PrisonPlanet Forum

9/11/2001 Attacks Were An Inside Job => Frozen CIA Operative Tim Osmon/Osama bin Laden is re-killed for another fake narrative => Topic started by: Dig on May 02, 2011, 05:02:42 pm

Title: Jane Lute, Henry Kissinger, John Hamre, and Max Boot plan on blowing shit up!
Post by: Dig on May 02, 2011, 05:02:42 pm
Homegrown 'terrorist' not Al Qaeda likely to attack soon!

5:10 p.m.-The FBI and Department of Homeland Security are warning law enforcement across the country that Osama bin Laden's death will likely inspire homegrown extremists in the U.S. to try to carry out attacks in the near-term.

Source:

http://www.9and10news.com/Category/Story/?id=289727&cID=1
Title: Re: Jane Lute, Henry Kissinger, John Hamre, and Max Boot plan on blowing shit up!
Post by: Dig on May 02, 2011, 05:07:41 pm
Absolute Proof CSIS is planning a coup d'etat in America
Consolidation of Power for seamless command and control takeover operations
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080606_managingthenextdomesticcatastrophe.pdf

(http://i56.tinypic.com/214sd3.png)


Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe: Ready (or not)?

Date: June 2008

Author: Christine E. Wormuth

Kissinger's Center for Strategic and International Studies

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080606_managingthenextdomesticcatastrophe.pdf

Summary of Key Points, Issues, Conclusions:

Even with the vast number of government agencies in place to assure America’s safety, the federal government and the nation are not ready for the next catastrophe.  There is still a great deal of confusion over who will be in charge during a disaster and no guidelines are in place to determine and assess the capabilities that states, cities, and towns should have to ensure they are prepared for the worst.  The improvements in preparedness are evident with several additions to federal government infrastructure.  

The Federal Emergency Management System (FEMA) has developed more than 200 prescripted mission assignments across 27 federal agencies to strengthen and streamline response capabilities in advance of actual events.  

The Department of Defense is creating a trained and ready Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management force that will be able to respond rapidly during a catastrophe.  As a means to progress the movement towards better homeland security and disaster preparedness,

the Center for Strategic and International studies has made several recommendations:  

(1) merge the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council into a single organization with a single staff,

(2) establish a clear chain of command inside the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to ensure that the Secretary can carry out his or her responsibility to serve as the federal government’s coordinator for incident management,

(3) state clearly that the Department of Defense will not have the lead in responding to catastrophic incidents but will be expected to play a substantial support role when needed, and

(4) create a partnership between the Office of Management and Budget and the NCS Strategic Planning Directorate to lead the development of integrated budget planning across homeland security mission areas.


Name of Researcher: Ashanti Z. Corey
Institution: Integrative Center for Homeland Security, Texas A&M University

Date Posted: July 23, 2008

http://homelandsecurity.tamu.edu/framework/homeland-security-overview/managing-the-next-domestic-catastrophe-ready-or-not.html/



About CSIS

In an era of ever-changing global opportunities and challenges, the Center for Strategic and Inter- national Studies (CSIS) provides strategic insights and practical policy solutions to decisionmakers. CSIS conducts research and analysis and develops policy initiatives that look into the future and anticipate change. Founded by David M. Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke at the height of the Cold War, CSIS was dedicated to the simple but urgent goal of finding ways for America to survive as a nation and prosper as a people. Since 1962, CSIS has grown to become one of the world’s preeminent public policy institutions. Today, CSIS is a bipartisan, nonprofit organization headquartered in Washington, D.C. More than 220 full-time staff and a large network of affiliated scholars focus their expertise on defense and security; on the world’s regions and the unique challenges inherent to them; and on the issues that know no boundary in an increasingly connected world. Former U.S. senator Sam Nunn became chairman of the CSIS Board of Trustees in 1999, and John J. Hamre has led CSIS as its president and chief executive officer since 2000.


Contents
Acknowledgments iv
Executive Summary vi

1. America Unprepared 1

2. Problematic Government Relationships 15

3. Immature Processes 42

4. Anemic Implementation 64

Appendix A: Summary of Report Recommendations 83
Appendix B: BG-N Phase 4 Working Group Members 86
Appendix C: Acronyms 87
Executive Summary

America is not ready for the next catastrophe. Almost seven years have passed since the nation was attacked here at home by violent Islamist extremists who remain free and who have made clear their willingness to use weapons of mass destruction against the United States, should they be able to acquire or build them. Almost three years have passed since Hurricane Katrina devas- tated the Gulf Coast and laid bare myriad flaws in the nation’s preparedness and response system. Simply creating the Homeland Security Council, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and U.S. Northern Command was not enough to make the country prepared. There are still no detailed, government-wide plans to respond to a catastrophe. There is still considerable confusion over who will be in charge during a disaster. There are still almost no dedicated military forces on rapid alert to respond to a crisis here at home.

There are still no guidelines to determine and assess the capabilities that states, cities, and towns should have to ensure they are prepared for the worst. To be sure, a number of significant steps have been taken, and the nation is clearly more prepared than it was seven or eight years ago. There is a National Homeland Security Strategy that provides overall direction for the federal government’s homeland security policies and programs. Hundreds, if not thousands, more people focus each and every day on improving national preparedness than before the September 11 attacks.

A National Response Framework describes how the federal government will work with state, local and tribal governments as well as the private sector and nongovernmental organizations during domestic incidents. Fifteen National Planning Scenarios have been drawn up to guide government planning for catastrophes. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) has developed more than 200 prescripted mission as- signments across 27 federal agencies to strengthen and streamline response capabilities in advance of actual events. The Department of Defense is creating a trained and ready Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosives (CBRNE) Consequence Management force that will be able to respond rapidly during a catastrophe, and the National Guard has almost completed its development of 17 CBRNE Emergency Response Forces spread around the country to help bridge the gap between the immediate response to a crisis and the arrival of more extensive federal capabilities.

Although significant progress has been made in the past several years– with many achievements extremely hard-won, through the tireless work of senior leaders and public servants across the government—what ultimately matters to the American public is not how far we have come but how far away we still are from being prepared for the next catastrophe. The task of readying America to face the threats of the post–September 11 era is an enormous one and poses a fundamental challenge for the next President.

Preventing, protecting against, preparing for, and responding to a domestic catastrophe are basic tasks of government at all levels. Unfortunately, today’s efforts to provide homeland security, particularly at the federal level, are not unlike the governmental equivalent of a children’s soccer game. One can see a tremendous amount of activity under way and considerable energy on the field, but the movements are often not very well coordinated. Players tend to huddle around the ball—in this case, whatever happens to be the crisis or headline issue of the day—and follow it wherever it goes, even if in doing so they neglect their assigned positions. In such an environment, it is not impossible to score a goal, but that outcome is usually due more to luck than to skill. Given that this is not a competition the nation can afford to lose, what can be done to improve America’s odds?

The key for the next Administration will be to bring order to the relationships, processes, and implementation of its homeland security system. Which organizations at the federal, state, and local level will perform what roles, who is the lead official at each level of the response, and how do all the players work together as a team? What processes should guide how stakeholders interact and ensure that everyone is working toward the same goals? What plans are needed to prepare the government to deal effectively with future catastrophes, and how should government at all levels decide what it needs so that it can execute those plans? Finally, how can the government translate its strategies and plans into trained and ready capabilities on the ground that can be deployed effectively in accordance with comprehensive, integrated plans developed in advance of a specific catastrophe?

Many of the building blocks required to move the country toward being truly prepared to handle a catastrophe already exist in some form, but the next Administration needs to bring the pieces together, fill in the gaps, and provide the resources necessary to get the job done. If implemented, the following major recommendations –slightly condensed from their full discussion in the body of this report—would go a long way toward getting America ready to manage the next domestic catastrophe, whatever form it might take.



Recommendations

■ Merge the National Security Council and Homeland Security Council into a single organization with a single staff.

The U.S. government has artificially separated homeland security from national security. Securing the homeland is a matter of national security—and it has both domestic and international components. Dividing homeland security from national security has resulted in fractured, partial solu- tions and has greatly weakened the ability of the federal government to generate unity of effort. Merging the National Security and Homeland Security Councils and their staffs will greatly enhance the federal government’s ability to develop holistic strategies and policies, and it will ensure that the homeland security aspects of national security policy are also supported by the political and bureaucratic power of the White House.

■ Establish a clear chain of command inside DHS to ensure that the Secretary can carry out his or her responsibility to serve as the federal government’s coordinator for incident management.

The relationship between DHS and FEMA continues to be murky and confusing. If the Hurricane Katrina experience showed anything, it illustrated the perils of not having a clear understanding of who is in charge of what—both in Washington and in the field—during a catastrophe. The absence of a clear framework for the DHS-FEMA relationship has had an extremely pernicious effect on homeland security policy in the past several years and has noticeably hampered the federal government’s efforts to improve preparedness. The next Administration and Congress should work together to put into a law a clear chain of command, from the President down to the field level, for the coordination of domestic incidents.

Under this new clarified framework, the Secretary of Homeland Security will serve as the principal federal coordinator of domestic incidents as directed in Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 5, “Management of Domestic Incidents,” and will report directly to the President. While the FEMA Administrator should be able to advise the President directly on the subset of emergency management matters, as specified in law, the operational chain of command for the overall incident should run from the President to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and then within DHS from the Secretary to the FEMA Administrator. In the field, the DHS chain of command during an incident should extend to the 10 FEMA Regional Administrators, who would execute their responsibilities on the ground through designated “Lead Federal Coordinators,” as discussed in more detail in the following recommendation. During a catastrophe, the Lead Federal Coordinator would be the single federal official on the ground responsible for coordinating the overall federal effort with all of the other response efforts.

■ Consolidate the positions of Principal Federal Official and Federal Coordinating Officer into the single position of Lead Federal Coordinator, who would report through the FEMA Administrator to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

During and after a catastrophe, there must be one DHS official on the ground, responsible to the President and accountable for the agency’s performance. It makes no sense to have a Principal Federal Official (PFO) who reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security and lacks line authority over a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) who reports to the FEMA Administrator, particularly when the FEMA Administrator works for the Secretary and FEMA is part of DHS. The continuing existence of the PFO and FCO positions perpetuates confusion at all levels—federal, state, local—and indeed reflects the larger DHS-FEMA bureaucratic battle. It is time for this battle to end. As the relationship between DHS and FEMA is restructured, the PFO and FCO positions should be eliminated in the National Response Framework and in statute, respectively, and replaced with a single position: Lead Federal Coordinator (LFC). In practice the LFCs should typically be very senior officials in each of the 10 FEMA regional offices and they should have the authorities of the FCO as described in the Stafford Act of 1988. Ensuring that there is a single DHS senior official on the ground during a crisis—who reports through the Secretary to the President, who has the power to coordinate and distribute federal assistance (whether directly or through delegation of authority), and who already knows the state and local players—would greatly increase unity of effort.

■ State clearly that the Department of Defense will not have the lead in responding to catastrophic incidents but will be expected to play a substantial support role when needed.

The persistent debate about whether the Department of Defense (DoD) should ever lead the response to a catastrophe instead of DHS should be settled. The next Administration should restate emphatically that DHS will be the Lead Federal Coordinator during domestic incidents, but should also make clear that DoD will be expected to play a significant supporting role in catastrophes, working within the HSPD-5 framework. As outlined in the National Response Framework, the federal government should have a single, scalable framework for incident management, led by a single federal agency. The nation cannot afford to have one system for 98 percent of all events, and a different, DoD-led system for the 2 percent of events that are “high end.” At the same time, the next Administration should make very clear that DoD will no longer hold the civil support mission at arm’s length and will be expected to play a very significant supporting role in the aftermath of a catastrophic event—a role that will require that DoD resource, train, and equip its forces accordingly.

■ Initiate a robust dialogue on the subject of how to balance the need to enable the federal government to directly employ federal resources within a state or states during the most extreme circumstances with the constitutional rights of states.

The idea of expanding the role of the federal government during a domestic catastrophe is anathema to many in the homeland security community; but in light of the threats faced by the nation in the post–September 11 environment, it is only prudent to ensure that the country’s preparedness system includes the ability of the federal government to exercise its full authority under the law to save lives and protect property during a major disaster. It is not impossible to imagine scenarios in which state leadership is severely weakened in its ability to orchestrate an effective response effort, or others in which the state leadership is in place but the state’s capacity to execute decisions made by those leaders is severely degraded. In such instances, it may be appropriate for the federal government to exercise the authority granted to it under the Stafford Act more fully than is envisioned today.

The goal of adapting the current system is not to enable the federal government to “take over” management of a catastrophe over the objections of a state governor, but rather to develop an understanding with state governors in advance about the conditions under which the federal government might need to directly employ federal resources within a state or states in the most extreme circumstances in order to execute its responsibility to save lives and protect property. The principle of managing a crisis at the lowest level of government possible should remain a fundamental feature of the American approach to domestic emergency management. At the same time, the next Secretary of Homeland Security, with the President’s strong backing, should work closely with state governors to begin exploring how the current system could be adapted in a mutually acceptable way that balances the need to fully empower the federal government under existing law with maintenance of the constitutional right of states to self-governance during a catastrophe.

■ Conduct a Quadrennial National Security Review and create a National Security Planning Guidance.

There is growing consensus that the federal government needs a mechanism to develop an inte- grated set of national security priorities, assess trade-offs among these different priorities, and assign roles and responsibilities for these priorities across the interagency. To achieve these objectives, the next Administration should direct the National Security Council (NSC) to lead a Quadrennial National Security Review (QNSR) in the first few months of the new term. The review would engage the relevant national security agencies, focus on a select set of critical national security priorities, and produce two major documents: an integrated National Security Planning Guidance and a public National Security Strategy, both of which would include treatment of homeland security issues. The National Security Planning Guidance would elaborate on the broad priorities articulated in the QNSR; provide more specific guidance on priorities, roles, and missions; and lay out timelines for the implementation of major planning objectives. In addition, the planning guidance would be the starting point for Cabinet agencies to develop their own more detailed strategies.

■ Create a Senior Director for Strategic Planning within the merged NSC to lead interagency strategic planning efforts and oversee their implementation.

The federal government cannot develop or implement the kinds of integrated national security strategies and programs that are needed to meet the challenges of the 21st-century security environment in the absence of strong leadership and coordination at the White House level. As part of the NSC, the next President should create and empower a robust strategic planning directorate, led by a Senior Director for Strategic Planning. Rather than relying on the 1- to 2-person strategic planning offices that have sometimes been a part of the NSC organization, the next President and National Security Adviser need at least 10–15 people leading strategic planning efforts on a daily basis. This office should be responsible for leading the QNSR and developing the National Secu- rity Planning Guidance. This office also should be responsible for guiding the interagency process to develop detailed plans for responding to catastrophic events, as well as the associated effort to develop requirements for catastrophe response at the federal level that are then fed into the federal budget process.

■ Establish a robust interagency organization overseen by the NSC but housed at DHS that is responsible for the development of integrated and detailed interagency plans and for identification of specific requirements for the federal departments.

Although considerable progress has been made in 2007 and 2008, the federal government still does not have a set of detailed interagency plans associated with the 15 National Planning Sce- narios. The next Administration should establish a strong interagency organization—closely overseen by the NSC Strategic Planning Directorate but housed at DHS—that is responsible on a daily basis for developing integrated, interagency operational plans for responding to catastrophic events. These plans would be updated regularly, perhaps every year or two. Creating such plans is one of the most important steps that the federal government can take to improve national readiness, and the interagency organization should be backed strongly by the NSC, should be staffed with the best possible personnel with planning expertise, and should be high on the radar screen of the next Secretary of Homeland Security. Complementing its deliberate planning function, it should be focal point for identifying specific requirements for federal departments, which are then validated by the relevant agencies and fed into their internal resourcing systems.

■ Create a partnership between the Office of Management and Budget and the NSC Strategic Planning Directorate to lead the development of integrated budget planning across homeland security mission areas.

To more fully integrate the implementation of homeland security policy, the next Administration should develop a partnership between the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the NSC Strategic Planning Directorate charged with devising a method of examining budgets across homeland security mission areas. This process should entail a front-end review of agency budget proposals in the planning stages, across mission areas and programs to identify priorities, capability gaps, overlaps, and shortfalls at the outset of the budget cycle. This partnership will require that NSC and OMB begin reviewing the agency budget plans together over the course of the summer before the President’s budget is submitted. The final budget submission to Congress could then include proposals presented not only by mission area but also by major programs that support the mission requirements. Participating NSC staff, taking the lead role, should be drawn mainly from the Strategic Planning Directorate but should also include other members of the NSC staff with deep knowledge of the particular subject matter areas. To facilitate this integrated review across mission areas, a new OMB staff group with significant policy expertise and cross-agency purview should be developed and should play a major role in the process.

■ Substantially revise the Target Capabilities List.

The federal government has directed state and local governments today to focus their preparedness investments on 37 target capabilities, but the target capability levels do not differentiate between big cities, smaller cities, small towns, and rural areas. Nor is there very clear guidance on how to measure whether state and local jurisdictions have achieved the prescribed target capability levels. The next Secretary of Homeland Security and FEMA Administrator should build on work that is just getting under way in FEMA to substantially revise the Target Capabilities List (TCL) so that desired target capabilities levels are linked to different types of jurisdictions and the guidelines provided differentiate between cities and towns around the country in terms of area, population size and density, numbers of potential high-risk targets, and other factors.

This effort should also clearly describe performance objectives for target capabilities in commonsense terms, linking those objectives to the particular needs of different sizes and types of jurisdictions. Equally important, a revised TCL will specify how progress toward those objectives will be judged. Once the objectives and evaluative measures are developed, DHS and state and local governments will have an agreed-on basis for assessing capability development, something that does not exist today. Particularly in light of the great dissatisfaction expressed by many state and local officials with the consultation process for the original TCL, published as part of the National Preparedness Guidelines, it is critically important that FEMA to adopt a truly collaborative process in undertaking this revision.

■ Reform the DHS grants program to be a flagship component of DHS that is well managed, transparent, highly credible, and tightly linked to federal priorities.

The DHS grants program and the organization within the department that administers the program will inevitably be crucial to DHS’s success in building preparedness at the state and local levels. Recognizing that the grants program and its administration contribute strongly to how DHS is viewed beyond the Beltway, the next Secretary and FEMA Administrator should make reforming the grant program a high priority. The FEMA regional offices should become in effect the front lines of the grant program process, as they are much closer to the state and local grant recipients than is DHS headquarters in Washington. Central to the reform effort should be linking the grant program more tightly to the strategic priorities outlined in policy guidance documents such as the Guidelines and a revised Target Capabilities List. Grant applications should explain how proposed investments will achieve target capability levels, grant recipients should report progress toward target capabilities using agreed-on evaluative measures contained in a revised TCL, and federal evaluations should be undertaken in addition to the self-assessment process, perhaps as a condition of grant eligibility.

■ Host a catastrophic event tabletop exercise for very senior officials early in each new Administration.

The new Administration should bring together its Cabinet officials for a tabletop exercise focused on managing a catastrophic event in the first 60 days of the new term. Such an exercise would force Cabinet officials to become familiar with their basic homeland security responsibilities and would give them all a better understanding of the scope and type of challenges the federal gov- ernment would likely face should some catastrophe occur. This kind of exercise also would help spur Cabinet Secretaries toward focusing their agencies on critical vulnerabilities early in the next Administration.

■ Reform TOPOFF to make it much closer to a “no-notice” exercise.

Because it involves extensive advance coordination, TOPOFF—the “top officials” capstone exercise—may not offer sufficient insight into the nation’s overall preparedness for catastrophic events. Only an exercise that is “no-notice,” or close to it, will provide an accurate picture of how well the federal government can coordinate its own efforts internally and work collaboratively with state and local governments as it responds to a catastrophe. Given the practical challenges associated with major field exercises, it may be useful to focus initially on holding no-notice tabletop exer- cises at the federal and state government level to test decisionmaking and coordination processes before determining whether it is possible to proceed to a full-fledged no-notice field exercise.

■ Complete and expand the existing effort to create homeland security regional hubs that leverage the resources of the FEMA regional offices.

Common sense dictates that leaders in Washington, D.C., cannot directly manage the response to a catastrophe taking place hundreds or thousands of miles away. FEMA’s recent initiatives to rein- vigorate its regional offices and make them the essential link between Washington and the field are critical and must be fully implemented. Without this connective tissue between Washington and the state and local levels, it will be difficult, if not impossible, to realize any meaningful vision of national preparedness. The FEMA regional offices should be responsible for developing regional strategies and plans, functioning as a one-stop shop for preparedness activities and the grant programs, and building on existing regional collaborative structures. To ensure that the regional offices can be fully effective, the next Administration should establish requirements making them the principal coordinators for federal agencies in the field. Finally, a very senior official in each regional office with bureaucratic, operational, and “Washington” skills should be predesignated as the Lead Federal Coordinator for each region.

■ Create regional homeland security task forces, drawn largely from existing National Guard units, to complement the regional homeland security hubs.

Creating regional homeland security task forces from existing National Guard units would provide a military complement to the FEMA regional offices. The next Secretary of Defense and Chief of the National Guard Bureau should work closely with governors and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM) to organize National Guard–led homeland security task forces in each region. Not only would these task forces create a focal point for regional military planning, exercising, and training, they would ensure that each region of the country has a rapid response force able to help bridge the three- to five-day gap between the immediate aftermath of an event, when local first responders are the only capabilities on the scene, and the arrival of most federal capabilities.

■ Implement and fund a strengthened version of the National Security Professional Program and fund and implement an expanded DHS professional development and education system.

The next Administration needs to beef up the requirements in the National Security Professional Program and provide additional resources for implementing Executive Order 13434, which created it. Without a workforce that has the skills and experience to operate across all the dimensions of homeland security—prevention, protection, preparedness, response, and recovery—the nation will not be able to protect itself against future catastrophes or manage them when they do happen. Rotation through different positions in the government to gain core competencies needs to be linked explicitly to eligibility for career advancement, as it was for uniformed military officers as part of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act.

Ideally, the professional development and education program envisioned in the executive order would also include opportunities for state- and local-level personnel to serve in the federal government. To support these rotational assignments and build a robust system of training and professional education, the next Administration should work with Congress to mandate that participating agencies fund a 3–5 percent personnel float. Complementing professional development at the interagency level, the next Secretary of Homeland Security should ensure that the DHS Learning and Development Strategy is appropriately funded and implemented, expand current education and development plans, and engage institutions of higher learning in a dialogue about future needs for homeland security professionals.
Title: Re: Jane Lute, Henry Kissinger, John Hamre, and Max Boot plan on blowing shit up!
Post by: Dig on May 02, 2011, 05:08:33 pm
ALL OF YOU WHO SERVE THE SYSTEM, YOU ARE WITH THE AMERICAN PEOPLE WHETHER YOU REALIZE IT OR NOT!  STOP SERVING YOUR MURDEROUS BOSSES!  YOU ARE HITLERS SA IN THE 21ST CENTURY.  YOU ARE BEING TOLD THAT YOU NEED TO GIVE UP YOUR RIGHTS (PRIVACY/RIGHT TO BE LEFT ALONE) IN ORDER TO HAVE GREATER SECURITY.  I AM NOT SAYING THIS, YOUR OWN CRIMINAL LED GOVT. PUPPET BOSSES ARE TELLING YOU THEMSELVES!  WAKE THE F*CK UP!!!

http://washingtontechnology.com/articles/2009/07/01/dhs-expanding-data-collection-on-employees.aspx

DHS requires more personal information from employees, contractors

New data elements include financial history and mother's maiden name


    * By Alice Lipowicz
    * Jul 01, 2009

The Homeland Security Department is updating and expanding its record collection to include new categories of personal information on all employees, contractors and volunteers who regularly need access to DHS facilities. The new categories of information include maiden name, mother's maiden name, clearance level, identifying physical information, financial history, duty date and weapons-bearer designation, states a Federal Register notice on June 25 .

Other information to be collected includes date of birth, Social Security Number, organizational and employee affiliations, fingerprints, digital color photograph, digital signature and telephone phone numbers.

The Personal Identity Verification Management System is being updated to support implementation of the Homeland Security Presidential Directive 12 that covers physical and logical access to federal facilities. Public comment will be taken until July 27.

The system covers all DHS employees, contractors and their employees, consultants and volunteers who require long-term access to DHS facilities and computer systems, the department said. The system also has been expanded to cover federal emergency responders, foreign nationals on assignment and other federal employees detailed to DHS.

