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***THE MAIN BOARDS - Welcome to the Prison Planet Educational Forum and Library*** => General Discussion for the Prison Planet Educational Forum and Library => Topic started by: Dig on September 07, 2011, 11:23:38 pm

Title: Gingrich: Over 200,000 Americans may die in the next false flag operation
Post by: Dig on September 07, 2011, 11:23:38 pm
This was live in front of millions of viewers for the GOP debate on MSNBC....

Newt Gingrich actually said that the next false flag terror attack will kill hundreds of thousands of Americans.

It was so shocking no one could even understand it and it was ignored, but we know exactly what he means. It was the same warning that Gary Hart made which caused AJ to get on the air before 9/11. The timing of the movie contagion is very suspect as well as CSIS white papers. MITRE, SAIC, and Booz Allen are also primary suspects for 9/11 and other false flags so they likely will be leading the nexct false flag that Newt Gingrich is exposing.
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 100,000 Americans will die in the next false flag operation
Post by: swain on September 07, 2011, 11:30:16 pm
Did he say "could" or "will"?
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 100,000 Americans will die in the next false flag operation
Post by: Dig on September 07, 2011, 11:36:23 pm
Did he say "could" or "will"?

What is the difference?
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 100,000 Americans will die in the next false flag operation
Post by: adissenter2 on September 07, 2011, 11:44:14 pm
got the quote from the transcript?

Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 100,000 Americans will die in the next false flag operation
Post by: swain on September 07, 2011, 11:54:35 pm
GINGRICH: Yeah, I just want to go back, frankly, to the homeland security question, because it's important for us to confront this. I helped develop the model for homeland security. It hasn't been executed well.

The fact is, we have enemies who want to use weapons against us that will lead to disasters on an enormous scale. And the original goal was to have a Homeland Security Department that could help us withstand up to three nuclear events in one morning.

And we need to understand, there are people out there who want to kill us. And if they have an ability to sneak in weapons of mass destruction, they're going to use them. We need to overhaul and reform the department, but we need some capacity to respond to massive events that could kill hundreds of thousands of Americans in one morning.

WILLIAMS: Congressman Paul, this same line. You want to demolish the TSA. What would exist in its place?
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 100,000 Americans will die in the next false flag operation
Post by: Dig on September 07, 2011, 11:54:38 pm
got the quote from the transcript?

i watched it live from the debate. are there any youtubes of the debate yet? It was about 45 minutes into it. He was justifying why he helped create DHS immediately after 9/11.
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 100,000 Americans will die in the next false flag operation
Post by: Dig on September 08, 2011, 12:10:45 am
GINGRICH: Yeah, I just want to go back, frankly, to the homeland security question, because it's important for us to confront this. I helped develop the model for homeland security. It hasn't been executed well.

The fact is, we have enemies who want to use weapons against us that will lead to disasters on an enormous scale. And the original goal was to have a Homeland Security Department that could help us withstand up to three nuclear events in one morning.

And we need to understand, there are people out there who want to kill us. And if they have an ability to sneak in weapons of mass destruction, they're going to use them. We need to overhaul and reform the department, but we need some capacity to respond to massive events that could kill hundreds of thousands of Americans in one morning.

Thanks for the transcript!

Ok, something I forgot, Newt Gingrich helped set up Homeland Security right after 9/11, but Homeland Security was developed before 9/11 by a grant from the RAND Corporation. Also, the fact that he says it was built to respond to 3 nuke attacks in one morning is the craziest batshit insanity I have ever heard in my life. The implications of that statement are mind boggling. Three nuclear attacks in one morning? A Nixon/Johnson 3AM call x 3?!?!?!?!

There needs to be immediate grand jury investigations into Newt Gingrich, RAND Corporation, MITRE, and DHS needs to be defunded ASAP!

Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 100,000 Americans will die in the next false flag operation
Post by: Dig on September 08, 2011, 12:19:29 am
The following speech is from February 2000, 18 months before 9/11 terror attacks. The entire agenda is laid out. Who is John C. Gannon? HE WAS A DIRECTO OF THE RAND FUNDED 'ANSER INSTITUTE OF HOMELAND SECURITY BEFORE 9/11!!!!

The CIA in the New World Order:
Intelligence Challenges Through 2015
Remarks by John C. Gannon

Chairman, National Intelligence Council
to the
Smithsonian Associates’
"Campus on the Mall"
1 February 2000

Thank you for the warm introduction. I’m delighted to represent our Director, George Tenet, at the Smithsonian Associates’ "Campus on the Mall." This is an exceptional public education program that takes on today’s challenging issues in a creative and stimulating manner that is in keeping with benefactor James Smithson’s well-known commitment to what he called the "increase and diffusion of knowledge." I look forward after my remarks to your comments and questions, which, for me, is the "value added" of having to listen to myself talk.

When my former boss, Bob Gates, was here in 1992, he entitled his address, "The End of the Cold War: Where Do We Go From Here?" I actually had thought of calling mine, "Ten Years After the Cold War: Where Do We Go From Here?" Now, the typical Washington cynic would say that this just proves intelligence bureaucrats are notoriously slow in responding to change.



Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 100,000 Americans will die in the next false flag operation
Post by: Dig on September 08, 2011, 12:30:12 am
John C. Gannon

Dr. John C. Gannon[1] is on the Board of Advisors at the ANSER Institute for Homeland Security.

Gannon is "Vice-Chairman of Intellibridge Corporation, a Washington firm that provides web-based analysis to corporate and government clients. Previously he served as Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (1997-2001) after serving for two years (1995-1997) as the Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency. In June 1998, Mr. Gannon was also appointed the Assistant Director of Intelligence for Analysis and Production.

"From 1992 until 1996, Mr. Gannon was the Director of the Office of European Analysis in the Directorate of Intelligence (DI). Before that, he held many assignments in the DI, including various management positions in the Office of European Analysis and tours on the staff of the President's Daily Brief, in the Office of Economic Research, and as a Latin America analyst.

"Mr. Gannon served as a Naval Officer in Southeast Asia and later, while in the Naval Reserves, was an instructor of navigation at the Navy Officer Candidate School in Newport, Rhode Island. He has been active in civic affairs in Falls Church, Virginia, serving on the City Council and Planning Commission (as Vice Chairman and Chairman). Early in his career, Mr. Gannon taught social studies and science in a secondary school in Jamaica as a member of the Jesuit Volunteer Corps. He also taught high school in Saint Louis.

"Mr. Gannon earned a Ph.D. and an M.A. in history from Washington University in Saint Louis and a B.A. in psychology from Holy Cross College in 1966. His graduate studies focused on Latin America, and his doctoral dissertation documented the evolution of political parties in Jamaica. He speaks Spanish."

ANSER Institute for Homeland Security

The ANSER Institute for Homeland Security is the Department of Homeland Security's first "government think tank," or Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC), focused on providing independent analysis on homeland security concerns. [1] The Institute operates within Analytic Sytems Inc. (also known as the ANSER Institute).

Although the DHS Science and Technology Directorate announced in 2004 that they "selected [ANSER] to operate the Homeland Security Institute . . . [f]ollowing a full and open competition procurement process conducted by Science and Technology,"[1] the Institute was "initiated and funded by ANSER's Board of Trustees in October 1999" and "formally established in April 2001."[2].

The Institute
Governance and Enabling Legislation

According to the Institute's website, it "is a not-for-profit center that operates under an indefinite-delivery, indefinite-quantity contract vehicle between DHS and Analytic Services Inc."[3] The Under Secretary for the DHS Science and Technology Directorate was authorized to fund FFRDCs like the Institute under The Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Section 305 of PL 107-296, as codified in 6 U.S.C. 185), and ANSER operates the Institute as an FFRDC for DHS under contract HSHQDC-09-D-00003.[4]


The Institute for Homeland Security is an off-shoot of the ANSER Institute, which was established by the RAND Corporation in 1958.[1] As Margie Burns wrote June 29, 2002, in Online Journal: "Although funded and initiated in October 1999, the institute was formally established only in April 2001, following a month of high-tech and heavy-hitter-security-type buzz assisted by its ties to the military and to the intelligence community. On March 13-15, 2001, the Homeland Security (HLS) Mini-Symposium was held by the Military Operations Research Society (Alexandria, VA), at the Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Lab in Laurel, MD.

