This PhD report will focus on how the study of how societies operate has been useful to wars and conflicts, with the grand goal of applying those teachings upon the western world.
The Elites KNOW humanity, how we tick, our ins and outs, what buttons to press for a desired reaction. This has become an academic study over the past 70 years, but it is older than this. It's earliest roots are in Babylonian mystery, which is arguably a study designed to teach how to operate humanity.
There's a war on for your mind
- Alex Jones
This is urban warfare through the streets of your psychology
- Immortal Technique
“The older dictators fell because they could never supply their subjects with enough
bread, enough circuses, enough miracles, and mysteries. Under a scientific dictatorship,
education will really work, with the result that most men and women will grow up to love
their servitude and will never dream of revolution. There seems to be no good reason why
a thoroughly scientific dictatorship should ever be overthrown.”
- Huxley, Brave New World Revisited
“Calculations of the future and how to modify it are no longer considered to be an
obscure academic pursuit. Long range planning and implementation of plans will be made
by a technological scientific elite. This will strain the democratic fabric to the
ripping point. The Protestant ethic will of atrophy as more and more enjoyed a very
leisured and guaranteed sustenance. Work as a means and an end of living will diminish.
Most people will tend to be hedonistic, and a dominant elite will provide the bread and
circuses to keep social dissension and disruption at a minimum. A small elite will carry
societies burdens. The resulting impersonal manipulation of most peoples lifestyles will
be softened by provision for pleasure seeking and guaranteed physical necessities. The
controlling elite will engage in power plays, largely without the involvement of most of
the people. The Society will be a leisurely one. People will study, play and travel.
Some will be in various stages of drug induced experiences. Each individual will receive
at birth, a multi-purpose identification, which will have amongst other things extensive
communications and control uses. Each individual will be saturated with ideas of
information. Each will be self selected, other kinds will be imposed, overtly by those
who assumed the responsibility for the others actions. Relatively few individuals will
be able to maintain control over their opinions. Most will be pawns of competing opinion
Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) sponsored 1969 study: ‘The Behavioral Science
Teacher Educational Program’ - now fully integrated within America's educational program.
Anthropology and Counterinsurgency: The Strange Story of their Curious Relationship
Something mysterious is going on inside the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD). Over the past 2 years, senior leaders have been calling for something unusual and unexpected-cultural knowledge of the adversary
. In august 2004, retired Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr., wrote an article for the Naval War College's Proceedings magazine that opposed the commonly held view within the U.S. military that success in war is best achieved by overwhelming technological advantage. Scales argues that the type of conflict we are now witnessing in Iraq requires "an exceptional ability to understand people, their culture, and their motivation."
1 In October 2004, Arthur Cebrowski, Director of the Office of Force Transformation, concluded that "knowledge of one's enemy and his culture and society may be more important than knowledge of his order of battle."
2 In November 2004, the Office of Naval Research and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) sponsored the Adversary Cultural Knowledge and National Security Conference
, the first major DOD conference on the social sciences
Why has cultural knowledge suddenly become such an imperative? Primarily because traditional methods of warfighting have proven inadequate in Iraq and Afghanistan. U.S. technology, training, and doctrine designed to counter the Soviet threat are not designed for low-intensity counterinsurgency operations where civilians mingle freely with combatants in complex urban terrain
The major combat operations that toppled Saddam Hussein's regime were relatively simple because they required the U.S. military to do what it does best-conduct maneuver warfare in flat terrain using overwhelming firepower with air support. However, since the end of the "hot" phase of the war, coalition forces have been fighting a complex war against an enemy they do not understand. The insurgents' organizational structure is not military, but tribal. Their tactics are not conventional, but asymmetrical. Their weapons are not tanks and fighter planes, but improvised explosive devices (IEDs). They do not abide by the Geneva Conventions, nor do they appear to have any informal rules of engagement.Countering the insurgency in Iraq requires cultural and social knowledge of the adversary
. Yet, none of the elements of U.S. national power-diplomatic, military, intelligence, or economic-explicitly take adversary culture into account in the formation or execution of policy. This cultural knowledge gap has a simple cause-the almost total absence of anthropology within the national-security establishment.