Personal information that is provided to DHS may be shared in DHS, as well as with appropriate federal, state, local and tribal agencies on a need-to-know basis, the notice states.
_________________________________________________________
http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2009/E9-14905.htm

[Federal Register: June 25, 2009 (Volume 74, Number 121)]
[Notices]              
[Page 30301-30305]
From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov]
[DOCID:fr25jn09-49]                        


DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Office of the Secretary
[Docket No. DHS-2008-0167]
Privacy Act of 1974; DHS/All--026 Personal Identity Verification
Management System Systems of Records
AGENCY: Privacy Office; DHS.
ACTION: Notice of Privacy Act system of records.

Title: Re: Jane Lute, Henry Kissinger, John Hamre, and Max Boot plan on blowing shit up!
Post by: Dig on May 02, 2011, 05:09:06 pm
Integrating USAID and DOS:
The Future of Development and Diplomacy

Project on National Security Reform
Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs
June 2009
http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PCAAC016.pdf


Charles R. Cutshall
Dustin C. Emery
Daniel J. Fitzpatrick
Sarah J. Hammer
Leslie J. Kelley
Kirill Meleshevich


EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In order to undertake any reform of a governmental agency, particularly one as large as the Department of State (DOS), it is imperative that previous attempts at reform be studied in depth to determine which factors are most likely to drive such initiatives to succeed or fail. To identify lessons useful to the creation of a Next Generation Department of State (Next-Gen DOS), major reform efforts in the last fifty years were reviewed, from the creation of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 through the 2006 Transformational Diplomacy efforts under Secretary Rice.

Each of these eight efforts represents a governmental response to changing circumstances in the world, domestic political structure, or political rhetoric regarding the place of development in national strategic policies. While a distinct global and national political climate may have influenced each initiative, certain general lessons can be learned from their undertaking. Our findings suggest that reforming the provision of foreign assistance by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and DOS depends upon the following:

1. Early engagement of a broad range of stakeholders
2. Presidential support and White House involvement
3. Active and early participation of Congress
4. Timing
5. Scale of reform
6. Clear roadmaps and well-detailed polices
7. Consistent message
8. Bureaucratic loyalties

At least in the foreign policy arena, the Obama administration is on the precipice of the change sought during their campaign. Coming into office while the previous administration’s foreign assistance framework is still in its developing stages gives the Obama administration the opportunity to make whatever changes they deem necessary to move foreign assistance in any direction they choose. While specifics about President Obama’s foreign policy are still unclear, they have the opportunity to initiate debate and participate rigorously in a major transformation in the provision of foreign assistance. With the growing belief that no longer will patchwork efforts at reform be sufficient, the FAA’s problems cannot be fixed in piecemeal fashion. President Obama is on time to bring together the current reform efforts in Congress with nongovernmental organizations, academics, and the private sector and engage these key players in a vigorous debate over the details of this much needed reform.

Foreign aid is arguably the most effective tool at the disposal of the US government to encourage social, economic and governmental development abroad. As a part of foreign policy, development is inherently linked to diplomacy. The relationship between the two, however, has not been a stagnant one. The current  strategic environment regarding the relationship between development and diplomacy was defined in major ways by the two terms of the Bush administration. To understand how that relationship is changing now, it is necessary to analyze the baseline for that change.

The 2002 National Security Strategy, and its official elevation of development to an equal pillar of national security, alongside diplomacy and defense resulted in the gradual militarization of aid. Although the total resources allocated for development increased significantly as a result of the new policy, a large part of this aid was delivered by the Department of Defense (DOD), rather than civilian agencies. The militarization of aid is not optimal, insomuch as it greatly expands the responsibility of the military, decreases the civilian face of aid, puts aid workers in harm’s way, and sacrifices some efficacy of aid delivery. The 2006 Rice Reform affected the relationship of development and diplomacy by creating the Director of Foreign Assistance, a position intended to better align to operations of USAID and DOS. Due to the fact that the reforms have not been fully implemented yet, their affects are still to be realized. An electronic information sharing system, the categorization of countries based on necessity for aid, and deployment of Foreign Service Officers to critical countries all attempt to bring greater cohesion to the US foreign assistance programs. These reforms, however, lacked fiscal support and made no attempt to demilitarize aid.

The Obama Administration will, of course, influence the relationship between development and diplomacy. The administration came into office at a time when the US is involved in two military engagements abroad, a failing economy, and unease regarding other domestic and foreign issues. To date, the administration has not taken a public stance on development and diplomacy. Despite the lack of an official statement from the White House, testimony, budget requests, and speeches by Cabinet-level officials provide a foundation for a better understanding of the new administration’s intentions.

Thus far, it appears that this direction will most likely strengthen “soft power,” demilitarize foreign aid, expand the number of Foreign Service Officers and civilian development personnel, integrate the foreign assistance structure of the government, and create a closer cooperation with Congress. Ultimately, this shift will be one towards “smart power” – the use of a variety of diplomatic tools to encourage US interests abroad. The changing relationship between development and diplomacy will have major implication for the shape and scope of the Next-Gen DOS.

Through the effective use of its authorities, Congress may play a significant role in making foreign policy. The main legislative vehicle for foreign assistance for the last five decades has been the FAA. Due, however, to acts of the legislature, the executive, and the nature of the political environment, the system through which  foreign assistance programs are authorized and funded has become fractured, dysfunctional, and outdated.  Originally designed in the shadow of World War II, with the threat of communism looming large, the FAA was the cornerstone of what President Kennedy referred to as the ‘Decade of Development.’ The “careful planning” which the Kennedy administration and the 87 th Congress intended to exist with regard to foreign assistance and development has been effectively laid to waste by, among other things, the effects of a revised budget process on authorization and appropriation committees, congressional earmarks, directives, sanctions, and inadequate or weak oversight of foreign aid programs.

In terms of further integration of USAID and DOS, Executive/Legislative tensions and the continuation of ineffective congressional oversight procedures serve as impediments to future reform. Whether it is a lack of understanding of each other’s roles, fears of ceding too much power to another body, or both, Congress and the Executive have promoted an uncoordinated and ineffective strategy for foreign assistance. Legislative restrictions and procedural requirements are used as tools by Congress to limit Executive flexibility. Similarly, the Executive works to develop new initiatives and other methods to gain more control over aid distribution. The lack of coordination between these two powers stands as a major barrier to the development of a comprehensive national strategy for foreign aid. Without a partnership between Congress and the Executive, it will be difficult to develop the support needed to integrate USAID and DOS. Legislative oversight has changed over the years and now lacks an overall strategic vision and attempts to retain control over aid providers through managing the appropriations process in excessive detail. The focus on appropriations, while neglecting the enactment of comprehensive authorizing legislation, has led to a disjointed approach to foreign aid policy and a dependence on earmarks and directives to limit the actions of the Executive. Furthermore, little legislative action by Congress has centered on the creation of new initiatives, while failing to reevaluate existing programs. This has led to the existence of agencies with overlapping mandates and an overall system that promotes an inconsistent and uncoordinated approach to foreign aid. In order for the effective consolidation of USAID and DOS, Congressional oversight must change to promote a broad strategic vision for foreign aid and remove funding restrictions that limit agency flexibility.

As a widely discussed alternative to USAID/DOS integration, the idea of moving development to a Cabinet-level post has received support from aid reform researchers and members of Congress. While this proposal aims to solve aid agency fragmentation and provide an increased role to development, removing USAID from DOS would require substantial coordination between the executive branch, Congress, USAID leadership, the Secretary of State and various other parties. The level of coordination required to implement such a reform limits the likelihood of success. This is due to an inherent connection between the missions of USAID and DOS, a lack of coordination between Congress and the Executive to develop the necessary legislation to pass such a proposal, entrenched interests by foreign aid agencies and uncertain reform outcomes.
 
The integration of USAID into DOS will require the involvement of the White House, Congress, relevant governmental entities, and other key stakeholders. It will, in the long-term, necessitate a comprehensive rewrite of existing legislation on the provision of foreign assistance. The full report, Integrating USAID and DOS: The Future of Development and Diplomacy, includes a comprehensive roadmap outlining the key measures that should be considered when moving forward with this process. The report includes actions that must be taken by both the President and Congress, recommends ways to encourage ownership of the process by the personnel of affected organizations, highlights key funding measures needed to ensure meaningful change, suggests the creation of a new Under Secretary of Development, provides methods for better integration, and lays out an organizational structure that will better align the mission and vision of foreign assistance.
Title: Re: Jane Lute, Henry Kissinger, John Hamre, and Max Boot plan on blowing shit up!
Post by: Dig on May 02, 2011, 05:09:33 pm
SMART SECURITY 2010
May 24-25, 2010
NRECA Conference Center, Arlington, VA
Towards Seamless Interoperability and Trust
The Intersection between Homeland Security and Homeland Defense

http://www.ideea.com/SmartSecurity2010/

PARTNERSHIP FOR A SAFER SOCIETY

SEVENTY YEARS at the forefront of technology has taught us a thing or two. Such as how to develop cost-effective solutions that provide countries with the capabilities to protect themselves against various kinds of threats. But threat profiles are constantly evolving, and much of our work today concerns developing technology for the increasing demands for security in the civil sector. It’s about network-based solutions that improve flows or safeguard buildings. Solutions that enable threats to be discovered before they develop into catastrophes – and that provide the tools for handling crises more effectively. In brief – solutions for partnership. Partnership for a safer society.

SMART SECURITY 2010
T a b l e o f C o n t e n t s
Schedule of Events 2 - 7
Sponsors 8
Speaker Biographies 10-16
Smart Security 2010 Management

Corporate Patrons

PLATINIUM
CSC

GOLD
SAAB

SILVER
UKTI

SPONSORS
OPERATIONAL RESEARCH CONSULTANTS
CHRISTINE ROBINSON & ASSOCIATES LLC INTELLIGENT COMMUNITY FORUM
WORKFLOW MANAGEMENT CONSORTIUM

SUPPORTERS
MARYLAND DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
CENTER FOR ADVANCED DEFENSE STUDIES
COMMON DEFENSE QUARTERLY

Organizer:
IDEEA, Inc.
6233 Nelway Drive
McLean, VA 22101-3141
Tel: 703 760 0762 Fax: 703 760 0764
Individuals with disabilities requiring special
accommodations should contact Quentin
Whiteree at (703) 760 0762 at least two weeks
prior to the event.
Smart Security 2010 Handbook
Editor-in-Chief
Quentin Whiteree
Editor
Carole H. Whiteree
Marketing
Emma Lynch

S c h e d u l e o f E v e n t s
DAY ONE – MAY 24th, 2010:
0815-0830 WELCOME
 Congressman Jim Moran
0830-0900 MULTI-AGENCY COLLABORATION; BEYOND 9/11 AT THE PENTAGON
 James Schwartz, Fire Chief, Arlington County
Introduced by Mary Hynes, Arlington County Board
0900-0915 BREAK
0915-1015 SECURING THE NATION
 Todd Keil, Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection, U.S. DHS
 Prof. Adam Ogilvie-Smith, Office for Security & Counter Terrorism, Home Office, UK
1015-1045 OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR
 Dr. Thomas Cellucci, Chief Commercialization Officer, Science & Technology
Directorate, DHS
1045-1115 THE TECHNOLOGY OF TERROR
 Aaron B. Fuller III, President, Enforcement, Security & Intelligence, N.American Public Sector, CSC
1115-1230 CYBERSECURITY AND THE PROTECTION OF THE HOMELAND
 Don Kent, VP of Government Relations, Navigators Global LLC
 Jenny Menna, Critical Infrastructure Cyber Protection & Awareness and Global Cyber
Security, National Cyber Security Division, (NCSD), DHS
 L. Russell Records, Chief Technology Officer, CENR, CSC
 Dr. Peter Sharfman, Director, Policy Analysis, MITRE Corporation
Moderated by: Sam Visner, VP, Strategy and Bus. Dev., Enforcement, Sec. and Intel.
Division, CSC Page 5

Terry Shear
Homeland Security Sector Specialist
Tel: 202 588 6670
Email:[email protected]
Ryan Nalty
Business Development Associate
Tel: 202 588 6691
Email: [email protected] Page 6

SMART SECURITY 2010

1230-1400 LUNCHEON: KEYNOTE: TECHNOLOGY – LEADING THE WAY TOWARD A
SECURE FUTURE
 Christine Wormuth, Principal Dep. Asst Sec for Homeland Defense DoD
1400-1430 HEART OF THE NATION – THE NATIONAL CAPITAL AREA
 Maj.Gen. Kathleen Fick, Director of Intelligence, National Guard Bureau
Introduced by Vance Renfroe, President, Renfroe Associates International
1430-1500 POPULATION RESILIENCY
 Brian Kamoie, JD, MPH, Senior Director for Preparedness Policy, National Security Staff, The White House
Introduced by Christine F. Robinson, Principal, Christine Robinson & Associates
1500-1615 ENABLING TECHNOLOGY FROM GOVERNMENT LABS
 Hon. Jay M. Cohen, The Chertoff Group
 Dr. Mark S. Maurice, Manager, International Programs, Air Force Research Laboratory
1615-1700 PEOPLE CENTRIC SECURITY – THE HUMAN SCIENCES
 David E.A. Johnson, Executive Director, CADS
 Rafi Sela, President, AR Challenges, Israel, United States & Canada
1700-1830 CONFERENCE RECEPTION
Martin O’Malley, Governor• Anthony G. Brown, Lt. Governor Department of Business and Economic Development
Mario Armstrong, NPR/CNN Tech Guru
DAY TWO – MAY 25th, 2010
0800-0830 KEYNOTE
 Dennis Wisnosky, Chief Technical Officer & Chief Architect of Business Mission Area,
OSD, DCMO
0830-0900 EXPERIENCES FROM OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES
 MGen. Gabriele Salvestroni, Def. & Def. Cooperation Attache, Embassy of Italy
0900-0930 HARNESSING GOVERNMENT & COMMERCIAL EXPERTISE
 Jan Wiberg, Director of the Security Product Portfolio SAAB Security
Moderator: Rosemary Budd, President, Ft. Meade Alliance
0930-1000 TECHNOLOGY DRIVERS FOR FUTURE PROGRAMS
 David Shepherd, Program Manager, Threat Vectors Analysis, DHS
 Stephen Swain, CEO, Security Innovation & Technology Consortium, Shrivenham, UK
Moderator: Rosemary Budd, President, Ft. Meade Alliance
1000-1030 FEDERATED IDENTITY
 Daniel E. Turissini, CEO, Operational Research Consultants, Inc.
Moderator: Rosemary Budd, President, Ft. Meade Alliance
1030-1045 BREAK
1045-1215 DEVELOPING THE TOOLSETS FOR INTEROPERABILITY
 Pisey Frederick, NTAC Fellow for National Information Exchange Model (NIEM)
 John Osterholz, VP, Cyber Warfare & Cyber Security, BAE Systems
 Riley Repko, Senior Advisor, Cyber Operations & Transformation for Air Force
Moderator: Nathaniel Palmer, Chief BPM Strategist, SRA International, Inc.Page 9
1230-1400 LUNCH – CYBER SECURITY IN THE AIR FORCE
 LTGEN. William T. Lord, USAF, Chief of Warfighting Integration and Chief Information
Officer, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force
1400-1500 INTER-AGENCY, INTER-GOVERNMENT INFORMATION EXCHANGE:
PERSPECTIVES
 INDUSTRY: Terry Morgan, Chairman, Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium
 SECURITY: Peter Varnish, OBE, Geopolitical Solutions Ltd
1500-1600 BRIEFING: PROTECTION OF THE AIRSPACE
 Patricia Craighill, Assistant Director, NEXTGEN JPDO & Special advisor to the SAF/XC
 William Oliver, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of Air & Marine, DHS



S p e a k e r s
The real Al-Qaeda

Rosemary M. Budd, Principal, Booz Allen Hamilton - North East (NE) Director – BRAC and Cybersecurity has 30+ years experience as a contractor in the U.S. Federal Government Intelligence and Defense Communities. She has a strong technical background in communications and networking for key mission systems. Rosemary is responsible for the Booz Allen implementation of NE BRAC and Cyber efforts. Ms. Budd earned M.S. and B.S. degrees in Computer Science from the University of Maryland. She serves as the President of the Ft. Meade Alliance (FMA), is Chairman of the FMA Executive Committee and Board of Directors; a member of the Board of Directors for the Maryland Tech Council and Central Maryland Regional Transit organizations. For the Central MD AFCEA chapter, Ms. Budd served as Vice President of Programs and Out- reach; and is a co-founder of the Women in Intelligence Group (WIIG). Ms. Budd is a member of the BWI Business Partnership.

Thomas A. Cellucci, PhD, MBA, accepted a five-year appointment from the Department of Homeland Security in August 2007 as the federal Government’s first Chief Com- mercialization Officer (CCO). He is responsible for initiatives that identify, evaluate and commercialize technology for the specific goal of rapidly developing and deploying products and services that meet the specific operational requirements of the DHS’s Operating Components and other DHS stakeholders such as First Responders and Critical Infrastructure/Key Resources owners and operators. Dr. Cellucci has also developed and continues to drive the implementation of DHS-S&T’s outreach with the private sector to establish and foster mutually ben- eficial working relationships to facilitate cost-effective and efficient product/service development efforts. This led to the establishment of the DHS-S&T Commercialization Office in October, 2008. Cellucci earned a PhD in Physical Chemistry from the University of Pennsylvania, an MBA from Rutgers University and a BS in Chemistry from Fordham University.

Hon. Jay M. Cohen, Rear Admiral, USN (ret.) was commissioned in 1968 upon graduation from the United States Naval Academy. He holds a joint Ocean Engineering degree from Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution and Master of Science in Marine Engineering and Naval Architecture from MIT. Cohen was promoted to the rank of Rear Admiral in October 1997 and reported to the Joint Staff as Deputy Director for Operations. In June 1999, he assumed duties as Director Navy Y2K Project Office responsible for transitioning all Navy computer systems into the new century. After an unprecedented five and a half year assignment as Chief of Naval Research, Rear Admiral Cohen retired from the Navy on February 1, 2006. Cohen was sworn in as Under Secretary for Science & Technology at the Department of Homeland Security (responsible for DHS Research, Development, Test and Evaluation) on August 10, 2006. Since leaving government, Rear Admiral Cohen is now a principal in The Chertoff Group, serves on numerous corporate boards and is CEO of JayMCohen LLC.

Pisey Fredrick was recently the NTAC Fellow for NIEM, NIEM, the National Information Exchange Model, is a partnership of the U.S. Department of Justice and the Department of Homeland Security. She has 11 years of experience in information technology, including seven years of experience using SOA/ Web Services Specification, such as XML Schema/XSLT/ SOAP/WS-Addressing/WSDL, in the implementation of Web/ SOA-based services. She has experience with various and related data model standards such as Global Justice XML Data Model (GJXDM), ANSI/NIST ITL, EFTS/EBTS, and NIEM. Ms. Frederick authored and implemented a biometric interface messaging format standard using XML/ SOAP technology, the US-VISIT (IDENT) Exchange Messages (IXM) Specification, an SOA-based standards application profile/GJXDM IEPD-based messaging structure. Ms. Frederick has her M.S. in software engineering from the School of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University and her B.S. in management information systems from the School of Commerce at the University of Virginia.

Aaron B. Fuller III is President of CSC’s Enforcement, Security and Intelligence (ESI) Group focused on high priority programs with an emphasis on sensitive information. Clients include intelligence agencies and programs, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U. S. Department of State, U.S. Department of Justice, and others. ESI includes the Global Security Solutions (GSS) unit that provides security capabilities throughout CSC for both client delivery and internal systems. The NPS Identity and Privacy High Growth Market Segment and several CSC Centers of Excellence are hosted in ESI. Mr. Fuller joined CSC in April 1998, as a vice president. At BDM International (1991-1998) he was senior vice president and operating unit executive. He has served in senior management positions at General Research Corporation and Booz-Allen & Hamilton. From 1975-1980 he was a senior economist at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA), a Wash- ington, D.C. defense think tank. He has a BA from Claremont McKenna College (Claremont, CA) and an MA from the University of Virginia.

Mary Hynes, an Arlington County resident for more than 30 years, was elected to the Arlington County Board in November 2007. Previously, Ms. Hynes served on the Arlington School Board from 1995 to 2006, chairing it on three occasions. A cornerstone of Ms Hynes’ work as a member of the County Board is ensuring that Arlington County excels in its preparation, response and recovery from emergencies. In addition to protecting and providing for Arlington’s 200,000 residents and 240,000 workers, Arlington County is home to and has a special responsibility for responding to emergencies at government facilities such as Reagan National Airport and the Pentagon. Since joining the Arlington County Board, Ms. Hynes has worked with citizens and staff to revamp and enhance community involvement in preparedness.

LTC (Ret.) Dave Johnson is Executive Director of the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in Washington, DC. A former Army Special Forces Officer and Strategist, he is a graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, the Command and General Staff Course, and recipient of the Diplome des Etudes Superieurde Defense from the Joint Defense College (France). He has held a wide variety of command and staff positions on multiple overseas contingency operations, as well as providing support to Law Enforce- ment Agencies for counter-narcotics operations along the Southwest border of the United States. From 2006-2009, he was Director of Digital Security Products with Intel Corporation.

Brian Kamoie, JD, MPH, is Senior Director for Preparedness Policy on the White House National Security Staff. In this role he leads the development of national policy related to all-hazards preparedness, domestic critical infrastructure protection and population resiliency, preparedness grants, and national security professional development. Prior to this, Kamoie served as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response and Director of the Office of Policy, Strategic Planning & Communications at the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS). Earlier, Kamoie was Associate Professor of Health Policy and Health Services Management and Leadership at The George Washington University School of Public Health and Health Services. He is a 2009 senior fellow of The George Washington University’s Homeland Security Policy Institute, and continues to serve on the adjunct faculty as Associate Professorial Lecturer in the School of Public Health and Health Services. Kamoie received his bachelor’s degree in policy studies and political science from Dickinson College in Carlisle, Pa. and his law degree and master’s degree in public health from The George Washington University in Washington, D.C., where he served as managing editor of The George Washington Law Review.

Todd M. Keil was appointed in December 2009 by President Barack Obama to serve as the Assistant Secretary for Infrastructure Protection at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security. His office is responsible for protecting the assets of the United States essential to the nation’s security, public health and safety, economic vitality, and way of life. He brings to the national infrastructure protection mission more than 22 years of experience in global security operations and management, intelligence and law enforcement, and threat assessment and risk mitigation. His recent experience in private industry includes senior consulting in risk mitigation, executive and facility security, and worldwide threat management. Prior to this, Mr. Keil held several key positions at the U.S. Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service, including Regional Director for Western Hemisphere Affairs. Mr. Keil holds a Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and Criminal Justice from Ripon College in Ripon, Wisconsin. He has also studied at the University of Bonn in Germany and the American University in Washington, D.C.

Donald H. Kent Jr. is a vice president at Navigators Global, based out of the Washington, D.C. office. In this role, Mr. Kent provides strategic, policy, and communication counsel to corporations, associations and other clients as they work with the Department of Homeland Security on issues related to transporta-tion, security, cyber, technology, emergency management, and immigration, among others. Prior to joining Navigators, Mr. Kent served as Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs at the Department of Homeland Security. Prior to his work at DHS, Mr. Kent spent 8 years on Capitol Hill working in senior positionsincluding Policy Advisor and Director of Transportation Policy for the Assistant Majority Leader, Senator Don Nickles (R-OK). For his service to DHS, Mr. Kent received the Secretary’s Award from Secretary Mi- chael Chertoff, the Meritorious Public Service Award from the United States Coast Guard Commandant

Admiral Thad Allen, and a distinguished service award from Immigration and Customs Enforcement Assistant Secretary Julie Myers. Mr. Kent graduated from Roanoke University in 1995 with a double major in criminal justice and sociology. Lt. Gen. William T. Lord is the Chief of Warfighting Integration and Chief Information Officer, Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, the Pentagon, Washington, D.C. General Lord leads five directorates and two field operating agencies consisting of more than 1,000 military, civilian and contractor personnel sup- porting a portfolio valued at $17 billion. He integrates Air Force warfighting and mission support capabilities by networking space, air and terrestrial assets. Additionally, he shapes doctrine, strategy, and policy for all communications and information activities while driving standards and governance, innovation, and architectures for information systems and personnel. General Lord is a 1977 graduate of the U.S. Air Force Academy. He holds a bachelor’s degree in biological and life sciences, and master’s degrees in business administration and national resource strategy.