"Also on March 13, [2001] by coincidence, George Walker Bush released his first National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD) (dated February 13, 2001), which expanded the National Security Council and added 11 new coordinating committees." [2] The NSPD directed the Deputy National Security Adviser -- Bush appointee Stephen J. Hadley, formerly with the National Institute for Public Policy and a former member of ANSER's Board of Trustees -- to attend NSC meetings, and makeing him Executive Secretary of the NSC. "Interestingly -- given today's emphasis on 'coordinating' and 'information-sharing' -- the directive also stated, 'The existing system of Interagency Working Groups is abolished.'" ibid. Homeland Security? Burns continued: "Perhaps as part of the same push last March, a now-gone web page from the Institute for Homeland Security answers a question posed on March 30, 2002, by Mark Bower of the Air National Guard: why homeland?" ibid.

The Institute's answer conceded that the catch phrase homeland defense had only "recently entered the lexicon of public discourse," although "the concept of 'defending the homeland' is an idea dating back through the better part of human history. To the best of knowledge, the Burns added, the term homeland defense is attributed to a 1997 report by the National Defense Panel. "News reports credit it to panel member Richard L. Armitage, former CIA officer and now deputy secretary of State, though Mr. Armitage has not taken full credit for it -- understandably." [3]

Writing for Buzzflash, Margie Burns postulated, "If Congress actually creates a Cabinet-level Department of Homeland Security [which occurred through Executive Order on February 28, 2003], we will have a Cabinet office named after a corporation. Members of the House Committee on Government Reform and the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee should be watchful. The government has already given the company lavish free advertising, with assistance from the Reverend Sun Myung Moon's publications. In spite of the Institute, the phrase homeland security was little seen in the popular media before September 2002 (at least in this country); aside from a sprinkling of journals and think tanks, only the Reverend Sun Myung Moon's Washington Times newspaper, Insight Magazine, and UPI boosted the Institute and its central catch phrase with any frequency." ibid.

Burns continued in Online Journal, "Immediately after September 11, the Washington Times was foremost in aggressively touting and defending -- indeed, insisting on -- instant adoption of homeland as the term of the hour, in articles published on September 16, 22, 30, and October 3 [2001], also citing ANSER. Predictably, the institute's web site also references articles from the Washington Times." ibid.


According to the ANSER Institute web site, in May 2001, the ANSER Institute of Homeland Security "was established to enhance public awareness and education and contribute to the dialog on a national, state, and local level." [4] However, when Dr. Ruth A. David, Ph.D., the Institute's CEO, was named the 2001 Bloomfield Distinguished Engineer-in-Residence at the College of Engineering at Wichita State University, the university's web pages stated: "ANSER ... performs technical, program, and policy analyses for the Department of Defense."

Additionally, at a plenary session presentation held at MORS from February 29 to March 2, 2000, and attended by Dr. David, ANSER was described as a "Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC)." [5]

On another occasion, "Mark DeMier of ANSER Analytic Services, a nonprofit U.S. Air Force-funded think tank, and editor of its Homeland Security Bulletin is quoted as saying. 'There is no single, coordinated U.S. government definition of homeland defense.'" [6]

Institutional Goals

"The Institute believes that preparing for these new challenges will require a determined, integrated effort at every stage of the process: deterrence, prevention, preemption, crisis management, consequence management, attribution and response." The Institute states that it is "leading the debate through executive-level education, public awareness programs, workshops for policy makers and online publications." ANSER produces a weekly 15,000-subscriber newsletter and the Journal of Homeland Security, "which features articles by senior government leaders and leading homeland security experts."

In the spring of 2002, one analysis of the Institute's performance stated that the then less than two years old Institute had "already gained recognition outside of the Beltway as a landmine of information regarding timely and in-depth debates concerning national security policy." The Institute's newsletter provided "one example of ANSER's increasing position of influence, as initially fewer than 100 people subscribed to the weekly email," which had then "grown to include over 100,000 readers." The Institute's Journal of Homeland Security quickly become "a staple for those involved in national security industries, as it provides a comprehensive overview of homeland defense, with article authorship being balanced between defense experts and academics alike." ibid.

Further evidence of ANSER's influence comes from none other than the Council on Foreign Relations: "Due to its rising influence, earlier this year [2002], Foreign Affairs published a review of the Institute for Homeland Security, noting that the Institute's 'Web site presents an array of resources, including an online journal, access to the syllabi of several courses on terrorism and homeland security, links to a wide variety of Internet sources, and a virtual library' on homeland defense.'" ibid.

'Partnership agreements' with other policy-oriented agencies such as the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the RAND Corporation were also praised. Additionally, the Secretary of the United States Air Force "hailed ANSER for producing products for the defense industry 'marked by quality, responsiveness, and objectivity.'" ibid.

Other Programs

"ANSER has also been offering online programs in cooperation with American Military University in Manassas, VA, leading to certificates in Homeland Defense, Forecasting Terrorism, and Homeland Security. A course called Homeland Security, conducted by the Institute's Director Colonel Randall Larsen, was geared up to begin fall 2001 at the National War College, with the first lecture by Col. (ret) Randall Larsen and Col. Robert Kadlec on homeland security coincidentally scheduled for September 11." ibid.

The Washington Post, according to its 1998 annual report, engaged in a joint venture with ANSER: "'Legi-Slate, a subsidiary of the Washington Post Company ... and ANSER ... [April 15] announced the partnership to provide ANSER's summaries of congressional hearings on defense acquisition and readiness on Legi-Slate's online service.' ... The Post Company 'disposed of substantially all' its Legi-Slate assets in 1999 ... "ibid.

Leadership Team (as of September, 2010)[5]

Corporate Officers
Dr. Ruth A. David, Ph.D. (President & Chief Executive Officer)
Philip Anderson, Ph.D (Senior Vice President & Chief Operating Officer, HSI Operating Unit)
Mr. George Thompson (Vice President, Deputy Director for Homeland Security Programs, (HSP), Mission Area Director for Departmental Unification and Integration)
Mr. Robert Tuohy (Vice President, Deputy Director for Homeland Security Operations, (HSO), Mission Area Director for Resilience, Emergency Preparedness, and Response)

Director's Staff
Richard Kohout (Mission Area Director, Counterterrorism, Borders, and Immigration)
Glenn Price (Fellow, Outreach Program Director)
Margaret "Jo" Velardo, PhD (Research Director)

Division Managers
Gerald "Jerry" Diaz, Ph.D (Fellow, HSO Directorate, Manager, Operations Analysis Division)
Mark Hanson (Fellow, HSO Directorate Manager, Threat and Risk Analysis Division)
Sarah Maloney (Fellow, HSP Directorate Manager, Business Enterprise Analysis Division)
Stephen Ries, PhD (Fellow, HSP Directorate Manager, Work Force Analysis Division)
Shelby Syckes (Fellow, HSP Directorate Manager, Program Analysis Division)

Senior Research Staff
John Baker (Fellow, HSO Directorate)
Charles Brownstein, PhD (Fellow, HSP Directorate)
Joseph Chang, PhD (Fellow, HSO Directorate)
Samuel Clovis, PhD (Fellow, HSO Directorate)
Kim Corthell (Fellow, HSP Directorate)
Gary Foster (Fellow, HSO Directorate)
Jerome Kahan (Fellow, HSO Directorate)
Curt Mann (Fellow, HSP Directorate)
David McGarvey, Ph.D (Fellow, HSO Directorate)
Howard Smith (Fellow, HSO Directorate)
Peter Zimmerman, PhD (Fellow, HSO Directorate)
Robert Zimmerman (Fellow, HSP Directorate)

Past Institute Personnel
Col. Randy Larsen (USAF, Ret.)
Peter Roman, Ph.D.
Col. Dave McIntyre, Ph.D. (USA, Ret)
Dr. Elin Gursky
Lloyd Salvetti
Alan Capps
Jennifer Crook
Sonita Almas
Steve Dunham
Trisha Anderson
Madhavi Patil

Board of Advisors
Dr. Jay C. Davis
Michael J. Bayer
John C. Gannon
Admiral Harold W. Gehman Jr. (USN, Ret)
Dr. John A. Hamre
Phil E. Lacombe
Dr. Joshua Lederberg
Judith A. Miller
Dr. Michael C. Moriarty
Dr. Tara O'Toole

Contact details

ANSER (Analytic Services Inc.)
Arlington, Virginia

External links
Chapter 4: U.S. Reflexive Modernization by Ian Alexander Oas. Re U.S. as "world hegemon" and the ANSER Institute and RAND Corporation influence on shaping U.S. defense policy.
ANSER Homeland Security entry from 911Review.Org, accessed August 30, 2010.

