Ex Lyndon LaRouche MI6 Source exposed HUGE List of MI6 Agents / Diana Coverup

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Offline Revolt426

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http://richardtomlinson.org/
HUGE BANK OF MI6 AGENT DATA



Richard Tomlinson v. MI6
The whereabouts of Richard Tomlinson is unknown, and whether he is alive or dead. The last heard from him in April 2007 was that the British government was determined to stop by any necessary means his publishing what he knows about MI6 secret villainy.


Richard Tomlinson writes:

24 February 2002

Here are a few details of my various legal battles with MI6. Over the years, it has become clear that one of their tactics against me has been to attack me with writs and confiscations etc at every opportunity primarily to drain my resources by forcing me to employ lawyers to defend myself. Here is a brief timeline of their actions against me:

October 1997. Arrested and imprisoned in UK. I had to pay for my own defence. I decided I could not afford a long trial, so pleaded guilty. Imprisoned for 12 months (released on parole after six months).

August 1998. Arrested in Paris on entirely spurious grounds (MI6 told French authorities that I was a "terrorist") then released after 48 hours. French handed my computer and other belongings to British. I had to pay a lawyer to attempt their retrieval, but did not get them back for over a year.

August 1998. Got served an absurd injunction in New Zealand, banning me from talking to the press about ANYTHING. I had to engage a lawyer to fight that.

August 1998. Refused entry to Australia to visit my brother. I had to pay an Australian lawyer a great deal of money in an unuccesful attempt to find out the reasons for the visa refusal.

August 1998. Refused entry to USA. Still fighting for a visa.

December1998. Got served another all encompassing injunction in Switzerland. Had to get a lawyer to represent me, but then decided it would be cheaper just to leave Switzerland.

January 1999. Tried to go to France. Got arrested at the border and told to immediately leave France. This was totally illegal under European law, but nevertheless I had to engage another French lawyer to fight my case. Case dragged on for two years (and very expensive) before I took the law into my own hands and unilaterally moved to France.

September 1999. MI6 tried to serve injunctions on me in Germany. I managed to avoid getting served so for once did not need a lawyer.

May 2000. Italian police confiscated my computers at the request of MI6. I had to pay an Italian lawyer a lot of money in an abortive attempt to get them back. They were not returned to me until May 2001.

June 2000. MI6 sued me in the civil courts in the UK, claiming that they had copyright on my book "The Big Breach", and anything else I write. They successfully froze all proceeds from the book and newspaper serialisation rights. This is illegal, but nevertheless I have fight the case if I want to receive the proceeds from my book. MI6 know that they cannot win this case, but that is not their objective - they wanted to force me to pay for a lawyer to fight their lawyers (paid on an unlimited budget by the taxpayer). I knew that they would use every ruse they could to drag out the case so that I would have to spend a great deal of money. I therefore engaged a lay-lawyer (not formally qualified, but very knowledgeable about the law) to represent me on a pro-bono basis. It is legal under UK and European law to be self-represented, or represented by any appointee whatever their qualifications. But this infuriated MI6 and they have consistently pleaded in court that she is not allowed to represent me. The case has gone through three stages of appeal, and at each stage the judges have upheld MI6's argument (no doubt under a great deal of pressure from government). We have applied for the final stage of appeal to be heard in the House of Lords. This will certainly be rejected, which will mean that we will then have to go before the European Court of Justice.

I am also still fighting for access to an employment tribunal to adjudicate over the legality of my sacking in 1995. This has gone to Judicial review.

I have been forced to spend a great deal of money on lawyers over the years, and this is still an ongoing battle. If anybody would like to make a donation to my legal fees, it would be most welcome. This is best sent to my lawyer in Switzerland, who holds a central account for my legal fees:


"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate … It will purge the rottenness out of the system..." - Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, 1929.

Offline Revolt426

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Re: Ex Lyndon LaRouche MI6 Source exposed HUGE List of MI6 Agents
« Reply #1 on: January 26, 2009, 03:15:20 AM »
http://richardtomlinson.org/mi6dir.htm

13 May 1999. A source for a list of "MI6 officers" has been provided: http://jya.com/mi6-list.htm. No authentication, may be genuine, a folly or a black op.
13 May 1999. Birdie says that it is another, yet unidentified, US Web site which published 100+ names of MI6 officers. The site is said to be now inactive. A press report on it should be appearing in Europe later today. That's all we know until birdie dumps more.

12 May 1999
Source: http://www.geocities.com/Paris/Jardin/8767/MI6dir.htm

The source URL disappeared on May 12, 1999, at about 5:00 PM US-CST. A. has provided a TAR.Z compressed file of the complete site: http://jya.com/mi6-rt.gz (79K).

Richard Tomlinson has written us today that there was never any names or information on his site that was not public information, and that HMG is overreacting for public effect to stigmatize his efforts. The names of MI6 officers cited in his affidavit on MI6 and Princess Diana below:

Nicholas John Andrew LANGMAN
Richard David SPEARMAN

Chief of MI6 David SPEDDING

Nicholas Bernard Frank FISHWICK

Maurice KENDWRICK-PIERCEY

John RIDDE

Richard FLETCHER

Alan PETTY

Chief of MI6 Colin McCOLL

These names, and another, Andrew Fulton, were previously publicized:

http://www.inside-news.ch/Shayler/!milosev.htm (mirrored here)


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Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson v MI6 v Tomlinson

 
 



  Directory of MI6 Officers

The first step to bringing accountability to MI6 is to publish the names of their officers. Every other branch of British public service publishes an annual directory of their officers. The Army has the Army list, the Police the Constabulary list etc. But MI6 publishes no such list. Why? Because they do not want their officers to be held accountable for their actions.

MI6 whine that the publication of such a list would "endanger the lives of agents". This is a smokescreen. Any member of the UK armed forces or the police faces far greater physical danger in the course of his normal duty than an MI6 officer, yet their names are published because they are legally accountable. So why not MI6 too?

Below is a partial list. It is not yet complete, but further names will be added as they are researched.

INJUNCTED!!  - MI6 obtain another injunction - read below!

[Two images of injunction were not accessible]

 [No names provided]

 



 
For More Information Contact:

Richard Tomlinson
Email: spectre@worldcom.ch

Last modified: May 11, 1999 



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MI6 and the Princess of Wales

Attached below is a sworn and testified statement that I have made on 12th May 1999 to the enquiry into the deaths of the Princess of Wales, Dodi Al Fayed, and Henri Paul. I firmly believe that MI6 have information in their files that would assist Judge Stephan's enquiry. Why don't they yield up this information? They should not be entitled to use the Official Secrets Act to protect themselves from investigation into the deaths of three people, particularly in the case of an incident of this magnitude and historical importance.

 

 

I, Richard John Charles Tomlinson, former MI6 officer, of Geneva, Switzerland hereby declare:

