Cyber War Games using "Red Teams" to prep for cyber false flags

[Dig]

Inside NSA Red Team Secret Ops With Government's Top Hackers
http://www.popularmechanics.com/technology/military_law/javascript:doContent('print','4270420','/technology/military_law/4270420.html?nav=hpPrint');
By Glenn Derene
Published on: June 30, 2008

When it comes to the U.S. government’s computer security, we in the tech press have a habit of reporting only the bad news—for instance, last year’s hacks into Oak Ridge and Los Alamos National Labs, a break-in to an e-mail server used by Defense Secretary Robert Gates ... the list goes on and on. Frankly that’s because the good news is usually a bunch of nonevents: “Hackers deterred by diligent software patching at the Army Corps of Engineers.” Not too exciting.

So, in the world of IT security, it must seem that the villains outnumber the heroes—but there are some good-guy celebrities in the world of cyber security. In my years of reporting on the subject, I’ve often heard the National Security Agency’s red team referred to with a sense of breathless awe by security pros. These guys are purported to be just about the stealthiest, most skilled firewall-crackers in the game. Recently, I called up the secretive government agency and asked if it could offer up a top red teamer for an interview, and, surprisingly, the answer came back, “Yes.”

What are red teams, you ask? They’re sort of like the special forces units of the security industry—highly skilled teams that clients pay to break into the clients’ own networks. These guys find the security flaws so they can be patched before someone with more nefarious plans sneaks in. The NSA has made plenty of news in the past few years for warrantless wiretapping and massive data-mining enterprises of questionable legality, but one of the agency’s primary functions is the protection of the military’s secure computer networks, and that’s where the red team comes in.

In exchange for the interview, I agreed not to publish my source’s name. When I asked what I should call him, the best option I was offered was: “An official within the National Security Agency’s Vulnerability Analysis and Operations Group.” So I’m just going to call him OWNSAVAOG for short. And I’ll try not to reveal any identifying details about the man whom I interviewed, except to say that his disciplined, military demeanor shares little in common with the popular conception of the flippant geek-for-hire familiar to all too many movie fans (Dr. McKittrick in WarGames) and code geeks (n00b script-kiddie h4x0r in leetspeak).

So what exactly does the NSA’s red team actually do? They provide “adversarial network services to the rest of the DOD,” says OWNSAVAOG. That means that “customers” from the many branches of the Pentagon invite OWNSAVAOG and his crew to act like our country’s shadowy enemies (from the living-in-his-mother’s-basement code tinkerer to a “well-funded hacker who has time and money to invest in the effort”), attempting to slip in unannounced and gain unauthorized access.

These guys must conduct their work without doing damage to or otherwise compromising the security of the networks they are tasked to analyze—that means no denial-of-service attacks, malicious Trojans or viruses. “The first rule,” says OWNSAVAOG, “is ‘do no harm.’?” So the majority of their work consists of probing their customers’ networks, gaining user-level access and demonstrating just how compromised the network can be. Sometimes, the red team will leave an innocuous file on a secure part of a customer’s network as a calling card, as if to say, “This is your friendly NSA red team. We danced past the comical precautionary measures you call security hours ago. This file isn’t doing anything, but if we were anywhere near as evil as the hackers we’re simulating, it might just be deleting the very government secrets you were supposed to be protecting. Have a nice day!”

I’d heard from one of the Department of Defense clients who had previously worked with the NSA red team that OWNSAVAOG and his team had a success rate of close to 100 percent. “We don’t keep statistics on that,” OWNSAVAOG insisted when I pressed him on an internal measuring stick. “We do get into most of the networks we target. That’s because every network has some residual vulnerability. It is up to us, given the time and the resources, to find the vulnerability that allows us to access it.”

It may seem unsettling to you—it did at first to me—to think that the digital locks protecting our government’s most sensitive information are picked so constantly and seemingly with such ease. But I’ve been assured that these guys are only making it look easy because they’re the best, and that we all should take comfort, because they’re on our side. The fact that they catch security flaws early means that, hopefully, we can patch up the holes before the black hats get to them.

And like any good geek at a desk talking to a guy with a really cool job, I wondered just where the NSA finds the members of its superhacker squad. “The bulk is military personnel, civilian government employees and a small cadre of contractors,” OWNSAVAOG says. The military guys mainly conduct the ops (the actual breaking and entering stuff), while the civilians and contractors mainly write code to support their endeavors. For those of you looking for a gig in the ultrasecret world of red teaming, this top hacker says the ideal profile is someone with “technical skills, an adversarial mind-set, perseverance and imagination.”

Speaking of high-level, top-secret security jobs, this much I now know: The world’s most difficult IT department to work for is most certainly lodged within the Pentagon. Network admins at the Defense Department have to constantly fend off foreign governments, criminals and wannabes trying to crack their security wall—and worry about a bunch of ace hackers with the same DOD stamp on their paychecks.

Security is an all-important issue for the corporate world, too, but in that environment there is an acceptable level of risk that can be built into the business model. And while banks build in fraud as part of the cost of doing business, there’s no such thing as an acceptable loss when it comes to national security. I spoke about this topic recently with Mark Morrison, chief information assurance officer of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

“We meet with the financial community because there are a lot of parallels between what the intelligence community needs to protect and what the financial community needs,” Morrison said. “They, surprisingly, have staggeringly high acceptance levels for how much money they’re willing to lose. We can’t afford to have acceptable loss. So our risk profiles tend to be different, but in the long run, we end up accepting similar levels of risk because we have to be able to provide actionable intelligence to the war fighter.”

OWNSAVAOG agrees that military networks should be held to higher standards of security, but perfectly secure computers are perfectly unusable. “There is a perfectly secure network,” he said. “It’s one that’s shut off. We used to keep our information in safes. We knew that those safes were good, but they were not impenetrable, and they were rated on the number of hours it took for people to break into them. This is a similar equation.”

[Dig]

The comments are very eye opening and thought provoking.  Here is one:

The red team used to be the guys who attacked the nuclear power plants. The Iraqi WMD inspectors and the CIA leaks about the inspectors and the secret OO's training at universities in WMD, by the way the same as Rice's training, led to Plame and her leak of how Ames was arrested. She was a leak from the beginning and the history after 95 and the Ames arrest is just her showing how she leaked the Ames arrest. The CIA analysts, linguists hired by CIA during their 'we must have more HUMINT,' have all moved over to DoD NSA. The OOs are still fighting over domestic powers that CIA has and the DIA doesn't - Plame's domestic intelligence and her dad's work at NSA. So, we have an old leak from Ames - she operated the same as Ames - and the CIA moving to NSA. CIA would call this a classic penetration of military intelligence. DIA might think about Los Alamos and the laptops and Iran and the laptops. The red team hackers are dealing with all this and maybe they should wonder a bit about who is ordering the hacking. The adversarial network is already there. The real time monitoring of what is typed into the computer is old. You might be typing and the typing is taken over by a monitor asking 'what are you typing?'

[nofakenews]

The comments are very eye opening and thought provoking.  Here is one:

The red team used to be the guys who attacked the nuclear power plants. The Iraqi WMD inspectors and the CIA leaks about the inspectors and the secret OO's training at universities in WMD, by the way the same as Rice's training, led to Plame and her leak of how Ames was arrested. She was a leak from the beginning and the history after 95 and the Ames arrest is just her showing how she leaked the Ames arrest. The CIA analysts, linguists hired by CIA during their 'we must have more HUMINT,' have all moved over to DoD NSA. The OOs are still fighting over domestic powers that CIA has and the DIA doesn't - Plame's domestic intelligence and her dad's work at NSA. So, we have an old leak from Ames - she operated the same as Ames - and the CIA moving to NSA. CIA would call this a classic penetration of military intelligence. DIA might think about Los Alamos and the laptops and Iran and the laptops. The red team hackers are dealing with all this and maybe they should wonder a bit about who is ordering the hacking. The adversarial network is already there. The real time monitoring of what is typed into the computer is old. You might be typing and the typing is taken over by a monitor asking 'what are you typing?'

Yep sane they make it no secret they want war on the internet to shut down web pages and blogs and like the bilderberg meetings where they decide what they plan to do next. They have done warrantless wiretapping and data mining on us and yet we are the criminal's cause we put out the truth.

We all have seen them censor myspace and youtube and even put caps on most of the cable internet providers so they can control how much we do by making it expensive to spread information and comcast was the cornerstone as one of the first to put in place caps.

I remember my post awhile back at the davos meeting this was on the table to censor us out like they have done in the UK and Australia and if you remember when George walker bush first wanted control he got the middle finger from the other countries so they have found a new way to bring in the control under the guise of saving the children.

Same reason I am saving all of Alex jones videos!!!

[Dig]

Yep sane they make it no secret they want war on the internet to shut down web pages and blogs and like the bilderberg meetings where they decide what they plan to do next. They have done warrantless wiretapping and data mining on us and yet we are the criminal's cause we put out the truth.

We all have seen them censor myspace and youtube and even put caps on most of the cable internet providers so they can control how much we do by making it expensive to spread information and comcast was the cornerstone as one of the first to put in place caps.

I remember my post awhile back at the davos meeting this was on the table to censor us out like they have done in the UK and Australia and if you remember when George walker bush first wanted control he got the middle finger from the other countries so they have found a new way to bring in the control under the guise of saving the children.

Same reason I am saving all of Alex jones videos!!!

Who are the cyber black operations control companies?  The same black operation companies that train terrorists, conduct false flag terror attacks, conduct torture interrogations (like slicing testicles, raping children, and throwing people out of windows after injecting them with LSD):  CACI and Kroll.

FUN FUN FUN

Some information on these companies that love you and protect you:

http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=87140.0

[Dig]

From Anti_Immuminati ( http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=87140.msg509252#msg509252 ):

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CYBER-"TERROR", BROUGHT TO YOU BY:







Sit back and grab your favorite drink and enjoy the show as I show you classical New World Order conditioning of the masses for "Cyber attacks" that would in fact be carried out by the very individuals, corporations, governments, firms, etc. whom you are told to believe are protecting IT/Cyber/Network/Communications Infrastructure.  Starting pre - Black OP in NY carried out via Ptech, (the "golden thread" of the NWO's subsequent and future C4ISR/DoDAF black op foundation) used to carry out all other alleged "attacks" against the Internet, power grids, et.al.

Keep your mind sharp while reading this to historically cross-reference this wicked disinfo chronologically to other propaganda that you are aware of to develop a picture of the full-spectrum bullshit the NWO has tried, and is continually attempting to inundate your brain with.
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http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/sci/tech/specials/washington_2000/648429.stm
Tuesday, 22 February, 2000, 12:27 GMT
Cyber-terrorists wield weapons of mass disruption [INSERT: LMFAO]



By BBC News Online's Kevin Anderson in Washington DC

Terrorists are not just exploring weapons of mass destruction but also weapons of mass disruption, said the director of the Global Organised Crime Project on Friday.

Arnaud de Borchgrave, is at the US Centre for Strategic and International studies, [INSERT: LMFAO, THE NWO [CSIS (Kissinger, Brzezinski, Schlesinger, et.al.) warned us of threats, just like they are still doing today] and joined other experts at the American Association for the Advancement of Science meeting to assess the threat of cyber-terrorism.

Extremists used to work in relative isolation, but they can now use the internet to recruit like-minded people, he said.

And in the digital age, the old-fashioned wiretap may be ineffective against terrorists using strong encryption, he added.

In testimony before Congress this week, FBI Director Louis Freeh said: "Convicted terrorist Ramzi Yousef, the mastermind of the World Trade Centre bombing, stored detailed plans to destroy United States' airliners on encrypted files on his laptop computer."

"Hacktivists" are using their computer cracking skills to deface websites and to make a point.

In his testimony, Mr Freeh also said: "A group calling itself the Internet Black Tigers conducted a successful "denial of service" attack on servers of Sri Lankan Government embassies. Italian sympathisers of the Mexican Zapatista rebels attacked web pages of Mexican financial institutions."

Access denied

The global nature of the internet and of these attacks highlights the challenges facing law enforcement, several of the experts said.

The recent attacks against Yahoo, eBay and several other high-profile websites could have been launched from anywhere in the world.

To trace the attack back to its source would require following the original command back hop through hop through the internet, according to Scott Charney, who before joining PricewaterhouseCoopers worked for the US Justice Department as part of the Computer Crime Initiative.

In the US, many Internet Service Providers are not keeping log data because there is no commercial incentive to do so, and in the European Union, several privacy directives call on providers to delete data on customers' activities after their monthly bill is paid, Mr Charney said.

This effectively erases the electronic trail, and the maze of regulations governing electronic search warrants around the world may delay law enforcement long enough for the electronic trail to go cold.

Daniel O'Connor with the National Infrastructure Protection Centre said, "Anyone who is sophisticated knows to bounce through a foreign country. It makes our jobs much more difficult."

Information warfare

But it is not simply terrorists or individual hackers but also foreign governments that might attempt to exploit computer network vulnerabilities to disrupt the technology-dependent United States.

"No country can match the US in terms of conventional weapons so cyber-terrorism becomes a credible alternative," Mr de Borchgrave said. "China has conducted war games designed to cripple and confuse a nation's computer power."

FBI Director Freeh said in his testimony that foreign countries perceive the US reliance on information technology to control critical government and private sector systems as the country's Achilles' heel.

"For example, two Chinese military officers recently published a book that called for the use of unconventional measures, including the propagation of computer viruses, to counterbalance the military power of the United States," Mr Freeh said.

Cyber-terrorism sceptic

But at least one panellist was sceptical about the threat of cyber-terrorism.

Kevin Poulsen knows about hacking. In 1982, he gained access to a dozen computers on Arpanet, the forerunner of today's internet, using a TRS-80 colour computer. He was 17 years old at the time.

Mr Poulsen now works for SecurityFocus.com, a security clearinghouse website, and he said information systems have become more secure, not less, over time.

And he dismissed the idea of an "Electronic Pearl Harbor," a term used often in information warfare circles to describe a potentially crippling and deadly cyber-attack.

"At Pearl Harbor, we lost the Pacific Fleet. We haven't even had an information Grenada," he said, referring to the US invasion of the Caribbean island in the 1980s.

He was careful to say that although he believes the threat posed by cyber-terrorism to be overblown that it does not mean that he is not concerned about security on the Internet.

But he added, "We don't need to invent an enemy to protect our networks."
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Original link no longer works.

http://www.gyre.org/news/us-enemies-plotting-computer-blitz-clinton-aide

U.S. enemies plotting computer blitz: Clinton aide -- Reuters  -- Toronto Star  -- June 19, 2000

A top aide to President Bill Clinton said Monday unspecified hostile countries are studying U.S. computer networks for ways to spark mayhem if war breaks out. 'This is not theoretical. It's real,' said Richard Clarke, White House National Security Council staff co-ordinator for security, infrastructure protection and counter-terrorism.
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Original link no longer works.

http://www.gyre.org/node/751/

Cyberterror: How to Counter an Unseen, Unpredictable Enemy? -- James Gordon Meek  -- APBNews.com  -- August 30, 2000

Who are America\'s cyberenemies? Don\'t ask the White House, it doesn\'t know -- but it insists they\'re out there. Watchdogs and experts in the computer security field say there is a real threat of hostile hackers penetrating sensitive government and private computer systems, and intrusions are detected constantly.
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http://archive.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/04/04/cyberterrorism/index1.html

The phantom cyber-threat [INSERT:  Phantom like "Phantom Flight 11", isn't that right "General" Eberhard (now Renuart), TRAITORS, and enemy commander(s) of NORAD-USNORTHCOM?

We should stop worrying about computer terrorism and learn who our real enemies are.

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By Caroline Benner

April 4, 2001 | Are you under 30? If so, jokes former National Security Advisor Anthony Lake in his book "Six Nightmares," chances are you have enough technical know-how to be a cyber-threat. And if you don't, says Lake, you can find everything you need, including cyber-attack tools and their instruction manuals, on the Internet. Armed with these tools, "millions of computer-savvy individuals could wreak havoc against the United States."

Lake isn't the only policy wonk warning us of our own vulnerability. On March 22, National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice and Richard Clarke, who heads U.S. counter-terrorism efforts, issued a warning against computer attacks that could disrupt vital services in the United States. "It is a paradox of our times," said Rice, "that the very technology that makes our economy so dynamic and our military forces so dominating also makes us more vulnerable."

But vulnerable to what? If the alarmists are right, we have some terrifying scenarios ahead of us: large-scale attacks on critical infrastructure such as the food supply, emergency services, government agencies, power grids, communication systems, air traffic control and financial systems. Lake, whose chapter "e-Terror, e-Crime" is a veritable case study in cyber-attack alarmism, worries that cyber-attackers could crash planes; tamper with food or medicines to poison populations; or disrupt the economy by shutting down electrical and communication systems. "The genie is well outside the bottle," he claims, now that attackers have jammed 911 lines in Miami, overwhelmed the e-mail system at an Air Force base and infiltrated an unclassified Pentagon computer.

To an extent, their fears are legitimate. In the last 20 years, the number of people with computer skills has grown dramatically; there are thousands of computer viruses and hundreds of millions of potential targets. An Associated Press story on Rice's announcement cited $400 million in financial losses due to computer attacks over the last year. But just because there are plenty of cyber-savvy individuals out there doesn't mean that the attacks we're likely to face are going to be as damaging as Lake and others fear. And no one among them is offering a careful analysis of what the threat may be and where it will come from.

Part of the problem is that Lake and other alarmists don't distinguish between the resources it takes to cause an expensive nuisance -- like last year's denial-of-service attacks on Yahoo and eBay -- and the skills, time and access one needs to create a devastating attack, like crashing an airplane. In "Six Nightmares," Lake doesn't consider the checks that protect infrastructure from such threats. He also fails to ask an obvious question: If there are so many malicious hackers at work (19 million, by Lake's count), why have their attacks been, by and large, fairly innocuous?

"Certainly the large majority of attacks demonstrate no more than script-kiddie skill level," says Tim Shimeall, a senior member of the technical staff with the CERT Analysis Center, a center for Internet security at Carnegie Mellon University.

Script kiddies, or unskilled criminal programmers, perform simple exploits against underprotected systems using software tools and instructions created by skilled programmers. They take a tool and run it against multiple targets, hoping to hit one of them. These tools can crack passwords, steal files, install malicious software in a target or cause a denial-of-service attack, but are unlikely to cause large-scale damage. "Script kiddies are getting their clickers on more sophisticated tools, but they have little ability to do more than launch them," says John Arquilla, associate professor of information technology at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif.

Tools like these don't automate large-scale attacks on critical infrastructure as much as reproduce attacks that more proficient troublemakers have carried out in the past. And so what expert cyber-terrorists don't do routinely -- widespread attacks on the electrical grid, for instance -- just isn't an option for the vast majority of maliciously minded delinquents.

Major acts of cyber-terrorism are considerably more difficult than Lake and other alarmists suggest. Many tools -- which are usually designed to attack popular operating systems and common network protocols -- don't work against some critical infrastructures which run on proprietary operating systems and protocols. Moreover, a new attack tool can lose potency within weeks as patches for the newfound vulnerability are created and applied by alert system administrators. Challenges like these are enough to knock most script kiddies out of the running. Large-scale destruction requires the ability to create or modify tools, or to know how to use combinations of tools. The vast majority of script kiddies just don't have those skills.

"To carry out a large-scale attack against critical infrastructure requires significant expertise," says Edward Felten, director of the Secure Internet Programming Lab at Princeton University. A December 1999 study from the Naval Postgraduate School, "Cyberterror: Prospects and Implications," elaborates on the sort of expertise that might be necessary to execute attacks such as a "sustained total interruption of some component of the national critical infrastructure across a substantial customer base." Attackers would likely need sophisticated programming skills as well as mastery of operating systems, network and computer architectures, and security measures. They would need time to fully analyze a target system, which may require insider knowledge. They may also need organizational skills to employ multiple simultaneous attacks from different locations.

A major cyber-attack takes skill and motive and so far, says Frank Cilluffo, an editor of "Cybercrime, Cyberterrorism, Cyberwarfare," "we haven't yet seen the marriage of the intent with the capability."

Lake believes that malicious hackers, or "crackers," could wreak havoc against the United States just for the challenge of it, or to gain prestige among their peers. But is this sufficient motivation (especially given the criminal penalties) for real destruction? Arquilla confirms that there have been instances when hackers were in a position to do enormous damage and chose not to. He notes that most hackers are looking for an intellectual challenge and their interests are served better by a healthy information infrastructure than a broken one.

Terrorists -- those with ample political motivation to carry out such an attack -- are hindered by a lack of skills. According to the Naval Postgraduate School study, large-scale acts by foreign terrorist groups are likely a thing of the future since it takes a while to develop the skill set necessary for such attacks. Purchasing outside expertise is a possibility, but doing so introduces security risks for the terrorist group.

When and if they do strike, cyber-attackers will find many of their targets well guarded. Critical infrastructure systems are not sitting ducks, waiting to be taken out by a skilled and motivated attacker. Most systems have elaborate security measures in place, which may not be foolproof, but do provide a measure of security. For starters, critical infrastructure systems often have limited connections to external networks, making them less susceptible to attack than more open systems. Humans are also monitoring systems more closely than they used to, which means that strange behavior is more likely to be noticed quickly. Non-human checks tend to be effective too: Banks back up their transactions daily and store the information offline.

Lake and other alarmists consistently ignore these and other countermeasures against cyber-terrorism and overestimate the likelihood of large-scale cyber-attacks. Take, for example, one of Lake's nightmare scenarios, borrowed from James Adams' book "The Next World War":

"A cyber-terrorist will remotely access the processing control systems of a cereal manufacturer, change the levels of iron supplement, and sicken and kill the children of a nation enjoying their food."

According to a standard medical text, a lethal dose of iron for a child is between five and 10 grams. However, given that cereal generally has less than one-half milligram of iron per serving, one serving of cereal would need to contain 10,000 to 20,000 times the normal amount of iron to kill the child eating it, an amount that would render the cereal inedible. But it's hard to imagine the cereal would ever even reach the breakfast table: Manufacturers routinely test their products before shipping them to stores and, even prior to that, would notice an increase in iron consumption.

While Lake and other alarmists fret over highly unlikely scenarios such as that, they gloss over far more feasible and more likely attacks.

We've seen the damage that ILOVEYOU-type viruses can do; they're difficult to guard against and can have a significant economic impact. But those viruses could be manipulated into far more damaging strains. Information theft -- from credit card information to government secrets -- continues to be a real threat. Small-scale attacks on critical infrastructure, say, temporarily overwhelming a 911 system, could be especially dangerous when combined with a physical strike, like a subway bombing. Lake lumps threats like these in with major attacks on infrastructure, making little distinction between likely, smaller-scale threats and full-scale cyber-attacks.

Lake, Rice and Clarke have good reason to warn us of the danger of cyber-attacks: There are people with the skills to cause real problems and we don't have the experience to know how likely some of the devastating attacks might be. But before our current spate of minor-grade cyber-attacks graduates into serious threats, we should be more realistic about what the damage is likely to be and from where we can expect it to come. As Cilluffo points out, we have a window of time to prepare for the threat. Let's at least understand the threat, before it's too late.
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http://www.heise.de/tp/r4/artikel/7/7469/1.html
On the Eve of Cold War II

John Horvath 26.04.2001
Computer networks are feeding a new Cold War mentality
It's an irony of history that while George Bush Sr. oversaw the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, his son, George W. Bush Jr., is on the threshold of overseeing the start of a second Cold War. And like its predecessor, we can expect it to last a long time. Moreover, the decreased sense of personal security and the restriction of individual liberty which accompanies such conflicts -- be they cold or hot -- will likewise be a part of our lives for a while.

Although the incident which brought the present state of affairs to the fore -- the collision of an American spy plane with a Chinese fighter jet -- is recent, the foundations of the Second Cold War has long been in place. Indeed, some would argue that the original Cold War did not end, and that present tensions are merely an extension of this conflict, one which is slowly coming out of hibernation.

In many ways, the past ten years have been a difficult one for the US. Policy makers have been busy trying to properly focusing on who the "enemy" really is in a post Cold War world. At the same time, it has been a challenge to convince the home population of the continued need to maintain large military expenditures. This is because America's industrial-military complex is based on a conceptual framework of perpetual war for perpetual peace. Hence, the demise of the Soviet Union did not spell an end to this framework, but merely a realignment of its strategic objectives.

Although present tensions between the US and China may eventually ease, what the spy plane incident nevertheless demonstrated is how the US is already on a war-footing, and that it's ready to quickly adapt to circumstances. The mass media in the US is a case in point. All media outlets in the US adopted the same line regarding the incident. In addition to this, they were crucial in setting the tone for the demonizing rhetoric against China.

For example, in an April 15th interview with two American servicemen on Meet the Press, host Tim Russert went at great lengths to introduce the notion that China "threatened" the crew, even though the two servicemen were reluctant to revert to such strong language. This notion was based on reports that the crew might go on trial in China after an investigation into the incident was completed.

The line of questioning which produced this "fact" merely followed the tone Russert wanted to set: that is, the Chinese authorities were aggressive. But it was not an easy job. Throughout the interview, Russert's plans were being foiled. When he tried to establish that the crew were "interrogated" while in custody, the two servicemen were clearly uneasy at the use of the term, and preferred to say that they were "questioned" (meanwhile, the crew were not "interrogated" or "questioned" by US authorities upon their release but "debriefed"). To make matters worse for Russert, the servicemen conceded to not being mistreated by their "captors".

Even more apparent than this, is how the military has evolved into a hallowed institution in the US since the end of the Vietnam War. No-one dares to question why "surveillance" is necessary; it's accepted as a simple matter of fact, that there is a need on the part of the US to spy against "enemies" even though China has not been formerly identified as one (at least not yet).

While there are many similarities between the Cold War of the days of Bush Sr. and that of his son, there is one main difference: in the past, concern over the Cold War heating up was on the use of nuclear weapons; nowadays, it's on the crashing of computer networks.

This fear is plain to see in the US. As in the heyday of McCarthyism when the paranoia was about a communist hiding under every bed, in digital age America it is "cyber-terrorism"; that is, there is a hacker lurking behind every IP address. The "threat" is considered real enough that President Bush Jr. has made a point of earmarking more money to combat it. Meanwhile, security experts continue to warn that computer networks in the US are full of holes that cannot be repaired.

The establishment of anti-US sites in wake of the spy plane incident further justifies this fear. In retaliation for the death of the pilot killed in the incident, some Chinese sites have started a "Hack the USA" movement pointing out vulnerable targets and offering information and help to get the job done. These include [extern] KillUSA and [extern] SOHU.

The fear over cyber-terrorism driving American insularity and paranoia is misplaced, however. The premise for "cyber-terrorism" is that an attack would harm "extremely sensitive" data that couldn't be quickly replaced and would have far-reaching effects. What is more, it would encompass multiple strikes and would be so devastating that it would cause infrastructure to shut down.

One would have to wonder why major infrastructure or "extremely sensitive" data would be on the public Internet in the first place, rather than private intranets. Not only this, if you really want to attack the US you would hit the country where it hurts most: in the pocket. Spoiling e-commerce is all you need: no need to worry about the military, utilities, transport, etc ...; just crash the stock market and you have brought America (and most of the western world) to its knees.

The hacktivism that goes on is obviously less inclined to go after huge infrastructure, or even extremely sensitive data for that matter. What is more, the most disruptive attacks to date, such as last year's DoS attacks and the "I Love You" worm were the work of script kiddies; in other words, they were the result of new forms of juvenile delinquency as opposed to the rise of cyber-terrorism.

Still, most analysts believe that hacking is a viable weapon. As a result, laws are being passed which infringe on fundamental rights and civil liberties for the sake of "national security" (the UK's cyber-terrorism bill being a case in point). Not only this, e-commerce has been elevated to such importance that to negatively affect it in any way is considered to be a terrorist act.

Thus, far from the promise of promoting social discourse and bringing the world together as a global village, computer networks are feeding a new Cold War mentality, one which threatens to fragment them into disjointed spheres of influence.
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http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir/jir010925_1_n.shtml
Malicious Internet activity increases following 11 September attacks

25 September 2001

Following the devastating terrorist attacks in the United States on11September, there have been numerous reports, some well founded and some not, on cyber activism directed against those connected with the atrocities.

