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Speech of
JAVIER SOLANA
EU High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy
Managing Global Insecurity
Brookings Institution
Washington, 21 March 2007
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Ladies and Gentlemen,
Dear Friends,
Dean Acheson's memoirs were called Present at the Creation. The story he tells is how in the post-
war period, under US leadership, a system was built that put the world on a new path of
international co-operation. His generation was determined to learn the lessons of the 1930s; to avoid
economic protectionism and a paralysed League of Nations.
They were committed to do better. But they were not naïve. After all, this was also the start of the
Cold War. So they knew about power. But they decided to make it subject to constraints. The title
of Acheson's memoirs is fitting. The leaders at that time were not always aware of it. But they
created what became known as "the multilateral system". Co-operation would not be just ad-hoc,
but based on strong institutions. For decades that system served us well.
This morning I am delighted that I am, so to say, also present at the creation of something, namely
this new initiative on Global Governance. I want to commend Strobe [Talbott] and Carlos [Pascual]
for getting this project off the ground, together with the Center for International Co-operation at
NYU and the Center for International Security and Co-operation at Stanford. The aim of this project
is ambitious and urgent: to launch a new reform effort for the global security system, in 2009.
As Carlos [Pascual] says, we have to analyse the capacity of the existing system to address the new
threats we face; assess why previous reform attempts have not always worked; and then decide how
we can build the momentum for a successful reform effort by 2009.
I am delighted to play a modest role myself.
Global governance is an awful term but a vital concept. We need it because of a simple reality:
interdependence. We live in a world where people, goods, ideas, money, threats and opportunities
move at a global level and at increasing speed. What happens half-way round the world, in
Afghanistan, Gaza or DR Congo affects our own security and prosperity.
Globalisation has offered millions a chance to live better lives. But it has also unleashed forces that
governments can neither stop not control. You all know the list: terrorism, non-proliferation,
climate change, pandemics, failing states. None can be solved by a single government acting alone.
So the question is: how do we organise this globalised world? And especially how do we tackle the
dark side of globalisation?On the whole, our capacity to analyse problems is good. But even when we agree on what has to
happen - take Israel-Palestine - we still don't manage to translate that consensus into results on the
ground. It is worth analysing why this is so.
Let us return for a moment to Acheson. The post-war system was very successful. We had a
network of strong institutions and regimes: the UN, IMF, GATT, NATO. Yes, the Cold War set
limits on the capacity of the system. But it also prevented the Cold War from degenerating into
open conflict.
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Through deterrence and détente, the Helsinki agreement, and arms control treaties, we eventually
brought about a peaceful end to the Cold War. This led in 1989/90 to the outbreak of euphoria. It
was the period of "the end of history"; the triumph of markets and democracy.
A new world order to
be managed by a rejuvenated United Nations. It was great to live through that phase. But people
were far too optimistic. For the global system is in serious trouble. It is simply not capable of
solving the big challenges of today.
In the 19th century, the problems that industrialisation brought about were solved through a series
of state interventions: from safety standards to sewage systems to a ban on child labour. We have to
ask ourselves: what structures, beyond the state, do we have to solve the big problems of our times?
We are dealing with complex security challenges that defy traditional ways of operating. We have
to see the connections between different threats. I
n many ways, Darfur is the first time we are aware
that a war is caused by climate change - and it will not be the last. We need more integrated
strategies to address these problems. In the old system, everyone was doing their own thing in their
own corner.
We now know that we must bring together the world of soldiers, diplomats, judges and
development experts. More fundamentally the old system cannot cope because power is shifting
away. Within political systems: to the media, markets and above all to individuals.
These days, there is less obedience. Who wants to be a follower if you are constantly told you can
be what you want to be? It is striking that in Britain, the slogan for the recruitment for the army has
changed from "Your country needs You" to "Be all you can be".
Power is also shifting between political systems: from the West to new powers. China, India, Brazil,
South Africa. And yes from the US, we have seen a tendency to make its engagement in the
multilateral system more selective. More narrowly focused on short-term priorities. And less willing
to seek deeper trade-offs with other countries.
What to do?
The first requirement is that the US plays an active and constructive role inside the
system. I have a sense that the tide may be turning. And I hope that this project will strengthen
those who argue that working through multilateral organisations is the best way to get lasting
results. More broadly, we need to make space at the top table.
Take the G-8. At present it does not really work effectively. It needs to change its membership.
Why not make it a G-10 in which the ten major countries are represented based on a composite
index of international weight (GDP, aid, soldiers and civilians deployed on peace support
missions)? This would not only bring China and India in but also keep some current members on
their toes...
Equally
we should make space for the new heavyweights at the UN Security Council. In turn, the
new powers should keep in mind that with greater global influence come greater responsibilities
too. To strengthen regional co-operation, could we have (semi)permanent seats at the UNSC for the
Great Powers but also for regional organisations?
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I am convinced that we need stronger regional organisations: the African Union, ASEAN, Latin
American structures. I also wonder whether the Middle East region will remain the big exception:
over-armed, under-institutionalised and rife with tensions.
Then we will need to develop new bargains. On the environment and climate change. Or on forms
of dialogues between cultures. Sometimes we need to be more serious about upholding our side of
the old bargain. Take non-proliferation. If we want to be credible, we have to take the disarmament
side of the bargain more seriously. In addition, the multilateral system cannot only address our
immediate concerns. When we talk about non-proliferation we mostly mean WMD (weapons of
mass destruction). But for many African or Asian leaders the most urgent proliferation problem is
that of small arms and light weapons.
Above all, we need to re-learn that the biggest shift in history came when we extended the rule of
law. First within states and now, gradually, also among them. We should step up what we are
already doing. Regionally - most strikingly in Europe. But also globally on some aspects of
international life. See the WTO dispute settlement system, or the International Criminal Court. In
short: we need to share power (with new players); re-think power (beyond the state paradigm) and
tame power (extend the rule of law internationally).
Let me end with some words on legitimacy. One big problem is that we all know that we live in a
globalised world. But our politics remain local or national. This is a problem for those, like me, who
are convinced that the world needs more global-level, multilateral co-operation. For I am also a
democrat in believing that power has to be accountable.
So the question becomes: how do you make global governance more effective while making it also
democratically accountable? A key benefit of acting multilaterally is legitimacy which in turns
enhances effectiveness. As I said, this means bringing in new centres of power.
But legitimacy also means bringing our publics along. If decisions are increasingly taken at the
international level, people have to see these as legitimate. So we have two imperatives: to create
greater effectiveness in global governance but also to uphold democratic legitimacy. To do so is
difficult. It requires new ideas and a sense of compromise. But I really see no real alternative.
Let me leave you with a quote from Jean Jacques Rousseau, from The Social Contract, now that we
are talking about a global social contract.
"The strongest is never strong enough to be always the master, unless he transforms strength into
right and obedience into duty."_____________
