TO THE QUALITY AND PERFORMANCE OF THE PROGRAM IS WITH YOU. SHOULD THE PROGRAM PROVE DEFECTIVE, YOU ASSUME THE COST OF ALL NECESSARY SERVICING, REPAIR OR CORRECTION.
16. Limitation of Liability.

IN NO EVENT UNLESS REQUIRED BY APPLICABLE LAW OR AGREED TO IN WRITING WILL ANY COPYRIGHT HOLDER, OR ANY OTHER PARTY WHO MODIFIES AND/OR CONVEYS THE PROGRAM AS PERMITTED ABOVE, BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY GENERAL, SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES ARISING OUT OF THE USE OR INABILITY TO USE THE PROGRAM (INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO LOSS OF DATA OR DATA BEING RENDERED INACCURATE OR LOSSES SUSTAINED BY YOU OR THIRD PARTIES OR A FAILURE OF THE PROGRAM TO OPERATE WITH ANY OTHER PROGRAMS), EVEN IF SUCH HOLDER OR OTHER PARTY HAS BEEN ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES.
17. Interpretation of Sections 15 and 16.

If the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of liability provided above cannot be given local legal effect according to their terms, reviewing courts shall apply local law that most closely approximates an absolute waiver of all civil liability in connection with the Program, unless a warranty or assumption of liability accompanies a copy of the Program in return for a fee.

END OF TERMS AND CONDITIONS
How to Apply These Terms to Your New Programs

If you develop a new program, and you want it to be of the greatest possible use to the public, the best way to achieve this is to make it free software which everyone can redistribute and change under these terms.

To do so, attach the following notices to the program. It is safest to attach them to the start of each source file to most effectively state the exclusion of warranty; and each file should have at least the “copyright” line and a pointer to where the full notice is found.

    <one line to give the program's name and a brief idea of what it does.>
    Copyright (C) <year>  <name of author>

    This program is free software: you can redistribute it and/or modify
    it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
    the Free Software Foundation, either version 3 of the License, or
    (at your option) any later version.

    This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
    but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
    MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
    GNU General Public License for more details.

    You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
    along with this program.  If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.

Also add information on how to contact you by electronic and paper mail.

If the program does terminal interaction, make it output a short notice like this when it starts in an interactive mode:

    <program>  Copyright (C) <year>  <name of author>
    This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details type `show w'.
    This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
    under certain conditions; type `show c' for details.

The hypothetical commands `show w' and `show c' should show the appropriate parts of the General Public License. Of course, your program's commands might be different; for a GUI interface, you would use an “about box”.

You should also get your employer (if you work as a programmer) or school, if any, to sign a “copyright disclaimer” for the program, if necessary. For more information on this, and how to apply and follow the GNU GPL, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.

The GNU General Public License does not permit incorporating your program into proprietary programs. If your program is a subroutine library, you may consider it more useful to permit linking proprietary applications with the library. If this is what you want to do, use the GNU Lesser General Public License instead of this License. But first, please read <http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/why-not-lgpl.html>.

Anti_Illuminati

  • Guest
Agenda item No. 4: Mandate the rollout of DNSSEC and BGPSEC
The Internet has become a fundamental pathway for public, private, and government communication, as well as financial transactions. Unfortunately, core infrastructure components in the United States remain woefully lacking in security for both DNS and BGP, making them unacceptably open targets for hackers.

Securing BGP is an absolute necessity. Only recently, there was a relatively significant routing problem that took parts of the Internet offline for several hours. The cause was runaway BGP advertisements from a single BGP peer. BGPSEC might not have helped that particular instance, as it was caused by human error, but the same problem would have occurred if someone had purposefully injected bad routing advertisements via unsecured BGP peers.

DNS is the cornerstone of IP networking. Without the names, we only have numbers, and while the resources might be available, without the directory converting the name of those resources to IP addresses, we can’t see the forest for the trees. Also, by poisoning DNS server cache, malcontents can direct users to their own versions of known Web sites and swipe their log-ins or gain access to other sensitive information. Ensuring that DNS servers cannot be compromised at any level is a requirement for a secure Internet.

Implementing DNSSEC and BGPSEC throughout the country is not only the right thing to do, it’s not a terribly difficult task to accomplish. In fact, ISPs and hosting providers should have done so already. The hard part would be coordinating the effort. Given a clear time frame and guidelines set forth by the government, carriers could be coerced into stepping up to the plate and implementing this basic and extremely vital safeguarding methodology for the Internet.

BGPSEC IS Already done at all of the US's physical border routers. Meaning any router that connects to another country is already filtered.

This is more of a primer for the next cyber false flag discussed by  Anti Illuminati and codified by all of his research that can be found on the PHD Forum. They will not impliment BGPSEC (Which is already available on all carrier class routers..) till after their cyber false flag.... Otherwise they will have closed a large section of their backdoors availability to be tapped by their backdooring systems.

BIND9and MS DNS already provides secure DNS ALREADY USED BY ALL GOVERMENT DARPANET MAINTAINED DNS ROOT SERVERS as well as the root servers at all major ISPs.
If, major ISPs and IT Companies like Microsoft pushed people to use existing secure DNS protocols and standards then this would not be an issue .


Agenda item No. 5: Clean up the spam mess
According to Spamhaus, the United States is far and away the No. 1 source for all spam (THIS IS A FLAT OUT LIE - RUSSIA, CHINA, AND INDIA ARE THE TOP 3 followed by the US) . In fact, most companies are experiencing spam levels as high as 99 percent of all incoming e-mail - (ANOTHER BOLD FACED LIE)- a ridiculous proportion made that much more unpalatable by the amount of phishing attempts hidden within. If these levels persist, they will eventually cause the demise of e-mail as a viable communications medium.

There is only so much that can be done within a single country to fix this problem, but steps need to be taken -- soon. One tactic would be to institute a mandatory $10-per-spam fine for anyone determined to be sending unsolicited bulk e-mail. By aggressively locating and prosecuting these cases, the United States could curtail a sizable chunk of spammers based within its borders. After all, the quickest way to end unsavory practices like this is to make them economically unviable. Meaningful fines pursued diligently are one method of achieving that goal.