.Once called "the handmaiden of colonialism
," anthropology has had a long, fruitful relationship with various elements of national power, which ended suddenly following the Vietnam War. The strange story of anthropology's birth as a warfighting discipline, and its sudden plunge into the abyss of postmodernism, is intertwined with the U.S. failure in Vietnam. The curious and conspicuous lack of anthropology in the national-security arena since the Vietnam War has had grave consequences for countering the insurgency in Iraq, particularly because political policy and military operations based on partial and incomplete cultural knowledge are often worse than none at all
Winning on the battlefield is irrelevant against an insurgent adversary because the struggle for power and legitimacy among competing factions has no purely military solution. Often, the application of overwhelming force has the negative, unintended effect of strengthening the insurgency by creating martyrs, increasing recruitment, and demonstrating the "brutality" of state forces.
The alternative approach to fighting insurgency, such as the British eventually adopted through trial and error in Northern Ireland, involves the following: A comprehensive plan to alleviate the political conditions behind the insurgency; civil-military cooperation; the application of minimum force; deep intelligence; and an acceptance of the protracted nature of the conflict. Deep cultural knowledge of the adversary is inherent to the British approach.
Although cultural knowledge of the adversary matters in counterinsurgency, it has little importance in major combat operations. Because the Powell- Weinberger doctrine meant conventional, large-scale war was the only acceptable type of conflict, no discernable present or future need existed to develop doctrine and expertise in unconventional war, including counterinsurgency. Thus, there was no need to incorporate cultural knowledge into doctrine, training, or warfighting. Until now, that is.
...In Britain the development and growth of anthropology was deeply connected to colonial administration
. As early as 1908, anthropologists began training administrators of the Sudanese civil service. This relationship was quickly institutionalized: in 1921, the International Institute of African Languages and Cultures was established with financing from various colonial governments, and Lord Lugard, the former governor of Nigeria, became head of its executive council. The organization's mission was based on Bronislaw Malinowski's article, "Practical Anthropology," which argued that anthropological knowledge should be applied to solve the problems faced by colonial administrators, including those posed by "savage law, economics, customs, and institutions." Anthropological knowledge was frequently useful, especially in understanding the power dynamics in traditional societies. In 1937, for example, the Royal Anthropological Institute's Standing Committee on Applied Anthropology noted that anthropological research would "indicate the persons who hold key positions in the community and whose influence it would be important to enlist on the side of projected reforms." In the words of Lord Hailey, anthropologists were indeed "of great assistance in providing Government with knowledge which must be the basis of administrative policy."
Successful counterinsurgency depends on attaining a holistic, total understanding of local culture. This cultural understanding must be thorough and deep if it is to have any practical benefit at all. This fact is not lost on the Army. In the language of interim FM 3-07.22: "The center of gravity in counterinsurgency operations is the population. Therefore, understanding the local society and gaining its support is critical to success. For U.S. forces to operate effectively among a local population and gain and maintain their support, it is important to develop a thorough understanding of the society and its culture, including its history, tribal/family/social structure, values, religions, customs, and needs.
Case in Point: Project Camelot
Project Camelot was a social science research project of the United States Army in 1964. The goal of the project was to assess the causes of violent social rebellion and to identify the actions a government could take to prevent its own overthrow.
CAMELOT was a United States Army program, not an operation of the Central Intelligence Agency. The work was performed by a subcontractor to what was then called the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) at American University, which was renamed the Center for Research in Social Systems (CRESS) after the CAMELOT fiasco.
From the same military paper
as above:Testifying before the U.S. Congress in 1965, R.L. Sproul, director of DARPA said: "It is [our] primary thesis that remote area warfare is controlled in a major way by the environment in which the warfare occurs, by the sociological and anthropological characteristics of the people involved in the war, and by the nature of the conflict itself."