Dr. Mark Maurice is Director of the International Office at the Air Force Office of Scientific Research (AFOSR) in Arlington, VA. Mark is also the Vice- President International for the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and is a member of their Board of Directors. From 1980 to 1993, Mark worked in the Air Vehicles Directorate of the Air Force Research Laboratory at Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, developing non-intrusive aero-diagnostics. In 1993, he became the Chief of Aeronautical Engineering at the European Office of Aerospace Research and Development, in London, UK, and served as a scientific liaison between AFRL and those doing similar research in Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and the Former Soviet Union. In 1997, Mark returned to Air Vehicles Directorate for a two-year assignment as the Assistant to the Chief Scientist. Mark received his Ph.D. in Aerospace Engineering from the University of Dayton, in 1992.

Congressman James P. Moran was first elected in 1994 and is currently carrying out his tenth term as U.S. Representative from Northern Virginia. A senior member of the Appropriations Committee, Congress- man Moran Chairs the Subcommittee on the Interior and Environment and also serves on the Defense and Labor, Health and Human Services Subcommittees. In the mid-1990’s, Congressman Moran co-founded the New Democratic Coalition, a group of approximately 75 middle of the road House Democrats committed to fiscal responsibility, free and fair trade, technology, and maintaining America’s security and economic competitiveness. As a member of the powerful Ap- propriations Committee, Jim has left his mark on the region by boosting investments in federal research and development, steering federal dollars to generate defense and technology jobs in Northern Virginia. Jim graduated from the University of Pittsburgh’s Gradu- ate School of Public and International Affairs with a master’s degree in Public Administration in 1970 after receiving a B.A. in Economics from the College of the Holy Cross in 1967.

Terry Morgan is the Director, Net-Centric Strategy for Cisco System’s Global Government Solutions Group (GGSG) and currently serves as the Chairman Emeritus, Executive Council, Network Centric Operation Industry Consortium. He has been Cisco’s Executive Council member since the NCOIC was established in 2005. He combines his military background with 15 years busi- ness experience to provide leadership and direction in developing the GGSG’s business model, processes and solutions. He represents Cisco at the executive-levels of government, alliances, standards bodies, associations and industry events. He is working with the NCOIC leadership team on the Consortium’s business model, processes and solutions to insure the NCOIC is a trusted partner and delivers on its goal of industry and govern- ment collaboration to accelerate the adoption of network centric capability. Previously, he spent 24 years in the U.S. Marine Corps. He is a graduate of the U. S. Army War College, the Marine Corps Command and Staff College and NATO Staff Officer’s course.

Prof. Adam Ogilvie-Smith spent 13 years working in intelligence at the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and the Cabinet Office, during which time he participated in the US International Visitor Program, studying “US-European Security Issues”. Adam has since worked for KPMG, Racal and now Thales. In 2009, he became the first secondee from industry in the Office for Security & Counter-Terrorism, part of the Home Office, where his role is to foster greater collaboration between Government and industry in the fields of security and counter-terrorism. Adam is a member of the Euro- pean Security Research & Innovation Forum (ESRIF), and the European Commission’s FP7 Security Advisory Group. He also has 18 years’ experience as a special constable (volunteer police officer) in the Gloucestershire Constabulary. Adam has a BSc in Mathematics & Statistics from Edinburgh University, an MBA from the Open University, and a Diploma in Company Direction from the Institute of Directors. He is an honorary pro- fessor at the Aberdeen Business School, part of Robert Gordon University.

John Osterholz is Vice President, Cyber Warfare and Cybersecurity, BAE Systems, Inc. John is responsible for integrating the application of cyber warfare and cyberse- curity capabilities across BAE Systems, Inc to success- fully address the U.S. and allied cyberspace market. Prior to assuming his current responsibilities, he was the Vice President/General Manager for C4ISR Systems, BAE Systems Inc. John was the Department of Defense senior executive responsible for development of the Global Information Grid architecture and its key programs, before joining BAE Systems in 2004. Prior to that, he held other executive leadership positions including director, Military Satellite Office; director, C4ISR Integration Support Activity; deputy director, Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA); and assistant director, White House Military Of- fice. Preceding his Washington assignments, John served in special operations and intelligence as a U.S. Army officer. John holds a bachelor’s degree in Physics from Rutgers University and a master’s degree in Information Systems from The George Washington University.

Nathaniel Palmer is a Principal and Chief BPM Strategist with SRA International, Inc. as well as Editor-in-Chief of BPM.com and Executive Director of the Workflow Management Coalition. Previously he was Director, Business Consulting for Perot Systems Corp, working under business process guru Jim Champy, and prior to that spent over a decade with Delphi Group as Vice President and Chief Analyst. In 1998 Mr. Palmer was the first individual to be awarded the distinction of Laureate in Workflow. He is co-author of “The X-Economy: Profiting from Instant Commerce” (Texere, 2001) as well as contributing author to “The BPM and Workflow Handbook,” “Mastering the Unpredictable” (Meghan-Kiffer Press, 2010) “BPM in Practice,” and “The Encyclopedia of Database Systems” (Springer, 2009.) He has been featured in publications ranging from Fortune to The New York Times, and has had over 100 by-lined articles in IT publications such as CIO and InformationWeek. He has also been featured as a guest expert on National Public Radio and World Business Review.

L. Russell Records is a Senior Partner with CSC Business Solutions and Services, and is now serving as the Chief Technology Officer (CTO) for CSC’s global Chemical, Energy, and Natural Resources Group. In this role, he is responsible for the architecture and construction of CSC’s Oil and Gas and Utilities solutions, including field business intelligence, cybersecurity for utilities, smart grid, and operations optimization. Prior to this assignment, he served as Regional Technology Director for the CSC Consulting’s Southwest Region since 1991. He has served several clients in the role of CTO, including most recently, the United Launch Alliance which manages the Atlas and Delta rocket launch programs for NASA and the Air Force. Mr. Records is a 1971 graduate of the Air Force Academy and received a Masters Degree from MIT in Instrumentation and Control Engineering. He is a long-term member of the Society of Petroleum Engineers and has served as a Drilling/Well Control Engineer in a number of US and overseas assignments, working for a leading petroleum engineering firm.

Riley Repko is the Senior Advisor for Cyber Operations & Transformation at the Department of the Air Force. In this position he overseas existing cyber programs and policies and developing new transformational strategies paramount to supporting the Air Force’s directed priorities in air, space and cyber operations. He serves as a functional expert collaborating with the Depart- ment of Defense, federal government organizations and the private-sector on how to effectively integrate cyber capabilities with current operational forces. He establishes and maintains essential relationships, specific lines of communication and critical processes that ensure continued success across the Air Force operational enterprise. Mr. Repko earned bachelor of science degrees in physics and electrical engineering from St Bonaventure University and the Air Force Institute of Technology respectively and a masters in business administration from St Mary’s University (Texas). He is also a graduate of the Air Force’s Air War College.

Christine Robinson heads the business and technology advisory firm, Christine Robinson & Associates, LLC, drawing upon her career-long background of performing senior leadership roles for outstanding technology firms. From small initiatives to some of the world’s largest, her business and technology solutions for U.S. government agencies and other organizations emphasize security. She co-authored the widely publicized paper “Transforming Security through Enterprise Architecture” to publish in the “2010 BPM & Workflow Handbook” in June, the recently published book “Future Cities, Designing Better, Smarter, More Sustainable and Secure Cities,” and has also written for numerous other publications. Her thought leadership and creativity have led her to win awards for innovation and excellence, inspire government procurements, and even help pass congressional legislation and funding. Christine cur- rently serves on the Arlington County IT Advisory Commission. Christine graduated with her BBA from the University of Texas at San Antonio and graduated with her MBA from George Washington University.

Major General Gabriele Salvestroni is currently the Italian Defense and Defense Cooperation Attache at the Embassy of Italy in Washington DC. M.G. Salvestroni graduated from the Italian Airforce Academy in 1979 and after basic jet and fighter training in the U.S. at Vance (OK) and Holloman (NM), he has served as a pilot in the air defense role flying F104s. After test pilot school in UK he was assigned to the flight test wing which he commanded in 1999. After flying duty he was assigned to the AirStaff where he was involved in research, development and acquisition for all major cooperation programs. Promoted to Brigadier General in 2005 he was chief of logistic department in the Airstaff.

James Schwartz is the Chief of the Arlington County Fire Department in Arlington, Virginia. Chief Schwartz has been with Arlington Fire for 26 years and was appointed Chief in June 2004. Prior to his appointment he served in a variety of fire department positions including Assistant Chief for Operations, responsible for all response-related activities, including fire, EMS, hazardous materials and technical rescue response, incident management and operational training. In April, 2003 he was assigned to the Office of the County Manager where he served as the Director of Emergency Management until his appointment to Fire Chief. Chief Schwartz chairs the International Association of Fire Chiefs’ Committee on Terrorism and Homeland Security. He is a member of the Interagency Board on Equipment Standardization and he serves on the Advisor Council for the Interagency Threat Assessment Coordinating Group at the National Counter Terrorism Center.

Rafi Sela is President of AR Challenges, LTd. (Israel) & AR Challenges (USA), Inc. Mr. Sela is a former Co-Chairman of the US Airport Security Task force at HSIA – Homeland Security Industries Association (USA) & founder & former President of the ILHSIA – Israeli Homeland Security Industries Association. He currently manages teaming projects between Israeli Homeland Security companies and their counterparts in North America, India and SE Asia, and has extensive Defense and Security business development experience in North America and Europe for over 30 years. Mr. Sela served in the IDF for 20 years as a senior Ordnance Officer specializing in product development for the Special operations. (Including the design and manufacturing of the equipment for the Entebbe raid). He is married with three children and four grandchildren.

Peter Sharfman is Director of Policy Analysis for the MITRE Corporation. MITRE is a not-for-profit company specializing in information technology that operates Federally Funded Re- search and Development Centers (FFRDCs) for the Defense Department and the Intelligence Community; the Federal Avia- tion Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, the Veterans’ Administration, and the Department of Homeland Security. At MITRE, Dr. Sharfman works issues where national security policy and information technology intersect. Before joining MITRE in 1989, he worked at the Congressional Office of Technology Assessment; OSD Net Assessment; the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and Cornell University. He received a B.A. from Harvard and an M.A. and Ph.D. (in political science) from the University of Chicago.

David Shepherdis a program manager at the Chemical-Biolog- ical Division within DHS’s Science and Technology Directorate. He manages the Threat Vectors Analysis program, a program focused on biosecurity which includes the Biodefense Knowledge Center (BKC) project as well as projects intended to provide criti- cal information to decision-makers and DHS senior staff. Hisareas of interest and expertise involve biological threat awareness and analysis, emergency preparedness and response, and knowledge and information management. He has been working at DHS S&T for five years, after working as a support contractor at DARPA. He has a bachelor’s degree in electrical engineering and master’s degrees in telecommunications and history.

Steve Swain is the CEO of the Security Innovation and Technology Consortium (SITC), a role he started in June 2008. Prior to this he was a consultant with Control Risks, an international risk consultancy. He joined them in September 2006 after retiring as a Chief Superintendent in the MPS. His last post was the Head of the Police International Counter Terror- ist Unit (PICTU), a national police and MI5 unit, with responsibility for designing counter terrorist policing options for the UK. He worked with MI5, Special Branch and the Anti-Terrorist Branch to produce as- sessments of the national intelligence picture. Steve is a leading authority on suicide terrorism and the architect of the UK tactics to counter the threat from international and domestic terror groups. He was part of the U.K. team working with the Greek Authorities on the security of the Athens Olympics. He spent time in Beijing performing a similar function for the 2008 Olympics. During his police career he worked at Heathrow Airport where he had responsibility for the airport counter-terrorist policing.

Dan Turissini co-founded Operational Research Consultants, Inc. in 1991. An innovator in systems engineering and integration he has focused ORC in the field of Information Assurance and Identity Management, providing integration & testing, operation & maintenance, and R&D for all aspects of Information Security. He has achieved Certificate Authority certifications across the Federal government, providing trusted eGovernment authentication capability and successful deployments of Federal Personal Identity Verification credentials for various Federal agencies. He holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Marine Engineering and Nautical Science from the US Merchant Marine Academy and a Masters in Engineering Administration from George Washington University.

Peter Varnish, O.B.E; FREng; FIET; is an independent electronics and weapons engineer specialising in defence and security technologies advising corporates and Governments [Australia; Singapore; UAE; Morocco; Senegal; Bulgaria] in the threat, resilience, offset; technology transfer, mergers and acquisitions. He recently advised the UK Foreign Office on business continuity. His particular interests include cyber warfare; data mining; border control especially Counter-IED, and passive tracking. He began his career with the Royal Navy Scientific Service in 1968 and after 33 years in HM Government Service retired from the board of the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency, [now QinetiQ] to join Definition International Limited as Chairman. He is also director of Geopolitical Solutions Ltd a technology audit company; and Closed Solutions Ltd who provide advice to Middle and Far East Governments and a nonexecutive director of a number of Homeland security SME’s, and BlueStar Capital.

Samuel Sanders Visneris Vice President for Strategy and Business Development at CSC, where he also leads CSC’s cyber strategy. Mr. Visner served previously as Senior Vice President for Strategy and Business Development at SAIC. Mr. Visner was Chief of Signals Intelligence Programs at the National Security Agency where he led several transformational programs. Mr. Visner also teaches as an adjunct professor at Georgetown University where he conducts a course on the effects on international security of information technology. Mr. Visner currently serves as a member of the Intelligence Task Force of the Defense Science Board and as part of the Global Reserve Program of the National Intelligence Council, which he supports on the issues of cybersecurity and cybercrime. Mr. Visner holds a Bachelor’s degree in International Politics from Georgetown University and a Master’s degree in Telecommunications from George Washington University.

Jan Wibergis Director of the Security Product Portfolio at Saab. He is former Chairman (Chair Emeritus) of NCOIC Technical Council leading the technical work of the Network Centric Operations Industry Consortium. He started off by serving in surveillance in the Swedish Airforce, He holds a Master of Science degree in Industrial Electronics and Computer Science. Jan has close to 30 years of progressive and diverse experience in the Military Defense industry focusing on computer and information technology in the area of C4ISR. His experience today includes both civil security and government homeland security in EU countries, as well as military ship programs for Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, Finland, Denmark, UAE and Pakistan. He has held progressively more responsible management positions in a number of companies, including Ericsson, Bofors and the Swedish National Police Board. Dennis Wisnosky is the Chief Architect and Chief Technical Officer of the Business Mission Area within the Office of the Deputy Chief Management Officer, U.S. Department of Defense. Mr. Wisnosky is responsible for providing expert guidance and oversight in the design, development, and modification of the federated architectures supporting the Department’s Business Mission Area. This role incorporates oversight of the DoD Business Enterprise Architecture (BEA) - the corporate level systems, processes, and data standards that are common across the DOD, in addition to the business architectures of the services and de- fense agencies. Mr. Wisnosky also serves as an advisor on the development of requirements and extension of DoD net-centric enterprise services in collaboration with the office of the DOD Chief Information Officer.

Christine E. Wormuth is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs. As Principal Deputy, she advises the Assistant Secretary of Defense on the homeland defense activities of the Department and regional security matters for the countries of the Western Hemisphere. In addition, she is responsible for management of the Department’s participation in interagency activities concerning homeland security and relations with the Department of Homeland Security. In 2007, she served as the staff director for the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, also known as “The Jones Commission.” Ms. Wormuth began her public service career in the Policy Office of the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1996 through 2002. She entered government as a Presidential Management Intern and received a Masters of Public Policy from the University of Maryland. She holds a Bachelor of Arts in political science and fine art from Williams College and is a member of Women in International Security.
Title: Re: Jane Lute, Henry Kissinger, John Hamre, and Max Boot plan on blowing shit up!
Post by: Dig on May 02, 2011, 05:11:53 pm
http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/080606_managingthenextdomesticcatastrophe.pdf

PDF Page 35:

"State and Local Governments" ... [are our enemy]

The past several years have strained homeland security relationships between the federal government
and state and local governments. According to the 2007 National Governors Association
Annual Survey, “States continue to report unsatisfactory progress in their relationship with the
federal government, specifically with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).”53 As noted
above, many emergency managers at the state and local levels felt that DHS’s emphasis on terrorism
was misplaced and came at the expense of preparedness for the natural disasters that state and
local governments were far more likely to experience.
The very public dispute between President
Bush and Governor Kathleen Blanco of Louisiana over control of the National Guard during the
response to Hurricane Katrina, together with the President’s seeming enthusiasm for a greater
role for the military in future disasters, unsettled many at the state and local levels.
Some state
emergency managers, such as Craig Fugate of Florida, emphasized that “it is important that the response from the federal level is one of a supporting role for state and local emergency management,
it cannot supplant these efforts.”54
Alarm at the state and local levels about the intentions of the federal government during future
catastrophes grew in 2007 with the enactment of a law allowing the President to federalize the
National Guard without consent from state governors in order to
restore public order and enforce the laws of the United States when, as a result of a natural
disaster, epidemic, or other serious public health emergency, terrorist attack or incident, or
other condition in any State or possession of the United States, the President determines that
domestic violence has occurred to such an extent that the constituted authorities of the State
or possession are incapable of maintaining public order.55
The National Governors Association and the National Guard community vigorously opposed
this provision, and they successfully lobbied Congress to repeal this expansion of presidential
powers a year later. As a result of these developments and others since the formation of the Department
of Homeland Security, relations between the federal
government and state and local governments are at a low
point.

Underlying these specific grievances and concerns is a
broader and largely unspoken concern by some government
officials and emergency managers outside Washington, D.C.,
that the federal government is attempting to significantly
change how the United States is organized to respond to
domestic emergencies. Historically, responding to domestic
emergencies has largely been the job of local and state
governments, in recognition of the fact that they are best
positioned to assess local needs and take quick action. Only
when local and state governments cannot meet all their needs
do they turn to the federal government for assistance. Essentially,
states pull down federal assistance through formal
requests, and the federal government pushes that assistance
out to states once those requests are received and approved.
The September 11 attacks and the growing realization that
further acts of catastrophic terrorism in the United States are a real possibility cast serious doubt
on that traditional pull-push system. The deeply flawed response to Hurricane Katrina added
further fuel to the debate. For those inclined to support the idea of “federal takeovers” of future
catastrophes, the performances of the city of New Orleans and the Louisiana state government
were confirmation of the need to find a new approach. For those who argue that a federal takeover
violates the U.S. approach to governance and is unlikely to lead to better disaster management, the
performance of FEMA and the tangled federal command and control structure were proof of the
folly of “putting the feds in charge.”  Although the argument about whether the federal government should take over in a crisis
engenders strong feelings on both sides, in reality the nation’s traditional system of relying on local
and state governments to manage domestic incidents, with help if needed from the federal government,
seems to work well for 98 percent of the disasters that occur in this country.
As the White
House’s lessons learned report on Hurricane Katrina noted, “The State’s role has been compared to
retail sales in terms of organization, delivery, and management. Under this description, the Federal
government’s role is comparable to wholesale. This generally works well and should continue
in the majority of instances.”57 That this model is equally well suited for catastrophes is less clear;
in fact, as the White House report observes on the very next page:
When the affected State’s incident response capability is incapacitated and the situation has
reached catastrophic proportions, the Federal government alone has the resources and capabilities
to respond, restore order, and begin the process of recovery. This is a responsibility that
must be more explicitly acknowledged and planned for in the NRP [emphasis added], and we
must resource, train, and equip to meet this obligation when such a contingency arises.58
The federal government has formally issued 15 disaster scenarios to be used in planning and
exercising at the federal, state, and local levels, and at least 12 of them would clearly be considered
catastrophes by the PKEMRA’s definition.59 What would the traditional “pull-push” disaster
management system look like in the event of a 10-kiloton nuclear detonation, or a major chemical
attack in an urban area,
to take two of the National
Planning Scenarios? [INSERT: The only "terrorists" capable of those kind of scenarios are the traitors at CSIS staging a false flag]
The National Response
Framework provides the basic
blueprint for how these
events would be managed.
A local on-scene commander
would be present
at the ground level, but for
such major events the state
governor would be making
the big decisions. On
the federal side, DHS’s first
step would be to establish
a Joint Field Office (JFO)
that would be closely tied
to the state emergency operations center. Under the current system, the lead federal official would likely be the Principal
Federal Official, reporting to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Because a nuclear event and a
major chemical attack are both obvious catastrophes, the federal government would be able to take
accelerated action, using procedures outlined in the Catastrophic Incident Annex (CIA) to the
National Response Framework. Under that annex, the federal government can immediately begin
deploying federal assets to the vicinity of the crisis without having to wait for formal requests from
the affected state governments. Yet even when such predeployment is allowed, as a matter of policy
federal resources arriving at federal mobilization centers or staging areas near the incident are to
“remain there until requested by State/local incident command authorities, when they are integrated
into the incident response effort.”60
According to the traditional model, the state government would then put together a formal
request for assistance and submit it through the JFO to FEMA, which would farm out the requests
to the different parts of the federal government that are predesignated to provide specific forms
of help. But if a nuclear device detonated, or if thousands of Americans were dead from exposure
to chemical gas and thousands of others were spontaneously evacuating because they feared
exposure, is it realistic to assume that the state government would have the capacity to formulate
a formal request to the federal government and marshal state resources into an effective response
effort? Would the state government have sufficient situational awareness to assess its needs? Would
the state government and local jurisdictions have the physical capacity to retain law and order?
Would enough of the state leadership be functioning and able to make informed decisions? States
that have extremely well developed emergency management systems and extensive response capabilities,
such as New York, Florida, and California, may be able to function relatively effectively
even during an event as grave as a nuclear detonation, and thus may be able to use the traditional
Stafford Act system of federal assistance. But for many other states, it is not clear that the current
system would be sufficient to ensure a robust response.
Recommendation 6: The next Administration should work closely with state governments
to initiate a robust dialogue on the subject of how to balance the need to enable the federal
government to directly employ federal resources within a state or states during the most extreme
circumstances with the constitutional right of states to self-governance.
The idea of expanding the role of the federal government during a domestic catastrophe is
anathema to many in the homeland security community, but the time has come to take the first
steps toward adapting the traditional emergency management model to the post–September 11
environment.
The Stafford Act already grants the federal government substantial authority during
a major disaster In any major disaster, the President may provide accelerated Federal assistance and Federal
support where necessary to save lives, prevent human suffering, or mitigate severe damage,
which may be provided in the absence of a specific request [from the Governor of the affected
State] and in which case the President (A) shall, to the fullest extent practicable, promptly
notify and coordinate with officials in a State in which such assistance or support is provided;
and (B) shall not, in notifying and coordinating with a State under subparagraph (A), delay or
impede the rapid deployment, use, and distribution of critical resources to victims of a major
disaster.62
Current policy governing the provision of federal assistance during a catastrophe as outlined
in the Catastrophic Incident Annex—expedited deployment of federal resources to federal mobilization
centers or staging areas near the incident — does not appear to fully exploit the authority
granted to the federal government under this section of the Stafford Act.
A President will surely be willing to take whatever steps are necessary to work with a governor
and his or her governing team during a major catastrophe,63 but it is not impossible to imagine
scenarios in which state leadership is severely weakened in its ability to orchestrate an effective
response effort,64 or leaders are in place but the state’s physical capacity to execute their decisions
is severely degraded. In such cases, it may be appropriate for the federal government to exercise
more of the authority granted to it under the Stafford Act than today’s plans envision.
The goal of adapting the current system is not to enable the federal government to manage
a catastrophe over the objections of a state governor, but rather to develop in advance an understanding
with state governors so that all agree on the extreme conditions under which the federal
government might need to directly employ federal resources within a state or states in order to
execute its responsibility to save lives and protect property.
The barriers to making such adaptations to the current domestic emergency management system
are largely cultural and psychological rather than legal. Despite the substantial legal authority
to act during a catastrophe already given to the federal government by both the Stafford Act
and the Insurrection Act, the notion of its taking a more prominent role is extremely politically
sensitive, and understandably so. The Bush Administration reportedly approached state governors
through the National Governors Association early in its first term to discuss new federal-state approaches
to disasters, but this initiative did not bear fruit.  The principle that crises are best managed at the lowest level of government possible should
remain a fundamental feature of the American approach to domestic emergency management. At
the same time, in light of the threats the nation faces in the post–September 11 environment, it is
only prudent to ensure that the country’s preparedness system includes the ability of the federal
government to exercise its full authority under the law to save lives and protect property during
a major disaster should a state government be incapacitated or its available resources inadequate.
The next Secretary of Homeland Security, with strong backing by the President, should work
closely with state governors to begin exploring how the current system could be adapted to make
such federal help possible in ways that are mutually acceptable. Given the political sensitivity of
this issue, the initiative would need to be handled discreetly at the most senior levels of DHS. A
first step might be a face-to-face discussion between the Secretary of Homeland Security and as
many state governors as possible, with the Secretary making very clear that the federal government
has no intention of developing a process to seize control over the objections of governors.
A logical follow-up would be a series of “principals only” tabletop exercises focused on a scenario
that envisioned the incapacitation of a state government (or multiple state governments). These
would enable senior federal officials and state governors to begin exploring key questions:
Under what circumstances would it be appropriate for the federal government to employ federal
resources directly within a state or states?