Of course, this approach would not stop overseas spammers, and botnet spam operations would continue. But if written properly, the law could ensure grounds for prosecution of any botnet with even a single member existing under U.S. jurisdiction.

There is already enough highly stringent illegal anti-spam legislation in the US.
http://www.cdt.org/publications/pp_9.23.shtml

The largest purveyors and enablers of spam are all of the major ISPs and retail companies. Seriously if companies like SBC, Comcast, Macy's, Ebay, and AOL/ TWC did not sell people your data blocks then the only victims of spam would be  people dumb enough to give spamers their e-mail addresses.  Companies like earthlink , yahoo , and google have already done enough to filter spam properly. I only give out my e-mail address on several gmail accounts hosted that are related to my consulting business - to clients and business contacts and these  accounts never have a single piece of spam in the inbox. The main e-mail I use for public things I know will generate spam (ie signing up to live.com, forums, and other places that are easily mineable for such data -  [email protected] their filters catch 99% of ALL SPAM.

Now I know this is the least popular view on this subject but it is the same view as we have on freedom and free market and should therefore be  carriered over to the internet.

I KNOW that those of you who have a mailbox in US that is not a PO box get a rain forest (not to be taken literally because they  merely slash and burn rain forests  ... and paper comes from tree farms ...) of junk mail every day even! I know I do and have always seen tons of junk mail on a daily basis in my mail box. I never gave these people permission. But, since they PAY the post OFFICE THEY ARE ALLOWED TO SEND PHYSICAL JUNKMAIL - BY THE RAINFOREST EVEN - TO ANY ONE THEY CHOOSE!

THE SPAMERS PAY MILLIONS SOME OF THEM BILLIONS OF DOLLARS IN BANDWIDTH FEES ON YTOP OF THE BILLIONS THEY SPEND TO GET THOSE ADRESSES. IT THIS NOT EXACTLY THE SAME AS AOL EARTHLINK AND MSN PAYING TO SEND YOU JUNKMAIL?

WHY THEN SHOULD SPAM BE ILLEGAL?

Oh I forgot AOL, Verizon,  SBC, Comcast, Qwest, and other ISPs  don't want to have to pay for storage of your e-mail because that would cut into profits. They would have to do more than give you a POP account on a crap server with a few megs of storage. Also , they would have no excuses for attachment size limits further increasing storage needs and forcing them to improve their e-mail infrastructures.

IF YOU DON'T LIKE SPAM USE GMAIL or YAHOO MAIL or JUST DON'T GIVE OUT YOUR EMAIL ADDRESS TO EVERY FRIGIN SITE THAT ASKS FOR IT... STOP INCLUDING EVERY ONE YOU KNOW IN THE CC FIELD OR TO FIELDS OF AN EMAIL - THATS WHY THEY HAVE A BCC BUTTON ..... TELL EVERY ONE YOU KNOW TO DO THE SAME...... IF YOU MUST  give out your e-mail to people you know will sell it to spamers  - THEN CREATE A SPECIFIC SPAM BOX ON A FREE EMAIL SERVICE.

IF PEOPLE PAY FOR IT THEN THEY SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO DO IT SINCE IT SAVES TREES EVEN - FOR THOSE OF YOU  WHO DON'T BELIEVER TREE FARMS EXIST .....
IT DOES NOT HURT YOU.
IT WILL ONLY FORCE ISPS TO GIVE YOU DECENT EMAIL SERVICES!

CHANCES ARE IF YOU GET PORN SPAM OR YOUR KID GETS PORN SPAM SOME ONE IN YOUR HOUSE (or some one you know) IS USING THAT E-MAIL TO LOOK AT FREE PORN SITES! Yet another reason not to give out you e-mail or let kids have unfettered internet access without parental supervision.

My oldest daughter uses the web (she is 4). Her computer sits next to mine and I watch her while she is using it. She is only allowed to go to PBS kids and Wikipedia and of course Alex Jone's websites.  She is not allowed to have an e-mail address because she is still to young to know how to protect it......

 
Agenda item No. 6: Tax breaks for rural broadband last-mile carriers
It’s no secret that broadband access to much of rural America is spotty at best. In fact, there are many not-so-rural areas that are grossly underserved. If we’re to hold ourselves up as leaders in the Digital Age, we need to make broadband more widely available to those who don’t live in metropolitan areas.

The U.S. government has tried rural broadband initiatives before. It even created a fund that ISPs could draw from to extend broadband access. Carriers such as Comcast and Verizon took their share and frittered the subsidies away without making significant strides toward connecting the unconnected.

While it’s not generally a good idea to throw good money after bad, a performance-based incentive program might be the place to start. Here, tax breaks could provide a spark. Under such a program, every previously unserved household brought into the broadband fold would result in a small tax break for the carrier responsible. In order to increase competition and reduce the de facto monopolies that exist in underserved areas, this incentive could be extended to any last-mile carrier that brings service into an area that currently offers only one other existing broadband option.
NO NO NOOOOOOOOOO they say it  themselves this is "... A BAD IDEA....". This is merely a reward for those  who have squandered monies awaiting the NWO's designated time to deploy inet2 to put the general masses on the internet. They don't want joe shmoe having internet in middle america. They could watch Prison Planet TV EVEN and they could never allow that ......


Agenda item No. 7: Codify national standards for electronic medical records
In this day and age, it shouldn’t be a challenge for one hospital or clinic to securely access a patient’s medical records, wherever they may be. In the paper era, this meant couriers, copiers, and lots of dead trees. These days, all it should require is sufficient authorization, encryption, and perhaps a proxy for auditing purposes.

Currently, many patients’ medical records are stored electronically in a database run by whatever EMR software your clinic or hospital is using. Access to those records from outside entities is all but impossible in most cases, requiring the records to be printed out and snail-mailed to another location. Since these records already exist in digital form, there should be a better way to safely and quickly transmit that information to another health care provider, especially in an emergency.

If the U.S. government set up a central proxy -- not a repository -- for EMR transactions, it could effectively keep accurate logs on the transmission of medical records from facility to facility, conform to HIPAA standards, and still enable medical records to easily move where they’re needed.