↑ 1.0 1.1 Homeland Security Establishes Its First Government "Think Tank", Department of Homeland Security press release, April 23 2004, from the DHS website], accessed August 31, 2010.
↑ ANSER Homeland Security Institute newsletter, August 21, 2003, accessed August 31, 2010
↑ "Governance" page on the ANSER Homeland Security Institute website, accessed August 31, 2010.
↑ Home Page, ANSER Homeland Security Institute website], accessed August 31, 2010.
↑ "Leadership" page on the ANSER Homeland Security Institute website, accessed August 31, 2010.
Category: Homeland security

A Dialog About the Future with NG Experts
December 2000

Address by John C. Gannon
Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production
The National Security Telecommunications
Information Systems Security Committee

3 April 2001

Thank you.  It is a special pleasure to be among such distinguished speakers today to address such an important organization as the NSTISSC.  Your conference organizers asked me to share our perspective on the cyberthreat, over the next several years. I’ll be happy to do that this morning.  To assist in my discussion of this important topic, I will draw from the work the National Intelligence Council has done on Global Trends 2015, with which I hope you are familiar, and on other estimative work undertaken by the NIC over the past year, especially by our National Intelligence Officer for Science and Technology, Larry Gershwin.  It is useful, I think, to put the cyber threat into the context of a major S&T revolution over the next fifteen years.  In Global Trends 2015 we anticipate that the world will almost certainly experience quantum leaps in information technology (IT) and in other areas of science and technology.  The continuing diffusion of  IT and new applications of biotechnology will be at the crest of the wave.  Information Technology will be the major building block for international commerce and for empowering nonstate actors.  Most experts agree that the IT revolution represents the most significant global transformation since the Industrial Revolution beginning in the mid-eighteenth century.
The integration--or fusion--of continuing revolutions in information technology, biotechnology, materials science, and nanotechnology will generate dramatic increases in technology investments, which will further stimulate innovation in the more advanced countries. Older technologies will continue lateral “sidewise development” into new markets and applications through 2015, benefiting US allies and adversaries around the world who are interested in acquiring early generation ballistic missile and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) technologies. Biotechnology will generate medical breakthroughs that will enable the world’s wealthiest people to improve their health and increase their longevity dramatically.  At the same time, genetically modified crops will offer the potential to improve nutrition among the billions of malnourished people in the world. Breakthroughs in materials technology will generate widely available products that are multi-functional,environmentally safe, longer lasting, and easily adapted to particular consumer requirements. On the downside, disaffected states, terrorists, proliferators, narcotraffickers, and organized criminals will take advantage of the new high-speed information environment and other advances in technology to integrate their illegal activities and compound their threat to stability and security around the world.


The networked global economy will be driven by rapid and largely unrestricted flows of information, ideas, cultural values, capital, goods and services, and people:  that is, globalization.  This globalized economy will be a net contributor to increased political stability in the world in 2015, although its reach and benefits will not be universal.  In contrast to the Industrial Revolution, the process and timelines of globalization will be more compressed.  Its evolution will be rocky, marked by chronic financial volatility and a widening economic divide.
Regions, countries, and groups left behind will face deepening economic stagnation, political instability, and cultural alienation.  These entities will foster political, ethnic, ideological, and religious extremism, along with the violence that often accompanies these phenomena .   These disaffected entities will force the United States and other developed countries to remain focused on “old-world” challenges while simultaneously concentrating on the implications of “new-world” technologies.

GT2015 “Bottom Line”

We do make an effort in GT2015 to cut through the scary scenarios to a broad judgment about the cyber threat:
Increasing reliance on computer networks is making critical US infrastructures more attractive as targets.  Computer network operations today offer new options for attacking the United States within its traditional continental sanctuary—potentially anonymously and with selective effects.  Nevertheless, we do not know how quickly or effectively adversaries such as terrorists, proliferators, narcotraffickers or disaffected states will develop the tradecraft to use cyber warfare tools and technology, or, in fact, whether cyber warfare will ever evolve into a decisive combat arm. We need, therefore, to assess carefully the capabilities of these varied groups in a continuing integrated threat assessment rather than panic and run.  The cyber threat is a call to action—collaborative and concerted action across NSTISSIC agencies—not a cry to surrender.  For those nations with a decisive technological advantage, like the United States, we need to remind ourselves that keeping that technological advantage will be our best line of both defense and offense. Which is to say, we need to do a lot more work on this and to keep you all in the loop as we go along.

[NOTE: This is contrary to all ideas of freedom and the rights of man. The CIA proposes to have more central control rather than more localized control such that we are protected by millions of people grounded in the traditions of America. They are saying that as threats get greater and greater, any attempt at sovereignty is a sign of weakness, a sign of panic, a sign of surrender. The CIA is saying that the only way to show America is powerful is by destroying the constitution and all sovereignty. Allen Dulles had the exact same mentality and that is why JFK fired his ass!]

Perspective from 2001

Let’s jump back from 2015 for a few moments and talk more concretely about the threats we face today.  Hostile cyber activity today is ballooning.  The number of FBI computer network intrusion cases has doubled during each of the past two years.  Meanwhile, several highly publicized intrusions and computer virus incidents since 1998 have fed a public—and perhaps foreign government—perception that the networks upon which US national security and economic well-being depend are vulnerable to attack by almost anyone with a computer, a modem, and a modicum of skill.  This impression, of course, overstates the case.

US Networks as Targets

It is true that information from industry security experts suggests that US national information networks have become more vulnerable—and therefore more attractive as a target of foreign cyber attack. The growing connectivity among secure and insecure networks creates new opportunities for unauthorized intrusions into sensitive or proprietary computer systems within critical US infrastructures, such as the nation’s telephone system. The complexity of computer networks is growing faster than the ability to understand and protect them by identifying critical nodes, verifying security, and monitoring activity.  The prospects for a cascade of failures across US infrastructures are largely known and understood. Business firms are dedicating growing, but still insufficient, resources to the defense of critical US infrastructures against foreign cyber attack—a low likelihood threat compared to routine disruptions such as accidental damage to telecommunications lines.

Nonetheless, mainstream commercial software—whose vulnerabilities are widely known—is replacing relatively secure proprietary network systems by US telecommunications providers and other operators of critical infrastructure. US government and defense networks similarly are increasing their reliance on commercial software.  Such commercial software includes imported products that provide opportunities for foreign implantation of exploitation or attack tools. Finally, opportunities for foreign placement or recruitment of insiders have become legion.  As part of an unprecedented churning of the global information technology work force, US firms are drawing on pools of computer expertise that reside in a number of potential threat countries, such as Russia. Access to US proprietary networks by subcontractors of foreign partners is creating “virtual” insiders whose identity and nationality often remain unknown to US network operators. Despite these growing vulnerabilities, however, the most important US targets remain difficult to compromise.  Compromising such targets requires more advanced tools and tradecraft, such as recruiting an insider.
Foreign or US insiders were responsible for 71 percent of the unauthorized entries into US corporate computer networks reported to an FBI-sponsored survey last year.
Despite the growing interconnectivity I’ve stressed this morning, control networks-whose compromise could disrupt critical US infrastructures such as power or transportation—are designed to be less accessible from outside networks, according to industry experts.  In addition, many control networks use unique, proprietary, or archaic programming languages thought to be--and clearly intended to be--poorly understood by hackers.