Firstly, media were quick to report the existence of a new Internet worm, called ‘W32.Nimda.A@mm’ which supposedly circulated as a result of the suicide attacks in Washington D.C. and New York. Arriving in the form of an attachment called ‘readme.exe’, it infects computers running the Microsoft Outlook and Outlook Express e-mail clients. In some circumstances the attachment does not even need to be opened to become effective. Experts became worried as the worm began to propagate very quickly exactly one week after the attacks, hunting for vulnerable web servers. The National Infrastructure Protection Center, (NIPC), an agency run by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), held a press conference on the worm and Attorney General John Ashcroft concluded that there was no apparent connection with the attacks.

However, there were at least three other hacking incidents that were related to the events of 11 September. Soon after New York and Washington were hit, the NIPC issued an advisory warning concerning a group calling themselves ‘The Dispatchers’, who claim to have corralled over 1,000 computers for a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack against unnamed internet sites. At least two Iranian websites were also defaced on the weekend following the devastation and it is thought that ‘The Dispatchers’ has also erroneously attacked a site that had offices in the World Trade Center. Websites belonging to the Special Risks Terrorism Team, a business unit of Chicago-based risk management company Aon Corporation, were defaced by the group. The company had a number of individuals working inside the World Trade Center when it was hit. It is not known why they were attacked, but their web addresses (www.terrorism.uk.com and www.terrorismteam.uk.com) seems to suggest that some form of automated tool was involved. The site of the official Taleban delegation to the United Nations (www.taleban.org) was also defaced, with a message informing viewers of the reward for information concerning the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden, a full description of the man and his aliases and a message urging people to visit the FBI terrorism web-pages. The Iranian Interior Ministry site was defaced with a picture of Osama bin Laden in flames, and the home website of the Iranian Payame Noor University was also attacked by a group identifying itself as ‘Medanhacking’. The message left on the Iranian Ministry’s website said that the hackers intended to target ‘every place that poses a possible threat to our safety and security’. Their targets included those who support terrorism, ‘… including but not limited to Israel, Palestine and Afghanistan’. In Germany veteran computer hacker gang the Chaos Computer Club (CCC) issued a message about the need for restraint, appealing to hackers worldwide to hold back from attacking Islamic websites and communication systems. A spokesman for the gang said that he had seen an e-mail circulating hackers urging them to attack websites representing Islamic fundamentalism and terrorist organisations.

These events can be placed in a wider trend of calls for action by cyber activists in retaliation for real world events. Witness the large-scale Palestinian-Israeli cyber war and the numerous proclamations from the hacker underground concerning the need for online retaliation after the ‘spyplane incident’ in China. It is unlikely that these incidents, so soon after the recent terrorist attacks in the US, will be the only ones. The only question is the scale of any future activity.
_____________________________________________________________
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0CE5DD1E3DF937A35753C1A9679C8B63

Securing the Lines Of a Wired Nation

By JOHN SCHWARTZ
Published: October 4, 2001

IN the hours of torment and confusion after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, many people making phone calls to or from the affected cities encountered the grating ''All circuits are busy'' recording. E-mail messages, however, seemed to sail through the crisis to their destinations. The smooth traffic was hailed by many experts as testament to the underlying strength of the Internet.

But hold on just one nanosecond. Are we talking about the Internet, referred to by so many other experts as a famously vulnerable, fragile network that can be brought to its knees by college students in the Philippines or a teenager in Canada, with estimates of damage in the billions of dollars?

It is indeed the same Internet, ever a combination of flaky and robust. Fred Cohen, the computer security researcher who first applied the word ''virus'' to malicious software, said that the individual elements of the network were fragile but that the network over all was resilient. ''It's easy to tear a piece of paper,'' he said. ''Try tearing a phone book in half.'' Still, David J. Farber, a computer scientist and former chief technologist at the Federal Communications Commission, said that the Internet's success on Sept. 11 could largely be attributed to the fact that ''nobody attacked it.''

Experts in the emerging field of cyberterrorism say that with such an inviting target, terrorists are bound to take up the hackers' wares. What will happen when an attacker with real resources and a deep desire to do harm grabs the keyboard?

It may not take long to find out, and the vulnerability may go far beyond Web sites or e-mail.

According to a report last week by the Institute for Security Technology Studies, founded last year at Dartmouth, ''U.S. retaliatory strikes for the tragic Sept. 11 events may result in cyberattacks against the American electronic infrastructure.'' While such attacks may amount to no more than familiar nuisances -- like hackers' defacing Web pages or tying up sites by overwhelming them with traffic -- ''the potential exists for much more devastating cyberattacks,'' the report said.

Those who watch trends in computer crime and terrorism say that the two are coming together with potentially catastrophic results. Richard A. Clarke, who will head cyberterrorism efforts for the Bush administration's Homeland Security Council, said in a speech last December that the government had to make cybersecurity a priority or face a ''digital Pearl Harbor.''

In 1997, the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection noted that telephone networks and the Internet were increasingly the bonds of the world's economy, for everything from financial operations to the supply of water and power.

Consequently, it said, ''a computer can cause switches or valves to open and close, move funds from one account to another, or convey a military order almost as quickly over thousands of miles as it can from next door, and just as easily from a terrorist hideout as from an office cubicle or military command center.''

For Tom Marsh, who was the commission's chairman, the worst-case scenarios are nightmarish: a determined coalition of hackers, he said, could disrupt 911 service, air traffic control, the power-switching centers that move electricity around the country, rail networks and more. ''It's a major undertaking,'' said Mr. Marsh, a retired Air Force general, ''but it's not beyond the realm of possibility.'' The complexity of the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, he said, showed that ''even terrorist organizations can conduct very well-organized and sophisticated attacks.''

''We said in our report we didn't foresee an electronic Pearl Harbor, and I still don't,'' he said. ''But I do believe that as cybercrime progresses, over time the terrorists are going to get more and more interested in it and see it as a very possible opportunity to cause major disruption.''

Those who have worked in cyberintelligence say that the attention to the subject is timely. ''Up until the 11th, people like me would talk in terms of the growing threat of transnational attack -- the prospect of new forms of terrorism -- and the basic reaction was, 'Yeah, yeah, yeah, but that's theoretical,' '' said Jeffrey A. Hunker, dean of the Heinz School of Public Policy and Management at Carnegie Mellon University and formerly the senior director for protection of critical infrastructure at the National Security Council.

Since the attacks, he said, it has become clear that ''there are clearly transnational organizations that are incredibly capable of executing sophisticated operations and are enormously creative and innovative.'' That, in turn, ''makes much more real the possibility of new techniques or new types of terrorist attacks,'' including cyberterror, he said. ''We're sitting on a cyber time bomb,'' he said.

Some experts have warned, for example, that systems accessible to the Internet like power grids could be brought down by a determined hacker, though as Mr. Farber put it, ''it's a lot easier to throw a hand grenade down the highway south of San Jose and take out a major power station'' than to do so by modem. And most would put cyberattacks in a different category from the weapons of mass destruction associated with visions of catastrophic terrorism; these are not nuclear arms, nerve gas or germs. Instead, many experts now call them weapons of mass disruption.

''People aren't going to be killing us with computers,'' Mr. Hunker said, ''but our life may be hell because of computer attacks.''

The likeliest use of the technology, he said, would be to complicate matters further after a real-world attack, a tactic he describes with the military phrase ''force multiplier.'' That could involve planting false information on the Web to create a panic or taking down crucial computers in the financial or communications sectors.

The ripple effects of the World Trade Center attacks on everything from the travel industry to supply chains in manufacturing show the potential for havoc. ''Besides the fact of the horrendous loss of life, it was really an attack on the critical infrastructures,'' said Mary J. Culnan, a professor of management and information technology at Bentley College in Waltham, Mass., and a member of the presidential commission that issued the 1997 report.

The Clinton administration started the first major national effort to upgrade computer security in government and business against cybercrime and terrorist attack. President Bill Clinton issued an order in May 1998 creating the National Infrastructure Protection Center, a collaborative effort of law enforcement, military and intelligence organizations to shore up defenses against computer crime. The center also developed an information-sharing network with major industrial sectors.

Such activities will presumably be brought under the umbrella of the new Homeland Defense Council that President Bush has appointed Gov. Tom Ridge of Pennsylvania to run. Mr. Clarke will oversee cyberdefense initiatives for the council as head of its Office of Cyber Security.

Michael Vatis, the head of the Dartmouth cybersecurity group and a former head of the National Infrastructure Protection Center, said the stereotype of computer intruders as thrill-seeking teenage loners was misleading. Talented intruders who are motivated -- and perhaps banding together with criminal or ideological motives -- can go far, he said, citing little-publicized attacks on business and Pentagon computer networks by hackers who may be linked to organized crime in Russia. The attacks, beginning in 1998, are the focus of a federal investigation. ''The type of access they were able to gain,'' he said, and ''the amount of information and the types of information they were getting means they could do lots of stuff to those systems,'' both purloining data and disrupting operations.

Even more dangerous than outsiders, potentially, are insiders with specialized knowledge, according to the 1997 report of the President's Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection. That report estimated that by this year 19 million people worldwide would have the skills to engage in malicious hacking and 1.3 million people would have advanced knowledge of the systems that control the nation's telecommunications infrastructure.

Whatever the nature of the attack, the tools are easy to acquire and the knowledge to use them even more so. A reasonably competent programmer who is willing to delve into the arcana of computer operating systems and networks can cobble together viruses or other destructive computer code from software posted online. Similarly, tools for examining computer systems for security holes and the programs that can be used to take advantage of them to gain unauthorized entry are also easy to find online, and computer vandals are happy to share their knowledge in Internet forums.

So what is to be done? Most of the measures that experts recommend, like keeping up with the latest antivirus software, using strong passwords to protect computers and networks and installing intrusion-detection software, are painfully obvious but still ignored by many businesses, government agencies and consumers. The Dartmouth report also recommends increasing protection at Web sites and keeping backups of their important data, with special attention to the potential for Web page defacement.

That report also recommends vigilance, and appropriate software, to prevent or detect the surreptitious commandeering of computer systems for use in denial-of-service attacks. (A guide to the best security practices can be found at www.cert.org /security-improvement.)

Informal networks for intrusion detection are beginning to form among those who hope to find security in numbers. One such network, AirCert, has been developed by the CERT Coordination Center at Carnegie Mellon's Software Engineering Institute. The fledgling AirCert project places Internet-based security sensors on participating sites; those sensors automatically send data on intrusion attempts to a central CERT knowledge base that is able to analyze the information and share it quickly.

The idea has been suggested before. A network for intrusion detection in government computers, called Fidnet, was proposed late in the Clinton administration but never created because of assertions that the system might be used as a large-scale monitoring network for citizens' online communications. Government officials insist that was never the intention, but Mr. Vatis said that they did not make their case well.

Making that case may now be easier, but Professor Culnan, at Bentley College, said that mounting an effective deterrent to cyberterror was no small task. ''It's a gigantic problem making this work,'' she said. ''But at least we've started thinking about it.''
_____________________________________________________________
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/1593018.stm
Thursday, 11 October, 2001, 09:10 GMT 10:10 UK
Doomsday fears of terror cyber-attacks


Fears that services like fire brigade could be at risk
By BBC News Online's Alfred Hermida

Computer experts have painted a chilling picture of the potential threat from a combined terror and cyber-attack on the United States.

They told Congress that terrorists could target computer networks critical to power supplies, telecommunications and financial systems and wreak havoc on the country.

"What if the terrorists were also able to impact our communications system, thus hampering the rescue and recovery efforts?" asked Ms Benzel, vice president of computer security firm Network Associates.

"What if the attackers were able to compromise systems monitoring the water supply for Manhattan? What if power to parts of the northeast corridor could have been brought down through a cyber-attack on key systems?

"We must prepare now to prevent this from happening," she urged.

Her fears were echoed by committee chairman Sherwood Boehlert. He warned that research and development on computer security had not kept pace with the threat.

"To put it simply, we need more people to be doing more creative thinking about computer security. That's what our adversaries are doing," he said.

Vulnerable networks

An official report released the day after the September attacks highlighted the vulnerability of America's computer networks.

"Recent reports and events indicate that these efforts are not keeping pace with the growing threats and that critical operations and assets continue to be highly vulnerable to computer-based attacks," said the US Government report.

"Despite the importance of maintaining the integrity, confidentiality, and availability of important federal computerised operations, federal computer systems are riddled with weaknesses that continue to put critical operations and assets at risk," it said.

Experts have been warning for some time about what has been described as an Electronic Pearl Harbour - a computer-based attack that would cause massive amounts of destruction and loss of life.

In a worst-case scenario, such an attack would target power distribution, financial services, emergency call services and air traffic control systems.

Shortly after the shocking events of 11 September, an influential US thinktank warned that cyber-attacks could become part of any future conflict.

'Nuisance attacks'

"The vast majority of previous politically related cyber-attacks have been nuisance attacks, and it is extremely likely that such attacks will follow any US-led military action," said the report by the US-based Institute for Security Technology Studies.

"The potential exists for much more devastating cyber-attacks following any US-led retaliation to the 11 September terrorist attacks on America. Such an attack could significantly debilitate US and allied information networks".

The Bush administration has acted to address the issue with the appointment of Richard Clarke as special White House advisor for cyberspace security.

Mr Clarke has a long record in counter-terrorism and cyber-security, most recently serving as national co-ordinator for security, infrastructure protection and counter-terrorism on the National Security Council.

But some are sceptical about the idea of dramatic assault on computer networks in the US. Computer security expert Richard Forno said cyber-attacks were more of a nuisance than viable terrorist tactics, warning against any knee-jerk measures.

Fears of a cyber-assault on the US have been heightened following the 11 September attacks.

President Bush has already moved to head off any danger by appointing a computer security veteran as special White House advisor for cyberspace security.

'Beyond frightening'

Speaking before the House Science Committee, computer security expert Terry Benzel said the potential for an attack on America's computer networks was "beyond frightening".
_____________________________________________________________
http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A3409-2003Jan30
Feds Building Internet Monitoring Center

By Brian Krebs
washingtonpost.com Staff Writer
Friday, January 31, 2003;

The Bush administration is quietly assembling an Internet-wide monitoring center to detect and respond to attacks on vital information systems and key e-commerce sites.

The center, which has been in development for the past 15 months, is a key piece of the White House's national cybersecurity strategy and represents a major leap in the federal government's effort to achieve real-time tracking of the Internet's health.

 The "Global Early Warning Information System," (GEWIS, pronounced "gee-whiz") is being built by the National Communications System (NCS), a Defense agency established in 1962 to ensure that the government has access to adequate communications systems during national emergencies. It is unrelated to the Total Information Awareness program, a planned Defense Department program that would actively mine databases worldwide to uncover terrorist and other threats.

The NCS started building the GEWIS system shortly after the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, when it began asking major Internet and telecommunications providers to sell "real-time" data about the status of their networks, said NCS Deputy Manager Brent Greene.

The NCS has spent an undisclosed sum of money to buy data from the members of the National Coordinating Center for Telecommunications, an NCS information sharing group established during the Clinton administration that includes some the largest telecom and Internet service providers in the world, including WorldCom, Verizon, Sprint, SBC Communications, Qwest and BellSouth.

Greene said the agency now receives data from several key telecom and Internet service providers, and in the next two months hopes to launch the first stage of its pilot project, which will combine the information into a graphical view of the health of the Internet.

The White House believes the monitoring center is necessary because no single entity in the government or private sector has more than a limited view of the global communications network.

"Nowhere do you see everything that is happening on the Internet," said White House cybersecurity adviser Richard Clarke at a recent public appearance in Washington. "Nowhere do you see the big board."

With Clarke's help, the NCS secured $5 million in 2002 for the GEWIS program.

The NCS is co-managed by the White House and the head of the Defense Information Systems Agency, which is responsible for guarding the communications infrastructures of the military and intelligence communities. On March 1, the NCS will be folded into the Department of Homeland Security, along with four other federal cybersecurity divisions.

Privacy Problems Resolved?

GEWIS has proven a tough sell for some ISPs, in part because of the way the government initially pitched its request for data. NCS first asked about the possibility of receiving live feeds from ISPs, with few restrictions on the amount or scope of data requested, according to several providers.

"We were led to believe that some contractors [working on GEWIS] may have gotten a little over-enthusiastic about what kinds of information they could get," said Stewart Baker, a former deputy director for the National Security Agency, and currently an attorney representing several ISPs. "Exactly what will be pulled together by GEWIS and what will be the role of companies asked to participate is all still up in the air."

The program has left other ISPs wondering how GEWIS differs from the "network operations center" outlined in the Bush administration's draft cybersecurity plan. The center, which would be run by the private sector, would link the network security operations of numerous telecommunications providers for the purpose of sharing information on specific cyber threats.

Clarke's deputy, Howard Schmidt, said GEWIS is a far less ambitious program than the network operations center. Instead, GEWIS would give the government the ability to spot cyberattacks before they become a worldwide problem and would use aggregate data to model the effects of a virus or cyberattacks on key systems, Schmidt said.

"GEWIS is merely a tool that would be looking at the Internet from the government's perspective," he said. "The effort mentioned in the cyber plan asks what are the bigger things that government may not need to know about but that the private sector should do a better job coordinating on?"

The NCS's Greene said the government is taking steps to ensure that the center does not collect personal information from ISPs. He said ISPs can use "software tools" to limit the amount of information transmitted to NCS while still allowing the agency to spot major problems with the Internet, such as denial-of-service attacks and computer viruses capable of crippling government and commercial activity online.

"We certainly don't want to get into the level of detail where we create the perception of government getting into stuff that a lot of people don't want the government to see," Greene said. "We think this is very doable, but it can only be done in a partnership with industry, and we have to be careful not to do anything to undermine that."

The NCS already receives real-time data from Verisign Corp., which oversees two of the Internet's 12 root servers that tell computers around the world how to reach key Internet domains. The company gave the government a software tool that allows the NCS to monitor the health of all 12 root servers for free.

The NCS also contracted to receive information from Keynote, a company that monitors the performance of major e-commerce Web sites. In addition, Lumeta Corp., a Somerset N.J.-based Bell Labs spinoff, sold the NCS large amounts of data pinpointing thousands of the most crucial routers on the Internet. Lumeta chief scientist Bill Cheswick helped create the first map of the Internet, which has been used to study Internet routing problems and distributed denial-of-service attacks.

One of the first companies successfully approached by the NCS was Boston-based Akamai Technologies, a company that makes software to monitor Web traffic for suspicious events. The company also sells a product that identifies the geographic location and network origin of visitors accessing customers' Web sites. Akamai CEO George Conrades is a board member of the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), the company that manages the Internet's worldwide addressing system.

To build on that level of industry cooperation, the NCS has recast its approach and plans to hold a workshop in March to address industry concerns about GEWIS. Greene said that GEWIS's goal is "not to become a secretive place that holds terabytes of data that we're off doing analysis on."

The administration hopes that GEWIS will benefit from the level of trust that the NCS has gained in developing a related project known as the Cyber Warning Information Network (CWIN).

Under construction since early 2001, CWIN will be a separate data network that government and leaders in the telecom and Internet industries can use as a hotline to share information or stay in touch in the event of crisis or attack that takes out the World Wide Web.

Developed under contract by AT&T Corp., CWIN terminals have recently been installed at several major telecom and Internet service providers. NCS hopes to build the network out to small and regional service providers in the coming months.

Many service providers that expressed uneasiness over GEWIS view CWIN as an essential step toward a more cooperative approach between the government and the private sector.

"This boils down to a trust question: How much does the government trust industry to manage these systems effectively, and to what degree does industry trust the government to handle all this data?" said Cristin Flynn, spokeswoman for WorldCom.

"I think there's an inclination on the part of ISPs to participate in that in good faith without setting off the alarm bells that some of the more ambitious proposals set off," Flynn said. "We think CWIN is a good way to build that trust, sort of like dating before we get married."

Mark Rasch, former head of the Justice Department's Computer Crime division, questioned the need for GEWIS. With most Internet attacks, he said, by the time you notice a huge spike in traffic, it's already too late to head off disruptions.

"Slammer made that fact very clear," Rasch said of the Internet worm that infected nearly 200,000 computers within a few short hours early Saturday morning.

[Anti_Illuminati]

http://www.mitre.org/news/digest/archives/2000/defense_red_team.html

Defense-Information Assurance Red Team

June 2000

The nature of war is changing. More and more the Department of Defense (DOD) is employing computers, networks, global telecommunication systems, and satellites to support it in performing its diverse national security missions. Today, the DOD has more than 2 million computers, 10,000 local area networks, and 100 long-distance networks. This technology helps to identify and track enemy targets, pay soldiers, and manage supplies. The technology also acts as a critical force multiplier by helping to ensure that appropriate military resources are used exactly when and where required.

But this same advanced communications technology can be the military’s Achilles’ heel. In part this is due to the DOD’s necessary reliance on the Internet and the public telephone switch systems, which are the critical backbone of the DOD.



The DOD is actively pursuing solutions to defeat growing threats to its lines of communications. One of the best ways to prepare for the cyber threat is through the use of an information assurance Red Team, which is an independent, interdisciplinary, simulated enemy force. After proper safeguards are established, the team uses active and passive techniques to expose and exploit information assurance vulnerabilities of friendly forces. The results are used as a means to improve those forces' readiness.

Recognizing the importance of this activity, the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence/Information Assurance requested MITRE's assistance to develop a uniform Red Team methodology.

Lead Information Security Engineer Julie Connolly described the process: "We began by visiting various government and commercial organizations with Red Team experience to better understand their perspectives and threat environment. Using the information we gained, and building on our own Red Team experience, we drew up the Defense-Information Assurance Red Team Methodology (D-IART). Also, a CD containing a Multimedia Red Team overview and tutorial was created. The D-IART methodology offers clear guidance on how to conduct Red Team activities to ensure that all actions are done in a consistent, sensible, and non-destructive manner. As you might imagine, putting the D-IART together took time and determination. The result has been well received by the user community."



Good reasons to use a Red Team:

    * A Red Team identifies vulnerabilities overlooked by system developers an defenders.
    * Red Teams can demonstrate potential harm a real attacker could inflict.
    * Red Teams contribute to the selection of cost-effective countermeasures.

The DOD began using information assurance Red Teams several years ago.They have been very effective in improving the DOD’s information assurance posture and in highlighting areas needing improvement. However, to assess DOD-wide information assurance readiness, a consistent approach for conducting and assessing Red Team activities across the DOD was needed. MITRE answered the need with a methodology that is flexible, easy to understand, and draws upon Red Team expertise within government and industry. The methodology also helps to ensure that all Red Team activities have consistency of purpose, a commonality of structure, and produce meaningful and comparable results.

The methodology guides those responsible for Red Team activities through the specific steps required to organize, tailor, and conduct their activities, and to aid in after-action analysis. It provides clear, step-by-step guidance through the pre-planning, planning, attack, and post-attack phases of a Red Team activity and includes a checklist of the steps for each phase. Clearly described are the roles and responsibilities of the participants in the four phases. This includes the personnel leading and making up the Red Team, the personnel making up the BlueTeam (the defenders), and the personnel making up the WhiteTeam (the referees).

The methodology’s flexibility allows for easy adaptation for activities ranging from small stand-alone systems to joint, multinational exercises. It is also applicable when the goal of the activity is to emphasize training, and when demonstrating the existence of vulnerabilities in the targeted systems.

The Red Team methodology can be applied to environments ranging from narrowly focused, highly limited exercises, to large-scale, joint activities. The methodology is also flexible enough to handle Red Team attacks of various depths of penetration and associated complexities. Attacks of significant impact demonstrate clearly the potential harm a real attacker could inflict. In other environments, adverse impacts on the operations of the defender system may require that the depth of attack be severely limited.

Controlling the potential harm that may result from a Red Team activity is a major component of the methodology. This includes providing guidance to ensure that the appropriate legal approval is obtained prior to initiating attacks, clearly defining the rules of engagement for the Red, Blue, and White team members, and clearly delineating the circumstances for emergency containment and halting of the activity.

To maximize the lessons learned from Red Team activities, the results must be quantified and used as a basis of comparison. To help achieve this goal, the methodology provides guidance with regard to data gathering and metrics.

In short, the Red Team methodology provides guidance for maximizing the benefits of a Red Team activity, and at the same time provides guidance to help avoid some of the pitfalls and traps that can occur if precautions are not taken.

Attacks on the DOD and the national information Infrastructure have been growing for over a decade

1986—As described in Clifford Stoll’s 1990 book, The Cuckoo's Egg, German hackers broke 400 military network computers in 1986. These attacks included Army computers at Fort Stewart, Georgia; Navy Coastal Systems Computers at Panama City, Florida; and Air Force computers at the Systems Command Space Division in El Segundo, California.

1988—The Internet Worm virtually crippled the Internet, bringing down thousands of computers. Kevin Mitnick began a decade of cyber-terrorism by breaking into systems owned by DEC and MCI.

1990—Dutch hackers began a 3-year attack on DOD systems, resulting in the penetration of 34 systems.

1994—Hackers from Great Britain attacked systems of the Air Force Research Laboratory, Rome Research Site; Wright Patterson Air Force Base; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Goddard Space Flight Center. The attack against the Rome Research Site systems alone is estimated to have cost the government $500,000.

1994—Hackers from Great Britain, Finland, and Canada attacked 24 servers that supported the U.S. Naval Academy.

1995—A hacker from Argentina broke into computers of NASA, the Naval Research Laboratory, and Los Alamos National Laboratory.

1996—Hackers vandalized the Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Justice home pages.

1996—The General Accounting Office released its report, “Information Security: computer Attacks at Department of Defense Pose Increasing Risks.” The report stated that attacks on government computers were a serious and growing threat. The Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) estimated that 250,000 attacks were launched against DOD systems in 1995. DISA also estimated that external attacks were successful 65 percent of the time, and only 1 out of every 150 attacks was actually detected and reported by system operators.

1997—Both the Air Force and NASA home pages were vandalized, and there were unconfirmed reports that State Department computers were hacked.

1998—Teenage hackers broke into 11 Pentagon systems in what was called the “most organized and systematic attack” to date. The exercise, Eligible Receiver, found vulnerabilities in a large number of DOD systems.

Page last updated: October 15, 2000

[jesqueal]

Sane & anti-illumi, do you think the chinese really have an interest to hack into america...it's hard to imagine what else "red team" could be intended to confer and there's been plenty of fearmongering on that front?
Or is there no chinese threat and its fearmongering for the false flag anti-ill has previously described?

[Dig]

Sane & anti-illumi, do you think the chinese really have an interest to hack into america...it's hard to imagine what else "red team" could be intended to confer and there's been plenty of fearmongering on that front?
Or is there no chinese threat and its fearmongering for the false flag anti-ill has previously described?

chinese always have an interest in hacking.  china has always been a protectionist country (not an empire building company).  They lost over 20 million civilians in WWII and they are not going to let that happen again (unless the state does it).

but the laxed security allows companies like Ptech to say "hey look the chinese are hacking (duh, you left the door open for them) so we need to conduct red team wargames (like on 9/11)".

[heavyhebrew]

It is routine to grab a foreign server and conduct operations from there since it provides legal cover for hacking here.

And I noticed the big bot invasion just dropped off the map, news wise.

The best defense is to make your enemy think you are incompetent and have them underestimate you.

[lordssyndicate]

Indeed great post sane.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Historically China is referred to as red and "Drill Teams" playing the role of the red team are considered the enemy . This carriers over from the cold war...
Go google it ...
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

HeavyHebrew completely Agreed...

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
A quick search for "MITER cyberwarfare" at www.clusty.com turned up one of their primary think tanks. It's history page has quite an interesting bit of connect the dots information  - indeed.

http://www.noblis.org/CompanyHistory.htm
History

A proud past. A bright future.
 
On February 20, 2007, Mitretek Systems became Noblis. It’s the newest chapter in a uniquely American history that dates back more than 60 years.
 
Today, Noblis is a dynamic nonprofit science, technology and strategy organization with many locations across the U.S. Our new name speaks to the great calling we have always had to use the best of science and technology to serve the public’s interest. And the roots of this great mission go back to the 1940s.

From MIT to MITRE.

During World War II, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) became a leading center for radar, communications and navigation technology. Faced with the threat of nuclear arms build up in the post-war years, the government funded Project Lincoln at MIT in the early 1950s to reexamine these technologies and explore their use in defending our nation from nuclear attack. Project Lincoln quickly led to the establishment of Lincoln Laboratory whose purpose was to further develop the MIT technologies into an air defense system for the United States.

The prototype for what became known as the Semi-Automated Ground Environment system, or “SAGE”, included radar systems much improved over the WWII versions, digital communication over telephone lines and advanced computers that could sort and present critical information for use by decision makers.