■ How would the federal government execute this authority? Would the procedures look substantially
different than those outlined in the NRF?

■ Under what, if any, circumstances could state leadership be judged to be fundamentally incapacitated? [INSERT: After CSIS/CFR scum destroy them using the Delta Force, see as Operation Last Dance (http://www.wnd.com/?pageId=3587)]

■ How could state leadership be restored, if it has been incapacitated at the outset of an event?

■ What circumstances, if any, might lead a President to go beyond exercising the full authority of the federal government under the Stafford Act to issue a declaration of martial law? Such an exercise, or series of exercises, would at least prompt the stakeholders to seriously discuss whether the current emergency management system needs to be adapted for the most extreme circumstances. In the absence of this kind of high-level process, the political taboos around this issue will deter the broader DHS bureaucracy from raising these questions. Unless this concerted effort is undertaken at senior levels, in any future catastrophe that destroys a state government’s ability to function the federal government’s efforts to play a more prominent role in providing assistance and support will be entirely ad hoc, and thus unlikely to be very effective.



The number one enemy of the globalists is state and local governments.  We need to get patriots/constitutionalists elected at the local, county, and state government levels to resist the federal, global, and corporate takeover!  Your city council, your State legislature, and neighborhood groups is where all political action needs to take place.  The "tenth amendment" movement is the garlic to these vampires, while "anarchy", "communism", "fascism" and "democracy" are wet soggy bread slices for these fungi at the CSIS.

The CSIS does not want state, county, local governments or charities responding to disasters; CSIS wants disasters to be used as an excuse to declare "martial law" as totally admitted to in this treasonous document.
Title: Re: Jane Lute, Henry Kissinger, John Hamre, and Max Boot plan on blowing shit up!
Post by: gEEk squad on May 02, 2011, 05:12:06 pm
Osama Bin Laden: Experts Fear Revenge By Al Qaeda or 'Lone Wolf'

http://abcnews.go.com/US/death-osama-bin-laden-trigger-terror-supporters-al/story?id=13505844

Security experts fear that al Qaeda or a U.S. born "lone wolf" may try to strike back at the U.S. for the death of Osama bin Laden and in a sign of the urgency, an elite unit of Marines who handle chemical and biological weapons attacks was recalled today from Japan.

...

Sen. Joe Lieberman, chairman of the Senate's Homeland Security Committee, feared the attack could come from a source other than al Qaeda.

"My own great concern in the days ahead is that a so-called 'lone wolf,' a single individual who has been radicalized, will now mobilize himself or herself to take action here at home against the American people," said Lieberman, I-Conn.
Title: Re: Jane Lute, Henry Kissinger, John Hamre, and Max Boot plan on blowing shit up!
Post by: Dig on May 02, 2011, 05:13:17 pm
Council on Foreign Relations

Following a Catastrophe: Ensuring the Continuity of Government

(Audio)


http://www.cfr.org/publication/14966/following_a_catastrophe.html

Speakers:    

Jamie S. Gorelick, Member, Continuity of Government Commission; Partner, WilmerHale
   
Fred C. Iklé, Distinguished Scholar, Center for Strategic & International Studies
   
Norman J. Ornstein, Senior Counselor, Continuity of Government Commission; Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute

Presider:    

Thomas E. Donilon, Partner, O'Melveny & Meyers LLP

November 7, 2007



THOMAS E. DONILON:  Why don't we get started?  We can maximize the time for our discussion.  

My name is Tom Donilon.  I've been asked to moderate today's discussion.  The topic is entitled "Following a Catastrophe:  Ensuring the Continuity of Government."  I'll talk about that in just a minute.  Let me do just a very quick set of introductions and reminders along the council -- of the council way.  Most of -- all of you, I think, know those:  cellphones off; BlackBerries, other wireless devices.  Today we're on the record.  That's the ground rules.

For our discussion today, we're joined by three people who really don't need any introduction.  That's a cliche.  It happens to be absolutely true in this case.  And I'll do it very quickly, again, so we can maximize discussion time.

Down at my far left, Jamie Gorelick is one of America's leading lawyers; has vast experience, as I think everybody in this room knows, in law, government service and in corporate America.  She was deputy attorney general during the Clinton administration.  Prior to being deputy attorney general, she was general counsel at one of the world's largest law firms, the Department of Defense legal department.  She's been president of the D.C. Bar, was counselor to the secretary of Energy, has served on a number of -- does serve on a number of corporate boards and a number of advisory committee and commissions to the United States government, most notably the 9/11 commission.

Fred Ikle is a long and distinguished expert in the area of national security affairs and also has a long and distinguished history of government service.  Fred is currently a distinguished scholar at CSIS, engaged principally now, I think, in studies about the impact of technology on national security.  As I said, Fred's service to the United States goes back to the -- at least the Nixon and Ford administrations, I think, Fred, as head of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; was the coordinator of foreign affairs advisers during the Reagan campaign, which was the immediate cause of me losing my first job in 1980 and put out on the streets -- (laughs) -- right -- and of course was during the Reagan administration undersecretary for Policy at the Defense Department.

Norm Ornstein is one of America's best-known political scientists.  He's currently and has been for a long time resident scholar the American Enterprise Institute for public research.  Norm is also a political scientist -- in addition to being well-known, is a political scientist with impact, who cares deeply about American political institutions as anybody I have known.  He is a senior counselor to the Continuity of Government Commission and has been one of the driving forces behind addressing the issues we're going to discuss today.  Norm was one of the driving forces behind campaign finance reform and one of the principal craftspeople of the McCain-Feingold legislation.  He has over the last 30 years been a force behind reform in Congress and again is a political scientist with -- who cares and has high impact.  

I principally remember Norman as my first professor in the first hour of my first day of college, where he was my political science professor in Political Science 101.  Somehow the lines crossed on who looks older than whom -- (laughter) -- over the years, right?  (Chuckling.)  I'll try to pinpoint that.  But nonetheless, Norman is -- has been one of the most important influences in my life, and it's great to see him here today.

As I --

NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN:  An A student.  (Laughter.)

DONILON:  Yeah.  (Laughs.)

As I -- yeah, you know, after the laughter, you can -- after the, you know, kind of brown-nosing evidence you're seeing today -- (laughter) -- (laughs) -- I only honed those skills over the years, right, you know.  

Today, as I said, the topic is entitled "Following a Catastrophe:  Ensuring Continuity of Government."  And simply put, I think our discussion today focuses on the following task, and that is to attempt to get an assessment of how the United States government would react to, be able to function after a catastrophic attack that put in peril its fundamental institutions:  the presidency, the Congress, the judiciary and its election system.

For those of us in the room who work in corporate America, you wouldn't have a global corporation that didn't have a disaster recovery program that wasn't constantly reviewed, updated and tested.  Your auditors at a major public American company, that had global reach and that had data that it relied on and data centers and the core decision-making processes -- your auditors would insist on looking at that regularly, and you'd want to make sure you had a best-in-class system.  

The question presented for this discussion is, do we have a best-in-class system?  Do we have a system that can survive the kind of catastrophic attack that the United States might suffer?  And we certainly have seen the possibilities of that around 9/11.  

I'd like to start with Norman to do an assessment, and I thought we could try to do three things today.  Get an assessment of the problem, talk about steps that could be taken of a practical nature, and then maybe explore a little bit, in our half-hour discussion here before we open it up, why some of the obvious steps haven't been taken to strengthen the kind of response that America could have to a catastrophic attack.  

Norm is, as I said, was kind of the inspiration behind the Continuity of Government Commission, wrote in the pages of Roll Call shortly after the 9/11 attack about the problem of Congress operating in an effective way in the wake of such an attack.  So I thought I -- just to signal everybody, we'll start with Norman.  I think we'll go to Jamie to talk about some of the practical things that could be done, and Fred to comment on their presentations.  

Norm.  

ORNSTEIN:  Thanks, Tom, and the answer to your question is, we do not have anywhere near sufficient plans in place for any of the institutions.  And it's unsettling frankly that six years after a warning signal with neon lights that continue to flash, we've done next to nothing in a fundamental way.  And the problems are there really on four fronts.

They're there for ensuring that there is a Congress up an running as swiftly as possible after a devastating attack that could knock it out of business, keeping in mind that the Constitution says flatly that it requires a quorum of half the members to do any official business and that in this case, the House of representatives has the biggest problem in terms of getting up and running, that the Constitution says that all House members shall be elected.  And if there are vacancies, they're filled by special elections, that in good times, when we're doing one or two, take, on average, four months.  And you can't do an election overnight is the practical reality.  

And for the Senate of the United States, the problem which we saw highlighted itself after 9/11, where the 17th Amendment to the Constitution allows states to have their executives appoint interim senators to fill vacancies, something of course that we've seen many times.  That's if there are vacancies.  When we had the anthrax scare, it brought another problem right in front of us.  Which is, if that had been a serious, pointed, organized attack using high-grade, weapons-grade anthrax, gotten into the ventilation system of the Senate, we could have had 60 or 70 senators with serious problems, hospitalized for months or longer, no quorum.  

And of course, those Senate terms last for six years.  We've had instances: Karl Mundt of South Dakota and then more recently for almost a year, Tim Johnson being out.  For Mundt, it was about four or five years where he was effectively comatose.  So that's a major set of problems.

Presidential succession, which is done via statute.  The last time we amended the presidential succession process was 1947 when vice president -- then-President Truman went to Potsdam the year before with his secretary of State, Edward Stettinius, and saw some serious peril there and thought, you know, we really don't have an adequate process in place.  And so we revamped the presidential succession, but it is woefully inadequate to what we face today.  It also is a deeply flawed act in other ways that we might get into a little bit.

There's the Supreme Court.  On 9/11, just by eerie coincidence that morning the Judicial Conference of the United States was meeting at the Supreme Court.  All nine justices, the chief judges of the appeals courts, the major figures from the district courts -- virtually the entire leadership of the federal judiciary about 150 yards from the Capitol Dome.  It turned out with an interesting twist that several people who were there told me afterwards.  During the course of that meeting, three or four times, with Chief Justice Rehnquist presiding, people were coming up onto the dais and whispering in his ear and then they'd leave and then they'd come back, and eventually he just got up and left, didn't say anything, as they hustled him off to an undisclosed location, leaving the rest of the judiciary to fend for themselves not having any idea what was going on.

Now, you might think, well, the court is not as significant; it deals with matters only in a more passive fashion and much later on.  But if you think about the potential nightmare scenarios -- and unfortunately, there are many nightmare scenarios; the most nightmarish being something happening at an inaugural, where everybody who is in charge in the government is generally present and where you have the brief moment at noon on January 20th when everything is supposed to change, but incoming Cabinet members who are there in the line of succession are not yet sworn in, and outgoing Cabinet members are supposed to have submitted letters of resignation as of that day.

And the leaders of Congress, the speaker, the president pro tempore of the Senate are up on the stage with the incoming and outgoing presidents and vice presidents.  If you ended up with a fog of war there -- there are many other circumstances where there might be some disputes about who is actually supposed to take over -- you don't want to have a dozen courts of appeals out there offering different suggestions as to who actually should be in charge, and there we have nothing much in place except a statutory requirement, six of the nine justices to make a quorum.

The fourth area -- which we're only starting to think about in the last few years; we didn't really think much about with 9/11 -- is elections.  The -- of course, on 9/11 in New York the mayoral primary had been scheduled.  Some people had already gone out to vote.  The governor stepped in using his executive authority -- actually, it's not at all clear he had that executive authority, but no one disputed it -- and postponed that election.

But imagine if you had a disruption in one state, one city, a couple of places and you had to cancel, say, voting in Cleveland, something -- a decision that would be made by a partisan secretary of State, or in one or two key states, what are we going to do?  Who's going to make those decisions?  Are you going to hold a presidential election, where, in effect, a sizeable group of people who could determine the outcome of the election can't vote because of a threat or an attack?  Are we going to let them going to let them vote later when the outcome otherwise would be known?  These are issues that have not been adequately discussed, and there is no plan in place and no official in charge since elections are local matters to deal with something that could have the most enormous impact.

So most of these things we did not even think about in a serious way before 9/11.  We haven't thought about the prospect of an attack that could come without any notice and be devastating.  All the plans we had in place for succession with the Cold War that -- many of which have been scrapped in years since, obviously inadequate or gone, and all of them in serious need of a scrubbing to bring them up to a point where auditors -- good auditors would say we're set.

DONILON:  Thanks, Norm.  Just before we go to Jamie, then you would -- you believe, I take it, that that requires a range of steps, including constitutional amendments?

ORNSTEIN:  To deal with the problem in Congress, and I, for one -- and this is something that occurred to me with unfortunate clarity on the afternoon of September 11th.  I'd been at Dulles Airport that morning, got called off the jetway when my plane was about to take off when the second plane hit the World Trade Center, went home and watched, and when it became clear to me that United 93 -- after it crashed in Pennsylvania -- had been headed, I thought, certainly to the Capitol.  And I knew what happens on a day like that at the Capitol -- beautiful day, morning business, lots of people around -- just envisioning what could occur.  I thought, you know, we could be without a House for months and months, and that would mean martial law.  And it didn't much matter to me at that point who the attorney general was, but I don't want martial law, benign or not, for a period of months.  

If you look at what Congress did in the weeks that followed, an enormous range of things, including authorizing the use of force, emergency appropriations to deal with that would -- there are some who believe that you can find ways around it without a constitutional amendment.  I believe we need an amendment that very simply would allow for temporary appointments until elections could be held that are real elections, where you can have a campaign and choices made, and for both Houses, for incapacitated members, until the incapacitated individuals can stand up and say, "I'm ready to come back."  For the presidential succession, for the court and for elections, this can all be done by statute.  

DONILON:  Jamie, so we've got a bad audit.  I think also you make -- I think the 9/11 commission found that in fact Flight 93 very much -- very likely could have been aimed at the Capitol as one of its targets.  We have a bad audit.  How should management think about it?

JAMIE S. GORELICK:  Well, you know, you think that with the kind of compelling case that Norm has made for action, that there would have been some.  So I thought I would look at, you know, why not?  Why haven't we done anything?  And what steps could one take?  I totally agree, and I'll come back to it, with Norm's assessment of where you would need a constitutional amendment and where not.  

But one of the first reactions to the commission's recommendation was  we shouldn't talk about it because it will alert the bad guys to our vulnerabilities.  Well, you know -- no, that's an argument that has been made, and it is an argument that has been made against discussing the need for cybersecurity, almost every vulnerability that we've tried to address as a country.  And I just think that we need to dispatch that.  If the Madrid bombings told us anything, it is that people who want to do harm are actually thoughtful about ways in which they might do it and are perfectly capable of taking advantage of timing.  So I think we need to be alert to that, but we need to dispatch it.  

Second, you have to think about each of the stakeholders and why they might feel that their ox might be gored here or that they would be giving up something substantial.  And the first point there is that there's a reason we have very few constitutional amendments.  People are very leery of making substantial changes in our system of governance.  And the menu of horribles that Norm has laid out actually would require changing many things, or possibly changing many things, simultaneously.  And that has -- that puts people on edge, and therefore they literally have done nothing.

So my view is you really have to parse this and lay responsibility on each of the constituencies for their part of the puzzle.

So the first is presidential succession.  You know, for 60 years, we have put members of Congress -- the leadership of Congress in the line of congressional -- presidential succession.  And one might well ask whether that makes sense given our political setup right now.  You know, imagine Newt Gingrich taking over for Bill Clinton or Nancy Pelosi for George Bush.  I mean, it just -- it would make more sense, I think, to the current political environment to keep it within the party and within the chain of command, if you will, of the Cabinet.  The contrary argument, of course, is, you know, who elected Condi Rice?  Why would you put a Cabinet member, who has not stood for election, in the line of succession?  I think that's a debate that you can have, that's a choice that you can have, and it's a statute that you can revisit, and you know, I think it ought to be revisited.

The second is this romantic notion that people in the House have that they are the House of the people, and therefore you cannot sit in the House unless you've been elected.  It's somewhat disparaging of the process that exists for the Senate.  And I don't think it's because democracy is more important to the House than the Senate.  I think it is probably so because people assumed that you're going to have an election pretty soon anyway, you could have a special election, and how hard could this be?

I agree with Norm that you have to have something equivalent to the appointment processes for the House that you now have for the Senate.  That, I think, would have to be done by constitutional amendment, but I think it needs to be put squarely on the House to debate this and discuss this.  

The states are -- and localities are responsible for elections.  And this is, I think, among the hardest issues to deal with, because each state has concerns about finality, concerns about cost.  It has its own short-term political concerns that people might not be able to get around.  And I think that this is a national problem that needs to be dealt with nationally.  And there should be a template for -- agreed upon by some conference of state officials similar to the commission that we had to look at our electoral process.  This is a national problem, and we need a national solution.  

And let's not forget the political parties, because in any number of Norm's scenarios, you have an issue for the political parties.  What if there is an assassination of the person who has been elected but not confirmed by the Electoral College in that space of time?  Who -- what happens then?  We've just not discussed this.  And that is a distinct possibility.  The time around elections and around transition is our time of greatest peril.  And the political parties thus have to be brought into this discussion.  

Of course, it is easier to act by statute than via constitutional amendment. I mean, just the process of a constitutional amendment is extremely difficult, and as I said at the outset, there are great antipathies toward changing the Constitution.  There are a number of things that could be done legislatively, but I think each of those parties needs to be brought to the table.  

Perhaps the simplest problem to address is the problem of the Supreme Court, and that's so for several reasons.  Although the Judicial Conference did gather together the leadership of the circuits and the district courts with the Supreme Court and they were in a place of maximum vulnerability on the day of 9/11, in general the courts are physically dispersed.  They have the power to issue writs generally, so that a court in California could actually issue a writ that would be applicable elsewhere; they are courts of general jurisdiction.

However, the mechanism for replacing members of the Supreme Court so that you would have a quorum is not ideal for -- it's not ideal in any circumstances, because these are lifetime appointments, and to move in a hurried fashion to do something so important and of long-standing effect is probably not wise.

A solution to this has been proposed by my partner, Randy Moss, who was the head of the Office of Legal Counsel in the Clinton administration, or one of them.  And he has proposed a fairly simple solution, which is that there be established an emergency intermediate court that could resolve disputes among the circuits, which is the most important -- among the most important of the responsibilities of the Supreme Court, for the period of time in which there is not a quorum in the Supreme Court.  That could be done by statute, and it would have limited impact.  It could be cabined so that people would be less anxious than they might be about some of these other -- some of these other changes.

The final point I would make on implementation is this.  The focus on the election process also should have us focus on the transition process. We know from intelligence that we've gathered that there has been a focus on our transition, and we know, those of us who've done transitions, that they're ugly; that you walk into the White House with essentially nothing available to you.  And thoughtful people have made very concrete suggestions about how to handle a transition that could be of great benefit to the country as we think about this constellation of issues.  And I would urge the people who've been interested enough to show up here at 8 in the morning to get involved in that discussion as well.

DONILON:  Thanks, Amy.

Fred, your reaction to some of the ideas that have been put on the table, additional practical responses to the assessment that Norm and Jamie have laid out?

FRED IKLE:  Right.  Well, Norm has told us about what ought we do, and Jamie, how difficult it is to do it.  And why is that so?  It in part has to do with the -- well, the focus of the body politic and government people.  And what you have here is that we do a lot of our planning by looking in the rear view mirror.  We haven't experienced something like this.  We've experienced 9/11, so we focus on a 9/11-type attack.  

Also, people in this area don't -- you know, we do a lot for the bird flu.  How likely is the bird flu?  We don't know.  We do a lot for terrorism against airplanes.  How likely is that?  We don't know.  We don't know how likely is this kind of an attack.

What is not sufficiently recognized is that if there's a motivation to attack, and you just touched on it towards the end of your remarks -- to eliminate our government, our constitutional government, thereby weaken our response to a larger attack that might follow the strike against our constitutional government -- it could be quite strong and from a clever enemy, and if the country -- our country is in a situation where we're already divided, like we are today a bit about what to do about crazy Ahmadinejad with his ICBMs, which he doesn't have yet, and what to do in Iraq and so on, in contrast to the united -- rather united population we had after Pearl Harbor.  And then, of course, Roosevelt was greatly helped by Hitler's great mistake of declaring war, but he couldn't have made it without -- without declaring war, without the declaration of war by Hitler, also probably (could ?) have moved ahead because the government was united.

So I think we ought to think about the importance also -- we discussed should this be public or not, and this is on the record -- the importance of indicating that we are prepared to cope with it even though it may be not fully developed in legal terms.

What we have had, actually, in 9/11 is an attack to inflict harm, destroy some of the icons, and what you have had in future attacks is probably attacks against the government, but in part it's been just to inflict casualties and harm.  And a lot of the focus about the threat of a nuclear weapon, terrorist attack is how many casualties.  There's less focus on depriving us of our government -- what I called in a book last year, annihilation from within -- that an enemy really wants to take our constitutional government so that we -- whatever's left of the organizations in this country malfunction and strongly dispute it as being illegal, illicit; the successor to the elected president, the secretary of Agriculture or whatever, is taking on powers which was never granted to him, and so you have a very divided country that's going to respond to this attack.  And that could make it attractive to certain types of enemies.

The -- I think if we realize that the probability of this event is unpredictable like all the other probabilities -- we do spend money on the other probabilities; we spend time on it -- this is not a question of a lot of money.  (Inaudible) -- spend billions as we do in other terrorist defenses.  It's an organizational question, and we should be able to put our minds together to do it in a way that hopefully minimizes the need for constitutional amendments and is bipartisan -- that's very important.

And it so happens -- and I think I got this idea from Norm -- that the period now we're entering is the ideal period.  A president is not up for re-election; he's not campaigning for himself.  We'll have a change in government, but it's not clear which way it will go, and we could fix it in a bipartisan way without favoring one side or the other.  That may be a way of doing it, and if we can press the people -- and so many are here -- either in executive branch or working in Congress that we should grab this period the next few months to make these changes, we might get there.

DONILON:  I think that's a very important point about the timing of the discussion.  It would be a very good gift from this government to the next, I think, to address some of these issues.  I also think that the point you made about not only having a system in place that is effective in terms of governing, but legitimate is a very critical point on this.

Questions from the floor, comments?  I think we have microphones.  It would be great if people would wait for those microphones, and just state your name and affiliation and your comment and question and we'll -- and to whom you wish to direct it, and we'll move on here.

Thanks.

QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  Russ Demming (sp), teaching at SAIS.  Thank you for -- you've all made a very compelling case that something needs to be done.  What is the best vehicle for this?  Is a commission -- a special commission to undertake this?  I know that Jamie is a member of continuity of government commission.  What is that?  Does it do anything?

GORELICK:  Norm created it so.  (Laughter.)

DONILON:  Yeah, why don't we have Norm -- why don't we have Norm comment on it.  Norm's going to answer the question.  What is that?  (Light laughter.)

ORNSTEIN:  Yeah.  The -- as Tom mentioned, the first piece I wrote on this was just a couple of weeks after 9/11 in a column I write in Roll Call, and at that point I said let's get this conversation started right away.  And what I hoped would happen is that the congressional leaders would have picked some individuals inside and outside just to talk about the problems and what might be done.  Nothing happened there for many months, and after a significant amount of public attention given, trying in part just to embarrass them into doing something, Speaker Hastert quite reluctantly put together a task force that was headed up by then-Representatives Chris Cox and Martin Frost.  And they actually did a pretty good job, but they were told, you know, don't consider anything other than minor tinkering.  