The recognition within DOD that research and development efforts to support counterinsurgency operations must be oriented toward the local human terrain led to the establishment of the Special Operations Research Office (SORO) at the American University in Washington, D.C. With anthropologists and other social scientists on staff, SORO functioned as a research center into the human dimension of counterinsurgency.
In 1964, SORO also designed the infamous Project Camelot. According to a letter from the Office of the Director of the Special Operations Research Office, Project Camelot was "a study whose objective [was] to determine the feasibility of developing a general social systems model which would make it possible to predict and influence politically significant aspects of social change in the developing nations of the world." The project's objectives were "to devise procedures for assessing the potential for internal war within national societies; to identify with increased degrees of confidence those actions which a government might take to relieve conditions which are assessed as giving rise to a potential for internal war; [and] to assess the feasibility of prescribing the characteristics of a system for obtaining and using the essential information needed for doing the above two things."
Project Camelot, which was initiated during a time when the military took counterinsurgency seriously as an area of competency, recognized the need for social science insights. According to the director's letter: "Within the Army there is especially ready acceptance of the need to improve the general understanding of the processes of social change if the Army is to discharge its responsibilities in the overall counterinsurgency program of the U.S. Government.
History of "The Science of Coercion"
Excerpts from The Science of Coercion, Christopher Simpson, Oxford University Press, 1994 hosted here:http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/SIM311A.htmlDuring the second half of the 1930s, the Rockefeller Foundation underwrote much of the most innovative communication research then under way in the United States
. There was virtually no federal support for the social sciences at the time, and corporate backing for the field usually remained limited to proprietary marketing studies. The foundation's administrators believed, however, that mass media constituted a uniquely powerful force in modem society...and financed a new project on content analysis for Harold Lasswell at the Library of Congress, Hadley Cantril's Public Opinion Research Project at Princeton University, the establishment of Public Opinion Quarterly at Princeton, Douglas Waples' newspaper and reading studies at the University of Chicago, Paul Lazarsfeld's Office of Radio Research at Columbia University, and other important programs.
As war approached, the Rockefeller Foundation clearly favored efforts designed to find a "democratic prophylaxis" that could immunize the United States' large immigrant population from the effects of Soviet and Axis propaganda. In 1939, the foundation organized a series of secret seminars with men it regarded as leading communication scholars to enlist them in an effort to consolidate public opinion in the United States in favor of war against Nazi Germany
-- a controversial proposition opposed by many conservatives, religious leaders, and liberals at the time -- and to articulate a reasonably clear-cut set of ideological and methodological preconceptions for the emerging field of communication research.
Harold Lasswell, who had the ear of foundation administrator John Marshall at these gatherings, over the next two years won support for a theory that seemed to resolve the conflict between the democratic values that are said to guide U.S. society, on the one hand, and the manipulation and deceit that often lay at the heart of projects intended to engineer mass consent, on the other. Briefly, the elite of U.S. society ("those who have money to support research," as Lasswell bluntly put it) should systematically manipulate mass sentiment in order to preserve democracy from threats posed by authoritarian societies such as Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union.
One Rockefeller seminar participant, Donald Slesinger (former dean of the social science at the University of Chicago), blasted Lasswell's claims as using a democratic guise to tacitly accept the objectives and methods of a new form of authoritarianism. "We [the Rockefeller seminar] have been willing, without thought, to sacrifice both truth and human individuality in order to bring about given mass responses
to war stimuli," Slesinger contended. "We have thought in terms of fighting dictatorships- by-force through the establishment of dictatorship-by-manipulation
. Slesinger's view enjoyed some support from other participants and from Rockefeller Foundation officers such as Joseph Willits, who criticized what he described as authoritarian or even fascist aspects of Lasswell's arguments. Despite this resistance, the social polarization created by the approaching war strongly favored Lasswell, and in the end he enjoyed substantial new funding and an expanded staff courtesy of the foundation.
Slesinger, on the other hand, drifted away from the Rockefeller seminars and appears to have rapidly lost influence within the community of academic communication specialists.