After this article was written, but before publication, Obama introduced a somewhat amorphous plan related to electronic medical records, but the particulars of this program aren’t readily available and are likely still in the development phase.

Such an agenda would require the cooperation of all EMR software developers, but that’s what standards are for. Come up with a central XML-based standard for the records with the help of those companies, and let them transition their products to work with the central proxy. It’ll take time, but the result will be worth it -- especially if you’ve just had a car accident in another state.

What they really mean is HIPPA LAW needs to be more flexible in allowing them get away with showing every one but you and your family your medical records. While requiring you to believe the illusion that  your medical data is protected because these pieces of paper that gives them full ownership of your data also says that they must keep it secret from any one, but one of the people directly treating you as a patient and yourself.

Who decides who is involved in your treatment?  When you go to a clinic and one doctor and he  sends you to another only to have your test work done by another group of people. Did you actually choose to let all of those people archive and record all of your medical history and data as required by HIPPA LAW?  (I'm sure most of you don't even know or believe it's being done)

Go read HIPPA LAWS...   

Can you say, streamlined eugenics policies.

As I said before this sh*t gets more and more evil by the line....

Agenda item No. 8: Mandate a single electronic voting standard
Companies that produce electronic voting systems have proved they can neither manage nor secure their own products. The result is widespread distrust in electronic voting across the country. With something as vital as the election of government officials, we cannot afford such problems, nor do we have to.

The government needs to appoint an independent contractor or bring in the expertise necessary to develop a rigorously tested open source system that can be used by electronic voting machine manufacturers free of charge. The onus of maintaining the code base could be placed on a consortium of key individuals from companies such as IBM, Microsoft, Cisco, and so forth.

By open-sourcing e-voting, rather than depending on proprietary vendors to ensure the integrity of our elections process, the very foundation of our democracy will be better secured. The closed source approach has too often proved to be a road to disenfranchisement.

Propaganda double speak.

What they really mean is they need to insure that DIebold stays in business and they can contiue to rig elections with plausible deniability because the voting machine software is BASED  and LET ME EMPHASIES THE FACT IT IS MERELY GOING TO HAVE TO BE BASED ON (by their own words above) on OPEN Source software. THEY DO NOT ACTUALLY SAY THAT THE VOTING MACHINE SOFTWARE ITSELF MUST BE OPEN SOURCE MERELY THAT IT MUST BE BASED ON IT!

GIVING THEM NOTHING BUT PLAUSIBLE DENIABILITY.

Agenda item No. 9: Lighten the FCC’s load
The FCC celebrates its 75th birthday this year, and my, how times have changed. Originally created to regulate the airwaves as we understood them in the 1930s, the FCC now stretches well beyond its original footprint, rendering it seemingly powerless to do anything besides levy fines for wardrobe malfunctions. It’s time to split the data from the spectrum and create an ICC, or Internet Communications Commission, that explicitly deals with national internetworking issues.

The internetworking communications system in the United States is far too large and complex for a single five-person commission to handle, in addition to its original charter of policing the airwaves. The stakes are simply too high. Ideally, a new commission would be created and populated with experts in a variety of technical fields essential to the health and security of the Internet, in addition to the usual political appointees.

More lies and  double speak.
 They know more and more people are waking up to the fact the FCC IS AN ILLEGAL INSTITUTION THAT CREATES ILLEGAL LAWS WITHOUT CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL! IT IS FAR WORSE THAN EVEN THE IRS!
Therefore they need a new agency that will have more far reaching enforcement capabilities and  the ability to invoke the patriot act in all of it's "Laws"  violations.

Agenda item No. 10: Clean its own house
Much ado has been made of President Obama’s staff running into technical roadblocks as they transitioned from campaigners to administrators. Having proved themselves technically savvy on the campaign trail, the team has since inherited a relatively ancient communications infrastructure within the halls of government itself. Modernization of this infrastructure should be among the chief goals of this administration.

And here we are talking about a lot more than just putting a foot down about a BlackBerry. After all, if the various clandestine services can engineer elaborate digital wiretapping and data collection practices across the United States, is it too much to ask that various staffers be able to use their Macs?

Security is certainly an issue for an endeavor such as this, but given that the previous administration “lost” thousands of e-mails by circumventing existing security practices, starting from scratch might not be a bad idea. In fact, it may be a fundamental requirement to maintain Obama’s pledge of a more open government.

The importance of oversight
This is an extremely technical time and an extremely technical country -- and it should have an extremely technical governing body.

Ideally, none of the above agenda items would be necessary if only the tech industry would police itself and make sound decisions that would not negatively impact the country as a whole. Unfortunately, utopian ideals such as these are far from reality, as has been proved by corporate malfeasance in just about every large industry within the United States. OSHA, the FDA, and other government agencies exist for this reason. The telecommunications, software, and hardware industries are not exempt.

It took a few decades from the inception of wireless communication for the government to see the need to create the FCC, and it’s been a few decades since the Internet became mainstream. It is not time for the creation of this post -- it’s well past time.

Translation: WE NEED MORE MONEY TO MOVE EVERYTHING TO INTERNET2 FASTER

Go read Anti Illuminati's research on the PHd Forum where he provides articles that document the fact they need to accelerate preparations for their upcoming cyber terror false flag




Notice that these are the NWO's TEN Commandments OF IT that they will now go forth and enforce.....


Everything put forth in this statement will destroy the internet and crush even more of our freedom - in addition to providing more money and plausible deniability for their upcoming cyber false flag.

We must stop this and contiue to expose their real agenda here. Thanks again Sane for bringing this to every one's attention. This is vital info .

Offline ChristSavage

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In my opinion this should of went in the Breaking News/Very Important Threads/Most important issues/Basic Information on the New World Order board.

But instead a bunch of threads just suddenly get on top of this one and start pushing this to the bottom....

EDIT: Actually I just realized that you have to PM a global moderator to add a thread to that board.

Should definitely be put in to the Attn: Alex Board, Live Topics (for Sunday or Monday whenever he is due back) heck, why not on Bermas' board for his show?  On top of breaking news for dang sure. 

Offline Volitzar

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No way in hell this will pass.  Not by Capt. Bilderberger Sen. Jay Rockefeller.