After a few months, Lloyd Cutler, the late, great, Lloyd Cutler called me up and said, "We've got to do something more on this."  And from that, we created a continuity of government commission, co-chaired by Lloyd and Alan Simpson with a group of very distinguished Americans like Jamie Gorelick.  

And we held public hearings, did serious deliberation, tried to jump-start the process, issued a report on Congress -- another one forthcoming on presidential succession -- you know, as much as anything to go through in a systematic way what the problems were, what potential solutions were, and then you also want to look at what the unintended consequences would be of anything that you wanted to do and put something out there on the table so we could jump-start a deliberative process.  

I think the report -- we still have a website up, marvelous stuff, but there's only so much a commission can do if you do not have the will or momentum from the major actors in the institutions who accept their own fiduciary responsibility to protect and extend themselves.  That continues to be a deficit.

DONILON:  Fred, do you have a comment on the mechanism?

IKLE:  Yeah.   My concern is the net outcome of commissions very often is to create another commission.  And I would think of something slightly more mischievous to get this going.  

The military have good procedures for succession, by and large, and if your public and people in Congress learn about work being done somewhere in the Pentagon, maybe, or some military installation, about martial law -- which is an ill-defined thing, by the way, it's not a clear legal arrangement -- martial law for this continuity -- for this discontinuity of government as a temporary fix until the executive branch and Congress have fixed it in a proper way, and start building it up and let the public know it's coming, it's being done, ask your congressman to get going on the right legal solution but we need something as a substitute -- this may drive it forward.

DONILON:  Yeah?

QUESTIONER:  Heather Kiriakou. One thing I was wondering is the ripple effect also to some of the other government agencies should such a catastrophic event occur.  Some things that CIA deals with is the presidential daily brief.  You know, a select number of individuals receive our most sensitive intelligence every day.

Should there be such a catastrophic event, it's unclear then who should receive this information.  And also, on something that would be a statutory requirement, who is responsible for doing covert action?  Has any of these issues been discussed and what do you think about them?

DONILON:  Jamie, why don't you take that.

GORELICK:  Yeah.  Well, as a legal matter, each one of those would follow literally as a ripple effect from the decision on succession.  So it's my assumption that the flow of intelligence, and the authority for approving such things as covert actions, would flow from whoever is in the line of succession to be president.  So I don't think you'd want to jerry rig some other procedures.  I mean, you have to decide the main question, which is who is running the executive branch in a period of turmoil such as the one that we've discussed.

ORNSTEIN:  Well, I do think that -- I could be wrong about this, but the covert findings issues require congressional consultation as well.

GORELICK:  They require notification, so you'd have to -- you'd have to determine, you know, there are notifications that go to Congress of covert actions.  And depending on the nature of them, there are protocols for who gets notified.  So certainly that piece of it you'd have to -- you'd have to decide as well.  Again, you know, presumably that would flow from your congressional succession planning.

DONILON:  In the middle here.

Q I'm Mark Reisch (sp), Encino Global Strategy Project.

I was wondering:  What lessons can you draw from history -- perhaps our own history, maybe the Civil War or ancient at the time of the Roman Republic -- the concept of the dictator in Cincinnatus -- as just examples that we can draw upon.

DONILON:  Norm, you all looked at a lot of history on this.

ORNSTEIN:  Well, there are a couple of points to make here.  The first is this lack of attention.  In effect, the inability to execute a will is unfortunately something -- is an example of history repeating itself.

We've had other periods in American history where we actually operated -- or let me use a different analogy.  Like driving a racecar without any insurance where we operated in a very precarious situation -- long periods of time, for example, when we had no vice presidential succession in place, as we have now done with a constitutional amendment -- a president died or was assassinated, the vice president took over, nobody behind him in presidential succession, leaving the president pro tempore of the Senate and the speaker of the House as the only ones there.  And Congress out of session for lengthy periods of time, so no safety net whatsoever.

That was changed only after we had a couple of instances where we barely dodged the bullet.  After President Garfield was assassinated, that finally brought a change in presidential succession to create a little bit more of a safety net.  You could look at Lincoln's assassination and right before that, the plans that many terrorists had, basically, to try and decapitate the government by getting rid of everybody who was in the line of succession.  This has happened before.

Now, at the same time, you can look at what occurs when you do get something that's the equivalent of martial law or you have a vacuum and somebody steps in and takes over power.  And it's not a pretty picture, frankly.  So what history tells us is that -- what history told us as we started the commission -- was this was not going to be an easy process.  Obvious as it seems that we ought to be doing something, that it wasn't going to happen very easily and that the consequences of not acting were very, very dire -- given how humans behave in times of crisis.

DONILON:  Fred, any comment on historical --

IKLE:  Yes -- a quick one.  I worked on -- I was participating in a Defense (design support ?) in the mid-'90s about terrorism -- transnational terrorism -- and as I was going through the sort of preparatory papers that we had, and analyses, I saw a sudden change.  Suddenly, this thing became serious.  What happened?  It was the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, that used very advanced poison gas trying to eliminate the Japanese government, which was the purpose of it.  Of course, it was so badly handled nothing came through.  But again, the rearview mirror gave you the impetus to do something.  And that was really -- we have to try to hang onto something where we can point to an event that came close to happening or that happened in some other countries.  Things happening in Europe that we might point to and might stimulate -- help stimulate reaction on our side.

DONILON:  How about -- we'll go right here in the corner here.  Thank you.

Q Thank you.  I'm Tom Wilkerson from the Naval Institute.

Two of you served in government.  All of you are scholars of our democratic process.  You've made -- I'm not a lawyer, but you've made -- at least to my inexperienced ears -- a very compelling case that there's something we should do and 9/11 has given us an example of what could be done to us.  So why isn't anyone listening?  I mean, you all have served in government, so when you talk to who were your succession, who now lead the government in those three branches, and make this compelling case, why do we get the -- as we say in the military -- the maintenance officer's salute?

GORELICK:  Well, I tried to speak to that some.  I think that there is inertia.  There is -- it's too hard.  There is the worry about the short-term political, you know, assumptions that is looking at what these changes might affect if you contemplate an event happening today.  And then there is what I mentioned earlier:  We have not tinkered with our system much, because people don't know what the consequences would be and they're afraid of it.  And this would require tinkering with everything.  And I think it's scary to people.

But what we're trying to do is force the issue.  I'm not so sure I love Fred's idea of forcing the issue by creating the perception that we're going to have military law, but it is inventive and mischievous.  But my view is you need to put this back to each element that has fiduciary responsibility.

ORNSTEIN:  Let me just add that -- you know, I can understand why rank and file members of Congress or even many people in the executive wouldn't act.  And it really is the same as so many very smart and capable people I know who do not write a will.  You've got children.  You travel.  You've got, you know, questions that could leave them in wrenching situations over custody.  You know, things that make a compelling case and yet people find a million reasons not to write a will.  They're superstitious that maybe it will hasten their own demise.  It raises all kinds of questions:  Will it be your sister or my brother who will get custody of our kids -- so people don't want to do it.

The frustration for me flows from the top.  I understand that, but if you are the speaker of the House or the majority leader of the Senate or the president of the United States, or the vice president of the United States, you have a different fiduciary responsibility.  You've got to rise above that, overcome the inertia and protect the basic character of your own institutions.  

And I had great frustration getting Speaker Hastert to care about this.  When he finally did care about it, it was because some of his own party members decided to dig in their heels against doing anything significant, because they didn't want to challenge the elective capacity of the United States House of Representatives.  I got nothing but indifference from Senate Majority Leader Frist.  And I haven't found that much difference now under Senator Reid or Speaker Pelosi, although they're at least paying a little more lip service, but nothing more than lip service.

ORNSTEIN:  Let me make, if I could, one follow-on.

Before you dismiss Mr. Eclay's (sp) comment about the military too quickly, you might want to revisit what really went down in Katrina because you don't have to eliminate the government for it to be paralyzed.

QUESTIONER:  Mm-hmm.

ORNSTEIN:  And what we saw down there is when it came down to things, that which remained was -- as an institution which was the only one that could impose order and provide support services turned out to be the United States military.  In the absence of anything else, I doubt very seriously that any foreign interloper could eliminate enough of that military that it couldn't again do that if there were someone who would ask for it in extremis.  

DONILON:  In the back.

QUESTIONER:  Good morning.  I'm Kevin O'Frey (sp) from the Palisades Group.

Following up on a conversation about martial law, the first time Norm Ornstein mentioned it, I sort of had followed you all the way and then got very uncomfortable, and every time it's come up, I've gotten uncomfortable.   Having looked at this, I would urge that we talk about the use of military force in the domestic environment and not about martial law because it's a red herring.  It's very hard to imagine any scenario where the executive branch would be decapitated completely -- there'd be no line of succession and a military ruler would take over or somebody would take, you know, constitutional authority wearing the uniform.  

So I guess -- with respect to the commission, I'm urging that you delineate between the notion of martial law -- which I think is a boogeyman -- and really issues of separation of powers and the use of military force -- which in Katrina, we didn't use force.  We used to military to restore order, and I don't think it was even under the Restoration Act.  There was -- you know, supporting a -- I don't think we had the attorney general involved in that, but I urge a little bit more caution until we talk to that

GORELICK:  Let me speak to that.

I mean, there are well-worn methodologies for utilizing the military in a wide variety of circumstances and they are rehearsed and they are understood.  I, however, don't think that it is crazy to assume for the purposes of planning a level of disarray in which the chain of command is not at all clear and in which our military leaders say, "We have the capacities to restore order.  We don't know who we're responding to, and therefore we're going to go ahead and do it."  

And the reason I say it's not crazy to think about that level of disarray is that there wasn't that decapitation of the executive branch on 9/11 and there was disarray.  The chain of command was completely obliterated.  Nothing happened as it should have happened because the president was gone.  The secretary of Defense said that himself, and so you had literally the vice president speaking directly to the -- or thinking he was speaking, anyway -- directly to the commander of NORAD to take action.  That's not the way it's supposed to work, and that's with nothing hitting anybody.  

So I actually think that it is prudent to think about disarray if some element of our government or more than one element of our government is actually attacked, because if I'm a senior military leader and I know I'm the only grown-up left, I might say, "I don't know who to respond to, but I can't let X continue."  So I think that it is -- we need to continue to contemplate that.  I don't think it's a complete boogeyman.  

ORNSTEIN:  Let me both second that, but also indicate that when I first mentioned martial law, that's not what I had in mind.  What I had in mind was a president acting as a unitary executive without any check or balance.  In the weeks after 9/11, Congress passed a resolution authorizing military force and at least at the end of it had the War Powers Act remains intact.  There was at least a fig leaf of a check and balance there.  I -- the Patriot Act that was implemented, whether you like it or don't like it, was a far more significant check than if the attorney general on his own had basically said, "Here's what we're going to do."  And of course, the Patriot Act had a sunset provision into it, building in the notion that whatever we do here or whatever excesses occur, that we'll end at a certain point and we'll at least revisit it.  That would not have happened had there been no Congress.

So there are two things here. There's martial law where one branch of government takes over and basically assumes the functions of other branches of government.  There is a kind of martial law where you have the military stepping in because all the other elected or constitutional branches are in disarray or decapitated.  And they're two separate issues, both compelling.  

DONILON:  Why don't we try next to Ross (ph) here and then one down, and then Bill and --

QUESTIONER:  Charlie Vichardis (ph), CB Grayson Company (ph).

First of all, I want to commend Norm and Jamie for working on this thing.  I worked on this program here in -- when the Reagan administration resurrected this whole COD program in the early 1990s, and Fred was very much a part of that.  And at that time, you couldn't even talk.  There was an existing program here underway.  We addressed many of the same issues then in succession.  None of us who worked on the program ever thought it ever going to work because we all had to deploy to mobile sites around the country and kiss your wife goodbye, and hope she would survive the nuclear attack.  And if she didn't, you'd left her some forwarding address she'd write a postcard to to match up to at some later date.  So you knew it wasn't going to work at that particular point in time.

I'd just come off a commission that I think is just one of the few commissions that really works in government, and that is the Base Realignment Commission.  And that is one of the commissions that has the force of law, and its recommendations to go the Congress, and unless the Congress votes it down, it becomes law.  And I would suggest that's probably what we really need in something like this case here or else it's -- 20 years from now, we'll be up here having breakfast again and be talking about the same subject.

I don't have a question.  (Laughter.)

QUESTIONER:  Hi, I'm Bob Murray, CNA.

I think this has been a tremendous conversation this morning, and also congratulate you for putting this effort there.  It seemed to me that there was a -- that there is a great strength in the point that Norm Ornstein made about temporary appointments by the states.  And that states have the advantage if they're controlling elections and being dispersed and relatively -- (audio break) -- and also sources of legitimacy.  So I wondered whether you were getting any reaction or had approached any of the governors, for instance.  Are they talking about this at all?  Because they would actually have to implement some of your ideas and that in some ways, it might be the easiest thing to fix if we could work out -- the House and maybe the Senate if we could work out this system of temporary appointments.  Still messy, but perhaps able to be worked out so that you could have a functioning legislature at least, even if the secretary of Agriculture is still the president.

QUESTIONER:  That was one of your recommendations --

ORNSTEIN:  Yeah.

QUESTIONER:  any reaction from the governors?

ORNSTEIN:  Yeah, and actually -- you know, a number of governors were very happy to consider this and to do it.  I got reactions from a number of state legislators.  There have been states -- Delaware was a very interesting example -- that had put their succession plans in place during the Cold War, and Delaware had a process in place where the members of the legislature would designate a group of three to six people as potential successors.  And then if something happened, the governor would choose from among that list.  So you at least get some political check in place.

The reaction that I got from many members of Congress was an interesting one because instead of looking at this in the broadest sense, they looked at it from their own narrow parochial perspective and it was, "I'll be damned if I'm going to let this son of a bitch pick my successor!" -- pointing to his own governor at that particular point in time.  And I said, "One, you'll be dead, so, you know, not to worry; and two, can't you think of this in the larger context?  And do you really think that governors that we have under a situation of utter catastrophe in the country would say, What a great opportunity to take advantage for political leverage?  It's just not going to happen.  But it's another part of human nature.

DONILON:  (Off mike.)

QUESTIONER:  Thank you.  Jill Sugar (ph).  

I'm clearly very struck by the comments that everyone has made and Jamie's points about the total disarray which clearly, given your work, you're very familiar with in terms of 9/11.  But I was also thinking back to something on a more simple level of even the day that Alexander Haig came to the White House Press Room and -- sort of the "I'm in charge."  And therefore thinking that so much of it has to do with the credibility and what this means to the American public, and the faith that government is going to have a continuity.  And what I'm wondering is -- this probably is something that has been contemplated, but if not, it seems to me that one of the difficulties -- as Norm has pointed out -- is having people who are still in office trying to make these decisions about themselves.

This also seems to me to be an issue that needs a very high level of focus and respect.  And what I'm wondering is, has there been any thought given to people such as former President Bush, Clinton, Sandra Day O'Connor, Tom Daschle, George Mitchell, Bob Dole -- having them discuss this and come up -- particularly as we enter this election period -- something that is ready or at least being contemplated for the next administration, but dealt with at that level of attention with people like you -- you, Norm, Jamie and Fred and others, Tom, being engaged?  

DONILON:  I'm tempted to put all the Haig questions to Fred.  (Laughter.)  

But is there are any comment on the idea of a sort of --

IKLE:  Well, Richard Owen (sp), I think, has written on that -- he's written notes on it.  And it wasn't quite as serious as it looked.  It was really more -- a bit flamboyant -- you know, in a tense meeting.  It didn't create a crisis.  The vice president was on his way to come into Washington.

GORELICK:  Yeah, but I -- I think -- you know, it's interesting to see how statesman-like people become -- immediately after leaving office and can see the bigger picture in a way that Jill suggests.  It's -- I think that it's actually a very good idea to get people who understand the stakes and who can -- and who've taken a step back to be involved.  Now getting that kind of collection of people around a table is extremely difficult, but you can imagine doing it for Congress separately, for example and calling upon people who have recently served and have, you know, reverence for the institution and continuing concern about our security.

MS.    :  (Off mike.)

ORNSTEIN:  Yeah.

You know, I -- just one comment on the Haig business.  As I've traveled around the country in the -- over the last six years and have talked about this issue, it is amazing how that continues to resonate with people.  When you mention it, everybody just sort of -- the eyes light up.  Poor Al Haig will be remembered first for that because that really stuck with people and it's the most effective way of dramatizing this issue, actually, in some respects.

I've talked to Tom Daschle, who's a statesman, and Bob Dole, who also is a statesman and continues to be deeply involved, although Bob is now 84 and threw himself into the Dole-Shalala Commission, which was a -- actually a shining example of how a commission can work well.  And I think he can get involved as well.  Getting -- when we first created the Continuity of Government Commission, Presidents Ford and Carter were honorary co-chairs as they did on so many things, but didn't play any active role and that was part of the deal that they would be honorary co-chairs.  Getting Presidents Clinton and Bush involved is a particularly interesting idea and I think very much worth pursuing.

DONILON:  Dan?

QUESTIONER:  Dan Tarullo from Georgetown Law School.  Thanks, Tom.

I have a brief comment and then a question.  The comment kind of amplifies on Jamie's observations of why this doesn't happen.  I mean, constitutionalizing has throughout our history been an incremental exercise.  You know, even the creation of the Constitution was moving from where we were under the Articles of Confederation to some things that people wanted to change, and each amendment has been people saying, "Well, do we like this, and if we don't, how do we change it?"  Whereas what you folks on the panel are contemplating is a potentially radical discontinuity where everything is sort of up for grabs.  And I think that means that basic questions become implicated again and everybody's fighting about basic questions.

Are you worried most about -- as Norm seems to be -- about somebody kind of seizing control or are you worried most about paralysis, where you have too many checks and balances -- people are unable to function?  And I guess in response to your question, Thomas, about what can be done, I'm struck by how little writing and discussion there is of this set of issues outside of Washington and the people sitting at the front of the table.  I mean, I unfortunately have to look at writing by law professors who want to -- or people want to go into law faculties every year haven't seen anything on this.  You know, everybody's writing on Article II powers, everybody's writing on civil liberties in a time of anti-terrorist activities.  Nobody's writing on this.  So it's got to kind of get outside the beltway, I think, to have any shot at picking up. That's number one.

The question is, I was a bit surprised at the degree to which this was a constitutional law professor's dream discussion.  What about the rest of the government?  Because I -- that's -- you know, using Tom's analogy, we have a very headquarters-heavy operation here with the exception of the judiciary, which Jamie pointed out.  And I add the Federal Reserve, which is -- has high-ranking people throughout the country and the military, to some degree.  Most of the rest of our government has all its nerve centers within seven miles of where we're sitting right now.  And I'm not talking about the secretary of Transportation.  I'm talking about all the assistant secretaries and the deputy assistant secretaries of Transportation and Energy and the like.  It -- how much contingency planning has been done for those important but non-symbolic functions of government after a genuine catastrophe in Washington?

DONILON:  Fred?

IKLE:  Well, quite a lot has been done in the military, really.  You know, we have NORTHCOM now.  We didn't have to sing for it for this republic here and changes happened as a result of Katrina, when all of the military was accepted by the Defense Department then and or disasters.  But to look at this more broadly, a continued two-pronged approach certainly move us forward.  And I like the recommendation of the Base Realignment Commission -- (off mike) -- as a commission that it can give us that power then to get something done.

Second -- parallel to that -- one could -- and this could be done internally in the Defense Department or the military establishment -- encourage them toward -- do further work.  And a lot of work has been done about the passe comitatus act, which often is interpreted as an excuse to do nothing to scratch the back of all these legislative pieces we have lying around to integrate these into preparing a legalized response by the military to such a crisis.  You move forward and there's two -- and there's two roads, you may more likely get something when there's at least two approaches -- may compete with each other and drive each other forward.  

DONILON:  That'll have to be the last word, in keeping with the council commitment to end on time for its events.

Thank you all very much.  It was terrific. (Applause.)
Title: Re: Jane Lute, Henry Kissinger, John Hamre, and Max Boot plan on blowing shit up!
Post by: Dig on May 02, 2011, 05:13:35 pm
There's the Supreme Court.  On 9/11, just by eerie coincidence that morning the Judicial Conference of the United States was meeting at the Supreme Court.  All nine justices, the chief judges of the appeals courts, the major figures from the district courts -- virtually the entire leadership of the federal judiciary about 150 yards from the Capitol Dome.  It turned out with an interesting twist that several people who were there told me afterwards.  During the course of that meeting, three or four times, with Chief Justice Rehnquist presiding, people were coming up onto the dais and whispering in his ear and then they'd leave and then they'd come back, and eventually he just got up and left, didn't say anything, as they hustled him off to an undisclosed location, leaving the rest of the judiciary to fend for themselves not having any idea what was going on.


W T F ?

Anyone else ever hear about one of our branches of government having a coincidental "all hands on deck" meeting right at the time of the "caught off guard" terror attacks?
Title: Re: Jane Lute, Henry Kissinger, John Hamre, and Max Boot plan on blowing shit up!
Post by: Dig on May 02, 2011, 05:16:18 pm
And their justification for this change...Abdulmutallab and the false flag Chertoff ordered flaming crotch...

Let's just go through the evidence they had on this guy who was put on the plane by a US INTELLIGENCE OFFICER...

1. His dad, a former minister in Nigeria, informed the US embassy there that his son had been radicalized
2. US intelligence had been following him for a while, dubbing him “the Nigerian”
3. He was on various international watch lists
4. He had been banned from Britain
5. The British intelligence service had identified him to our intelligence agencies in 2008 as a potential threat
6. He bought a one-way ticket to the United States in Africa through Europe
7. He paid cash
8. He checked no luggage
9. He had no passport
10. His VISA was flagged multiple times
11. He was staggering and practically unconscious likely due to forced intake of pharmaceuticals (standard operating procedure for a false flag)
12. HE WAS LED ON THE PLANE BY A SHARP DRESSED US INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
13. THE FACT THAT HE WAS LED ON THE PLANE BY A US INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IS NOT ONLY CONFIRMED BY EYEWITNESSES BUT BY THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF STATE PATRICK KENNEDY

Now how does adding another 10 or 100 million to an illegal watch list help when the INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS ARE COMMITTING THE F-ING TERROR!?!?!?!?!


State Department Admits:
Detroit Christmas Bomber Was Deliberately Allowed to Keep US Entry Visa, Board His Flight

http://tarpley.net/2010/02/11/state-department-admits-detroit-christmas-bomber-was-deliberately-allowed-to-keep-us-entry-visa-board-his-flight/
Webster G. Tarpley TARPLEY.net February 10, 2010


The Detroit Christmas bomber was deliberately and intentionally allowed to keep his US entry visa as the result of a national security override issued by an as yet unknown US intelligence or law-enforcement agency with the goal of blocking the State Department’s planned revocation of that visa. This is the result of hearings held on January 27 before the House Homeland Security Committee, and in particular of the testimony of Patrick F. Kennedy, Undersecretary of State for Management. The rickety US government official version of the December 25 Detroit underwear bomber incident, which has been jerry-built over the past month and a half, has now totally collapsed, and key elements of the terrorism-spawning rogue network inside US agencies and departments are unusually vulnerable to a determined campaign of exposure.

These developments decisively confirm the analysis offered by the present writer in a Dec. 28, 2009 television interview on Russia Today.1 On that occasion, my estimate was that Mutallab was a protected patsy being used by rogue elements of the US intelligence community for the deliberate and intentional creation of a high profile incident with the goal of obtaining a large-scale political effect. On January 4, Richard Wolffe reported on the MSNBC Countdown program that the Obama White House was investigating whether the Detroit Christmas incident had been “intentionally” created by an intelligence network with an “alternative agenda.”2 It was in this report that Wolffe posed the alternative of “cock-up or conspiracy.”3 Unfortunately, Obama opted for the screw-up version on January 5.