The phrase "psychological warfare" is reported to have first entered English in 1941 as a translated mutation of the Nazi term Weltanschauungskrieg (literally, worldview warfare), meaning the purportedly scientific application
of propaganda, terror, and state pressure as a means of securing an ideological victory over one's enemies. 31 William "Wild Bill" Donovan, then director of the newly established U.S. intelligence agency Office of Strategic Services (OSS)
, viewed an understanding of Nazi psychological tactics as a vital source of ideas for "Americanized" versions of many of the same stratagems. Use of the new term quickly became widespread throughout the U.S. intelligence community. For Donovan psychological warfare was destined to become a full arm of the U.S. military, equal in status to the army, navy, and air force.
"Donovan's concept of psychological warfare was all-encompassing," writes Colonel Alfred Paddock, who has specialized in this subject for the U.S. Army War College. "Donovan's visionary dream was to unify these functions in support of conventional (military) unit operations, thereby forging a 'new instrument of war.'
These projects helped define U.S. social science and mass communication studies long after the war had drawn to a close. Virtually all of the scientific community that was to emerge during the 1950s as leaders in the field of mass communication research spent the war years performing applied studies on U.S. and foreign propaganda, Allied troop morale, public opinion (both domestically and internationally), clandestine OSS operations, or the then emerging technique of deriving useful intelligence from analysis of newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, and postal censorship intercepts.
Lists of social scientists and scholarly contractors can be discovered at each of the government's centers of wartime communications and public opinion research.
The practical significance of these social linkages has been explored by social psychologist John A. Clausen, who is a veteran of Samuel Stouffer's Research Branch. Clausen made a systematic study during the early 1980s of the postwar careers of his former colleagues who had gone into the fields of public opinion research, sociology, and psychology. Some twenty-five of twenty-seven veterans who could be located responded to his questionnaire; of these, twenty-four reported that their wartime work had had "lasting implications" and "a major influence on [their] subsequent career." Clausen quotes the reply of psychologist Nathan Maccoby (Stanford): "The Research Branch not only established one of the best old-boy (or girl) networks ever, but an alumnus of the Branch had an open door to most relevant jobs and career lines. We were a lucky bunch
." Nearly three-fifths of the respondents indicated that the Research Branch experience "had a major influence on the direction or character of their work in the decade after the war," Clausen continues, "and all but three of the remainder indicated a substantial influence.... [F]ully three-fourths reported the Branch experience to have been a very important influence on their careers as a whole."
The common experience created a network of professional contacts that almost all respondents to the survey found to be very valuable in their subsequent careers. They tapped these contacts later for professional opportunities and for project funding, according to Clausen. "Perhaps most intriguing" in this regard, Clausen writes, was the number of our members who became foundation executives. Charles Dollard became president of Carnegie. Donald Young shifted from the presidency of SSRC [Social Science Research Council] to that of Russell Sage, where he ultimately recruited Leonard Cottrell. Leland DeVinney went from Harvard to the Rockefeller Foundation. William McPeak ... helped set up the Ford Foundation and became its vice president. W. Parker Mauldin became vice president of the Population Council. The late Lyle Spencer [of Science Research Associates] . . . endowed a foundation that currently supports a substantial body of social science research.
There was a somewhat similar sociometric effect among veterans of OWI propaganda projects. OWI's overseas director Edward Barrett points out that old-boy networks rooted in common wartime experiences in psychological warfare extended well beyond the social sciences. "Among Office of War Information alumni
," he wrote in 1953, are the publishers of Time, Look, Fortune, and several dailies; editors of such magazines as Holiday, Coronet, Parade, and the Saturday Review, editors of the Denver Post. New Orleans Times-Picayune, and others; the heads of the Viking Press, Harper & Brothers, and Farrar, Straus and Young; two Hollywood Oscar winners; a two-time Pulitzer prizewinner; the board chairman of CBS and a dozen key network executives; President Eisenhower's chief speech writer; the editor of Reader's Digest international editions; at least six partners of large advertising agencies; and a dozen noted social scientists.