With the prototype built, the government decided to develop and install a fully operational system. A portion of MIT's Lincoln Laboratory was spun off as The MITRE Corporation*, taking on the tasks of system engineering and oversight for this highly complex project.

Among the first to use defense technology for the public good.
	From the outset, MITRE had strong ties to the U.S. Department of Defense and deep roots in computational science and engineering. While SAGE was designed for the military purposes of tracking and destroying hostile aircraft, it didn’t take MITRE long to find an important civilian use for this advanced technology—and the nation’s first air traffic control system was born.

Eventually, MITRE decided to focus its efforts and resources on FFRDC support for DOD, FAA, and the IRS. 

In 1996, Mitretek Systems was formed as a completely independent nonprofit organization with a unique charter to apply science and technology in serving the public good.

After 11 years as Mitretek Systems, and today as Noblis, our clients include private sector companies and nonprofits, as well as federal, state and local government agencies. We are helping to solve some of our nation’s most complex and enduring systems, process and infrastructure problems in national and homeland security, transportation, healthcare, criminal justice, energy and the environment, public safety, oceans, atmosphere and space, and other fields.

/table]As our sphere of endeavor grows, our mission and values remain the same. We have a passion to work on behalf of the public good and to make lasting contributions—the kind that save lives, enhance economic well-being, make people safer and healthier, and our homeland more secure.

And we continue another important aspect of our founding mission—transferring the knowledge we gain to public use.

*MIT, The MITRE Corporation and Mitretek Systems are independent and unrelated organizations.

[lordssyndicate]

One last thing not to say that we will ever be compromised by the Chinese...

Merely the red team itself pulling a "Cyber  Terror" False flag AFTER they bring in  Internet2 so we can not defend our selves with alternative media sources.

They will then name those they feel are threats as per their wonderful DBs that have practically  everything you've ever done from birth already cataloged.... as collaborators and perpetrators... Essentially claiming we are terrorist cells...

Allowing them to then impliment their plans to take people off to camps....

[Anti_Illuminati]

One last thing not to say that we will ever be compromised by the Chinese...

Merely the red team itself pulling a "Cyber  Terror" False flag AFTER they bring in  Internet2 to shut us all up.

Keep in mind that the entire world has been subtly conditioned since BEFORE 9/11 with incessant fearmongering about global Internet hackers wreaking complete havoc.  As you can see by some of the older "cyber-terror" articles running through 2000 right on through 2001 to present--the constant "reminder" of fear of "deadly Al-Qaeda Internet attacks" has been rampaging for nearly a decade, and no "terror attack" has ever occured against the Internet.

So if and when it does occur, much of the public will just accept the fact that there are 14 year old hackers with 180 I.Q.'s running around breaking 256 bit AES encryption and shutting down nuclear power plants and power grids, hospitals, banks, et.al.-because many of them they have been conditioned and they don't even realize it.  You couple this with scumbag computer scientists at Mantech International/SAIC/MITRE reverse engineering compartmentalized psychos collaborating to release tens of thousands of computer viruses, worms, trojans for the past decade--and you've got a "healthy fear" of that "dirty Internet" ingrained into the minds of hundreds of millions, all ready to give up their rights.

[lordssyndicate]

Keep in mind that the entire world has been subtly conditioned since BEFORE 9/11 with incessant fearmongering about global Internet hackers wreaking complete havoc.  As you can see by some of the older "cyber-terror" articles running through 2000 right on through 2001 to present--the constant "reminder" of fear of deadly Al-Qaeda Internet attacks has been rampaging for bearly a decade, and no "terror attack" has ever occured against the Internet.

So if and when it does occur, much of the public will just accept the fact that there are 14 year old hackers with 180 I.Q.'s running around breaking 256 bit AES encryption and shutting down nuclear power plants and power grids, hospitals, banks, et.al.-because many of them they have been conditioned and they don't even realize it.

Quite right Anti Illuminati.

 The average sheeople able to believe that all of those 14 year olds  ".... untracebly  bought thousands  of play stations 3's at 700$ a pop  to  build super clusters to do it all ..... . All using stolen credit cards even ...Many of them hiding these clusters at schools claiming they were for lan parties with friends ..."  right ... indeed... All because MSM and the new News Demi gods of Inet2  will say so  and the average tap water drinking sheeople will believe  ... ....
 
Meanwhile  now ... the most the average joe knows about MITER is "... thAt's some CArpenter's tool rIght?"



:/ 

[lordssyndicate]

Why is a file share server index showing that google.com.brazil and even the Brazilian government are hosting trojans?
http://www.puxaki.com.br/procurar.php?inicio=120&proximo=61&tipobusca=contenha&palavras=bo2&categoria=qualquer&chave=48FADAF1&powered=0
IF YOU FOLLOW THE LINKS .....DO NOT DOWNLOAD ANY OF THESE -UNLESS YOU KNOW WTF YOU ARE DOING!  THESE ARE LIVE WORMS  , ROOTKITS, and TROJANS...

Found this while trying to do some "in depth" investigative research into the roots of the resurgence of ancient  botnets ....
The oddest thing about all of them is they are using ancient versions of trojans . Many of them so old most modern virus scanners may not catch them.
Things like the original SUB7, NETBUS, and Back Orifice are floating around in larger  masses than have been seen in a while  - on IRC, gnutella, and torrent networks....

Go grab a gnutella client of your choice (or hop on efnet or dalnet and pick a nice looking channel by title...) and search for something "media like" you'll find many ancient trojans - that were but up until a few months ago less common place, than many of the newer trojan and rootkit varients (which have all but disappeared.. even more striking....)

that said here is that site url and a screen shot from the windows vm i was using ...

for those who know/ care - files shown in dl bar are being used to develop metasploit scanner script...
http://www.puxaki.com.br/procurar.php?inicio=120&proximo=61&tipobusca=contenha&palavras=bo2&categoria=qualquer&chave=48FADAF1&powered=0

IF YOU FOLLOW THE LINKS .....DO NOT DOWNLOAD ANY OF THESE -UNLESS YOU KNOW WTF YOU ARE DOING!  THESE ARE LIVE WORMS  , ROOTKITS, and TROJANS...

[Dig]

Why is a file share server index showing that google.com.brazil and even the Brazilian government are hosting trojans?
http://www.puxaki.com.br/procurar.php?inicio=120&proximo=61&tipobusca=contenha&palavras=bo2&categoria=qualquer&chave=48FADAF1&powered=0
IF YOU FOLLOW THE LINKS .....DO NOT DOWNLOAD ANY OF THESE -UNLESS YOU KNOW WTF YOU ARE DOING!  THESE ARE LIVE WORMS  , ROOTKITS, and TROJANS...

Found this while trying to do some "in depth" investigative research into the roots of the resurgence of ancient  botnets ....
The oddest thing about all of them is they are using ancient versions of trojans . Many of them so old most modern virus scanners may not catch them.
Things like the original SUB7, NETBUS, and Back Orifice are floating around in larger  masses than have been seen in a while  - on IRC, gnutella, and torrent networks....

Go grab a gnutella client of your choice (or hop on efnet or dalnet and pick a nice looking channel by title...) and search for something "media like" you'll find many ancient trojans - that were but up until a few months ago less common place, than many of the newer trojan and rootkit varients (which have all but disappeared.. even more striking....)

that said here is that site url and a screen shot from the windows vm i was using ...

for those who know/ care - files shown in dl bar are being used to develop metasploit scanner script...
http://www.puxaki.com.br/procurar.php?inicio=120&proximo=61&tipobusca=contenha&palavras=bo2&categoria=qualquer&chave=48FADAF1&powered=0

IF YOU FOLLOW THE LINKS .....DO NOT DOWNLOAD ANY OF THESE -UNLESS YOU KNOW WTF YOU ARE DOING!  THESE ARE LIVE WORMS  , ROOTKITS, and TROJANS...

holy shit, WTF is wrong with these people.

Hey Rockefeller!!!! Your "Boys from Brazil" are expediting your false flag! Tell them to cut the shit, everybody knows what you are doing.

[lordssyndicate]

Yeah my thoughts as well -Sane..

Also, as HeavyHebrew mentioned this resurgence isn't even being covered by any of the normal security journals or websites such as slashdot etc....

Which is even more  affirming that all of these bots are going to be part of Jay Rockefeller's false flag.

Could they be more obvious?  The top link is a nameless shadow rootkit hosted by Google and the next 2 top links are hosted by the Brazillian Government even... nuff said ...

[EvadingGrid]

BBC is joining in with pure FUD

Major cyber spy network uncovered

Please read the 'article', and then tell me if the idiots had not been using "I sponsor eugenics / rape me " software that this would have happend ?


(FUD == Fear Uncertainty and Doubt ) IBM marketing tactic adopted by the IT Industry.

[akston]

BBC is joining in with pure FUD

Major cyber spy network uncovered

Please read the 'article', and then tell me if the idiots had not been using "I sponsor eugenics / rape me " software that this would have happend ?


(FUD == Fear Uncertainty and Doubt ) IBM marketing tactic adopted by the IT Industry.

You refer, I gather, to Windows?

The question of false flag or organic hacker activity aside, (one of the four servers was on US soil, the other three found in China), this is already spurring calls for an international cybersecurity regime...
One of the first things out of SecDev's office on this issue was the following

Rohozinski, of SecDev, echoed this sentiment: "We are a country of cyberspace," he said. "We are spread across one of the largest territories in the world. What keeps us together is telecommunications." Rohozinski sees his and Villeneuve and Walton's achievement as evidence that Canada is poised to take a leadership role in the formulation of a body of rules of engagement for the Internet, along the lines of those that already exist for "airspace, sea lanes, [and] road travel." He even went so far as to call for "an international legal regime governing cyberspace."

http://torontoist.com/2009/03/toronto_versus_the_international_cy.php

The Citizen Lab site, out of the Munk Centre (globalist thinktank, btw)
http://www.citizenlab.org/

The video of the press conference, hosted out of the Munk Centre...
http://hosting.epresence.tv/MUNK/1/watch/104.aspx?

SecDev's site
http://www.secdev.ca/Secdev-temp/index.htm.html

SecDev does consulting work for NATO, and is hooked up with the Information Warfare Monitor, which regularly calls for enhanced cyber security
North America needs to protect itself from cyber-warfare
http://www.infowar-monitor.net/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=2046

[lordssyndicate]

So, to add to this.

Why is it that all major bot related crap always seems to trace back to this one individual and her  groups of socially  engineered  provocateur script kiddies?


Her name is Kelly Hallisey, and her primary lacky goes by the aliases of GreenDragon and GreenDragonTavern.

Having dealt with these individuals several times over the past 15 years and always being able to attach them to some major crime and frame up every time  has always been even more suspicious.

The most interesting thing is that while she and her lacky GreenDragon are always the primary party responsible for encouraging individuals and groups to commit cyber crime and many times telling these people exactly what to do and who to attack. Yet, niether Keyll Hallisey  (known as Bratty on efnet) nor her lackey GreenDragon have ever been charged with any crimes. They have been arrested many times but never indicted...
 Oddd no? every time a major ddos attack or major international botnet ring is uncovered these 2 people seem to be involved directly and there is always more than ebnough proof to convict them. Yet, they never go to jail merely the people these 2 shills frame(All of these frame ups being extremely obvious even) .  So, why are these 2 COINTEL Pro shills constantly being protected?

But let's start by looking at just a few examples of their work that have made it into major news papers:

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/05/19/AR2005051900711.html

Paris Hilton Hack Started With Old-Fashioned Con
Source Says Hacker Posed as T-Mobile Employee to Get Access to Information

By Brian Krebs
washingtonpost.com Staff Writer
Thursday, May 19, 2005; 3:24 PM

The caper had all the necessary ingredients to spark a media firestorm -- a beautiful socialite-turned-reality TV star, embarrassing photographs and messages, and the personal contact information of several young music and Hollywood celebrities.

When hotel heiress Paris Hilton found out in February that her high-tech wireless phone had been taken over by hackers, many assumed that only a technical mastermind could have pulled off such a feat. But as it turns out, a hacker involved in the privacy breach said, the Hilton saga began on a decidedly low-tech note -- with a simple phone call.
   
Computer security flaws played a role in the attack, which exploited a programming glitch in the Web site of Hilton's cell phone provider, Bellevue, Wash.-based T-Mobile International. But one young hacker who claimed to have been involved in the data theft said the crime only succeeded after one member of a small group of hackers tricked a T-Mobile employee into divulging information that only employees are supposed to know.

The young hacker described the exploit during online text conversations with a washingtonpost.com reporter and provided other evidence supporting his account, including screen shots of what he said were internal T-Mobile computer network pages. Washingtonpost.com is not revealing the hacker's identity because he is a juvenile crime suspect and because he communicated with the reporter on the condition that he not be identified either directly or through his online alias.

A senior law enforcement official involved in the case said investigators believe the young hacker's group carried out the Paris Hilton data theft and was also involved in illegally downloading thousands of personal records from database giant LexisNexis Inc. The source asked not to be identified because of his role in this and other ongoing investigations.

A third source, a woman who has communicated with the hacker group's members for several years, also confirmed key portions of the young hacker's story and said she saw images and other information downloaded from Hilton's T-Mobile account hours before they were released on several Web sites.

T-Mobile declined to comment on the details of the hacker's account of the Paris Hilton incident, saying through a spokesman that the company cannot discuss an ongoing investigation. The spokesman said the company "will work with federal law enforcement agencies to investigate and prosecute anyone that attempts to gain unauthorized access to T-Mobile systems."

Getting Access

In the months leading up to the Hilton incident, the hacker group freely exploited a security glitch in the Web site of wireless phone giant T-Mobile, according to the hacker, who described himself as the youngest member of the group. The group had found that a tool on the T-Mobile site that allowed users to reset their account passwords contained a key programming flaw.

By exploiting the flaw, the group's members were able to gain access to the account of any T-Mobile subscriber who used a "Sidekick," a pricey phone-organizer-camera combination device that stores videos, photos and other data on T-Mobile's central computer servers.

The hackers could only exploit the Web site vulnerability if they actually knew a Sidekick user's phone number. The loose-knit group had grown bored of using the flaw to toy with friends and acquaintances who owned Sidekicks and decided to find a high-profile target, one that would ensure their exploits were reported in the press, the young hacker said. They ultimately settled on Hilton, in part because they knew she owned a Sidekick; Hilton had previously starred in a commercial advertising the device.

The group's members --- who range in age from their mid-teens to early 20s -- include a handful of "AOLers," a term used in hacker circles to describe youths who honed their skills over the years by tampering with various portions of the network run by Dulles, Va.-based America Online Inc. Four members of the group have all met face-to-face, but as with most hacking groups, the majority of their day-to-day interactions took place online.

Before gaining access to Hilton's wireless phone account, the group had spent a year studying weaknesses in T-Mobile's Web sites. The group member interviewed for this story had already written a simple computer program that could reset the password for any T-Mobile user whose phone number the hackers knew.

According to the young hacker's account, the Hilton caper started the afternoon of Feb. 19, when a group member rang a T-Mobile sales store in a Southern California coastal town posing as a supervisor from T-Mobile inquiring about reports of slowness on the company's internal networks.

The conversation -- which represents the recollection of the hacker interviewed by washingtonpost.com -- began with the 16-year-old caller saying, "This is [an invented name] from T-Mobile headquarters in Washington. We heard you've been having problems with your customer account tools?"
The sales representative answered, "No, we haven't had any problems really, just a couple slowdowns. That's about it."

Prepared for this response, the hacker pressed on: "Yes, that's what is described here in the report. We're going to have to look into this for a quick second."

The sales rep acquiesced: "All right, what do you need?"

When prompted, the employee then offered the Internet address of the Web site used to manage T-Mobile's customer accounts -- a password-protected site not normally accessible to the general public -- as well as a user name and password that employees at the store used to log on to the system.

To support his story, the hacker provided washingtonpost.com with an image of a page he said was from the protected site. T-Mobile declined to comment on the screenshot, and washingtonpost.com has no way to verify its authenticity.

Inside the Walls

The hackers accessed the internal T-Mobile site shortly thereafter and began looking up famous names and their phone numbers. At one point, the youth said, the group harassed Laurence Fishburne, the actor perhaps best known for his role in the "Matrix" movies as Morpheus, captain of the futuristic ship Nebuchadnezzar.

"We called him up a few times and said, 'GIVE US THE SHIP!'" the youth typed in one of his online chats with a reporter. "He picked up a couple times and kept saying stuff like YOUR ILLEGALLY CALLING ME."

Later, using their own Sidekick phone, the hackers pulled up the secure T-Mobile customer records site, looked up Hilton's phone number and reset the password for her account, locking her out of it. Typical wireless devices can only be hacked into by someone physically nearby, but a Sidekick's data storage can be accessed from anywhere in T-Mobile's service area by someone with control of the account. That means the hackers were at that point able to download all of her stored video, text and data files to their phone.

"As soon as I went into her camera and saw nudes my head went JACKPOT," the young hacker recalled of his reaction to first seeing the now-public photos of a topless Hilton locked in an intimate embrace with a female friend. "I was like, HOLY [expletive] DUDE ... SHES GOT NUDES. THIS [expletive]'s GONNA HIT THE PRESS SO [expletive] QUICK."

The hackers set up a conference call and agreed to spread the news to several friends, all the while plotting ways to get the photos up on various Web sites. Kelly Hallissey, a 41-year-old New York native who has been in contact with the group of hackers for several years, said the group's members showed her evidence that they had gained access to Hilton's phone during these early hours -- before the images made their way online.

By early Feb. 20, the pictures, private notes and contact listings from Hilton's phone account -- including phone numbers of celebrities such as Cristina Aguilera, Eminem, Anna Kournikova and Vin Diesel -- had appeared on GenMay.com (short for General Mayhem), an eclectic, no-holds-barred online discussion forum.

Within hours of the GenMay posting, Hilton's information was published on Illmob.org, a Web site run by 27-year-old William Genovese of Meriden, Conn., known online as "illwill." (The FBI charged Genovese in November with selling bits of stolen source code for Microsoft Windows 2000 and Windows NT operating systems.) By Monday morning, dozens of news sites and personal Web logs had picked up the story, with many linking to the illmob.org post or mirroring the purloined data on their own.

Hallissey, who describes herself as a kind of "den mom" to a cadre of budding hackers, confirmed that the teenage source has been engaged in various hacking activities for several years. Hallissey met a slew of the hacker group's members after a three-year stint during the 1990s as one of thousands of people who helped AOL maintain its online content in exchange for free Internet access and various other perks. Hallissey has since joined a still-active wage lawsuit against AOL and maintains www.observers.net, a Web site critical of the Dulles-based company.

Hallissey said her sense of privacy has been erased gradually over the past two years as a result of her association with a number of AOLers who playfully bragged to her about their success with social engineering. They showed her online screen shots of her water, gas and electric bills, her Social Security number, credit card balances and credit ratings, pictures of her e-mail inbox, as well as all of her previous addresses, including those of her children.

"This was all done not by skilled 'hackers' but by kids who managed to 'social' their way into a company's system and gain access to it within one or two phone calls," said Hallissey, who asked that her current place of residence not be disclosed. "Major corporations have made social engineering way too easy for these kids. In their call centers they hire low-pay employees to man the phones, give them a minimum of training, most of which usually dwells on call times, canned scripts and sales. This isn't unique to T-Mobile or AOL. This has become common practice for almost every company."

AOL officials declined to comment about the young hacker or other "AOLers" for this story.

The Weakest Link

Security experts say the raiding of Hilton's wireless account highlights one of the most serious security challenges facing corporations -- teaching employees to be watchful for "social engineering," the use of deception to trick people into giving away sensitive data, usually over the phone.

In his book "The Art of Deception," notorious ex-hacker Kevin Mitnick says major corporations spend millions of dollars each year on new technologies to keep out hackers and viruses, yet few dedicate significant resources to educating employees about the dangers of old-fashioned con artistry.

"The average $10-an-hour sales clerk or call-center employee will tell you anything you want, including passwords," Mitnick said in a telephone interview. "These people are usually not well-trained, but they also interact with people to sell products and services, so they tend to be more customer-friendly and cooperative."

During his highly publicized hacking career in the 1990s, Mitnick -- who spent four years in prison and now works as a computer security consultant -- broke into the computer networks of some of the top companies in the technology and telecommunications industries, but rarely targeted computers systems directly.

Rather, he phoned employees and simply asked them for user names, passwords or other "insider" data that he could use to sound more authentic in future phone inquiries. "This kind of thing works with just about every mobile carrier," Mitnick said.

He said all of the major wireless carriers -- not just T-Mobile -- are popular targets for social engineering attacks. Mitnick said he knows private investigators who routinely obtain phone records of people they are investigating by calling a sales office at the target's wireless carrier and pretending to be an employee from another sales office.

Mitnick described how an investigator will claim to have the customer they're investigating in the store, but can't access their data because of computer trouble. Then the investigator asks the sales representative at the other store to look up that person's password, account number and Social Security number. In many cases the employee provides the information without verifying the caller's identity. Armed with that data, he said, investigators usually can create an account at the wireless provider's Web site and pull all of the target's phone records.

Large organizations that maintain numerous branches around the country are especially susceptible to social engineering attacks, said Peter Stewart, president of Baton Rouge, La.-based Trace Security, a company that is hired to test the physical and network security for some of the most paranoid companies in the world: banks.

More often than not, Stewart says, his people can talk their way into employee-only areas of banks by pretending to be a repairman or just another employee. In most cases, the break-in attempts are aided by information gleaned over the phone.

"Usually your corporate headquarters are more stringent and things get more lax the further away from there you get," Stewart said. "The larger you are as a company the more likely it is that you're not going to know everyone by name, and lots of companies have no policy in place of verifying who's calling you and how to respond to that person."

'Web Security 101'

Social engineering can be difficult to counter, but the now-infamous Paris Hilton attack follows other recent serious T-Mobile security breaches engineered by hackers.

On Feb. 15, Nicolas Jacobsen, 22, of Santa Ana, Calif., pleaded guilty to compromising a T-Mobile Web server that granted access to hundreds of wireless accounts. He faces a maximum of five years in jail and a $250,000 fine at a sentencing hearing originally scheduled for mid-May.

Jacobsen was arrested last fall by the U.S. Secret Service as part of a large-scale investigation into an international online credit card fraud ring. According to court records, Jacobsen had hijacked hundreds of T-Mobile accounts, including a mobile phone belonging to a then-active Secret Service agent. Jacobsen had posted to an online bulletin board that he could be hired to look up the name, Social Security number, birth date, and voice-mail and e-mail passwords of any T-Mobile subscriber.

T-Mobile later alerted 400 customers that their e-mails, phone records and other data had been compromised as a result of that break-in.

The court files don't give details about how it happened, but Jack Koziol, a senior instructor for the Oak Park, Ill.-based InfoSec Institute, said the intruder likely took advantage of security flaws in the company's Web servers. Koziol conducted an informal audit of T-Mobile's site in March and uncovered hundreds of pages run by Web servers vulnerable to well-known security flaws, he said.

"It's pretty amazing how poorly secured their Web properties are," said Koziol, whose company offers training to corporate, law enforcement and government clients on the latest techniques and tactics used by hackers. "Most of these flaws are simple Web Security 101, stuff you'd learn about in the first few chapters of a basic book on how to secure Web applications."

T-Mobile officials declined to say what steps they took to close the security holes identified by the Hilton hackers or how many other accounts may have been hijacked.

"T-Mobile has invested millions of dollars to protect our customers' information, and we continue to reinforce our systems to address the security needs of our subscribers," company spokesman Peter Dobrow wrote in an e-mail. "For our customers' protection, we do not publicly disclose the specific actions taken to reinforce our systems."



~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Next we have this incident  where she intentionally attempts to frame two people in the truth movement (one of her typical MO's) :

http://news.zdnet.co.uk/internet/0,1000000097,2110331,00.htm
'Deceptive Duo' suspects hit in FBI raid'

Published: 16 May 2002 09:11 BST[/b]

The FBI has issued search warrants against two former online vandals it believes to be the members of a "patriot" hacking group called the Deceptive Duo.

As first reported by CNET News.com, agents raided the homes of two teenagers earlier this week. The FBI on Sunday seized equipment in Florida from The-Rev, a former member of the hacking group Sm0ked Crew, according to a friend of the Deceptive Duo hackers.

Separately, the Contra Costa county district attorney's office confirmed that agents acting on a warrant issued in the Deceptive Duo case confiscated computer equipment from Robert Lyttle, the previously convicted pro-Napster defacer, in California on Monday.

The California raid prompted a Wednesday juvenile parole hearing for Lyttle, who is now 18. Lyttle has been confined to his home as a result of the criminal hearing.

"He has been placed on a higher level of supervision," said a source familiar with the proceedings, who asked not to be identified. "He has to wear an ankle bracelet, which tells them where he is. If he walks away from the house, it sends a signal to the probation department."

The Deceptive Duo has defaced dozens of US government and military sites with pro-American messages lambasting the poor security of the nation's critical systems. The hacked sites have included those of the Defense Department and the Sandia National Laboratories, which is associated with the US Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration.

No charges have yet been filed against either suspect, said Chris Murray, a spokesman for the FBI's Washington Metropolitan Bureau. However, the search warrants and affidavit used in the case have been sealed and are not available for public viewing, he said. Because the Deceptive Duo hit government and military sites, the case is being administered from the Washington DC Metropolitan office of the FBI.

An FBI representative in San Francisco confirmed that the bureau had issued a search warrant on Monday. A spokesperson for the FBI office in Miami Beach, Florida, could not be reached.

Dodie Katague, deputy district attorney for California's Contra Costa county, confirmed that Lyttle had appeared in a probation hearing Wednesday to discuss how his probation status would be affected by the new charges.

"Now that he is an adult -- he is 18 -- we are letting the Feds handle it," said Katague. "And he is going to be in a lot more trouble than before." Lyttle was convicted of defacing dozens, and perhaps hundreds, of Web sites with a pro-Napster message. He is on probation.

Kelly Hallissey, a Las Vegas resident who bills herself as an "online mom" to several hackers including the two suspects, said she argued with The-Rev and Pimpshiz -- Lyttle's online monicker -- to stop defacing, but they wouldn't.

"They knew that they were going to get caught," she said. Hallissey worried that the teenagers would be made an example under new laws passed as part of the USA Patriot Act and maintains that they truly thought they were helping the security cause.

"This is their part in helping after 9-11 (11 September)," Hallissey said. "A lot of kids they knew went into the service after 9-11. Their skills lie in hacking, however. It sounds corny, but they mean it and they believe it."

The Deceptive Duo's defacements mimicked a secret agent file. In the first hack in late April, the Duo wrote: "We are two US Citizens that understand how sad our country's cybersecurity really is. The Deceptive Duo's continuous mission is to define the weaknesses that lie upon us. Our lives revolve around the use of electronic communication, we must protect our formation of controlling technology one way or another."

Many security experts have been critical of the tactics employed by the duo in the name of helping computer security.

"There are probably better ways to tell people that their security sucks," said Dragos Ruiu, an independent security consultant. "In one way, it's an excuse to play around, because they probably would have done it anyway."

Yet in a previous email interview with CNET News.com, the Deceptive Duo said they believed they had already helped the cause of US security.

"There is quite an improvement in security," they wrote. "Because the systems we were once able to breach are no longer susceptible to attack... Not only are our targets more secure, but we strongly believe that witnesses to this entire ordeal will see that everything is a bit more realistic. This will force them to act on their own system security if so inclined."

Lyttle's attorney, San Francisco-based Omar Figaeroa, believed that the 18-year-old hacker will be released in the end.

"When all the facts are in, Robert will be exonerated, because he had no criminal intent," he said. "He was acting in good faith."



~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

I know - two incidents do not necessarily a COINTEL Pro Shell make.
Let's continue shall we ?

Her link to this story does not become immediately apparent  till you read her  comments she posted giving herpersonal 1st hand account  of the story....

http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9411
FBI busts alleged DDoS Mafia
Kevin Poulsen, SecurityFocus 2004-08-26
[/b]
A Massachusetts businessman allegedly paid members of the computer underground to launch organized, crippling distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks against three of his competitors, in what federal officials are calling the first criminal case to arise from a DDoS-for-hire scheme

“ There are DDoS attacks all the time organized on IRC, but this is certainly the first case where you have a corporate executive who was using the services of another person to launch attacks against competitors. ”

Prosecutor Arif Alikhan

Jay Echouafni, 37, is a fugitive from a five-count federal indictment in Los Angeles charging him with aiding and abetting computer intrusion and with conspiracy. As CEO of the online satellite TV retailer Orbit Communication Corp., Echouafni allegedly paid a business associate to recruit members of the computer underground to cripple three online stores, resulting in long periods of downtime and an estimated $2 million in losses to the businesses and their service providers.