Based on what was already known a few days after this incident, it was clear that normal screening and surveillance procedures had been scrapped and aborted in order to allow the youthful patsy Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab of Nigeria to board his flight from Amsterdam in the Netherlands to Detroit. Mutallab’s father, a rich, well known, and reputable Nigerian banker had gone to the US Embassy in his country and formally warned a State Department official as well as a CIA representative that his son was in Yemen and in all probability consorting with terrorists. Under normal circumstances, this report alone would have been more than enough to get Mutallab’s US visa revoked in the same way he had already been denied entry to Great Britain. He also would normally have been placed on the no-fly list, thus setting up two insuperable obstacles to getting on his Detroit bound flight and winging off to produce an incident which caused several weeks of public hysteria in this country, completely with demands for body scanners in airports. In addition, the US intelligence community had reports that a Nigerian was training with the purported “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula” in Yemen. Obama had called a December 22 meeting with top CIA, FBI, and DHS officials because of reports of a terrorist attack looming during the Christmas holiday.

The January 27 hearings of the House Homeland Security Committee were also addressed by Michael Leiter, the AWOL Director of the National Counterterrorism Center, along with Jane Holl Lute, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security, who was sent in place of HHS Secretary Janet Napolitano, who boycotted the hearings. But the important testimony came from Kennedy, whose responsibilities include Consular Services, and therefore visas. In his opening statement, Kennedy offered a tortured circumlocution to describe what had happened. Attempting to head off the question of why the State Department had not revoked Mutallab’s visa, Kennedy stated:

“We will use revocation authority prior to interagency consultation in circumstances where we believe there is an immediate threat. Revocation is an important tool in our border security arsenal. At the same time, expeditious coordination with our national security partners is not to be underestimated. There have been numerous cases where our unilateral and uncoordinated revocation would have disrupted important investigations that were underway by one of our national security partners. They had the individual under investigation and our revocation action would have disclosed the U.S. Government’s interest in the individual and ended our colleagues’ ability to quietly pursue the case and identify terrorists’ plans and co-conspirators.” 4

Undersecretary Kennedy: An Agency Objected to Revoking Visa

Not surprisingly, House Homeland Security Chairman Bennie Thompson (D-MS) wanted to know what that really meant. Here is his exchange with Undersecretary Kennedy:

REP. THOMPSON: Okay. So — all right. So he has a visa. So what does that do? In the process, does it revoke the visa? Does it —

MR. KENNEDY: We — as I mentioned in my statement, Mr. Chairman, if we unilaterally revoked a visa — and there was a case recently up — we have a request from a law enforcement agency to not revoke the visa. We came across information; we said this is a dangerous person. We were ready to revoke the visa. We then went to the community and said, should we revoke this visa? And one of the members — and we’d be glad to give you that out of — in private — said, please do not revoke this visa. We have eyes on this person. We are following this person who has the visa for the purpose of trying roll up an entire network, not just stop one person. So we will revoke the visa of any individual who is a threat to the United States, but we do take one preliminary step. We ask our law enforcement and intelligence community partners, do you have eyes on this person, and so you want us to let this person proceed under your surveillance so that you may potentially break a larger plot?

REP. THOMPSON: Well, I think that the point that I’m trying to get at is, is this just another box you’re checking, or is that some security value to add in that box, to the list?

MR. KENNEDY: The intelligence and law enforcement community tell us that they believe in certain cases that there’s a higher value of them following this person so they can find his or her co-conspirators and roll up an entire plot against the United States, rather than simply knock out one soldier in that effort.5

What Kennedy is saying is that the established bureaucratic routine calls for the State Department to inquire of the other intelligence and law enforcement agencies that compose the US intelligence community whether they have any objection to the lifting of a visa. In this case, reports Kennedy, there was such an objection from at least one agency, based on their contention that Mutallab was under intensive scrutiny as part of an operation which might lead to the discovery and arrest of far bigger fish. We should also notice that Kennedy is extremely reluctant to speak before the committee in public session about exactly which intelligence or law-enforcement agency this was, and that the members of the committee do not demand an immediate straight answer. Perhaps Kennedy told them later, behind the closed doors of a secret executive session. But after weeks of hysteria, the public has a right to know.

Classic Use of National Security Override to Protect A Patsy

What we see here is a classic example of the use of a national security override on the part of subversive moles who are performing their most basic responsibility of protecting a patsy by preventing him from being arrested or otherwise interfered with until that patsy can perform his assigned task and produce the desired incident, with the goal of inducing an intensive political response in the form of a wave of public hysteria. With this method, the name of the patsy is in effect flagged in all the relevant databases with the notation that this person is the target of an ongoing investigation which cannot be interfered with because of overriding national security concerns. This means that the patsy in question is immune to arrest by traffic cops, airport and border officials, or any other law enforcement official. The patsy is untouchable — until of course the terrorist provocation has been carried out.

Various alleged 9/11 figures operated for extended periods of time inside the US, evidently under the cover of such national security overrides. How did the accused 19 9/11 hijackers enter and leave this country, obtain visas, rent apartments, acquire checking accounts and credit cards, obtain driver’s licenses, register vehicles, rent cars, attend flight schools, and repeatedly fly on US domestic airlines? How did they escape arrest for traffic violations, which some of them committed? The answer is in all likelihood that they had been made untouchable to ordinary law enforcement because their names had been flagged with national security overrides which made them immune to arrest for routine infractions or because their names appeared on watch lists and similar databases.

Congressman Michael McCaul (R-TX) returned to this sensitive issue in his questioning of Undersecretary Kennedy, leading to the following exchange:

REP. MCCAUL: Well, I think there needs to be a lot better coordination going on here between these two entities. And Mr. Kennedy, why given the information that you had, why wasn’t the VISA revoked?

MR. KENNEDY: Sir, as I mentioned earlier, when we get any information, when anyone appears at an American embassy and they say that they have doubts about someone, we immediately generate what is called a visa VIPER message. We sent that to the entire law enforcement and intelligence —

REP. MCCAUL: My problem — I understand the process. But you had this information, and you didn’t revoke the VISA.

MR. KENNEDY: Because —

REP. MCCAUL: I mean the cable I just read makes it pretty clear that this man is associated with extremists in Yemen, and you didn’t revoke his VISA.

MR. KENNEDY: What it was, sir, is his father said he was associated with this. And so we then asked the intelligence and law enforcement communities if they have any other information. I don’t want to take much of your time, and I’d glad to visit with you afterwards. 6

We note again the tremendous reticence of Undersecretary Kennedy in getting into the details of how the national security override was issued in the case of Mutallab’s visa. Kennedy suggests he will explain it all to the Congressman in private, but not in the full glare of public opinion were his words will end up on the Federal News transcript.

Demand to Know Who Let Mutallab Keep His Visa

Instead, it is imperative for the preservation of democratic institutions that the full details be known of how the State Department was prevented from revoking Mutallab’s visa. We want to know which agency demanded that Mutallab not be interfered with. We want to know the names and posts held by the officials who issued the override of the State Department’s proposal. We want these officials fired. We want these officials thoroughly investigated. We want them to appear before public congressional hearings. We want them to be the targets of civil suits by airlines and other interested parties. We want to find out the nature of any privately controlled intelligence networks to which they may belong. Such an investigation may well lead outside of the United States, and most particularly to the United Kingdom. Mutallab comes from Nigeria, a former British colony. He spent several years in London, the site of MI-6’s Londonistan school for Islamic fundamentalist extremist patsies and fanatics, where he was apparently radicalized. Mutallab was then you sheep dipped into Yemen, another former British colony, where he was placed in contact with Awlaki the CIA lackey, a notorious double agent and agent provocateur. Given the fact that Mutallab was operating outside of this US, the CIA is an obvious suspect, but not the only one.

There is every reason to conclude that the rogue network of moles operating inside US intelligence — otherwise known as the invisible government or shadow government — knew that Mutallab was coming, knew that he would be carrying a device resembling a bomb, and wanted him to enter the skies over Detroit. (Whether Mutallab’s handlers thought they were giving him a bomb that would actually go off is a separate question.) They did all this because they sincerely wanted a major terrorist provocation of the US population, designed to unleash waves of Islamophobic hysteria that would be useful for the support of ongoing operations in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia, and quite possibly against Iran.

Not Body Scanners, But Mole Detectors at CIA and FBI

Earlier commentaries on this incident had alleged a failure to connect the dots. As it now transpires, the dots were evidently connected by the State Department, but their action was blocked by an override issued by another agency. Another popular cover story for the failure of screening and surveillance on Christmas between Amsterdam and Detroit was that Mutallab’s name had been misspelled when entered into the relevant antiterrorist database. Kennedy conceded in his testimony that one such data entry was misspelled, but another one was entered accurately. All of this needs to be viewed with great skepticism.

Apart from these details, it should be clear to all that the official US account of the Detroit Christmas incident has now been completely refuted. We do not need body scanners at airports. We need mole detectors installed at the CIA, FBI, DIA, NSA, State Department, NCTC, and the National Security Council. The urgent necessity is now to find out precisely who issued a critical override that allowed Mutallab to keep his visa and board his flight to Detroit. Pull on that thread and revelations might well follow that lead back to the networks behind 9/11, Iran Contra, and much else. Political forces friendly to Obama have tended to see this case as staged in order to embarrass the tenant of the White House. These forces should now demand immediate congressional hearings into the allegations contained in Undersecretary Kennedy’s testimony.


1http://tarpley.net/2009/12/28/tarpley-on-rt-nigerian-patsy-helps-us-meddling-in-yemen-civil-war/
2http://tarpley.net/2010/01/05/obama-white-house-probing-rogue-network-of-moles-behind-christmas-detroit-patsy-fiasco-reports-richard-wolffe-on-msnbc/
3http://tarpley.net/2010/01/06/obama-flubs-his-first-bay-of-pigs-moment-as-terror-moles-escape-purge/
4 http://www.state.gov/m/rls/remarks/2010/135865.htm
5See Federal News Service transcript of the Q&A before the committee at: http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=25151&docId=l:1117012781&start=15 , emphasis added.
6See Federal News Service transcript of the Q&A before the committee at: http://www6.lexisnexis.com/publisher/EndUser?Action=UserDisplayFullDocument&orgId=574&topicId=25151&docId=l:1117012781&start=15 , emphasis added.
Title: Re: Jane Lute, Henry Kissinger, John Hamre, and Max Boot plan on blowing shit up!
Post by: Dig on May 02, 2011, 05:17:51 pm


Merging the HSC and NSC: Stronger Together

Christine Wormuth and Jeremy White
http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=5.1.3
- Volume V No. 1: January 2009 -

At the federal level, homeland security is inherently and fundamentally an interagency undertaking. The quality of interagency relationships and processes is central to the success or failure of federal – and national – homeland security activities. Short of giving a single Cabinet secretary directive authority over other Cabinet secretaries during major domestic incidents (which is unlikely given traditional forms of American government) the only way to ensure effective unity of effort at the federal level is to exercise strong leadership from the White House. This kind of leadership is needed not just during an actual catastrophe but also when the government is engaged in the day-to-day activities of working to prevent, protect against, and prepare for such catastrophes. In recent years the White House has not played this role, in large part because of the bifurcation of national security issues into a National Security Council and a Homeland Security Council. One of the most important and most necessary changes the new administration should make is to merge these organizations into a single council with a largely shared professional staff. This newly merged Council should exercise forceful leadership on behalf of the president of the United States in developing homeland security strategy and policy and should closely oversee its implementation.

Why a Merger is Needed

There are three main reasons that the existing Homeland Security Council (HSC) and its staff have not been particularly effective. The first, and perhaps most important, is structural: by establishing a separate council and associated staff to address homeland issues, the White House artificially bifurcated its approach to national security issues, although the issues themselves frequently have both domestic and international aspects that are interrelated. For example, effectively combating terrorism involves targeting terrorists and their support networks overseas, but also addressing the potential for radicalization of individuals inside the United States. Effectively addressing 21st century security challenges requires an integrated approach that considers both sides of a given problem – but such an approach is very difficult to achieve when two different organizations inside the White House are involved. Both council staffs work in the Old Executive Office Building, but they share little more than a mailing address. Each council has a different organizational structure, each staff reports to a different adviser to the president, and each has its own executive secretariat, with separate systems for convening meetings and designating lead directorates on specific issues. The two council staffs don’t even work on the same e-mail system: while the NSC staff does most of its work on the classified e-mail system, the HSC staff works mostly on the “low side,” or the unclassified network. Some coordination between the two staffs does take place, but it occurs largely through the initiative of individual staff members, who must overcome the hurdles presented by the bifurcated structure.

A second major reason for the ineffectiveness of the HSC on many issues is organizational: it is relatively weak, particularly compared to the NSC. A host of dry, technical personnel and budget issues have contributed significantly to this problem. Unlike the NSC and its staff, the HSC and its staff do not constitute a separate organization inside the Executive Office of the President; as a result, HSC personnel numbers count against the overall personnel ceiling for White House staff and so there is pressure to minimize the size of the HSC organization. While the NSC has more than 240 staff members, the HSC on average has only forty-five. 1 Moreover, as a consequence of HSC’s administrative status within the Office of the President, the council does not have its own budget, which places a tight salary cap on the staff. Although HSC staff members have significant responsibility and work extremely long hours, even the highest paid among them earn less than senior GS-15 civil servants elsewhere in government. This salary gap has added to the difficulty of recruiting the best and brightest to the HSC organization – a task that was already challenging, because the HSC is seen as having less stature than the NSC. As a result, many more HSC than NSC staffers have backgrounds in political campaigns rather than in national and homeland security issues, and frequently they are less experienced overall than their NSC peers.

Finally, the HSC has not been particularly effective in its efforts either to lead the interagency in developing core strategy and guidance on homeland security issues (such as developing an interagency deliberate planning process) or in overseeing implementation of policies once they are developed (such as the range of documents and processes called for in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 on National Preparedness that was signed out in 2004). This lack of success can be partly attributed to the HSC’s relatively small and inexperienced staff, but it is also associated with the explicit preference shown by the Bush Administration for “the lead agency approach,” which focuses the NSC and HSC staffs primarily on coordination rather than development of strategy and policy. 2 Historically, some presidents have structured the NSC to take a greater leadership role in driving foreign and national security policy; others have used the NSC primarily as a coordinating body. 3 However, as security challenges become increasingly complex, and as extensive capabilities must be integrated from across the entire federal government, the lead agency model clearly will prove inadequate in many cases. During the Bush Administration, the Department of Homeland Security has served as the lead agency for most major homeland security initiatives, but in the absence of firm backing from the White House and an HSC with the power to quash bureaucratic disagreements, DHS has typically expended a great deal of its efforts on intramural struggles within the executive branch. 4

What a Merged Council Would Look Like

Merging the two councils is the first step the new administration can take toward creating significantly more unity of effort in government efforts to prevent, prepare for, and respond to a catastrophe. A newly unified NSC and staff should be empowered to lead the interagency in formulating homeland security policy and overseeing its implementation on behalf of the president of the United States. To effect this merger, President Obama will need to ask Congress to amend the Homeland Security Act of 2002 by eliminating sections 901 through 906 of the law, which essentially establish the Homeland Security Council as a distinct organization. 5 Unifying the Homeland Security Council and National Security Council organizations would also require amending the National Security Act of 1947 to make the secretary of homeland security and attorney general permanent members of the NSC. The current practice of inviting other Cabinet heads to NSC meetings as appropriate to the specific substantive issues under consideration should continue.

The unified National Security Council would be led by the national security adviser (NSA) to the president, as is the case today, but the NSA would have two deputies – a deputy for international affairs and a deputy for domestic affairs. The national security adviser already holds one of the most grueling jobs in Washington, bearing the responsibility for a vast array of issues. Merging the two councils and their staffs would clearly add to this burden, but that disadvantage is more than outweighed by the benefits of addressing security issues holistically at the White House level. Assigning all security issues to a single national security adviser will ensure that the NSA has sufficient authority to resolve conflicts between Cabinet heads, particularly during times of crisis. Moreover, the two deputies would help lessen the challenge for the NSA of dealing with such a broad span of duties. These deputies would also need to be of sufficient stature to work effectively with top government officials, up to and including the level of Cabinet secretaries. During the Bush administration there have been as many as five positions labeled “deputy NSA” at one time; limiting their number to two would give the office more importance, bringing its holders much closer to being true seconds-in-command to the NSA. Moreover, should the international and domestic aspects of a problem seem to give rise to conflicting solutions or to require trade-offs, a single national security adviser with authority over the entire spectrum of issues will be positioned to weigh all elements and make a balanced recommendation to the president. Under the current model, the president has no single adviser whose job it is to weigh the competing domestic and international aspects of a problem and render an impartial judgment – overcoming the disagreements of Cabinet members, if necessary.

Under the merged council construct, with a single NSA and two deputy NSAs, much of the NSC staff would be shared and would report to both deputies. Some staffers might report only to one deputy, depending on their responsibilities. While President Obama should merge the two councils and their staffs, care should be taken to ensure that the “new” NSC organization complements its traditional national security expertise with senior staff who fully understand and possess considerable experience in catastrophe prevention, critical infrastructure protection, preparedness, response, and recovery issues. A merged council that is staffed only with traditional national security experts will not be effective at developing homeland security policy and guidance and would largely defeat the purpose of the merger.

Not only should the merged council include significant staff with expertise in homeland security disciplines, the council also should include staff that provide state and local government perspectives to ensure greater integration of these issues at the federal level. The National Security Education Program codified in Executive Order 13434 provides a mechanism to bring individuals with these backgrounds on to the merged council staff. Through the National Security Professional Development Program, senior state and local officials could join the council staff for a year to serve a detail assignment at the NSC. Under this type of program, senior people serving in the counterterrorism division of the New York City Police Department could spend a year at the White House, working in the merged council. This type of a rotational approach would also create opportunities for professionals at the federal level to serve in key positions in state and local governments, enabling them to use those experiences to inform their work when they return to the federal government. Although achieving these kinds of opportunities presents a host of bureaucratic challenges, their achievement would be a major step toward creating a truly “joint” homeland security workforce with vertical and horizontal integration that would enhance national preparedness.

In addition to integrating state and local perspectives at the staff level, there are other means of infusing these perspectives into policy-making at the White House level. The next president could reinstate the Homeland Security Advisory Council established to provide advice and counsel to the Executive Office of the President. Re-establishing this council would be another way to craft sensible homeland security policies and create greater buy-in for these policies outside the Beltway. To avoid charges of drawing only on the “usual suspects” at the state and local level for input, the next president should allow organizations like the National Governors Association (NGA), the U.S. Conference of Mayors, and the National Emergency Management Association (NEMA) to choose some of the members of the advisory council. Creating new opportunities for state and local representatives to provide input into policy development at the federal level geared toward implementing a national integrated homeland security system would not only help to increase the feeling of ownership of new policies, but would also generate better understanding at the federal level of how homeland security needs vary by state and region.

What a Merged Council Would Do

Whatever the specific organization chosen by President Obama, to generate greater unity of effort the new unified National Security Council must play a much more prominent role in developing strategy and policy, and in overseeing the implementation of that policy, than either the NSC or HSC has done under the current administration. As integrated approaches to address future security challenges are developed, the roles of all relevant Cabinet agencies will not be equal. Some strategies may require that departments take responsibilities that are outside their traditional comfort zones; some resources may have to be shifted from one department to another. To ensure that clear policies are developed, difficult decisions are made, and turf battles are decisively resolved, a robust and unified NSC must act as honest broker and be empowered to carry out presidential decisions once they are made.

Some have argued that a merger is not particularly necessary, because the existence of separate Homeland Security and National Security Councils has not led to any major policy failures. The existence of two separate councils may not have caused any major policy failures, but it has caused the executive branch to miss important opportunities to develop more effective homeland security policy. For example, if the National Response Framework outlines how the federal government will operate with its partners “to the right of the boom,” there is no analogue to how the federal government will operate with its partners “to the left of the boom” – before a catastrophe takes place. There are many reasons the executive branch does not yet have a National Prevention Framework, but in part it is because developing a prevention framework would have required staffs from the NSC and HSC – who come from different professional disciplines and cultures – to work together closely, solmething they are not used to doing. Merging these staffs into a single organization would bring them together and begin building a corporate culture of cross-fertilization and integration during policy development, which is sorely needed in the broader homeland security enterprise

Just as important as effective NSC leadership during the front-end phase policy development is attentive NSC oversight of policy implementation. Such oversight does not imply an operational role for the council and its staff; the pitfalls of an operational NSC were amply demonstrated by the activities of Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North and others on the NSC staff during the Reagan administration. But in light of the relative autonomy of the Cabinet agencies, and the frequency of hard-fought battles over policies and resources, the only way to guarantee effective implementation is for the NSC staff to closely monitor the activities of Cabinet agencies. The current HSC organization does not have the staff, expertise, or stature to perform such monitoring; the current NSC has the necessary assets but lacks the power (which must be granted by the president) to execute this oversight role. As a result, turf battles are fought and re-fought, policy initiatives languish, congressional reporting deadlines are missed, and bureaucratic logrolling is common.

When a Merger Should Happen

Although considerable progress has been made since the September 11 attacks in 2001, the country is still not fully prepared to deal with a domestic catastrophe. What ultimately matters to the American public is not how far we have come, but how far away we still are from being prepared for the next catastrophe. Homeland security received scant attention during the 2008 presidential campaign, but the task of readying the United States to face the threats of the post-September 11 era is an enormous one and poses a fundamental challenge for the new president. A merged NSC-HSC would go a long way towards enabling the federal government to do its part to better prepare the United States to face future challenges. Merging the HSC and the NSC would send a clear signal that homeland security issues will now be a fundamental part of President Obama’s mainstream national security policy and will be a top priority for the new administration.



Christine E. Wormuth is a senior fellow in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where she works on defense and homeland security issues, including emergency response and preparedness challenges, homeland security policy development, defense strategy and resources, and the capabilities and readiness of the U.S. military.

Jeremy White is research assistant in the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where he works on issues relating to homeland defense, Iraq, homeland security policy, and future military readiness. Questions and comments regarding this essay should be directed to [email protected]

Christine Wormuth and Anne Witkowsky, Managing the Next Domestic Catastrophe (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2008), 17.

See David Ignatius, “Bush’s Clark Kent,” Washington Post, February 11, 2005, A25; Colonel David J. Clement, USMCR, Improving the Efficiency of the Interagency (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2006), 17; Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002); Thomas E. Ricks, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq (New York: Penguin Books, 2006); James Mann, Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (New York: Penguin Books, 2004).

For example, in the Eisenhower and Nixon administrations the NSC clearly played a lead role in formulating foreign policy. The Kennedy administration’s NSC was much smaller, but its staff was dogged in ensuring that the federal departments implemented the president’s policies at the time. In contrast, in the Reagan administration the NSC organization largely shed its policy-making functions and adopted much more of a coordinating role. See The White House, “History of the National Security Council 1947—1997,” http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/history.html.

David J. Rothkopf, Running the World (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 435; Stephen Flynn, America the Vulnerable: How Our Government Is Failing to Protect Us from Terrorism (New York: HarperCollins, 2004), 141–43.

Public Law 107-296, Homeland Security Act of 2002, November 25, 2002, §901 -§906.


And guess what just happened recently even without congress or the president (also thanks to birther truther tenther)...


DoD/DHS/NATO bypasses congress to militarize entire USA via secret cyber memo

retrieved from
http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1286984200944.shtm

Joint Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Secretary of Homeland Security Janet Napolitano on Enhancing Coordination to Secure America's Cyber Networks

Release Date: October 13, 2010

For Immediate Release
Office of the Press Secretary
Contact: 202-282-8010

“Reflecting President Obama’s strong commitment to building an administration-wide approach to combating threats to our cyber networks and infrastructure, the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) have signed a memorandum of agreement that will align and enhance America’s capabilities to protect against threats to our critical civilian and military computer systems and networks.

Effective cybersecurity means protecting critical networks against a wide range of state and non-state actors that do not adhere to physical borders.

With this memorandum of agreement, effective immediately, we are building a new framework between our Departments to enhance operational coordination and joint program planning. It formalizes processes in which we work together to protect our nation’s cyber networks and critical infrastructure, and increases the clarity and focus of our respective roles and responsibilities. The agreement embeds DoD cyber analysts within DHS to better support the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC) and sends a full-time senior DHS leader to DoD’s National Security Agency, along with a support team comprised of DHS privacy, civil liberties and legal personnel. The agreement will ensure both agencies’ priorities and requests for support are clearly communicated and met.