Communications Studies In Modern Academic Form
Again from: http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/SIM311A.html
Turning to a consideration of CIA-sponsored psychological warfare studies, one finds a wealth of evidence showing that projects secretly funded by the CIA played a prominent role in U.S. mass communication studies during the middle and late 1950s. The secrecy that surrounds any CIA operation makes complete documentation impossible, but the fragmentary information that is now available permits identification of several important examples.
The first is the work of Albert Hadley Cantril (better known as Hadley Cantril), a noted "founding father" of modem mass communication studies. Cantril was associate director of the famous Princeton Radio Project from 1937 to 1939, a founder and longtime director of Princeton's Office of Public Opinion Research, and a founder of the Princeton Listening Center, which eventually evolved into the CIA-financed Foreign Broadcast Information Service. Cantril's work at Princeton is widely recognized as "the first time that academic social science took survey research seriously, and it was the first attempt to collect and collate systematically survey findings
." Cantril's The Psychology of Radio, written with Gordon Allport, is often cited as a seminal study in mass communication theory and research, and his surveys of public opinion in European and Third World countries defined the subfield of international public opinion studies for more than two decades.
Cantril's career had been closely bound up with U.S. intelligence and clandestine psychological operations since at least the late 1930s
. The Office of Public Opinion Research, for example, enjoyed confidential contracts from the Roosevelt administration for research into U.S. public opinion on the eve of World War 11. Cantril went on to serve as the senior public opinion specialist of the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (an early U.S. intelligence agency led by Nelson Rockefeller and focusing on Latin America), of the World War II Office of War Information, and, in a later period, as an adviser to President Eisenhower on the psychological aspects of foreign policy. During the Kennedy administration, Cantril helped reorganize the U.S. Information Agency.
According to the New York Times, the CIA provided Cantril and his colleague Lloyd Free with $1 million in 1956 to gather intelligence on popular attitudes in countries of interest to the agency. The Rockefeller Foundation appears to have laundered the money for Cantril, because Cantril repeatedly claimed in print that the monies had come from that source. However, the Times and Cantril's longtime partner, Lloyd Free, confirmed after Cantril's death that the true source of the funds had been the CIA.
Cantril's first target was a study of the political potential of "protest" voters in France and Italy, who were regarded as hostile to U.S. foreign Policy. That was followed by a 1958 tour of the Soviet Union under private, academic cover, to gather information on the social psychology of the Soviet population and on "mass" relationships with the Soviet elite. Cantril's report on this topic went directly to then president Eisenhower; its thrust was that treating the Soviets firmly, but with greater respect -- rather than openly ridiculing them, as had been Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' practice -- could help improve East-West relations. Later Cantril missions included studies of Castro's supporters in Cuba and reports on the social psychology of a series of countries that could serve as a checklist of CIA interventions of the period: Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Egypt, India, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, and others.An important focus of Cantril's work under the CIA's contract were surveys of U.S. domestic public opinion on foreign policy and domestic political issues -- a use of government funds many observers would argue was illegal.
There, Cantril introduced an important methodological innovation by breaking out political opinions by respondents' demographic characteristics and their place on a U.S. ideological spectrum he had devised -- a forerunner of the political opinion analysis techniques that would revolutionize U.S. election campaigns during the 1980s.
A second-and perhaps more important -- example of the CIA's role in U.S. mass communication studies during the 1950s was the work of the Center for International Studies (CENIS) at MIT. The CIA became the principal funder of this institution throughout the 1950s, although neither the CENIS nor the CIA is known to have publicly provided details on their relationship. It has been widely reported, however, that the CIA financed the initial establishment of the CENIS; that the agency underwrote publication of certain CENIS studies in both classified and nonclassified editions; that CENIS served as a conduit for CIA funds for researchers at other institutions, particularly the Center for Russian Research at Harvard; that the director of CENIS, Max Millikan, had served as assistant director of the CIA immediately prior to his assumption of the CENIS post; and that Millikan served as a "consultant to the Central Intelligence Agency," as State Department records put it, during his tenure as director of CENIS. In 1966, CENIS scholar Ithiel de Sola Pool acknowledged that CENIS "has in the past had contracts with the CIA," though he insisted the CIA severed its links with CENIS following a bitter scandal in the early 1960s.