Paul Ashley, 30, of Powell, Ohio, is named in a separate criminal complaint as Echouafni's go-between in arranging two of the attacks. Ashley was the network administrator of the Web and IRC hosting company CIT/FooNet, run from his home, which was shuttered sometime after being raided by the FBI last February. Three other Americans and one U.K. citizen are charged with actually carrying out the attacks.

"This is an example of a growing trend: that is, denial of service attacks being used for either extortionate reasons, or to disable or impair the competition," says FBI supervisory special agent Frank Harrill. "It's a growing problem and one that we take very seriously, and one that we think has a very destructive impact and potential."

According to an FBI affidavit filed in the case, Echouafni was a client of CIT/FooNet's hosting services when he made a deal with Ashley, then the owner, in October of last year. Echouafni allegedly paid Ashley $1,000 to snuff out two competing websites that he claimed had stolen some of his content and were staging DDoS attacks against his company.

Ashley in turn used his connections in the underground, and in at least one case the promise of free CIT/FooNet server, to recruit three associates to do the dirty work: Joshua Schichtel, Jonathan Hall, and Lee Walker, known online as "Emp," "Rain," and "sorCe" respectively. Each of the three apparently had sizable "botnets" at their disposal, meaning they could each command thousands of compromised PCs to simultaneously attack a single host -- Walker alone had control of between 5,000 and 10,000 computers through a customized version of the Agobot worm, according to the FBI affidavit. Schichtel's network of 3,000 zombies was more modest, and he quietly subcontracted the job to Richard "Krashed" Roby, who allegedly took the assignment in exchange for a free shell account.

The attacks began on October 6th, with SYN floods slamming into the Los Angeles-based e-commerce site WeaKnees.com, crippling the site, which sells digital video recorders, for 12 hours straight, according to the FBI. The company's hosting provider, Lexiconn, responded by dropping WeaKnees.com as a client, sending the company to more expensive hosting at RackSpace.com.

RackSpace fought back, but the attackers proved determined and adaptive. In mid-October the simple SYN flood attacks were replaced with an HTTP flood, pulling large image files from WeaKnees.com in overwhelming numbers. At its peak the onslaught allegedly kept the company offline for a full two weeks. (The company declined to comment on the case).

RapidSatellite.com, which sells satellite TV receivers, was hit at the same time and with similar results. The company responded by quickly moving their electronic storefront to the distributed content delivery services of Speedera, only to be crippled three days later by an attack on that provider's DNS servers, which for an hour also blocked access to other Speedera-hosted sites, including Amazon.com and the Department of Homeland Security, according to the FBI affidavit. RapidSatellite then moved to Akamai, but were out again within a week when the attackers switched to an HTTP flood attack, running massive numbers of queries through RapidSatellite.com's search engine.

Behind the scenes Ashley was allegedly micromanaging the assault. A chat log recovered from Schichtel's hard drive shows Ashley admonishing his subordinate to stay on top of his portion of the attack: "u gotta keep ane [sic] eye on it...cuz they could null route the ip and change the dns...and it would be back up." When Schichtel asks, "what did they do to you?," Ashley replies with an answer fit for Tony Soprano. "[F]---ing with us...well, a customer."

"Operation Cyberslam"
In December, the alleged DDoS conspirators' informal relationship became more corporate, when Echouafni purchased CIT/FooNet from Ashley, and kept Ashley on as network administrator at $120,000 a year salary. Ashley, in turn, formally hired Hall to perform "security" for the company -- which the FBI suggests was a euphemism for launching more DDoS attacks against Echouafni's enemies.

In Feburary, Echouafni -- now the boss -- phoned Hall directly to order an attack on a new target, according to the government: another satellite T.V. retailer called Expert Satellite. Hall dutifully launched a SYN flood against the new victim, but the results didn't please his CEO; Echouafni contacted Hall repeatedly to inform him that the site had resurfaced, and to express his disappointment. "Echouafni also implied that [Hall] would be fired if he did not launch the attacks," reads the affidavit

By then, law enforcement was making progress on the investigation they code named "Operation Cyberslam."

FBI cyber crime agents had spotted what appeared to be reconnaissance for the HTTP flood attacks in WeaKnees.com's October log files, originating from a shell hosting company called Unixcon. Unixcon traced the activity to an account that had been established with a stolen credit card number, but an FBI source, whose identity is protected in the affidavit, fingered U.K. resident and Unixcon administrator Lee "sorCe" Walker as the culprit.

Walker was already known to the FBI from an investigation earlier in the year, when one of Walker's IRC enemies complained that Walker had DDoSed him. The Bureau even had Walker's home address. An FBI agent traveled to the U.K. in February to accompany London police as they raided Walker, who admitted to the WeaKnees.com and RapidSatellite.com attacks, and fingered Ashley as his handler, according to the affidavit.

The Bureau raided Ashley's home on Valentine's day. Before they hauled away CIT/FooNet's servers -- an act that would briefly cause controversy in the hosting community -- Ashley allegedly admitted to the attacks, and named all three of his cyber button men and Echouafni. Echouafni was arrested in Massachusetts, and released on $750,000 bail secured by his house. "We've alleged in the indictment that Echouafni was the manager, organizer and leader of the group," says assistant U.S. attorney Arif Alikhan, head of the Los Angeles computer crimes section, who's prosecuting the case.

He's also missing. According to court records, last month Echouafni's attorney won a motion to permit Echouafni's wife and children to "travel freely within and outside of the United States of America," and to have their passports returned. That was Echouafni's last action in court: the government says he's disappeared, and officials believe he's likely in Morocco. "He's a native of Morocco, and he was arrested in March as he returned from Morocco into the U.S.," says the FBI's Harrill. Echouafni's attorney did not return a phone call.

The Echouafni investigation was one of a handful of cases specifically cited Thursday by U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft in announcing what the Justice Department called "Operation Web Snare" -- a tallying of over 150 recent and ongoing federal criminal cases relating to computers or identity theft. Ashcroft said the case illustrates "the increased use of the Internet to damage rival businesses and communicate threats for commercial advantage."

"I think it's the first case of its kind involving a DDoS for commercial advantage or for hire," says Alikhan. "There are DDoS attacks all the time organized on IRC, but this is certainly the first case where you have a corporate executive who was using the services of another person to launch attacks against competitors."


Let's add to this, posts to a forum linking to trojan bots using  the name of her "Hacker Collective" Demonic Minds and two of her efnet aliases...

~~~~~~~~~~~~  Now What  Kalley Hallissey had to say about the incedent in her own words:~~~~~~~~~

http://www.securityfocus.com/comments/articles/9411/28231/threaded#28231

FBI busts alleged DDoS Mafia 2004-08-30
Kelly Hallissey
Well, I guess my attitude in reading this is a little different than most peoples. I'm sure if any of you knew these people as more than just a screen name or handle you would too.

Based on knowing some of these individuals for up to 9 years, having watched them grow up online, the births of their children, their companies struggle against the attacks of others I am compelled to say that this article appears to be primarily sensationalist journalism.

Jon and Joshua never accepted nor were offered a dime for any dDos attacks yet in your article it implies they were. Yes they worked for CIT but not as hired henchmen. Paul was not a "ringleader". He didn't "orchestrate" or engineer anything. If he did anything then it was at the order of his boss.

I guess the aspect or rather the lack of a view on how hard it is to survive on the inet as a shell provider or colo host with the lack of assistance from the various federal agencies to handle the millions of packets thrown at you daily amazes me. Especially from you Kevin, you have lived on the 'net for much longer than I. Yet the only view I see in this article is one of sensationalism, or rather, one that appears to have come directly from a federal agency.

I found the inclusion of logs that were supposedly under lock and key with the feds (and some under a signed agreement between various parties and the fbi not be divulged) rather interesting.

But not as interesting as the cause of those whole attacks.

The same companies that those who were cited in the article as being attacked?

Were the same ones who were said to be responsible for the dDos attacks at Foonet. And funny enough, when someone dDossed them? The dDos at Jay/Foonet/CIT stopped. What a coincidence!

To those who are ignorant about surviving on the 'net as an irc host? Its a dog eat dog world there, you either get hit or be hit. You can't stay clean because nobody can or will help you to do so.

My apologies Kevin, I am very disappointed in you here. It amazes me you backed someone like Adrian Lamo, yet ripped apart one of the best hosts I've ever met. And please....don't pull my post like you have the others. If you are going to post a bunch of nonsense at least allow those of us with REAL knowledge and truth respond to your media hype.

Sincerely yours,

Kelly Hallissey

www.observers.net

PS WHY is it that the press was told these people were indicted before they were? None of the ones I have spoken to had been served yet......Some internet mafia they are if the press knew the charges before they did.


~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


I know that  last  bit makes her almost look like a good guy.

Till you read this and find she has direct connections to MITER: (they don't just randomly select people for these  studies least of all something so sensitive as this ... and Kelly is quite will known on Efnet for being the "queen" of DDOS attacks and zombie botnets...)

http://teamcore.usc.edu/AP-Elves.mhtnew window

ALREADY ROAMING WEB, BOTS ARE HEADING INTO A NEW DOMAIN

Some believe the cyberspace agents will handle personal tasks for Internet users in addition to gathering data.

By Anick Jesdanun
ASSOCIATED PRESS
February 15, 2001

Every day at lunchtime, Friday asks Milind Tambe what he craves. A roasted chicken breast sandwich? A tandoori chicken pizza? Answer in hand, Friday dutifully orders the item for pickup or delivery.

Friday also keeps track of the University of Southern California professor's whereabouts, schedules his meetings, and warns colleagues if Tambe is running late.

Friday is no ordinary personal secretary, though. Friday isn't human at all.

It's a software robot, or "bot," alive entirely in cyberspace.

One day, some researchers believe, all Internet users will have personal bots to take care of daily tasks, including communicating with other people through their bots. Instead of phone tag, we could all be playing bot tag.

Simpler bots are already roaming the Internet, helping users find Web pages, compare prices, even monitor gossip.

"Things are getting more complicated, so we needed these assistants," Tambe said. "And since we have them, we can afford to let things get more complex."

But bots can be troublesome as well, and some have already caused problems.

"A robot could destroy data, violate copyright or strain resources on another site," said Ben Shneiderman, director of the Human-Computer Interaction Laboratory at the University of Maryland. "Who's responsible for failures?"

One particular bot visits the lab's Web site every 15 minutes and downloads the same software - for no apparent reason, he said.

Software robots date back to the 1950s and '60s, but they didn't begin to appear en masse until the '90s. Today's bots are smarter, more autonomous and more adaptive to their environment.

Early bots crawled the Net for information. One widely used bot named Archie looked for software available through the Net's file-transfer protocol. The World Wide Web Wanderer and its successors scoured the Web for sites to list on search engines.

These days, shopping bots gather prices on books, compact discs and other items at hundreds of e-commerce sites, allowing would-be shoppers to get price and availability information from a single site.

Of course, some bots simply annoy. Spam bots collect e-mail addresses from online newsgroups for marketing pitches. Some chatter bots do little but visit chat rooms, poorly pretending to be humans.

But others can be enjoyable. A bot named Digital frequents a chat room at Observers.net to give the latest weather and explain technical terms. Participant Kelly Hallissey observes: "What a hoot it was."

Like them or not, bots have become essential in many respects. Imagine surfing for information without access to search engines. Though a few directories, such as Yahoo's, are compiled by humans, those only track a sliver of what a bot can gather.

Bots scan Web pages for links to discover even more pages. They look for links until they reach a dead end, at which point they hit the equivalent of a "back" button to find yet another path to follow. At each stop, the bots gather relevant data for indexing.

"Try to imagine any subject, however bizarre, and they will come up with something," said Alan Emtage, who developed the search bot for Archie. "It's practically impossible to navigate your way without these resources."

Instead of simply creating indexes, future bots may automatically deliver Web pages to you based on your personal preferences, said Larry Page, chief executive for search engine Google, whose bots now visit 2,000 Web pages per second.

Future bots also promise to automatically order items for you, instead of simply bringing back prices. They may buy groceries based on your eating habits or automatically arrange flights and hotel rooms based on your appointment calendar.

Bots have already been developed for corporate information-gathering and espionage. They can quietly scan newsgroup postings and other online resources for mentions of you, your company or your competitors.

On Jan. 31, a Swiss company called Agence Virtuelle announced RumorBot, a tool that promises to "track customers' views and rectify any grievances before serious damage."

Such bots may raise privacy issues, but the company said RumorBot would only check public forums that any human could already visit. Stephane Perino, the company's founder and chief executive, said the Internet is too large for humans to efficiently monitor, yet rumors in one corner of cyberspace could potentially affect stock prices or do other damage.

But bots will need to become more reliable before most humans will give them more control.

Danny Sullivan, editor of SearchEngineWatch.com, says that while bots are crucial for searching, they are inherently dumb because they are software and can't think for themselves.

Web crawlers have been caught in endless loops - "spider traps" - when Web pages link back to each other.

When the Sony PlayStation 2 went on sale late last year, BlueLight.com and other shopping sites faced an onslaught of bots checking for availability.

BlueLight spokesman Dave Karraker said the site slowed by 50 percent until engineers figured out how to block the offending bots.

EBay Inc. and Register.com Inc. have filed lawsuits to stop software robots, claiming trespassing, and federal judges have issued preliminary injunctions against bots created by Bidder's Edge Inc. and Verio Inc.

"If there were no rules against this, [you could have] tons and tons of individuals on the Internet having tons and tons of bots running, hitting any site," said Robert Gardos, Register.com's chief technology officer.

If enough bots did this at once, he said, sites would crash.

Bots could also compound problems by acting more quickly and in unison based on uniform programming rules, said Michael Kearns, head of artificial intelligence research at AT&T Labs.

For example, the stock market is already prone to fluctuation as investors buy and sell in droves based on the news of the moment. But it takes at least a few minutes for humans to execute decisions, and reason may prevail in some instances.

If robots take over trading, Kearns said, those checks and balances could disappear.

Tambe, who helped develop Friday and is still testing it, has experienced problems firsthand.

Friday once canceled an important meeting with one of Tambe's supervisors. The meeting was kind of important: The professor was to discuss funding for his lab.

"My agent figured out that since I wasn't here in themorning, I was most likely going to cancel the meeting," he said.

For now, the professor has no plans to share his credit card number with Friday. Tambe figures that "tomorrow it could go out and order 100 books for me based on my interests."

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
 
However her most famous escapades of all are the ones she executed on behalf of  Rockefeller interests in attempts to infiltrate AOL and then destabilize them financially.

Don't believe me ?

Ok let's  read these  wonderful articles:

http://crab.rutgers.edu/~goertzel/aolvolunteers.htm

April 14, 1999
NY Times

          America Online Is Facing Challenge Over
          Free Labor

          By LISA NAPOLI

               For the last 10 years, America Online Inc., the nation's largest
               online service, has relied on volunteers to help maintain the virtual
          community it offers its members. The volunteers, who are known as
          "community leaders," perform tasks like answering questions from
          subscribers, supervising chat rooms and enforcing the service's rules.

          The reward has been a free account with the service and, America
          Online says, the opportunity to play a more active role in its community
          of 16 million members.

          Now at least seven former volunteers are
          challenging the practice, and have asked the
          Labor Department to look into whether the use
          of volunteer labor by America Online and its
          subsidiary, America Online Communities Inc.,
          violates the Federal Fair Labor Standards Act.

          A Labor Department spokesman would neither
          confirm nor deny that AOL was under
          investigation, but several former volunteers
          provided copies of a letter from the
          department's Employment Standards
          Administration saying it would look into the
          matter.

          Information about the investigation was published two weeks ago on
          Observers.net, a Web site set up last September by former volunteers.

          A spokeswoman for America Online, Ann Brackbill, said on Friday
          that she was aware of the Web site and the information about an
          investigation, which she said had prompted the company to "initiate
          contact" with the Labor Department. But she added, "We do not
          elaborate on discussions we have with regulatory agencies."

          America Online, which has 12,000 employees, also has more than
          10,000 volunteers, Ms. Brackbill said. Volunteers commit to a minimum
          of four hours a week of work, in addition to training time and time spent
          on required paperwork. Some of the former volunteers said they devoted
          much more time to the company.

          Marilyn Perkins of Chicago, a co-founder of Observers.net, is one of at
          least seven people who have registered separate complaints with the
          Labor Department. Ms. Perkins and other volunteers acknowledge that
          they signed on to work for AOL in exchange for a free account, which
          now costs $21.95 a month. But many volunteers signed up when the
          value of a free account was potentially much higher, because the online
          service billed users at an hourly rate and charges for heavy users ran in
          the hundreds of dollars.

          Although their complaints vary, the former volunteers say that AOL relies
          on volunteers to do work that should be paid. Ms. Perkins says the
          company has dismissed volunteers who have asked for compensation or
          complained about the program, and has taken away their free accounts.

          In their complaints to the Labor Department, the former volunteers do
          not make explicit demands for back pay. The issue, they said, is to
          publicize the situation and to change the way the online service uses
          unpaid labor.

          "Some are filing for revenge, some are filing to stop AOL from abusing
          others, some simply want their AOL accounts returned to them," said
          Kelly Hallissey, a former volunteer who lives in Greensboro, N.C.

          "I'm filing to support others' allegations and also to object to how AOL
          has treated myself and many others."

          Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, a person must be compensated for
          time spent at job-related activities that benefit the employer, regardless of
          how the job is classified. There is a difference between volunteering for a
          charitable cause and volunteering to perform work that is critical to a
          company's business, said Jeffrey Chamberlain, an employment lawyer
          based in Albany who is not involved in the AOL dispute.

                                     In a claim like the one made by the
                                     former AOL volunteers, Chamberlain
                                     said: "The more it looks like a real
                                     job, the less likely it is to be deemed
                                     volunteer. The kinds of things they
                                     are describing would make lawyers'
                                     bells go off."

                                     But Ms. Brackbill defended the
          volunteer program, saying it was a formalization of contributions that
          AOL subscribers have made to the service since it began in 1985. "It's
          an organic thing that sprouted from what people love to do online," she
          said. "Community and participation are the DNA of the Internet."

          AOL is not the only online company to use volunteers. Many Internet
          companies that offer community features rely on members to enforce
          standards and to contribute to the community in some fashion.

          For instance, Ivillage, an online women's network, uses more than 1,000
          volunteers to manage message boards and chat communities.

          Michael Rubin, an employment lawyer in San Francisco, says the nature
          of work is being redefined because of computer and Internet connections
          that are readily available in homes, potentially creating new legal issues
          for companies that use remote help.

          If found in violation of wage and hour laws, an employer could be
          required to pay double the compensation to which the workers should
          have been entitled, Rubin said. If it is found that the violations were
          willful, the employer could be subject to civil penalties and possibly
          criminal prosecution.

          A decision against AOL could set a precedent for the online industry
          that might force companies to rethink the way they use volunteers, Rubin
          said, adding, "If the industry in fact was kept operating because of
          volunteer workers, it may have to reconfigure."
 

          Lisa Napoli at napoli@nytimes.com welcomes your comments and
          suggestions.
 

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~


More on this  here:



Her Attourney (A very Famous NWO Necon Rockefeller Shill):
http://experiencefestival.com/eliot_spitzer
(from page2)

Eliot Spitzer:  Encyclopedia II - America Online - Controversies

America Online - Community Leaders. Prior to the middle of 2005, AOL used volunteers called Community Leaders, or CLs, to monitor chatrooms, message boards, and libraries. Some community leaders were recruited for content design and maintenance using a proprietary language and interface called RAINMAN, although most content maintenance was performed by partner and internal employees. In 1999, Kelly Hallissey and Brian Williams, former Community Leaders and founders of anti-AOL website filed a class action ...





~~~~~~~~~~~~Her personal Response to AOL on top of the Law suit~~~~~~


Was to stage a false flag attack on AOL using knowledge only an insider could have gotten to compromise thier system and then blame it on  nameless hackers...
http://www.aolsucks.org/list/0104.html

It all traces back to her:

But there's one threat that AOL's executives can't seem to address: 
hackers.  Several hundred screen names have been compromised, according to
two AOL watchdog web sites.
   
      http://observers.net/crisreply.html
      http://www.inside-aol.com
   
AOL told the Washington Post that they'd only learned about the breach
when the Observers.net web site published a report on it. And Sunday night
Kelly Hallissey, one of the site's staffers, told AOL Watch that she
believed hackers were still accessing the database.

   http://washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A9476-2000Jun16.html
   http://www.observers.net/insideview.html

Reuters credited the attack for "highlighting the vulnerability of even
the world's largest Internet services provider to the threat of hacker
attacks."  One hacker told the Post that for anyone who digs behind AOL's
pretty interface, "there is a lot of stuff you can compromise."

   http://cnnfn.com/2000/06/16/technology/wires/aol_wg/
   http://news.cnet.com/news/0-1005-200-2091566.html
   http://www.zdnet.com/zdnn/stories/news/0,4586,2589679,00.html