I firmly believe that there exist documents held by the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) that would yield important new evidence into the cause and circumstances leading to the deaths of the Princess of Wales, Mr Dodi Al Fayed, and M. Henri Paul in Paris in August 1997.
I was employed by MI6 between September 1991 and April 1995. During that time, I saw various documents that I believe would provide new evidence and new leads into the investigation into these deaths. I also heard various rumours – which though I was not able to see supporting documents – I am confident were based on solid fact.
In 1992, I was working in the Eastern European Controllerate of MI6 and I was peripherally involved in a large and complicated operation to smuggle advanced Soviet weaponry out of the then disintegrating and disorganised remnants of the Soviet Union. During 1992, I spent several days reading the substantial files on this operation. These files contain a wide miscellany of contact notes, telegrams, intelligence reports, photographs etc, from which it was possible to build up a detailed understanding of the operation. The operation involved a large cast of officers and agents of MI6. One more than one occasion, meetings between various figures in the operation took place at the Ritz Hotel, Place de Vendome, Paris. There were in the file several intelligence reports on these meetings, which had been written by one of the MI6 officers based in Paris at the time (identified in the file only by a coded designation). The source of the information was an informant in the Ritz Hotel, who again was identified in the files only by a code number. The MI6 officer paid the informant in cash for his information. I became curious to learn more about the identity of this particular informant, because his number cropped up several times and he seemed to have extremely good access to the goings on in the Ritz Hotel. I therefore ordered this informant’s personal file from MI6’s central file registry. When I read this new file, I was not at all surprised to learn that the informant was a security officer of the Ritz Hotel. Intelligence services always target the security officer’s of important hotels because they have such good access to intelligence. I remember, however, being mildly surprised that the nationality of this informant was French, and this stuck in my memory, because it is rare that MI6 succeeds in recruiting a French informer. I cannot claim that I remember from this reading of the file that the name of this person was Henri Paul, but I have no doubt with the benefit of hindsight that this was he. Although I did not subsequently come across Henri Paul again during my time in MI6, I am confident that the relationship between he and MI6 would have continued until his death, because MI6 would never willingly relinquish control over such a well placed informant. I am sure that the personal file of Henri Paul will therefore contain notes of meetings between him and his MI6 controlling officer right up until the point of his death. I firmly believe that these files will contain evidence of crucial importance to the circumstances and causes of the incident that killed M. Paul, together with the Princess of Wales and Dodi Al Fayed.
The most senior undeclared officer in the local MI6 station would normally control an informant of M.Paul’s usefulness and seniority. Officers declared to the local counter-intelligence service (in this case the Directorate de Surveillance Territoire, or DST) would not be used to control such an informant, because it might lead to the identity of the informant becoming known to the local intelligence services. In Paris at the time of M. Paul’s death, there were two relatively experienced but undeclared MI6 officers. The first was Mr Nicholas John Andrew LANGMAN, born 1960. The second was Mr Richard David SPEARMAN, again born in 1960. I firmly believe that either one or both of these officers will be well acquainted with M Paul, and most probably also met M. Paul shortly before his death. I believe that either or both of these officers will have knowledge that will be of crucial importance in establishing the sequence of events leading up to the deaths of M.Paul, Dodi Al Fayed and the Princess of Wales. Mr Spearman in particular was an extremely well connected and influential officer, because he had been, prior to his appointment in Paris, the personal secretary to the Chief of MI6 Mr David SPEDDING. As such, he would have been privy to even the most confidential of MI6 operations. I believe that there may well be significance in the fact that Mr Spearman was posted to Paris in the month immediately before the deaths.
Later in 1992, as the civil war in the former Yugoslavia became increasingly topical, I started to work primarily on operations in Serbia. During this time, I became acquainted with Dr Nicholas Bernard Frank FISHWICK, born 1958, the MI6 officer who at the time was in charge of planning Balkan operations. During one meeting with Dr Fishwick, he casually showed to me a three-page document that on closer inspection turned out to be an outline plan to assassinate the Serbian leader President Slobodan Milosevic. The plan was fully typed, and attached to a yellow "minute board", signifying that this was a formal and accountable document. It will therefore still be in existence. Fishwick had annotated that the document be circulated to the following senior MI6 officers: Maurice KENDWRICK-PIERCEY, then head of Balkan operations, John RIDDE, then the security officer for Balkan operations, the SAS liaison officer to MI6 (designation MODA/SO, but I have forgotten his name), the head of the Eastern European Controllerate (then Richard FLETCHER) and finally Alan PETTY, the personal secretary to the then Chief of MI6, Colin McCOLL. This plan contained a political justification for the assassination of Milosevic, followed by three outline proposals on how to achieve this objective. I firmly believe that the third of these scenarios contained information that could be useful in establishing the causes of death of Henri Paul, the Princess of Wales, and Dodi Al Fayed. This third scenario suggested that Milosevic could be assassinated by causing his personal limousine to crash. Dr Fishwick proposed to arrange the crash in a tunnel, because the proximity of concrete close to the road would ensure that the crash would be sufficiently violent to cause death or serious injury, and would also reduce the possibility that there might be independent, casual witnesses. Dr Fishwick suggested that one way to cause the crash might be to disorientate the chauffeur using a strobe flash gun, a device which is occasionally deployed by special forces to, for example, disorientate helicopter pilots or terrorists, and about which MI6 officers are briefed about during their training. In short, this scenario bore remarkable similarities to the circumstances and witness accounts of the crash that killed the Princess of Wales, Dodi Al Fayed, and Henri Paul. I firmly believe that this document should be yielded by MI6 to the Judge investigating these deaths, and would provide further leads that he could follow.
During my service in MI6, I also learnt unofficially and second-hand something of the links between MI6 and the Royal Household. MI6 are frequently and routinely asked by the Royal Household (usually via the Foreign Office) to provide intelligence on potential threats to members of the Royal Family whilst on overseas trips. This service would frequently extend to asking friendly intelligence services (such as the CIA) to place members of the Royal Family under discrete surveillance, ostensibly for their own protection. This was particularly the case for the Princess of Wales, who often insisted on doing without overt personal protection, even on overseas trips. Although contact between MI6 and the Royal Household was officially only via the Foreign Office, I learnt while in MI6 that there was unofficial direct contact between certain senior and influential MI6 officers and senior members of the Royal Household. I did not see any official papers on this subject, but I am confident that the information is correct. I firmly believe that MI6 documents would yield substantial leads on the nature of their links with the Royal Household, and would yield vital information about MI6 surveillance on the Princess of Wales in the days leading to her death.
I also learnt while in MI6 that one of the "paparazzi" photographers who routinely followed the Princess of Wales was a member of "UKN", a small corps of part-time MI6 agents who provide miscellaneous services to MI6 such as surveillance and photography expertise. I do not know the identity of this photographer, or whether he was one of the photographers present at the time of the fatal incident. However, I am confident that examination of UKN records would yield the identity of this photographer, and would enable the inquest to eliminate or further investigate that potential line of enquiry.
On Friday August 28 1998, I gave much of this information to Judge Hervé Stephan, the French investigative Judge in charge of the inquest into the accident. The lengths which MI6, the CIA and the DST have taken to deter me giving this evidence and subsequently to stop me talking about it, suggests that they have something to hide.
On Friday 31 July 1998, shortly before my appointment with Judge Hervé Stephan, the DST arrested me in my Paris hotel room. Although I have no record of violent conduct I was arrested with such ferocity and at gunpoint that I received a broken rib. I was taken to the headquarters of the DST, and interrogated for 38 hours. Despite my repeated requests, I was never given any justification for the arrest and was not shown the arrest warrant. Even though I was released without charge, the DST confiscated from me my laptop computer and Psion organiser. They illegally gave these to MI6 who took them back to the UK. They were not returned for six months, which is illegal and caused me great inconvenience and financial cost.
On Friday 7th August 1998 I boarded a Qantas flight at Auckland International airport, New Zealand, for a flight to Sydney, Australia where I was due to give a television interview to the Australian Channel Nine television company. I was in my seat, awaiting take off, when an official boarded the plane and told me to get off. At the airbridge, he told me that the airline had received a fax "from Canberra" saying that there was a problem with my travel papers. I immediately asked to see the fax, but I was told that "it was not possible". I believe that this is because it didn't exist. This action was a ploy to keep me in New Zealand so that the New Zealand police could take further action against me. I had been back in my Auckland hotel room for about half an hour when the New Zealand police and NZSIS, the New Zealand Secret Intelligence Service, raided me. After being detained and searched for about three hours, they eventually confiscated from me all my remaining computer equipment that the French DST had not succeeded in taking from me. Again, I didn't get some of these items back until six months later.
Moreover, shortly after I had given this evidence to Judge Stephan, I was invited to talk about this evidence in a live television interview on America’s NBC television channel. I flew from Geneva to JFK airport on Sunday 30 August to give the interview in New York on the following Monday morning. Shortly after arrival at John F Kennedy airport, the captain of the Swiss Air flight told all passengers to return to their seats. Four US Immigration authority officers entered the plane, came straight to my seat, asked for my passport as identity, and then frogmarched me off the plane. I was taken to the immigration detention centre, photographed, fingerprinted, manacled by my ankle to a chair for seven hours, served with deportation papers (exhibit 1) and then returned on the next available plane to Geneva. I was not allowed to make any telephone calls to the representatives of NBC awaiting me in the airport. The US Immigration Officers - who were all openly sympathetic to my situation and apologised for treating me so badly - openly admitted that they were acting under instructions from the CIA.
In January of this year, I booked a chalet in the village of Samoens in the French Alps for a ten day snowboarding holiday with my parents. I picked up my parents from Geneva airport in a hire car on the evening of January 8, and set off for the French border. At the French customs post, our car was stopped and I was detained. Four officers from the DST held me for four hours. At the end of this interview, I was served with the deportation papers below (exhibit 2), and ordered to return to Switzerland. Note that in the papers, my supposed destination has been changed from "Chamonix" to "Samoens". This is because when first questioned by a junior DST officer, I told him that my destination was "Chamonix". When a senior officer arrived an hour or so later, he crossed out the word and changed it to "Samoens", without ever even asking or confirming this with me. I believe this is because MI6 had told them of my true destination, having learnt the information through surveillance on my parent's telephone in the UK. My banning from France is entirely illegal under European law. I have a British passport and am entitled to travel freely within the European Union. MI6 have "done a deal" with the DST to have me banned, and have not used any recognised legal mechanism to deny my rights to freedom of travel. I believe that the DST and MI6 have banned me from France because they wanted to prevent me from giving further evidence to Judge Stephan’s inquest, which at the time, I was planning to do.
Whatever MI6’s role in the events leading to the death of the Princess of Wales, Dodi Al Fayed and Henri Paul, I am absolutely certain that there is substantial evidence in their files that would provide crucial evidence in establishing the exact causes of this tragedy. I believe that they have gone to considerable lengths to obstruct the course of justice by interfering with my freedom of speech and travel, and this in my view confirms my belief that they have something to hide. I believe that the protection given to MI6 files under the Official Secrets Act should be set aside in the public interest in uncovering once and for all the truth behind these dramatic and historically momentous events.
   

 

SWORN at )

this day of )

1998, before me:- )

------------------------------------

A Notary Public

EXHIBIT 1 [none provided with file] 

EXHIBIT 2 [none provided with file]


For More Information Contact:

Richard Tomlinson
Email: spectre@worldcom.ch

Last modified: May 12, 1999
"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate … It will purge the rottenness out of the system..." - Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, 1929.

Offline Revolt426

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http://cryptome.org/mi6-restored.htm

April 2001.

Anonymous has restored information censored by the British Government from Chapter 36 of MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service, by Stephen Dorril. It is published here to provide public information on MI6 which Mr. Dorril could not, and has been done so without his knowledge or permission.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ON HER MAJESTY'S SECRET SERVICE - UNCENSORED
This is the original text with missing words provided and hyperlinked to footnotes and highlighted in red.

Agent D/813317 Richard Tomlinson joined MI6 in 1991. Born in New Zealand, he read aeronautical engineering at Cambridge and was a Kennedy memorial scholar at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Fluent in French, German and Spanish, Tomlinson was approached at university where he gained a first. A lecturer had asked him if he wanted to do 'something stimulating' in the foreign service. Despite modern recruiting methods, the trusted old-boy network is still a favoured option at Oxbridge, and a number of other key universities, such as Durham and Exeter, still have a contact group of lecturers on the lookout for 'firsts' as suitable recruits.

Historian Andrew Roberts has written about his own experience of being approached in 1987 to join the 'FCO Co-ordinating Staff', as MI6 is known (also "The Executive Branch"): the 'chat with a Cambridge contact', tea at the John Nash-designed Carlton House which overlooks St James's Park, 'a discreet lunch a fortnight later and then a delightfully absurd mini-exam, in which one of the questions was "Put the following in order of social precedence: earl, duke, viscount, baron, marquis" '. At Century House, Roberts recognised 'several of the young Miss Moneypennys from the secretarial schools' parties at university'. The questions continued in a farcical vein: 'If I had been a communist, a fascist or a homosexual . . . Where do Britain's best long-term interests lie? Washington, Brussels or Moscow?' During the medical examination, he was told that 'with Oxford it's the drugs thing, with Cambridge it's the boys'. Attitudes have changed, and by 1997 MI6 was prepared to post a 'gay couple' - 'counsellor' and chief of station Christopher Hurran and his long-time Venezuelan lover - to the British embassy in Czechoslovakia. A few years earlier, the Service had recruited a member of CND. Finally, Roberts went through the process of positive vetting (known since 1990 as EPV). It is generally conducted by a semi-retired officer with a false name, who interviews referees and other contacts, and undertakes checks on credit-worthiness.

Suitable candidates are put through the fast-stream Civil Service Selection Board. Roberts, however, decided not to join, and Tomlinson did so only after spending a number of years travelling and working in the City, during which time he had also signed up for the SAS territorial regiment. Over the last decade the Service has recruited a number of personnel from the special forces, though their gung-ho philosophy seems at odds with the image that M16 has projected of the modern spy. Tomlinson eventually joined MI6 for old-fashioned 'patriotic reasons' and sat the standard Foreign Of fice entry examination before being accepted on to the intelligence service training course.

New recruits are introduced to the traditional 'tradecraft' of the world of spying and gain a broad range of knowledge from recruiting and running agents to developing agents of influence and organising and servicing 'dead letter' drops. Because of the smaller numbers, MI6 officers indulge in less specialisation than their American counterparts, though the techniques are essentially little different from those used at the beginning of the century. The infamous Dreyfus affair began when a cleaning woman, Marie Bastian, working in the German embassy but employed by the French secret service, handed over to her French controller the contents of the wastepaper baskets she emptied. MI6 recruiters still look out for 'the life-and-soul-of-the-party types who could persuade the Turkish ambassador's secretary to go through her boss's wastepaper basket'. These days, however, the spy is armed with a hand-held digital scanner which can hold the filched material in its memory and can also be used in emergencies to transmit the stolen secrets by burst transmissions via a satellite.