Growing Foreign Capabilities

Advanced technologies and tools for computer network operations are becoming more widely available, resulting in a basic, but operationally significant, technical cyber capability for US adversaries.
Most US adversaries have access to the technology needed to pursue computer network operations.  Computers are almost globally available, and Internet connectivity is both widespread and increasing.  Both the technology and access to the Internet are inexpensive, relative to traditional weapons, and require no large industrial infrastructure.
The tradecraft needed to employ information technology and tools effectively however—particularly against more difficult targets such as classified networks or critical infrastructures—remains an important limiting factor for many of our adversaries.

Hackers since the mid-1990s have shared increasingly sophisticated and easy-to-use software on the Internet, providing tools that any computer-literate adversary could obtain and use for computer network reconnaissance, probing, penetration, exploitation, or attack.  Moreover, programming aids are making it possible to develop sophisticated tools with only basic programming skills.
Globally available tools are particularly effective against the mechanisms of the Internet, but specialized tools would be needed against more difficult targets, such as  the networks that control many critical infrastructures.

Even with technology and tools, considerable tradecraft also is required to penetrate network security perimeters and defeat intrusion detection systems—particularly against defensive reactions by network security administrators.  Tradecraft also will determine how well an adversary can achieve a targeted and reliable outcome, and how likely the perpetrator is to remain anonymous.  Attackers must tailor strategies to specific target networks—requiring advanced and continued reconnaissance to characterize targets and ensure that exploitation tools remain effective in the face of subtle changes to computer systems and networks.
Cyber attacks against less well defended military networks, such as logistics for example, still would require prior identification of critical nodes and a preplanned campaign, if the attacks were to achieve a strategic impact such as delaying a US force deployment.

Potential Actors and Threats

Let me talk about some of the groups that will challenge us on the cyber front:


Although the most numerous and publicized cyber intrusions and other incidents are ascribed to lone computer-hacking hobbyists, such hackers pose a negligible threat of widespread, long-duration damage to national-level infrastructures.  The large majority of hackers do not have the requisite tradecraft to threaten difficult targets such as critical US networks—and even fewer would have a motive to do so.  Nevertheless, the large worldwide population of hackers poses a relatively high threat of an isolated or brief disruption causing serious damage, including extensive property damage or loss of life.  As the hacker population grows, so does the likelihood of an exceptionally skilled and malicious hacker attempting and succeeding in such an attack. In addition, the huge worldwide volume of relatively less skilled hacking activity raises the possibility of inadvertent disruption of a critical infrastructure.


A smaller foreign population of politically active hackers—which includes individuals and groups with anti-US motives—poses a medium-level threat of carrying out an isolated but damaging attack.  Most international hacktivist groups appear bent on propaganda rather than damage to critical infrastructures.  Pro-Beijing Chinese hackers over the past two years have conducted mass cyber protests in response to events such as the 1999 NATO bombing of China’s embassy in Belgrade. Pro-Serbian hacktivists attacked a NATO Website during Operation Allied Force.  Similar hacktivism accompanied the rise in Israeli-Palestinian clashes last year.

Hackers for Hire

Government and criminal organizations have the resources to recruit hacker talent and the motivation to guide that technical talent with sophisticated tradecraft in order to turn it toward long-term objectives that could threaten the United States.

Industrial Spies and Organized Crime Groups

International corporate spies and organized crime organizations pose a medium-level threat to the United States through their ability to conduct industrial espionage and large-scale monetary theft, respectively, and through their ability to hire or develop hacker talent. Japanese syndicates used Russian hackers to gain access to law enforcement databases, evidently to monitor police investigations of their operations and members, according to a press report last year. According to press reports, a Mafia-led syndicate last year used banking and telecommunications insiders to break into an Italian bank’s computer network.  The syndicate diverted the equivalent of $115 million in European Union aid to Mafia-controlled bank accounts overseas before Italian authorities detected the activity.

Foreign corporations also could use computer intrusions to tamper with competitors’ business proposals, in order to defeat competing bids. Computer network espionage or sabotage can affect US economic competitiveness and result in technology transfer--directly through product sales, or indirectly-to US adversaries. Because cyber criminals’ central objectives are to steal, and to do so with as little attention from law enforcement as possible, they are not apt to undertake operations leading to high-profile network disruptions, such as damage to US critical infrastructures. Major drug trafficking groups, however, could turn to computer network attacks in an attempt to disrupt US law enforcement or local government counternarcotics efforts. Organized crime groups with cyber capabilities conceivably could threaten attacks against critical infrastructure for purposes of extortion. Moreover, rampant criminal access to critical financial databases and networks could undermine the public trust essential to the commercial health of US banking institutions and to the operation of the financial infrastructure itself.  In addition, criminal computer network exploitation could inadvertently disrupt other infrastructures.


Traditional terrorist adversaries of the United States, despite their intentions to damage US interests, are less developed in their computer network capabilities and propensity to pursue cyber means than are other types of adversaries.  They are likely, therefore, to pose only a limited cyber threat.   In the near term, terrorists are likely to stay focused on traditional attack methods. (Nonetheless, we will be on the alert for new information that could alter this judgment. We anticipate that more substantial cyber threats are possible in the future as a more technically competent generation enters the ranks.

National Governments

National cyber warfare programs are unique in posing a threat along the entire spectrum of objectives that might harm US interests.  Among the array of cyber threats, as we see them today, only government-sponsored programs are developing capabilities with the prospect of causing widespread, long-duration damage to US critical infrastructures.  China (to name just one example) is expanding cyber related military training and is already incorporating cyber warfare into military exercises, according to press reporting.  President Jiang last year stated that wars were passing from the stage of “mechanized warfare” to that of “information warfare.” A Chinese presidential decree last year established a military university whose mission includes training soldiers in information warfare, among other communications-related fields, according to a Chinese press report.

Future Tools and Technology

New cyber tools and technologies are on the way for both the offense and defense.  For example, because networks-and their vulnerabilities-are evolving so rapidly, new tools for network mapping, scanning, and probing will become increasingly critical to both attackers and defenders.  Either side could apply research in autonomous software “agents”-intelligent, mobile, and self-replicating software intended to roam a network gathering data or to reconnoiter other computer network operations. For defenders, incremental deployment of new or improved security tools will help protect against both remote and inside threats.  Technologies include better intrusion detection systems, better methods for correlating data from multiple defensive tools, automated deployment of security patches, biometric user authentication, wider use of encryption, and public key infrastructures to assure the authenticity and integrity of e-mail, electronic documents, and downloaded software.  For attackers, viruses and worms are likely to become more controllable, precise, and predictable-making them more suitable for weaponization.  Advanced modeling and simulation technologies are likely to assist in identifying critical nodes for an attack and conducting battle damage assessments afterward.  Other capabilities likely by 2005 include self-modification to defeat signature recognition, remote control, stealthy propagation, and the ability of a single tool to affect multiple, mainstream operating systems.
In addition, tools for distributed hacking or denial of service-the coordinated use of multiple, compromised computers or of independent and mobile software agents-will mature as network connectivity and bandwidth increase.  The rapid pace of change in information technology suggests that the appearance of new and unforeseen computer and network technologies and tools could  provide advantages in cyber warfare  to either the defender or the attacker.  Wildcards for the years beyond 2005 include the possibility of fundamental shifts in the nature of computers and networking, driven, for example, by emerging optical technologies.  These changes could improve processing power, information storage, and bandwidth enough to make possible application of advanced software technologies-such as artificial intelligence-to cyber warfare. Such technologies could provide the defender with improved capabilities for detecting and attributing subtle malicious activity, or could enable computer networks to respond to attacks automatically.
They could provide the attacker with planning aids to develop an optimal strategy against a potential target and to more accurately predict effects.