AOL's spokesperson told MSNBC they were "taking steps" to eliminate the
hole. ( http://msnbc.com/news/421768.asp ) But this may be a concession
that the problem isn't fixed yet -- at least, judging from one earlier
incident. In January hackers discovered a way to access any AOL Instant
Messenger account (if it didn't have a corresponding AOL account.) AOL
immediately told reporters at Wired News, C|Net, and MSNBC that they were
deploying patches to fix AIM security problems.

~~~~~~~~~~~~ Here is an article citing Kelly Practically boasting about how insecure AOL is~~~~~~

http://www.internetnews.com/xSP/print.php/404471
AOL: Instant Messaging Interoperability is a Non-Issue
By Patricia Fusco
June 28, 2000[/b]

Earlier in June, the Federal Communications Commission requested that America Online Inc. explain its stance on instance messaging, in light of its proposed merger with Time Warner Inc.

Royce Dickens, FCC Cable Service Bureau deputy chief of the policy and rules division, probed America Online's pledge to develop an interoperability standard for instant messaging, and if AOL was actively working to set such standards.

In its reply to the Commission earlier this week, AOL noted that it pioneered the concept of instant messaging in 1985 and unveiled the first service to its members in 1989. At that time, instant messaging was available only to AOL subscribers, according to the firm's attorneys.

AOL said it recognized the popularity of its proprietary instant messaging service in 1997 and began giving away for free to anyone on the Web.

Since then, AOL has also entered more than a dozen royalty-free license agreements with other companies-including Lotus, Lycos Inc., EarthLink Inc. and other Internet service providers.

Additionally, AOL stated that it has and continues to support efforts to create an open and interoperable standard that would allow users to exchange instant messages across different instant messaging networks.

To that end, AOL submitted its proposal to the Internet Engineering Task Force about how to best achieve the goal of interoperability mid-June.

AOL's proposal included the architecture to design a worldwide instant messaging system. In doing so, AOL legal representatives said the proposal represents a significant step toward the development of detailed protocols for implementing full instant messaging interoperability.

Rival instant messaging firms quickly challenged AOL's integrity and acceptance of developing an open standard.

At the same time AOL's IETF proposal was submitted, it was playing a cat-and-mouse game resisting unauthorized attempts by Odigo Inc. to access its instant messaging network.

Avner Ronen, Odigo vice president of strategic design, scoffed at AOL's professed desire for open standards.

"What AOL has posted is no more than an outline for interoperability," Ronen said. "On the surface, great, they are committed. However, they have claimed commitment for over one year now. This outline has no time-frame and no specific architecture. AOL's announcement does not bring us any closer to a standard platform."

AOL said that allowing outside companies to access its instant messaging servers would jeopardize the security and privacy of its 23 million members and 50 million instant messaging users.

AOL legal representatives alleged that had e-mail protocols been as deliberate as its instant messaging system, unsolicited e-mail, or spam, and e-mail borne viruses would not afflict the online community today.

The legal team of Peter Ross, Wiley, Rein & Fielding, and Arthur Harding,, Fleischman and Walsh, L.L.P., informed the FCC that the best way to access alternative instant messaging providers is to secure a royalty-free licensing agreement with AOL.

"AOL does not demand payment in exchange for use of its IM technology. Likewise, AOL does not pay for access to other providers' customers," the lawyers wrote.

AOL's legal team contends that because most of the instant messaging services are free to use, consumers can choose the program-or programs-that best meet their needs. Even without interoperability, Internet users canexchange instant messages, regardless of their preferred instant messaging provider.

To do so, consumers must download a multitude of programs to interact with non-AOL instant messaging users. AOL contends that such a system opens up consumers to security issues, because they must disclose their passwords whenever they send messages across systems.

AOL told the FCC it has the best approach for developing worldwide instant messaging interoperability. Its proposed architectural design resolves the technical, security, and privacy-related challenges of building a secure and open system.

While AOL attempts to make instant messaging a non-issue with the FCC so it can obtain the go-ahead to acquire Time Warner, Americas largest online service provider remains steadfast in its commitment to guaranteeing the privacy and security of its instant messaging users.

This commitment to security has been contested in other areas of AOL's services.

While AOL members are assured at every point of contact that their information is secure from potential maliciousness, Observers.net recently shared information with the public about how easily AOL's firewalls can be violated.

Kelly Hallissey, Observers.net benevolent hackers, said AOL has the wrong attitude about being invulnerable to outside forces.

"They have depended upon their firewall, the premise that this latest publicized breach is new, is erroneous," Hallissey said. "It's the same technique that has been used for over 1 year. Why didn't AOL do anything about it? Why haven't they closed it yet? They were blindsided with how wid

[lordssyndicate]

More interesting evidence  about this shill:

Realize that in this conversation she has posted from IRC all of the participants are Ms. Hallissey. She is doing this to cause undue strife to the hosting company while also DDOSing their servers...

Isn't she nice she complains to you about attacking herself while ddosing you (she does this often .. just search www.clusty.com for her name and tons of interesting incidents pop up showing her truly psychotic nature.) Then she gets her lackies to back her up or argue that they are one of the attackers / victims... it's all really quite dramatic even....

http://www.webhostingtalk.com/archive/index.php/t-423398.html


Kelly Hallissey
07-11-2005, 12:13 AM
   
Today I was sitting minding my own business and went to dcc a bot in my channel, kthnx. I accidentally typo'd and tried to dcc kthx a bot in #chpass. Wow remind me NOT to do that again. Within seconds I received the following msg from that "bot".


Session Start: Sun Jul 10 17:44:01 2005
Session Ident: kthx
[17:44] Session Ident: kthx (die@k-thx.biz)
[17:44] <kthx> and may I ask why ur dccing me?
Session Close: Sun Jul 10 17:45:43 2005

I ignored that not thinking much of it. I whois'd on receiving the message and realized my mistake but was busy and continued along my business until I received THIS msg.....


Session Start: Sun Jul 10 17:51:45 2005
Session Ident: kthx
[17:51] Session Ident: kthx (die@k-thx.biz)
[17:51] <kthx> ms kelly a hallissey... you still at 700 meadowview dr treating you, over there in mansfield? or did you move to vegas?

::inserts whois for those of you who would be interested:::

kthx is die@k-thx.biz * Make it so.
kthx on @#p @#google @#redhat @#linuxchat @#felon @#trojan @#drones @#trojans @#alphabet @#packeting @#clones @#* @#+o @#chpass @#fdc
kthx using irc.mzima.net Welcome to the fjear nation.
kthx is away: is away: (Auto-Away after 10 mins) [BX-MsgLog Off]
kthx End of /WHOIS list.

The log continues....

[17:52] <Kelz> LOL you are a bit behind the times
[17:52] <kthx> yeah that was a old one...
[17:53] <Kelz> which dumb**** are you?
[17:53] <kthx> that's ok.. 239 31 xxxx... you are pwned for life (edited as it is my real social security #)
[17:53] <kthx> stop playing games with your betters
[17:53] <Kelz> actually
[17:53] <Kelz> Id say you are
[17:53] <Kelz> but its chill
[17:56] <kthx> 11197 tuscolana st.. neh?
[17:56] <Kelz> long since left
[17:56] <Kelz> keep trying loser
[18:01] <Kelz> is that the best you can do?
[18:11] <Kelz> kthx is die@k-thx.biz * Make it so.
[18:11] <Kelz> kthx on @#p @#google @#redhat @#linuxchat @#felon @#trojan @#drones @#trojans @#alphabet @#packeting @#clones @#* @#+o @#chpass @#fdc
[18:11] <Kelz> kthx using irc.mzima.net Welcome to the fjear nation.
[18:11] <Kelz> kthx is away: is away: (Auto-Away after 10 mins) [BX-MsgLog Off]
[18:11] <Kelz> kthx End of /WHOIS list.
[18:11] <Kelz> why were you harrassing me?
[18:11] <kthx> and why were u dccing me?
[18:11] <Kelz> I made a typo
[18:11] <Kelz> sue me
[18:12] <Kelz> why did you change hostmasks to paste me my social?
[18:12] <kthx> Well, I thought u dropped that box
[18:12] <kthx> so I assumed the nick here
[18:12] <kthx> I wasn't the one
[18:12] <Kelz> So you decided to drop my dox while not on gige so I couldn't do ****?
[18:12] <kthx> talking to you
[18:13] <Kelz> Its a domain your company owns
[18:13] <Kelz> and its oped in your channel
[18:13] <kthx> ya, so? u were dccing a bot
[18:13] <Kelz> So are you denying you pasted my social back to me?
[18:14] <Kelz> [17:51] <kthx> ms kelly a hallissey... you still at 700 meadowview dr treating you, over there in mansfield? or did you move to vegas?
[18:14] <Kelz> [17:52] <Kelz> LOL you are a bit behind the times
[18:14] <Kelz> [17:52] <kthx> yeah that was a old one...
[18:14] <Kelz> [17:53] <Kelz> which dumb**** are you?
[18:14] <Kelz> [17:53] <kthx> that's ok.. 239 31 xxxx (edited)... you are pwned for life
[18:14] <Kelz> you claiming thats NOT YOU?
[18:14] <kthx> yes, but it is someone else on my net that I will not disclose.
[18:14] <Kelz> You will have to.
[18:14] <Kelz> Enjoy.
[18:14] <kthx> nope, never.
Session Close: Sun Jul 10 18:15:00 2005

Wow what a nice group of folks, I joined their channel and was banned on join. So I ask my friends to help me find their uplink, its on ispeeds.net and their uplink is velcom.com, but the nameserver for the domain is chpass.com, now here's where it gets interesting, I msged chpass the owner and asked why this was going on, he wasn't idle but chose not to answer.

chpass is adv@get.your.shell.at.chpass.com * www.chpass.com - stable/reliable undroppable shell
chpass on #vcd #god +#gangsta-vibez +#XDCC-FILES +#chpass +#mp3dcc +#0day-Xdcc +#bootlegcentral +#metalmetal
chpass using irc.nac.net I have a poisonous friend
chpass has been idle 6mins 19secs, signed on Sun Jul 10 17:20:20
chpass End of /WHOIS list.

So I'm sitting here composing my abuse email and then the msgs start again but this time the host has changed, its the ADMIN FOR CHPASS.COM.

kthx is passwd@admin.chpass.com * www.chpass.com
kthx on @#p @#wheel @#hacking @#packet @#hacker @#hackers @#elite @#ninja @#felon @#trojan @#drones @#trojans @#alphabet @#packeting @#decrypt @#encrypt @#clones @#* @#chpass @#stoners @#google @#teenchat @#exploit @#linuxchat @#redhat @#/<-rad @#god @#gawd @#ircparty @#fdc
kthx using irc.efnet.nl Business Internet Trends IPv4/IPv6 EFNet server
kthx End of /WHOIS list.

Session Start: Sun Jul 10 18:15:25 2005
Session Ident: kthx
[18:15] Session Ident: kthx (passwd@admin.chpass.com)
[18:15] <kthx> Just remember, u start messing with me, I won't give up till I own u for life.
[18:15] <kthx> Bitch.
[18:15] <Kelz> Oh threaten me
[18:15] <Kelz> please
[18:16] <kthx> lol
[18:16] <Kelz> Pussy bitch hiding behind a bot to talk your ****
[18:16] <Kelz> the bot in obs is kthnx
[18:16] <Kelz> the keyboard on this laptop sucks
[18:16] <Kelz> Now since you want to play I'll play
[18:16] <kthx> wait a sec
[18:16] <kthx> thats bryan's bot
[18:16] <kthx> isn't it
[18:16] <Kelz> No **** you dumb****
[18:17] <kthx> look
[18:17] <Kelz> No YOU look
[18:17] <kthx> lets end this ****
[18:17] <kthx> as there is no need for it
[18:17] <Kelz> I am sick of your channel harrassing me
[18:17] <Kelz> NO NEED?
[18:17] <Kelz> YOU dropped my social
[18:17] <Kelz> *I* didn't do **** except TYPO
[18:17] <kthx> I did not drop your social.
[18:17] <kthx> someone else did.
[18:17] <Kelz> Your bot did
[18:17] <Kelz> and I'll let your uplinks deal with it
[18:17] <kthx> lol
[18:17] <kthx> well
[18:18] <kthx> enjoy
[18:18] <Kelz> yeah
[18:18] <Kelz> I'll do that
[18:18] <kthx> cuz If I hear anymore of this
[18:18] <kthx> ur **** is gonna be pasted to everyone
[18:18] <kthx> including ur credit report.
[18:18] <kthx> so
[18:18] <kthx> its ur choice
[18:18] <kthx>
[18:19] <Kelz> =)
[18:19] <Kelz> thanks kiddie
Session Close: Sun Jul 10 18:19:51 2005

So the admin of chpass.com has done a credit report on me, how sweet. And threatens me from his gigeserver box.

Session Start: Sun Jul 10 18:20:06 2005
Session Ident: kthx
[18:20] Session Ident: kthx (passwd@admin.chpass.com)
[18:20] <kthx> On the other hand, I could just take that u dcc'd my bot accidentally, and ummm, I'll keep my people away from ur ****, and this can end right here and now.
[18:20] <kthx> cuz really, I don't have a real beef with u yet.
[18:20] <kthx> so why start?
[18:22] <kthx> Just don't get me started.
[18:23] <Kelz> talk to your uplinks

How sweet, he offered me an "out" of being "owned".

I emailed in an abuse complaint and got accused by ispeed aka passwd, of packeting their box, I asked if this is how they handled abuse complaints (full volley of emails are available for those who are interested) and then received a msg on efnet from them on a proxy, you guys will love this.


Session Start: Sun Jul 10 19:27:17 2005
Session Ident: KnightAZY
[19:27] Session Ident: KnightAZY (~kny@194.186.226.84)
[19:27] <KnightAZY> hey your daughter is such a whore, i ****ed that slut in the *** last night, so ****ing young and such a whore geez what are u teacher ur daughter
[19:27] <Brattie> wow nice thing to say about a 7 year old
[19:27] <Brattie> feel proud of yourself?
[19:28] <KnightAZY> your daughter is such a little ****, you gotta teachj that whore some manners otherwise she will group up to be a huge slut just like she is now
[19:28] <Brattie> Aren't you elite
[19:28] <Brattie> talking **** about a little kid
[19:28] <KnightAZY> yea i got an elite **** and it was in your daughters pussy
[19:29] <Brattie> sounds like yer upset about losign yo9ur shell
[19:29] <Brattie> poor baby
[19:30] <KnightAZY> lol what shell
[19:30] <KnightAZY> im not upset about anything im just letting you know that you got a slut for a daughter
[19:30] <Brattie> dude
[19:30] <Brattie> my kids 7 years old and hasn't been out of my sight in months so stfu with your ********
[19:30] <Brattie> its lame and stupid
[19:31] <KnightAZY> haha its not ********, you knows its the truth and thats why you are pissed AHAHHAHA
[19:31] <KnightAZY> go check her pussy you will see it has been deflowered
[19:31] * Brattie clicks on ignore
[19:32] <KnightAZY> AHHHAHH did the whore get mad?
Session Close: Sun Jul 10 19:41:10 2005

But alas, that's not been the end of it. I shortly thereafter received this msg....

Session Start: Sun Jul 10 20:10:13 2005
Session Ident: passwds
[20:10] Session Ident: passwds (passwd@admin.chpass.com)
[20:10] <passwds> Thanks, I enjoyed reading your email - was quite entertaining.
[20:10] <Kelz> I'm sure the uplinks enjoyed them too.
[20:11] <passwds> hell ya
[20:11] <Kelz> Their responses haven't been so supportive of you.
[20:11] <passwds> Good luck
[20:11] <Kelz> Enjoying talking about raping my kid?
[20:11] <passwds> fake logs
[20:11] <passwds> tsk tsk
[20:11] <Kelz> Seems you are a great guy
[20:12] <Kelz> The logs are saved, unedited and the owner of at least one of those uplinks knows I don't fake logs.
[20:12] <passwds> hahahahaha
[20:12] <passwds> stupid bitch.
[20:12] <Kelz> Seems to me you are the stupid one
[20:13] <passwds> You're gonna so regret ****ing with me, and faking logs.
[20:13] <passwds> tsk tsk
[20:13] <Kelz> I haven't faked anything and you well know it
[20:13] <Kelz> Why don't you make some more threats?
[20:14] <passwds> hahahaha
[20:14] <Kelz> Oh wait
[20:14] <Kelz> you just did
[20:14] <passwds> I don't need to make ANY threats =)
[20:14] <Kelz> why am I going to regret it?
[20:14] <passwds> cuz ur fat?
[20:14] <passwds>
[20:14] <Kelz> How old are you? 12?
[20:15] <passwds> no, 13
[20:15] <Kelz> Grow up little boy.
[20:15] <passwds> 13/F/U
[20:15] <passwds> haha
[20:15] <passwds> EOF
[20:16] <Kelz> Doesn't seem like any of my clients have that quit atm
[20:17] * Kelz yawns

The fact that this company has had multiple users harassing me, spamming my social security #, etc over the last month has been my problem.

The fact that the admins are now doing it and will do similar things to their customers should they "piss them off" is yours.

I have yet to receive a response from velcom or gigeservers. They were notified 4 hours ago.

I am sure gigeservers will handle it appropriately but velcom is an unknown to me, for now.

These logs are available as both the buffer logs I saved as well as the true mirc logs, all dated and timestamped appropriately.

I strongly suggest you chose where you do your business carefully when dealing with either of these shell providers.

Sincerely,

Kelly Hallissey

PS I left off the part about the box admin, a different one, xmage, joining my channel on a nick that he juped after it was packetted down and claiming that the admin.chpass* and other hostmask had no ties to them even though they housed the nameserver for it and its their companies name lol.
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 12:42 AM
Kelly Hallissey,
I know your trying to show yourself as all innocent, but i have firewall logs of you attempting to DDoS the individual in question. So, its to your benefit not to bring this up in WHT. What you did was immature, and of course not legal.
I keep trying to pull myself away from this, and of course you keep brining this up everywhere.
Velcom is not going to reply to you; the buck stops here. If there's something going on, you should have come to *me* in the first place, *not* DDoS my IPs. You attempting to ruin Ispeeds' reputation is not going to get you anywhere.
have a nice day.
Kelly Hallissey
07-11-2005, 12:53 AM
   
I see you are the "packet specialist" not I. Unless you have some proof that *I* originated a dos attack or had someone do it on my behalf, all you have posted is slander to get yourself and your company off the hook. Provide a log of me asking for it to be done or of me initiating a ddos command.

Nice way to handle your customer ip phreaking my info. Says a lot about you as a host.

Kelly
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 12:58 AM
I have pretty solid evidance that you are the individual behind all of this. Lets not forget that you, indirectly hinted this out in your emails to me as well. There is no question about that. Your chat (argument) logs with the client in question, and my firewall logs match perfectly, so does the IP address in question, given that it was not in use by anyone else at the time of the attack.
I would be more than happy to help you but, but sorry, you scewed up by getting your buddies to packet my server before contacting me.
I replied to your abuse@ emails in less than 30 minutes. I think i did everything i could, and i would have resolved this, if you werent DDoSing my server. but you picked the wrong path. We in no way support packet kiddies and as i said in the email, you are on your own.
Justin
07-11-2005, 12:59 AM
Kelly Hallissey,
I know your trying to show yourself as all innocent, but i have firewall logs of you attempting to DDoS the individual in question. So, its to your benefit not to bring this up in WHT. What you did was immature, and of course not legal.
I keep trying to pull myself away from this, and of course you keep brining this up everywhere.
Velcom is not going to reply to you; the buck stops here. If there's something going on, you should have come to *me* in the first place, *not* DDoS my IPs. You attempting to ruin Ispeeds' reputation is not going to get you anywhere.
have a nice day.

TheTrance,

Have you any proof of her actually attacking you or is this pure speculation?

I seriously doubt Kelly would go denial of service attacking anyone in fact she has aided in prevently some attacks. In any case I do hope that such situations are resolved properly and do not get out of hand.

-Justin
Kelly Hallissey
07-11-2005, 12:59 AM
Psst.....

If I can drop you from my dialup you should hang your head in shame for having such a lousy company!
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 01:02 AM
Justin,
yes i actually do; I have no intention to lie, or be against her. I dont even know who she is. I am not saying she did it, but she has most likely got someone to "take care" of the client in question.
Kelly Hallissey
07-11-2005, 01:03 AM
Originally posted by TheTrance
I have pretty solid evidance that you are the individual behind all of this. Lets not forget that you, indirectly hinted this out in your emails to me as well. There is no question about that. Your chat (argument) logs with the client in question, and my firewall logs match perfectly, so does the IP address in question, given that it was not in use by anyone else at the time of the attack.
I would be more than happy to help you but, but sorry, you scewed up by getting your buddies to packet my server before contacting me.
I replied to your abuse@ emails in less than 30 minutes. I think i did everything i could, and i would have resolved this, if you werent DDoSing my server. but you picked the wrong path. We in no way support packet kiddies and as i said in the email, you are on your own.

I hinted at it? Let me post the emails then so you can point that out, amazin how you point the finger at me to obscure your customers breaking the LAW because he is YOUR ADMIN.
flameboy
07-11-2005, 01:07 AM
Why not just post the logs here? Seems pretty stupid to just repeatedly claim that she DoSed you and thats why you didnt do anything.

You should be able to prove it. Posts logs with time stamps. Posts the emails that you claim were insinuating DoS on your servers. If you cant show anything to back up this claim then dont even bother making it.

As far as i can see, the evidence shown by Kelly seems to prove the unprofessionalism of the hosts harboring these kiddies.
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 01:08 AM
Originally posted by Kelly Hallissey
I hinted at it? Let me post the emails then so you can point that out, amazin how you point the finger at me to obscure your customers breaking the LAW because he is YOUR ADMIN.

quote from your previous email:
"...That's not saying "Dos this" and its not my fault someone chose to hit it due to it, as far as *I* know the box never dropped,"
I wonder why you were so anxious to know if it dropped or not. Makes me wonder.

Also i will make it clear here that i *am* the owner, and the admin. I am the one you should talk to, don't involve anyone else.
Kelly Hallissey
07-11-2005, 01:11 AM
Subj: User phreaking my social security number and info from your service_
Date: 7/10/2005 6:29:48 P.M. Central Daylight Time
From: Bellevue Refugee
To: ben@ispeeds.net, abuse@ispeeds.net
CC: netadmin@velcom.com

_
Dear Sir/Madam:
_
My name is Kelly Hallissey, today due to a typo on my behalf, I accidentally tried to dcc the nick kthx as opposed to kthnx._ Kthx was on your network and proceeded to paste my social security # to me as well as former addresses and threatened to spam my credit report.
_
These parties own various shell provider boxes and I DEMAND immediate removal from your network for this blatant abuse by the owners of these companies.
_
Attached are logs from the conversation.
_
Sincerely,
_
Kelly Hallissey
_
kthx is die@k-thx.biz * Make it so.
kthx on @#p @#google @#redhat @#linuxchat @#felon @#trojan @#drones @#trojans @#alphabet @#packeting @#clones @#* @#+o @#chpass @#fdc
kthx using irc.mzima.net Welcome to the fjear nation.
kthx is away: is away: (Auto-Away after 10 mins) [BX-MsgLog Off]
kthx End of /WHOIS list.
-
_
_
kthx is passwd@admin.chpass.com * www.chpass.com
kthx on @#p @#wheel @#hacking @#packet @#hacker @#hackers @#elite @#ninja @#felon @#trojan @#drones @#trojans @#alphabet @#packeting @#decrypt @#encrypt @#clones @#* @#chpass @#stoners @#google @#teenchat @#exploit @#linuxchat @#redhat @#/<-rad @#god @#gawd @#ircparty @#fdc
kthx using irc.efnet.nl Business Internet Trends IPv4/IPv6 EFNet server
kthx End of /WHOIS list.
-

(attached logs)

Subj: Re: User phreaking my social security number and info from your service_
Date: 7/10/2005 7:18:42 P.M. Central Daylight Time
From: ben@ispeeds.net
To: BellevueRefugee@aol.com
Sent from the Internet (Details)

_
Next time come talk to me before you try to packet my servers.

Subj: Re: User phreaking my social security number and info from your service_
Date: 7/10/2005 7:19:18 P.M. Central Daylight Time
From: Bellevue Refugee
To: ben@ispeeds.net

_
In a message dated 7/10/2005 7:18:42 P.M. Central Daylight Time, ben@ispeeds.net writes:

Next time come talk to me before you try to packet my servers.


Umm I don't packet, if it got hit it wasn't me.

Subj: Re: User phreaking my social security number and info from your service_
Date: 7/10/2005 7:28:23 P.M. Central Daylight Time
From: ben@ispeeds.net
To: BellevueRefugee@aol.com
Sent from the Internet (Details)

_
sure you didnt.

Subj: Re: User phreaking my social security number and info from your service_
Date: 7/10/2005 7:43:43 P.M. Central Daylight Time
From: Bellevue Refugee
To: ben@ispeeds.net

_
In a message dated 7/10/2005 7:28:23 P.M. Central Daylight Time, ben@ispeeds.net writes:

sure you didnt.


Nice abuse response, got to love responsible admins.

Subj: Re: User phreaking my social security number and info from your service_
Date: 7/10/2005 8:06:40 P.M. Central Daylight Time
From: ben@ispeeds.net
To: BellevueRefugee@aol.com
Sent from the Internet (Details)

_
I am responding to your "abuse" report. The fact is that, if you had
contacted me before you got your pals to packet him down, i would have
helped you. I responded to your email in less than 30 minutes, however,
you started this all the wrong way.

Subj: Re: User phreaking my social security number and info from your service_
Date: 7/10/2005 8:10:34 P.M. Central Daylight Time
From: Bellevue Refugee
To: ben@ispeeds.net

_
In a message dated 7/10/2005 8:06:40 P.M. Central Daylight Time, ben@ispeeds.net writes:

I am responding to your "abuse" report. The fact is that, if you had
contacted me before you got your pals to packet him down, i would have
helped you. I responded to your email in less than 30 minutes, however,
you started this all the wrong way.


*I* didn't dos anyone down, I pasted the conversation in a channel and asked wtf it was, that's it._ I couldn't traceroute from here to find the uplink and asked someone to traceroute it for me (the isp here blocks traceroute, ping, etc)._ That's not saying "Dos this" and its not my fault someone chose to hit it due to it, as far as *I* know the box never dropped, you saying the box got dropped is the first I have heard of it._ And frankly, if you allow your users to do crap like that from your box then why are you so shocked someone did hit it?_ Seems to me that the weight is on the person who pasted my social security #, not me.
_
Now that same person is harrassing me from various shells talking about raping my 7 year old._ Really nice.

Subj: Re: User phreaking my social security number and info from your service_
Date: 7/10/2005 8:19:28 P.M. Central Daylight Time
From: ben@ispeeds.net
To: BellevueRefugee@aol.com
Sent from the Internet (Details)

_
of course it didn't get dropped, but while your buddies were doing it, it
happened that i was monitoring the traffic. Guess what, there are not a
lot of users on that particular server and no one else was using the IP
address assigned to that client.
I am not shocked that the IP got hit, no, thats normal for IRC. However, i
am shocked that *you* came to me eventhough you have packetted him. I just
don't want to get involved in this, please go ahead and resolve your
issues with the client in question.
Kelly Hallissey
07-11-2005, 01:13 AM
I see no insinuation, I see no proof, I see no logs of dos attacks.

What I DO see is you trying to cover your own tail end for what was done on your network.

Pathetic
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 01:13 AM
Kelly,
thanks for the paste, but i already posted the part that everyone should've noticed.
flameboy, please have a look at the end of kelly's paste of my email to her.
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 01:15 AM
Originally posted by Kelly Hallissey
I see no insinuation, I see no proof, I see no logs of dos attacks.

What I DO see is you trying to cover your own tail end for what was done on your network.

Pathetic

I have absolutly nothing to cover; I didn't do anything illegal, I replied to your emails. Don't expect me to police IRC. I tried to help you, and i would have helped you if you were a bit more honest.
I think i've said what needed to be said.
JacobD
07-11-2005, 01:16 AM
Hmm...

I guess what is amazing to me at this point in our little story is around the same time that the admin of that provider is claiming ddos, there was a reported network hiccup on his host at gigeservers that affected more than just a few clients.

Also, seeing how I know exactly where Ms. Hallissey is and exactly what provider she is currently using at this point, I find it also hard to believe that the provider in her area is strong enough to be able to be the attacker in a DDoS attack. The area doesn't even have workable DSL service.
flameboy
07-11-2005, 01:20 AM
It seems like your making a radical assumption that kelly dossed you and are basing inaction off of it.

Let me get this straight. Because the host in question got attacked around the same time that this stuff happened, you are going to TOTALLY DISMISS the complaint about one of your customers?

How does that even make sense? The fact that you got DoSed doesnt change the bad behavior by your client!
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 01:20 AM
Guys, quite honestly i've said nothing but the truth here; it's really up to you to believe it or not; but again, all i am doing is stating the truth. Of course no one is going to be able to prove that she is the attackers, but when i look at what happened, it gives me a pretty STRONG evidance that she has been involved in this herself. you be the judge.
myrddin
07-11-2005, 01:20 AM
What I see is an admin making claims with no proof to back it all up.

Start showing some logs buddy.
JacobD
07-11-2005, 01:20 AM
Originally posted by TheTrance
flameboy, please have a look at the end of kelly's paste of my email to her.

You haven't provided any proof that you have been DDoS'd by Ms. Hallissey as you have claimed.

How can you claim to be the admin of a service if someone else on that service is using "admin.chpass.com" and its obviously not you who is using that host?

Why not deal with those who are spamming personal information from your ips and then worry about the other nonsense another day? Or is it that those users have accounts on your box so as it is insurance against you getting ddossed by those people?
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 01:22 AM
i am not related to chpass. We are talking about ispeeds.
packzz
07-11-2005, 01:23 AM
Wow how much longer is this going to go on? Is this really the place for this?
Kelly Hallissey
07-11-2005, 01:24 AM
Where are the logs of this dos? Need more time to make them?
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 01:24 AM
Originally posted by myrddin
What I see is an admin making claims with no proof to back it all up.

Start showing some logs buddy.

reffer to my previous post.
myrddin
07-11-2005, 01:26 AM
Furthermore, even in this situation, the path YOU are choosing is wrong.
Even IF Kelly did do what you claim, either intentional or not, the fact remains that you have an abusive admin on your network that needs to be dealt with.

Your priority, instead of arguing that you think you were DDoSed, should be to fix the issue with that admin.

What will keep him from doing this in the future?
JacobD
07-11-2005, 01:26 AM
Actually, it does belong here to simply show how a provider refuses to handle problem users.
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 01:26 AM
Originally posted by Kelly Hallissey
Where are the logs of this dos? Need more time to make them?

The logs are not going to help you out. I have my evidance and i dont NEED to prove it to anyone. I have no reason to be against you,simply because i dont know you. I have no reason to lie as i didnt do anything wrong. Like i said, I am not sitting here to police IRC for you.
You are guilty in my eyes, and nothings going to change that. You know better than me that you have packetted our server because you were pissed at the client.
End of conversation with you.
I am not involved in this and i do not intend to be.
JacobD
07-11-2005, 01:27 AM
Originally posted by TheTrance
reffer to my previous post.

We have refered to your previous post. You have not provided any proof that you were attacked in any of those posts. Unless you now are able to use invisible text in this forum, it's simply not there.
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 01:30 AM
Lets not forget that logs can be easily forged; she *has* an incentive to fake logs, I don't; and from my experince with Ms. Kelly Hallissey, i really don't trust her. My client is innocent until proven guilty.
JacobD
07-11-2005, 01:33 AM
Originally posted by TheTrance
Lets not forget that logs can be easily forged; she *has* an incentive to fake logs, I don't; and from my experince with Ms. Kelly Hallissey, i really don't trust her. My client is innocent until proven guilty.

Hmm...I guess you're right. I mean those faked logs you would make would help you save face on WHT and not look like a totally clueless admin who can't seem to keep his users in line when they pull stupid stunts from your box.

Especially when evidence is provided showing what the client did and can be corroborated if you would ask that client...but hey...I guess you need all the script kiddies and packetmonkeys you can get to keep paying that server bill for ya.
myrddin
07-11-2005, 01:36 AM
Originally posted by TheTrance
My client is innocent until proven guilty.

So how else besides provided logs do you expect your client to be proven guilty.
Are logs not the basis of the internet? Is there another way to prove who did what?

It's logs or nothing, and Kelly's provided some. Have you?
Kelly Hallissey
07-11-2005, 01:37 AM
Originally posted by TheTrance
Lets not forget that logs can be easily forged; she *has* an incentive to fake logs, I don't; and from my experince with Ms. Kelly Hallissey, i really don't trust her. My client is innocent until proven guilty.

I have incentive? your experience with me?

Lets go through a few things here

I don't know passwd except from today in the logs I posted, and I damn sure do NOT know you or if I do you made a very unmemorable appearance in my lifetime.

I have no "incentive" to make up logs, I don't run a shell company or an uplink. Any host that has gotten logs from me is well aware I don't fake them, they usually see the same ones when they sniff their dirty clients as good admins should.