Offline Monkeypox

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Should definitely be put in to the Attn: Alex Board, Live Topics (for Sunday or Monday whenever he is due back) heck, why not on Bermas' board for his show?  On top of breaking news for dang sure. 

I'm sure Alex and his people know about it.
War Is Peace - Freedom Is Slavery - Ignorance Is Strength


"Educate and inform the whole mass of the people... They are the only sure reliance for the preservation of our liberty."

—Thomas Jefferson

Offline Dig

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Jay Rockefeller: Internet should have never existed
http://wakeupfromyourslumber.blogspot.com/2009/03/jay-rockefeller-internet-should-have.html

Mr. Rockefeller, you should be ashamed to lash out at a bastion of liberty and free speech, but your tirade is to be expected. After all, you're nothing more than a bag man for Big Coal, which you slavishly serve and help rape your beautiful state for a handful of coins.

You're also part of the "Wars for Empire and Israel" crowd, voting for the illegal and immoral Iraq War and for giving the president a blank check for torture. And to let the same spy on Americans without warrants. For which you profited handsomely, raking in big bucks for your "campaign" expenses.

You've voted against programs to help children and ones to help poor students to afford college.

And your part of that notorious Rockefeller family that has been running con games on Wall Street for decades.

No wonder you're against Free Speech.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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Recent cyberattacks provide pretext for sweeping new Internet snooping powers by the government
http://onlinejournal.com/artman/publish/article_4898.shtml
By James Corbett Jul 13, 2009, 00:24



On Friday, July 3, while most Americans were preparing for a weekend of fireworks and hot dogs, the Obama administration had an ominous message: they are going ahead with a Bush-era plan to allow the NSA even more power to invade, intercept and analyze the data of anyone visiting a government website, ostensibly to help prevent a major cyberattack.

The timing of the announcement -- the day before a long holiday weekend -- seemed unusual, but less than 24 hours later just such an attack began to unfold on a series of websites in America and South Korea, including those of the White House, Pentagon, New York Stock Exchange, Treasury Department, Secret Service and Washington Post, amongst others.

The attack itself turns out to have been fairly innocuous -- a run of the mill DDOS (distributed denial of service) attack that did not even employ the latest malware, but you wouldn’t know that from reading the sensational reporting in the controlled corporate media. The VOA reports that the ‘Internet attackers’ have struck again. US State Department under cyberattack for fourth day blares a headline from the AFP.

Blame for the attack is now falling on North Korea, but what North Korea has to gain by taking down The Washington Post’s website is anybody’s guess (perhaps Kim Jong-il was giving his own pronouncement on the recent revelation that the Post was selling access to high-level politicians to lobbyists for $250,000 a pop). The big winner in this attack, it seems, is the federal government, which has been preparing to unveil an Internet surveillance spy grid for years, but has virtually no mandate to do so from a public that has become tired of invasive government snooping.

Various government stooges have been trying to drum up support for their Orwellian police state fantasy for years by warning of the coming ‘cybergeddon’ at the hands of ‘cyber terrorists.’ In 2003, former National Security Agency (NSA) Director Mike McConnell was going on international fear mongering trips, warning of attacks “equivalent to the attack on the World Trade Center in New York” unless a new agency were created to deal with the threat. The ‘cyber 9-11’ meme has carried on ever since, with hysterical coverage of Chinese cyber warriors and teenage hackers, attempting to rally the public into supporting a new front in the War on Terror: cyberspace.

Of course, exactly as was the case of 9/11, which was used as a pretext for introducing and passing (before anyone had time to read it) the voluminous, labyrinthine, constitution-destroying USAPATRIOT Act, so too will the ‘cyber 911’ be used to justify an iPATRIOT Act that will destroy any vestige of legal red tape preventing the government from tracking, tracing and controlling every movement of every citizen in cyberspace forever.

That this legislation exists and is, in fact, merely waiting for a large cyberterrorist incident to justify rushing it into law was actually admitted last year by former Counter Terrorism Czar Richard Clarke to Lawrence Lessig. “I was having dinner with Richard Clarke and I asked him if there is an equivalent [to the USAPATRIOT Act],” Lessig recounted to a technology conference in California last year. “Is there an i-PATRIOT Act just sitting waiting for some substantial event as an excuse to radically change the way the Internet works. He said, ‘Of course there is.’”

The three prongs of the attack on Internet freedom and privacy come from the military, the NSA and the Executive/Legislative branches of government. In 2003, the military labeled the Internet itself an enemy weapons system and ever since then there has been growing momentum behind various military, intelligence and governmental schemes to track and trace all movements of all Internet users, American or foreign. Last year, the Air Force attempted to establish its own cyber command, resulting in military turf wars that spawned last month a new U.S. Cyber Command and the further militarization of cyberspace. The military has even threatened a military response against any would-be hackers of government systems (unless you are North Korean, evidently).

At the same time, the NSA is jockeying to launch a new system dubbed Einstein that would see all telecoms route data traveling to or from government networks through an NSA monitoring box. This is on top of existing programs like Pinwale and Stellar Wind, which have already given them legal access to secretly spy on billions of communications records. Now Mike McConnell is back on the fear mongering trail telling anyone who will listen that if the NSA doesn’t have the authority to examine everyone’s search history, private emails and file transfers, then there will be a (you guessed it) “cyber 9/11.”

The third prong of the attack comes from America’s own elected representatives. Even back in 2007 the powerful think tank known as the Center for Strategic and International Studies was already preparing for the coming Obama presidency, convening a yearlong panel that issued a report called Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency, which contained the following chilling passage under the heading Regulate cyberspace: “Voluntary action is not enough. The United States must assess and prioritize risks and set minimum standards for securing cyberspace in order to ensure that the delivery of critical services in cyberspace continues if the United States is attacked.”

Now, Jay Rockefeller is attempting to do just that with a bill that would kick start this process of setting ‘minimum standards’ for cybersecurity over to an advisory panel filled with globalists, corporate chieftains and hand-picked academics. Rockefeller tried to drum up his own support for the bill by reaching new heights of hysterical fear mongering over the Net, even going so far as to say the Internet should never have existed. Obama is getting in on the act as well, threatening to pick a new ‘cyber czar’ who is conspicuous for having taken every opportunity during his time in Congress to vote for the expansion of NSA spying programs and authorities.