Such gadgets are developed for the Directorate of Special Support responsible for providing technical assistance to operations - staffed by MoD locksmiths, video and audio technicians and scientists in sections devoted to chemicals and electronics, forensic services, electronic support measures, electronic surveillance and explosive systems. While the gadgets continue to provide the modern spy with a James Bond-like image - for instance, identification transmitters that can be hidden in an agent's shoes to enable the monitoring by satellite of their precise location - the reality is that most of the work is mundane and office-bound. Trainees still receive small-arms training at Fort Monkton, but much of the training is taken up with learning to use the computer system and writing reports in the house style. As part of the Service's obsession with security, a great deal of time is spent on being indoctrinated in cipher and communications work.

Trainee officers are instructed on how to encrypt messages for transmission and how to use the manual BOOK cipher which is regarded as particularly secure. Used at stations abroad to transmit details of operations, potential sources and defectors, BOOK is sent either via the diplomatic bag or by special SIS courier. Diplomatic bags are not totally secure as the success of the Service's own N-Section testified. It employed up to thirty people in Palmer Street rifling the opened bags which were then expertly resealed. The work petered out in the mid-sixties as other means of communication took over.

____________________

t Some code words in this chapter have had to be disguised on legal advice.
Officers learn about 'off-line' systems for the encryption of messages such as NOREEN - used prior to transmission by cipher machines - and 'on-line' systems for the protection of telegrams during transmission, code-named HORA and TRUNCHEON. They are indoctrinated into the use of certain cryptonyms for forwarding telegrams to particular organisations and offices such as SIS headquarters, which is designated ACTOR. They also learn about code words with which sensitive messages are headlined, indicating to whom they may be shown. UK EYES ALFA warns that the contents are not to be shown to any foreigners and are intended only for the home intelligence and security services, armed forces and Whitehall recipients. UK EYES BRAVO includes the above categories, the Northern Ireland Office, LIST X firms engaged in the manufacture of sensitive equipment, and certain US, Australian, New Zealand and Canadian intelligence personnel liaising with the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) in London. Additional code words mark specific exclusions and inclusions. ECLIPSE material cannot be shown to the Americans, while LOCSEN deprives local intelligence officials and agencies of its content. Material for named individual officers, sometimes at specified times, is headed DEDIP or DESDEN, while particularly sensitive material about a fellow officer or operation is known as DEYOU.

The protection of files and their secure handling is a top priority, with officers taught to keep a classified record of their use and location. Photocopiers have the ability to mark and check the origin of non-authorised copies of classified material. Following the development by MoD scientists of a means of reading a computer disk without a computer, all disks are protected in transit. All correspondence by letter is secured by specially developed red security tape which leaves detectable signs if tampered with, though - near-undetectable photographic and laser techniques exist to read the inside of mail and to open envelopes. Each officer has his own safe with dual-combination locking, while the filing cabinets with false tumbler locks, as an added precaution, are protected from penetration by X-rays. Since no lock is secure from picking, they collapse internally if anything more than the slightest force is used. In the event of drilling, a glass plate inside the door shatters, releasing a spring-loaded bolt to prevent opening. Frequent random checks take place on the number settmgs to see if the safe has been opened illegally.

These bureaucratic procedures and attention to minute security rules are not merely technical; failure to carry out security precautions can lead to points deduction in the security breach points system. If an officer racks up 160 points over three years (breach of Top Secret counts as 80 points), this may lead to security clearance being withdrawn and instant dismissal.

New officers will initially be based at the exotic Vauxhall Bridge headquarters, about which many Service personnel are sensitive, almost embarrassed. Access to 'Ceausescu Towers', as some officers have dubbed it, is gained by use of a swipe card and PlN number. The interior comprises a hive of bare, unmarked air-conditioned corridors. The only visible signs of occupancy are the acronyms on the doors, with nothing on the walls except floor plans and exit signs. As with major stations abroad, such as Moscow and Beijing, Vauxhall Cross is classified as a Category A post, with a high potential physical threat from terrorism (HPT) and sophisticated hostile intelligence services (HIS). Operatives from the TECHNICAL SECURITY DEPARTMENT (TSD) based at Hanslope Park, Milton Keynes, and from MI6's own technical department ensure that the building is protected from high-tech attack (HTA). There is triple glazing installed on all windows as a safeguard against laser and radio frequency (RF) flooding techniques, and the mainframe computer, cipher and communications areas are housed in secure, modularshielded rooms. A secure command-and-control room runs major operations such as those in Bosnia, where 'war criminals' were tracked and arrested by SAS personnel.

Off the corridors are open-plan offices which give the impression of informality, though security overrides such considerations. A new officer will find that since l996 more women than men have been recruited to the Service, but males remain predominant, particularly in senior positions. As in many modern offices, officers will be seen working at computers, processing information, collating files, planning operations, liaising with foreign intelligence agencies and networks, and, most importantly, supporting the three to five hundred officers in the field, though only half that number will be stationed abroad at any one time. MI6 has been at the forefront of updating its information technology and, in 1995, installed at a cost of £200 million an ambitious desktop network known as the Automatic Telegram Handling System (ATHS /OATS), which provides access to all reports and databases. Staff are officially not allowed to discuss their work with colleagues, not even when they relax in the staff bar with its spectacular views over the River Thames, though, as Richard Tomlinson discovered, gossip is in fact rife.

All officers will spend time in the field attached to embassies, though they will have little choice as to the location. Turning down a post will jeopardise future promotions and can lead to dismissal. Stations abroad are classed from the high-risk Category A, such as Yugoslavia and Algeria, to the lesser B, such as Washington and New York, C, the European countries, and D, often the Commonwealth, where there is little or no threat. New officers might find themselves among the additional personnel sent to Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea, following the Service's boost to its presence in South-East Asia, or involved in operations into China following the transfer of Hong Kong and the winding up of its espionage operations in the former colony. In a large station such as Washington, operating under 'light' diplomatic cover will be a head of station (often a Counsellor), a deputy and two or three officers (First and Second Secretaries). There will also be back-up staff consisting of three or four secretaries, a registry clerk to handle files and documents, and communications and cipher officers. Easily identified by the trained eye in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 'Diplomatic List' - the number of Counsellor and First Secretary posts is limited and there tend to be too many for the positions available - an MI6 officer's presence will be known to the host intelligence and security agency. In some cases, a senior officer will make his presence known to draw attention away from his colleagues.

Before postings and missions abroad, officers receive a briefing from the Information Operations (I/OPs) unit, which provides them with a list of sympathetic journalists who can be trusted to give them help and information. These contacts have become increasingly important in trouble spots such as the Balkans.

I/OPs also has a more covert role in planning psychological operations along the lines of the old Special Political Action (SPA) section and the Information Research Department (IRD). I/OPs may also, according to a former MI6 officer, 'attempt to influence events in another country or organisation in a direction favourable to Britain'. One example is MI6's determined effort to 'plant stories in the American press about Boutros Ghali, whom they regarded as dangerously Francophile, in the run up to the 1992 elections for UN secretary-general'. Foreign operations of this sort do not require ministerial sanction.1

I/OPs also expends considerable energy behind the scenes in 'surfacing' damaging stories designed to discredit critics of the Service. They will use off-the-record briefings of sympathetic journalists; the planting of rumours and disinformation, which through 'double-sourcing' are confirmed by a proactive agent; and the overt recruitment of journalist agents. Journalists paid to provide information or to 'keep their eyes open' are known as an 'asset' or an 'assistant' or just 'on side'. According to Richard Tomlinson, paid agents included in the nineties one and perhaps two national newspaper editors. An editor is unlikely to be directly recruited as the Service would require the permission of the Foreign Secretary and would not like to be put in the position of being refused. Such high-fliers are more likely to have been recruited early in their careers. In this case, the journalist was apparently recruited at least three years before becommg an editor and remained an asset until at least 1998. Tomlinson has said that the editor was paid a retainer of £100,000, with access to the money via an offshore bank in an accessible tax haven. The editor was given a false passport to gain entry to the bank, which he regularly visited.2

In trying to identify the editor 'agent', media interest centred on Dominic Lawson, son of the former Tory Chancellor of the Exchequer, who became editor of the Spectator in 1990 and had been editor of the Sunday Telegraph since 1995. Lawson denied that he had ever been 'an agent, either paid or unpaid, of Ml6 or of any other government agency'. On the other hand, the youngest brother of Lawson's second wife, Rosa Monckton, had joined MI6 in 1987. In 1996, Anthony Monckton was appointed First Secretary (Political) in the Croatian capital Zagreb.

Quite separately, one of Rosa's closest friends and a godparent to the Lawsons' daughter, the late Princess of Wales had clearly been under some kind of surveillance, as evidenced by the 1,050-page dossier held by the US National Security Agency (NSA) in its archive, detailing private telephone conversations between Diana and American friends intercepted at MI6's request. While all stories linking MI6 to the Princess's death in the car accident in France have been complete nonsense, it has been alleged that working closely with I/Ops in an attempt to deflect enquiries away from the security services had been a chief of staff to 'C', Richard Spearman, temporarily posted to the Paris embassy with his assistant, Nicholas Langman.3

Operational officers can be casually spotted by the 'PENTEL' roller-ball pens in their top pocket (it was discovered by accident that they have the ability to create invisible ink), the Psion organiser and the specially adapted 'Walkman' (PETTLE) they carry to record conversations for up to ten minutes on the middle band of an ordinary commercial music cassette tape. They also use laptop computers for writing reports. If that seems like a recipe for disaster, the secret hard disk contains a protected back-up.

The station is usually sited in a part of the embassy regularly swept by technical staff for bugs and other electronic attack. It is entered using special door codes with an inner strongroom-type door for greater security. Following all the procedures learned during training, officers handling material up to the 'Secret' level work on secure overseas Unix terminals (SCOUT) and use a messaging system known as ARRAMIS. Conversations by secure telephone masked by white noise are undertaken via a special SIS version of the BRAHMS system. A special chip developed by GCHQ apparently makes it impossible even for the US NSA to decipher such conversations. Secure Speech System (HOUSEMAN) handset units are used by SIS officers within a telephone speech enclosure. The most important room is electronically shielded and lined with up to a foot of lead for secure cipher and communications transmissions. From the comms room, an officer can send and receive secure faxes up to SECRET level via the CRYPTEK fax system and S***** (encrypted communications with the Ministry of Defence (MoD), Cabinet Office, MI5 (codename SNUFFBOX), GCHQ and 22 SAS. An encrypted electronic messaging system working through fibre optics, known as the UK Intelligence Messaging Network, was installed in early 1997 and enables MI6 to flash intelligence scoops to special terminals in the MoD, the Foreign Office and the Department of Trade and Industry. Manned twenty-four hours a day, 365 days a year, and secured behind a heavy thick door, the cipher machines have secure 'integral protection', known as TEMPEST. MI6 officers abroad also work alongside GCHQ personnel, monitoring foreign missions and organisations.