It seems to me that you are way hellbent on defending your dirty admin by attacking me instead of putting your buddy in check.

Your company will go far.
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 01:37 AM
Originally posted by JacobD
Hmm...I guess you're right. I mean those faked logs you would make would help you save face on WHT and not look like a totally clueless admin who can't seem to keep his users in line when they pull stupid stunts from your box.

Especially when evidence is provided showing what the client did and can be corroborated if you would ask that client...but hey...I guess you need all the script kiddies and packetmonkeys you can get to keep paying that server bill for ya.

If i was a clueless admin, i wouldnt be in business for 3 years. However, if you werent so clueless, you wouldnt be making such a lame comment. Don't question my knowledge. I know what i am doing, and i did what makes sense to me.
JacobD
07-11-2005, 01:37 AM
Ms. Cleo would have the answer...I wonder if she's awake right now.
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 01:39 AM
Originally posted by Kelly Hallissey
I have incentive? your experience with me?

Lets go through a few things here

I don't know passwd except from today in the logs I posted, and I damn sure do NOT know you or if I do you made a very unmemorable appearance in my lifetime.

I have no "incentive" to make up logs, I don't run a shell company or an uplink. Any host that has gotten logs from me is well aware I don't fake them, they usually see the same ones when they sniff their dirty clients as good admins should.

It seems to me that you are way hellbent on defending your dirty admin by attacking me instead of putting your buddy in check.

Your company will go far.

you seem to be able to get your way out of trouble by bitching and complaining and accusing others. sorry missy, this time you'r guilty and thats not gonna change. Don't even try to pull me into this.
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 01:41 AM
I really think you are going in circles, maybe its time for the moderators to close this. I am off for the night.
JacobD
07-11-2005, 01:41 AM
Originally posted by TheTrance
If i was a clueless admin, i wouldnt be in business for 3 years. However, if you werent so clueless, you wouldnt be making such a lame comment. Don't question my knowledge. I know what i am doing, and i did what makes sense to me.

For someone who has been in business for "3 years," why is this the first time that I've heard of you and your little company?

I question your knowledge simply because you have proven quite blatantly you have none. You can't make a claim that someone attacked you after they filed an abuse report with you without providing some type of real proof that it happened.

Anyone who has posted here more than once knows this and realizes that.
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 01:44 AM
Originally posted by JacobD
For someone who has been in business for "3 years," why is this the first time that I've heard of you and your little company?

I question your knowledge simply because you have proven quite blatantly you have none. You can't make a claim that someone attacked you after they filed an abuse report with you without providing some type of real proof that it happened.

Anyone who has posted here more than once knows this and realizes that.


Unlike you, i am an educated person with 2 University degrees. The shell business is what i run on the side, and i've never really advertised it that much. That doesn't really mean that i'm inexperinced.
Justin
07-11-2005, 01:48 AM
The logs are not going to help you out. I have my evidance and i dont NEED to prove it to anyone. I have no reason to be against you,simply because i dont know you. I have no reason to lie as i didnt do anything wrong. Like i said, I am not sitting here to police IRC for you.
You are guilty in my eyes, and nothings going to change that. You know better than me that you have packetted our server because you were pissed at the client.
End of conversation with you.
I am not involved in this and i do not intend to be.

So what you claim is that she attacked your server due to an issue with a client of yours? This whole pretext is becoming quite un-believeable. You do not wish to provide any proof of your claim, you also do not wish to deal with the abuse of a client (as the IP in question does belong to your company when looked up for whois contacts), and on top of all this you keep deferring to something that is purely guesswork when referring to a ddos with no actual distinct evidence of such. How do we all know that it was even you that would of been who was attacked? You do realize if a provider "drops" many chances are it was another user being attacked with a heavy ddos and not even your own server. That or it was due to a client on your server typically and not even aimed at a specific company in many cases.

Overall why persist in such claims... whether true or not the whole point being deal with abusive customers accordingly. If someone is going unlawfully spamming around private/personal information of anybody's period that is highly illegal and if found to be an accessory to the crime anyone involved even remotely stands to be persued by law. I myself don't know of any company who would want to take such risks.

In any case I do hope both parties involved will be able to resolve this dispute in the right channels.

[lordssyndicate]

-Justin
passwd
07-11-2005, 01:49 AM
As per your initial post:

Session Start: Sun Jul 10 19:27:17 2005
Session Ident: KnightAZY
[19:27] Session Ident: KnightAZY (~kny@194.186.226.84)
[19:27] <KnightAZY> hey your daughter is such a whore, i ****ed that slut in the *** last night, so ****ing young and such a whore geez what are u teacher ur daughter
[19:27] <Brattie> wow nice thing to say about a 7 year old
[19:27] <Brattie> feel proud of yourself?
[19:28] <KnightAZY> your daughter is such a little ****, you gotta teachj that whore some manners otherwise she will group up to be a huge slut just like she is now
[19:28] <Brattie> Aren't you elite
[19:28] <Brattie> talking **** about a little kid
[19:28] <KnightAZY> yea i got an elite **** and it was in your daughters pussy
[19:29] <Brattie> sounds like yer upset about losign yo9ur shell
[19:29] <Brattie> poor baby
[19:30] <KnightAZY> lol what shell
[19:30] <KnightAZY> im not upset about anything im just letting you know that you got a slut for a daughter
[19:30] <Brattie> dude
[19:30] <Brattie> my kids 7 years old and hasn't been out of my sight in months so stfu with your ********
[19:30] <Brattie> its lame and stupid
[19:31] <KnightAZY> haha its not ********, you knows its the truth and thats why you are pissed AHAHHAHA
[19:31] <KnightAZY> go check her pussy you will see it has been deflowered
[19:31] * Brattie clicks on ignore
[19:32] <KnightAZY> AHHHAHH did the whore get mad?
Session Close: Sun Jul 10 19:41:10 2005

Where's the link to chpass.com/ispeeds in relation to this? Did you mess up in fabricating these logs or something? :x
JacobD
07-11-2005, 01:49 AM
Originally posted by TheTrance
Unlike you, i am an educated person with 2 University degrees. The shell business is what i run on the side, and i've never really advertised it that much. That doesn't really mean that i'm inexperinced.

An educated person with no business sense. Yea...I can see that. I guess anyone can get a degree these days. I get spam emails on them all the time.

For what matters, I will not be referring any business to your company or to anyone in association with your company as it has become quite obvious to me and others that you are not willing to handle abuse reports in an appropriate manner.

Saying that the abuse didn't happen doesn't make you not liable for the abuse that did happen on your server and your allocated ips.

I hope Ms. Hallissey follows through completely to your uplinks (which I'm assuming she already has) and show them your refusal to deal with your problem users.

Have a nice day.
myrddin
07-11-2005, 01:50 AM
Originally posted by TheTrance
Unlike you, i am an educated person with 2 University degrees. The shell business is what i run on the side, and i've never really advertised it that much. That doesn't really mean that i'm inexperinced.

Education will never replace common sense. One of which you obviously lack.
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 01:50 AM
Originally posted by JacobD

I hope Ms. Hallissey follows through completely to your uplinks (which I'm assuming she already has) and show them your refusal to deal with your problem users.

Have a nice day.

I wish her luck in whatever she is undertaking
Have a even nicer day
Kelly Hallissey
07-11-2005, 01:53 AM
Originally posted by passwd
As per your initial post:

Where's the link to chpass.com/ispeeds in relation to this? Did you mess up in fabricating these logs or something? :x

Wow nice response to your abuse from your shells. Funny how in one log you admit someone on your bot did that but then you claim the logs are edited.

It doesn't fly passwd, I could paste your convos with others on efnet today on this topic who pasted them back to me to prove that it was you.

That what you want instead of just admitting it?
flameboy
07-11-2005, 01:58 AM
its funny, most isps would find a DoS attack a reason to take a look at their users, this guy uses it as an excuse to ignore it
myrddin
07-11-2005, 02:01 AM
I would really like to see some opinions on all this from other users on the board.

Speak now! (or forever hold your peace)
TheTrance
07-11-2005, 02:02 AM
you know whats even funnier? kelly getting her buddies to post here, trying so hard to accuse me of your little BS.
passwd
07-11-2005, 02:05 AM
I didn't comment on anything other than the fact that the portion of "Kelly Hallissey's" initial post that I pasted has NO link whatsoever to me. If you look at that section carefully, you will notice that the nicks in question (both receiver + sender) have no other link to any of the other content that was pasted which brings up some serious questions as to the credability of Ms. Kelly Hallissey.
Justin
07-11-2005, 02:06 AM
you know whats even funnier? kelly getting her buddies to post here, trying so hard to accuse me of your little BS.

TheTrance,

What I frankly find so interesting is the fact that you wish to dispute abuse with abuse which while in math class errors out to nothing but this is not math class now is it?

What I also find intriguing is how you claim everyone else on this thread is one of Kelly's "buddies" when many of us are avid WHT members who do contribute here often. I would strongly suggest you watch how you word things as I know I for one will not be dealing with your company ever as you wish to disregard abuse trying to make it just "go away" which doesn't solve a single thing.

-Justin
Kelly Hallissey
07-11-2005, 02:08 AM
Originally posted by passwd
I didn't comment on anything other than the fact that the portion of "Kelly Hallissey's" initial post that I pasted has NO link whatsoever to me. If you look at that section carefully, you will notice that the nicks in question (both receiver + sender) have no other link to any of the other content that was pasted which brings up some serious questions as to the credability of Ms. Kelly Hallissey.

So you don't dispute the logs of me with your shells? Interesting.
flameboy
07-11-2005, 02:09 AM
you know whats even funnier? kelly getting her buddies to post here, trying so hard to accuse me of your little BS.
You dont quit with the accusations do you?

I'm not kellys buddy, i havent had any conversations with her at all. I have seen in her in some channels and thats about it.

A link for this thread was pasted on irc and after reading it i decided to post.

there are PLENTY of reasons to side with kelly after reading the origional post, and none of them include being buddies with her.

please wakeup. Your using the fact that you got DoSed as an excuse to allow abuse to happen on your servers. You havent even issued an apology!
passwd
07-11-2005, 02:12 AM
I am disputing the accuracy of the information provided against me.
Kelly Hallissey
07-11-2005, 02:16 AM
Originally posted by passwd
I am disputing the accuracy of the information provided against me.

The only thing you copied as inaccurate was the log of the person claiming to have raped my child, I'll accept that wasn't you.

However

The logs of you from your ip on your box were you.
passwd
07-11-2005, 02:24 AM
Well than, if you wern't sure that was me or not, you should of not posted that at all. This just shows malice on your part, and an inability to post accurate information hence raising a reasonable doubt.
Justin
07-11-2005, 02:26 AM
Ok,

now for one who has bothered to lookup and verify disputed information posted by the O/P, from the whois information provided we can surmize the following:

the host in question (k-thx.biz) as proven by nslookup is hosting on the following DNS Servers (responding with the IP address: 206.53.59.xx):
ns1-ns4.chpass.com
Domain Type Class TTL Answer

k-thx.biz. A IN 3600 206.53.59.67

k-thx.biz. NS IN 3600 ns2.chpass.com.

k-thx.biz. NS IN 3600 ns3.chpass.com.

k-thx.biz. NS IN 3600 ns4.chpass.com.

k-thx.biz. NS IN 3600 ns1.chpass.com.

Now while this is clearly an IP address in use by chpass I can only presume that how ispeeds is involved (and thus the title of this thread) is due to the fact that this IP is swipped to their company and thus chpass is a client of theirs and thus making them responsible for handling abuse reports in a timely fashion....
NOTE: More information appears to be available at NET-206-53-59-0-1.

Rcp.net VELCOM (NET-206-53-48-0-1)
206.53.48.0 - 206.53.63.255
ISpeeds Communications I-SPEEDS (NET-206-53-59-0-1)
206.53.59.0 - 206.53.59.255

# ARIN WHOIS database, last updated 2005-07-10 19:10
# Enter ? for additional hints on searching ARIN's WHOIS database.

When looking up further...
NOTE: More information appears to be available at BST53-ARIN.


OrgName: ISpeeds Communications
OrgID: ISPEE-1
Address: 4324 finch ave east
City: Edmonton
StateProv: AB
PostalCode: M2N-6T6
Country: CA

NetRange: 206.53.59.0 - 206.53.59.255
CIDR: 206.53.59.0/24
NetName: I-SPEEDS
NetHandle: NET-206-53-59-0-1
Parent: NET-206-53-48-0-1
NetType: Reassigned
NameServer: NS1.ISPEEDS.NET
NameServer: NS2.ISPEEDS.NET
Comment:
RegDate: 2004-08-30
Updated: 2004-08-30

OrgTechHandle: BST53-ARIN
OrgTechName: xxx, xxx
OrgTechPhone:
OrgTechEmail: ***@ispeeds.net

Naturally I have blanked out the actual handle to prevent possible spam. In any case clearly TheTrance you are involved in this as you are the responsible party for this client's IP address.

-Justin
flameboy
07-11-2005, 02:26 AM
Originally posted by passwd
Well than, if you wern't sure that was me or not, you should of not posted that at all. This just shows malice on your part, and an inability to post accurate information hence raising a reasonable doubt.


Just curious, did anyone else chuckle when reading this?
Kelly Hallissey
07-11-2005, 02:28 AM
Originally posted by passwd
Well than, if you wern't sure that was me or not, you should of not posted that at all. This just shows malice on your part, and an inability to post accurate information hence raising a reasonable doubt.

Wrong, I said if you deny it is you I will accept that. That doesn't say I have a doubt, I just have no way of backing it up except for timing and nastiness which I have receieved from you and your company for quite a spell now.

That doesn't say I don't think it was you. And it shows no malice or reasonable doubt.

Good use of the dictionary on your last post
linds
07-11-2005, 02:28 AM
Session Start: Sun Jul 10 19:27:17 2005
Session Ident: KnightAZY
[19:27] Session Ident: KnightAZY (~kny@194.186.226.84)
[19:27] <KnightAZY> hey your daughter is such a whore, i ****ed that slut in the *** last night, so ****ing young and such a whore geez what are u teacher ur daughter
[19:27] <Brattie> wow nice thing to say about a 7 year old
[19:27] <Brattie> feel proud of yourself?
[19:28] <KnightAZY> your daughter is such a little ****, you gotta teachj that whore some manners otherwise she will group up to be a huge slut just like she is now
[19:28] <Brattie> Aren't you elite
[19:28] <Brattie> talking **** about a little kid
[19:28] <KnightAZY> yea i got an elite **** and it was in your daughters pussy


after reading all of this forum i am shocked that a simple dos would matter (if this lady did infact dos anything) over this dirty mouthed idiot, i would infact call this kind of verbal attack child porn and not dealing with this abuse makes me wonder if this place is allowing this kind of thing to go on.....
I wonder if u would allow this said if u infact had a child of this age?
I'm disgusted it is even allowed!
:angry:
flameboy
07-11-2005, 02:29 AM
Besides, passwd, its really silly that you make 3 points trying to point out that that wasnt you. Its besides the point.

Have you nothing to say about all the other logs???
Justin
07-11-2005, 02:38 AM
Ok now what really bothers me... Can I ask if the company ispeeds is so innocent why do I get to be unjustly harassed via IRC as follows:

Session Start: Mon Jul 11 02:31:34 2005
Session Ident: Teetrance
Session Ident: Teetrance (admin@packet.filtered.ca)
[2:31am]« Teetrance » you gotta believe me
[2:31am]« Teetrance » that she packtted me
[2:31am]« Teetrance » im gonna pull myself out of this
[2:32am]« Teetrance » i have 0 doubts
[2:32am]« Teetrance » otherwise i wouldnt be posting
[2:32am] <jeschur4> sir to what do i owe this pm
[2:32am] <jeschur4> if you would be handling abuse reports you would not of had a thread opened publicly about your company
[2:32am] <jeschur4> nobody is disputing a ddos attack
[2:32am]« Teetrance » well
[2:32am]« Teetrance » im saying that
[2:32am] <jeschur4> im not even going to bother to comment on such
[2:33am]« Teetrance » i would have handled it nicely if she didnt packet me
[2:33am]« Teetrance » if i do what she says now
[2:33am]« Teetrance » it looks bad for me
[2:33am] <jeschur4> your blatent disregard for abuse is something that shows i will _never_ be dealing with your company
[2:33am]« Teetrance » simply means i gaveup because she packetted me
[2:33am]« Teetrance » im doing whats common sense
[2:33am]« Teetrance » but im going to ignore whatever they post
[2:33am] <jeschur4> sir ill be ignoring any response at this point
[2:34am]« Teetrance » thats fine
[2:34am] <jeschur4> because you flat out and simply are trying to involve others who are outside observers
[2:34am]« Teetrance » not really
[2:34am] <jeschur4> it is your job as you are the IP owner to deal with abuse
[2:34am]« Teetrance » i dont care
[2:34am] <jeschur4> flat out and simple
[2:34am]« Teetrance » not at all
[2:34am] <jeschur4> so sir i recommend you become professional and bother to follow through on such
[2:34am]« Teetrance » its my job to show the true face of ********
[2:35am]« Teetrance » anyhow
««ñötîÇË»» /whois list for: Teetrance
««ñötîÇË»» Address: admin@packet.filtered.ca «« Canada »»
««ñötîÇË»» Name: C.
««ñötîÇË»» Channels: #sharktech
««ñötîÇË»» Server: irc.kagmir.ca, Server thats Dedicated to Kurious
««ñötîÇË»» End of /whois list for: Teetrance
[2:35am]« Teetrance » im not going to post anything there
[2:35am]« Teetrance » but you are involved with her as well
[2:35am] <jeschur4> I am quite tempted personally to disclose this log of your messaging/harassing me publicly
[2:35am]« Teetrance » hence why trying to hard
[2:35am]« Teetrance » to protect her
[2:35am] <jeschur4> I do not need to be dealing with you
[2:35am]« Teetrance » i know you all
[2:36am]« Teetrance » you might not know me
[2:36am] <jeschur4> she has helped mitigate kiddies from attacking my own company even
[2:36am]« Teetrance » but i know every one of you
[2:36am]« Teetrance » yeah
[2:36am] <jeschur4> and how am I involved?
[2:36am]« Teetrance » now that its her turnm your supporting her
[2:36am] <jeschur4> besides the fact she helps out with staminus
[2:36am]« Teetrance » anyways
[2:36am]« Teetrance » end of conversation
[2:36am]« Teetrance » i got to know you better.

This whole ordeal is making me not wish to deal even remotely with either company in this thread title.
Justin
07-11-2005, 02:45 AM
Further investigation of the IP that was used clearly shows:

Domain Type Class TTL Answer

packet.filtered.ca. A IN 1 66.252.10.253

filtered.ca. NS IN 38400 box.ispeeds.net.

box.ispeeds.net. A IN 900 69.31.73.221

IPwhois indicates:
NOTE: More information appears to be available at NET-66-252-10-128-1.

CREATIVE INTERNET TECHNIQUES CRTV-NET1 (NET-66-252-0-0-1)
66.252.0.0 - 66.252.31.255
iSpeeds CRTV-66-252-10-128 (NET-66-252-10-128-1)
66.252.10.128 - 66.252.10.255

# ARIN WHOIS database, last updated 2005-07-10 19:10
# Enter ? for additional hints on searching ARIN's WHOIS database.

I for one would like to know why this company chooses to unjustly try to let themselves off the hook. That as well as going harassing other providers on a live support medium. In any case I do hope that this issue gets resolved finally.

-Justin
blueneon
07-11-2005, 03:36 AM
I have just finished reading the posts (of which I found a link to via IRC).
I have to say that I found it both very entertaining and appalling to say the least.
Let me take this opportunity to speak from my own capacity as a hosting/dedicated server provider. If I received the same abuse@ email as “TheTrace” did with regards to the illegal use of my services, I would instantly deal with the situation (and I would deal with the manner as a separate and singular subject to do with the user in question).
If I then proceeded to receive what I *thought* to be a Ddos attack on my network, I would record all fire-walling / software logs. I would then deal with this latter subject in its entirety on its own. It has been made very clear that you have based your – quote – “Strong evidence” – unquote – on nothing more than an assumption, as you said your self – quote - “You *hinting* in your email” – unquote – I find that, not only completely unprofessional, but also it shows your total lack of technical administration skills. The fact that you have no way of shedding some light on the *proof* requested other then referring to what *you* perceived to be a *hint* in some email correspondence.
In my opinion I think you may have experienced some sort of server lag (if anything) due to whatever reason, and in you incapacity as an admin you *assumed* you were being attacked. Furthermore you used you numb wits to link Kelly to this “so-called” attack. Thereby decided in your complete confusion to simply shrug the entire matter off.
The fact is that you received an abuse@ email containing legitimate logs that a user (or more likely just a buddy that you let use your server – as I strongly doubt your legitimacy as a company) was using your services for illegal purposes and that should have been dealt with (at least for the sake of your own network integrity and other users *if in deed you even have any*) whether or not Kelly was in some how involved in what you seem to think was some kind of revenge attack, this matter should have been dealt with professionally and in its own capacity – ie. You send an abuse@ email to *her* uplink.
In conclusion it looks like you should have simply not replied in WHT as you have now made a complete mockery of your *so-called* company.

Regards
Blueneon
passwd
07-11-2005, 04:10 AM
Quote from initial post:

Wow what a nice group of folks, I joined their channel and was banned on join. So I ask my friends to help me find their uplink, its on ispeeds.net and their uplink is velcom.com, but the nameserver for the domain is chpass.com, now here's where it gets interesting, I msged chpass the owner and asked why this was going on, he wasn't idle but chose not to answer.

chpass is adv@get.your.shell.at.chpass.com * <url snipped> - stable/reliable undroppable shell
chpass on #vcd #god +#gangsta-vibez +#XDCC-FILES +#chpass +#mp3dcc +#0day-Xdcc +#bootlegcentral +#metalmetal
chpass using irc.nac.net I have a poisonous friend
chpass has been idle 6mins 19secs, signed on Sun Jul 10 17:20:20
chpass End of /WHOIS list.

---

Congrats! You messaged the adv bot? Want a metal? LOL

Just another example of inaccurate information (that bot being reffered to as the owner).
BigBison
07-11-2005, 04:12 AM
Originally posted by Kelly Hallissey
...Funny how in one log you admit someone on your bot did that but then you claim the logs are edited...

Yes, I raised an eyebrow on that as well. You know what else I found odd? These statements:

Originally posted by TheTrance
...i have firewall logs of you attempting to DDoS the individual in question...Your chat (argument) logs with the client in question, and my firewall logs match perfectly, so does the IP address in question...

Followed by this statement:

Originally posted by TheTrance
I am not saying she did it, but she has most likely got someone to "take care" of the client in question.

That's a considerable amount of backpedaling considering the 'IP match in the logs'. Was it her IP address or not?

Originally posted by blueneon
If I received the same abuse@ email as “TheTrace” did with regards to the illegal use of my services, I would instantly deal with the situation (and I would deal with the manner as a separate and singular subject to do with the user in question).
If I then proceeded to receive what I *thought* to be a Ddos attack on my network, I would record all fire-walling / software logs. I would then deal with this latter subject in its entirety on its own.

Welcome to WHT, blueneon! I agree, it's shocking. Follow up on the CC phreaking and then deal with the DDoS separately. "Kelly did it" appears to have been an assumption, and a baseless one at that.

Originally posted by TheTrance
I have my evidance and i dont NEED to prove it to anyone.

If you are unwilling to provide proof of a criminal accusation, you become guilty of libel. Had you not made a public accusation of a crime against Ms. Hallissey, only then would you not NEED to prove it to anyone. If you are unwilling to provide that proof in this thread, then you NEED to issue a retraction and apologize to Ms. Hallissey, IMHO.

Originally posted by TheTrance
Like i said, I am not sitting here to police IRC for you.

But you are required to investigate abuse complaints of a criminal nature against your customers. It's in the agreement you signed with whomever your upstream providers happen to be. Pretty standard thing. You were in error not to follow up on either the threats/harassment or CC phreaking and I imagine, unless Kelly is making all this up, this will get you into some trouble with the tier above you, particularly if they know you think they're "a bunch of monkeys".

http://www.webhostingtalk.com/showthread.php?s=&threadid=413379

Originally posted by TheTrance
you know whats even funnier? kelly getting her buddies to post here, trying so hard to accuse me of your little BS.

Resorting to name calling and profanity certainly doesn't help your case. The complaint against you is a lack of professionalism, to which you respond "BS". But it was out of line to question jschurawlow's motives. He's been around here acting professionally long enough where his word does carry a lot of weight. I've never read any of your posts, or Kelly's, before tonight but if you want my opinion on which of you is a professional, I don't think you really have to ask.
Kelly Hallissey
07-11-2005, 04:14 AM
Thank you for proving what I've said about chpass so far passwd, you are showing yourself as the fine upstanding quality person my original post shows you as.
myrddin
07-11-2005, 04:17 AM
Originally posted by passwd
Quote from initial post:

Wow what a nice group of folks, I joined their channel and was banned on join. So I ask my friends to help me find their uplink, its on ispeeds.net and their uplink is velcom.com, but the nameserver for the domain is chpass.com, now here's where it gets interesting, I msged chpass the owner and asked why this was going on, he wasn't idle but chose not to answer.

chpass is adv@get.your.shell.at.chpass.com * <url snipped> - stable/reliable undroppable shell
chpass on #vcd #god +#gangsta-vibez +#XDCC-FILES +#chpass +#mp3dcc +#0day-Xdcc +#bootlegcentral +#metalmetal
chpass using irc.nac.net I have a poisonous friend
chpass has been idle 6mins 19secs, signed on Sun Jul 10 17:20:20
chpass End of /WHOIS list.

---

Congrats! You messaged the adv bot? Want a metal? LOL

Just another example of inaccurate information (that bot being reffered to as the owner).

I love how even AFTER you edited your post, you still left a funny little typo in there. It's medal, not metal. =/
zacharooni
07-11-2005, 04:21 AM
*yawn*
Too early in the morning for this shiznit. :\
I don't know how you guys do it.
flameboy
07-11-2005, 04:23 AM
Originally posted by passwd
Quote from initial post:

Wow what a nice group of folks, I joined their channel and was banned on join. So I ask my friends to help me find their uplink, its on ispeeds.net and their uplink is velcom.com, but the nameserver for the domain is chpass.com, now here's where it gets interesting, I msged chpass the owner and asked why this was going on, he wasn't idle but chose not to answer.

chpass is adv@get.your.shell.at.chpass.com * <url snipped> - stable/reliable undroppable shell
chpass on #vcd #god +#gangsta-vibez +#XDCC-FILES +#chpass +#mp3dcc +#0day-Xdcc +#bootlegcentral +#metalmetal
chpass using irc.nac.net I have a poisonous friend
chpass has been idle 6mins 19secs, signed on Sun Jul 10 17:20:20
chpass End of /WHOIS list.

---

Congrats! You messaged the adv bot? Want a metal? LOL

Just another example of inaccurate information (that bot being reffered to as the owner).


You can keep doing this, but like i said before. Nitpicking over little errors doesnt change the overall picture and just makes you look even more ridiculous.
blueneon
07-11-2005, 04:25 AM
Well Done Passwd!!!!
I think you should get a medal too...
Only this one should come in to shiney rings and be place around your rists rather then you neck.
passwd
07-11-2005, 04:30 AM
My whole point is that this case is not being built on facts. Bottom line.
Kelly Hallissey
07-11-2005, 04:40 AM
Originally posted by passwd
My whole point is that this case is not being built on facts. Bottom line.

The facts are I posted logs that are time/date stamped along with whoises and have since sent them to various uplinks of some of the various hosts who have requested them, in those logs you claimed it wasn't you but then you claim the very logs were edited WHILE we were in msgs.

Funny how thats your defense here, would have flown if you hadn't claimed it in the logs I posted.

Trance claims in one post that I have a motive for doing this and because of his dealings with me I am not to be believed, then turns around and says he doesn't know me.

::BLINK::

Pick a stance and stick with it.

passwd, if all you are going to do is post potshots then perhaps you shouldn't post here, it just makes you and your company appear to be exactly what I said it was in my original post.

Kelly
b00m
07-11-2005, 05:12 AM
greetings-

I know first hand of Ms. Brattie
Where do I begin..

I would label her as a "**** Stirrer".
I joined #obs on efnet after my nickname was juped by a bunch of packet kiddies who were all associated with #obs. I asked if I could have my nickname back, and why I was being ddos'd.

Only minutes later, my entire network was receiving massive traffic from random locations, SYN/UDP attacks, these continued over the course of a few hours. They continued to come in and out in waves, for the next 2 weeks.

After complaining in #obs that they were childish and should get a life, I was pummeled with more threats, including some from Brattie, I remember something along the lines of "I'll drop your **** in no time". Remember that, dont'cha? Well it wasn't a few minutes after that my network had no connectivity, and null routing ips was the only option. After the attack was overwith, we have a total of 40932.4GB bandwidth transfered. This is over a course of 2 weeks, I would like to personally thank you for the wonderful bill you've organized for my company.

If you think this is a simple complaint you're wrong, Ms. Brattie you've already been involved in prior cases, it's a shame you'll be speaking with federal agents again. I hope you've got a good story, and a good lawyer.

I'll be expecting those funds back for my bandwidth., good day hussy!
b00m
07-11-2005, 05:39 AM
Quote from Brattie:

*I* didn't dos anyone down, I pasted the conversation in a channel and asked wtf it was, that's it._ I couldn't traceroute from here to find the uplink and asked someone to traceroute it for me (the isp here blocks traceroute, ping, etc)._ That's not saying "Dos this" and its not my fault someone chose to hit it due to it, as far as *I* know the box never dropped, you saying the box got dropped is the first I have heard of it._ And frankly, if you allow your users to do crap like that from your box then why are you so shocked someone did hit it?_ Seems to me that the weight is on the person who pasted my social security #, not me.

-------------------------------------

Notice the usage of the *'s in "I", yes, you didn't do it yourself, you msg'd your cyber lovers to do the dirty work for you. It's not rocket science to see what's going on. Anyone with half a clue knows exactly what is going on. Secondly, why should it be the providers responsibility to prevent someone from pasting a series of digits on the internet. If you're going to continually whine about your information being dropped, why make friends with a bunch of DDoS attackers who continue to DDoS anyone they feel like. In my opinion you deserve your information slapped allover the internet. You also deserve a lynching.
myrddin
07-11-2005, 05:45 AM
Lovely attack to #obs on EFnet:


[2:39:53] <User21> ispeeds ownz j00 molo,%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[2:39:53] <Turbonet4> ispeeds ownz j00 molo,%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[2:39:53] *User21(#obs)* ispeeds ownz j00 mulu,%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[2:39:53] *Turbonet4(#obs)* ispeeds ownz j00 mulu,%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[2:39:54] <warnet118> ispeeds ownz j00 molo,%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[2:39:54] <vl1474> ispeeds ownz j00 molo,%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[2:39:54] <user45> ispeeds ownz j00 molo,%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[2:39:54] *user45(#obs)* ispeeds ownz j00 mulu,%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[2:39:55] <Container> ispeeds ownz j00 molo,%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[2:39:55] *warnet118(#obs)* ispeeds ownz j00 mulu,%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
[2:39:55] vl1474 (~vl1474@210.213.231.58) has parted. «193 people»
[2:39:56] user45 (~user45@61.5.66.62) has parted. «192 people»
[2:39:56] *Container(#obs)* ispeeds ownz j00 mulu,%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%


Very professional if ya ask me.
Cr0fter
07-11-2005, 05:46 AM
Originally posted by b00m
greetings-

I know first hand of Ms. Brattie
Where do I begin..

I would label her as a "**** Stirrer".