The entire cyberterror hysteria seems to have reached a peak in the last month, with the announcement of U.S. Cyber Command, the impending vote on Rockefeller’s bill and the naming of Obama’s cyber czar expected to occur in the near future.

Up until last week, there has only been one problem: there has been no clear mandate for any of this hysterical rush toward increased government snooping and regulation on the Internet. The American public is becoming disgusted with Obama’s continuation of the NSA spying program and has been unwilling to get behind giving up their online liberties in exchange for protection from the threat of teenage hackers and Russian spambots. The former head of the National Cybersecurity Center resigned this March citing “threats to the democratic process from the NSA’s attempts to dominate all governmental cybersecurity efforts. Wired even ran a story detailing how the U.S. Cyber Command is an agency without a purpose, function or mission that has been trying to find a reason for existing.

Now along comes a relatively unsophisticated DDOS attack from what may or may not be North Korea (there is no proof for the origin of the attack other than the government’s say-so) and suddenly it all seems justified: the creation of new branches of the military to deal with cyberwarfare and even create sophisticated new cyberweapons for destroying hackers and rogue governments; the NSA programs to track and trace all searches, file transfers and communications of seemingly everyone on the planet; Rockefeller’s legislation to appoint big business and globalists to advise on mandatory communications regulations. It seems that Obama and the NSA have more to gain from these attacks than do the North Koreans.

Of course, the capability (and presumably the intention) to monitor every electronic communication passing through the United States in real time has long existed. What we are seeing now is the revelation of long-established policies and technologies to a public that may have rejected them before. The Communications Assistance for Law Enforcement Act (CALEA) of 1994 already mandated that every communications device in the country be accessible by law enforcement, and it has now been mainstream news for years that the FBI can (and has) dialed into cellphones to listen in on any conversations taking place within reach of the microphone . . . even if the power is turned off. In 2006, an AT&T whistleblower revealed an NSA spy room directly in the data hub monitoring every email, every phone call and every fax traveling through that hub. In 2008, it was admitted that part of the NSA’s efforts to catch Al-CIAda included agents passing around particularly humorous phone sex conversations between US military overseas and their wives back home.

No, the capability of spying on all communications of all Americans is not being developed now; that has already happened. Right now we are witnessing the implementation of the phase in which the capability to track and trace all communications are being introduced to the public and justified on the grounds of national security. Expect to see an increasing number of media-hyped “cyberattack” stories before the cyber 9/11 makes the iPATRIOT Act a reality.

Of course, it should be obvious by now that those in charge of multi-billion dollar agencies are in positions to directly materially benefit from just such large, stunning cyberattacks, opening the door to the false-flag mentality by which attacks are to be welcomed for their transformative nature. Certainly the NSA is not building a $1.6 billion data center to sit on their hands waiting for an attack, nor are the governments of the UK, Canada, Ireland and many other countries suddenly considering draconian new e-spying legislation for the fun of it.

For those who are interested in how a false-flag cyber terrorist attack could be generated, the PTech story remains a crucial piece of the puzzle. The technology exists for those in the know to commit sophisticated, convincing and devastating attacks through the government’s own cyber infrastructure. The only question is who has the means, motive and opportunity to use it.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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May 22, 2000
ROCKEFELLER OFFERS INTERNET PRIVACY LEGISLATION
http://rockefeller.senate.gov/press/record.cfm?id=292997


— Says "Opt-in" Bill will Help Both Consumers and Industry —



 WASHINGTON —U.S. Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-WV), a senior member of the Senate Commerce Committee, today joined Senator Fritz Hollings (D-SC), and eight other Senators, in offering legislation to protect consumer privacy on the Internet. The Senator said that the legislation, which would require companies to ask consumers to "opt-in" before seeking personally identifiable information, is a sensible and flexible approach to the growing concern over Internet privacy.

     "Internet privacy is a towering concern for consumers that rises above nearly every other Internet issue," Rockefeller said. "When it comes to Internet privacy, there are both good actors and bad actors. But it's clear that Americans legitimately believe that they are losing control of personal information and that too many online companies collect and sell private information without real consumer consent."

     Rockefeller continued, "I would love to see strong Internet privacy protections achieved by industry self-regulation, but I've increasingly come to believe that this is not occurring quickly or universally. Creating privacy protections that Americans trust is in the best interests of both consumers and the industry. If we increase confidence in online privacy, more consumers will be able to enjoy the huge benefits of electronic commerce and online business will achieve even greater success."

     The legislation says that a web site or Internet service provider may not collect, use, or disclose data about an individual without complying with rules in four specific areas:

Notice: Companies must provide clear and conspicuous notice about what information will be collected, how that information may be used and to whom they will sell or disclose the information. Notice of changes or breaches in security must also be provided.

Consent: Consumers must "opt-in" before their personally identifiable information is collected, used or disclosed — meaning that companies must obtain affirmative consent from consumers before such activities. And consumers must be able to "opt-out" when non-personally identifiable information is collected — meaning that consumers may request that this information not be used by the company.

Access: Upon request by a user, companies must provide reasonable access to personally identifiable information about that user — along with the opportunity to correct, eliminate or supplement such information.

Security: Companies must have in place reasonable procedures to protect the security and confidentiality of information.

     Rockefeller said, "Our legislation simply gives consumers more information and more choices about how their personal information is treated on the Internet. Technology has shifted the privacy balance in favor of those who are seeking information, and consumers are losing ground. Through reasonable and flexible new rules, our legislation will give consumers the tools they need to take back control of information about themselves on the Internet. The right information and the ability to withhold consent will allow consumers to chose a level of privacy that makes them comfortable."

     The legislation also takes several other steps to promote online privacy, including creating an Online Privacy Office within the Federal Trade Commission.


 
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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Talk about letting psychotic killers out to roam around public areas...WTF?

Jay, stop being such a f**king asshole crybaby.

The internet has exposed you and your genocidal incestuous family, sorry.

Maybe if they did not spend the last 100 years exterminating over 100 million human beings you would not have as much to hide.

Now stop going batshit crazy shitting in your pants cookoo, please. We have enough to deal with concerning your family member Nick trying to shoot us all up with implantable RFID's.