Officers in the field may include not only those officially classed as diplomats but also others operating under 'deep' cover. Increasingly MI6 officers abroad act as 'illegals'. It is known that Service officers are sometimes employed during the day in conventional jobs such as accountancy, and provided with false identities. British banks - the Royal Bank of Scotland is particularly helpful, and to a lesser extent the Midland - help supply credit cards to officers working under cover. At the end of each month, officers have to pay off their aliases' credit cards. Banks also help transmit money overseas for covert operations. During the Cold War, banks in the Channel Islands and other offshore locations acted as a conduit for secret funding.4

Recruiting or running agents and gathering intelligence are the prime objectives of these deep-cover operatives, and their real work, some claim, starts at six in the evening when the conventional diplomats begin their round of cocktail parties. Such social events can be very useful for gathering intelligence and spreading disinformation. Baroness Park recalled that one of MI6's more successful ploys was 'to set people very discreetly against one another. They destroy each other. You don't destroy them.' Officers would offer the odd hint that it was 'a pity that so-and-so is so indiscreet. Not much more.' Officers will also deal with paid 'support agents' - those who supply MI6 with facilities including safe houses and bank accounts, as well as intelligence. There are also 'long insiders' - agents of influence with access to MI6 assessments and sanitised intelligence. The Service's deep-cover agents have burst transmitters with the ability to transmit a flash signal to MI6 via a satellite when they are in danger.5

(SIS suceeeded in placing a former SIS officer to work closely at a high level on the delicate negotiations of the London/Frankfurt exchange merger. An ex-Cambridge and fluent Asian language specialist, she graduated IONEC with one of the highest scores outlasting all her male colleagues during the hostage endurance course.)

Officers abroad may also be asked to aid more sophisticated operations designed to build up the Service's psychological profiles of political leaders. A special department within MI6 has tried in the past to procure the urine and excrement of foreign leaders. A specially modified condom was used to catch the urine of Romanian leader Nicolae Ceausescu, while the 'product' of Presidents Fidel Castro and Leonid Brezhnev was 'analysed' by medical specialists for signs of their true health.

Tomlinson's duties included recruiting agents to inform on foreign politicians. His most important task was to infiltrate in 1992 a Middle Eastern weapons procurement programme network - the BMP3 - with the object of locating and disabling a chemical weapons facility. Authorised by an unnamed senior Cabinet minister, the sabotage plan - onc account suggests the planting of a bomb - aimed to intercept a shipment of machinery and interfere with its extractor fan equipment, despite warnings of the possible risk to the lives of dozens of civilian workers at the plant. In November 1992 using the name 'Andrew Huntley' and the pretext of assisting at a conference run by the Financial Times, Tomlinson went under cover to Moscow. His very sensitive mission was to obtain Russian military secrets on ballistic missiles and effect the defection of a Russian colonel who specialised in this area. Although, strangely, he was not given the usual 'immersion' language training in Serbo-Croat, Tomlinson soon found himself in the former Yugoslavia, whose break-up had taken the Service by surprise.6

When the country fractured in January 1991 into Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, EU recognition of independent Croatia proved to be a critical and disastrous policy, eventually paving the way for Serb aggression which the Foreign Office interpreted as civil war. MI6 had been running a few federal sources in the old Yugoslavia, but they provided little worthwhile intelligence. The Service lacked appropriate linguists and had to start more or less from scratch. The JIC established a Current Intelligence Group (CIG) on the Balkans, and within eighteen months MI6's Controllerate dealing with the area had recruited a number of sources at a high level from among the ethnic military and political protagonists.

During 1993, as a 'targeting officer' within the Balkans Controllerate, whose job was to identify potential informants, Tomlinson spent a harrowing and dangerous six months travelling as a journalist to Belgrade, Skopje, Zagreb and Ljubljana, in the process recruiting a Serb journalist - journalists of every nationality were a particular MI6 target in the Balkans, as they proved to be more productive than most other sources - and a leader of the Albanian opposition in Macedonia. In 1993, UN blue-helmeted troops started patrolling the borders of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. According to sources, MI6 used air-drops in an operation to set up arms dumps on the border of Macedonia as part of a stay-behind network.7

Another operation included running as an agent a Tory MP, who gave information about foreign donations to the Conservative Party. Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Northern Ireland minister, Harold Elleston was an old Etonian who studied Russian at Exeter University and subsequently became a trade consultant specialising in the former eastern bloc countries, during which time he was recruited by MI6. He worked for them in eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union and during the conflict in former Yugoslavia. After visiting former Yugoslavia in 1992, Elleston, who was employed by a lobbying firm with Conservative candidate John Kennedy (aka Gvozdenovic), notified his Ml6 handlers that donations were reaching the Conservative Party from Serbia. Despite Harold Wilson's ruling in the sixties that the intelligence services would not use MPs as agents, the Service received special sanction from Prime Minister John Major to continue Elleston's secret role. Sir Colin McColl warned Major that the party was possibly accepting tainted money via Kennedy, a key figure in arranging payments from the Serb regime.8

MI6 was itself seen as being pro-Serb in its reporting. In 1994, two articles arguing against western policy in the Balkans conflict appeared in the Spectator (the right-wing magazine unknowingly served as 'cover' for three MI6 officers working in Bosnia, Belgrade and Moldova), written under a Sarajevo dateline by a 'Kenneth Roberts', who had apparently worked for more than a year with the United Nations in Bosnia as an 'adviser'. Written by MI6 officer Keith Robert Craig, who was attached to the MoD's Balkan Secretariat, the first on 5 February rehearsed arguments for a UN withdrawal from the area, pointing out that all sides committed atrocities. The second, on 5 March, complained baselessly about 'warped' and inaccurate reports by, in particular, the BBC's Kate Adie of an atrocity against the Bosnian Serbs. Guardian correspondent Ed Vulliamy recalled being invited to a briefing by MI6 which was 'peddling an ill-disguised agenda: the Foreign Office's determination that there be no intervention against Serbia's genocidal pogrom'. Without the slightest evidence, the carnage that took place in Sarajevo's marketplace was described as the work of the Muslim-led government, which was alleged to be 'massacring its own people to win sympathy and ultimately help from outside'. As Vulliamy knew, Sarajevo's defenders were 'dumb with disbelief'. Despite UN Protection Force reports which found that it was Serb mortars which were killing Muslims, the MI6 scheme 'worked - beautifully', as the allegations found their way into the world's press. Vulliamy noted that 'it was quickly relished by the only man who stood to gain from this - the Serbian leader Radovan Karadzic'.9

Perhaps it was only an intelligence/Foreign Office faction which was pro-Serb. From March 1992 until September 1993, Tomlinson worked in the East European Controllerate under the staff designation UKA/7. He has claimed that in the summer of 1992 he discovered an internal document that detailed plans to assassinate President Slobodan Milosevic. During a conversation, an ambitious and serious colleague who was responsible for developing and targeting operations in the Balkans (P4 / OPS), Nick Fishwick, had pulled out a file and handed it to Tomlinson to read. 'It was approximately two pages long, and had a yellow card attached to it which signified that it was an accountable document rather than a draft proposal.' It was entitled 'The need to assassinate President Milosevic of Serbia' and was distributed to senior MI6 officers, including the head of Balkan operations (P4), Maurice Kenwrick-Piercy, the Controller of East European Operations (C/CEE), Richard Fletcher, and later Andrew Fulton, the Security Officer responsible for eastern European operations (SBO1/T), John Ridd, the private secretary to the Chief (H/SECT), Alan Petty ('Alan Judd'), and the Service's SAS liaison officer (MODA/SO), Maj. Glynne Evans. According to Tomlinson, Fishwick justified assassinating Milosevic on the grounds that there was evidence that the 'Butcher of Belgrade' was supplying weapons to Karadzic, who was wanted for war crimes, including genocide. US and French intelligence agencies were alleged to be already contemplating assassinating Karadzic.

There were three possible scenarios put forward by MI6. Firstly, to train a Serbian paramilitary opposition group to carry out the assassination. This, Fishwick argued, had the advantage of deniability but the disadvantage that control of the operation would be low and the chances of success unpredictable. Secondly, to use the small INCREMENT cell of SAS/SBS personnel, which is especially selected and trained to carry out operations exclusively for MI6/MI5, to send in a team that would assassinate the President with a bomb or by a sniper ambush. Fishwick said that this would be the most reliable option, but would be undeniable if the operation went wrong. Thirdly, to kill Milosevic in a road crash which would be staged during one of his visits to the international conferences on former Yugoslavia in Geneva. Fishwick suggested that a stun device could be used to dazzle the driver of Milosevic's car as it passed through one of Geneva's motorway tunnels.10

A year later, Tomlinson acted as a counsellor to the commander of the British forces in Bosnia and worked at manipulating the sources in the entourage of Karadzic. One participant to these operations suggests that these sources 'produced a very detailed intelligence picture which included not just the military plans and capabilities of the different factions but also early warning of political intentions'. There appears to have been little evidence of this intelligence coup in the Foreign Office decisions that followed, and its value is contradicted by another source which, while admitting that several significant agents were recruited, concludes that they did not 'produce substantial intelligence of quality'.11

The intelligence deficit was worsened by the United States' unwillingness to provide its Atlantic partner with all its intelligence on the Serbs. General Sir Michael Rose, a former head of the SAS and commander-in-chief of the UN Protection Force, realised that during 1994 all his communications were being electronically intercepted and his headquarters in Sarajevo was 'bugged' by the Americans because Washington, which wanted to use Nato air strikes to bomb the Serbs to the negotiating table, thought the British were too supportive of the Bosnian Serbs. The Americans also monitored the communications of SAS scouts deep in Bosnian territory and discovered that they were deliberately failing to identify Serb artillery positions. This lack of trust caused friction and led to a backstage confrontation between the secret services, and reminded some observers that the special relationship existed only on the basis that the US saw Britain as a cnance to extend its reach into Europe.12

The plans for Milosevic were not the only assassination plot in which MI6 became entangled. Renegade MI5 officer David Shayler, who was released by a French court in November 1998 on 'political grounds' following his detention in prison as part of extradition proceedings to England, first heard of a plot to kill the Libyan leader, Colonel Gaddafi, in November 1995.