CENIS emerged as one of me most important centers of communication studies midway through the 1950s, and it maintained that role for the remainder of the decade. According to CENIS's official account, the funding for its communications research was provided by a four- year, $850,000 grant from the Ford Foundation, which was distributed under the guidance of an appointed planning committee made up of Hans Speier (chair), Jerome Bruner, Wallace Carroll, Harold Lasswell, Paul Lazarsfeld, Edward Shils, and Ithiel de Sola Pool (secretary). It is not known whether Ford's funds were in fact CIA monies. The Ford Foundation's archives make clear, however, that the foundation was at that time underwriting the costs of the CIA's principal propaganda project aimed at intellectuals, the Congress for Cultural Freedom, with a grant of $500,000 made at CIA request, and that the Ford Foundation's director, John McCloy (who will be remembered here for his World War II psychological warfare work), had established a regular liaison with the CIA for the specific purpose of managing Ford Foundation cover for CIA projects. Of the men on CENIS's communication studies planning committee, Edward Shils was simultaneously a leading spokesman for the CIA-backed Congress for Cultural Freedom Project; Hans Speier was the RAND Corporation's director of social science research; and Wallace Carroll was a journalist specializing in national security issues who had produced a series of classified reports on clandestine warfare against the Soviet Union for U.S. military intelligence agencies. In short, CENIS communication studies were from their inception closely bound up with both overt and covert aspects of U.S. national security strategy of the day.
The CENIS program generated the large majority of articles on psychological warfare published by leading academic journals during the second half of the 1950s. CENIS's dominance in psychological warfare studies during this period was perhaps best illustrated by two special issues of POQ published in the spring of 1956 and the fall of 1958. Each was edited by CENIS scholars-by Ithiel de Sola Pool and Frank Bonilla and by Daniel Lerner, respectively -- and each was responsible for the preponderance of POQ articles concerning psychological warfare published that year. The collective titles for the special issues were "Studies in Political Communications" and "Attitude Research in Modernizing Areas."
Examples of Powerful Population Dynamic StudiesSilent Weapons for Quiet Wars
Full text here: http://www.theforbiddenknowledge.com/hardtruth/silentweaponsforquietwars.htm
The aviation field provided the greatest evolution in economic engineering by way of the mathematical theory of shock testing. In this process, a projectile is fired from an airframe on the ground and the impulse of the recoil is monitored by vibration transducers connected to the airframe and wired to chart recorders. By studying the echoes or reflections of the recoil impulse in the airframe, it is possible to discover critical vibrations in the structure of the airframe which either vibrations of the negine or aeolian vibrations of the wings, or a combination of the two, might reinforce resulting in a reconant self-destruction of the airframe in flight as an aircraft. From the standpoint of engineering, this means that the strengths and weaknesses of the structure of the airframe in terms of vibrational energy can be discovered and manipulated.
To use this method of airframe shock testing in economic engineering, the prices of commodities are shocked, and the public consumer reaction is monitored. The resulting echoes of the economic shock are interpreted theoretically by computers and the psycho-economic structure of the economy is thus discovered. It is by this process that partial differential and difference matricos are discovered that define the family household and make possible its evolution as an economic industry (dissipative consumer structure). Then the response of the household to future shocks can be predicted and manipulated, and society becomes a well regulated animal with its reins under the control of a sophisticated computer-regulated social energy bookkeeping system.
Everything that is expected from an ordinary weapon is expected from a silent weapon by its creators, but only in it its own manner of functioning.