I mean really Jay, how many paranoid delusional lunatics can one family have, geez.

----------------------------------------------------------
Blitz of “Cyber Attacks” as Rockefeller Bill Approaches
http://www.infowars.com/blitz-of-cyber-attacks-as-rockefeller-bill-approaches/
Kurt Nimmo Infowars July 8, 2009

A determined propaganda blitz is well underway as the government sets the stage for the passage of Cybersecurity Act of 2009, introduced in the Senate earlier this year. If passed, it will allow Obama to shut down the internet and private networks. The legislation also calls for the government to have the authority to demand security data from private networks without regard to any provision of law, regulation, rule or policy restricting such access. In other words, the bill allows the government to impose authoritarian control over electronic communications.   
   
Senator Rockefeller muses that we’d all be better off if the internet never existed.

Earlier today, the corporate media reported on a “powerful attack that overwhelmed computers at U.S. and South Korean government agencies,” allegedly launched by North Korea. “South Korean intelligence officials believe the attacks were carried out by North Korea or pro-Pyongyang forces,” the Associated Press reported.

It should be noted that South Korea’s intelligence apparatus — known as the Korean Central Intelligence Agency — was formed under the auspices of the U.S. Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps during the Korean War and is notorious for intervening in that country’s politics and kidnapping Koreans living abroad and torturing them. In other words, anything South Korean intelligence tells the corporate media should be taken with a large grain of salt.

According to “security experts analyzing the attacks,” Obama’s White House, the Pentagon, the New York Stock Exchange, the National Security Agency, Homeland Security Department, State Department, the Treasury Department, Federal Trade Commission and Secret Service, the Nasdaq stock market and The Washington Post were targeted.

All of this is happening as Senate Commerce Chairman John (Jay) Rockefeller — who has said we’d all be better off if the internet was never invented — plans a committee vote on cybersecurity legislation he introduced in April with Sen. Olympia Snowe, R-Maine.

Under Rockefeller’s bill, the White House would be required to create an Office of the National Cybersecurity Adviser within the Executive Office of the President as well as an advisory panel of experts from industry, academia and the globalist NGOs, according to Congress Daily.

In May, Obama pledged to personally select a cyber czar who would report to the National Security Council and National Economic Council.
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Offline Dig

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Rockefeller, Aides Draft Bill Allowing Emergency Presidential Powers to Disconnect Computers From Internet
http://huntingtonNews.net
By Tony Rutherford Aug. 29, 2009

Huntington, WV (HNN) – Civil liberty questions have emerged surrounding the drafting of a bill by aides of West Virginia Senator Jay Rockefeller that would allow Presidential power to disconnect private sector computers from the internet. On one hand, the legislation has been compared to President Bush shutting down private air traffic on September 11, 2001, but other see such vagueness that privacy and constitutional rights come into the spin.
 
Senate Bill 773 surfaced early this Spring and sparked alarm that the President could in an cyber terrorism emergency disconnect private sector computers from the net. Co-sponsor Rockefeller,D-WV, the Senate Commerce Committee chairman, had his aides work to soften the civil liberty issues, but an article given top story treatment by Matthew Drudge (“Drudge Report”) has raised more questions than have been answered.
 
Rockefeller, who introduced the bill in April with bipartisan support, insists the legislation was critical to protecting everything from water and electricity to banking, traffic lights and electronic health records. "I know the threats we face," Rockefeller said in a prepared statement when the legislation was introduced. "Our enemies are real. They are sophisticated, they are determined and they will not rest. We must protect our critical infrastructure at all costs--from our water to our electricity, to banking, traffic lights and electronic health records."
 
Based on the bill, the emergency seizure of control over private networks in a cyber terrorism threat encompasses anything having to do with the Internet, telecommunications, computers, or computer networks. Under the broad definition, red flags loudly raise the possibility of the federal government seizing control of discrimination of news and information sources.
 
Deemed the most worrisome, Section 201, permits the president to “direct the national response to the cyber threat” for “the national defense and security” including an immediate threat to “strategic national interests” by , (5) “directing the periodic mapping of Federal Government and United States critical infrastructure information systems or networks, and shall develop metries (sic) to measure the effectiveness of the mapping processes.”
 
The same section appears to require the private sector to share information with the government.
 
DOWNLOAD a pdf of an excerpt of this section of SB 773, by clicking HERE
 
Jena Longo, deputy communications director for the Senate Commerce committee, released the following email statement to CNET.com :
 
“The president of the United States has always had the constitutional authority, and duty, to protect the American people and direct the national response to any emergency that threatens the security and safety of the United States. The Rockefeller-Snowe Cybersecurity bill makes it clear that the president's authority includes securing our national cyber infrastructure from attack. The section of the bill that addresses this issue, applies specifically to the national response to a severe attack or natural disaster. This particular legislative language is based on longstanding statutory authorities for wartime use of communications networks. To be very clear, the Rockefeller-Snowe bill will not empower a "government shutdown or takeover of the Internet" and any suggestion otherwise is misleading and false. The purpose of this language is to clarify how the president directs the public-private response to a crisis, secure our economy and safeguard our financial networks, protect the American people, their privacy and civil liberties, and coordinate the government's response.”
 
The e-mail apparently seeks to downplay the Drudge headline that the bill would give President Obama emergency control over the internet.
 
Larry Clinton, president of the Internet Security Alliance which has reps from Verizon, Verisign, and Carnegie Mellon University on its board, told CNET, “It is unclear what authority Sen. Rockefeller thinks is necessary over the private sector.” One section requires federally certified cybersecurity professionals and a requirement that certain unspecified private computer systems and networks be managed by people possessing such a license.
 