This structure is designed to put the full weight of our combined capabilities and expertise behind every action taken to protect our vital cyber networks, without altering the authorities or oversight of our separate but complementary missions. We will improve economy and efficiency by better leveraging vital technologies and personnel to serve both Departments’ missions in full adherence to U.S. laws and regulation. This memorandum of agreement furthers our strong commitment to protecting civil liberties and privacy. [INSERT: LMAO, yeah right]

We look forward to building on this vitally important step toward greater collaboration as we continue to work together on new and better ways to protect our economy and critical networks against evolving threats by those who seek to harm the United States.”





http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/20101013-dod-dhs-cyber-moa.pdf

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
AND
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
REGARDING CYBERSECURITY

1. PARTIES. The parties to this Agreement are the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Department of Defense (DoD).

2. AUTHORITY. This Agreement is authorized under the provisions of the Homeland Security Act (2002); the Economy Act; U.S. Code Title 10; Executive Order 12333; National Security Directive 42; Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5; Homeland Security Presidential Directive-7; and National Security Presidential Directive54/Homeland Security Presidential Directive-23.

3. PURPOSE. The purpose of the Agreement is to set forth terms by which DHS and DoD will provide personnel, equipment, and facilities in order to increase interdepartmental collaboration in strategic planning for the Nation's cybersecurity, mutual support for cybersecurity capabilities development, and synchronization of current operational cybersecurity mission activities. Implementing this Agreement will focus national cybersecurity efforts, increasing the overalI capacity and capability of both DHS' s homeland security and DoD's national security missions, while providing integral protection for privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.

4. SCOPE. DoD and DHS agree to collaborate to improve the synchronization and mutual support of their respective efforts in support of U.S. cybersecurity. Departmental relationships identified in this Agreement are intended to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of requirements formulation, and requests for products, services, technical assistance, coordination,and performance assessment for cybersecurity missions executed across a variety of DoD and DHS elements. They do not alter existing DoD and DHS authorities, command relationships, or privacy, civil liberties, and other oversight relationships. In establishing a framework to provide mutually beneficial logistical and operational support, this Agreement is not intended to replicate or aggregate unnecessarily the diverse line organizations across technology development, operations, and customer support that collectively execute cybersecurity missions.

5. RESPONSIBILITIES.

A. Department of Homeland Security.

1) Identify and assign, in coordination with the Department of Defense, a DHS Director, Cybersecurity Coordination who will be in the National Protection and
Programs Directorate and will be located at the National Security Agency (NSA) but will not be in the NSA chain of command. This individual will also act as the DHS Senior Cybersecurity Representative to U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM).

2) Receive DoD requests for cybersecurity support and consider DoD requirements, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law and DHS mission requirements and authorities, related to operational planning and mission coordination.

3) Identify qualified DHS personnel to perfom DHS functions under the sole supervision and direction of DHS officials as follows:
a. Assign DHS personnel to work at NSA as part of a Joint Coordination Element (JCE) performing the functions ofjoint operational planning, coordination, synchronization, requirement translation, and other DHS mission support for homeland security for cybersecurity under the direct supervision of the Director, Cybersecurity Coordination;
b. Assign personnel to work at the NSA Directorate of Acquisition for collaborative acquisition and technology development;
c. Assign or detail, as appropriate, personnel to work at the National Security Agency/Central Security Services (NSA/CSS) Threat Operations Center (NTOC) to promote joint operational planning, coordination, synchronization, requirement translation, and other DHS mission suppOl1 for homeland security for cybersecurity; and
d. Assign representatives from the Office of the General Counsel, Privacy Oftice, and the Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties to support the DHS Director, Cybersecurity Coordination, at NSA, and coordinate with the 000 countcrparts identified in paragraph B.2.d.

4) Ensure that DHS personnel have current security clearances (TS/SCI) upon assignment to NSA, including training on the appropriate handling and dissemination of classified and sensitive information in accordance with DoD, Intelligence Community and NSA regulations. 5) Provide funding for DHS mission requirements, salaries, and training unique to DHS personnel for assignments under paragraph 5.A.3.

6) Provide appropriate access, administrative support, and space for an NSA Cryptologic Services Group (CSO) and a USCYBERCOM Cyber Support Element (CSE) collocated with the National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC), at DHS, and integration into DHS's cybersecurity operational activities. DHS \ViII provide all necessary DHS equipment and connectivity to permit both CSG and CSE entities the capability to carry out their respective roles and responsibilities.

7) DHS Director, Cybersecurity Coordination.
a. Provide requests for cybersecurity planning, technology, and where appropriate other support to NSA and USCYBERCOM and advocate for such requests based on DHS requirements to protect Federal Executive branch, non-DoD, non-national security systems, and U.S. critical infrastructure and key resources.
b. Convey to and coordinate within DHS any NSA and USCYBERCOM requests for support or requirements regarding cybersecurity operations.
c. Participate in and lead, as appropriate, joint planning and other processes.
d. Promote and facilitatc strong communications between DHS and DoD senior leadership, including that of NSA, on cybersecurity matters ofjoint interest, including engaging in joint operational planning and mission coordination.
e. Maintain cognizance of DHS and, as appropriate, of DoD, NSA, and USCYBERCOM cybersecurity activities, to assist in deconfliction and promote synchronization of those activities.
f. Assist in coordinating DoD and DHS efforts to improve cybersecurity threat information sharing between the public and private sectors to aid in preventing, detecting, mitigating, and/or recovering from the effects of an attack, interference, compromise, or incapacitation related to homeland security and national security activities in cyberspace.

B. Department of Defense.

1) Direct the Director ofNSA (DIRNSA) and Commander, USCYBERCOM, to undertake collaborative activities and provide cybersecurity support envisioned in this agreement and subsequent implementing agreements.

2) National Security Agency.
a. Assign an NSA SES-equivalent to serve as the NSA lead to the Joint Coordination Element (JCE). This NSA ofticial will coordinate and work with the DHS Director, Cybersecurity Coordination in carrying out the activities of the Joint Coordination Element. This NSA official will not be in the DHS chain of command, and his OT her performance ratings will be prepared by NSA with input from the DHS Director, Cybersecurity Coordination. This NSA official will supervise and direct all NSA personnel assigned to the JCE.
b. Receive and coordinate DHS requests for cybersecurity support and consider DHS requirements, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law and NSA mission requirements and authorities, in operational planning and mission coordination.
c. Provide appropriate access, facilities, and administrative support (including necessary equipment and connectivity) to support the Director, Cybersecurity Coordination and DHS personnel assigned or detailed to the three entities listed below. NSA will provide all necessary NSA equipment and connectivity to permit DHS personnel with the capability to carry out their roles and responsibilities.

i. NSA Directorate of Acquisition

11. Joint Coordination Element to be located at NSA

111. NSNCSS Threat Operations Center

d. Identify representatives from its Office of the General Counsel and Privacy Office to work with counterparts at 000, USCYBERCOM, and DHS to support the implementation of this Agreement.
e. Collocate a Cryptologic Services Group at the NCCIC at DHS, for support to and operational synchronization with DHS's cybersecurity operations and the National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP).
f. Assign or detail qualified personnel in accordance with this Agreement both to serve in JCE positions and in CSG positions as mutually agreed.
g. Engage with DHS and USCYBERCOM in joint operational planning and mission coordination.
h. Provide funding for NSA mission requirements, salaries and training unique to NSA for personnel identified in B.2.c.

3) USCYBERCOM.
a. Receive DHS requests for cybersecurity support and consider DHS requirements, as appropriate and consistent with applicable law and USCYBERCOM mission requirements and authorities, in operational planning and mission coordination.
b. Collocate a Cyber Support Element at the NCCIC at DHS, for support to and operational synchronization with DHS's cybersecurity operations and the NCIRP.
c. Assign qualified personnel to CSE positions.
d. As needed to implement this Agreement, provide, on a reimbursable basis, appropriate access, administrative support and space for DHS personnel.
e. Provide funding for USCYBERCOM mission requirements and training unique to its personnel during the assignment.
f. Engage with DHS and NSA in joint operational planning and mission coordination.

C. Joint DoD-DHS.

1) Synchronize the roles and relationships of the proposed DoD Integrated Cyber Center (ICC) and the current DBS National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center (NCCIC).

2) Develop agenda of appropriate supporting actions, including consideration of the establishment of a Joint Program Office (JPO).

3) Develop jointly appropriate agreements, including necessary funding mechanisms, to implement the objectives and responsibilities of this Agreement pursuant to applicable authority.

6. OVERSIGHT. To oversee the activities described in the preceding paragraphs, the Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security and the Deputy Secretary of Defense will conduct monthly oversight meetings suppo11ed by the DHS Deputy Under Secretary, National Protection and Programs Direclorate (NPPD); the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Director ofNSAlCommander, USCYBERCOM.

7. POINTS OF CONTACT.
Philip Reitinger                                                     James N. Miller
Deputy Under Secretary                                        Principal Deputy Under Secretary for Defense Policy
National Protection and Programs Directorate            Department of  Defense
Department of Homeland Security                           2100 Defense Pentagon  
Washington, DC 20528                                          Washington, DC 20301-2100

8. OTHER Provisions. Nothing in this Agreement is intended to conflict with law, regulation, Presidential order or directive, or the directives of DHS or DoD. If a term of this Agreement is inconsistent with such authority, then that term shall be invalid, but the remaining terms and conditions of this Agreement shall remain in full force and effect. This Agreement shall be interpreted and implemented in a manner that respects and complies with (and does not abrogate) the statutory and regulatory responsibilities of the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Secretary of Defense. This Agreement does not obligate funds.
9. EFFECTIVE DATE. This Agreement is effective upon signature of both parties.
10. MODIFICATION AND REVIEW. This Agreement may be modified upon the mutual written consent of the parties. This Agreement will be reviewed by the parties after one year.
11. TERMINATION. The terms of this Agreement, as modified with the, consent of both parties, ,,,,ill remain in effect until terminated. Either party upon 30 days written notice to the other party may terminate this Agreement.

APPROVED BY:
Janet Napolitano                                     Robert Gates
Secretary of Homeland Security                 Secretary of Defense
9-27-10                                                9-24-10
Title: Re: Jane Lute, Henry Kissinger, John Hamre, and Max Boot plan on blowing shit up!
Post by: Dig on May 02, 2011, 05:35:05 pm
"SILENT VECTOR" October 2002 CSIS/ANSER terror exercise on infrastructure

(http://web.archive.org/web/20030402194455/http://www.csis.org/isp/sv/sv_logo.jpg)

http://web.archive.org/web/20030402194455/www.csis.org/isp/sv/index.htm (http://web.archive.org/web/20030402194455/www.csis.org/isp/sv/index.htm)

 Overview

SILENT VECTOR was a strategic level exercise designed to simulate possible U.S. reaction to a credible threat of terrorist attack when there is not sufficient information for effective protection. The overall purpose of the exercise was to assist the Administration and Congress in their attempts to improve the effectiveness of response during the pre attack phase of a major terrorist incident.

The United States operates 103 nuclear power plants, is the world's largest consumer of petrochemicals and by-products and continues to import a disproportionate amount of oil from the Middle East. It is reasonable to assume that terrorist organizations have recognized the potential financial, industrial, and public impact of a substantive attack against American energy infrastructure.

SILENT VECTOR challenged current and former senior government leaders to respond to increasingly credible and specific intelligence indicating the possibility of a large scale attack against critical energy and energy-related infrastructure on the East Coast of the United States.
Players

President                                                                   Hon. Sam Nunn
Governor of Virginia                                                   Hon. James S. Gilmore III
Secretary of State Hon.                                           Fred C. Iklé
Secretary of Defense                                                   Hon. John P. White
Secretary of Homeland Security                                   ADM James M. Loy, USCG (ret.)
Secretary of Energy                                                   Hon. Charles B. Curtis
Attorney General                                                           Hon. George J. Terwilliger III
National Security Advisor                                           Hon . R. James Woolsey
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff                                   GEN Wesley K. Clark, USA (ret.)
Director, Central Intelligence Agency                           Mr. Winston Wiley
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation                           Hon. William S. Sessions
Director, Federal Emergency Management Agency           Hon. James Lee Witt
Director, Nuclear Regulatory Commission                           Hon. Shirley Ann Jackson
Director, White House Office of Homeland Security           Hon. Jerome M. Hauer
Director, National Economic Council                               Mr. Stephen Friedman
The President's Press Secretary                                   Hon. Margaret Myers
Deputy Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation           Mr. Dale Watson


Scenario

(http://web.archive.org/web/20030427181747/http://www.csis.org/isp/sv/sv_pic05.jpg)

The role players were summoned to an emergency meeting with the President and the National Security Council at Camp David to address the looming crisis. Based on information from two independent and relatively reliable sources, the national intelligence community determined that there was a credible, conventional, terrorist threat to unspecified elements of energy infrastructure on the east coast of the United States. The attack was expected to occur in two days, however the precise timing was unknown. Given this information, the role players were faced with several key questions:

   1. Is the attack real? How credible is the intelligence?
   2. What is likely to be attacked?
   3. What should our priorities be?
   4. Can anything be done to prevent an attack?

Over the course of the two days leading up to the expected attack (simulated by two 4-hour sessions), role players were presented with specific analyses on threats, vulnerabilities and expected impacts as well as, emergent intelligence and law enforcement data to help formulate a comprehensive response plan. At the outset, the role players determined that the threat was too vague for direct, specific measures but did raise the alert level and installed general protective measures. This in turn led to media leaks and public panic in communities near energy facilities, such as nuclear power plants. The role players then had to face the problem of balancing rising panic with the need for more extreme protective measures.

The day of the expected attack comes and goes, but nothing happens. The role players must confront the silence of the day after the anticipated attack (simulated by one two-hour session). They are faced with not knowing if the attack was foiled, deterred, or a hoax. Role players must determine when it is safe to return to normal life.

In developing the scenario for SILENT VECTOR, CSIS created a threat/vulnerability integration methodology to map likely terrorist capabilities against the vulnerabilities of specific sectors/facilities of energy and energy-related infrastructure. While simplified for the purposes of the exercise, the methodology used to develop a threat/vulnerability integration matrix establishes a foundation upon which to build a system of assigning priorities and allocating resources for homeland security. Currently, no such analytical approach exists for U.S. critical infrastructure.

For more information about Silent Vector, contact Phil Anderson.

This exercise was developed in partnership with the ANSER Institute of Homeland Security and was made possible by grants From the Smith Richardson Foundation and the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism

Special thanks to Environmental Systems Research Institute and AIR Worldwide for their invaluable technical support in the planning and execution of Silent Vector.

CSIS would also like to recognize the valuable contributions and support of the following organizations:

Colonial Pipeline Company
Defense Threat Reduction Agency
National Petrochemical & Refiners Association
Naval Surface Warfare Center, Dahlgren Division
Nuclear Energy Institute
Sandia National Labs
U.S. Department of Defense
U.S. Department of Energy
U.S. Department of Transportation



PRESENTATION OF FINDINGS [PLEASE READ THIS]

http://web.archive.org/web/20040114021156/www.csis.org/isp/sv/SVwebfindings.pdf (http://web.archive.org/web/20040114021156/www.csis.org/isp/sv/SVwebfindings.pdf)



2002 Press Releases &
Media Advisories
October 18, 2002

SILENT VECTOR: Energy Terrorism Exercise
Hamre to Share Initial Assessment of Simulation Results, Vulnerabilities

WASHINGTON, October 18, 2002 — - CSIS president and CEO John Hamre, CSIS Homeland Security Initiatives Director Phil Anderson, and ANSER Institute Director Randy Larsen, will outline the initial results of a recent simulation exercise of the pre-attack phase of a credible threat to the U.S. energy infrastructure from 12:00 P.M. 1:00 P.M. on Monday, Oct. 21, at CSIS, 1800 K Street, NW, B-1 conference level, room A.

Silent Vector, which was patterned after the 2001 Dark Winter simulated bioterrorist attack, was designed to reveal some of the most pressing issues and vulnerabilities that would arise if the nation were faced with a highly credible, but ambiguous, threat of a terrorist attack on American soil.

This two-day exercise employed a simulated National Security Council of senior policymakers, with former Senator Sam Nunn acting as president. Through the course of the game, participants, largely former senior-level government officials, were given increasingly credible and specific intelligence of a large-scale attack on the nation's critical energy infrastructure. Silent Vector was developed and produced by CSIS in partnership with the ANSER Institute and the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. Among the issues examined:

    * What are the critical challenges the federal government would face during the pre-attack phase of a terrorist event focused on U.S. energy infrastructure?
    * What unique challenges would the law enforcement and intelligence communities face when responding to credible but ambiguous threats to the American homeland?
    * What are the fault lines that exist in the interagency community, and among federal, state and local governments during the pre-attack phase of a major terrorist incident?
    * What are the fault lines that exist between the public and private sectors during the pre-attack phase of a major terrorist incident?
    * What are the potential impacts of a credible threat of attack?
    * What are the key vulnerabilities of select critical energy infrastructure?

"As with Dark Winter, we believe that a detailed discussion of this 'real world' energy infrastructure scenario and its effects will serve the nation's national security interests," said Anderson. "We expect that a well-planned and executed simulation focusing on the threat-rather than consequence management-of a major attack on U.S. energy infrastructure could generate a similar level of policy attention and impetus for improved preparation and response by the administration and Congress."



PHOTO ALBUM OF EXERCISE

http://web.archive.org/web/20030501143607/www.csis.org/isp/sv/pic11.htm (http://web.archive.org/web/20030501143607/www.csis.org/isp/sv/pic11.htm)

(to see the previous pics, use the URL above and select <<<Previous)

Title: Re: Jane Lute, Henry Kissinger, John Hamre, and Max Boot plan on blowing shit up!
Post by: Dig on May 02, 2011, 05:38:57 pm
Hack Obtains 9 Bogus Certificates for Prominent Websites; Traced to Iran

In a fresh blow to the fundamental integrity of the internet, a hacker last week obtained legitimate web certificates that would have allowed him to impersonate some of the top sites on the internet, including the login pages used by Google, Microsoft and Yahoo e-mail customers.

The hacker, whose March 15 attack was traced to an IP address in Iran, compromised a partner account at the respected certificate authority Comodo Group, which he used to request eight SSL certificates for six domains: mail.google.com, www.google.com, login.yahoo.com, login.skype.com, addons.mozilla.org and login.live.com.

The certificates would have allowed the attacker to craft fake pages that would have been accepted by browsers as the legitimate websites. The certificates would have been most useful as part of an attack that redirected traffic intended for Skype, Google and Yahoo to a machine under the attacker’s control. Such an attack can range from small-scale Wi-Fi spoofing at a coffee shop all the way to global hijacking of internet routes.

At a minimum, the attacker would then be able to steal login credentials from anyone who entered a username and password into the fake page, or perform a “man in the middle” attack to eavesdrop on the user’s session.

Comodo CEO Melih Abdulhayoglu calls the breach
the certificate authority’s version of the Sept. 11 terror attacks.


Our own planes are being used against us in the C.A. [certificate authority] world,” Abdulhayoglu told Threat Level in an interview. “We have to up the bar and react to these new threat models. This untrusted DNS infrastructure cannot be what drives the internet going forward. If DNS was trusted, none of this would have been an issue.”

Comodo says the attacker was well prepared, and appeared to have a list of targets at the ready when he logged into the company’s system and began requesting certificates.

In addition to the bogus certificates, the attacker created a ninth certificate for a domain of his own under the name “Global Trustee,” according to Abdulhayoglu.

Abdulhayoglu says the attack has all the markings of a state-sponsored intrusion rather than a criminal attack.

“We deal with [cybercriminals] all day long,” he said. But “there are zero footprints of cybercriminals here.”

“If you look at all these domains, every single one of them are communications-related,” he continued. “My personal opinion is that someone is trying to read people’s e-mail communications. [But] the only way for this attack to work [on a large scale] is if you have access to the DNS infrastructure. The certificates on their own are no use, unless they have access to the DNS infrastructure itself, which a state would.”

Though he acknowledges that the attack could have originated anywhere, and been routed through Iranian servers as a proxy, he says Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s regime is the obvious suspect.

Out of the nine fraudulent certificates the hacker requested, only one — for Yahoo — was found to be active. Abdulhayoglu said Comodo tracked it, because the attackers had tried to test the certificate using a second Iranian IP address.

All of the fraudulent certificates have since been revoked, and Mozilla, Google and Microsoft have issued updates to their Firefox, Chrome and Internet Explorer browsers to block any websites from using the fraudulent certificates.

Comodo came clean about the breach this week, after security researcher Jacob Appelbaum noticed the updates to Chrome and Firefox and began poking around. Mozilla persuaded Appelbaum to withhold public disclosure of the information until the situation with the certificates could be resolved, which he agreed to do.

Abdulhayoglu told Threat Level that his company first learned of the breach from the partner that was compromised.

The attacker had compromised the username and password of a registration authority, or R.A., in southern Europe that had been a Comodo Trusted Partner for five or six years, he said. Registration authorities are entities that are authorized to issue certificates after conducting a due-diligence check to determine that the person or entity seeking the certificate is legitimate.

“We have certain checks and balances that alerted the R.A. [about the breach], which brought it to our attention,” he said. “Within hours we were alerted to it, and within hours we revoked everything.”

For more information at link below:

http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2011/03/comodo-compromise/


This is a cyber False flag.
They are gearing up for the BIG Cyber False Flag.

These are preparations steps...

How can we tell?
Well... look at the connections.


================================

U.S. agencies respond to cyberattack on information security firm
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/us-agencies-respond-to-cyberattack-on-information-security-firm/2011/03/23/ABDhjoKB_story.html?wpisrc=nl_tech
By Ellen Nakashima, Wednesday, March 23, 6:21 PM

Federal agencies are confronting possible repercussions from a cyberattack disclosed late last week on one of the nation’s largest information security companies.

RSA Security, a division of EMC, has contracts throughout the federal government for its SecurID system, which uses a token to generate a random six-digit number every 60 seconds. That number, when used with a user’s password, provides access to unclassified systems throughout government agencies.

In a filing Thursday to the Securities and Exchange Commission, EMC reported “an extremely sophisticated” cyberattack that targeted its RSA business unit and resulted in “certain information” about its products “being extracted.” Although there were no reports of lost customer data as a result of the breach, the risk is that the stolen information could enable a successful attack later, company officials said.

“We do not believe that either customer or employee personally identifiable information was compromised as a result of this incident,” RSA Executive Chairman Art Coviello said in a letter to customers accompanying the filing.

================================

RSA is connected to Verisign:

================================

http://www.cscic.state.ny.us/security/conferences/security/2006/presenters.cfm

John Weinschenk
Cenzic

Prior to Cenzic, John was the VP of the Enterprise Services Group at VeriSign, the largest provider of digital trust services in the world. In that role, he held worldwide responsibility for marketing VeriSign's authentication, digital trust, and wireless services to Global 1000 companies. He forged several alliances with strategic partners, including IBM, where he drove the effort to embed VeriSign's public key infrastructure technology in network access devices. Before VeriSign, John was CEO at TransIndigo.

While growing that company from six to more than 50 employees, he shaped it into one of the leading developers of real-time transactional authority, and then oversaw the successful acquisition of the company by RSA. John has established numerous pivotal deals and relationships while holding executive positions at Entegrity Solutions (VP of Business Development and Alliances, Product Operations, and Worldwide Marketing), HAL Computer Systems (Director of Business Strategy), and Unisys Corporation (Director of Engineering).

================================

Now, Verisign's connection to Amit Yoran:

================================

More on George Tenet:


http://nationalcorruptionindex.com/pages/profile.php?profile_id=208


George Tenet
Last Updated: May 01, 2008

... Tenet also serves on the boards of American Online (AOL) and Guidance Software, the self-proclaimed “world leader in computer investigations.” Guidance added Tenet to its board on March 22, 2006. In 2003, Guidance entered a strategic alliance to provide computer forensics to the government, with I2 Inc., a British technology firm with FBI contracts that was acquired by ChoicePoint in early 2005. Guidance also has strategic alliances with Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) and Verisign. Amit Yoran joined Guidance Software’s board on September 14, 2005. (Yoran started cybersecurity firm RipTech, which Symantec bought in 2002 for $145 million. After serving as head of cybersecurity for DHS, Yoran was appointed as CEO of CIA-created In-Q-Tel on January 4, 2006. Yoran resigned after three months, shortly after hiring old friend and Carlyle Venture Partners veteran and Secure Elements director Mark Frantz....