Shayler had been posted to MI5's counter-terrorist G9A section with responsibilities for issues relating to Lockerbie and Libya. A higher executive officer, earning £28,000 per year, Shayler headed up the Libyan desk for over two years and was held in high esteem, undertaking presentations to senior civil servants on all matters relating to Libya. For this work he received a performance-related bonus. An MI6 officer, referred to as PT16B, with whom Shayler had developed a close working relationship, informed him during a liaison meeting on Libya that the Service was running an important Arab agent. A former Libyan government official code-named 'Tunworth', the agent was a go-between with Libyan opposition groups, including a little-known band of extremists called Al Jamaa Al Islamiya Al Muqatila (Islamic Fighting Force). Tunworth had apparently approached MI6 in late 1995, outlining plans to overthrow Gaddafi by the Islamic Fighting Force, and later met with an MI6 officer in a Mediterranean country where he asked for funding. Shayler was told that more than £100,000 had been handed over in three or four instalments beginning in December. PT16B and his colleagues wrote a three- to four-page CX report for Whitehall circulation to other agencies, which stated that MI6 was merely in receipt of intelligence from agent Tunworth on the militants' coup plotting and the group's efforts to obtain weapons and Jeeps. It seems that no mention was made of any MI6 involvement in an assassination attempt.13 [Cryptome note, see: http://cryptome.org/qadahfi-plot.htm ]
"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate … It will purge the rottenness out of the system..." - Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, 1929.

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Shayler later heard that there had been a bomb attack on Gaddafi's motorcade near a town called Sirte, but the device was detonated under the wrong car. In fact, it seems that the dissidents launched an attack with Kalashnikovs and rocket grenades on the wrong car. In a communique to Arab newspapers on 6 March 1996, the Islamic Fighting Force stated that its men had tried to attack Gaddafi as he attended the Libyan General People's Congress. The attempt went wrong when Gaddafi did not show up in person, and the terrorists were forced to cancel the attack. 'But as our heroes were withdrawing they collided with the security forces and in the ensuing battle there were casualties on both sides.' Three fighters were killed but the leader of the hit team, Abd al-Muhaymeen, a veteran of the Afghan resistance who was possibly trained by MI6 or the CIA, 'escaped unhurt'. Following a crackdown by Gaddafi's secret police, his family home in the town of Ejdabiya was burnt down. The back of the Fighting Force was broken and its leaders retreated to Afghanistan.14

When Shayler subsequently met  PT16B, the MI6 othcer mentioned the attack with 'a kind of note of triumph, saying, yes, we'd done it'. Shayler's reaction was 'one of total shock. This was not what I thought I was doing in the intelligence service.' He told BBC's Panorama programme: 'I was absolutely astounded ... Suddenly we were talking about tens of thousands of pounds of taxpayers' money being used to attempt to assassinate a foreign head of state.' He concluded that 'no matter who is funding this, it's still international terrorism. The Brits might say we're the good guys, but it's a very difficult road to go down.'

Government officials dismissed Shay]er's claims as 'completely and utterly nutty'. A Foreign Office spokesperson said that it was 'inconceivable that in a non-wartime situation the Government would authorise the SIS to bump off a foreign leader. In theory, SIS can carry out assassinations but only at the express request of the Foreign Secretary.' The 1994 Intelligence Services Act refers to MI6 being able to perform 'other tasks' and protects of ficers from prosecution for criminal acts outside Britain. Indeed, a clause was especially inserted into the 1998 Criminal Justice Bill - which outlaws organisations in Britain conspiring to commit offences abroad - giving all Crown agents immunity from prosecution under the legislation, including possibly the assassination of foreign leaders. It was clear to Shayler, however, and confirmed by BBC sources, that MI6 had not sought ministerial clearance for backing the attempt on Gaddafi. MI6, Shayler believed, was 'operating out of control and illegally'.15

Whatever the truth is surrounding Shayler's accusations, the public and politicians will not discover the full facts. Unlike in the United States, where similar, but less detailed, revelations led to a major Senate enquiry into alleged assassination plotting in the mid-seventies, there will be no House of Commons investigation. As Tomlinson explains, 'there is a deep-rooted belief that, should a policy or operation go wrong, nobody will be held ultimately responsible. The Service will always be able to hide behind the catch-all veil of secrecy provided by the Official Secrets Act or, if the heat really builds up, a Public Interest Immunity Certificate.16

Given his operational experience, as a Grade 5 officer Tomlinson might have expected steady promotion through the ranks and a long career in the secret service, perhaps ending as head of a Controllerate. Senior officers, who are easily spotted in the honours lists with their OBEs, retire at fifty-five. Their attachment to the Service does not end there, however. A number are found appointments as non-executive directors with companies or subsidiaries that have dealt with MI6, or employed as security or corporate liaison officers. 'It is part of their retirement package,' Tomlinson has revealed. 'They are effectively MI6 liaison officers. iust like MI6 liaison officers in Whitehall departments.'17

Since MI6 helped establish Diversified Corporate Services in Rome, New York and London in the late sixties, there has been an increasing trend for setting up consultancies, with the tacit approval or encouragement of the Service. Among the consultants to Ciex, which has 'cornered a lucrative market' in providing a restricted 'confidential service' in 'strategic advice and intelligence' for 'a small group of very substantial customers', are Hamilton McMillan, who retired from the Service's counter-terrorist section in 1996, and former head of the Middle East department Michael Oatley, who previously worked tor another intelligence-linked consultancy, Kroll Associates. Set up in 1995 by the late Sir Fitzroy Maclean, with a board that includes a former Royal Dutch Shell managing director and a former BP deputy chair, the Hakluyt Foundation provides leading British businesses with information that clients 'will not receive by the usual government, media and commercial routes'. Hakluyt's managing director, Christopher James, was until 1998 in charge of MI6's liaison with commerce, while a fellow-director, Mike Reynolds, was regarded as one of the Service's brightest stars.18

Tomlinson's career in the secret world turned out to be short-lived. He returned home from the Balkans exhausted and traumatised by the atrocities he had witnessed, but, fearing that the Service's personnel managers might regard this as a sign of weakness, he did not tell them of his emotional state.* At one point he had been depressed following the death of his girlfriend. Since he had no one to whom to unburden himself - as is standard practice, his parents were unaware of his secret life - his personal problems mounted. Despite the claims of improved personnel management within the Service, Tomlinson received little or no support. It seems that the Service has not put in place any counselling provision as a result of Tomlinson's (and others') experience, but, instead, has decided that officers be vetted by clinical psychologists in order to 'identify actual or potential personality disorders', particularly those being appointed to sensitive posts. Harold Macmillan once said that anyone who spent more than ten years in the secret service must be either weird or mad.19

____________________

* Recalcitrant officers and agents under suspicion are sometimes interrogated at the 'cooler' facilities in Chelsea and in a special soundproofed 'rubber' room situated beneath a hotel in west London 

Tomlinson's personnel manager claimed that he was not a team player, lacked judgement and was not committed to the Service because he was prone to going on 'frolics of his own'. In early 1995, Tomlinson turned up for work and discovered that his swipe card would not gain him entry to MI6 headquarters. Security guards informed him that it had been cancelled. His security clearance had been stopped after he complained to his superiors that a number of MI6's operations and tactics were unethical. Tomlinson was also privy to much sensitive information, as gossip was prevalent inside headquarters. For instance, he was aware that a British businessman had threatened to go public with allegations that intelligence officers had destroyed his company. MI6 was said to have mounted a covert operation, including telephone tapping, against the businessman to ensure that he did not contact the press. Tomlinson was formally dismissed from the Service in August 1995. He did not believe that MI6 was properly accountable to the law. This lack of accountability at the top 'cascades downwards to even the lowest levels' and provides 'a fertile breeding ground for corruption'.20

One MI6 officer paid for his divorce by pocketing the expenses of a fictitious agent whose fake intelligence had been taken from the pages of the Economist. Another senior officer sold false passports to Middle Eastern businessmen and possibly drug traffickers, and diverted taxpayers' money intended for defectors and informants - up to £400,000 - into his offshore bank account. 'Agent J' was allowed to retire on a full pension with no police investigation or prosecution because 'he knew where the bodies were buried'. The scandal was uncovered by the US authorities, who were investigating drugs in the Caribbean and came across an offshore bank account opened with a British passport issued in a false name. Senior MI6 of ficers are allowed to open new bank accounts and transfer cash.21

Tomlinson blamed his dismissal on a personality clash with a personnel manager. Other officers, including his immediate superior, protested that the personnel officer's accusations were unsubstantiated. Tomlinson was allowed to appeal to the intelligence services' tribunal, set up in 1994 and chaired by Lord Justice Brown, but, following the rejection of his appeal, he dismissed it as a 'star chamber'. 'I was denied the basic natural justice. I had no legal representation or access to papers which were said to give reasons for my dismissal. I could not cross-examine key witnesses.'* When he then told the head of the Personnel Department that he would pursue his claim for unfair dismissal at an industrial tribunal, he was informed: 'There's no point in doing that because nobody can tell the Chief what to do.'22

____________________

* In February 1999 Foreign Secretary Robin Cook accepted that M16 staff should 'as much as possible, enjoy the same rights as other employees'. A special investigator with access to all intelligence files would be appointed to look into allegations of malpractice. Home Secretary ack Straw, however, said that the Official Secrets Act would not be amended to allow 'whistleblowing' because the security services were now 'accountable'.
MI6 refused to co-operate with the tribunal, which led to Tomlinson's decision to write a book about his experiences. Investigated by Special Branch officers, Tomlinson was subsequently jailed for twelve months on 18 December 1997 under the Official Secrets Act in order 'to deter others from pursuing the course you chose to pursue'. He spent six months in Belmarsh prison, courtesy of Her Majesty, and was released in April 1998.23

Publicity concerning Tomlinson's case led to considerable anxiety in Whitehall and is said to have caused turmoil inside MI6. The Service feared that the publicity would expose poor management and lead to calls for changes and reform. It became the task of the Director of Security and Public Affairs, and effectively C's number two, John Gerson, to 'deal' with Tomlinson. A Far East specialist with close ties with the Americans, Gerson, who is an associate member of the Centre for the Study of Socialist Legal Systems at London University, is the model of the well-versed and evasive civil servant as portrayed in Yes, Minister. His hobby is the classic spy's pastime of birdwatching. Rewarded with a CMG in the 1999 New Year's Honours, Gerson has been ably assisted by the main contact with the press, Iain Mathewson, a former official in the DHSS and Customs and Excise, who joined MI6 in 1980.