I joined #obs on efnet after my nickname was juped by a bunch of packet kiddies who were all associated with #obs. I asked if I could have my nickname back, and why I was being ddos'd.

Only minutes later, my entire network was receiving massive traffic from random locations, SYN/UDP attacks, these continued over the course of a few hours. They continued to come in and out in waves, for the next 2 weeks.

After complaining in #obs that they were childish and should get a life, I was pummeled with more threats, including some from Brattie, I remember something along the lines of "I'll drop your **** in no time". Remember that, dont'cha? Well it wasn't a few minutes after that my network had no connectivity, and null routing ips was the only option. After the attack was overwith, we have a total of 40932.4GB bandwidth transfered. This is over a course of 2 weeks, I would like to personally thank you for the wonderful bill you've organized for my company.

If you think this is a simple complaint you're wrong, Ms. Brattie you've already been involved in prior cases, it's a shame you'll be speaking with federal agents again. I hope you've got a good story, and a good lawyer.

I'll be expecting those funds back for my bandwidth., good day hussy!


Its funny how you just registered TODAY and one of your posts are in this thread. This is probably an account created by TheTrance or one of his kiddies...
b00m
07-11-2005, 05:51 AM
uhm. yeah --- ask brattie if she remembers the ddos she organized. let me guess "no"
myrddin
07-11-2005, 05:57 AM
Now the attack to #obs says:

[2:53:28] <uhwm> **** you kelz, ispeeds ownz j00 molo,%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% %%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%

These people need to be STOPPED. If it is in fact ispeeds initiating this, I would hope that the authorities get involved. This should not be tolerated.
Cr0fter
07-11-2005, 06:01 AM
so someone who just registered to post in this thread claims Brattie ddosed him with no evidence to proove that, just like TheTrance's claim. Even a 10 year old kid won't believe your crap. Hell I can register with another nick under a proxy and do the same thing.
b00m
07-11-2005, 06:09 AM
Yes-- No evidence, exactly why im posting, why the **** would I post if I didnt have a solid backing of what's going on? I don't need to show logs to you to prove it, they are already relayed to who they need to be. Quit making excuses for your IRC whore friend.
Cr0fter
07-11-2005, 06:17 AM
Originally posted by b00m
Yes-- No evidence, exactly why im posting, why the **** would I post if I didnt have a solid backing of what's going on? I don't need to show logs to you to prove it, they are already relayed to who they need to be. Quit making excuses for your IRC whore friend.

If they are already relayed to who they need to be why did you even waste your time registering and posting this? Just to back up TheTrance's claims? So you're going to back him up with no evidence what so ever just like TheTrance? If so, I would like to congratulate you, you have done a great job in convincing me. Besides, anyone who would read this thread would think twice before buying off ispeeds.net. You don't have to make it worse. And btw, the people on #obs don't even know who am I. And spamming #obs wouldn't help you, it makes things worse.
b00m
07-11-2005, 06:28 AM
Why are you wasting your time replying to my post? I'm stating facts, I don't care what you believe, I know what happened, I was the one hit repeatedly with DDoS for weeks. You were not.
Cr0fter
07-11-2005, 07:08 AM
Facts are to be supported by evidence, otherwise they would just be claims.
anon-e-mouse
07-11-2005, 10:50 AM
Closed for review and/or cleaning/tossing.



~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Having been personally attacked by her (the 3rd time in 7 years  I have actually   run into this demon ) 2 weekends ago while showing the Obama deception on www.unstream.tv/Deprogram
Our sister channel linked via bots  to efnet was attacked by her and her bots. Many of the hosts actually match those found  in strings of botnets found in the host lists i posted in an earlier thread...

That said I leave you with  what the encyclopedia dramatica has to say about her.

http://encyclopediadramatica.com/Brattie

Kelly Hallissey
From Encyclopedia Dramatica
(Redirected from Brattie)
Jump to: navigation, search
Kelly's method of extracting favors from admins leaves something to be desired.
Kelly's method of extracting favors from admins leaves something to be desired.

Kelly Hallissey is some basement-dwelling fatty who got angry because AOL tricked her into agreeing to work for free for them. When she found out that even people with Asperger's syndrome were entitled to compensation for their time, she got angry and decided to sue them. She started an ill-conceived class action Internet lawsuit that resulted in lots of lulz for the AOL legal team.

After being laughed out of court, Kelly decided she was quitting AOL forever and built up a squadron of skript kiddie scenesters that proceeded to endlessly terrorize AOL with electronic break-ins and denial of service attacks. It consists entirely of autistic males who hope to one day get laid by this enormously fat whore. They idle in #obs on EFnet, where Kelly can be found threatening to have someone's shell account taken because she has cybersex with admins of companies.

Ironically, Kelly's website (observers.net) was built and is maintained (albeit poorly) by an unpaid cyber-sweatshop. Kelly lies awake at night worrying that her own volunteers will sue.

[lordssyndicate]

A Cyber Sweatshop that had direct ties to this group of internet Nazis :

http://www.cyberangels.org/
From
http://www.cyberangels.org/about.php
When Curtis Sliwa founded The Guardian Angels in 1979, the safety risks facing New Yorkers were daunting and obvious. Yet today our children face even greater threats in the online world - insidious because they elude detection, making them difficult to avoid. In response to citizens' calls for assistance in dealing with online threats, the Guardian Angels launched CyberAngels in 1995.

Today CyberAngels is one of the oldest and most respected online safety education programs in the world. Under the leadership of Anthony de Araujo and Katya Gifford, the program has expanded to become a virtual learning community - earning a prominent position among online safety education providers.


Aside from being the founder of the Guardian Angels - a known COINTEL Pro shop Here is the rest of his story (not doctored by himself like the one on Wikipedia...)
http://www.s9.com/Biography/Sliwa-Curtis

1954 - Born on the 26th of March in Canarsie, Brooklyn, New York.

1970 - He had fabricated a series of criminal incidents "that clearly had not taken place".

 

1979 - Founded Guardian Angels.

 

1980 - He was also active in Buffalo, New York and was often critical of local police policies and practices.

1990 - He was co-host with his then-wife Lisa Evers on WABC-AM in New York City.

1992 - On the 19th of June, Sliwa was ambushed by two gunmen after getting in the back of a taxi in New York City.

2005 - On the 20th of September, the case against Gotti was declared a mistrial after the jury became hopelessly deadlocked.

2006 - A retrial on the same charges was declared a mistrial on the 10th of March, again due to a deadlocked jury.

         - The third trial was declared a mistrial on the 27th of September, once again due to a deadlocked jury.

         - On the 20th of October, prosecutors announced that they will not re-try Gotti, and dismissed the charges against him. Sliwa was outraged by the decision and announced that he will sue Gotti for the kidnapping attempt.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

More on the second point of this time line :
http://encyclopedia.stateuniversity.com/pages/5297/Curtis-Sliwa.html

Curtis Sliwa - Career, Assassination attempt on Sliwa, Current media presence, Family, Trivia



Social activist, born in New York City, New York, USA. He was a rebellious student in parochial school. While working at a McDonald's restaurant, he organized the Rock Brigade, which evolved into the Magnificent Thirteen and then the Guardian Angels (1979). Originally the Guardian Angels simply wanted to protect subway riders in New York City, but the organization spread to many other cities (eventually to foreign countries) and broadened its goals to protecting people in various public areas. Some regarded the Angels as potentially dangerous vigilantes, but gradually the group came to be accepted by city governments and the public at large. He married Lisa Evers (1981), a karate black belt, who served as his close associate in his expanding organization. There were several attempts on Sliwa's life during the 1980s.

Curtis Sliwa (born March 26, 1954 in Canarsie, Brooklyn, New York) founded the Guardian Angels in 1979, a volunteer anti-crime organization with which he has remained closely identified.
Career

Sliwa originally created the organization to combat widespread violence and crime on the New York City subways. Sliwa later admitted that, in order to attract favorable media attention the Guardian Angels, he had fabricated a series of criminal incidents "that clearly had not taken place" in the late 1970's and early 1980s.

In the early 1980's, he was also active in Buffalo, New York and was often critical of local police policies and practices.

Sliwa later became a populist conservative radio talk show host, although his political views are less noticeable than his "gift of gab" rapid-fire speaking style. In the early 1990's, Sliwa was co-host with his then-wife Lisa Evers on WABC-AM in New York City.
Assassination attempt on Sliwa

On June 19, 1992 Sliwa was ambushed by two gunmen after getting in the back of a taxi in New York City. "Junior" Gotti, son of the late crime boss John Gotti, and two members of the Gambino crime family were charged with conspiring to murder Sliwa in retaliation for comments about the elder Gotti that Sliwa made during his radio program.
Current media presence

After his attempted murder, his WABC program was cancelled. Through his friendship with Mayor Rudy Giuliani Sliwa landed a radio program on the then city-owned and operated WNYC.

Sliwa is now the co-host, with Ron Kuby, of the "Curtis and Kuby in the Morning" program aired weekdays from 5 A.M. Sliwa and Kuby also co-hosted a television version of "Curtis &
Family

In 2004 Sliwa married for a third time and became a father.
Trivia

Sliwa is known for his connection to the New York City local community and frequently participates in local events.

Please include a link to this page if you have found this material useful for research or writing a related article. Content on this website is from high-quality, licensed material originally published in print form. You can always be sure you're reading unbiased, factual, and accurate information.

Highlight the text below, right-click, and select “copy”. Paste the link into your website, email, or any other HTML document.
<a href="http://encyclopedia.stateuniversity.com/pages/5297/Curtis-Sliwa.html">Curtis Sliwa - Career, Assassination attempt on Sliwa, Current media presence, Family, Trivia</a>

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

What this evidence also shows is direct ties to the Mafia. They especially don't attempt to kill a  public personality on a radio talk show - who is merely making  emblazoned comments  , unless they know you have the real dirt on them.

The only way to have dirt on them that infuriating is to have been a part of that inner circle...
Meaning Curtis had to have been having dealing with them himself personally for them to be that afraid ...



~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

In his own words he is :


http://www.guardianangels.org/curtis.html


 Curtis Sliwa
CEO & Founder

Curtis Sliwa begins each weekday morning well before sunrise, at "the Rooster Hour", bringing his high energy, sharp wit, and candor to thousands of New Yorkers as the popular host of WABC 770 AM Radio's "The Curtis Sliwa Show," broadcast from 5 AM-6 AM and 10AM -12 PM, Monday through Friday). After jump-starting the days of radio listeners with news, lively commentary, and interviews, he often rushes off for a television appearance on, FOX News, BBC, CNN, Hannity and Colmes, or Time Warner Cable's NY1. Curtis caps off the day by taking it "from the suites to the streets" for 96.9 WTKK in Boston from 10PM to 1 AM.

Next, as Founder and CEO of the non-profit, volunteer Alliance of Guardian Angels, Inc ("The Guardian Angels"), Curtis takes to his cell phone, computer, and the streets to address the latest activity at the Angel's 136 chapters in 13 nations (the US, Canada, Japan, Philippines, New Zealand, Peru, Brazil, Denmark, England, Macedonia, South Africa, Israel, and Mexico). The well-trained Guardian Angels serve their communities, patrolling streets and subways as one, unarmed, to deter crime and violence. A new chapter is forming, yet another community or citizen is crying out for help, or the Angels are responding to an act of violence or crisis. He might book a weekend visit to a city in need, meet with local chapter members, set off for a local crime scene to offer help, or volunteer to safeguard a community event.

The red beret proudly worn by Curtis and Guardian Angels around the world has become an icon for "safety", the singular goal of the organization. The life of Curtis is one of dedication, unwavering commitment, and selflessness. The enemies, to name a few, are gangbangers, bullies, cyberbullies and Internet predators. Our young people are among our most vulnerable and a major target of his protective efforts. The answers he offers are education, empowerment, and collaboration.

Curtis has built his global grass roots volunteer organization by "empowering the powerless", engaging individuals to help themselves without standing by, waiting for help or backing from government and other resources. Says Curtis, "You have to get involved in the process. Don't sit on the sidelines." His example of leadership, personal responsibility, and the power of "Us and We, not I and Me" has inspired individuals of all races, ethnicities, and ages for 29 years to step up to the plate, become actively engaged in solutions, recognizing that every person CAN make a difference.

Curtis and his wife Mary, the organization's COO, have expanded the Angels target zone, from streets and subways to schools, parents, and the Internet. They dispatch Guardian Angels Education Teams to schools in New York, New Jersey, Washington DC, and Florida, where members conduct programs to raise awareness about bullying, gangs, youth violence, and Internet threats, and outline solutions to help safeguard children and families. Recently, they introduced their first online program on bullying and gang awareness, prevention and defense. They are growing CyberAngels, the organization's Internet Safety program, which has been teaching families how to stay safe online since 1995. CyberAngels was recipient of The prestigious Points of Light Presidential Service Award in 1998.

Born and raised in the Canarsie section of Brooklyn, Curtis started his lifetime work in public service as a young man. As night manager of the McDonald's at Webster and Fordham Road in the Bronx in the early 70s, he instituted a community clean-up program. Local volunteers, dubbed the "Rock Brigade," painted over graffiti, cleaned up vacant lots, boarded up vacant buildings and planted trees and gardens.

Later that decade, determined to take back the community, reduced by drugs, crime, gangs, and arson, Curtis expanded his neighborhood program to patrol the Number 4 train, then known as the "Mugger's Express." Curtis recruited a multi-cultural, multi-racial team of volunteers ("the Magnificent 13") who rode one of NYC's worst subway lines between the toughest stops in the city, making citizen's arrest, if needed, to detain gang members and criminals for police. Initially they encountered resistance and skepticism from both transit and local police. Soon however, doubt was replaced with trust as Guardian Angels volunteers became role models. Out of these modest beginnings, The Guardian Angels was born in 1979.

Curtis is a member of the Board of Directors for The Children's Miracle Network. He is featured frequently as a guest lecturer at colleges and universities, and an adjunct professor at St. John's University. Since 2002, the Angels have conducted workshops at St. John's University in support of the Safe Schools Against Violence in Education Act (S.A.V.E.). Curtis' programs and initiatives have been recognized by Presidents and Prime Ministers, Governors, Senators and Mayors, as well as by leading businessmen, veterans groups and numerous other associations. He wins praises time and time again for his appearances as a speaker before corporate teams, media professionals, senior executives, non-profit associations and educators. Curtis was voted Top Talk Show Host of the Year by Radio and Records Magazine, and has been nominated for numerous other prestigious industry awards.

Curtis married wife Mary in 2000. They have one son, Anthony Chester, born in 2003.

"Ideas CAN become realities as long as you roll up your sleeves, you do the hard work, and you're true to your commitment and your cause." - Curtis Sliw


Me pukes from the stench of NWO Nazi propaganda....

That said  ... now we look at who funds the Guardian Angels


http://www.newyorksocialdiary.com/node/1981


Sanctuary for Families held its12th Annual Zero Tolerance Benefit on Tuesday, June 5th at Pier Sixty. They raised over $1.47 million in support of their work with domestic violence victims.

The event honored Carole Hochman with the Zero Tolerance Award, presented to her by her daughter and Sara Allard. CB Richard Ellis was honored with the Corporate Vision Award and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP, the Law Firm Leadership Award. Co-Chairs for the evening were Sara Allard, Creative Director, Carole Hochman Design Group; Cherrie Nanninga, Chief Operating Officer, CB Richard Ellis, New York Tri-State Region; and Robert C. Sheehan, Executive Partner, Skadden Arps.Over 970 guests attended the dinner and awards presentation.

Following dinner, more than 1000 guests attended the dance party, hosted by Moby and Charles Rockefeller and sponsored by Grey Goose and Lucky Magazine. 2007 Rock ‘n’ Roll Hall of Fame inductee DJ Grandmaster Flash kept the huge crowd on the dance floor. A raffle and silent auction was held throughout the evening, with a special limited–ticket raffle for a Vespa Scooter.
The evenings guests included Laurel W. Eisner, Sanctuary for Families’ Executive Director; Loretta McCarthy, President of the Board of Directors of Sanctuary for Families; Stephanie Schwartz Ferdman, Chair of Sanctuary’s President’s Council; Paul Carlucci (Publisher The New York Post), (Creative Director, Calvin Klein),Carole Hochman (President, Carole Hochman Design), Betsey Johnson, Chantal Bacon, Susan and Alex Casdin, Holly Speyer Lipton and Jonathan Lipton, Kelly  Kennedy Mack and Stephen Mack, Sheryl and Barry K. Schwartz (Mr. Schwartz is former Chairman & CEO of Calvin Klein), Kimberly Kravis Schulhof and Joanthan Schulhof, Stanley Shopkorn, Susan Sokol (President, Vera Wang), Brendan Shanahan of the New York Rangers, Curtis Sliwa (ABC Radio talk show host and founder of the Guardian Angels), Darren Walker (Vice President, Rockefeller Foundation) and City Council Members Vincent J. Gentile, Darren Walker (Vice President, Rockefeller Foundation, and David Yassky.

Sanctuary for Families is the largest nonprofit in New York State dedicated exclusively to serving domestic violence victims and their children. Each year, they help thousands of victims and their children build safe lives by offering a range of high-quality services to meet their complex needs.  www.sanctuaryforfamilies.org 




Jay - We all see your COINTEL Pro Shills are the ones using all of the MITER / PTECH / NSA Backdoors you had them build to wage False Flag Attacks on OUR THE TAX PAYTERS INTERNET!!!   CUT THAT SH*TE THE FRACK OUT!!!  We Know who you are!

[lordssyndicate]

lordsyndicate...

People do that stuff for fun, it's been going on since 1990 and I wouldn't expect it to end anytime soon..

Just log off irc..

Having been the IRCD coder for Infatech believe me I am well aware of the nature of IRC. But, time and again these individuals always end up having something to do with all of the major kiddie porn and ddos botnets......


I realize how things work on IRC - that's why I rarely spend time there any more (too much drama)..

My point here is being one so familiar with IRC and the IT community I am aware what is considered normaand not normnal.

If you know who Bratty is on efnet then you will admit there is nothing normal about the way she blatantly violates all of efnet's terms of service and yet has an operhost spoof.  Why reward some one who admittedly for a period of 3 months  carried out DDOS attacks on many efnet servers reseting many ISP's routers at the time.

Why is it she and her clan are the only ones left around collecting massive botnets when you used to have hundreads if not thousands of script kidies doing the same?

Why do all the major botnets now blatantly all trace back to her and her  crew and no one is doing a damn thing about it?


That is why this is not your typical IRC drama ....
Because, Kelly Hallisey either works for the CIA or is a major player at COINTEL Pro. I have seen this lady frame too many people over the past decade for shit she herself is responsible for... (and it's obvious she and her crew did it because thier IP's and hostnames etc are everywhere).

Hell in the late 90's Marshal Chicosto of Cyberarmy.com found conclusive evidence which he gave to interpol that proved she and ring of hackers who were part of the "cyber angels" were in fact the largest purveyors of child pornography on the internet and even had ties to dyna corps. Several of Kelly's accomplices went to jail and she spent the next 6 months DDOSing cyberarmy.com .....

Point being I know this lady. I have had the misfortune of dealing with her one to many times personally ... I know for a faact she has served as an informant to put to patsy several friends of mine in 2003 who were running a truth related  streaming video website.

She had them framed for credit card fraud  then  tried to do the same with myself by sending my paypal account large numbers of bogus transactions .... Being I had no reason to expect receiving money I refunded every one of the transactions and avoided being hit with charges myself....

I have therefore  made my statements and done my research based on prior experiences with this individual. ....

[mr anderson]

Don't worry the Air Force can save us..

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t849CYRd2Ak

[lordssyndicate]

Don't worry the Air Force can save us..

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t849CYRd2Ak

More propaganda from Rockefeller minions.... This exactly the stuff Anti Illuminati and I have been discussing --they carry out millions of Cyber attacks on themselves daily -- it is used as a method to harden their systems in real time on the fly.

Or I should say they monitor Agile's realtime interactions and ability to learn to cope with all cyber attacks and harden itself on the fly.

This AI learns and uses all it learns it to harden ITSELF -- and more accurately calculate it's own Petri Nets! EVEN

The OMG Documents and  George Mason University Documents give you the exact blueprints for this system... Anti Illuminati and myself are working to transcribe these PDFs they are numerous and some  quite lengthy.

But, if you ever wanted to build your own massive petri net capable super AI system to control the world here are the FRACKING BLUE PRINTS EVEN! Or design a system to counter theirs. A counter AI even! (either one would cost billions mind you)  Courtesy the NWO's  themselves via their own public non-classified web archives....  which probably won't be public for long after this ....

 
http://www.badongo.com/file/14358435 George Mason Univeristy PDFs
http://www.badongo.com/file/14358728 OMG PDFs

[techie]

I was loading the [Cyber War Games using "Red Teams" to prep for cyber false flags] and the [Electric Grid BS conditioning for Booz Allen/MITRE/Ptec's Cyberterror False Flag] threads on my five year old linux installation's Epiphany 1.2.8 browser,  and a popup window on my screen says:

*******************************************************
Connect to untrusted site?

Your browser was unable to trust "www.cwid.js.mil". It is possible that someone is intercepting your communication to obtain your confidential information.

You should only connect to the site if you are certain you are connected to "www.cwid.js.mil".
********************************************************

I tried to re-create this happenning,  by loading the pages again,  but it only happened the first time.

Sorry  if this is too far off topic,  just wondered if anyone else has this happen.

__________
techie

[lordssyndicate]

I was loading the [Cyber War Games using "Red Teams" to prep for cyber false flags] and the [Electric Grid BS conditioning for Booz Allen/MITRE/Ptec's Cyberterror False Flag] threads on my five year old linux installation's Epiphany 1.2.8 browser,  and a popup window on my screen says:

*******************************************************
Connect to untrusted site?

Your browser was unable to trust "www.cwid.js.mil". It is possible that someone is intercepting your communication to obtain your confidential information.

You should only connect to the site if you are certain you are connected to "www.cwid.js.mil".
********************************************************

I tried to re-create this happenning,  by loading the pages again,  but it only happened the first time.

Sorry  if this is too far off topic,  just wondered if anyone else has this happen.

__________
techie

Yes we've seen that before  some of the links hit a .MIL SSL server with a private certificate.
Yet another tactic to discourage readers.....

[Anti_Illuminati]

Quote from:  Psycopath Rockefeller strikes again! Pentagon Hacked [Inside job? Duh!]

No doubt, you have seen the news that F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program was breached by hackers, with all signs pointing to China. The Post reports that Lockheed Martin and the Pentagon are saying that no serious compromises occurred:

“We know we are probed on this every day. We have very aggressive defensive systems. The more sensitive the information, the greater the safeguards are,” said Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman. He said he was not aware of any sensitive F-35 technology having been compromised by a cyber-attack.

And this just as the 60-day cybersecurity review is about to be completed. Coincidence?

Andrew Storms, at nCircle, says the rash of recent revelations has the scent of a campaign. In an email, he told me:

The recent rash of breach disclosures can mean one thing, the federal government is greasing the wheels for more money and new legislation. This is a classic tactic both in government and private sector business. You first build up awareness for your cause, then instill some FUD, then you come in the most innovated looking proposal to solve all the issues. A word to anyone emotionally caught up in the Chinese super hackers taking over the US networks - perspective.

And at the RSA conference, we should see some tip of the hand from cybersecurity lead Melissa Hathaway.

Chances are we will hear more promotion of the public/private sector partnerships strategic goal, but this time the plans will also include significant sticks.

http://government.zdnet.com/?p=4666

http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/government/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=207100754&cid=tab_art_hard

RSA: Cyber Storm II Builds Network To Defend Against Cyber Crisis

The latest government-sponsored simulated computer security crisis shows there are still some shortfalls in information sharing.

By Thomas Claburn
InformationWeek
April 9, 2008 06:36 PM

Among the goals for Cyber Storm II, a government-sponsored computer security exercise that occurred last month, was testing information sharing capabilities across organizations during a crisis.

By the accounts of panelists at the RSA Conference in San Francisco who participated in the exercise, the simulated cyber crisis was hugely valuable; they just couldn't share very much information about what went on.

Detailed information about Cyber Storm II will be made available later this summer in an after-action report, said Greg Garcia, assistant secretary for cybersecurity with the Department of Homeland Security.

It thus came as no surprise when U.S. CERT's deputy director Randy Vickers acknowledged that the exercise showed there were still some shortfalls in information sharing during the simulated crisis.

Other panelists included Michigan CIO Dan Lohrmann, New Zealand's managing director of critical infrastructure protection Paul McKittrick, Microsoft senior security specialist Paul Nicholas, and Dow senior information systems manager Christine Adams.

After listening to the panelists talk for forty-five minutes in very general terms about what their organizations hoped to accomplish and in similarly vague terms about various "learnings" that emerged, questions were solicited from the audience.

One pony-tailed RSA attendee, presumably a security pro, expressed dissatisfaction with the lack of specific information disclosed about Cyber Storm II and asked bluntly, "Was there a red team and did they win?"

According to the color traditions observed by the military and security professionals, the red team typically represents an attacking enemy and the blue team typically represents the defenders or home country.

"We don't have a firm answer about winning or losing," said panel moderator Jordana Siegel, acting deputy director at Department of Homeland Security. She however did allow that the exercise had taught everyone a lot.

Generally speaking, the U.S. government has not been shy when it comes to proclaiming its successes.

But if the blue team got trounced, that should not be an entirely unexpected result given that in real world version Cyber Storm II -- now playing on the Internet and coming soon to a network near you -- the red team scores victories daily, against government agencies, businesses, organizations, and individuals.

Vickers insisted that the red team-blue team dynamic didn't quite fit Cyber Storm II. That may be Cyber Storm III. But Cyber Storm II in March was more about getting ready to be tested. It was more about networking, which is to say building interpersonal relationships across organizations among those who may one day face a real cyber crisis.

Citing the words used by Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff at his RSA keynote speech on Tuesday, Garcia said, "It takes a network to defeat a network, and that network is the adversary."

Whatever else it did, Cyber Storm II strengthened the foundations of the blue team's network, the public-private partnership that oversees critical cyber infrastructure.

And as Microsoft's Nicholas observed, public-private partnership "is easy to say but it's hard to do."
__________________________________________________________
http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/government/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=207100489

RSA: Chertoff Likens U.S. Cyber Security To 'Manhattan Project'

The Homeland Security secretary calls for beefing up the cyberdefenses of federal agencies and making sure all of them can respond to threats around the clock.

By Thomas Claburn
InformationWeek
April 8, 2008 06:35 PM

In a keynote address at the RSA Conference in San Francisco, Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff warned that the damage caused by a large-scale cyberattack might result in consequences comparable to the Sept. 11, 2001, attack on the World Trade Center buildings in New York.

"We have to look not only at threats that have materialized in the past," said Chertoff. "We have to consider the threats that may materialize in the future. ... We know that a successful large-scale cyberattack against our country would have very wide-reaching consequences."

Through the Internet, terrorists and criminals can do the kind of damage they could never do on their own, Chertoff said. As an example, he cited the massive denial-of-service attack launched against Estonian government computers last year.

"This attack went beyond simple mischief, it represented an actual threat to the ability of the Estonian government to govern the country," said Chertoff.

"Imagine what would happen if it were possible for hackers to enter the air travel system," he said.

Chertoff characterized cybersecurity as a very serious challenge, one that is likely to grow more serious over time. A network response, he said, is necessary to deal with network attacks.

"It takes a network to beat a network," said Chertoff.

Though US-CERT, the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, which provides information necessary to defend the nation's networks, Chertoff hopes to bring additional resources to bear to defend the country's computers.

Chertoff likened the government's attempt to improve its cybersecurity to the intensive effort of the Manhattan Project that brought the atomic bomb to fruition. In January, President Bush signed an order that gave DHS and the National Security Agency greater power to oversee government computer security. Details about what the agencies are doing remain classified.

Presently, Chertoff said it's not possible to monitor access to federal networks in real time, not all federal agencies have 24/7 network monitoring capabilities, and US-CERT's Einstein system is too backward looking in that it identifies threats that have already had an impact.

Chertoff said the government simply doesn't respond fast enough across the board. "The time delay is time that we cannot afford to lose in a world where attacks come literally in microseconds and from all corners of the globe," he said.

In keeping with the President's National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace, Chertoff aims to reduce the number of network access points into federal agencies from about 1,000 presently to about 50. He called for beefing up the cyberdefenses of federal agencies and making sure that all of them can respond to threats around the clock.

"The best way to deal with an attack is to prevent it before it happens rather than after it has occurred," Chertoff said.

Chertoff also emphasized the need for the federal government to engage with the private sector, given that so much of the nation's critical infrastructure is secured by private organizations.

[Insert:  YEAH, WHERE THEY ARE MORE SUBSTANTIALLY OUT OF YOUR CRIMINAL HANDS TO BE ABLE TO CARRY OUT FALSE FLAGS ON YOU ENEMY TRAITOR, PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS STILL HAVE SOME SEMBLANCE OF PROPRIETARY, RELATIVELY SECURE, DECENTRALIZED, OR NOT READILY EXPLOITABLE SYSTEMS THAT YOU WANT TO FULLY COMMANDEER TO ENSLAVE THE ENTIRE POPULATION AND CREATE ENDLESS FAKE LEGITIMIZATION OF PEOPLE GIVING UP ALL OF THEIR RIGHTS UNTIL THEY LITERALLY LIVE IN ABOVE MAXIMUM SECURITY PRISON LEVEL SURVEILLANCE IN WHATEVER LIVING QUARTERS WILL BE LEFT BY THEN.]