It shoots situations, instead of bullets; propelled by data processing, instead of chemical reaction (explosion); originating from bits of data, instead of grains of gunpowder; from a computer, instead of a gun; operated by a computer programmer, instead of marksman; under the orders of a banking magnate, instead of a military general.
It makes no obvious explosive noises, causes no obvious physical or mental injuries, and does not obviously interfere with anyone's daily social life.
Yet it makes an unmistakable 'noise', causes unmistakable physical and mental damage, and unmistakably interferes with daily social life, i.e., unmistakable to a trained observer, one who knows what to look for.
The public cannot comprehend this weapon, and therefore cannot believe that they are being attached and subdued by a weapon.
The public might instinctively feel that something is wrong, but because of the technical nature of the silent weapon, they cannot express their feeling in a rational way, or handle the problem with intelligence. Therefore, they do not know how to cry for help, and do not know how to associate with others to defend themselves against it.
When a silent weapon is applied gradually to the public, the public adjusts/adapts to its presence and learns to tolerate its encroachment on their lives until the pressure (psychological via economic) becomes too great and they crack up.
Therefore, the silent weapon is a type of biological war fare. It attacks the vitality, options, and mobility of the individuals of a society by knowing, understanding, manipulating, and attacking their sources of natural and social energy, and their physical, mental, and emotional strengths and weaknesses.Report From Iron Mountain - probably disinfo but useful for this report
Full text here: http://educate-yourself.org/nwo/reportironmountain1.shtml
This report utilizes socio-mechanical learning to discuss the institution of war and its domestic purposes.
Defence Dept's Sentient Worldhttp://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/23/sentient_worlds/Sentient world: war games on the grandest scale
Perhaps your real life is so rich you don't have time for another.
Even so, the US Department of Defense (DOD) may already be creating a copy of you in an alternate reality to see how long you can go without food or water, or how you will respond to televised propaganda.
The DOD is developing a parallel to Planet Earth, with billions of individual "nodes" to reflect every man, woman, and child this side of the dividing line between reality and AR.
Called the Sentient World Simulation (SWS), it will be a "synthetic mirror of the real world with automated continuous calibration with respect to current real-world information", according to a concept paper for the project.
"SWS provides an environment for testing Psychological Operations (PSYOP)
," the paper reads, so that military leaders can "develop and test multiple courses of action to anticipate and shape behaviors of adversaries, neutrals, and partners".
SWS also replicates financial institutions, utilities, media outlets, and street corner shops. By applying theories of economics and human psychology, its developers believe they can predict how individuals and mobs will respond to various stressors.
SEAS can display regional results for public opinion polls, distribution of retail outlets in urban areas, and the level of unorganization of local economies, which may point to potential areas of civil unrest
Yank a country's water supply. Stage a military coup. SWS will tell you what happens next...Homeland Security and the Defense Department are already using SEAS to simulate crises on the US mainland.
Military and intel officials can introduce fictitious agents into the simulations (such as a spike in unemployment, for example) to gauge their destabilising effects on a population.
Jim Blank, modelling and simulation division chief at JFCOM-J9, declined to discuss the specific routines military commanders are running in the Iraq and Afghanistan computer models. He did say SEAS might help officers determine where to position snipers in a city square, or to envision scenarios that might emerge from widespread civil unrest.
SEAS helps commanders consider the multitude of variables and outcomes possible in urban warfare, said Blank.
"Future wars will be asymetric in nature. They will be more non-kinetic, with the center of gravity being a population
." (Jesqueal: The exact same line given to him in a report, above - press ctrl+f type "07.22")
The US Army is using SEAS to identify potential recruits.
The Pentagon's use of the mainstream media to perpetuate lies and disinformation to influence not only the enemy we are engaging but the American people as a whole has been ongoing.
Americans have been led to believe over the years that reforming education is about improving reading or math skills or standardized academic achievement test scores, etcetera, etcetera, etcetera. However, when one considers that the U.S. has been drastically overhauling the education system for over four decades, why have improvements not materialized? In fact, the three R's (i.e. basic academics) have suffered, and the older traditional standardized achievement test scores have plummeted.