The Cold War was easy for the intelligence agencies, to the extent that they had clear, identifiable targets. It also provided a curtain behind which they could hide their failures. Without an all-embracing enemy to counter, the Secret Intelligence Service has developed a bits-and-pieces target list, known as the 'Mother Load' agenda, which lacks coherence. This is sometimes explained as being due to the fact that the world has become more unstable. This is nonsense. There is no danger of a world conflagration such as there was during Berlin in 1961, Cuba in 1962, the Middle East in 1967 and 1973, or at other crisis points when nuclear bombers took to the air. Threats from so-called rogue states such as Iran and Iraq are altogether of a different magnitude. Even then, it is apparent that many of the 'scares' - suitcase nuclear bombs, missiles with nuclear and biological warheads, nuclear terrorists, etc. - are either grossly exaggerated or simply manufactured by the intelligence services.

It is true that there are significant trouble spots in the world and Britain rightly has to take measures to monitor them, but what this so-called instability has exposed is the inability of agencies designed for the Cold War to tackle the problems of today. In the United States, where a much more open, democratic debate has taken place, the CIA's director from 1977 to 1981, Stansfield Turner, has suggested that the solution is to build a new intelligence service from scratch. Others talk of open-source intelligence agencies that would exploit the explosion of information and do away with the mystique that surrounds secret sources.

The most trenchant criticism of the changes that MI6 has undertaken since the end of the Cold War has come from insiders. David Bickford, former lawyer to the security services, argued in November 1997 that the British intelligence community - MI6, MI5, whose Director-General, Stephen Lander, is not regarded as an inspired choice, and GCHQ - 'is not doing its job properly'. He said that the cost was completely unjustified as there was 'triplication of management, triplication of bureaucracy and triplication of turf battles'. SIS appears to be top heavy with management, with resources being shifted away from operations to administration, such as employing lawyers to deal with the new crime agenda, as well as public relations officers, accountants, etc. There would appear, then, to be room for cuts.

Officials claim that MI6 currently costs about £140 million. This is hardly a credible figure for an organisation employing two thousand staff. Indeed, sources who were privy to the figures as presented to the Permanent Secretaries' Committee on the Intelligence Services in thc mid-eighties were then quoting £150 million. What few people are aware of is that the budget only covers MI6's operations: everything else is excluded. (Overseas Estate Department) It does not take a specialist to appreciate that a realistic budget would be considerably higher if all the running costs of maintenance, pensions, travel, overseas stations, computers, equipment, communications, and the full building costs of the new headquarters (the National Audit Office report on the £90 million overspend is to remain secret) are taken into account. The Treasury insists that costs which were previously hidden away in the budgets of other departments, such as the MoD, are now included in the Secret Vote figure for MI6. This cannot be true. Staff costs are met by the Foreign Office, while the MoD pays for Fort Monkton and the Hercules transport plane and Puma helicopter that are kept on permanent stand-by for the Service's use. It is unlikely that ministers are aware of the network of 'front' companies that MI6 set up in the early nineties, nor of the numerous bank accounts, such as the one at the Drummonds branch of the Royal Bank of Scotland, which the Service operates.

It can now be revealed that the real budget figure - intelligence sources with access to the budget call it MI6's biggest secret - is at least double the official figure. One source with access to the internal accounts puts it as high as five times this figure. Ministers and MPs are being misled. So is the Commons Intelligence Security Committee. The American experience is that it is budgetary control which provides the only means of real leverage and represents a move towards genuine oversight.

Intelligence chiefs have argued successfully that a detailed audit of MI6 expenditure would 'prejudice their operational security'. The result is, Tomlinson argues, 'a management and budgetary structure which would provide a theme park for management consultancies'. It is not surprising to learn that MI6 officers have 'little idea how to manage a budget, and even less incentive to manage it well'. Tomlinson discovered many cases of profligate waste. It was common at the end of the financial year for departments to feverishly spend the remaining budget on planning expensive operations - which, in reality, had little chance of success - in order to prevent cuts to the following year's allocation.24

Bickford had his own agenda, believing that British Intelligence was turning 'a blind eye to the fact that economic crime - organised racketeering in narcotics, kidnap extortion, product contamination and fraud - now poses the greatest threat to the security of the international community'. During 1995 the intelligence agencies had apparently tried to persuade the Major government to allow them to develop closer links with large companies so as to provide them with 'protective business intelligence'. The initiative failed because, Bickford claimed, the different agencies bickered between themselves on how to finance and run the new scheme. Tomlinson agrees that there is 'often bitter fighting between the two agencies over who should have primacy over a particular target or operation'. Although arbitrary ground rules are sometimes brokered between warring departments, communication between MI6 and MI5 remains 'desperately poor'. There is 'remarkably little cross-fertilisation of ideas or operational co-ordination'.25

Besides economic crime, the main threat to Britain, Bickford believed, was 'super-terrorism', involving weapons of mass destruction, and because of the 'common international nature of these threats', the case for having three different agencies 'falls at the first hurdle'. These threats and the many others that the intelligence services have warned us about often do not stand up to close scrutiny - indeed, the modern intelligence service's prime purpose appears to be to generate fears - but Bickford's argument that a merger between the three services would save 'tens of millions of pounds' and provide the necessary 'focused direction, integration and analysis of electronic and human intelligence' deserves to be taken seriously. Tomlinson argues that such a streamlined organisation should be accountable to a parliamentary committee so that 'intelligence targets, priorities and budgets are all controlled through the normal democratic process'.26

A new Treasury-led interdepartmental committee inquiry was instigated in 1998 to put the security and intelligence services under what was said to be an unprecedented 'root-and-branch' scrutiny, the aim being to expose the intelligence agencies to zero-based budgeting, a Treasury discipline that asks the agency concerned to explain from first principles the value of everything it does. As Independent political correspondent Donald Macintyre suggested, 'Ministers will have to be tough; when an effort was made from within the Treasury to do the same thing in the 1980s, it foundered when the security services, almost certainly with Margaret Thatcher's backing, put the shutters up.

Although the official budget for MI6, MI5 and GCHQ is claimed to be £713 million, rising to £776 million in 1999/2000 (not including a Treasury supply estimate for the capital budget of £144 million) and up to £1 billion for all agencies, Sir Gerald Warner, who as former deputy head of MI6 and Intelligence and Security Co-ordinator at the Cabinet Office (1991-6) should be in a position to know, put a figure of £2.5 billion on the entire cost of Britain's intelligence community. The reality is that the intelligence budget has increased in a period when defence spending has gone down from 5 per cent to around 3.5 per cent of GDP. Defence intelligence, the international arms trade and nuclear proliferation absorb about 35 per cent; intelligence on foreign states and their internal politics about 10 per cent; intelligence operations, including supplying diplomats and ministers in negotiations with secrets and economic espionage, about 20 per cent; counter-terrorism another 20 per cent; with counter-intelligence, counter-espionage, drugs and international crime the rest.

An inquiry conducted by the Cabinet Office in 1998, with wide terms of reference, including ensuring that the agencies' objectives are properly 'focused' on providing relevant intelligence to other Whitehall departments, asked them to justify their activities as well as their usefulness. It was acknowledged that the scrutiny team would probably recommend some 'down-sizing' of MI6, which had 'run out of things to do', though no clues were forthcoming from the politicians. The intelligence chiefs have them selves complained that New Labour has had no policy on the intelligence services, and it is true that all efforts to elicit a pre-election policy statement from the future Prime Minister, Foreign Secretary and Home Secretary met with failure. MI6 Chief Sir David Spedding, however, had no need to worry.

Foreign Secretary Robin Cook, the former left-winger who in opposition regularly criticised the intelligence and security services for their threat to civil liberties, lack of accountability and waste of taxpayers' money, had, one intelligence source told Richard Norton-Taylor, 'further to travel than his predecessors' in coming to terms with his responsibilities for the Secret Intelligence Service. It did not take long. Labour politicians who, in the main, have had little contact wlth the intelligence world, or much interest in its activities, have been and continue to be easily seduced by the magic of secrecy and privileged access to special sources. MI6 senior staffers knew what to do, having for so long, as Tomlinson warned, 'carefully and successfully cultivated an air of mystique and importance to their work'. Knowing that the reality is very different, SIS continues to devote considerable time and resources to lobbying for its position in Whitehall.

Cook made the short trip across the Thames to the Service's palatial Vauxhall Cross headquarters, where Spedding and his successor, Richard Dearlove, avoiding discussion of MI6's real budget, briefed him on their latest 'successes': a 'crucial role' in revealing Saddam Hussein's continuing chemical, biological and nuclear weapons programme; uncovering Iranian attempts to procure British technology; and tracking drug smugglers and countering money laundering in the City of London. And then, in April 1998, dressed in the traditional white tie and tails for the Mansion House Easter dinner for diplomats and City businessmen, ** Cook went out of his way - indeed, further than any previous Labour Foreign Secretary - to praise SIS, noting that they 'cannot speak for themselves' because 'the nature of what they do means that we cannot shout about their achievements if we want them to remain effective. But let me say I have been struck by the range and qualily of the work. It seems that some things in the British state never change.

** There have been numerous rumours in areas of Whitehall's intelligence community that while in opposition, Mr Cook used a well know high class London based escort agency (A****) [A reader suggests "Adam's"] - apparently the preferred choice of several MP's and Whitehall civil servants.

The Security and Intelligence services keep on file indiscretions, however politically sensitive, of crown servants, MP's etc - An example of that would be the sexual encounter that occurred between Gordon Brown and Peter Mandelson (interrupted accidentally by a member of Michael Meacher's staff) in Gordon Brown's office at the House of Commons while in opposition and is still only known to a very select number of Commons and Whitehall hierarchy. The services are also aware of the sexual relationship between Mr Hague and Mr Coe.

"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate … It will purge the rottenness out of the system..." - Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, 1929.

Offline Revolt426

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MI6, BUSH AND FOOT AND MOUTH By Gordon Logan


INTRODUCTION

(The author, Gordon Logan, triggered the premature Moscow Coup of August 1991, that led to the downfall of the Soviet Union. The introduction below presupposes some familiarity with www.cryptome.org/markov-file.htm , and www.cryptome/markov-file3.htm), otherwise the reader can scroll down to the main body of the article. MI6 refers to SIS, and more specifically to the largely SIS clique based on the Joint Intelligence Committee that have established themselves as Britain’s secret government, using a large cadre of agents in the media, and bagmen from the forces. Their commitment to their right wing Republican analogues who have usurped a similar role in the United States is virtually total, as the reader will find out. This allegiance has done nothing for the British, many of whom experience their country as the primary post-industrial slum of Western Europe.)