And at some point when the government's network security systems are more responsive, Chertoff said he expected that the government would share some network security data to help the private sector keep its systems secure.

[Anti_Illuminati]

http://www.computerworld.com/printthis/2004/0,4814,91374,00.html

Play War!: War-gaming for IT Strategists

Strategic planning comes to life when war games are used to simulate business moves -- such as IT investments -- and countermoves.

Gary Anthes
 

March 22, 2004 (Computerworld) They didn't understand the threat until it was too late. For years, the cyberattacks came, increasing in sophistication and growing in the damage they did to the U.S. economy and to certain targeted industries in particular. Just when the nation was awakening to the nature of the threat—thanks to a defector from the enemy side—the enemy country switched to bioattacks. Like the cyberattacks, these were hard to pin down. (That outbreak of mad cow disease was an accident, wasn't it?)

So clever were the attacks that in most cases, U.S. officials didn't know just where they were coming from. As a result, their foreign policy toward the originating country was wholly inappropriate: They spent billions on weapons to defend against a military threat, when in fact the opposing country was hellbent on economic warfare.

Fortunately for the U.S., this isn't a true story. It's a brief summary of a two-day war game that played out recently in Newport, R.I. Put on by the military strategy experts at Alidade Inc., the game pitted a Blue Team (the U.S) against a Red Team (an Asian country, perhaps China). The players were mostly military types hoping to hone their strategy skills, but some players, including this reporter, were there to see how war-game concepts might be applied in the commercial world.

The teams began by deciding how to spend their military budgets—$300 billion for Blue, $30 billion for Red—and over the course of five moves, each one covering a period of five years, Blue and Red took turns acting and reacting with various military and foreign-policy actions. For example, when Blue and Orange—Orange is a country in Red's region with close economic ties to Red—agreed to a joint military exercise, Red saw it for what it was: a naked attempt by Blue to exercise influence in Red's back yard.

The Red Team, meeting in a hotel conference room next to Blue, considered six responses, including doing its own military exercises with Orange, funding massive high-tech economic development in Orange and threatening nuclear proliferation in the region.
Red ended up making only token moves in any of those directions. Instead, it focused on beefing up its cyberwar capabilities, both offensive and defensive, while making various cosmetic overtures to Blue, such as proposing to establish joint projects in biotechnology, ecology and IT.

Red Team Commander Scott Borg, a senior research fellow at the Institute for Security Technology Studies at Dartmouth College, describes Red's winning strategy this way: "We knew Blue wouldn't attack us, and we knew we couldn't win any military conflict with them. So we made it an economic war." Although Borg conceived of most of Red's ideas, he nevertheless learned something new from them. "It will keep me awake at night," he says. "It's made me realize all the things a Red Team really can do."

Mismatched Moves

Jeffery Cares, president of Alidade and a self-styled "military innovation expert and naval futurist," says teams in war games often misread each other and respond inappropriately. "Often Blue plays A/counter A, while Red plays D/counter D." That's what happened in this game.

And that's what often happens in the corporate world, where companies with entrenched strategies—reinforced by success—fail to anticipate out-of-the-box competitive moves. For example, IBM in the 1970s failed to foresee competition for the mainframe.

War games can be a uniquely effective way for corporations to do long-range planning for investments, including IT investments, says Paul A. Strassmann, a lecturer in national security studies at Syracuse University and a Computerworld columnist. "I am a strong believer that war-gaming will displace much of what these days is called corporate strategic planning," he says. Strassmann is a former CIO at several Fortune 50 companies and a former member of the Pentagon's war-gaming simulation review board.

The time has passed when IT can justify its budget solely on the basis of its contribution to the efficiency of the corporation, Strassmann says. It must now work at a more strategic level. "Global competition is now conducted in terms of commercial information warfare, and IT is a weapon of choice," he says. "So competitive planning in the commercial sector really becomes war-gaming. Then the question is, Will the CIO get a seat at the table when the game is played?"

Virtually all companies do long-range planning. But doing "what if" speculations with co-managers around the boardroom table doesn't produce the kinds of insights and discoveries that players say can come out of a formal war game. "The worst thing that can happen in strategic planning is that the boilerplate plan from last year is dusted off, the blanks are filled in, it's distributed, and people immediately file it on the shelf next to last year's plan," says D. Scott Frondorf, president of Nextscale Inc. in Cincinnati and a member of the Blue Team in Newport.

"You have to do something that brings the strategic plan to life," Frondorf says. "You have to give it character and a space in which to operate. Something like a war game does exactly that. In fact, it could be a test for the boilerplate plan."

Testing the boilerplate is just what a major manufacturer did in a recent war game, Strassmann says. The game pitted a Red Team, consisting of managers who had put together a traditional five-year plan, against a Blue Team of lower-level line managers responsible for making the plan happen. Perversely, this arrangement forced those who had developed the plan to attack the company trying to live by it. "The result was counterintuitive" for the participants, says Strassmann, who moderated the game. "At the end of the game, everybody said, 'Hell, we didn't know this.'"

"The top management that prepared the plan had never walked the shoes of the other guy," Strassmann says. "Now that they had Red shoes on, they saw the vulnerabilities of the Blues and they said, 'We are just going to take them to the cleaners.'"

The game helped the company realize it had an ace in the deck all the time, Strassmann says. "The ace was one of many projects pursued on an exploratory basis in advance engineering. The game moved the project high on the list of priorities and accelerated deployment. This turned out to be a great success in gaining market share."

This particular game focused on product development and marketing and not directly on IT issues, but the CIO did participate, Strassmann says. "The CIO gained enormous understanding of the marketing issues, and I understand he subsequently reallocated some of his priorities," he says.

Jack Reader, a senior business development manager at Cisco Systems Inc., attended the Alidade war game and says the concept could be applied internally for long-range planning. "But no one here has bought into it yet," he says. "These out-of-the box things take a while to find the right sponsorship at a big company like Cisco."

Reader says war games are well suited to corporations faced with making expensive and complicated long-term technology choices. For example, he says, a CIO at a small bank might adopt the role of a Red Team against a larger competitor's Blue Team or, if the CIO works for a dominant bank, it could play the role of Blue against smaller competitors playing Red.

"What would you do if your CFO came down the hall and told you your IT budget had been cut 80%?" Reader says. "As it turns out, there are some pretty decent strategies when you are the small guy. It's less brute force; it's about being smarter."

Alidade likens its war games to "exploring the landscape." Now, having played the game, Frondorf agrees. "A war game forces you to think through the scenario and create what I call 'trail heads,' places that mark pathways to explore," he says. "I like to say that everything interesting happens at the boundaries. In IT, that's especially true."

Red Team vs. Blue Team
Professional illustrators from Alphachimp Studio Inc. worked in real time throughout the two-day war game to chronicle the strategies, moves and countermoves of the Red Team and the Blue Team.

In Move 2, Red considers and takes a number of options aimed at giving the appearance of cooperation with Blue while overtly and covertly competing economically.

In Move 3, Blue still has trouble understanding the economic and cyber war game that Red is playing.

Meanwhile, Red considers a rich array of military and economic options — both overt and covert — and continues to keep Blue off balance.

By Move 4, the Blue Team senses that it isn't in control of the game and is confused as to what Red is up to. Blue now sees the struggle as mostly an economic one, but its discovery has come too late.

Finally discovered in its cyberattacks, Red switches to untraceable bioattacks while simultaneously building defenses against Blue incursions into Red's region.

[Anti_Illuminati]

http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/06/foggy-future-for-militarys-new-cyber-command/#more-14140

U.S. Cyber Command: 404 Error, Mission Not (Yet) Found

June 26, 2009



Earlier this week, Defense Secretary Robert Gates ordered the military to start setting up a new “U.S. Cyber Command.” It’s a move that’s been discussed in defense circles for more than a year. But despite the announcement — and despite the lengthy debate – no one in the military-industrial complex seems all that sure what this new fighting force is supposed to do, exactly.

Officially, the Pentagon still has a few months to figure things out. Gates told his troops in a Tuesday memo that they have until September 1st to come up with an “implementation plan” for the new command. But there’s a ton to figure out in the next ten weeks. As Gates notes, that plan will have to “delineate USCYBERCOM’s mission, roles and responsibilities,” detail the command’s “minimum requirements” to get up and running, and sort out its “relationships” with the rest of the military – and the rest of the government.

In other words, just about everything.

Let me paraphrase a series of conversations I’ve had this week with people working on this new command: Is CYBERCOM supposed to be a new fighting force, a glorified IT department, an intelligence agency, or what? Mmmmm, unclear, to be determined. If it’s a fighting force, how much offense or defense will it play? To be determined. And what does cyber defense really mean, these days? TBD. If it’s an intelligence agency, how far will the command go to protect civil liberties? To snoop on everyone, in the name of network security? TBD. TBD.

Further complicating matters is that CYBERCOM might significantly reorder how the Pentagon organizes its geek brigades. (Or not. That’s TBD, too.) Each of the armed services already employs thousands of people to keep its data and communications networks flowing. The Defense Department already has an in-house shop, dedicated to building and maintaining its networks: the Defense Information Systems Agency, or DISA. It has also has a far-flung group of cybersnoops, counter-snoops, and network attackers; that would be the National Security Agency, or NSA.

How exactly all these agencies will combine — or whether they will combine at all — is one of the many CYBERCOM questions still left unanswered. (Another: what does a recent and classified National Intelligence Estimate on cyber security recommend.) But already, there’s tough talk in and around the Pentagon of budgets being defended, and personnel being kept.

When the Air Force tried to establish a cyber command of its own, it touched off an internecine scramble within the service. None of the units wanted to surrender cash or crew to the new agency. A veteran of that fight predicts there will be a similiar fight, surrounding CYBERCOM. “They’re gonna to look at the new command as a gigantic beast to be slain – the son of a bitch who’s gonna take my money and my people,” this former senior military official says. “The new command is gonna look at them and see — food.”

One thing that is pretty clear: NSA will be leading this emerging command. Gates is recommending that NSA Director Lt. Gen. Keith Alexander also become the head of the new network force — and get a fourth star. Gates is also suggests that the command set up its headquarters somewhere mighty convenient for Alexander: Ft. Meade, Marlyand, home of the NSA.

The clandestine agency — renown in the military for its geeky skills, and infamous among civil libertarians for its widespread monitoring of Americans’ communications — may also come to dominate the wider government cyber defense effort, as well. Under the president’s recently-announced (and also pretty vague) network protection plan, the Department of Homeland Security is theoretically responsible for coordinating the network defense of the civilian government, and of the country’s critical infrastructure. But DHS doesn’t have nearly the technical brains or the financial brawn of the Defense Department and the NSA. Just look at the two departments’ budgets for next year. As the Wall Street Journal notes, the Pentagon is planning to train “more than 200 cyber-security officers annually. By comparison, the Department of Homeland Security has 100 employees dedicated to civilian cyber security, with plans to reach 260 next year.”

Which is why Homeland Security chief Janet Napolitano says that “NSA will provide technical assistance, both to DOD [Department of Defense] and to us.”

“That is the structure of the cyber policy plan that the president announced, so we absolutely intend to use the technical resources, the substantial ones that NSA has,” she tells Danger Room.

Alexander has said explicitly that he does “not want to run cyber security for the United States government.” But could that wind up happening away — throwing a cloak of secrecy over all of network defense? TBD.

[Anti_Illuminati]

Bump

[luckee1]

Thank you for bumping this.  You know I am on the hunt for info to down load! 

[lordssyndicate]

bump - yes I know it's and older thread but umnn let me add this  a very recent article :


http://www.wethepeoplewillnotbechipped.com/main/news.php?readmore=5939

The Pentagon's Cyber Command: Civilian Infrastructure is a "Legitimate" Target
GlobalInfoGridWhen U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates launched Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) last June, the memorandum authorizing its stand-up specified it as a new "subordinate unified command" under U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), one that "must be capable of synchronizing warfighting effects across the global security environment as well as providing support to civil authorities and international partners."

As Antifascist Calling reported at the time, Gates chose Lt. General Keith Alexander, the current Director of the National Security Agency (NSA), to lead the new DOD entity. The agency would be based in Ft. Meade, Maryland, where NSA headquarters are located and the general would direct both organizations.

In that piece I pointed out that STRATCOM is the successor organization to Strategic Air Command (SAC). One of ten Unified Combatant Commands, STRATCOM's brief includes space operations (military satellites), information warfare, missile defense, global command and control, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), as well as global strike and strategic deterrence, America's first-strike nuclear arsenal.

Designating CYBERCOM a STRATCOM branch all but guarantees an aggressive posture. As an organization that will unify all military cyber operations from various service branches under one roof, CYBERCOM will coordinate for example, Air Force development of technologies to deliver what are called "D5 effects" (deceive, deny, disrupt, degrade and destroy).

Ostensibly launched to protect military networks against malicious attacks, the command's offensive nature is underlined by its role as STRATCOM's operational cyber wing. In addition to a defensive brief to "harden" the "dot-mil" domain, the Pentagon plan calls for an offensive capacity, one that will deploy cyber weapons against imperialism's adversaries.

As a leading growth sector in the already-massive Military-Industrial-Security-Complex, the cyberwar market is hitting the corporate "sweet spot" as the Pentagon shifts resources from Cold War "legacy" weapons' systems into what are perceived as "over-the-horizon" offensive capabilities.

In association with STRATCOM, the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA), will hold a Cyberspace Symposium, "Ensuring Commanders' Freedom of Action in Cyberspace," May 26-27 in Omaha, Nebraska.

Chock-a-block with heavy-hitters in the defense and security world such as Lockheed Martin, HP, Booz Allen Hamilton, CACI, Cisco, CSC, General Dynamics, QinetiQ, Raytheon and the spooky MITRE Corporation, the symposium seeks to foster "innovation and collaboration between the private sector and government to delve into tough cyber issues." The shin-dig promises to "feature defense contractors and government agencies showcasing their solutions to cyberspace and cyber warfare issues."

During pro forma hearings before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) April 15, Alexander's testimony was short on specifics, as were his written responses to "Advance Questions" submitted to the general by the SASC.

During Thursday's testimony, Alexander told the Senate panel that the command "isn't about efforts to militarize cyberspace," but rather "is about safeguarding the integrity of our military's critical information systems."

"If confirmed" Alexander averred, "I will operate within applicable laws, policies and authorities. I will also identify any gaps in doctrine, policy and law that may prevent national objectives from being fully realized or executed."

What those "national objectives" are and how they might be "executed" are not publicly spelled out, but can be inferred from a wealth of documents and statements from leading cyberwar proponents.

As we will explore below, despite hyperbole to the contrary, CYBERCOM represents long-standing Pentagon plans to militarize cyberspace as part of its so-called "Revolution in Military Affairs" and transform the internet into an offensive weapon for waging aggressive war.

"Switching Cities Off"

While we do not know how Pentagon assets will be deployed, we can be certain their destructive potential is far-reaching. We can infer however, that CYBERCOM possesses the capacity for inflicting irreparable harm and catastrophic damage on civilian infrastructure, and that power grids, hospitals, water supply systems, financial institutions, transportation hubs and telecommunications networks are exquisitely vulnerable.

The potential for catastrophic violence against cities and social life in general, has increased proportionally to our reliance on complex infrastructure. Indeed, most of the networks relied upon for sustaining social life, particularly in countries viewed as adversaries by the United States would be susceptible to such attacks.

In densely populated cities across Africa, Asia, Latin American and the Middle East, even a small number of directed attacks on critical infrastructural hubs could cause the entire network to collapse. The evidence also suggests that the Pentagon fully intends to field weapons that will do just that.

As the National Journal reported in November, in May 2007, "President Bush authorized the National Security Agency, based at Fort Meade, Md., to launch a sophisticated attack on an enemy thousands of miles away without firing a bullet or dropping a bomb."

According to investigative journalist Shane Harris, during the Iraq "surge" Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, requested and received an order from President Bush for an "NSA cyberattack on the cellular phones and computers that insurgents in Iraq were using to plan roadside bombings."

While corporate media, the Pentagon and the security grifters who stand to make billions of dollars hyping the "cyberwar threat" to gullible congressional leaders and the public, the DOD, according to Harris, "have already marshaled their forces."

Bob Gourley, who was the chief technology officer for the Defense Intelligence Agency told Harris: "We have U.S. warriors in cyberspace that are deployed overseas and are in direct contact with adversaries overseas," and that these experts already "live in adversary networks."

While the specter of a temporary "interruption of service" may haunt modern cities with blackout or gridlock, a directed attack focused on bringing down the entire system by inducing technical malfunction across the board, would transform "the vast edifices of infrastructure" according to geographer and social critic Stephen Graham, into "so much useless junk."

In his newly-published book, Cities Under Siege, Graham discusses the effects of post-Cold War U.S./NATO air bombing campaigns in Iraq, Afghanistan and the former Yugoslavia as a monstrous instrumentality designed to inflict maximum damage and thereby coerce civilian populations into abandoning resistance to the imperialist hyperpower: the United States.

Much the same can be said of America's "stationary aircraft carrier" in the Middle East, Israel, during its murderous bombing campaign and ground invasion of Gaza during 2008-2009, which similarly targeted civilian infrastructure, reducing it to rubble.

"The effects of urban de-electrification" Graham writes, "are both more ghastly and more prosaic: the mass death of the young, the weak, the ill, and the old, over protracted periods of time and extended geographies, as water systems and sanitation collapse and water-borne diseases run rampant. No wonder such a strategy has been called a 'war on public health,' an assault which amounts to 'bomb now, die later'."

Although critics such as James Der Derian (see: Virtuous War) argue that "new forms of control and governance" are made possible by the modern surveillance state and that "the speed of interconnectivity that the computer enables has, more than any other innovation in warfare from the stirrup to gunpowder to radar to nukes, shifted the battlefield away from the geopolitical to the electromagnetic," exactly the opposite is the case.

Searching for "clean," "sanitized" modes of waging high-tech, low casualty war (for the aggressors), U.S. Cyber Command has been stood-up precisely to deliver the means that enable America's corporate and political masters to "switch cities off" at will, as a tool of economic-political domination.

In this respect, the "electromagnetic" is fully the servant of the "geopolitical," or as Guy Debord reminds us in The Society of the Spectacle: "The current destruction of the city is thus merely one more reflection of humanity's failure, thus far, to subordinate the economy to historical consciousness; of society's failure to unify itself by reappropriating the powers that have been alienated from it."

Part of that "alienation" resides in the chimerical nature of imperialism's quest for high-tech "silver bullets" to assure its continued domination of the planet, despite evidence to contrary in the form of the slow-motion meltdown and collapse of the capitalist economy. The fact is, despite the decidedly "low-tech," though highly-effective, resistance of the people of Iraq, Palestine and Afghanistan, our masters will continue to pour billions of dollars into such weapons systems to stave off their "rendezvous with history."

While Pentagon Press Secretary Geoff Morrell went to great lengths last year to downplay the offensive role envisaged for Cyber Command, others within the defense bureaucracy are far more enthusiastic.

In a 2008 piece published by Armed Forces Journal, Col. Charles W. Williamson wrote that "America needs a network that can project power by building an af.mil robot network (botnet) that can direct such massive amounts of traffic to target computers that they can no longer communicate and become no more useful to our adversaries than hunks of metal and plastic. America needs the ability to carpet bomb in cyberspace to create the deterrent we lack."

Alexander's equivocal written responses were hardly comforting, nor did they blunt criticism that the Pentagon fully intends to stand-up an electromagnetic equivalent of Strategic Air Command. While promising that CYBERCOM would be "sensitive to the ripple effects from this kind of warfare," as The New York Times delicately put it, Alexander sought to blunt criticism by averring that the Pentagon "would honor the laws of war that govern traditional combat in seeking to limit the impact on civilians."

In written responses to Senate, Alexander went to great lengths to assure the SASC that military actions would comply with international laws that require conformity with principles of military necessity and proportionality.

However, as the Times pointed out, Alexander agreed with a question submitted by the Senate that "the target list would include civilian institutions and municipal infrastructure that are essential to state sovereignty and stability, including power grids, banks and financial networks, transportation and telecommunications."

During questioning by SASC Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) Thursday, how CYBERCOM would respond to an attack "through computers that are located in a neutral country," Alexander was far more ambiguous. He responded that would "complicate" matters, particularly when it came to the critical question of "attribution."

Despite matters being "complicated" by the fog of war, Alexander didn't rule out an attack on a presumably "neutral" country, even one that unwittingly serves as a "path through."

"Offensive cyber weapons" Alexander wrote, "would only be authorized under specific lawful orders by the [Defense Secretary] and the president and would normally come with supplemental rules of engagement."

While true as far as it goes (which isn't very far!) Alexander's boss, General Kevin Chilton, STRATCOM's commander suggested last year that "the White House retains the option to respond with physical force--potentially even using nuclear weapons--if a foreign entity conducts a disabling cyber attack against U.S. computer networks." (emphasis added)

According to Global Security Newswire, during a Defense Writers Group breakfast last May Chilton told journalists, "I think you don't take any response options off the table from an attack on the United States of America. Why would we constrain ourselves on how we respond?"

Chilton went on to say that "I think that's been our policy on any attack on the United States of America. And I don't see any reason to treat cyber any differently. I mean, why would we tie the president's hands? I can't. It's up to the president to decide."

Hardly comforting words.

In response to an SASC query, Alexander wrote that as Commander his duties include "executing the specified cyberspace missions" to "secure our freedom of action in cyber space."

Among other things, those duties entail "integrating cyberspace operations and synchronizing warfighting effects across the global security environment." According to it's charter, the command will "direct global information grid operations and defense" and execute "full-spectrum military cyberspace operations."

The command will serve "as the focal point for deconfliction of DOD offensive cyberspace operations;" in other words, it will coordinate and act as the final arbiter amongst the various armed branches which possess their own offensive cyber capabilities.

In the Pipeline

Contemporary military doctrine in the United States, but also in Israel, has emphasized the use of overwhelming force as a means to eradicate civilian infrastructure and break a population's resistance, what Graham has called "the systematic demodernization and immobilization of entire societies classified as adversaries."

Whether such force is applied through "traditional" means, aerial bombing preceded or followed by crippling economic sanctions as in Iraq and Palestine, or by the deployment of more "modern" means, cyberwar, state terror has as its primary target the civilian population and crafts its tactics so as to ensure maximal levels of psychological coercion.

This is fully consonant with the Pentagon's goal to transform cyberspace into an offensive military domain. In a planning document, since removed from the Air Force web site, theorists averred:


Cyberspace favors offensive operations. These operations will deny, degrade, disrupt, destroy, or deceive an adversary. Cyberspace offensive operations ensure friendly freedom of action in cyberspace while denying that same freedom to our adversaries. We will enhance our capabilities to conduct electronic systems attack, electromagnetic systems interdiction and attack, network attack, and infrastructure attack operations. Targets include the adversary's terrestrial, airborne, and space networks, electronic attack and network attack systems, and the adversary itself. As an adversary becomes more dependent on cyberspace, cyberspace offensive operations have the potential to produce greater effects. (Air Force Cyber Command, "Strategic Vision," no date, emphasis added)


U.S. campaigns in Afghanistan, Iraq and Yugoslavia and Israeli aggressive wars against Gaza, the West Bank and Lebanon, demonstrate forcefully that contemporary military doctrine now strives to develop the capacity to systematically degrade, as a means of controlling through threats or actual attacks, the infrastructural "glue" that bind entire nations together. There can be no doubt that the Air Force's "Strategic Vision" is now fully integrated into CYBERCOM.

As well, with increasing reliance by the state and its military on high-tech methods of waging war for economic-political-social domination, the self-same methods are appropriated and deployed within heimat societies themselves. Hence, escalating securitization schemes (warrantless wiretapping, watch listing and indexing of "suspect" citizens) are the handmaidens of a generalized militarization of daily life.

What then, are some of the features and future weapons systems being explored by CYBERCOM and their corporate partners? The SASC as part of its confirmation process of General Alexander, has provided a useful summary, Building Cyberwarfare Capabilities in Public Documents.

If anything, the examples cited below clearly demonstrate that CYBERCOM is quietly seeing to it that the "mismatch between our technical capabilities to conduct operations and the governing laws and policies," as Alexander wrote to the SASC, for waging aggressive cyberwar will soon be resolved.

Dominant Cyber Offensive Engagement and Supporting Technology
BAA-08-04-RIKA [BAA, Broad Agency Announcement]
Agency: Department of the Air Force
Office: Air Force Materiel Command
Location: AFRL [Air Force Research Laboratory]-Rome Research Site
Posted on fbo.gov: June 13, 2008

"Solutions to basic and applied research and engineering for the problems relating to Dominant Cyber Offensive Solutions to basic and applied research and engineering for the problems relating to Dominant Cyber Offensive Engagement and Supporting Technology are sought. This includes high risk, high payoff capabilities for gaining access to any remotely located open or closed computer information systems; these systems enabling full control of a network for the purposes of information gathering and effects based operations."

"Also, we are interested in technology to provide the capability to maintain an active presence within the adversaries information infrastructure completely undetected. Of interest are any and all techniques to enable stealth and persistence capabilities on an adversaries infrastructure. This could be a combination of hardware and/or software focused development efforts. Following this, it is desired to have the capability to stealthily exfiltrate information from any remotely-located open or closed computer information systems with the possibility to discover information with previously unknown existence. Any and all techniques to enable exfiltration techniques on both fixed and mobile computing platforms are of interest. Consideration should be given to maintaining a 'low and slow' gathering paradigm in these development efforts to enable stealthy operation. Finally, this BAA's objective includes the capability to provide a variety of techniques and technologies to be able to affect computer information systems through Deceive, Deny, Disrupt, Degrade, Destroy (D5) effects."

Air Force PE 0602788F: Dominant Information Technology

FY 2011 Base Plans: "Continue development of information system access methods and development of propagation techniques. Continue development of stealth and persistence technologies. Continue development of the capability to exfiltrate information from adversary information systems for generation of actionable CybINT. Continue technology development for preparation of the battlefield and increased situational awareness and understanding. Continue development of technology to deliver D5 effects. Continue development of autonomic technologies for operating within adversary information systems. Continue development of techniques for covert communication among agents operating within adversary information systems. Continue analysis of proprietary hardware and software systems to identify viable means of access and sustained operations within the same. Continue development of a publish/subscribe architecture for exchange and exfiltration of information while operating within development of a publish/subscribe architecture for exchange and exfiltration of information while operating within adversary information systems. Initiate development of techniques to deliver PsyOps via cyber channels. Develop deception techniques to allow misdirection and confusion of adversary attempts to probe and infiltrate AF systems."

As Washington Technology reported in February, "Lockheed Martin Corp. will continue to work with the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency to help develop a governmentwide cybersecurity initiative under a $30.8 million contract."

That initiative, the National Cyber Range will "provide a revolutionary, safe, fully automated and instrumented environment for U.S. cybersecurity research organizations to evaluate leap-ahead research, accelerate technology transition, and enable a place for experimentation of iterative and new research directions," according to DARPA.

Target, acquired...
· citizen_smith on April 19 2010 13:59:53 Print