Despite the fundamental and global impact of the information revolution, the reliance of critical US activities on computer networks, and the attention being devoted to information operations, uncertainty remains whether computer network operations will evolve into a decisive military weapon for US adversaries.  To a degree that we cannot estimate, emergency measures to compensate for computer network disruptions will be available to maintain some basic level of services-as demonstrated during the Y2K rollover.  Adversaries, therefore, may never overcome the planning uncertainties that derive from a US potential to work around even severe degradations in network performance.  Let us hope I am right in this judgment. Whether or not foreign computer network operations mature into a major combat arm, however, they will offer an increasing number of adversaries new options for exerting leverage over the United States-including selection of either nonlethal or lethal damage and the prospect of anonymity.  Adversaries will be able to use cyber attacks to attempt to deny the United States its traditional continental sanctuary with attacks on critical infrastructures. They could exploit US legal and conceptual controversies relating to defending privately operated networks with US Government resources and the separation of the US domestic and foreign security establishments. Adversaries also could use cyber attacks to attempt to slow or disrupt the mobilization, deployment, combat operations, or resupply of US military forces.  Attacks on logistic and other defense networks would be likely to exploit heightened network vulnerabilities during US deployment operations-complicating US power projection in an era of decreasing permanent US military presence abroad.
Implications for Intelligence

Whatever direction the cyberthreat takes, the United States Government will be confronting an increasingly interconnected world in the years ahead.  This is the core message of GT2015.  We will have to develop, in response, greater communications and collaboration across the agencies of our own Government, with other governments, and with the corporate world.  Interagency cooperation will be essential to understanding the cyberthreat, as well as other transnational threats that will crowd our agenda, and to responding effectively with interdisciplinary strategies.  Consequence management of a major attack on a critical US infrastructure would involve virtually all agencies of the Federal Government, State, and local governments, foreign governments, law enforcement, the military, the medical community, and the media.  NSTISSC and the Intelligence Community clearly have a lot of work to do if we are to understand this evolving threat and to be prepared to deal with it.

Remember that the following speech was given in April of 2001 by the Central Intelligence Agency. It says that electronic threats are "limited". This of course limited scrutiny with the Stephens/Mossad/Saudi funded PTECH component of the 9/11 terrorists attacks. Remember that PTECH and MITRE (CIA well aware of all MITRE activity) were in the basement of the FAA for two years before 9/11/2001. This means that the CIA who knew about MITRE and PTECH were guiding other agencies, namely, in this specific speech...

The National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (,

away from being alert to any electronic crimes prior to the 9/11 false flag. They likely did the same speech to other agencies like the FAA, etc.

But, the NSTISSC (created by George HW Bush in 1990) had accountabilities to the systems in use at all government agencies (FAA, SS, FBI, WH, etc.) for PTECH to run wild during the 9/11 event with limited scrutiny thanks to the CIA's internal propaganda!

"Ptech was with MITRE Corporation in the basement of the FAA for two years prior to 9/11"

Indira Singh & P-Tech

Indira Singh on Mitre and Ptech - Pt. 1
Indira Singh on Mitre and Ptech - Pt. 2


Anti_Illuminati for dummies. The ultimate study guide for the layman.

Developing Cybernetic dictatorship based on Nazi, Soviet & Stasi BETA-TESTS

29 March 2006. has been superceded by

April 2005 index of issuances:

Unclassified National Security System issuances:

8 October 2000

The National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee (NSTISSC) was established by President Bush under National Security Directive 42 (NSD 42) entitled, "National Policy for the Security of National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems," dated 5 July 1990. It reaffirms the Secretary of Defense as the Executive Agent and the Director, National Security Agency as the National Manager for National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security. In addition, the Directive establishes the NSTISSC.

The NSTISSC provides a forum for the discussion of policy issues, sets national policy, and promulgates direction, operational procedures, and guidance for the security of national security systems through the NSTISSC Issuance System. National security systems contain classified information or:
a. involves intelligence activities;
b. involves cryptographic activities related to national security;
c. involves command and control of military forces;
d. involves equipment that is an integral part of a weapon or weapons system(s); or
e. is critical to the direct fulfillment of military or intelligence missions (not including routine administrative and business applications).

Images source:

Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 100,000 Americans will die in the next false flag operation
Post by: Dig on September 08, 2011, 12:32:43 am
Absolute Proof CSIS is planning a coup d'etat in America
Consolidation of Power for seamless command and control takeover operations


Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or not)?

Date: June 2008

Author: Christine E. Wormuth

Kissinger's Center for Strategic and International Studies

Summary of Key Points, Issues, Conclusions:

Even with the vast number of government agencies in place to assure America’s safety, the federal government and the nation are not ready for the next catastrophe.  There is still a great deal of confusion over who will be in charge during a disaster and no guidelines are in place to determine and assess the capabilities that states, cities, and towns should have to ensure they are prepared for the worst.  The improvements in preparedness are evident with several additions to federal government infrastructure.  

The Federal Emergency Management System (FEMA) has developed more than 200 prescripted mission assignments across 27 federal agencies to strengthen and streamline response capabilities in advance of actual events.  

The Department of Defense is creating a trained and ready Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management force that will be able to respond rapidly during a catastrophe.  As a means to progress the movement towards better homeland security and disaster preparedness,

the Center for Strategic and International studies has made several recommendations:  

(1) merge the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council into a single organization with a single staff,

(2) establish a clear chain of command inside the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure that the Secretary can carry out his or her responsibility to serve as the federal government’s coordinator for incident management,

(3) state clearly that the Department of Defense will not have the lead in responding to catastrophic incidents but will be expected to play a substantial support role when needed, and

(4) create a partnership between the Office of Management and Budget and the NCS Strategic Planning Directorate to lead the development of integrated budget planning across homeland security mission areas.

Name of Researcher: Ashanti Z. Corey
Institution: Integrative Center for Homeland Security, Texas A&M University

Date Posted: July 23, 2008

About CSIS

In an era of ever-changing global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and Inter- national Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decisionmakers. CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to the simple but urgent goal of finding ways for America to survive as a nation and prosper as a people. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent public policy institutions. Today, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. More than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focus their expertise on defense and security; on the world’s regions and the unique challenges inherent to them; and on the issues that know no boundary in an increasingly connected world. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000.

Acknowledgments iv
Executive Summary vi

1. America Unprepared 1
2. Problematic Government Relationships 15
3. Immature Processes 42
4. Anemic Implementation 64
Appendix A: Summary of Report Recommendations 83
Appendix B: BG-N Phase 4 Working Group Members 86
Appendix C: Acronyms 87
Executive Summary

America is not ready for the next catastrophe. Almost seven years have passed since the nation was attacked here at home by violent Islamist extremists who remain free and who have made clear their willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States, should they be able to acquire or build them. Almost three years have passed since Hurricane Katrina devas- tated the Gulf Coast and laid bare myriad flaws in the nation’s preparedness and response system. Simply creating the Homeland Security Council, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and U.S. Northern Command was not enough to make the country prepared. There are still no detailed, government-wide plans to respond to a catastrophe. There is still considerable confusion over who will be in charge during a disaster. There are still almost no dedicated military forces on rapid alert to respond to a crisis here at home.

There are still no guidelines to determine and assess the capabilities that states, cities, and towns should have to ensure they are prepared for the worst. To be sure, a number of significant steps have been taken, and the nation is clearly more prepared than it was seven or eight years ago. There is a National Homeland Security Strategy that provides overall direction for the federal government’s homeland security policies and programs. Hundreds, if not thousands, more people focus each and every day on improving national preparedness than before the September 11 attacks.