================================

And Amit Yoran connects to Ptech:

================================

Source (http://securitywireweekly.blogs.techtarget.com/2008/12/05/amit-yoran-on-dhs-federal-cybersecurity-enterprise-security/)

(http://www.lookingglassnews.org/articles/jun06/rsa.jpeg)(http://photos1.blogger.com/x/blogger/3483/716/400/434315/tech.jpg)
Amit Yoran on DHS, federal cybersecurity, enterprise security

December 5th, 2008 by Dennis Fisher

Amit Yoran, the former cybersecurity czar at the Department of Homeland Security and a veteran security executive, joins Dennis Fisher to discuss the state of enterprise security, the Obama administration’s cybersecurity priorities and why information sharing between the government and private sector hasn’t worked.

http://securitywireweekly.blogs.techtarget.com/podpress_trac/web/239/0/Yoran12042008.mp3
__________________________________________________________
From 2008 (this was NOT specified in 2007's Northcom Document, which shows their progression toward toward EVISCERATION of freedom and vicious attack now underway against the web.)

"Homeland Defense and Security scenario vignettes cover a broad range of significant terrorist activities, to include cyber attacks directed at Canada and the U.S. as a result of CTF (Coalition Task Force) operations as well as several natural disasters."

- NORAD-USNORTHCOM
__________________________________________________________
From 2005 (Applies hugely moreso now because they've been planning this for years, and as you can see from above, only starting in 2008 did NORTHCOM/Booz Allen Hamilton ramp up their attack plans on this.)

See: PROMIS/Ptech/Choicepoint/Infragard/DIEBOLD=World ID/Carbon Tax/IP v6  http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=79634.0

Below excerpt sourced from:
Source (http://www.fcw.com/fcw/articles/2005/0221/web-cyber-02-22-05.asp)
Feb. 22, 2005

SAN FRANCISCO -- The federal government and several international partners will hold a cyber preparedness exercise in November, Homeland Security Department officials said here at the RSA Conference.  Its purpose is to give federal agencies an opportunity to test their plans for responding to a direct or indirect attack on the computer networks that control the nation's critical infrastructure such as power plants and oil pipelines. The exercise will be unclassified, and the public will be informed, said Hun Kim, deputy director of the National Cyber Security Division at DHS.

Instead, Wilson said he suspects that sophisticated intruders would
quietly try to wreak havoc, causing a loss of confidence in the
interconnected system of networks and information systems on which the nation's economy and security now depends. "Somebody's going to figure out how to get across a low wall and get on the inside, and they're not going to go in a chat room and talk about it," Wilson said. "We're talking about a sophisticated adversary."

Finding a hidden enemy and cleaning up the damage in such a scenario would be extremely difficult, Wilson said. "You're going to have not only national security issues; you're going to have privacy issues.
 
I'll leave it at that," he said.
__________________________________________________________
Source (http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-10110133-83.html?tag=mncol;title)
Europe to get cybercrime alert system
(http://i.i.com.com/cnwk.1d/i/ne/pg/fd_2007/070117_cybercrime.jpg)  

Europe is getting a cybercrime alert system as part of a European Union drive to fight online criminals. According to plans, European law enforcement body Europol will receive 300,000 euros ($386,430) to build an alert system that pools reports of cybercrime, such as online identification and financial theft, from across the 27 member states.

Police will launch more remote searches of suspects' hard drives over the Internet, as well as cyberpatrols to spot and track illegal activity, under the strategy adopted by the European Union's council of ministers Thursday. The strategy, a blueprint for fighting cybercrime in the EU over the next five years, also introduces measures to encourage businesses and police to share information on investigations and cybercrime trends.

"The strategy encourages the much-needed operational cooperation and information exchange between the member states," said Jacques Barrot, vice president of the European Commission. "If the strategy is to make the fight against cybercrime more efficient, all stakeholders have to be fully committed to its implementation. We are ready to support them, also financially, in their efforts." Plans for the EU alert system follow the recent establishments of the Police Central E-crime Unit and National Fraud Strategic Authority, which aim to fight cybercrime in the United Kingdom.
__________________________________________________________
How might Obama's appointment to head the DHS turn things around for the department? Experts weigh in.

Source (http://www.internetnews.com/security/article.php/3789476/Cyber+Threats+Await+Next+Homeland+Security+Chief.htm)

Cyber Threats Await Next Homeland Security Chief
(http://www.internetnews.com/img/2008/12/dhs_napolitano200x180.jpg)
Janet Napolitano

Though it is charged with keeping America safe, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has also run up a record of high-profile failures during its short history.  Its role in the response to Hurricane Katrina, followed by a series of cyber security breaches, led to Congressional criticism of DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and its CIO, Scott Charbo. And several of its proposed programs have stalled.

It's a legacy that Arizona Gov. Janet Napolitano is poised to inherit, having been named on Monday as President-elect Barack Obama's pick for DHS secretary.  And as a result of the DHS's troubles, information security experts have a laundry list of suggestions for Napolitano once she's confirmed.

First off, she should speed up the hiring process to better protect against future cyber security threats, according to Shannon Kellogg, director of information security policy at EMC (NYSE: EMC). Kellogg pointed out that the DHS has lost several employees involved in information security, including Greg Garcia, assistant secretary for cyber security and communications, who announced his departure this week.

Getting new people in quickly and retaining them will be important because US-CERT, the operational arm of the department's National Cyber Security Division and a key player in national and private sector Internet security, is building out broader capabilities and expanding quickly, Kellogg told InternetNews.com.

"That requires you hire people very quickly, but this is counter to how government hiring processes work," he added. US-CERT coordinates defenses against and responses to cyber attacks nationwide and issues security threat warnings. It developed software for the Einstein Program, an intrusion detection system in the federal government that is the result of the 2002 Homeland Security Act, the 2003 Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) and the Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-12, issued in August 2004. The first two versions of Einstein have been implemented in the Federal government.

EMC's Kellogg said that Einstein III is in the works. The project -- in which Kellogg called on Napolitano to continue investing -- will add real-time reporting capabilities to the system.

Clean up your own house

Napolitano should also make sure DHS deals with its own security vulnerabilities. The department suffered 844 security breaches during its fiscal 2005 and 2006, leading a House subcommittee on tech and cyber security to DHS CIO Scott Charbo of not doing his job, during a June 2007 hearing. The breaches also led to charges from a congressman that the IT vendor DHS contracted to build its networks, Unisys, bore partial responsibility for the breaches. The company quickly denied the accusations' validity, but the incident later led to an FBI probe of Unisys (NYSE: UIS).

"I hope the new secretary will continue to emphasize the importance of information security in this environment," EMC's Kellogg said. "DHS should be an example for information security within the federal government." As a result, the DHS should take a proactive approach to security, Scott Crawford, research director at Enterprise Management Associates, told InternetNews.com.

"There is no national agenda for taking cyber security all that seriously at this point," he said. "The DHS is left to reacting to events as they occur and leaving events to the private sector." Also at issue is how the next director of homeland security will work with the tech czar that Obama has promised to appoint -- a position commonly thought of as a national CTO. While details are scant on Obama's plans for the position, analyst Charles King of Pund-IT said he believes Napolitano should fight the idea of creating a single CTO position.

Instead, he thinks she should suggest a national council of CTOs, he told InternetNews.com in an e-mail. A long list of rumored candidates Obama's tech czar post has included names like that of Google CEO Eric Schmidt -- who later signaled his interest in remaining at the search giant -- as well as former FCC chair Reed Hundt, Apple CEO Steve Jobs, Amazon CEO Jeff Bezos and Julius Genachowski, an economic adviser to Obama and cofounder of venture capital firm Rock Creek Ventures.

But King thinks that's a bad idea. Napolitano should appoint working CTOs who have actually been involved in developing successful commercial projects, he said. He added that Napolitano ought to keep the national CTO on a tight leash, giving them three months to develop one-, two- and three-year plans for modernizing the nation's IT resources -- and refusing to extend the deadline.

All these suggestions will take time to flesh out. But one of the things Napolitano can do to score points quickly with the new administration is to have DHS establish a methodology to rate how well companies and agencies are communicating securely, one observer noted. "The DHS should enable agencies and the U.S. government to use a unified architecture to communicate securely, and a rating system will motivate people to use best practices for secure communication," said Kelly Mackin, president and COO of DataMotion, told InternetNews.com.

According to Mackin, whose firm handles secure e-mail for a U.K. government department, there are 4.7 terabytes of e-mail data for every 1,000 employees in a company -- data that could pose a danger if not properly locked down. "Although 93 percent of employees think e-mail is a critical piece of how they do business, most of that e-mail is not secured, and DHS must address this problem," she said.
__________________________________________________________
Voter Fraud Recount Revealed: AIPAC/Rockefeller!!!!!!!!!!!!
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=21681.msg83959#msg83959

(http://www.infragardatlanta.org/pix/INFRAGARD_ATLANTA_top2.jpg)
"FBI INFRAGARD - Kill your neighbors with FBI/CACI intelligence!
Infragard--Join now and get your own license to kill!!!
"

InfowarCon Advisory Board:  Dr. Dan Kuehl, National Defense University; Amit Yoran, NetWitness; Mark Rasch, FTI; Dorothy Denning, DoD; Richard Forno, Infowarrior.org; Lars Nicander, CATS; Bruce Brody, CACI.

InfowarCon Sponsors & Partners Include: The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Mandiant, Netwitness, Purifile, Secure Computing, Lincoln Group, White Wolf Security, Department of Defense Cyber Crime Center (DC3), (ISC)2; Homeland Defense Journal, Government Security News, Homeland Defense Week, Officer.com, Continuity Insights, InfraGard National Members Alliance, ISSA NOVA, Terrorism Research Center and National Defense University.

(http://www.lookingglassnews.org/articles/jun06/rsa.jpeg)

Source (http://www.lookingglassnews.org/viewstory.php?storyid=6427)

Mossad: RSA Security & Ptech Run US Govt Computers
Posted in the database on Monday, June 19th, 2006 @ 12:41:33 MST (818 views)
by Christopher Bollyn    American Free Press

The most critical computer and communication networks used by the U.S. government and military are secured by encryption software written by an Israeli "code breaker" tied to an Israeli state-run scientific institution.

The National Security Agency (NSA), the U.S. intelligence agency with the mandate to protect government and military computer networks and provide secure communications for all branches of the U.S. government uses security software written by an Israeli code breaker whose home office is located at the Weizmann Institute in Israel.

A Bedford, Massachusetts-based company called RSA Security, Inc. issued a press release on March 28, 2006, which revealed that the NSA would be using its security software:

"U.S. Department of Defense Agency Selects RSA Security Encryption Software" was the headline of the company's press release which announced that the National Security Agency had selected its encryption software to be used in the agency's "classified communications project.

RSA stands for the names of the founders of the company: Ronald L. Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard M. Adleman. Adi Shamir, the lead theoretician, is an Israeli citizen and a professor at the Weizmann Institute, a scientific institution tied to the Israeli defense establishment.

"My main area of research is cryptography – making and breaking codes," Shamir's webpage at the Weizmann Institute says. "It is motivated by the explosive growth of computer networks and wireless communication. Without cryptographic protection, confidential information can be exposed to eavesdroppers, modified by hackers, or forged by criminals."

The NSA/Central Security Service defines itself as America’s cryptologic organization, which "coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to protect U.S. government information systems and produce foreign signals intelligence information."

The fact that the federal intelligence agency responsible for protecting the most critical computer systems and communications networks used by all branches of the U.S. government and military is using Israeli-made encryption software should come as no surprise. The RSA press release is just the icing on the cake; the keys to the most critical computer networks in the United States have long been held in Israeli hands.

AFP inquired with the NSA about its use of Israeli-made security software for classified communications projects and asked why such outsourcing was not seen as a national security threat. Why is "America’s cryptologic organization" using Israeli encryption codes?

NSA spokesman Ken White said that the agency is "researching" the matter and would respond in the coming week.

American Free Press has previously revealed that scores of "security software" companies – spawned and funded by the Mossad, the Israeli military intelligence agency – have proliferated in the United States.

The "security" software products of many of these usually short-lived Israeli-run companies have been integrated into the computer products which are provided to the U.S. government by leading suppliers such as Unisys.

Unisys integrated Israeli security software, provided by the Israel-based Check Point Software Technologies and Eurekify, into its own software, so that Israeli software, written by Mossad-linked companies, now "secures" the most sensitive computers in the U.S. government and commercial sector.

The Mossad-spawned computer security firms typically have a main office based in the U.S. while their research and development is done in Israel.

The Mossad start-up firms usually have short lives before they are acquired for exaggerated sums of money by a larger company, enriching their Israeli owners in the process and integrating the Israeli directors and their Mossad-produced software into the parent company.

RSA, for example, an older security software company, acquired an Israeli-run security software company, named Cyota, at the end of 2005 for $145 million.

In January 2005, Cyota, "the leading provider of online security and anti-fraud solutions for financial institutions" had announced that "security expert" Amit Yoran, had joined the company's board of directors.

Prior to becoming a director at Cyota, Yoran, a 34-year old Israeli, had already been the national "Cyber Czar," having served as director of the Department of Homeland Security's National Cyber Security Division.

Yoran had been appointed "Cyber Czar" at age 32 by President George W. Bush in September 2003.

Before joining DHS, Yoran had been vice president for worldwide managed security services at Symantec. Prior to that, he had been the founder, president and CEO of Riptech, Inc., an information security management and monitoring firm, which Symantec acquired in 2002 for $145 million.

Yoran and his brother Naftali Elad Yoran are graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at Westpoint. Elad graduated in 1991 and Amit in 1993. Along with their brother Dov, the Yoran brothers are key players in the security software market. Amit has also held critical positions in the U.S. government overseeing computer security for the very systems that apparently failed on 9/11.

Before founding Riptech in 1998, Yoran directed the vulnerability- assessment program within the computer emergency response team at the US Department of Defense.

Yoran previously served as an officer in the United States Air Force as the Director of Vulnerability Programs for the Department of Defense's Computer Emergency Response Team and in support of the Assistant Secretary of Defense's Office.

In June 2005, Yoran joined the board of directors of Guardium, Inc., another Mossad-spawned "provider of database security solutions" based in Waltham, Massachusetts.

Guardium is linked with Ptech, an apparent Mossad "cut out" computer security company linked with the 9/11 attacks. Ptech, a computer software company in Quincy, Mass., was supposedly a small start-up company founded by a Lebanese Muslim and funded by a Saudi millionaire.

Yet Ptech's clients included all the key federal governmental agencies, including the U.S. Army, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Naval Air Command, Congress, the Department of Energy, the Federal Aviation Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, NATO, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Secret Service and even the White House.

The marketing manager at Ptech, Inc. when the company started in the mid-1990s, however, was not a Muslim or an Arab, but an American Jewish lawyer named Michael S. Goff who had suddenly quit his law firm for no apparent reason and joined the Arab-run start-up company.

Goff was the company's information systems manager and had single-handedly managed the company's marketing and "all procurement" of software, systems and peripherals. He also trained the employees. Goff was obviously the key person at Ptech.

In the wake of 9/11, during the Citizens' Commission hearings in New York, Indira Singh, a consultant who had worked on a Defense Advanced Research Project, pointed to Ptech and MITRE Corp. being involved in computer "interoperability issues" between the FAA and NORAD. At this time Ptech's ties to Arabs was the focus, and Goff was out of the picture.

"Ptech was with MITRE Corporation in the basement of the FAA for two years prior to 9/11," Singh said. "Their specific job is to look at interoperability issues the FAA had with NORAD and the Air Force in the case of an emergency. If anyone was in a position to know that the FAA – that there was a window of opportunity or to insert software or to change anything – it would have been Ptech along with MITRE."

The Mossad-run Guardium company is linked with Ptech through Goff Communications, the Holliston, Mass.-based public relations firm previously run by Michael S. Goff and his wife Marcia, which represents Guardium. Since being exposed in AFP in 2005, however, Michael's name no longer appears on the company website.

Although he and his brother reportedly grew up in Pound Ridge, New York during the 1970s and 1980s, the heads of the Jewish community told AFP that they had never heard of him. One said that she had conducted a survey of the Jews living in the small village of Pound Ridge in the 1970s and she would have remembered if a wealthy Israeli family named Yoran had been found. Why did the locals in Pound Ridge NOT remember the Yorans?

Probably because they were NOT in Pound Ridge - but in Israel. The Pound Ridge address was used to give the appearance that the Yorans were Americans. I spoke with Elad and he has a distinctive Israeli accent - not what you would expect for a guy who grew up in a posh Yankee village.

So who are the Yorans? Who are their parents and why did they come to the United States? To raise a couple high-level moles to infiltrate the most sensitive U.S. computer networks? How could they have lived for 20 years in Pound Ridge and NOT be remembered.

(http://www.iacsp.com/Splash2006ia.jpg)
GET READY FOR THE NEW AMERIKA!! A BETTER INFORMED SOCIETY WILL RESULT IN A FREER ONE WITH OUR MACHINE GUNS AND CYBER POLICE THAT CAN'T GET ANY OTHER TYPE OF JOBS BECAUSE THAT'S THE ONLY JOBS WE'VE LEFT FOR YOU IN THE NAU!!!  YOU PASS OUT ANTI-NWO MATERIAL, & PROTEST CLOUD COMPUTING?  YOU'LL BE SHOT ON SIGHT!!!  YOU WON'T EVEN HAVE TO GET ON THE TRAIN, BECAUSE THE SECRET THAT NO ONE HAS TOLD YOU IS THAT THE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, BUSES, ET.AL. WILL TAKE YOU TO THE FEMA CAMPS UNDER USTRANSCOM!  NOW SHUT UP SLAVES!!!!

SCADA - STUXNET - See a pattern here?

March 24, 2011 1:36 PM PDT
U.S. warns of more SCADA software holes
Read more: http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20046912-245.html#ixzz1Ha2QQcG1

Flaws in SCADA software, used to monitor and control sensors and operations at utilities and other critical infrastructure facilities, seem to keep coming out of the woodwork:

• Last week, the U.S. ICS-CERT (Industrial Control System Computer Emergency Response Team) issued several advisories about vulnerabilities exposed in SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) software. One was in an ActiveXcontrol in WellinTech KingView V6.53 human machine interface (HMI) software used in power, water, and aerospace industries, mostly in China. The researcher publicly released exploit code for the hole and the vendor released an update that resolves the problem. The second vulnerability was reported in Progea's Movicon 11 HMI product, used primarily in Italy. It too has been patched.

• Also last week, a Russian firm released exploits targeting 11 unpatched, or zero-day, holes in SCADA software, which The Register was first to report.

• Three days ago, an Italian researcher publicly released information on dozens of unpatched holes in four different products and released exploits for targeting them. The move prompted an ICS-CERT warning.

• On Tuesday, Spanish researcher Ruben Santamarta told the BugTraq e-mail list that he had found flaws in BroadWin WebAccess, a Web browser-based HMI product from Advantech that ICS-CERT says is used in energy and other industries in North America, Asia, North Africa and the Middle East. Santamarta released details of the vulnerability and exploit code and ICS-CERT issued an alert.

• And yesterday, ICS-CERT released yet another advisory, this one warning about a SQL (Structured Query Language) vulnerability in the Ecava IntegraX or HMI product that could allow data leakage or manipulation as well as remote code execution on the backend host running the database service. Ecava has developed a patch for the hole.
Security problems with software used to monitor and control systems in the electric grid, refineries, gas pipelines, and other critical operations are moving to the forefront as the industries adopt Web-based technologies and connect previously isolated networks to the Internet.

"What is the acceptable tolerable level for security with industrial control systems? We don't know," Mike Ahmadi, co-founder of consultancy GraniteKey told CNET. "Systems have been isolated from the outside world...It's a very significant change we're going through right now."

While the SCADA bug reports appear to be accelerating, it's unclear if any of the vulnerabilities have been used in attacks on working plants or systems.

However, last year the threat became reality with Stuxnet, sophisticated and multipronged attack targeting specific Siemens software used in industrial control operations that experts said appeared to be directed at nuclear facilities in Iran.



Read more: http://news.cnet.com/8301-27080_3-20046912-245.html#ixzz1Ha2c6CNO
Title: Re: Jane Lute, Henry Kissinger, John Hamre, and Max Boot plan on blowing shit up!
Post by: Dig on May 02, 2011, 05:39:38 pm
DNSSEC, COMCAST, CSIS, CYBERTERROR FALSE FLAGGING



 

Majority of U.S. Federal Domain Names Still Fail to Meet Federal Internet Security Mandate for DNSSEC Adoption
http://dnssec.blogspot.com/2010/09/majority-of-us-federal-domain-names.html
Wednesday, September 22, 2010
 
TACOMA, Wash.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--IID (Internet Identity), a provider of technology and services that help organizations secure Internet presence, today announced it has identified major online security holes for U.S. government organizations in its “Q3 State of DNS Report”. According to the report, a majority of Federal agency run .gov domains are not signing their DNS (Domain Name System) with DNSSEC (Domain Name Security Extensions) despite a December 2009 Federal deadline for adoption. DNSSEC is designed to ensure DNS entries are not poisoned in transit, so users are not taken to an unintended Internet destination.

The report was the first independent study into the deployment of DNSSEC across a majority of .gov domains including Federal, state, local, Native American and others. .gov domains are not published publicly, but IID was able to track down a majority of them for this study. IID analyzed the DNS of more than 2,900 .gov domains and found:

421 Federal .gov domains are fully authenticated with DNSSEC out of 1,185 (36 percent)

Two percent of Federal .gov domains signed with DNSSEC are incorrectly configured and fail completely when DNSSEC checks are done at some DNS resolvers

Another two percent of Federal .gov domains have basic DNS misconfigurations that keep them from operating properly at all

Two states, Idaho and Vermont, have successfully authenticated many of their domains with DNSSEC – a good sign for non-Federal adoption

“This should be a wakeup call that DNSSEC, likely for a multitude of reasons, is still not being implemented across a wide spectrum of .gov domains despite a mandate to do so,” said IID president and CTO Rod Rasmussen. “Furthermore and even more worrisome, there is a small percentage of .gov domains that are adopting but not properly utilizing DNSSEC, leaving organizations with a false sense of security and likely problems for their users.”
 
A January 2010 report prepared by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) titled, "In the Crossfire – Critical Infrastructure in the Age of Cyber-War," found 57 percent of 600 IT and security professionals polled had experienced DNS poisoning attacks – which DNSSEC is supposed to stop. According to the IT and security professionals questioned, the cost of downtime incurred from a network infrastructure attack like DNS poisoning on their organizations was more than six million dollars a day.

“DNS is still the wild west of Internet infrastructure and it remains relatively wide open for cyber criminals today," said Online Trust Alliance (OTA) Founder and President Craig Spiezle. "It is essential for organizations to not only adopt DNSSEC, but also utilize various other solutions which help ensure online trust.”

More findings from the IID report including how improperly implementing DNSSEC has actually hamstrung some domains can be found at www.internetidentity.com/resources/trend-reports. Rod Rasmussen will discuss the findings of this report while at the OTA Online Trust & Cybersecurity Forum in Washington, D.C. this Friday, September 24.

About IID

IID (Internet Identity) has been providing technology and services that secure the Internet presence for an organization and its extended enterprise since the company was founded in 1996. It recently started delivering the industry’s first and only solution for detecting, diagnosing and mitigating domain name system (DNS) security and configuration issues for an organization and its extended enterprise. IID also provides anti-phishing, malware and brand security solutions for many of today’s leading financial service firms, e-commerce, social networking and ISP companies, and more. The company is working hard to deliver solutions that help keep the Internet safe and trusted for businesses. IID is headquartered in Tacoma, Washington. More information can be found at www.internetidentity.com.




Comcast begins DNS security rollout
http://dnssec.blogspot.com/2010/10/comcast-begins-dns-security-rollout.html
Monday, October 18, 2010

First in U.S. to protect customers against Kaminsky-style cache poisoning attacks. Comcast has begun migrating its customers to a new Internet security mechanism that will help protect them from being inadvertently routed to phony Web pages for pharming attacks, identity theft and other scams. Comcast is the first major ISP in the United States to adopt the new mechanism, which is known as DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC).

Source: Carolyn Duffy, Marsan, Network World, Retreived on October 18, 2010 from networkworld.com/news/2010/101810-comcast-dns-security.html?hpg1=bn