From:
Sent: Wednesday, April 11, 2001 12:22 PM
To: logan_g@jic.edu.sa
Subject: Djogova
Gordon,

I visited Djogova. […] She said that she was called to the National Parliament (meaning the State Security) in connection with Mercia [Mercia MacDermott - the British double agent who tricked the Bulgarians into killing Georgi Markov in 1978. G.L.] She said that they told her that they had stopped your press articles, and those against you. […] When I asked her why she maintained Mercia under constant surveillance [from 1985 G.L.] she said that our services maintained surveillance of many people, including you. But Mercia did a lot for Bulgaria… [trans. from Bulgarian]

N.

The above e-mail from Sofia, Bulgaria, refers to Mrs Radka Djogova, who was an old friend of Mercia MacDermott and was charged with her surveillance after she was caught in 1985. Amongst other things, Mrs MacDermott was forbidden to give her telephone number to Bulgarians, and Mrs. Djogova had the task of ensuring that Mrs MacDermott gave a false telephone number to anyone that requested it. As Mrs. Djogova indicates, I was also kept under surveillance, but it was discrete and of a very different nature, and unlike Mrs MacDermott, I could give my telephone number to anyone I liked.

The other important thing in the above is that it indicates that I have been banned from the media in Bulgaria. That suggests that the Bulgarian government had allowed my Cryptome articles (see www.cryptome.org/markov-file.htm ) to be published in January in order to turn the screws on Britain and the United States, and force them to go back on their secret agreement to let the country revert to the ex-communists (and the Russians). There can be little doubt that the Russians retaliated by giving the green light to the Albanian rebels to move into Macedonia a few weeks later in February. If any clarification is needed, then read the following, written by a personal enemy of mine: Col. Yuli Georgiev, former head of Bulgarian counter-intelligence, who has long had excellent connections with the Russian FRS.

"Because of the crisis that is afflicting the Russian economy, the military strategists of the United States and NATO have made the mistake of underestimating the Russians' capabilities. It is however clear that the fact that Russia has limited military and economic resources, means that she will resort to other, concealed mechanisms, with which to increase the political and economic instability - and inter-ethnic conflicts - of the Balkan countries even further. Russia is good at playing on the contradictions between the United States and Europe, and consequently could get support in influential Republican circles, who have indicated that they are willing to withdraw from some areas, and to return the world to the days when the stability of whole regions and continents was guaranteed by the geopolitical powers, with respect for their interests, and an acceptance of their right of influence and intervention." [Italics by G.L. Trans. form Bulgarian]
I am also banned in Britain and the United States. According to literary agents on both sides of the Atlantic there is ‘zero interest’ from publishers, who do not even send rejection slips. So MI6 has been working hard over the last year to globalize censorship.

In Britain and America, only Martin Bright of the Observer, (who had already had problems with Britain’s secret police), and John Young of Cryptome have dared to deal with me, so I seem to be regarded as a minefield. I have been in touch with a few British organizations that advertise themselves as campaigners for liberty, freedom of information, etc. John Wadham’s organization Liberty wrote the following for example:

"We are forced to decide how to target our resources in a matter [sic] that is most effective and which our members approve of. We have considered the information you gave us but feel the issues involved would be too much to take on at this time."
Wadham blames his members(!) for his organization’s refusal to support Sir Teddy Taylor MP, and write two letters (with second class stamps) to the then Home Secretary and the then Foreign Secretary respectively, requesting them to reopen the investigations into the murders of Georgi Markov and Robert Maxwell. It would be foolish to interpret the refusal of Mr Wadham’s organization as the mere spinelessness of a gang of ambitious young lawyers bent on using Liberty as a stepping stone to Parliament. It is a clear indication of penetration and manipulation by the secret police – similar to the way that MI5 ran the British Communist Party for years. This is the sort of thing that was understood by the people of Eastern Europe ten or more years ago, but which the people of Britain either do not notice, or participate in without a qualm. Like the gagged press, such organizations are ultimately ineffectual, and spend their time shadowing boxing, winning the odd court case, rather than going for the jugular and exposing the criminality of Britain’s secret state, so that the politicians can find the courage to go in and kick ass.

Since last December, I have been working on MI6 from abroad. However, on 6th June, following an improvement in Britain’s diplomatic relations with that part of the world, a couple of plain clothes officers of the local Intelligence Service paid a visit to the director of the English Language Center where I work. I was called into his office afterwards and told that they had asked him to tell me to stop communicating across international boundaries on matters relating to MI6. I understood from the conversation that the British Foreign Office might arrange a spell in one of the local prisons on a trumped up charge. Does the new Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, permit this sort of crap from his subordinates?

I was not surprised that Robin Cook was demoted after the general election– he fell out with his pin-striped thugs in February last year when the Ghadafi, Markov and Maxwell cases hit his desk in short order; he was reported in the Observer on 19th March last, as having protested (with Peter Hain) to Straw about censorship.

I was disturbed to read some weeks ago that the late John Smith’s widow had been given a job with Hakluyt. A smoking gun if ever there was one. Hakluyt is an MI6 company, and it is difficult not to conclude that Mrs Smith was placed there for purposes of surveillance. There was speculation after John’s death that he had been poisoned. The Americans had been cultivating Blair, Mandelson and Brown since the eighties, and Blair was too promising, and manipulable, for them to pass up. Meta Ramsey must have ‘failed’ John, and MacColl and Spedding would have taken care of the rest. I have met that kind of murderer several times. They would watch you drop dead on the carpet without turning a hair. I have been told (by someone connected with MI6) that Smith would have had the courage to resist MI6 if he had become Prime Minister. Blair, by contrast, is paralyzed if there isn’t a Mandelson or a Campbell to hold his hand. Pathetic.

I still haven’t written an official complaint about the role of MI6 in the Markov and Maxwell murders, for the simple reason that ‘complaints may only be made in respect of anything believed to have been done after 15th December 1994, when the Act came into force’. Did Jack not know that, when he wrote to Teddy Taylor on Jan 29th? Perhaps the best approach would be simply to walk into Scotland Yard and get them to take Mrs MacDermott in for questioning. As Straw mentioned in his letter, I visited the Foreign Office on December 21st last, and spoke to a Mr. Falconer in the public reception area. On the other side of the room, a man in a razor sharp blue pin stripe suit was pacing up and down, obviously from upstairs. As I left, I glimpsed his face: very worried indeed. These people are fighting for survival.

MI6, BUSH AND FOOT AND MOUTH

When I began writing on David Shayler’s website in November 1999, I expressed the opinion that we had to drive a wedge between the government and the security services. Clearly we succeeded, though we hadn’t anticipated the weakness of the Prime Minister. David reposted my revelations several times – notably in mid March last year, when the Observer responded on 19th March with a series of articles telling their readers to go to his website. To close down his website, MI6 had to get him back to Britain. Meanwhile censorship struck Britain in the form of a stick and a carrot. The stick was the new top level censorship committee (reported in the Sunday Times on May 21st last year), and the first journalist to be offered the carrot was the BBC’s World Affairs Editor, John Simpson, who was invited for lunch with wine in the MI6’s new House of Cards at Vauxhall Cross. One of John’s best friends is Sir Peter (or is it Michael?) Reddaway – a wonderful fellow who makes an excellent living at the FCO making sure as little information as possible reaches journalists and members of Parliament. Another of the many journalists that have gone to Vauxhall Cross to schmooze with the spooks is the editor who killed the Markov/Maxwell story after three months of chicanery. Such prostitution deserves more than a lunch or a knighthood, it deserves a dukedom – and a good hiding from his colleagues.

With the accusations that have accumulated, the spectre of European law has been tormenting MI6 for over a year now. On top of that there is the rising scandal of Echelon. The British secret government, dominated by MI6 and the CIA head of station in Grosvenor Square, is incompatible with the modus operandi of the European Union, and legal bust-ups with Europe are looming on the horizon.

It was therefore no surprise that a Republican delegation led by Senator Phil Gramm slipped into London last summer to visit the ‘unelectable’ William Haig and propose British membership of NAFTA. The secret government was hoping to solve its problems by getting Blair out and reversing Britain out of Europe and into NAFTA. Master cooks themselves, they will have no qualms about cohabiting with the Bush administration (which is run by shysters who have cooked everything from the Florida electoral rolls to the US Supreme Court).

 
Not surprisingly, I, and members of my family, attract rather close surveillance. This can have its advantages. We occasionally have the opportunity to learn things from people with a remarkably good understanding of the black arts of politics, much better than any gagged British newspaper. For example when embarrassing documents from the Downing Street waste paper basket began to surface in the British press last June, we were told that ‘MI6 wanted to get Blair out at the next election’.

However, after months of ‘Downing Street Leaks’ from Blair’s waste paper basket, the secret government and the CIA chief of station were shocked to find that Blair’s popularity was quite unaffected. As the autumn turned into winter, and the Downing Street leaks dried up, the press began to blame Blair for the worsening weather. The anti-Blair campaign, spearheaded by the huge circulation of the transatlanticly owned Murdoch/Black newspapers (25 million copies a day) was followed by the entire press – Conservative and Labour. So striking was this sustained anti-Blair barrage, that Newsweek finally made it the main subject of its May 21st issue, and printed a spoof tabloid cover with the following headlines ‘85% Chance of Rain, and Blair Does Nothing’ and ‘Manchester United Victorious Again – No Thanks to Blair’.

The year-long campaign did have one stroke of luck however: last December, just after Bush’s confirmation by the Reagan-nominated US Supreme Court, a thief walked through fences and walls and got into the British Ministry of Defence Laboratory at Porton Down, a maximum security facility which contains a wide range of the most dangerous viruses and poisons in the world. The thief knew what he was looking for – he escaped with a phial of foot and mouth virus. (This information slipped past the censor and got onto the front page of the Daily Express on April 7th – the millionaire pornographer [sic] who had just bought the Express was a newcomer to British journalism and thought it was ok to print real news – something that British newspapers avoid doing if they possibly can.)
 
A few weeks after the Porton Down theft, the foot and mouth epidemic surfaced all over England, indicating a terrorist attack, but strangely enough the British press, which usually falls over itself to report anything to do with terrorism, wasn’t interested in the terrorist angle. They were interested in the Blair angle, and for months New Labour was blamed for foot and mouth. It was announced that MI5 would investigate the Porton Down episode, but we can be certain that the report will never be made public, because Britain’s farmers might turn nasty if they find out that the viral strain that caused the outbreak was the same as the one that disappeared from Porton Down. At the behest of Charles Moore, the editor of the MI6 house newspaper, the Daily Telegraph (29th March), Blair was forced to delay the general election by a month so as to give the secret government a little more time to drag down his rating. Bellwether MI6 journalist Tom Bower struck the final futile blow for his puppetmasters on the morning of the election in the Daily Mail, with a long article exposing that Blair’s ministers had not only sabotaged the nation’s agriculture – they had cocked up the planned National Football Stadium, a shocking revelation designed to enrage English football fans, whom MI6 no doubt reckon to be the bedrock of Blair’s electoral support.
Former Tory Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd had lamented the unelectability of the Tories as early as last summer, but the new Bush administration clearly knew better, and treated the Blair government as if it would not survive the General Election. Almost immediately after the presidential inauguration, Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld declined to invite his British opposite number, Geoff Hoon, to Washington. Rumsfeld instead invited the Tory defence spokesman, Iain Duncan Smith. This gesture – normally reserved for US-backed opposition leaders from pariah states – was proffered to a country that a few days earlier had been the United States No. 1 ally. (I exclude Israel, of which of the US government seems to have become a part.) A few weeks later Blair turned up in Washington to meet the new President. When Bush was asked if he had anything in common with Blair, he replied succinctly, "We both use Colgate." The Bush administration was convinced it wouldn’t be doing business with Blair for long, so superfluous courtesies were dispensed with.

Of course, at the heart of all this is something more than MI6’s fear of European law, and the legal exposure of its criminality. At the heart of the matter lies a major, geopolitical issue - the Bush administration’s determination to weaken the European Union and kill the euro as an international currency. If the Republicans don’t stop Britain from adopting the euro, there is a clear possibility that the euro will one day replace the dollar as an international currency, and deprive the Republican Party of its preferred method of bankrolling the arms companies that it serves - by printing more dollars. This is another important issue that the media avoid discussing. The euro is a problem not for Britain, but for America. It is America’s battles that are being fought inside the Conservative Party.

Following the Blair victory, the secret government and their backers in the Bush administration have suffered a major defeat. They are stuck with Blair and will pressure him at every turn, and Blair, being Blair, will very probably give in – the firing of Cook was a dire act of appeasement following the dismissal of Mandelson and Vaz. Like Patti Hurst, Blair is too frightened to resist and has chosen to join his kidnappers – a classic example of the ‘Stockholm syndrome’.

The victory of the pro-European Kenneth Clarke in the first round of the election of a new Tory leader presents another problem for the secret government. If Clarke becomes the conservative leader, that will take some of the pressure off Blair and he might conceivably find the strength to resist the forces that are already making him a historical nonentity.

Britain has become a Bush sideshow, and in order to save the House of Cards at Vauxhall Cross from European justice, MI6 has abandoned what is left of British industry, is betraying the City, and because of a lunatic covert action, has laid waste to British agriculture. Not surprising, however, if we bear in mind that David Spedding and his men got away with the murder of Britain’s most popular public figure in Paris in the early hours of 1st September 1997. Not surprising, above all, if we consider the calibre of Britain’s political journalists, the Shrimsleys and the Prawnsleys, who hammer trivia out of their keyboards, and ‘kiss the whip’ of censorship, for fear of noticing the massive, and obvious political crimes of a rotten state.

"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate … It will purge the rottenness out of the system..." - Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, 1929.

Offline Revolt426

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http://cryptome.org/mi6-diana.htm

A writes:

Next week a number of SIS [MI6] officers are listed to give evidence to the
Princess Diana and Dodi Fayed inquest in London. They will
be called by names such as 'A', 'E', etc.


Operational Note by the Coroner on the SIS witnesses:

http://www.scottbaker-inquests.gov.uk/press_notices/0408.htm

Schedule of their planned appearances:

http://www.scottbaker-inquests.gov.uk/sitting_days/index.htm

These witnesses will be questioned about a proposal by one of them to assassinate someone in a road tunnel - a person who was originally identified as Slobodan Milosevic, but appears now (although not with complete certainty) to have been another, unnamed, Serbian figure.

References to peace talks etc. suggest that this unnamed figure, whose
name has been redacted from certain materials provided to the interested
parties at the inquest, was Radovan Karadjic. However, it is still
possible that the actual named target was Milosevic.

Some of the SIS officers' identities can be deduced from Richard
Tomlinson's letter to his solicitor, available here:

http://www.inside-news.ch/shayler/!milosev.htm,

in which he writes that:

"The minute was approximately 2 pages long, and had a yellow minute card
attached to it which signified that it was an accountable document
rather than a draft proposal. It was entitled "The need to assassinate
President Milosevic of Serbia".
In the distribution list in the margin
were P4 (Head of Balkan operations, then Maurice Kendwrick-Piercey),
SBO1/T (Security officer responsible for eastern European operations,
then John Ridd), C/CEE (Controller of east European operations, then
Richard Fletcher or possibly Andrew Fulton), MODA/SO (The SAS liaison
officer attached to MI6, then Major Glynne Evans), and H/SECT (the
private secretary to Sir Colin McColl, then Alan Petty)."
Going by the transcript of evidence given to the inquest on 20 Feb by
the guy who was head of SIS operations at the time of the car crash in
Paris, and who later became Chief

http://www.scottbaker-inquests.gov.uk/hearing_transcripts/200208pm.htm,

it is possible to make the following identifications of next week's
witnesses:

A is Nicholas Fishwick, the guy who made the proposal
E is Richard Fletcher or possibly Andrew Fulton
G is SIS officer John Ridd
H is very probably Maurice Kendwrick-Piercey
Whether all individuals mentioned in the quoted paragraph by Tomlinson
were interviewed for the purposes of the inquest, and whether they will
all be called as witnesses to the inquest, remains unclear. Evidence
from the SAS liaison officer (the SAS, as well as doing other things,
provides special forces personnel to carry out such jobs for SIS) would
be particularly interesting.

The 'Times' quotes Lord Foulkes, a member of the Intelligence and
Security Committee, as saying "the coroner should now seriously consider
stopping the inquest."

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/politics/article3406344.ece

It remains to be seen whether this sort of commenting on a matter
currently ongoing before a court - and which is no business of the
executive or the legislature - will spread?



"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate … It will purge the rottenness out of the system..." - Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, 1929.

Offline Biggs

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very informative reading, many thanks for posting this stuff Revolt426, definitely a 'save to favourities' thread for future reference.
STOP THE KILLING NOW
END THE CRIMINAL SIEGE OF GAZA - FREE PALESTINE!!!!!!!

Offline Revolt426

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Bump - Did anyone see this stuff? JEEZ......
"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate … It will purge the rottenness out of the system..." - Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, 1929.

Offline Biggs

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good info can get kinda lost in GD due to the faster turnaround
STOP THE KILLING NOW
END THE CRIMINAL SIEGE OF GAZA - FREE PALESTINE!!!!!!!

Offline Revolt426

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good info can get kinda lost in GD due to the faster turnaround
Yea i gave it a bump so the day people can take a look... some crazy information on that page..
"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate … It will purge the rottenness out of the system..." - Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, 1929.

Offline Revolt426

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Just browsing over it again, there is so much dot connecting that its mind blowing:

I/OPs also has a more covert role in planning psychological operations along the lines of the old Special Political Action (SPA) section and the Information Research Department (IRD). I/OPs may also, according to a former MI6 officer, 'attempt to influence events in another country or organisation in a direction favourable to Britain'. One example is MI6's determined effort to 'plant stories in the American press about Boutros Ghali, whom they regarded as dangerously Francophile, in the run up to the 1992 elections for UN secretary-general'. Foreign operations of this sort do not require ministerial sanction.1

I/OPs also expends considerable energy behind the scenes in 'surfacing' damaging stories designed to discredit critics of the Service. They will use off-the-record briefings of sympathetic journalists; the planting of rumours and disinformation, which through 'double-sourcing' are confirmed by a proactive agent; and the overt recruitment of journalist agents. Journalists paid to provide information or to 'keep their eyes open' are known as an 'asset' or an 'assistant' or just 'on side'. According to Richard Tomlinson, paid agents included in the nineties one and perhaps two national newspaper editors. An editor is unlikely to be directly recruited as the Service would require the permission of the Foreign Secretary and would not like to be put in the position of being refused. Such high-fliers are more likely to have been recruited early in their careers. In this case, the journalist was apparently recruited at least three years before becommg an editor and remained an asset until at least 1998. Tomlinson has said that the editor was paid a retainer of £100,000, with access to the money via an offshore bank in an accessible tax haven. The editor was given a false passport to gain entry to the bank, which he regularly visited
"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate … It will purge the rottenness out of the system..." - Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, 1929.

Offline Revolt426

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That is British 'Black Arts' Counter Intelligence! and an MI6 source to prove it!
"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate … It will purge the rottenness out of the system..." - Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, 1929.

Offline Biggs

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That is British 'Black Arts' Counter Intelligence! and an MI6 source to prove it!

known in northern Ireland as 'dirty tricks' the British intelligence are masters of the trade
STOP THE KILLING NOW
END THE CRIMINAL SIEGE OF GAZA - FREE PALESTINE!!!!!!!

Offline TheHouseMan

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Those are some dirty tactics. They always use methods which consume your time, as well as other precious resources.

Offline Revolt426

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Just wanted to highlight this tactic, because the empire used it, and they are still using it and it is the cause of every war in the last few centuries:

Recruiting or running agents and gathering intelligence are the prime objectives of these deep-cover operatives, and their real work, some claim, starts at six in the evening when the conventional diplomats begin their round of cocktail parties. Such social events can be very useful for gathering intelligence and spreading disinformation. Baroness Park recalled that one of MI6's more successful ploys was 'to set people very discreetly against one another. They destroy each other. You don't destroy them.' Officers would offer the odd hint that it was 'a pity that so-and-so is so indiscreet. Not much more.' Officers will also deal with paid 'support agents' - those who supply MI6 with facilities including safe houses and bank accounts, as well as intelligence. There are also 'long insiders' - agents of influence with access to MI6 assessments and sanitised intelligence. The Service's deep-cover agents have burst transmitters with the ability to transmit a flash signal to MI6 via a satellite when they are in danger
"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate … It will purge the rottenness out of the system..." - Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, 1929.

Offline barndoor77

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Wow there is some serious dirty laundry stuff in these documents.

I bet MI5 and MI6 is just so happy that this information is posted and copied everywhere, and am sure they are reading it.


Offline Revolt426

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Wow there is some serious dirty laundry stuff in these documents.

I bet MI5 and MI6 is just so happy that this information is posted and copied everywhere, and am sure they are reading it.


The Agent that exposed this is "missing" and "On the run".  I am sure he has a nice price tag on his head.
"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate … It will purge the rottenness out of the system..." - Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, 1929.

Offline Revolt426

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Note to moderators - this website has been removed [likely by British Intelligence] as i've just re-checked it. Please keep this data to preserve it , i am not sure it is sourced anywhere else.
"Liquidate labor, liquidate stocks, liquidate the farmers, liquidate real estate … It will purge the rottenness out of the system..." - Andrew Mellon, Secretary of Treasury, 1929.

luckee1

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Have you tried to torrent thes document so every one can get copies and make it public?