Author Topic: *AF Research Lab Doc Exposed*-Carpet Bombing people's personal computers  (Read 19351 times)

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The official document exposing their plans will follow shortly (in extracted form), meanwhile (it is embedded further down):

Army, Air Force seek to go on offensive in cyber war
By Bob Brewin June 13, 2007

In an unusual act of candor, both the Army and Air Force in the past two months have issued solicitations asking the computer industry to provide technologies the services can use to wage offensive cyberattacks against enemy computer systems.

The Army's Communication and Electronics Command last month released an announcement asking the IT industry to present technologies that it could use to infiltrate enemy computer networks and communications systems. The military refers to such cyberattacks as "offensive information operations," or OIO.

The Army acknowledged in the announcement that it already has waged cyberattacks on enemy networks and communications platforms, but provided no details. But it wants to "leverage innovative technologies" to improve its cyberattacks "and prevent enemy forces from detecting and countering efforts directed against them," according to the announcement. "Technologies designed to interrupt these modern networks must use subtle, less obvious methodology that disguises the technique used, protecting the ability whenever possible to permit future use."

The Air Force also is seeking offensive cyber warfare capabilities, according to an announcement and a request for information released in April. The Air Force's 950th Electronic Systems Group said it is seeking industry help to define technologies and capabilities "associated with computer network attack." The technologies would be used to "disrupt, deny, degrade or deceive an adversary's information system," according to the request for information.

The Air Force wants technology that will help it map data and voice networks, provide it with access to those networks, conduct denial-of-service attacks on current and future network operating systems and network devices and engage in data manipulation on enemy networks.

The Air Force Electronic Systems Center declined to classify potential targets of the offensive cyber operations, such as nations, terrorists, rogue groups or individuals. "Specific capabilities or procedures cannot be discussed for security reasons," said Monica Morales, a spokeswoman for the Electronic Systems Center, the parent command of the 950th Electronic Systems Group.

[INSERT: * 950th Electronic Systems Group

    The group develops, acquires, and integrates ISR systems to provide information superiority, kill chain and information operations capabilities for the Air Force, joint and coalition combat operations. The group leads integration and transition and fielding of highly-classified technologies to meet warfighter requirements and administers a contract budget valued at $5.4 billion fiscal year defense plan.
The offensive cyberattack capabilities that the Army and Air Force want to develop match what Marine Gen. James Cartwright, commander of the Strategic Command, called for during a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee in March. He told the panel that if "we apply the principle of warfare to the cyber domain, as we do to sea, air and land, we realize the defense of the nation is better served by capabilities enabling us to take the fight to our adversaries, when necessary, to deter actions detrimental to our interests."

Bruce Schneir, a security consultant with BT Counterpane, endorsed the Army and Air Force efforts. "Our government would be negligent if it did not develop offensive information operations capabilities," he said.

[INSERT:  Schneir, you're now officially a dumbass duped anti-Constitutional scumbag piece of NWO assisting TRASH.]

But, Schneir added, since cyber space, unlike the physical battlefield, has connections to global networks that support commerce and communications, any offensive operations conducted by the United States must be fine-tuned to avoid disrupting computer systems that are not part of any enemy system that the military would target. That would be the cyber equivalent to collateral damage inflicted in a bombing campaign.

Steven Aftergood, director of the Project on Government Secrecy for the Federation of American Scientists, described the release of the Army and Air Force offensive cyberattack solicitations as significant, because the services have only released limited information on their cyberattack plans, operations or technologies. These solicitations are more detailed.

The Army expects industry to submit responses to the announcement by the end of June. The Air Force is scheduled to hold an industry day for its Network Warfare Operations Capabilities solicitation on June 14 in San Antonio.

Air Force looking to build cyber weapons

By Bob Brewin 05/14/2008

The Air Force issued a proposal on Monday asking the technology industry to help it develop the ability to hack into an enemy’s computer systems and to conduct offensive cyber warfare, such as shutting down systems, according to internal and public documents.

In its proposal, the Air Force Research Laboratory-Rome Research Site in Rome, N.Y., said it wanted help from researchers and industry to develop technologies that would support what the lab called a dominant offensive cyber engagement.

An internal briefing from the lab’s headquarters at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Ohio defines the engagement as the ability to “conduct full-spectrum offensive cyber/info military, leadership and infrastructure.”

The request dovetails with a similar research effort kicked off last year by the Air Force Electronic Systems Group, which asked industry to develop the technologies and capabilities needed to attack an adversary’s computer systems.

“Although it is rare to find such a public request by the Air Force, [other] governments around the world [already] have the resources, methods and systems to play in the cyberspace war zone,” said Yuval Ben-Itzhak, chief technology officer for Finjan Software Inc. in San Jose, Calif., which develops and sells secure Web gateway software.

The lab emphasized in the request that it noted the lab wants to develop the capability to gain access to remote open and closed networks and to systems that provide full control of a network for the purposes of collecting data and conducting operations to manipulate the system.

The lab wants capabilities to burrow to the core of any computer, including techniques to allow it to gain user and root-level access to fixed and mobile computers. The lab is interested in methodologies that would allow it to access all types of operating systems, patch levels, applications and hardware, according to the request.

The Air Force also wants the ability to conduct these operations without being detected for a long time, so the United States could “maintain an active presence within the adversaries' information infrastructure completely undetected” to collect an enemy’s sensitive and classified information.

The Air Force labels these electronic tactics “D5 effects,” to affect computers through what it calls “deceive, deny, disrupt, degrade and destroy.”

Air Force Col. Charles Williamson, in an article that appeared in the May issue of Armed Forces Journal, said the Air Force should take a “carpet bombing” approach to offensive operations in cyberspace. Williamson, staff judge advocate for the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency at Lackland Air Force Base in Texas, suggested that the service imitate hackers and develop its own force of botnets -- thousands of computers controlled by a signal source -- to attack adversaries.

The cyber warfare strategy could backfire, according to an analyst who served in a top Defense Department post. Philip Coyle, who served as assistant secretary of Defense and director of its operational test and evaluation office from 1994 to 2001, said he does not believe the Air Force has “thought through the ‘arms control’ implications of this work. Once the Air Force starts attacking . . . all hell could break loose. The Air Force is not equipped, and likely could never be equipped, to deal with retaliation from thousands or millions of hackers.

“Hopefully, this solicitation will produce some cooler heads who will help the Air Force think through these matters,” said Coyle, now senior adviser with the Center for Defense Information, a security policy research organization in Washington. “But too often the tendency is to come up with new weapons -- including cyber weapons -- without adequate regard for the question . . . ‘Where does it all end? How will our friends and allies, as well as our adversaries react to our efforts? Through our actions, are we making the threat worse?’”

The military will use caution with cyber weapons, as it has with nuclear weapons, Ben-Itzhak said. “Most people trust their nation that it will not start a war or a nuclear attack for no serious reason,” he said. “They can also trust that such offensive cyberspace methods will be used for good reasons, although, just by reading [about] them, they might sound scary.”

Ben-Itzhak added that investment in offensive cyber operations -- under the theory that a good offense makes for the best defense-- won’t solve the problems the Air Force faces in combating relentless cyberattacks against its networks. “Investments in offensive methods will not save investments in defensive methods,” he said. “It is the basic of any war, including the cyber war.”



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*AF Research Lab Doc Exposed*-Military strikes auth vs. "Cyber threats"
« Reply #1 on: April 30, 2009, 05:00:14 pm »

Michael Riconosciuto on Encryption
by J. Orlin Grabbe

Michael Riconosciuto is one of the original architects of the PROMIS backdoor. PROMIS was a people-tracking software system sold to intelligence organizations and government drug agencies worldwide. The global dispersion of PROMIS was part of a U.S. plot to spy on other spy agencies.

Riconosciuto, who was Director of Research for a Wackenhut-Cabazon Indian joint venture, oversaw a group of several dozen people who worked out of business offices in nearby Indio, California. According to the testimony of Robert Booth Nichols, a CIA agent associated with Meridian International Logistics and connected to Music Corporation of America (MCA), Riconosciuto was in frequent contact with Bobby Inman, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and then Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), during this time.

Since intelligence computers are, for security reasons, usually not connected to external networks, the original backdoor was a broadcast signal. The PROMIS software was often sold in connection with computer hardware (such as a Prime computer) using a specialized chip. The chip would broadcast the contents of the existing database to monitoring vans or collection satellites using digital spread spectrum techniques whenever the software was run.