The fact is that performance-based reforms have never been about improving students' knowledge of the three R's. The following quotes from the 1993 U.S. Department of Education publication titled School Change Models and Processes shed light on this dilemma. This booklet clearly explains the three waves of reform, which were initiated on the federal level in the '60s, in this way:
Three perspectives that have been most influential in educational change are:
1) the rational-scientific perspective which posits that change is created by the dissemination of innovative techniques,
2) the political perspective (the top-down approach) which brings about change through legislation and other directives imposed by parties outside the school or districts, and
3) the cultural perspective (the bottom-up approach) which seeks to influence change by encouraging values changes within organizations.
Systemic Reform = Creating Cultural Change
The publication goes on to say that "the cultural perspective... has become a dominant perspective or metaphor of major school redesign and restructuring efforts in the 1990s...." Little is said in this report about improving education, but much is said about "redesigning" and "restructuring" education. The report calls the type of reform that is implemented from the cultural perspective "systemic reform" and defines it in this way:"We see the use of innovative technical knowledge combined with staff development in the context of a school improvement approach that is multilevel, involving not only the school, the district, and the state agency but reaching out as well to create cultural change in the community" (emphasis added).
Is it any wonder that so many public school students can't read and write well? Some students fail to read at all when they receive their high school diplomas. That's because public education is not about offering a broad knowledge base and opportunities for academic achievement any more. The truth is that public schools have become a vehicle for implementing the type of social reform envisioned by John Dewey and other progressive education reformers.
The concept of "systemic reform" has its roots in the progressive education reform movement. Systemic reform is not about making the schools stronger academically; it's about creating "cultural change in the community" through changing children's beliefs and behavior. At the heart of any culture is a belief system, and beliefs shape behavior. Christian beliefs have historically been at the heart of American culture. Bringing "cultural change" means changing what have traditionally been Christian beliefs, values and conduct.
Not only are these third round reforms pervasive-going far beyond the walls of the schoolhouse-they are also well funded by powerful associations, private foundations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The main problem with these groups running the show is that they are not made up of elected officials, making them unaccountable to the people. Systemic reform involves appointing committees and councils, etc. to make decisions that elected bodies have a legal right to make. This trend must be changed if "the people" are to be truly represented in the decision-making process.
Changing the curriculum and testing in order to create cultural change through the public schools was the first step in bringing about systemic change. The second step in this cultural transformation has been to retrain teachers as "change agents." The Behavioral Science Elementary Teacher Education Program (BSTEP), conducted at Michigan State University from 1965-1969, and funded by the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), provided the "research" necessary to restructure teacher education.
The following quote from the report titled Feasibility Study: Behavioral Science Teacher Education Program, Final Report, dated December 31, 1969, explains the intent of BSTEP:
"The first goal was to develop a new kind of elementary teacher who is basically well-educated, engages in teaching as clinical practice, is an effective student of the capacities and environmental characteristics of human learning, and functions as a responsible agent of social change " (p.6).
The report goes on to explain the following:
BSTEP provides the elementary school teacher with particular sets of behavior and mental processes, to function as a practitioner specifically trained to give comprehensive aid to a client. The BSTEP teacher is expected to learn from experience through a cyclical style of describing, analyzing, hypothesizing, prescribing, treating, and observing consequences. The last activity, observing consequences of the treatment administered, in turn leads to the first, describing the changed situations, to begin a new cycle. The feedback from the iterative [involving repetition] design is used to improve his practitioner skills and knowledge, and to better fill the needs of the client-pupil…. The Program is designed to focus the skills and knowledge of behavioral scientists on education problems, translating research into viable programs for preservice and in-service teachers. (p. 6-7)
FOOD FOR THOUGHT: Teachers are not psychologists or psychiatrists! Their students are not "clients." "Prescribing" and "treating" clients should not be part of a teacher's job description. As a public school teacher, I endured many an in-service workshop that was meant for psychologists, not teachers! After reading the BSTEP study, I understood why.