Large internet and telecommunication companies held a teleconference with the senator’s aides this week. Citing vacations, no one has been available for comment, the article said. However, a source has stated as an example an attack on the electrical grid by a broadband connection would be one that would contemplate the scenario envisioned in the proposed legislation.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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Rockefeller Crafting Cybersecurity Bill
http://techdailydose.nationaljournal.com/2009/03/rockefeller-crafting-cybersecu.php
Friday, March 20, 2009





Senate Commerce Chairman John (Jay) Rockefeller and Sen. Olympia Snowe, R-Maine, are crafting legislation that they hope will improve the country's cybersecurity posture in the face of increasingly sophisticated global attacks against U.S. government networks as well as the nation's broader critical infrastructure. Rockefeller indicated he was working on the bill at a Thursday hearing where he also pledged to make cybersecurity a committee priority this year. He called cybersecurity "a profoundly and deeply troubling problem to which we are not paying much attention." CongressDaily's AM Edition has more coverage of the hearing (subscription required).

"We presently have systems to protect our nation's secrets and our government networks against cyber espionage, and it is imperative that those cyber defenses keep up with our enemies' cyber capabilities," a draft summary of the Rockefeller-Snowe proposal obtained by CongressDaily stated. "However, the threat of cyber attack on our private sector's critical infrastructure - banking, utilities, air/rail/auto traffic control, and telecommunications is equally alarming and protections must be put in place." The document goes on to say the proposal would "bring new high-level governmental attention to develop a fully integrated, thoroughly coordinated, public-private partnership."

Follow the jump for a detailed rundown of what the bill could include...



1) Significantly raise the profile of cybersecurity within the Federal government and streamline cyber-related government functions and authorities.

• Establish the Office of the National Cybersecurity Advisor within the Executive Office of the President. The National Cybersecurity Advisor will lead this office and report directly to the President. The Advisor will serve as the lead official on all cyber matters, coordinating with the intelligence community, as well as the civilian agencies. This section also outlines a number of important functions and authority of the National Cybersecurity Advisor, including the authority to disconnect a Federal or critical infrastructure network from the Internet if they are found to be at risk of cyber attack.

• Develop a comprehensive national strategy for cybersecurity. The Advisor is responsible for developing a comprehensive national strategy for cybersecurity to coordinate Federal and private sector cybersecurity efforts.

• Require a Quadrennial Cybersecurity Review. The legislation will direct the National Cybersecurity Advisor to conduct a quadrennial review of the U.S. cybersecurity program, modeled after the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review, to examine cyber strategy, budget, plans, and policies.

• Require a threat and vulnerability assessment to help us understand the threats and vulnerabilities of public systems and private-sector owned critical infrastructure.

2) Remake the relationship between government and the private sector on cybersecurity.

• Create a public-private clearinghouse for cyber threat and vulnerability information-sharing. The clearinghouse would responsible for the management and sharing of data between the federal government and private sector critical infrastructure operators.

• Create a Cybersecurity Advisory Panel consisting of outside experts in cybersecurity from industry, academia, and non-profit advocacy organizations to review and advise the President the on cybersecurity related matters.

• Establish enforceable cybersecurity standards. The legislation would require the National Institute of Standards and Technology to establish measureable and auditable cybersecurity standards that would be applicable both to government and the private sector.

• Provide for licensing and certification of cybersecurity professionals. The legislation would require the development and implementation of a professional licensing and certification program for cybersecurity professionals similar to those required for other major professions.

• Create state and regional cybersecurity centers for small and medium sized companies. These centers, modeled off of the Commerce Department's Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) programs, would assist small and medium sized businesses in adopting cybersecurity measures.

• Establish international norms and cybersecurity deterrence measures. The legislation would require the Advisor to work with the Secretary of State to develop international standards and techniques for improving cybersecurity.

• Establish a Secure Products and Services Acquisitions Board responsible for certifying that products the federal government purchases will have met standards for security as established by the Board. Many federal contracting officers do not incorporate security provisions into acquisition contracts, either because it is not considered a performance requirement or they lack the knowledge and understanding to make it a requirement, and this Board would eliminate that problem by requiring all information and communication technologies are reviewed and approved.

3) Foster innovation and creativity in cybersecurity to develop long-term solutions

• Expand the Scholarship-For-Cyber-Service program focused on recruiting students into a cybersecurity curriculum program. Upon graduation, these students would enter public service, joining an agency or department and leveraging the skills they've learned.

• Create an annual cybersecurity competition and prize to attract, identify, and recruit students to study cybersecurity.

• Increase federal cybersecurity research and development at the National Science Foundation.

• Attempt to place a dollar value on cybersecurity risk. The legislation would require the Advisor to provide a report on the feasibility of create a market for cybersecurity risk management, to include civil liability and government insurance.

4) Promote public awareness and protect civil liberties.

• Promote cybersecurity awareness by initiating a cybersecurity awareness campaign to educate the general public about cybersecurity risks and countermeasures they can implement to better protect themselves.

• Require a comprehensive legal review of the federal statutory and regulatory legal framework applicable to cybersecurity, including recommendations on changes that need to be made to modernize this legal framework.

• Require a report on identity management and civil liberties. The legislation would require the Advisor to review the feasibility of an identity management and authentication program, to include recommendations regarding civil liberties protections.

Categories: Congress, Security, Web Safety

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1) Significantly raise the profile of cybersecurity within the Federal government and streamline cyber-related government functions and authorities.

• Establish the Office of the National Cybersecurity Advisor within the Executive Office of the President. The National Cybersecurity Advisor will lead this office and report directly to the President. The Advisor will serve as the lead official on all cyber matters, coordinating with the intelligence community, as well as the civilian agencies. This section also outlines a number of important functions and authority of the National Cybersecurity Advisor, including the authority to disconnect a Federal or critical infrastructure network from the Internet if they are found to be at risk of cyber attack.

• Develop a comprehensive national strategy for cybersecurity. The Advisor is responsible for developing a comprehensive national strategy for cybersecurity to coordinate Federal and private sector cybersecurity efforts.

• Require a Quadrennial Cybersecurity Review. The legislation will direct the National Cybersecurity Advisor to conduct a quadrennial review of the U.S. cybersecurity program, modeled after the Defense Department's Quadrennial Defense Review, to examine cyber strategy, budget, plans, and policies.

• Require a threat and vulnerability assessment to help us understand the threats and vulnerabilities of public systems and private-sector owned critical infrastructure.

2) Remake the relationship between government and the private sector on cybersecurity.

• Create a public-private clearinghouse for cyber threat and vulnerability information-sharing. The clearinghouse would responsible for the management and sharing of data between the federal government and private sector critical infrastructure operators.