A National Response Framework describes how the federal government will work with state, local and tribal governments as well as the private sector and nongovernmental organizations during domestic incidents. Fifteen National Planning Scenarios have been drawn up to guide government planning for catastrophes. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed more than 200 prescripted mission as- signments across 27 federal agencies to strengthen and streamline response capabilities in advance of actual events. The Department of Defense is creating a trained and ready Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management force that will be able to respond rapidly during a catastrophe, and the National Guard has almost completed its development of 17 CBRNE Emergency Response Forces spread around the country to help bridge the gap between the immediate response to a crisis and the arrival of more extensive federal capabilities.

Although significant progress has been made in the past several years– with many achievements extremely hard-won, through the tireless work of senior leaders and public servants across the government—what ultimately matters to the American public is not how far we have come but how far away we still are from being prepared for the next catastrophe. The task of readying America to face the threats of the post–September 11 era is an enormous one and poses a fundamental challenge for the next President.

Preventing, protecting against, preparing for, and responding to a domestic catastrophe are basic tasks of government at all levels. Unfortunately, today’s efforts to provide homeland security, particularly at the federal level, are not unlike the governmental equivalent of a children’s soccer game. One can see a tremendous amount of activity under way and considerable energy on the field, but the movements are often not very well coordinated. Players tend to huddle around the ball—in this case, whatever happens to be the crisis or headline issue of the day—and follow it wherever it goes, even if in doing so they neglect their assigned positions. In such an environment, it is not impossible to score a goal, but that outcome is usually due more to luck than to skill. Given that this is not a competition the nation can afford to lose, what can be done to improve America’s odds?

The key for the next Administration will be to bring order to the relationships, processes, and implementation of its homeland security system. Which organizations at the federal, state, and local level will perform what roles, who is the lead official at each level of the response, and how do all the players work together as a team? What processes should guide how stakeholders interact and ensure that everyone is working toward the same goals? What plans are needed to prepare the government to deal effectively with future catastrophes, and how should government at all levels decide what it needs so that it can execute those plans? Finally, how can the government translate its strategies and plans into trained and ready capabilities on the ground that can be deployed effectively in accordance with comprehensive, integrated plans developed in advance of a specific catastrophe?

Many of the building blocks required to move the country toward being truly prepared to handle a catastrophe already exist in some form, but the next Administration needs to bring the pieces together, fill in the gaps, and provide the resources necessary to get the job done. If implemented, the following major recommendations –slightly condensed from their full discussion in the body of this report—would go a long way toward getting America ready to manage the next domestic catastrophe, whatever form it might take.


■ Merge the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council into a single organization with a single staff.

The U.S. government has artificially separated homeland security from national security. Securing the homeland is a matter of national security—and it has both domestic and international components. Dividing homeland security from national security has resulted in fractured, partial solu- tions and has greatly weakened the ability of the federal government to generate unity of effort. Merging the National Security and Homeland Security Councils and their staffs will greatly enhance the federal government’s ability to develop holistic strategies and policies, and it will ensure that the homeland security aspects of national security policy are also supported by the political and bureaucratic power of the White House.

■ Establish a clear chain of command inside DHS to ensure that the Secretary can carry out his or her responsibility to serve as the federal government’s coordinator for incident management.

The relationship between DHS and FEMA continues to be murky and confusing. If the Hurricane Katrina experience showed anything, it illustrated the perils of not having a clear understanding of who is in charge of what—both in Washington and in the field—during a catastrophe. The absence of a clear framework for the DHS-FEMA relationship has had an extremely pernicious effect on homeland security policy in the past several years and has noticeably hampered the federal government’s efforts to improve preparedness. The next Administration and Congress should work together to put into a law a clear chain of command, from the President down to the field level, for the coordination of domestic incidents.

Under this new clarified framework, the Secretary of Homeland Security will serve as the principal federal coordinator of domestic incidents as directed in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5, “Management of Domestic Incidents,” and will report directly to the President. While the FEMA Administrator should be able to advise the President directly on the subset of emergency management matters, as specified in law, the operational chain of command for the overall incident should run from the President to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and then within DHS from the Secretary to the FEMA Administrator. In the field, the DHS chain of command during an incident should extend to the 10 FEMA Regional Administrators, who would execute their responsibilities on the ground through designated “Lead Federal Coordinators,” as discussed in more detail in the following recommendation. During a catastrophe, the Lead Federal Coordinator would be the single federal official on the ground responsible for coordinating the overall federal effort with all of the other response efforts.

■ Consolidate the positions of Principal Federal Official and Federal Coordinating Officer into the single position of Lead Federal Coordinator, who would report through the FEMA Administrator to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

During and after a catastrophe, there must be one DHS official on the ground, responsible to the President and accountable for the agency’s performance. It makes no sense to have a Principal Federal Official (PFO) who reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security and lacks line authority over a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) who reports to the FEMA Administrator, particularly when the FEMA Administrator works for the Secretary and FEMA is part of DHS. The continuing existence of the PFO and FCO positions perpetuates confusion at all levels—federal, state, local—and indeed reflects the larger DHS-FEMA bureaucratic battle. It is time for this battle to end. As the relationship between DHS and FEMA is restructured, the PFO and FCO positions should be eliminated in the National Response Framework and in statute, respectively, and replaced with a single position: Lead Federal Coordinator (LFC). In practice the LFCs should typically be very senior officials in each of the 10 FEMA regional offices and they should have the authorities of the FCO as described in the Stafford Act of 1988. Ensuring that there is a single DHS senior official on the ground during a crisis—who reports through the Secretary to the President, who has the power to coordinate and distribute federal assistance (whether directly or through delegation of authority), and who already knows the state and local players—would greatly increase unity of effort.

■ State clearly that the Department of Defense will not have the lead in responding to catastrophic incidents but will be expected to play a substantial support role when needed.

The persistent debate about whether the Department of Defense (DoD) should ever lead the response to a catastrophe instead of DHS should be settled. The next Administration should restate emphatically that DHS will be the Lead Federal Coordinator during domestic incidents, but should also make clear that DoD will be expected to play a significant supporting role in catastrophes, working within the HSPD-5 framework. As outlined in the National Response Framework, the federal government should have a single, scalable framework for incident management, led by a single federal agency. The nation cannot afford to have one system for 98 percent of all events, and a different, DoD-led system for the 2 percent of events that are “high end.” At the same time, the next Administration should make very clear that DoD will no longer hold the civil support mission at arm’s length and will be expected to play a very significant supporting role in the aftermath of a catastrophic event—a role that will require that DoD resource, train, and equip its forces accordingly.

■ Initiate a robust dialogue on the subject of how to balance the need to enable the federal government to directly employ federal resources within a state or states during the most extreme circumstances with the constitutional rights of states.

The idea of expanding the role of the federal government during a domestic catastrophe is anathema to many in the homeland security community; but in light of the threats faced by the nation in the post–September 11 environment, it is only prudent to ensure that the country’s preparedness system includes the ability of the federal government to exercise its full authority under the law to save lives and protect property during a major disaster. It is not impossible to imagine scenarios in which state leadership is severely weakened in its ability to orchestrate an effective response effort, or others in which the state leadership is in place but the state’s capacity to execute decisions made by those leaders is severely degraded. In such instances, it may be appropriate for the federal government to exercise the authority granted to it under the Stafford Act more fully than is envisioned today.

The goal of adapting the current system is not to enable the federal government to “take over” management of a catastrophe over the objections of a state governor, but rather to develop an understanding with state governors in advance about the conditions under which the federal government might need to directly employ federal resources within a state or states in the most extreme circumstances in order to execute its responsibility to save lives and protect property. The principle of managing a crisis at the lowest level of government possible should remain a fundamental feature of the American approach to domestic emergency management. At the same time, the next Secretary of Homeland Security, with the President’s strong backing, should work closely with state governors to begin exploring how the current system could be adapted in a mutually acceptable way that balances the need to fully empower the federal government under existing law with maintenance of the constitutional right of states to self-governance during a catastrophe.

■ Conduct a Quadrennial National Security Review and create a National Security Planning Guidance.

There is growing consensus that the federal government needs a mechanism to develop an inte- grated set of national security priorities, assess trade-offs among these different priorities, and assign roles and responsibilities for these priorities across the interagency. To achieve these objectives, the next Administration should direct the National Security Council (NSC) to lead a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR) in the first few months of the new term. The review would engage the relevant national security agencies, focus on a select set of critical national security priorities, and produce two major documents: an integrated National Security Planning Guidance and a public National Security Strategy, both of which would include treatment of homeland security issues. The National Security Planning Guidance would elaborate on the broad priorities articulated in the QNSR; provide more specific guidance on priorities, roles, and missions; and lay out timelines for the implementation of major planning objectives. In addition, the planning guidance would be the starting point for Cabinet agencies to develop their own more detailed strategies.

■ Create a Senior Director for Strategic Planning within the merged NSC to lead interagency strategic planning efforts and oversee their implementation.

The federal government cannot develop or implement the kinds of integrated national security strategies and programs that are needed to meet the challenges of the 21st-century security environment in the absence of strong leadership and coordination at the White House level. As part of the NSC, the next President should create and empower a robust strategic planning directorate, led by a Senior Director for Strategic Planning. Rather than relying on the 1- to 2-person strategic planning offices that have sometimes been a part of the NSC organization, the next President and National Security Adviser need at least 10–15 people leading strategic planning efforts on a daily basis. This office should be responsible for leading the QNSR and developing the National Secu- rity Planning Guidance. This office also should be responsible for guiding the interagency process to develop detailed plans for responding to catastrophic events, as well as the associated effort to develop requirements for catastrophe response at the federal level that are then fed into the federal budget process.

■ Establish a robust interagency organization overseen by the NSC but housed at DHS that is responsible for the development of integrated and detailed interagency plans and for identification of specific requirements for the federal departments.

Although considerable progress has been made in 2007 and 2008, the federal government still does not have a set of detailed interagency plans associated with the 15 National Planning Sce- narios. The next Administration should establish a strong interagency organization—closely overseen by the NSC Strategic Planning Directorate but housed at DHS—that is responsible on a daily basis for developing integrated, interagency operational plans for responding to catastrophic events. These plans would be updated regularly, perhaps every year or two. Creating such plans is one of the most important steps that the federal government can take to improve national readiness, and the interagency organization should be backed strongly by the NSC, should be staffed with the best possible personnel with planning expertise, and should be high on the radar screen of the next Secretary of Homeland Security. Complementing its deliberate planning function, it should be focal point for identifying specific requirements for federal departments, which are then validated by the relevant agencies and fed into their internal resourcing systems.

■ Create a partnership between the Office of Management and Budget and the NSC Strategic Planning Directorate to lead the development of integrated budget planning across homeland security mission areas.

To more fully integrate the implementation of homeland security policy, the next Administration should develop a partnership between the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the NSC Strategic Planning Directorate charged with devising a method of examining budgets across homeland security mission areas. This process should entail a front-end review of agency budget proposals in the planning stages, across mission areas and programs to identify priorities, capability gaps, overlaps, and shortfalls at the outset of the budget cycle. This partnership will require that NSC and OMB begin reviewing the agency budget plans together over the course of the summer before the President’s budget is submitted. The final budget submission to Congress could then include proposals presented not only by mission area but also by major programs that support the mission requirements. Participating NSC staff, taking the lead role, should be drawn mainly from the Strategic Planning Directorate but should also include other members of the NSC staff with deep knowledge of the particular subject matter areas. To facilitate this integrated review across mission areas, a new OMB staff group with significant policy expertise and cross-agency purview should be developed and should play a major role in the process.

■ Substantially revise the Target Capabilities List.

The federal government has directed state and local governments today to focus their preparedness investments on 37 target capabilities, but the target capability levels do not differentiate between big cities, smaller cities, small towns, and rural areas. Nor is there very clear guidance on how to measure whether state and local jurisdictions have achieved the prescribed target capability levels. The next Secretary of Homeland Security and FEMA Administrator should build on work that is just getting under way in FEMA to substantially revise the Target Capabilities List (TCL) so that desired target capabilities levels are linked to different types of jurisdictions and the guidelines provided differentiate between cities and towns around the country in terms of area, population size and density, numbers of potential high-risk targets, and other factors.

This effort should also clearly describe performance objectives for target capabilities in commonsense terms, linking those objectives to the particular needs of different sizes and types of jurisdictions. Equally important, a revised TCL will specify how progress toward those objectives will be judged. Once the objectives and evaluative measures are developed, DHS and state and local governments will have an agreed-on basis for assessing capability development, something that does not exist today. Particularly in light of the great dissatisfaction expressed by many state and local officials with the consultation process for the original TCL, published as part of the National Preparedness Guidelines, it is critically important that FEMA to adopt a truly collaborative process in undertaking this revision.

■ Reform the DHS grants program to be a flagship component of DHS that is well managed, transparent, highly credible, and tightly linked to federal priorities.

The DHS grants program and the organization within the department that administers the program will inevitably be crucial to DHS’s success in building preparedness at the state and local levels. Recognizing that the grants program and its administration contribute strongly to how DHS is viewed beyond the Beltway, the next Secretary and FEMA Administrator should make reforming the grant program a high priority. The FEMA regional offices should become in effect the front lines of the grant program process, as they are much closer to the state and local grant recipients than is DHS headquarters in Washington. Central to the reform effort should be linking the grant program more tightly to the strategic priorities outlined in policy guidance documents such as the Guidelines and a revised Target Capabilities List. Grant applications should explain how proposed investments will achieve target capability levels, grant recipients should report progress toward target capabilities using agreed-on evaluative measures contained in a revised TCL, and federal evaluations should be undertaken in addition to the self-assessment process, perhaps as a condition of grant eligibility.

■ Host a catastrophic event tabletop exercise for very senior officials early in each new Administration.

The new Administration should bring together its Cabinet officials for a tabletop exercise focused on managing a catastrophic event in the first 60 days of the new term. Such an exercise would force Cabinet officials to become familiar with their basic homeland security responsibilities and would give them all a better understanding of the scope and type of challenges the federal gov- ernment would likely face should some catastrophe occur. This kind of exercise also would help spur Cabinet Secretaries toward focusing their agencies on critical vulnerabilities early in the next Administration.

■ Reform TOPOFF to make it much closer to a “no-notice” exercise.

Because it involves extensive advance coordination, TOPOFF—the “top officials” capstone exercise—may not offer sufficient insight into the nation’s overall preparedness for catastrophic events. Only an exercise that is “no-notice,” or close to it, will provide an accurate picture of how well the federal government can coordinate its own efforts internally and work collaboratively with state and local governments as it responds to a catastrophe. Given the practical challenges associated with major field exercises, it may be useful to focus initially on holding no-notice tabletop exer- cises at the federal and state government level to test decisionmaking and coordination processes before determining whether it is possible to proceed to a full-fledged no-notice field exercise.

■ Complete and expand the existing effort to create homeland security regional hubs that leverage the resources of the FEMA regional offices.

Common sense dictates that leaders in Washington, D.C., cannot directly manage the response to a catastrophe taking place hundreds or thousands of miles away. FEMA’s recent initiatives to rein- vigorate its regional offices and make them the essential link between Washington and the field are critical and must be fully implemented. Without this connective tissue between Washington and the state and local levels, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to realize any meaningful vision of national preparedness. The FEMA regional offices should be responsible for developing regional strategies and plans, functioning as a one-stop shop for preparedness activities and the grant programs, and building on existing regional collaborative structures. To ensure that the regional offices can be fully effective, the next Administration should establish requirements making them the principal coordinators for federal agencies in the field. Finally, a very senior official in each regional office with bureaucratic, operational, and “Washington” skills should be predesignated as the Lead Federal Coordinator for each region.

■ Create regional homeland security task forces, drawn largely from existing National Guard units, to complement the regional homeland security hubs.

Creating regional homeland security task forces from existing National Guard units would provide a military complement to the FEMA regional offices. The next Secretary of Defense and Chief of the National Guard Bureau should work closely with governors and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to organize National Guard–led homeland security task forces in each region. Not only would these task forces create a focal point for regional military planning, exercising, and training, they would ensure that each region of the country has a rapid response force able to help bridge the three- to five-day gap between the immediate aftermath of an event, when local first responders are the only capabilities on the scene, and the arrival of most federal capabilities.

■ Implement and fund a strengthened version of the National Security Professional Program and fund and implement an expanded DHS professional development and education system.

The next Administration needs to beef up the requirements in the National Security Professional Program and provide additional resources for implementing Executive Order 13434, which created it. Without a workforce that has the skills and experience to operate across all the dimensions of homeland security—prevention, protection, preparedness, response, and recovery—the nation will not be able to protect itself against future catastrophes or manage them when they do happen. Rotation through different positions in the government to gain core competencies needs to be linked explicitly to eligibility for career advancement, as it was for uniformed military officers as part of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Ideally, the professional development and education program envisioned in the executive order would also include opportunities for state- and local-level personnel to serve in the federal government. To support these rotational assignments and build a robust system of training and professional education, the next Administration should work with Congress to mandate that participating agencies fund a 3–5 percent personnel float. Complementing professional development at the interagency level, the next Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the DHS Learning and Development Strategy is appropriately funded and implemented, expand current education and development plans, and engage institutions of higher learning in a dialogue about future needs for homeland security professionals.


DHS requires more personal information from employees, contractors

New data elements include financial history and mother's maiden name

    * By Alice Lipowicz
    * Jul 01, 2009

The Homeland Security Department is updating and expanding its record collection to include new categories of personal information on all employees, contractors and volunteers who regularly need access to DHS facilities. The new categories of information include maiden name, mother's maiden name, clearance level, identifying physical information, financial history, duty date and weapons-bearer designation, states a Federal Register notice on June 25 .

Other information to be collected includes date of birth, Social Security Number, organizational and employee affiliations, fingerprints, digital color photograph, digital signature and telephone phone numbers.

The Personal Identity Verification Management System is being updated to support implementation of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 that covers physical and logical access to federal facilities. Public comment will be taken until July 27.

The system covers all DHS employees, contractors and their employees, consultants and volunteers who require long-term access to DHS facilities and computer systems, the department said. The system also has been expanded to cover federal emergency responders, foreign nationals on assignment and other federal employees detailed to DHS.

Personal information that is provided to DHS may be shared in DHS, as well as with appropriate federal, state, local and tribal agencies on a need-to-know basis, the notice states.

[Federal Register: June 25, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 121)]
[Page 30301-30305]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access []

Office of the Secretary
[Docket No. DHS-2008-0167]
Privacy Act of 1974; DHS/All--026 Personal Identity Verification
Management System Systems of Records
AGENCY: Privacy Office; DHS.
ACTION: Notice of Privacy Act system of records.
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 100,000 Americans will die in the next false flag operation
Post by: Dig on September 08, 2011, 12:33:28 am
TSA and DHS are not the government. Just like the Gestapo, they will be found guilty of crimes against humanity. This has already been planned, look at the history. The company, ANSER Institute of Homeland Security was originally funded by RAND corporation. They set up PROMIS and PTECH and work for outside interests and not the interests of the US nor its legal government. They set up 9/11 and then got power after 9/11. People like Gannon and Ruth David are open conspirators, so is CSIS, Kissinger, and his interns. People are waking up to this fact and can see clearly that this beast called DHS are the actual anti-government radical violent trilateral terrorists who mean to bring our entire country down.
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 200,000 Americans may die in the next false flag operation
Post by: blackbeagle on September 08, 2011, 12:51:04 am
Did I miss something? He never said False Flag Ops. He said we needed to fix Homeland so that we can deal with big attack.
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 200,000 Americans may die in the next false flag operation
Post by: Dig on September 08, 2011, 01:10:44 am
Did I miss something? He never said False Flag Ops. He said we needed to fix Homeland so that we can deal with big attack.

He did not say false flag operation? Funny, that is what I heard.  In all seriousness, WTF, you expect one othe top 100 puppets in our country (at the same level of a Gary Hart) to actually use the words 'false flag'?  What 'big attack' is possible when there are billions of IBM sensors monitoring every sight, sound, smell, etc. 24/7 with autonomous predictable analysis and the powers of an adjustment bureau? You really think that there is a bona fide attack that could kill hundreds of thousands of Americans which does not include hundreds of stand down orders and funding from offshore globalist banksters?
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 200,000 Americans may die in the next false flag operation
Post by: adissenter2 on September 08, 2011, 01:23:08 am
Did I miss something? He never said False Flag Ops. He said we needed to fix Homeland so that we can deal with big attack.

the word "fix" is key

Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 200,000 Americans may die in the next false flag operation
Post by: Dig on September 08, 2011, 06:20:40 am
Secret IBM Document from 2006: Pandemic Plan Overview

Services and Procurement Pan IOT Europe
Pandemic Plan Overview

*There is a 100% chance that a pandemic will occur in the next 5 years.

* During the pandemic, a maximum of 30% of the workforce will be available.

*We will plan 2 waves of the pandemic, each lasting 12 weeks each, separated by a 12 week "breather" period.

*There will be One Trigger from Corporate VP probably a few days ahead of WHO official trigger.

* In each country where we operate, we will respond positively to government requests.

The link below only works if you copy and paste it on your addy bar.!.html

IBM: Building a Smarter Depopulation System
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 200,000 Americans may die in the next false flag operation
Post by: larsonstdoc on September 08, 2011, 09:12:28 am

  You know that Newt has the NWO's playbook---he's one of THEM.
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 200,000 Americans may die in the next false flag operation
Post by: Satyagraha on September 08, 2011, 09:50:35 am
Newt Gingrich said,
"the original goal was to have a Homeland Security Department
that could help us withstand up to three nuclear events in one morning"

Was anyone aware of this "original goal" of DHS?
Did we ever hear this before anywhere?
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 200,000 Americans may die in the next false flag operation
Post by: Satyagraha on September 08, 2011, 09:57:54 am
From: "Optimization Approaches to Decision Making
on Long-Term Cleanup and Site Restoration
Following a Nuclear or Radiological Terrorism Incident"
S. Y. Chen and Thomas S. Tenforde

Protective Actions and Guidelines

In the United States, federal agencies have been planning responses to nuclear emergencies for decades. 18 Historically the planning has focused primarily on emergencies involving accidental releases of radioactive materials, such as from nuclear power plants. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) first developed a Protective Actions Guide (PAG) manual in 1975. Following the Three Mile Island accident in 1979, President Carter issued an executive order establishing the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) as the lead agency coordinator for the nationís radiological emergency response and preparedness. Under the arrangement, EPA was assigned the task of establishing PAGs for radiological response planning, and it issued the Manual of Protective Action Guides and Protective Actions for Nuclear Incidents with input from other federal agencies. 19

Following the terrorism acts of September 11, 2001, DHS was created by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, which consolidated twenty-two agencies (including FEMA) into one single federal agency. DHS has a threefold mission: to lead the unified national effort to secure America; to prevent and deter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to the nation; and to secure the nationís borders while welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade. 20 The Top Official (TOPOFF) exercise, also directed by Congress in response to the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, was designed to strengthen the nation's capacity to prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from large-scale terrorist attacks involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD).


Still searching for a source that cites "three" nuclear events in "one morning"....nada.
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 200,000 Americans may die in the next false flag operation
Post by: Effie Trinket on October 09, 2014, 08:51:34 am
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 200,000 Americans may die in the next false flag operation
Post by: jofortruth on October 09, 2014, 09:57:44 am
More on Newt Gingrich:
Title: Re: Gingrich: Over 200,000 Americans may die in the next false flag operation
Post by: ncjoe on October 09, 2014, 10:57:06 am
what the Globalist want to do to America is simple answered...Look at China....China has been assimilated ...they want us chaining our kids to telephone poles while they work in a job that will never give them financial security...which is why their is suicide nets...they want to do to America whats already been don't to China...