Spread spectrum techniques offer a way to mask, or disguise, a signal by making it appear as "noise" with respect to another signal. For example, one may communicate covertly on the same spectrum as a local TV broadcast signal. From the point of view of a TV receiver, the covert communication appears as noise, and is filtered out. From the point of view of the covert channel, the TV signal appears as noise. In the case of the PROMIS broadcast channel, the signal was disguised as ordinary computer noise--the type of stuff that must be reduced for TEMPEST certification in the U.S.

In spread spectrum frequency communication, the transmitted spectrum is much wider than what is really necessary. In digital communication, the transmission widths of digital signals are expanded so that many "bit periods" are needed to represent one bit at baseband. This results in an improvement in the signal-to-noise- ratio. Spread spectrum techniques are used extensively in covert military communications and secure satellite systems.


Carpet bombing in cyberspace

Why America needs a military botnet


The world has abandoned a fortress mentality in the real world, and we need to move beyond it in cyberspace. America needs a network that can project power by building an robot network (botnet) that can direct such massive amounts of traffic to target computers that they can no longer communicate and become no more useful to our adversaries than hunks of metal and plastic. America needs the ability to carpet bomb in cyberspace to create the deterrent we lack.

America faces increasingly sophisticated threats against its military and civilian cyberspace. At the same time, America has no credible deterrent, and our adversaries prove it every day by attacking everywhere. Worse, our defensive concept is fundamentally flawed, and we have not learned the simplest lessons of history.

As much as some think the information age is revolutionary, local networks and the Internet are conceptually similar to the ancient model of roads and towns: Things are produced in one place and moved to another place where they have more value. The road-and-town model works well between cooperating states, but states also compete, and when they do, they sometimes have to defend themselves from attack. In today’s Internet, network “towns” are “fortified” with firewalls, gateways, passwords, port blocking, intrusion detection devices and law enforcement. This approach uses the same strategy as the medieval castle with its walls, moat, drawbridge, guards, alarms and a sheriff. While castles worked more or less for hundreds of years, they are now abandoned as completely ineffective except against the most anemic attack.

The time for fortresses on the Internet also has passed, even though America has not recognized it. Now, the only consequence for an adversary who intrudes into or attacks our networks is to get kicked out — if we can find him and if he has not installed a hidden back door. That is not enough. America must have a powerful, flexible deterrent that can reach far outside our fortresses and strike the enemy while he is still on the move.

Homer’s epic poems describe how fortified Troy held out against the united Greek armies for 10 years until Troy finally fell when it foolishly brought the threat inside its own walls by falling for the enemy’s masquerade in the form of a giant wooden horse. Today, it is no coincidence that the Trojan horse exploit uses the same technique on the Internet by hiding a threat inside what appears to be a gift.

In spite of Troy’s defeat, fortresses worked for thousands of years because they were so reliable and cheap compared to standing armies. Fortresses reached their zenith in the medieval castle, even though they were vulnerable to siege, tunneling and the threat that someone would open the gate from inside. However, the popularity of castles declined as the power of artillery increased. While fortresses enjoyed some notable successes, even the post-Civil War settlement of the American West evolved to relying on quickly constructed fortresses with wooden walls to house a highly mobile attack force that could secure a vast area.

The death knell for the fortress came during World War II at the Belgian Fort Eben-Emael. Its answer to the artillery threat was thicker and higher walls and the threat of its own artillery against any enemy in the vicinity of the fort, especially at the nearby bridge. But the attack did not come across the bridge. It came from the air. The Germans cunningly dropped storm troopers in gliders right in the middle of the fort, engaged the garrison and tied it up long enough for the massive German Army swarming across the bridge to compel surrender, which came in just one day.

Today, every Army outpost in America traces its roots to the walls, guards and gates of Troy. But none of today’s forts relies for boundary defense on anything more substantial than a chain-link fence, even though the base may contain billions of dollars in military equipment and the things most important to the soldiers — their families. The U.S. intends for defense of its “forts” to occur thousands of miles away. We intend to take the fight to the enemy before the enemy has a chance to come here. So, if the fortress ultimately failed, does history provide a different model?


Almost from the beginning, air base defenders recognized the need to defend in close, coupled with the necessity of finding the enemy and destroying his planes on the ground before they launch.

In “Air Warfare and Air Base Air Defense,” John F. Kreis described the early defense of the air weapon. From the beginning of World War I, defense happened when the enemy was above your airfield, with expediencies such as Lewis machine guns mounted on stumps in the ground. However, by 1915, British Maj. Gen. Hugh Trenchard’s large, repeated raids on German airfields put the Germans on the defensive. Today’s air base defense concept still uses a layered defense in depth, but it starts as far as possible from the air bases, then relies on close-in defense only as a last resort. That capability in cyberspace can exist in an botnet.

A botnet is a collection of widely distributed computers controlled from one or more points. Criminals build botnets by using automated processes to break through the defenses of computers anywhere in the world and implant their programs or code. Often, the computer user is tricked through a crafty e-mail into cooperating with the installation of the code. The infected machines are called zombies and can be remotely controlled by masters. Hackers can build multiple levels of masters and zombies with millions of computers.

Hackers often use botnets to generate spam, but their real strength lies in their ability to generate massive amounts of Internet traffic and direct it against a small number of targets. This is called a distributed denial of service (DDOS) attack. The effect is that the target computers are cut off from the Internet. Because communication is often a computer’s main purpose, a compromised computer might as well be a rock. While preparation and money can help target computers defend themselves, once under attack, they have little ability to recover.

Multiday attacks against CNN and Yahoo in 2000 and against Estonia in 2007 cost tens of millions of dollars. The SANS Institute projects that increasingly sophisticated botnets will be the No. 2 cyber security menace for 2008. A DDOS attack against a net-centric military could stop or delay any operation it intended. How could the U.S. military build such a system?


The U.S. would not, and need not, infect unwitting computers as zombies. We can build enough power over time from our own resources.

Rob Kaufman, of the Air Force Information Operations Center, suggests mounting botnet code on the Air Force’s high-speed intrusion-detection systems. Defensively, that allows a quick response by directly linking our counterattack to the system that detects an incoming attack. The systems also have enough processing speed and communication capacity to handle large amounts of traffic.

Next, in what is truly the most inventive part of this concept, Lt. Chris Tollinger of the Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency envisions continually capturing the thousands of computers the Air Force would normally discard every year for technology refresh, removing the power-hungry and heat-inducing hard drives, replacing them with low-power flash drives, then installing them in any available space every Air Force base can find. Even though those computers may no longer be sufficiently powerful to work for our people, individual machines need not be cutting-edge because the network as a whole can create massive power.

After that, the Air Force could add botnet code to all its desktop computers attached to the Nonsecret Internet Protocol Network (NIPRNet). Once the system reaches a level of maturity, it can add other .mil computers, then .gov machines.

To generate the right amount of power for offense, all the available computers must be under the control of a single commander, even if he provides the capability for multiple theaters. While it cannot be segmented like an orange for individual theater commanders, it can certainly be placed under their tactical control.

For computer network attack intended to create effects for a theater commander, the most sensible person to exercise tactical control is the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). The JFACC is responsible for the theater’s deep-strike capability and habitually operates in parallel warfare with hundreds of simultaneous strikes on hundreds of locations. That is exactly the kind of capability provided by the botnet. Also, the JFACC has the most at stake in using the botnet for deterrence, limited strike or massive strike because it is the JFACC who will have to send in his joint airmen if the botnet fails. This means he will have the most incentive to compel the Air Force to build and exercise this tool for him.

Computer network defense presents a different problem. Here, the botnet needs to be under the tactical control of a combatant commander with global responsibility. The enemy is almost certain to attack from every quarter and will completely ignore or actively exploit our seams between regions. Cutting up the botnet into regional pieces would so dilute its power that it would be worthless and make rapid employment functionally impossible.

The system also needs to avoid tampering and fratricide. Cannoneers of fuse-fired artillery carried spikes which they could quickly drive in the fuse hole to prevent the weapon from being turned on friendly forces if their position was overrun. The botnet could replicate that protection with various mechanisms, including disabling the botnet code if an automated check indicated the code has been altered. The botnet could protect against fratricide by having filters to prevent attacks against .mil, .gov or registered allied addresses, unless specifically overridden.


Lawyers have been known to trot out a “parade of horribles” to demonstrate weaknesses in an idea. These issues are difficult but not insurmountable. But before addressing them, it is important to note what the botnet is not.

The botnet is not a replacement for law enforcement action or diplomacy. If the harm coming to U.S. systems is low enough that a military response is not required, the U.S. must default to traditional responses that respect the sovereignty of other nations, just as we expect them to respect our sovereignty and the primacy of our responsibility to stop harm coming to them from the U.S. With that understanding, what challenges remain?

Some people would fear the possibiltiy of botnet attcks on innocent parties. If the botnet is used in a strictly offensive manner, civilian computers may be attacked, but only if the enemy compels us. The U.S. will perform the same target preparation as for traditional targets and respect the law of armed conflict as Defense Department policy requires by analyzing necessity, proportionality and distinction among military, dual-use or civilian targets. But neither the law of armed conflict nor common sense would allow belligerents to hide behind the skirts of its civilians. If the enemy is using civilian computers in his country so as to cause us harm, then we may attack them.

On the other hand, if the U.S. is defending itself against an attack that originates from a computer which was co-opted by an attacker, then there are real questions about whether the owner of that computer is truly innocent. At the least, the owner may be culpably negligent, and that does not, in fairness or law, prevent America from defending itself if the harm is sufficiently grave. Two scenarios reveal that the issues are more political than legal.

From a legal standpoint, the U.S. has long been a proponent of the international law doctrine of “defense in neutral territory” since Secretary of State Daniel Webster in 1842 accepted the British explanation that they had exercised their right of self-defense in capturing the steamer Caroline from an American pier, setting it ablaze, then sending it plunging over Niagara Falls after it had been used in the service of Canadian rebels: “Respect for the inviolable character of the territory of independent nations is the most essential foundation of civilization ... [and] exceptions should be confined to cases in which the ‘necessity of that self-defence is instant, overwhelming, and leaving no choice of means, and no moment for deliberation.’” Notably, the British were not responding to harm caused by the U.S. government but to harm caused by criminals acting from U.S. territory. That may well be the case if the U.S. uses the botnet defensively. However, the bigger legal challenge for the U.S. is reciprocity. What we do to other countries, they get to do to us without our complaining.

The political ramifications may be more difficult to manage. A U.S. defensive DDOS attack on a neutral country, or on multiple neutral countries, will certainly require the U.S. to explain itself. Commanders need to be ready to disclose some facts indicating why the U.S. took action and what they did to tailor their response. Finally, the U.S. needs to be ready to consider legitimate claims for compensation, if warranted.

The truly difficult problems come in defending against attack from devices adversaries have captured from U.S. or allies’ civilians. Generally, the U.S. military is not going to attack a U.S. private computer. Harm coming from one of those machines will first be treated as a crime, and military forces should stay out of the situation in accordance with the Posse Comitatus Act. However, Title 10 of the United States Code, Section 333, allows the president to order use of the military in the U.S. under tightly controlled conditions when civil authorities are overborne.

More challenging is the problem of an attack coming from an ally’s civilian computers. Obviously, the U.S. would seek allies’ cooperation if at all possible, but we could be in a position of launching an attack on a nation whom we have sworn to protect in a mutual defense pact. Together, the U.S. and its allies can reduce this risk by cooperating to maximize computer security. If we attack them as a matter of proportionate response, it would only be because computers in their territory are attacking us.

The biggest challenge will be political. How does the U.S. explain to its best friends that we had to shut down their computers? The best remedy for this is prevention. The U.S. and its allies need to engage in a robust joint endeavor to improve net defense and intelligence to minimize this risk.

A smart enemy will load his attack code in as many countries as possible so that when we launch a defensive strike, the maximum number of countries will be angry at the U.S. at the same time. However, this carries some risk for the real controller of the botnet that struck the U.S. If they spread their code broadly, they increase the incentive for multiple countries to cooperate in finding the truth of the attacks, so risk balances against reward. In the meantime, we have defended our own capability if circumstances required.

Also, a smart enemy will use “IP spoofing” by crafting his own DDOS attack packets to appear to come from somewhere other than the Internet Protocol (IP) address of the real node launching the attack. He could even craft his packets to make it appear the attack was coming from inside U.S. military networks so that if we merely captured the apparent source IP address and used that to aim the attack we would fire our botnet at our own computers. However, U.S. operators need not use the source IP address as the only pointer. All available information can be used to aim the attack, including the sophistication of the attack, targeting of sensitive systems and level of damage. If intelligence and circumstances point to a particular country, the U.S. is not barred from exercising its rights of self-defense or proportionate response just because the attacker was crafty. Military history is full of deception, and IP spoofing is simply the latest incarnation. In addition, the attacker could be guilty of the war crime of perfidy, or at least violate the U.N. prohibition against unfriendly acts, and call down on himself the ire of the international community, if he attempts to hide inside the cyber domain of a neutral nation. In any event, this threat illustrates the urgent need to improve the chance of proper targeting of our response to attack by cooperating to build an Internet version of the Distant Early Warning radars (the DEW Line) the U.S. and its allies jointly employed near the Arctic Circle during the Cold War.

There will be voices of skepticism.

“There are engineering challenges.” Yes, there are. They include potential choke points at border routers and backbone gateways. However, there are solutions, such as broadly distributing the computers or routing the technology refresh machines directly to the Internet. America’s Air Force has tackled tougher challenges. In any case, the current defensive concept is fundamentally flawed and cannot continue as our sole protection.

“Intelligence requirements would be too great.” While the joint doctrine on information operations notes that intelligence requirements for information operations can be more extensive than for kinetic operations, it did not contemplate an botnet. One of the advantages of a botnet is that offensive targeteers essentially only need the IP address of the target device, plus an appropriate level of intelligence, to allow an informed collateral damage assessment.

“Our enemies will know it was America that attacked them.” Precisely. We want potential adversaries to know this capability works and will be used when needed. In fact, we should do live-fire demonstrations on the Internet against range targets so foreign signals intelligence organizations can observe. Of course, we should fire inert rounds so as to not give away secrets.

“We might kill someone in a hospital or shut down emergency services.” The risk of this occurring is overblown. Hospitals and emergency services already need backup plans in case of many exigencies from natural causes, including the types of power and communications outages that a DDOS could cause. Also, target preparation in cyberspace can create no-strike lists just like the physical world.

“Brute force attacks lack elegance.” Who cares? The U.S. successfully conducted area bombing against Taliban trenches in Afghanistan. Not every attack needs to be with a laser-guided bomb. Brute force has an elegance all its own.

“This is not a silver bullet.” Of course not. A DDOS is not a good defense against espionage. The U.S. still needs a layered defense in-depth with firewalls, software patches, good information assurance and brilliant defenders because the botnet would do little against a phishing attack in which a hacker tricks people into running malicious software. However, what the botnet offers that does not exist today is the ability to let the enemy know he might be caught and suffer an attack that would take the benefit out of his risk.

“We might start a new arms race.” We are in one, and we are losing. Gen. James Cartwright, then-commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, testified for the 2007 Report to Congress of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission that analysts think China has the world’s largest denial-of-service capability. Can the U.S. reasonably believe that other nations have not learned from the DDOS attacks on Yahoo and CNN in 2000 or on Estonia in 2007? As Gregory Rattray projected in his book, “Strategic Warfare in Cyberspace,” if we are, or are about to be, engaged in a conventional conflict, the adversary may launch a DDOS that, under the right circumstances, could deter or delay us. Their capability could reduce our options. In addition, at least one foreign nation has advocated unrestricted warfare in cyberspace.

While the U.S. can have a plan to control each of the “horribles” in the parade, it is less certain that adversaries will.

The days of the fortress are gone, even in cyberspace. While America must harden itself in cyberspace, we cannot afford to let adversaries maneuver in that domain uncontested. The botnet brings the capability to help defeat an enemy attack or hit him before he hits our shores.

COL. CHARLES W. (CHARLIE) WILLIAMSON III is the staff judge advocate, Air Force Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Agency, at Lackland Air Force Base, Texas. He has served as a flight test manager for small, air-breathing missiles; as a judge advocate at two base-level legal offices; as a staff judge advocate for two base-level legal offices; and as the first staff judge advocate for the Joint Task Force-Computer Network Operations. The views expressed here are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Air Force or Defense Department.


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*AF Research Lab Doc Exposed*-Military strikes auth vs. "Cyber threats"
« Reply #2 on: April 30, 2009, 05:06:53 pm »
Network Warfare Operations Capabilities (NWOC)

General Information
Document Type:      Presolicitation
Solicitation Number:      FA8707-07-R-0001
Classification Code:      A – Research & Development
Naics Code:         541710 – Research and Development in Physical,
            Engineering and Life Sciences

Contracting Office Address
Department of the Air Force, Air Force Material Command, Electronic Systems
Center, OL-AA 950 ELSG/KIS,145 Duncan Drive Suite 200, San Antonio, TX.
   OL-AA 950 ELSG/KIS, Network Warfare Operations Capabilities (NWOC),

The 950 ELSG invites concept papers addressing Information Operations (IO)  capabilities focusing on Network Warfare Operations (NWO) to be administered by OL-AA 950 ELSG/KIS. This BAA is issued under the provisions of paragraph 35.016 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) which provides for the competitive selection of technology demonstration proposals. Contracts awarded based on responses to this BAA are considered to be the result of full and open competition and in full compliance with the provisions of Public Law 98-369, “The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984.”
Concept papers in response to this announcement shall be submitted electronically to Ms. Lisa K. Anderson at  Responses shall reference the above BAA number. This announcement is effective 1 July 2007 through 30 Jun 2009. Concept papers may be submitted at any time during this period. A copy of this BAA will be posted on the World Wide Web at  There will be no other solicitations issued for this topic.

1.   Technical Description: The OL-AA 950 ELSG/KIS is an organization focused on the development and sustainment of NWO for the operational Air Force. This BAA solicits concept papers with the potential to enhance Air Force operations focused on the NWO element of IO. NWO is the integrated planning and employment of military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the interconnected analog and digital network portion of the battlespace. NWO is conducted in the information domain through the dynamic combination of hardware, software, data, and human interaction. These topics include, but are not limited to:

a.   Network Attack (NetA). The employment of network based capabilities to destroy, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp information resident in or transiting through networks.
b.   Network Defense (NetD). The employment of network based capabilities to defend friendly information resident in or transiting through networks against adversary efforts to destroy, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp it.
c.   Network Warfare Support (NetS). Actions tasked by or under direct control of an operational commander to search for, intercept, identify, and locate or localize sources of access and vulnerability for the purpose of immediate threat recognition, targeting, planning, and conduct of future operations. NetS provides information required for immediate decisions involving network warfare operations. NetS data can be used to produce intelligence, or provide targeting for electronic or destructive attack.
d.   Technologies/concepts for developing capabilities associated with computer network attack (i.e., to disrupt, deny, degrade, destroy or deceive an adversary’s information and information system). This should address but not be limited to the following:
i.   Mapping of networks (both data and voice)
ii.   Access to networks
iii.   Denial of service on current and future operating systems and network devices
iv.   Data manipulation
e.   Technologies/concepts for developing capabilities for IO modeling and simulation.
f.   Situational awareness that gives the operator near real-time effectiveness feedback in a form that is readily observed by the operator.
g.   Technologies/concepts for developing capabilities to assess and visualize non-kinetic effects.
h.   Technologies/capabilities/concepts for generating and distributing dynamic electronic target folders to include non-kinetic courses of action (COAs).
i.   Processing of multi-level security information.
j.   Technologies/concepts for developing capabilities to support rapid implementation of effects-based capabilities.
2.   Proposed concept papers may also address new tactics, techniques, procedures, and mature technology applications that may affect Air Force IO doctrine and strategy.
3.   Security Requirements: The submittal process under this BAA is intended to be as streamlined as possible in order to allow the Government to leverage the latest technology advances; however, every precaution must be taken to protect potentially sensitive or classified material. Such material should not be transmitted across open-source media like public phone, fax, internet, or e-mail. If a submitter has any reason to believe their concept may reference ideas or operations that require special protection, the submitter should immediately contact Mr. Michael Gamble, OL-AA 950 ELSG/KIS Security Officer, at (210) 925-6628. In general, potentially sensitive submissions should be sent via REGISTERED MAIL to the mailing address listed in Section A of this BAA. Submitters who are supported by an accredited security office may be bound by specific laws and regulations directing the proper methods for transmission of classified concepts.
4.   Other Special Requirements:
b.   Successful offerors must comply with the Privacy Act, AFI 37¬-132.
c.   Offerors are advised that only Warranted Procuring Contracting Officers are legally authorized to commit the Government to an award under this BAA.

1.   Offerors are requested to provide their Commercial and Government Entity (CAGE) code.

2.   It is preferred that only non-proprietary data be provided; however, proprietary data may be submitted. Proprietary data shall be clearly identified and marked. Any respondent consents to the Government allowing the MITRE Corp., a Federally Funded Research and Development Center, and advisory and assistance contractors, access to the concept demonstration papers. They will assist the Government on as needed basis in evaluating the capabilities of the companies responding to this BAA.

3.   The role of the support contractors is purely advisory, and the exclusive responsibility for defining requirements and evaluating responses will remain with the Government. The contracts with these support contractors prohibit the unauthorized use or dissemination of any proprietary information companies may submit in response to this BAA. Supporting contractors have signed a nondisclosure certification form prior to being granted access to proprietary information. These executed forms will be available for examination at the OL-AA 950 ELSG/KIS location.  Unless a company responding to this BAA indicates otherwise, any respondent consent to the Government allowing support contractors listed below access to proprietary information submitted for evaluation purposes.  950 ELSG/KIS support contractors currently are: BAE Systems, Northrop-Grumman – TASC, L3/ Titan, ARINC, Booze-Allen, AT&T, and ManTech/Aegis.  This list is subject to change. 

4.   Notice to Foreign-Owned Firms: Such firms are asked to immediately contact Mr. Isaac O. Jones Jr, Contracting Officer, upon deciding to respond to this announcement. Foreign contractors shall be aware that restrictions may apply which could preclude their participation in this acquisition.

1.   The cost of preparing concept papers in response to this announcement is not considered an allowable direct charge to any other contract, but may be an allowable expense to the normal bid and proposal indirect cost in FAR Part 31.205-18.

2.   Offerors can respond to all or part of the areas of interest announced in this BAA found on the HERBB web site. 

3.   Every effort will be made to protect the confidentiality of the concept paper and any evaluations. The submitter must mark the concept paper with a protective legend IAW FAR 52.215-1(e).     

4.   Unnecessarily elaborate brochures or proposals are not desired.     

5.   Use of a diagram or figure to depict the essence of the proposed demonstration is strongly encouraged.     

6.   Submitter’s concept papers shall not exceed ten (10) pages using Microsoft Word format using 10 pitch font. Concept papers in excess of ten pages will be returned to the offeror for resubmission in accordance with the page limits.  Fold out pages will not be accepted.

7.   Additionally, the offeror shall submit an unclassified, non-proprietary title and summary, not to exceed one (1) additional page each.  These pages will not be counted in the ten page limitation.

8.   Multiple concept papers addressing different topic areas may be submitted by each offeror. However, each concept paper must address only one concept.     

9.   Each concept paper must contain as a minimum: Title, Period of Performance, Estimated Cost, Company Address, Technical and Contracting Points of Contact, Phone, Fax & Email, Task Objective, Technical Summary and Proposed Deliverables. OL-AA 950 ELSG/KIS will evaluate concept demonstration papers against the criteria listed in paragraph E below and will determine which concept demonstration papers to pursue based on their applicability and consistency with the intent of the BAA.

10.   The following information for classified submissions shall be added: Classified level at which company is cleared, CAGE code, contractor address for forwarding classified material, (name, address, zip code), cognizant security office (name, address, zip code), offeror’s security officer’s name and telephone number.

11.   The concept paper should include the anticipated period of performance as well as a rough-order-of-magnitude (ROM) cost. The ROM cost consists of the total cost plus profit/fee, if any. The ROM should be a best estimate of the anticipated cost of the effort. The ROM should be consistent with any dollar value or ranges, if any, specified in the announcement, as well as the level of work being proposed.

12.   The concept paper should not include a cost proposal or any of the material which usually accompanies a cost proposal.  It must include a short technical description of the concepts and plans to accomplish the technical objectives. It should also briefly describe the technologies to be pursued in the effort. It should also identify any Independent Research and Development (IR&D) work underway within the company which may have direct application. The concept paper should address only that specific part of the BAA that the offeror intends to accomplish. A single concept paper that attempts to address the whole scope of the technology described in the BAA will not be accepted.

13.   Those offerors whose concept papers are of interest may be invited to submit a formal proposal. Offerors whose concept papers are determined to not be of interest are not precluded from submitting a proposal and may request proposal instructions if they so desire. All offerors submitting concept papers will be contacted by the Technical Point of Contact either with a letter informing them that the effort proposed is not of interest to the Government, or with a request for a formal cost and technical proposal approximately forty-five days after concept paper/proposal submission.

14.   It is recommended that concept papers be received by the following dates to maximize the possibility of award: FY07-08 –  31 Jul 2007, FY09 –  30 Jun 2008; FY10 – 30 Jun 2009.  Concept papers will be accepted at any time, but it is less likely that funding will be available in each fiscal year after the dates cited. 

15.   Organization Conflict of Interest (OCI) mitigation plans will be accepted by 950 ELSG/KIS when a contractor is notified to send a technical/cost proposal.  Contractors shall submit their OCI mitigation plans prior to or with its technical/cost proposal.

Multiple awards for the NWOC concept paper initiative are anticipated.  The principal funding and the anticipated awards as a result of this BAA will start in 4Q FY07, and will be in the form of contracts, cooperative agreements, or other transactions depending on the nature of the work proposed.  Individual awards will normally range from 6 to 12 months with dollars typically ranging from $25,000 to $500,000 for prototype development and demonstration.  Deliverables will be technical reports, prototype applications, software and integrated system enhancements and upgrades.  The total value for all awards under this BAA shall not exceed $15,000,000.  Concept paper, when requested and submitted, will be evaluated as they are received. Concept paper will be evaluated under the following criteria:
1.   Impact of the proposed concept on enhancing Air Force IO operational capabilities.
2.   Technical merit of the proposed concept with an emphasis on technically mature, creative and innovative solutions.
3.   Past performance.
4.   Realism and reasonableness of the proposed cost/price.
Criteria 1 through 3 are of equal importance. All evaluation factors other than cost or price are significantly more important than cost or price.  Criteria 1 through 4 above will also be used to determine whether concept papers submitted and are consistent with the intent of this BAA and of interest to the Government.
No further evaluation criteria will be used in awarding a contract under this BAA.
Anticipated Period of Performance:
Approximately 12 months from contract award through complete evaluation of concept demonstration. Only Procuring Contracting Officers are legally authorized to commit the Government.

Questions on the objectives or preparation of the technical proposal should be addressed to Mr. James A. Palinkas, Program Manager, (210) 925-6673, email:
Questions related to contracting or cost issues should be directed to Ms. Lisa K. Anderson, Contract Specialist, (210) 925-6748, email:
The Contracting Officer for this BAA is Mr. Isaac O. Jones Jr., Contracting Officer, (210) 925-6732, email:
The Security point of contact for this BAA is Mr. Michael Gamble, OL-AA 950 ELSG/KIS Security Officer, at (210) 925-6628, email:

Offline Dig

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Looks like they will use the Pandemic Hoax Wargame to initiate this procedure.

They will say that they require a consistent message and that the Internet can kill people during a pandemic.

Then when they get total command and control over the Internet they will use the real virus.

We have a technology room to post information regarding secure OS's but this stuff really needs to be exposed, it is total insanity and completely illegal.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately


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FLTC Perspective

Focused Long Term Challenges (FLTCs) are an innovative approach
to match user requirements with relevant technology development,
while also leveraging from existing multi-directorate research.
The eight  FLTCs created are focused to address all threat areas
addressed in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Of the eight
shown on the graphic, there are four with specific application to the
Information Directorate, identified on the following slides or link.

Focused Long Term Challenges

1.  Anticipatory Command, Control & Intelligence (C2I)

2.  Unprecedented Proactive Surveillance & Reconnaissance (S&R)

3.  Dominant Difficult Surface Target Engagement/Defeat

4.  Persistent & Responsive Precision Engagement

5.  Assured Operations in High Threat Environments

6.  Dominant Offensive Cyber Engagement

7.  On-demand Theater Force Projection, Anywhere

8.  Affordable Mission Generation & Sustainment


#1 - Anticipatory C2I

#5 - Assured Operations in High Threat Environments

#6 - Dominant Offensive Cyber Engagement

#7 - On-Demand Theater Force Projection

FLTC #1 Anticipatory Command, Control & Intelligence (C2I)

Anticipate Enemy Actions and Respond with Synchronized Management of Battlespace Effects

Find Threatening Systems and Objects

Predict Adversary Behaviors

Perform Near-Real Time Decision Management

Assure Fully Effective C2 Operators

Conduct On-Demand Collaboration Across Operator and Sensor Systems

FLTC #5  Assured Operations in High Threat Environments

Achieve Mission Objectives With Impunity Against Full Spectrum Threats, from Anti-Access IADS to Cyber

Anticipate and Avoid Threats Through Stealth and Deception

Detect and Defeat Threats Through Active Defenses

Survive the Attack Through Passive and Adaptive Protection

Recover from Threat Effects

FLTC #6  Dominant Offensive
Cyber Engagement

Conduct full spectrum offensive cyber/info ops against military, leadership, and infrastructure

Access Adversary’s Cyber/Info Systems Anywhere, Anytime

Operate with Stealth and Persistence in Cyber

Generate Robust Cyber Intelligence (CYBINT)

Deliver Integrated D5 Information Operations Effects

Deliver Counter Electronics Effects

FLTC #7  On-Demand Force Projection, Anywhere

Timely Deployment of Flexible Ground, Information  & Space Capabilities for the Commander

Rapidly Constitute Multi-Mission, Affordable Satellites
Rapidly Deploy Multi-Mission, Affordable Space Payloads

Generate On-Demand, Reusable Affordable Space Access

Rapidly Checkout Spacecraft and Autonomous Operations

Globally Project Ground Forces and Material Anywhere in All Weather

Globally Move, Manage, And Process Information In Real-time

Offline Dig

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Good thing we got those weapons to defeat guys in caves with 20 year old AK's.

All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline lordssyndicate

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That's right  Sane.

Many of them are able to be affected wirelessly ... If u you are plugged into the grid, any one using a cell phone or wireless device , and all automobiles that incorporate onstar (ALL toyotas, Fords, GMs, Hondas, and any one who uses on star or the alternative system) even iof you don't pay for the feature it is there you just can't access it...

Normal Automobiles that include a computer can be controlled when within range of some other electronic source such as power lines ...
This means all cars made after 1992

The only way around this is to first get off the grid then impliment frequency filters to filter specific frequencies ... Then an NSA class firewall if you put anything on the internet... once again all of this MUST BE 100% OF THE GRID.
 Not even physically connected.. or the master breaker to the power lines must be in the off position...

This is no joke and they are no longer merely running exploits they are actively attacking us all now as we speak and will escalate the level of attack as needed as per  their own c documents posted courtesy Anti Illuminati.
"Biotechnology it's not so bad. It's just like all technologies it's in the wrong HANDS!"- Sepultura


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So what we have here is yet another form of 'legal' terrorism acts performed by none other than the US military, as usual. A state that perfoms acts of terrorism is a terrorist state. Using the public internet to wage cyber wars! How disgusting!!!!!!!!!! Why don't they go get their own darn internet and leave us the hell alone?

Offline L2Design

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Im changing my computer LOL

Make it so!

Offline 8bitagent

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Thank GOODNESS for Indira Singh going on radio 4 years ago exposing the whole PTECH/Al Qaeda/Defense Dept/MAK/Logan Furniture octopus. Total PROMIS 2.0 backdoor, so these rich Saudi NWO corporate heads in bed with the globalists can cripple infrastructure and scramble NORAD so their little wind up toy hijackers can go unimpeded in controlled planes.

And isnt it funny, how the globalist's shining jewel Ali Mohamed's(who is a free man like Melvin Lattimore)
wife has long worked deep in Silicon Valley?

Good to see the PTECH/Mitre angle really fleshed out.
"We should not be here. I'm scared, this is creepy. You know what I mean? This could go very deep, Carol. This could be like, you know, like with the Warren commission, or something. I don't like it."-Woody Allen, Manhattan Murder Mystery(1993)

Offline Dig

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Hey look at the new definition of TRON...DUH!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
And this is from the late 1990's


What TRON Stands for

TRON is an acronym that stands for "The Real-time Operating system Nucleus," an expression that's a little difficult to understand unless you have a background in computer science, so let's break this acronym down into three pieces and explain it so that anyone can understand it.

First, there is the problem of what the term "real time" means. To the lay person, this is an absurd expression, because all time is real time, isn't it? Is there such a thing as unreal time? Well, in a way there is, although it is more properly referred to as "system time," that is, the amount of time it takes the computer system to process a task. When the amount of system time it takes a computer system to process a task is short enough to allow the computer system to respond in time to an event in the real world, then that computer system is said to be a "real-time system." In other words, it's a system that is capable of processing in "real-world time." (Those who would like detailed information on real-time systems should refer to the following FAQ.)

In order to better understand this, consider today's personal computer systems. They don't necessarily process tasks in time to meet your needs, which is why the little wrist watch icon or hourglass icon keeps appearing on the screen of your computer for longer and longer periods of time--and that's in spite of the fact that microprocessors have gotten faster and main memories have grown considerably in size. So what's the reason for that? Well, for starters, the operating systems we use today are gargantuan in size compared to those of the early personal computers. Another reason is that the application software we use today has become bloated due to the addition of ever more features. And finally there is the fact that the latest generations of personal computers have been designed to process multiple tasks simultaneously. Thus it's actually possible to "overtask" one of today's personal computers, which can result in the entire system locking for 10 or 15 minutes. That can hardly be described as "real-time performance."

Second, there is the term "operating system," which most people have heard of, but may not be sure of either its meaning or importance. In a computer system, software is built hierarchically, that is to say, layer upon layer. At the bottom of this hierarchy is the operating system, which is a group of small programs that provide the core functionalities for the higher layers. Thus the better the bottom layers are designed the easier it is to provide advanced functions to the higher layers. Moreover, if the bottom layers are designed from the start for real-time processing, then the upper layers can also be designed to effect processing in real time.

The biggest problem with today's personal computer operating systems is that the bottom layers weren't designed for running multiple tasks, and they weren't designed for processing in real time. The results of this are instability that leads to frequent system crashes and slow processing. But this state of affairs shouldn't really be surprising, since the bottom layers of today's personal computer operating systems were designed to run on tiny hardware platforms and were rushed to completion as a result of market forces. (Yes, market forces produce both good and bad results!)

Now the companies that developed the original personal computer operating systems are trying to update them so that they are more stable and offer high-performance multitasking, but that's easier said than done. In the case of Apple Computer Inc., for example, the development to upgrade the company's Macintosh operating system was so problem plagued that Apple purchased NeXT Software Inc. to gain access NeXT''s NEXTSTEP operating system, which it plans to use as the foundation for its new flagship operating system--a merger of Macintosh and NEXTSTEP--to be marketed under the name "Rhapsody" in 1998. NEXTSTEP is a modern operating system based on a "microkernel," the Mach microkernel developed at Carnegie-Mellon University to be exact, which brings us to the third term in the TRON acronym, "nucleus." (Those who would like to view a list of links to operating system Web pages should click here.)

A "kernel," which is also referred to as an "executive" or a "nucleus," provides the core functionality that the higher-level parts of a modern operating system are built upon and rely upon to function properly. A modern kernel handles such critical functions as the timing and switching of tasks (the faster the switching, the better the real-time performance), the allocation and management of memory (traditional personal computer operating systems have been weak at this, which is why they frequently crash), and communication among tasks (for example, transferring the output of one task to another task for input).

Well then, what makes TRON so special if there are already other kernels out there? The answer is two things.

First, TRON is not a collection of computer code that a systems engineer compiles and runs on a particular processor.

Rather, it is a set of "interfaces and design guidelines" (in other words, a set of software design specifications) for creating the computer code that will become the kernel. Although these interfaces and design guidelines are copyrighted by the TRON Association, they are available for use by software developers anywhere in the world without charge. Thus the computer architecture based on TRON, the TRON Architecture, is an "open architecture" that welcomes cloning and interoperability.

Second, unlike other modern kernels developed to date, TRON was proposed to serve as a common software core for all the various types of computer systems used throughout human society and human living spaces. Needless to say, since a single real-time kernel obviously could not run across everything from an 8-bit single-chip microcontroller to a mainframe computer central processing unit, there are many versions of this software core that have been defined to meet the needs of the various systems. When taken together, these various versions of TRON, which are all compatible with each other, form the basis for the world's first "total computer architecture." Moreover, since TRON has been designed through a top-down approach with the needs of high-speed networking in mind, TRON also forms the basis of a highly efficient "real-time" network architecture [Fig. 1].

The TRON Architecture is divided into four main subarchitectures. These are:

Industrial TRON (ITRON)
ITRON is a specification for designing real-time kernels that control home appliances, office automation equipment, factory machinery, etc.; any ITRON-based system is referred to as an "intelligent object"

Business TRON (BTRON)
BTRON is a specification for designing real-time multitasking operating systems for personal computers, workstations, PDAs, etc.; BTRON-based systems serve as the main human-machine interface (HMI ) in networks based on the TRON Architecture

Central and Communications TRON (CTRON)
CTRON is a specification for designing real-time operating systems for mainframe computers, digital switching equipment, etc.; CTRON-based systems serve as the hubs or axes through which communication and data transfer take place in networks based on the TRON Architecture

MTRON is an architecture to link together ITRON, BTRON, and CTRON-based systems.

Since the first three of these subarchitectures are used across a wide range of computer systems, there are multiple specifications with each subarchitecture. For example, in the case of ITRON, there are specifications for 8-bit, 16-bit, and 32-bit MPUs.

In addition to the above four main subarchitectures, there is also an open microprocessor architecture called TRON VLSI CPU architecture for designing 32-, 48-, and 64-bit MPUs. MPUs based on this architecture have functions for supporting real-time multitask processing in TRON-based networks.

The TRON Symbol in red on the left is based on the Chinese character behind it, which is pronounced 'to' in Japanese and means a '[Chinese] peck measure' or 'dipper', in other words a large standard vessel for measuring volume or capacity. Since the TRON Project is a large standardization movement that intends to increase the volume of interactions between computers, TRON Project Leader Ken Sakamura felt it would be appropriate to use this Chinese character as the basis for the TRON Project Symbol. The TRON Seal on the right, which Prof. Sakamura had made in China during one of his many trips there to evangelize the TRON Project, is based on the ancient Chinese seal characters for 'tou' and 'lun', 'to' and 'ron' in Japanese, which is how someone from China would pronounce TRON in Chinese. Seals of this type have been used for thousands of years in East Asia for purposes of authentication.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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More on the mysterious issues concerning cyber security recently:


GOP IT guru’s sisters question events surrounding his death
By Stephen C. Webster Published: April 30, 2009

The sisters of Michael Connell, a GOP IT consultant and former associate of Karl Rove who died in a plane crash last December, are now questioning the circumstances surrounding his death.

“Shannon Connell of Madison says her brother Michael rarely talked about work,” a local Wisconsin paper reported Thursday. “She knew he ran an Ohio company called New Media Communications that set up websites for Republicans including former President George H.W. Bush and Florida Gov. Jeb Bush. But it wasn’t until after he died last December, when the small plane he was piloting crashed, that she learned via the Internet of his tie to a voter fraud case and to allegations that presidential adviser Karl Rove had made threats against him.

“‘At first, it was really hard for me to believe Mike was dead because somebody wanted him dead,” the paper quoted Shannon as saying. “But as time goes on, it’s hard for me not to believe there was something deliberate about it.”

“A native of Illinois, Shannon moved to Madison in 2002,” the paper adds, “the same year as her sister, Mary Jo Walker. Walker, a former Dane County Humane Society employee, has similar concerns about their brother’s death: ‘It doesn’t seem right to me at all.’”

Although there has been speculation in the media about the possibility of sabotage in Connell’s death, Raw Story reported in January that authorities do not suspect foul play. The official investigation by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) has not yet determined the cause of the crash; their final report is required to be produced within a year.

Michael Connell was served with a subpoena in Ohio on Sept. 22 in a case alleging that vote-tampering during the 2004 presidential election resulted in civil rights violations. Connell, president of GovTech Solutions and New Media Communications, is a website designer and IT professional who created a website for Ohio’s secretary of state that presented the results of the 2004 election in real time as they were tabulated.

At the time, Ohio’s Secretary of State, Kenneth J. Blackwell, was also chairman of Bush-Cheney’s 2004 reelection effort in Ohio.

The 45-year-old Republican operative was killed when his single-passenger plane crashed into a home in a suburb of Akron, Ohio.

Connell’s ten year-old, seven-passenger, single engine Piper Saratoga II crashed into an empty house on Charolais Street in Lake Township, Ohio. The plane’s right wing clipped a flagpole in the front yard before it broke up, set fire to the garage, and tumbled some 50–60 feet along the ground toward the back yard of a neighboring home.

Connell was thrown from the burning plane and killed instantaneously by massive blunt force trauma, according to the Stark County coroner’s report. Although the body was not burned, fingerprints were required to confirm identity, according to Captain Lorin Geisner of the Greentown Fire Department.


They were killing off the bio experts for the past 10 years, now they are executing the cyber experts.  Who is doing it?




There are your cyber security execution corporations. They have been executing dissenters for over 40 years.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline dissident99

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Holy Freaking Bump for later ..
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Offline mr anderson

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Expect another attack on the forum... Part 3 coming soon!  :D ;)

Great thread, AI... So many great threads to read!
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Offline Freeski

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Maybe Y2K was a global test, not intended to shut anything down, but to measure access and control of devices from the grid.
"He who passively accepts evil is as much involved in it as he who helps to perpetrate it. He who accepts evil without protesting against it is really cooperating with it." Martin Luther King, Jr.

Offline Dig

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Press Release 09-088
Shift in Simulation Superiority
April 30, 2009

New report highlights strengths and weaknesses in U.S. high-end computer simulations relative to international counterparts

Above is a three-dimensional view of a model protocell approximately 100 nanometers in diameter.

Science and engineering are advancing rapidly in part due to ever more powerful computer simulations, yet the most advanced supercomputers require programming skills that all too few U.S. researchers possess. At the same time, affordable computers and committed national programs outside the U.S. are eroding American competitiveness in number of simulation-driven fields.

These are some of the key findings in the International Assessment of Research and Development in Simulation-Based Engineering and Science, released on Apr. 22, 2009, by the World Technology Evaluation Center (WTEC).

"The startling news was how quickly our assumptions have to change," said Phillip Westmoreland, program director for combustion, fire and plasma systems at the National Science Foundation (NSF) and one of the sponsors of the report. "Because computer chip speeds aren't increasing, hundreds and thousands of chips are being ganged together, each one with many processors. New ways of programming are necessary."

Like other WTEC studies, this study was led by a team of leading researchers from a range of simulation science and engineering disciplines and involved site visits to research facilities around the world.

The nearly 400-page, multi-agency report highlights several areas in which the U.S. still maintains a competitive edge, including the development of novel algorithms, but also highlights endeavors that are increasingly driven by efforts in Europe or Asia, such as the creation and simulation of new materials from first principles.

"Some of the new high-powered computers are as common as gaming computers, so key breakthroughs and leadership could come from anywhere in the world," added Westmoreland. "Last week's research-directions workshop brought together engineers and scientists from around the country, developing ideas that would keep the U.S. at the vanguard as we face these changes."

Sharon Glotzer of the University of Michigan chaired the panel of experts that executed the studies of the Asian, European and U.S. simulation research activities. Peter Cummings of both Vanderbilt University and Oak Ridge National Laboratory co-authored the report with Glotzer and seven other panelists, and the two co-chaired the Apr. 22-23, 2009, workshop with Glotzer that provided agencies initial guidance on strategic directions.

"Progress in simulation-based engineering and science holds great promise for the pervasive advancement of knowledge and understanding through discovery," said Clark Cooper, program director for materials and surface engineering at NSF and also a sponsor of the report. "We expect future developments to continue to enhance prediction and decision making in the presence of uncertainty."

The WTEC study was funded by the National Science Foundation, Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, National Institutes of Health, National Institute of Standards and Technology and the Department of Energy

For more information, read the full report and the University of Michigan press release.


Media Contacts
Joshua A. Chamot, NSF (703) 292-7730

Program Contacts
Clark Cooper, NSF (703) 292-7899
Phillip R Westmoreland, NSF (703) 292-8695

Principal Investigators
Sharon Glotzer, University of Michigan (734) 615-6296

The National Science Foundation (NSF) is an independent federal agency that supports fundamental research and education across all fields of science and engineering. In fiscal year (FY) 2009, its budget is $9.5 billion, which includes $3.0 billion provided through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. NSF funds reach all 50 states through grants to over 1,900 universities and institutions. Each year, NSF receives about 44,400 competitive requests for funding, and makes over 11,500 new funding awards. NSF also awards over $400 million in professional and service contracts yearly.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline lordssyndicate

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SO, they are actively bragging not only can they simulate things but they can simulate everything even down to proto cells. Not only can we do that but we can then engineer even more devestating capabilities using these system .

With the super computing power Availible via the systems they have listed on top500.orgthey can even do much of this in real time or even acclerated time lins within the simulation...

Man that's evil... good addition sane.
"Biotechnology it's not so bad. It's just like all technologies it's in the wrong HANDS!"- Sepultura

Offline RemixNinja

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Air Force Cyberspace Command Stuff and The General Lord Who Runs It...
« Reply #17 on: May 01, 2009, 05:11:11 pm »
I did a search and couldn't see if someone had already posted this information relating to the Air Force Cyberspace Command.

Here is the link to the General's biography (note:  "Major General Lord", a very movie-like character name) who runs the provisional Air Force Command.

Also, here's the agenda for an upcoming cyberspace symposium in Louisiana on June 16-18.


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Everytime A_I posts anything about puters I am reminded how little I know about computers programming and all.  Sane too.  But I do understand warfare and psychotics.  How the hell am I supposed to protect myself on computer web and all that?  I know I must but how? Fome the tone you guys use, I beleive there IS a way to protect my computer from the oncoming onslaught.  Heck I can't even get my puter to copy the TOD or Endgame! 

Offline lordssyndicate

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In regards to TRON. 

Umnnnnnnnnn f**k.

So, umnnn Sane , let me get this straight not only have they built every OS from the ground up to support PROMIS but they have included TRON. Which allows them to merely take control of your box using Chinese characters  for authentication via a head unit system.

WOW. So, they could not only use your box as a bug / weapon but even integrate it's compute power  into their GiG  for use in distributed computing without the computer's owner ever knowing they are doing it !

FRACK SETI@HOME this shit is GiG@HOME and  no one can turn it off....

WOW f**k

"Biotechnology it's not so bad. It's just like all technologies it's in the wrong HANDS!"- Sepultura


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Added: February 8, 2006 Modified: Apr 11, 2008 9:00 amTrack Changes

The purpose of this modification is to republish the original announcement, incorporating all previous modifications, pursuant to FAR 35.016(c). This republishing also includes the following change: Increases the total funding for the BAA. No other changes have been made.

NAICS CODE: 541712

FEDERAL AGENCY NAME: Department of the Air Force, Air Force Materiel Command, AFRL - Rome Research Site, AFRL/Information Directorate, 26 Electronic Parkway, Rome, NY, 13441-4514

TITLE: Information Warfare: Offensive and Defensive Counterinformation

ANNOUNCEMENT TYPE: Initial announcement.


CFDA Number: 12.800

DATES: It is recommended white papers be received by the following dates to maximize the possibility of award: FY 06 by 10 Mar 06; FY 07 by 1 May 06; FY 08 by 1 May 07 and, FY 09 by 1 May 08. White papers will be accepted until 2:00 p.m. Eastern time on 31 December 2009, but it is less likely that funding will be available in each respective fiscal year after the dates cited. FORMAL PROPOSALS ARE NOT BEING REQUESTED AT THIS TIME. See Section IV of this announcement for further details.


INFORMATION WARFARE: AFRL/IF is soliciting white papers to identify and develop technologies to enable a distributed information infrastructure that provides all the mechanisms and services required to allow the warfighters to craft their C4I information environments, including ability to establish distributed virtual staffs, to share a common consistent perception of the battlespace, and construct distributed task teams among sensors, shooters, movers, and command posts. These technologies will be applied across the full spectrum of cyber operations, in support of Air Force mission requirements.

Specific technologies include, but are not limited to: network protocols, information adaptation, network management, routing technologies, adaptive interfaces, distributed information environments, multimedia services, adaptive security services, global resource management, architectures, computer and network risk assessment/management, vulnerability assessment, assurance techniques, detection of intrusions and misuse, network security, wireless information assurance, assessment of information damage, cyber forensics, recovery of information systems and computer networks to operational levels, and a full spectrum of active response and computer network attack techniques.

Information superiority is an integral part of air and space superiority, an Air Force doctrine. This gives the commander freedom from attack, the freedom to maneuver and the freedom to attack. Information superiority is that degree of information advantage of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive opposition. Information operations are not focused exclusively on information superiority and information operations alone is not sufficient to achieve information superiority. AFRL/IF has developed a responsive R&D technology program to help the US achieve information superiority. The technology research in this BAA will be focused in the following areas of information operations: influence operations, network warfare operations and electronic warfare operations.

Influence Operations: Focused on affecting the perceptions and behaviors of leaders, groups, or entire populations. Influence operations employ capabilities to affect behaviors, protect operations, communicate commander's intent and project accurate information to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain. These effects should result in differing objectives. The military capabilities of influence operations are psychological operations, military deception, operations security, counterintelligence operations, counterpropoganda operations and public affairs operations.

Network Warfare Operations: The integrated planning, employment, and assessment of military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the interconnected analog and digital network portion of the battle space. Network warfare operations are conducted in the information domain through the combination of hardware, software, data and human interaction. The operational activities of network warfare operations are network attack, network defense and network warfare support.

Electronic Warfare Operations: The integrated planning, employment, and assessment of military capabilities to achieve desired effects across the electromagnetic domain in support operational objectives.

The objective of this BAA is to address highly innovative R&D areas in information operations. Proposed work should address the innovative and strategic thought of the 21st century adversary, and develop new concepts to counter with innovative information-based capabilities. Further, proposed work should address new concepts for continuously analyzing the information battle space to identify US vulnerabilities and adversary weaknesses, and develop new defensive and offensive strategies and capabilities accordingly.

There are critical technical areas of focus under this BAA which are high leverage areas to be worked in order to address the most difficult Air Force requirements, provide the Air Force with the greatest technology push possible, and surface opportunities for contributing to important national security issues such as defending information systems and countering cyber terrorism.

Network Attack: Employment of network-based capabilities to destroy, disrupt, degrade, deny, delay, corrupt or usurp information resident in or transiting through networks. A primary effect is to influence the adversary commander's decisions.

Network Defense: Employment of network-based capabilities to defend friendly information resident in or transiting through networks against adversary efforts to destroy, disrupt, degrade, deny, delay, corrupt or usurp it. Actions include analyzing network activity to determine the appropriate course of action to protect, detect, and react to internal and external threats to Air Force networks.

Network Warfare Support: The collection and production of network related data for immediate decisions involving network warfare operations. Specifically, network warfare support provides profiling, event analysis, open source review, as well as pattern analysis in support of network defense and countermeasure development.
March 24, 2006
Air Force Seeks to Create Hybrid Infowar/Public Relations Technologies

The U.S. military’s ability to repel electronic attacks while preserving its “freedom” to conduct such attacks are integral to achieving “information superiority” over the rest of the world, the Air Force Research Lab (AFRL) says. However, these capabilities alone cannot guarantee such superiority, according to AFRL. Consequently, it has launched an R&D program whose goal is to combine cyberattack operations with public relations and military deception campaigns -- the outcome which would give decision makers the ability to control the “battlespace” and simultaneously mold “the perceptions and behaviors of leaders, groups, or entire populations.”

The “Information Warfare: Offensive and Defensive Counterinformation” program seeks to develop new and advanced technologies to provide war fighters with “all the mechanisms and services required” to achieve such control.

“This gives the commander freedom from attack, the freedom to maneuver and the freedom to attack,” the document, known as a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA 06-12-IFKA), says. “Information superiority is that degree of information advantage of one force over another that permits the conduct of operations at a given time and place without prohibitive opposition.”

The initiative calls for the submission of innovative concept papers that potentially “provide the Air Force with the greatest technology push possible,” the BAA says. It is focusing on three infowar subject areas: network warfare operations, electronic warfare operations, and “influence operations.”

Network warfare involves the destruction or disruption of “enemy” communications and data networks, whereas electronic warfare focuses on controlling the “electromagnetic domain” of various wireless systems.

Influence operations, on the other hand, emphasize a military commander’s ability to broadly disseminate information “to achieve desired effects across the cognitive domain.”

These capabilities are employed in the form of “psychological operations, military deception, operations security, counterintelligence operations, counterpropaganda operations and public affairs operations,” according to the BAA.

Though participation initially was limited to U.S. firms and persons, earlier this month the Air Force authorized “foreign allied participation” at the prime contractor level. It specifically designated those foreign allies as Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and United Kingdom.

Approximately $40 million has been tentatively approved to launch the project. AFRL says it anticipates funding the endeavor at the rate of about $10 million annually between fiscal years 2006-2009. It expects to award individual contracts, grants, and cooperative agreements not to exceed 24 months, with dollar amounts ranging from $100,000-$1 million per year.

“Information superiority is an integral part of air and space superiority, an Air Force doctrine,” the agency says.

March 24, 2006

Offline lordssyndicate

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Yet another damning document.

This one showing solicitations to their authorized general contractor pool to upgrade their attack capabilities beyond their current capacity ...

Man, as if they couldn't already murder millions using the existing capabilities they need to upgrade these systems in order to more effectively kill even more millions ...
"Biotechnology it's not so bad. It's just like all technologies it's in the wrong HANDS!"- Sepultura


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“Information superiority is an integral part of air and space superiority, an Air Force doctrine,” the agency says.

BS!  It is the same ole same ole, CONTROL, BABY CONTROL!!!!

Offline agentbluescreen

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----Whose goal is to combine cyberattack operations with public relations and military deception campaigns -- the outcome which would give decision makers the ability to control the “battlespace” and simultaneously mold “the perceptions and behaviors of leaders, groups, or entire populations.

Welcome to the machine!

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OH shit..................................................


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Offline Effie Trinket

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This is the kind of absolute pychopathy, treason that you will see massively expanded.  Here's a blast from the past (14 years ago) from one of the current traitorourous shitbags in Trumps administration:

Senator takes aim at illegal downloads

WASHINGTON (AP) — Illegally download copyright music from the Internet once, or even twice, and you get a warning. Do it a third time, and your computer gets destroyed.
That's the suggestion made by the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee at a Tuesday hearing on copyright abuse, reflecting a growing frustration in Congress over failure of the technology and entertainment industries to protect copyrights in a digital age.

The surprise statement by Sen. Orrin Hatch, R-Utah, that he favors developing technology to remotely destroy computers used for illegal downloads represents a dramatic escalation in the increasingly contentious rhetoric over pirated music.

During a discussion of methods to frustrate computer users who illegally exchange music and movie files over the Internet, Hatch asked technology executives about ways to damage computers involved in such file trading. Legal experts have said any such attack would violate federal anti-hacking laws.

"No one is interested in destroying anyone's computer," replied Randy Saaf of MediaDefender, a secretive Los Angeles company that builds technology to deliberately download pirated material very slowly so other users can't.

"I'm interested," Hatch interrupted. He said damaging someone's computer "may be the only way you can teach somebody about copyrights."

The senator, a composer who earned $18,000 last year in song-writing royalties, acknowledged Congress would have to enact an exemption for copyright owners from liability for damaging computers. He endorsed technology that would twice warn a computer user about illegal online behavior, "then destroy their computer."

"If we can find some way to do this without destroying their machines, we'd be interested in hearing about that," Hatch said. "If that's the only way, then I'm all for destroying their machines. If you have a few hundred thousand of those, I think people would realize" the seriousness of their actions.

"There's no excuse for anyone violating copyright laws," Hatch said.

Some legal experts suggested Hatch's provocative remarks were more likely intended to compel technology and music executives to work faster toward ways to protect copyrights online than to signal forthcoming legislation.

"It's just the frustration of those who are looking at enforcing laws that are proving very hard to enforce," said Orin Kerr, a George Washington University law professor and former Justice Department cybercrimes prosecutor.

Sen. Patrick Leahy of Vermont, the committee's senior Democrat, later said the problem is serious but called Hatch's suggestion too drastic.

"The rights of copyright holders need to be protected, but some Draconian remedies that have been suggested would create more problems than they would solve," Leahy said in a statement. "We need to work together to find the right answers, and this is not one of them."

Rep. Rick Boucher, D-Va., urged Hatch to reconsider. Because Hatch is Judiciary chairman, "we all take those views very seriously," he said. But Kerr said Congress was unlikely to approve any bill to enable such remote computer destruction by copyright owners "because innocent users might be wrongly targeted."

A spokesman for the Recording Industry Association of America, Jonathan Lamy, said Hatch was "apparently making a metaphorical point that if peer-to-peer networks don't take reasonable steps to prevent massive copyright infringement on the systems they create, Congress may be forced to consider stronger measures." The RIAA represents the major music labels.

Computer-security experts were in the main critical of Hatch's remarks. In a blog entry published on, industry observer Dana Blankenhorn commented, "What if Orrin Hatch's dream (previously known, Republicans should shout, as Democrat Howard Berman's dream) were possible? What if it were possible to ... destroy someone's computer remotely, through the Internet?

"The answer is hackers would get the technology very, very quickly. Terrorists would get the technology very, very quickly. And Orrin Hatch would be unable to compute anymore. Neither, for that matter, would I. Neither would you. That code would spread, not like a virus, but like spam, and destroy the Internet forever."

The entertainment industry has gradually escalated its fight against Internet file-traders, targeting the most egregious pirates with civil lawsuits. The RIAA recently won a federal court decision making it significantly easier to identify and track consumers — even those hiding behind aliases — using popular Internet file-sharing software.