• Create a Cybersecurity Advisory Panel consisting of outside experts in cybersecurity from industry, academia, and non-profit advocacy organizations to review and advise the President the on cybersecurity related matters.

• Establish enforceable cybersecurity standards. The legislation would require the National Institute of Standards and Technology to establish measureable and auditable cybersecurity standards that would be applicable both to government and the private sector.

• Provide for licensing and certification of cybersecurity professionals. The legislation would require the development and implementation of a professional licensing and certification program for cybersecurity professionals similar to those required for other major professions.

• Create state and regional cybersecurity centers for small and medium sized companies. These centers, modeled off of the Commerce Department's Hollings Manufacturing Extension Partnership (MEP) programs, would assist small and medium sized businesses in adopting cybersecurity measures.

• Establish international norms and cybersecurity deterrence measures. The legislation would require the Advisor to work with the Secretary of State to develop international standards and techniques for improving cybersecurity.

• Establish a Secure Products and Services Acquisitions Board responsible for certifying that products the federal government purchases will have met standards for security as established by the Board. Many federal contracting officers do not incorporate security provisions into acquisition contracts, either because it is not considered a performance requirement or they lack the knowledge and understanding to make it a requirement, and this Board would eliminate that problem by requiring all information and communication technologies are reviewed and approved.

3) Foster innovation and creativity in cybersecurity to develop long-term solutions

• Expand the Scholarship-For-Cyber-Service program focused on recruiting students into a cybersecurity curriculum program. Upon graduation, these students would enter public service, joining an agency or department and leveraging the skills they've learned.

• Create an annual cybersecurity competition and prize to attract, identify, and recruit students to study cybersecurity.

• Increase federal cybersecurity research and development at the National Science Foundation.

• Attempt to place a dollar value on cybersecurity risk. The legislation would require the Advisor to provide a report on the feasibility of create a market for cybersecurity risk management, to include civil liability and government insurance.

4) Promote public awareness and protect civil liberties.

• Promote cybersecurity awareness by initiating a cybersecurity awareness campaign to educate the general public about cybersecurity risks and countermeasures they can implement to better protect themselves.

• Require a comprehensive legal review of the federal statutory and regulatory legal framework applicable to cybersecurity, including recommendations on changes that need to be made to modernize this legal framework.

• Require a report on identity management and civil liberties. The legislation would require the Advisor to review the feasibility of an identity management and authentication program, to include recommendations regarding civil liberties protections.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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April 23, 2009
Will New Internet Legislation In Congress Enable So-Called "Right Wing Extremist" Blogs Like This One To Be Shut Down? Is The Gulag At Yucca Mountain Being Readied As You Read This?

Dear Pals,

Here's an interesting tidbit about what the Spend-O-Crats in Congress (aka: The DeeCee PECers - a PECer is a member of the Political Elite Class) are working on.

Sounds like dissent is only acceptable if it is dissent that the Obama Administration approves of.

See you in Gulag!

Jay Rockefeller Scared to Death that Blogs Tell the Truth
Under "Cybersecurity", Congress Will Be the Internet's Greatest Threat!
http://birkblog.typepad.com/my_weblog/2009/04/will-new-internet-congressional-legislation-enable-socalled-right-wing-extremist-blogs-like-this-one.html
By Brad O'Leary


Gird your blogs, because if liberals in Congress get their way, President Obama will have sole discretionary authority to shut down the Internet or critical parts of the Internet should he feel his presidency is being tested. Worse, under the guise of cybersecurity, Obama will essentially be granted the power to destroy free speech on the web.

On April 1st of this year, Senators Rockefeller, Snowe, Bayh and Nelson introduced bills S. 773 and S.778, collectively called the Cybersecurity Act, which would give President Obama dictatorial power over the Internet during a time of national crisis or emergency.

All of the bills' sponsors voted for the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 that prohibited organizations and individuals from running advocacy ads against candidates 60 days in advance of a general election. Now it seems these same people have conjured up a gag order for the Internet.

According to the current drafts, under the Cyber Security Act of 2009 the President may "declare a cybersecurity emergency and order the limitation or shut down of Internet traffic to and from any comprised federal government or United States critical infrastructure information system or network". He may also "order the disconnection of any Federal Government or United States critical infrastructure information systems or networks in the interest of national security."

What constitutes "cybersecurity emergency" or "critical infrastructure information system or network" is left completely up to the President to define. We know that the Administration, according to Rahm Emanuel, never wants "a serious crisis to go to waste". We also know the Administration supports the regulation of free speech on the Internet.

President Obama's choice to lead the powerful Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs is none other than Cass Sunstein, a radical Harvard law professor and supporter of the Fairness Doctrine for the Internet. According to Sunstein, "A system of limitless individual choices, with respect to communications, is not necessarily in the interest of citizenship and self-government."

Obama campaign fundraiser and FCC Chair nominee, Julius Genachowski, is a supporter of "Net neutrality", the first step in applying the Fairness Doctrine to the Internet.

"Net neutrality" proponents like Genachowski would have government decide what content Internet operators and network owners must provide. Incredibly, they claim this is to keep the Internet free and open to all, when in reality, their goal is to usher the heavy hands of federal regulators into the tent.

Stifling any venue where ideology competes with left-wing mainstream media has always been a goal of the left and Obama. Obama has just been more evasive in his means by supporting policies such as "net neutrality" and wobbling on the reinstatement of the Fairness Doctrine to talk radio. Liberal members of Congress are now set on sending America on an unconstitutional b-line away from Uncle Sam and directly to Big Brother.

The Cybersecurity Act is also includes a provision where "The Department of Commerce shall serve as the clearinghouse of cybersecuirty threat and vulnerability information to the Federal Government and private sector owned (emphasis mine) critical infrastructure information systems and networks." Shelving all privacy laws including the requirement for warrants, the Secretary of Commerce "shall have access to all relevant data concerning such networks without regard to any provision of law, regulation, rule or policy restricting such access." Senator Rockefeller made it clear in his statement what "relevant data" this act could include when he stated "We must protect our critical infrastructure at all costs - from our water to our electricity, to banking, traffic lights and electronic health records - the list goes on."
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately