Why the US is losing in Afghanistan - updates on the Pashtun insurgency

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Soldiers take over where Afghan gov't fears to go

Soldiers in Afghan river valley try to prod villagers toward gov't in areas gov't fears to go

HEIDI VOGT
AP News
http://wire.antiwar.com/2010/07/11/soldiers-take-over-where-afghan-govt-fears-to-go/

Jul 11, 2010 12:06 EDT

The American soldiers climb over walls, jump ditches and scan the dirt for trip wires in an hourlong hike, all to meet with one man: the new head of a mosque in a tiny village in a southern Afghan river valley. They hope to persuade him to support the Afghan government.

They have a tough sell. The mullah, Bas Mohammad, says residents in Charbagh never see government representatives — not doctors, teachers or agriculture workers — even though the village sits on the edge of the south's largest city, Kandahar.

In areas like these, where government authorities rarely venture, patrolling NATO troops are not just a security force: They are also envoys of the Afghan government.

The Taliban clearly have a presence in Charbagh. The road between the village and an American outpost is so littered with homemade bombs that soldiers from the 2nd Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment avoid it altogether, making what should be a 300-yard (-meter) walk last an hour. Mohammad's predecessor was run off by the militants, and the new mullah, a month into his job, has already been warned to leave.

The violence isolates Charbagh, and many other areas around Kandahar, and often soldiers are the only ones willing to risk the journey.

But NATO and Afghan forces aren't planning a major offensive to rout the militants around Kandahar city, as they did in the southern town of Marjah this past winter. Commanders have said that instead they're taking a softer approach in the area — known as "Operation Hamkari," which means cooperation — squeezing the Taliban by strengthening government services.

Government workers, though, are having a harder time getting around the Arghandab valley as violence has increased with the summer growing season. There have been suicide bombings, firefights and assassinations throughout the area. The district government chief was killed in June.

"A couple more weeks of this kind of fighting and we're worried that contractors are going to start refusing to go out there," said Chris Harich, a U.S. State Department envoy who works with the district government. Afghan contractors do much of the government and development work in areas that are too high-risk for international civilians.

"We think that the valley is about 50 percent government-controlled. The other 50 percent is contested," said Brig. Gen. Ben Hodges, the commander of U.S. forces in the south. He spoke to The Associated Press last week during a visit to Bravo Company's combat outpost in the valley.

The Arghandab valley is key because it is a major transit route for Taliban fighters into Kandahar city — where they launch quick strike bombings and assassinations before retreating back. But Harich said they don't expect to send government representatives into new areas of Arghandab until the risk eases. And so the onus is on the troops.

In Charbagh, the head of the American patrol, Lt. Ross Weinshenker, takes off his helmet and sits on the ground for a nearly three-hour conversation with the white-bearded mullah, who squats on his haunches.

The mullah tells the 24-year-old from St. Louis how he was chosen by the villagers to run their mosque, and the two discuss whether there's any way to justify Taliban bombings in the Quran and what to do about government corruption.

Mohammad says he can't let on that he's really pro-government — his son is a police officer — for fear of losing the support of the villagers and attracting the attention of the Taliban. When he first arrived in town, a Taliban operative showed up at his house and told him to leave. Mohammad says he told the man that he had nothing against them but stood his ground. He hasn't seen the man since.

Asked about the meetings of elders organized in the area by the government and NATO forces, Mohammad says they're not worth attending.

"It's all corrupt — just a bunch of people trying to get money, trying to make sure their people get government contracts," he says.

The conversation doesn't reach any conclusion. Mohammad makes contradictory statements: at one point he says there's no Taliban in the village, even though he also claims to have been threatened. He swears that no bombs have been planted near the village, then explains that he helped defuse some homemade explosives in a nearby field.

But Weinshenker comes away declaring it a step in the right direction. He feels like he's on his way to building trust with the old man — key to eventually getting him into those meetings he now shuns.

It's a snail-like process, conducted by troops who were trained to fight and are now trying to retool to become gun-bearing diplomats. Sometimes the two roles seem impossible to marry.

The soldiers are willing to take off their helmets and drink tea with the locals, but they refuse to give up their practice of securing a compound by standing on the roof, even when a mullah in a nearby village protests that they might spy uncovered women in the courtyards of other compounds.

The commander of Bravo Company, Capt. Adam Armstrong, said they're willing to make slow progress.

And they have had successes: A few families have moved back into previously dangerous villages and Afghan soldiers have started to gain the trust of the population. Just last week, they successfully used word-of-mouth to persuade a wheat farmer to clear one of his fields of bombs that had been planted in it. The soldiers were ready to burn the field before the wheat was harvested if he didn't agree to clear it, but torching it would have certainly alienated some residents.

But the timeline is already starting to look crunched as new forces prepare to push into the area overseen by Bravo Company this fall and President Barack Obama has said troops need to start drawing down in 2011.

Soldiers say that impending deadline makes it harder for them to convince villagers that they're here to stay until the government really can step in. The Taliban have successfully convinced many that a full pullout is imminent.

And so it isn't surprising that Mullah Bas Mohammad is far from ready to stick his head out on behalf of American troops. He and the people he serves are still on the edge.

A young boy who's been listening in on the conversation from a couple feet away looks at the U.S. soldiers and says "Taliban" while giving a thumbs-up sign. Then he turns his thumb down toward the ground and says "American."

An Afghan soldier hands the boy a bottle of water. The boy pours it out on the ground without taking a sip.

Source: AP News

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U.S. troops face Afghan enemy too young to kill

By Jonathon Burch Jonathon Burch
Sun Jul 11, 9:47 pm ET
http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100712/ts_nm/us_afghanistan_fighters

A local boy looks at U.S. Army soldiers from Alpha Company, 2-508 Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th Brigade Combat Team, as they conduct a morning patrol through the village of Kowall in Arghandab District, north of Kandahar July 11, 2010

 
ARGHANDAB, Afghanistan (Reuters) – U.S. Staff Sergeant Aaron Best made no apologies as his soldiers escorted 14-year-old Ahmad, blindfolded and handcuffed, onto their outpost in southern Afghanistan for questioning.

"Don't be fooled," said Best, "I have detained so many teenagers. These fighters are getting younger and younger."

Ahmad, whose real name has been concealed to protect his identity, was picked up by a U.S. patrol along with a 15-year-old boy in Arghandab, in southern Kandahar province, one of Afghanistan's most volatile regions, because they were behaving suspiciously.

Ahmad and his friend were hiding in vegetation, observing the soldiers, when they were spotted. The boys scurried away and when Best's men finally caught up to them they tried to resist arrest, making the soldiers even more suspicious.

Both boys, along with several older detainees picked up on the patrol, tested positive for traces of ammonium nitrate on their hands, a chemical found in gunpowder and explosives. Ammonium nitrate is also found in certain fertilizers and, although they are banned in Afghanistan because they can be used to make homemade bombs, they are still used by some farmers. The detainees could simply have been farm laborers.

Ahmad and the others were kept overnight for questioning by Afghan police and released the next day to village elders who said they would vouch for them.

Whether or not Ahmad and his 15-year-old friend had been laying homemade bombs or had even fired weapons at U.S. troops before, Best's men will probably never find out, but the arrests illustrate a worrying trend reported from soldiers on the ground: that they are encountering an increasingly younger fighter.

"Over the last eight to nine years there has been a dynamic change in the age of fighters. Most fighters now are between 14 and 18 years-old," said Lieutenant Colonel Guy Jones, commander of 2-508th Parachute Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, based in Arghandab.

"In 2002, fighters were 22 to 30-years-old and commanders were between 32 and 40," said Jones who is on his fourth tour in Afghanistan.

Jones pulls out a piece of paper from his pocket to illustrate his point. On the paper are the names of recently captured detainees with their photographs beside them. Their ages range from 14 to 20.

One wounded boy caught firing a weapon at U.S. forces is now recovering in hospital at the main foreign air base in Kandahar. He is only 13, said Jones.

"EMULATING THEIR GRANDFATHERS"

Jones said the young fighters were being coerced into joining the insurgency.

"These kids are looking at their elders and grandfathers as the great mujahideen, with respect, and they want to emulate them," said Jones, referring to the men who fought against the Soviet occupation during the 1980s.

"The Taliban are pressuring young fighters to fight like their grandfathers and telling them: 'Hey, be like them.'"

Whatever the reasons, it makes Best and his men wary of nearly everyone they meet on their patrol, and Afghanistan has one of the youngest populations in the world.

Each time the soldiers patrol out of their outpost in Arghandab, a white kite is hoisted up from a nearby village.

The soldiers know they have Taliban "spotters" around the area and that these are most likely children, but when they have challenged the kite fliers they claim ignorance. For the soldiers it has happened too many time to be a coincidence.

This time Staff Sergeant Best agreed with the Afghan police to let the detainees go, saying it could help build up a rapport with the community, but the platoon commander's frustration was palpable.

"At the end of the day we don't have enough evidence on them and keeping them in for another two days will only turn the village against us," he said.

"It's like you really have to catch them putting the bomb in or firing a gun at us for something to happen."

(Editing by David Fox and Alex Richardson)

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Afghanistan air drops provide life support to troops

Page last updated at 08:27 GMT, Sunday, 11 July 2010 09:27 UK
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/10589753.stm
By Caroline Wyatt

Defence correspondent, BBC News, Helmand

WATCH VIDEO :
The Hercules dropping supplies in Afghanistan
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk/10589753.stm

With the roads in southern Afghanistan fraught with danger for land convoys, some vital supplies are now being air-dropped into the coalition troops' more remote forward operating bases by the RAF.

The airfield at Kandahar airbase works night and day, seven days a week, transporting troops and equipment into this landlocked country.

In the blazing afternoon sun, a heat-haze rises from the tarmac as soldiers from 47 Air Despatch Squadron load up huge pallets of water and rations into the back of a Hercules C-130 aircraft.

It is a method dating back to the air drops of World War II, when British troops operating in France were re-supplied by air.

Today, air drops are being used for the smaller Nato patrol bases and checkpoints scattered across Helmand province - still one of the most hostile areas of Afghanistan.

'Life support'
 
Sqn Ldr Andy Wood, the officer commanding the Hercules detachment in Kandahar, said: "We do it when a convoy is having problems getting to the patrol bases because of the IED (improvised explosive device) threat, or if there is a high threat to helicopters or they are too busy, and we have the ability to drop stores, water, rations and ammunition."

"The despatch system has been around for a long time, going back to the Dakota times in the Second World War and it's a bit of a mixture between science and Heath Robinson.

But it works, and it's accurate and it delivers the goods that the guys really need."

The aircraft can drop loads of up to 16 tons, offering life support to forces on the ground.

 The pilots have to be focused as they fly over hostile territory

But the supplies must be loaded with precision so that the weight is evenly distributed, and the parachutes on top of each pallet can open without hindrance when the moment comes.

Mistakes can be lethal, whether for civilians below or for the troops who collect the supplies. The dropping of Nato leaflets was suspended after a carton dropped by air killed an Afghan civilian below a few months ago.

Once darkness has fallen, the Hercules takes off for its flight over hostile territory.

The pilots are focused on their mission, but seem relaxed as the plane flies over Helmand, most of the land below us dark, apart from the few spots of light visible from the bigger towns.

Parachutes
 
Above us, an RAF Tornado fighter jet is flying in armed "overwatch", to ensure the Hercules is safe, while in the back of the plane the load-master and air despatchers prepare for the drop with split-second timing.

When it nears the drop zone, the Hercules banks sharply upwards to allow gravity to help shift the heavy load.

When the plane is over the right spot a green light comes on and the load is unleashed. The pallets drop rapidly out of the back, their parachutes flying open as they descend.

 The supplies sent across to the troops on the ground include vital rations

It is a textbook drop.

Hercules pilot Sqn Ldr Al Whinton said: "It's a pretty good feeling to be able to resupply these guys as sometimes they're out in the field hanging on their bootlegs almost, hanging on for rations."

"We have the ability to resupply them, so they get what they need and we are pleased to do that."

On the ground, still under cover of darkness, the troops pick up these vital rations.

Patrolling and fighting in the 45-50C (113-122F) heat of a Helmand summer, the pallets of water will soon be finished, but for now the water and rations should be enough to keep the soldiers on this part of the front line going until it's time for the next re-supply from the skies.

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'Stressed troops' burning out in Afghanistan

Updated Mon Jul 12, 2010 10:45am AEST
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/07/12/2950566.htm?section=justin

The ADA says stress levels are high because most of the fighting is being done by a small number of troops (Four Corners)

The Australia Defence Association says the Federal Government may have to consider sending more soldiers to Afghanistan to relieve the stress on those serving there now.

The Association says some helicopter crews and special forces are becoming stressed and over-worked because they are having to rotate through too many tours of duty too quickly.

The Association's Neil James says stress levels are high because much of the fighting by Australians in Afghanistan over the last few years has been done by a small part of the Defence Force.

"Small specialised elements such as helicopter crews and special forces have been very, very highly stressed because they have had a high operational tempo," he said.

"It may be that the load will have to be spread more evenly across the whole Defence Force to lower the operational tempo for those parts of the Defence Force that, quite frankly, are getting close to being over-used."

The Defence Association says it believes the increase in the number of deaths of Australian troops in Afghanistan could be due to the increase in Coalition activity because of the United States troop surge.

At the weekend the 17th Australian soldier, Private Nathan Bewes from Kogarah in New South Wales, was killed in Afghanistan in a bomb attack.

Mr James says an increase in US troop numbers means Australians accompanying them are involved in more operations in areas they have not been before.

"It may very well be that the casualties aren't related to any upsurge in the fighting, although in this case they probably are," he said.

"The thing about casualty rates is that you have to look at them in the long term and not take a snapshot at any one time, because you can get quite an artificial picture."

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Skilled Taliban blamed for rising death toll

Updated Sun Jul 11, 2010 11:05pm AEST
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/07/11/2950325.htm

Mr Smith has warned Australians to expect more casualties. (defence.gov.au)

Foreign Affairs Minister Stephen Smith says the Taliban's increased expertise in bomb making is contributing to a rise in the number of Australians killed in Afghanistan.

Private Nathan Bewes from the Brisbane based 6th Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment, was killed by an improvised explosive device while on foot patrol in the Chora Valley in Uruzgan on Friday night.

He was the sixth Australian soldier killed in just over one month and the 17th since the war began.

Mr Smith has told ABC 1's Insiders program that roadside bombs are becoming an increasing problem for troops in Afghanistan.

He has warned Australians to expect more casualties.

"The so-called surge, the increased presence has seen an additional conflict both in Uruzgan and in Afghanistan generally," he said.

"A number of the deaths that we have seen - not just Australians but the international security assistance forces - have been by roadside bombs.

"We know the Taliban have become more expert, more sophisticated and more complex in the way in which they use these booby traps."

But Federal Greens Leader Bob Brown says a growing number of Australians want our troops out of Afghanistan and called for a parliamentary debate on the issue.

"It's a terrible war, these soldiers are there at the nation's behest and we think they should be brought safely back to Australia," he told the Nine Network.

"Because this war is not going the way it should, it was bungled from the outset by [former US] president [George W] Bush.

"Every member of Parliament should be on his or her feet reflecting what there electorate thinks.

"We will go to the election fighting very strongly to have our troops brought safely home from Afghanistan."

Yesterday, Prime Minister Julia Gillard reiterated her support for the Afghanistan war and said she hoped the Australian public would continue its support.

She said despite the rising Australian death toll, she was determined to see the Australian mission in Afghanistan succeed.

"We pursue that mission because Afghanistan has been a safe haven for terrorists, for terrorists who have wreaked acts of violence against Australians in 9/11 and in Bali," she said.

Ms Gillard said there is little that can be done to reduce the danger for Australia's soldiers in Afghanistan.

"Our soldiers are going about this difficult and dangerous task as best it can be done, but there is no degree of skill or training or equipment that can take away the dangers," she said.

"This is dangerous work and we are seeing the outcome of the dangers that our soldiers face."

Private Bewes's partner, Alice Walsh, said she will miss him for the rest of her life and urged all Australians to take a moment to consider the sacrifices made by soldiers.

"While your loved one comes home to you every day there are others who are worrying if there will be another day," she said.

"Soldiers' families be proud, as they are out changing the world, making history and putting their lives on the line for Australia.

"Take one minute out of your day to pray or wish upon a star for a soldier so that they may all come back home safely one day to his/her family."

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Top anti-war Democrat: Afghanistan war could ‘destroy’ Obama’s presidency


By Sahil Kapur
Monday, July 12th, 2010 -- 10:00 am
http://rawstory.com/rs/2010/0712/nadler-afghan-war-destroy-obama-presidency-democratic-congress/

 

WASHINGTON – An outspoken anti-war Democrat said ongoing US military efforts in Afghanistan could deeply imperil the presidency of Barack Obama and the fortunes of the Democratic Party.

“I think that this war, if it goes on and if it escalates, has the potential to destroy this presidency and to destroy the Democratic majorities in Congress," Rep. Jerrold Nadler (D-NY) told Raw Story in an interview.

The New York congressman, who has called the Afghanistan war a "fool's errand," said he has no qualms opposing Obama and Democratic leaders on this sensitive issue ahead of the midterm elections, despite the harsh climate for his party.

"When you’re dealing with war and peace you can’t think of it in those terms," he said. "People are dying. The security of our country, the honor of our country, the lives of our men and women, the lives of foreign men and women – are at stake. And that’s a lot more important, frankly, than partisan advantage."

For Nadler, his stance on Afghanistan hearkens back to when he disapproved of US efforts in Vietnam in the 1960s, which President Lyndon Johnson championed and escalated.

"I got into politics opposing a president of my party – a president who was very good in most other respects – over the Vietnam war," he said.

Military leaders say the US has national security interests in creating a stable central government in Afghanistan, by rooting out Taliban insurgents and ensuring the region doesn't become a save-haven for Al-Qaeda.

Obama, who has championed the mission and deployed 30,000 additional troops to the region this year, faces a tough political predicament. Recent events have enhanced negative perceptions of the war, but withdrawal may carry with it an admission of failure and lead to damaging criticism from Republicans.

A House vote on July 1 to approve war funding revealed growing Democratic divisions over the war. Three-fifths of Democrats backed an amendment demanding an exit strategy, which failed due to resolute Republican opposition.

While the president and most members of Congress deem a withdrawal timetable ill-advised, Nadler considers the shift in Democratic perception a positive step. "I think most of the Democratic Party is coming around," he said.

The Brooklyn native said that while he believes there are political incentives for ending the Afghanistan war, his opposition is based chiefly on harsh realities in the region that make victory unachievable at a reasonable cost, if at all.

"It ought to be stopped for all sorts of reasons, but those political reasons increase the case for stopping it," Nadler said.

***

[Related: Nadler says Steele is 'right that the Afghan war is unwinnable']
http://rawstory.com/rs/2010/0709/nadler-steele-right-afghan-unwinnable/

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Monday, July 12, 2010
15:43 Mecca time, 12:43 GMT
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/07/201071292938573363.html
   
News CENTRAL/S. ASIA 
 
Report: 2010 worst for Afghanistan 

 
The Taliban remains undeafeted despite more US troops being drafted into the country [Reuters] 
 
The current year has been the most violent in Afghanistan since the US-led forces invaded the land-locked central Asian country in 2001, an Afghan rights group has said.

According to the Afghanistan Rights Monitor (ARM), civilian deaths have risen amid increased insecurity and the Taliban remains far from being defeated.

"In terms of insecurity, 2010 has been the worst year since the demise of the Taliban regime in late 2001," it said on Monday.

"Not only have the number of security incidents increased, the space and depth of the insurgency and counter-insurgency-related violence have maximised dramatically," ARM said.

About 1,074 civilians were killed and more than 1,500 injured in war-related incidents in the first six months of 2010, compared with 1,059 killed in the same period last year, ARM said.

Taliban 'resilient'

In late December, Barack Obama, the US president, ordered an extra 30,000 American troops into Afghanistan as part of a new strategy designed to reverse the Taliban momentum and speed up an end to the nine-year war.

IN DEPTH :

-  Video: Afghans talk peace in the Maldives
-  Inside Story: Is 'Afghanistan' possible?
-  Focus: Afghanistan's governance problem
-  Focus: Making room for the Taliban
-  Focus: To win over Afghans, US must listen
-  Timeline: Afghanistan in crisis
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/07/201071292938573363.html
 
But ARM's mid-year report entitled "Civilian Casualties of Conflict", said that Obama's policy of intensifying operations against the Taliban has not disrupted, dismantled or defeated the fighters.

On the contrary, it says, "the insurgency has become more resilient, multi-structured and deadly".

"Up to 1,200 security incidents were record in June, the highest number of incidents compared to any month since 2002," it said.

Most civilian deaths - 661 - were caused by Taliban fighters, who showed "little or no respect for the safety and protection of non-combatants in their armed rebellion against the government and its foreign supporters", it said.

The United States and Nato have more than 140,000 troops in Afghanistan with another 10,000 due in coming weeks as part of the counter-insurgency strategy.

The Taliban's main weapon, homemade bombs known as improvised explosive devices, were blamed for most of the deaths and injuries among Afghan civilians in the period, ARM said.

ARM said that suicide attacks by Taliban bombers were the second biggest killer of civilians in the first half of this year, killing 127 non-combatants.

It said a reduction in air strikes, ordered by the former commander of foreign forces, US General Stanley McChrystal, had resulted in fewer civilian deaths attributed to US-led forces.
 
 

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Revealed: How strategy to train Afghan forces is in deep trouble

By Jonathan Owen and Brian Brady

Afghanistan's forces are ill-prepared for the violent reality of the country's security situation


July 11, 2010
http://uruknet.info/?p=m67847&hd=&size=1&l=e

IoS investigation finds Afghan army and police riddled with addicts, illiterates and insurgents

The strategic plan of creating an Afghan security force to replace US and British troops fighting in Afghanistan is in serious disarray with local forces a fraction of their reported size, infiltrated by the Taliban at senior levels, and plagued by corruption and drug addiction, an Independent on Sunday investigation can reveal.

And the way in which their capacity has been assessed over several years, during which time tens of billions of dollars have been spent on building up Afghan security forces, is so flawed that it has been scrapped.

Less than a quarter of the army and less than one in seven police units are rated as "CM1" – meaning they are capable of operating independently. Yet the true picture is worse. An audit of the Capability Milestone (CM) rating system used to rate police and army units has revealed a misleading picture of the true level of progress.

Arnold Field, US Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (Sigar) described the system as "unreliable and inconsistent". His audit warns that Afghan military and police assessments "have overstated operational capabilities", with even the top-rated units unable to operate independently. As many as 50 per cent of police units in some areas are failing drugs tests it notes. On one occasion, coalition soldiers witnessed Afghan police openly smoking cannabis and unwilling to conduct operations or leave their compound.

The report details how army units can be as low as 59 per cent of their supposed size when it comes to going on duty. On average, only 74 per cent of Afghan soldiers in combat units were actually found present for duty, according to the report.

It warns of critical shortages of military advisers needed to "meet the demands of current force development goals", with a shortfall of more than 200 mentoring and partnering teams as of March this year.

The International Security Assistance Force's (Isaf) leaders acknowledge problems with the local security forces, as they brace themselves for an increase in attacks over the summer months. Isaf hopes to increase the combined strength of the Afghan Army and police from under 200,000 at the start of 2009 to over 300,000 next year, in the hope that this will accelerate a withdrawal of international forces from Afghanistan.

But an analysis by the IoS reveals that the true strength of the Afghan security forces – those that have been trained and judged to be able to operate independently – is barely 34,000. This is almost a seventh of the 236,000 claimed by Nato/Isaf.

Insurgents have been able to infiltrate Afghan security forces at senior levels. In one case, a police commander was found to have been involved in a number of indirect fire and IED attacks on coalition forces, as well as the kidnap and murder of a American civilian. In another, a known Taliban commander was discovered serving in the Afghan army.

Both examples, cited in a recent US Department of Defense report, highlight what coalition forces are up against in trying to push through political pledges of building up a sustainable Afghan security force. Corruption is now so rife within the army that officers are now allocated postings through a lottery in an attempt to stop people buying positions.

The police are seen as a particular problem. A purge of the corruption-riddled force by the Afghan Ministry of the Interior (MOI) resulted in more than one-in-five senior police leaders being sacked or prosecuted for corruption or misconduct in the past 18 months. All senior police and MOI officials must declare their income and assets, and take lie-detector tests.

Barely a tenth of police units are rated effective. Some 70 per cent of police are illiterate, and half have had no formal training, according to experts. In a specialist newsletter published by the Nato Training Mission they warn that current training capacity "falls short of meeting the urgent and basic needs of training the untrained ANP and new recruits."

A trail of confidential correspondence between Foreign Office officials, obtained by the IoS, highlights the concerns within the government. The drive to speed up training in response to political pressure for an exit strategy has led to officials lowering the bar. "We want high quality recruits – as high a quality as we can get for forthcoming activities. This means lowering the bar – a bit – in terms of literacy, but maintaining it in terms of [for example] the threshold on drug addiction," admitted an official in the British Provincial Reconstruction Team in Lashkar Gah in June last year.

101st British soldier dies in Sangin

A Royal Marine killed in an explosion in Afghanistan last week was named yesterday as David Charles Hart, 23, of 40 Commando. He was the 101st British serviceman to die in Sangin and the 314th to die in Afghanistan. His death, coincided with the Defence Secretary's announcement that British troops were pulling out of the town.

His family said he showed "Commando spirit" throughout his life.

He died after he was caught in a blast while on foot patrol in the Sangin District of Helmand Province. He was deployed to Afghanistan in April, to mentor the Afghan National Police in Sangin.

His parents Dilys and Chris Hart, from Upper Poppleton, North Yorkshire, said: "Throughout his life David showed the qualities of the Commando spirit, he had a great personality and was a friend to everyone.

"His cheerfulness, his sense of humour and his smile will be sorely missed, but never forgotten. We are immensely proud, as he was, of his achievements."

The Ministry of Defence said Hart passed out for duty as a Royal Marines Commando on 16 October 2009 and was awarded the Commando Medal.




 

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The Demand for Obedience, and Reverence for Authority (II): Being There

by Arthur Silber

http://uruknet.info/?p=m67848&hd=&size=1&l=e

July 11, 2010

(I): Introduction, and Numerous Errors on the First Level of Analysis
Here :    http://powerofnarrative.blogspot.com/2010/07/demand-for-obedience-and-reverence-for.html


Our first episode ended with an intolerably suspenseful cliffhanger:

Why is the United States in Afghanistan?

No, no. That simply won't do. It's far too dry and detached in presentation. Let's try to bring it closer in spirit to the form in which we commonly encounter this damnably vexing question. It usually goes more like this (I've provided detailed stage directions, to help make what is always an especially charming moment come alive for you, dear reader):

We hear gasps that grow more and more frequent, as our protagonist finds it progressively difficult to breathe. Unbearable and steadily increasing anxiety suffuses the air. As we contemplate the nervewracking spectacle, goosebumps speckle our soul. Finally, the unanswerable question of the ages bursts forth from frothing lips:

"Why, dear God, oh, why, why, why are we in Afghanistan?"

Our protagonist presses the back of one hand to his forehead as he casts his eyes beseechingly toward heaven, in the classic pose from melodrama denoting the futility of all man's efforts when faced with an implacably hostile universe. The other hand grasps his chest, vainly attempting to provide succor and strength to his faltering heart. After a few moments, he weakly extends his arms toward us, as if to beg for deliverance from his intellectual torments. Finally, he slowly collapses to the floor, his body lifeless, his soul shattered, defeated by life's excruciating burden, undone by the question that forbids satisfactory response.
Are we able to provide assistance to this beleaguered soul? To judge from most commentary, we are not. (Numerous examples of such commentary will soon be offered; many of them are remarkably akin to this profoundly unnerving scene, one surely destined for inclusion among classic horror vignettes.)

Our protagonist must perish! Woe, woe unto us. Or unto him, at least.

Ah, but we are not "most commentary." Yes, we are also arrogant. Most unfortunately for you, our insufferability shall not prevent us from proceeding.

To answer this question of questions, one which the vast majority of writers and commentators repeatedly insist is perhaps the most impenetrable mystery in the entire universe (and undoubtedly not just this universe), let's begin with a simple maxim: Geography is your friend.

Take a look at this map. Consider it for a minute or two. It's a close-up view of Afghanistan and the surrounding area, showing just that country and its immediate neighbors. Who are those neighbors?

Immediately to the south and east (and sharing a very long border) is Pakistan, with India just beyond. Also to the east, and sharing a short border with Afghanistan, is China.

To the north are three of the 'Stans: Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Beyond the 'Stans (take a look at a wider view) are Russia to the north, and China once again to the northeast.

Directly to the west, and also sharing a long border with Afghanistan, is Iran.

We recapitulate for emphasis and clarity: Pakistan, India, the three 'Stans, Russia, China and Iran. Perhaps your torment begins to ease.

In terms of geography alone, Afghanistan is a critical gateway to almost all the countries that are of greatest concern to the United States government today. If you look again at the wider view, you'll see that Afghanistan is right smack in the middle of everything.

This geographical fact about Afghanistan has placed that unfortunate region right smack in the middle of campaigns of conquest throughout history. Alexander the Great spent time in Afghanistan, as undoubtedly did other lesser-known leaders who predated him. If you come by land from Europe, Africa or the Middle East and you wish to get to the major part of the Asian land mass or the Indian subcontinent, chances are you'll go directly through Afghanistan. It's right in the damned middle.

So I repeat: geography alone means that Afghanistan is going to be of immense importance to those bent on dominion and control over large portions of the globe. Please note that this is quite apart from any natural resources that might be found in Afghanistan. Indeed, throughout much of history and long before the region was called Afghanistan, no resources were known to be there (except perhaps for human resources, but there weren't many of those either, certainly not compared to other parts of the world). And still, Afghanistan was tragically often a key part of the route followed by those who would subdue certain parts of the globe. I'll return to the question of resources a bit later; for now, think of those resources as a side dish to the main course -- a very lovely side dish, to be sure, especially for those bent on power and wealth, but still in the nature of a supplement. If it turns out to be a valuable supplement, so much the better.

The main course is geographical. Afghanistan is right in the damned middle of much that is of great importance to those who seek power and dominion.

As noted, Afghanistan was very familiar to leaders of ancient times because of its strategic location. Most of us know at least a bit about more recent history and the era of The Great Game. You can read more about that as your time and interest indicate. The foundational point remains the same. As it is sometimes expressed, and here it is all too accurate: geography is destiny.

A related point is crucial to the discussion to come in this series: because of the critical nature of Afghanistan's location for those in pursuit of power and control, the primary goal throughout history and continuing today, for Britain, for Russia, for the United States, for others, can be expressed in two words:

Being There.

That's the whole thing. Full stop. Being there -- because Afghanistan is the strategic gateway to further destinations of immense importance, because a presence in Afghanistan serves to shore up expeditions to other countries, because securing Afghanistan is necessary to a continuing power base in Central Asia.

When we understand this, we can see that all the other purported goals -- building a stable democratic government, securing Afghanistan for the Afghans, defeating alleged terrorists, ensuring regional stability for the benefit of all humankind (never solely for the sake of the U.S., or Russia, or Britain or anyone else, may the heavens forfend, but only and always for all humankind, such is the nobility and remarkable lack of self-interest of the ruling class) -- all of that is marketing and public relations. The ruling class offers those justifications because they sound so much nicer and more pleasant. Besides, the public gobbles them up with eager ignorance. Sometimes a few members of the public will behave with astonishing impertinence and point out that the marketing ploys don't seem to comport with facts on the ground. The ruling class doesn't care about any of that. Shred the PR all you wish: it's PR. It doesn't matter. They hope you spend all your time demonstrating in great detail how threadbare and senseless the marketing is. And many of you oblige them. Silly, silly you.

The marketing doesn't matter. They're primarily interested in only one objective: being there. And guess what: the United States is there. The very strong likelihood is that the U.S. will continue to be there for decades to come.

Afghanistan's geographical and therefore strategic importance is painfully obvious. So, too, are the ruling class's goals. They've announced them thousands of times. On this occasion, I don't exaggerate: the ruling class has unambiguously declared its purposes time and again. It would appear many people weren't listening -- or they heard, but chose not to believe what the ruling class repeatedly stated with admirable clarity.

Some will object that there is no reason to pursue power and control in this manner. Why don't the various powers simply mind their own business? Above all, especially today, why doesn't the United States simply mind its own business? Ah, but the ruling class emphatically believes it is minding its own business. It all depends on how we define our terms, doesn't it?

And they've explained all that to you, as well. In fact, the ruling class of the United States, so astonishingly noble and devoted only to the betterment of all mankind as they insistently declare, has explained it numerous times for over a century. There's that listening and/or comprehension problem again. So next time, we'll take a little historical survey, and there is still more to be said about Afghanistan in particular.

In terms of the U.S. ruling class's objectives, being there in Afghanistan is only the beginning of the story. The next installment will focus on the broader concern: "... and Being Everywhere."

Our ruling class does not lack for ambition. Madness, you insist? Such plans must fail? Such goals can only lead to great suffering and endless death? I haven't noticed the ruling class suffering all that much, or dying in substantial numbers. In fact, they seem to be doing quite remarkably well. They would appear to be positively thriving.

What is madness, failure and death to countless millions of "ordinary" people is a business plan for the ruling class. For decades and even centuries, it's been a very successful business plan. It all depends on your perspective.

As I've regularly noted recently, many of us do love the marketing. But you should seriously consider not discussing it as if it matters. It doesn't. To the extent you treat the marketing as important, you do the ruling class's bidding, and you provide them a gift of inestimable value.

Now wouldn't you agree that's very silly? I should think you might at this late date.

 

[bigron]

July 10, 2010


What Exactly Is COIN?

By Sandy Shanks
http://www.opednews.com/articles/What-Exactly-Is-COIN-by-Sandy-Shanks-100709-519.html

Since Defense Department figures show that COIN is costing American taxpayers approximately $5B/month in Iraq and Afghanistan, it behooves Americans to have intimate knowledge of what COIN is. Well, first of all, it is a misnomer. Second, it is an unproven strategic theory. And three, so far its use as an Americanstrategic principle has proven to be a dismal failure in three wars, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. And four, its use by other world powers, Great Britain and France predominantly in the 19th and 20th centuries, has resulted in equally dismal success stories, meaning there are none.

COIN is a misnomer. That does not require any special intelligence, but it does require one to use one's reliable Webster Dictionary. COIN is an acronym for counterinsurgency. Insurgency is defined by Webster as an "insurrection against an existing government, usually one's own." Resistance is defined by Webster as"an underground organization composed of groups of private individuals working as an opposition force in a conquered country to overthrow the occupying power, usually by acts of sabotage, guerrilla warfare, etc." Once again, it does not take a genius to figure out that U.S. forces are an occupying power in Iraq, and that U.S.-led NATO forces commanded by an American general is an occupying force in Afghanistan. Ergo, those forces fighting occupation in Iraq and Afghanistan are not insurgents, but resistance fighters.

Now there we have a P.R. problem. No doubt insurgents, a notch above or below terrorists on the threat scale (depending on one's point of view), are bad guys, but resistance fighters?. In our own Revolutionary War citizen soldiers, merchants, clerks, farmers, seamen, fathers, mothers, daughters, and sons took up arms against George III and his armies. They became resistance fighters and, glory be, they won. The French Resistance against Nazi Germany is legendary. Contrary to nasty insurgents, resistance fighters are the good guys, if not heroes. Getting back to Iraq and Afghanistan, counter-resistance is a really bad term and will not garner many votes in Congress or in the eyes of the American public. A counter-resistance strategy is reminiscent of both the Nazi empire and the Soviet Union. But it is what it is. U.S. forces are implanted on foreign soil in Iraq and Afghanistan on bases that give new meaning to the term,fortress. They are virtual American cities in those lands. We are an occupier in those two sovereign nations, and those who wish us leave are not insurgents. They are members of a resistance movement, plain and simple.

Before we move on to what COIN actually is, the reader is reminded of its cataclysmic failure in Vietnam while using the colloquial term,"winning hearts and minds." Vietnam is the second longest war in our history. It cost the lives of 58,267 American troops, 303,644 were wounded. 1,100,000 Viet Cong and NVA soldiers were killed while the ARVN (South Vietnamese army) suffered 266,000 killed in action. Estimates of civilians killed directly by hostile action vary, but 2,000,000 in both Vietnams is as good a guess as any ...in other words, a lot. According to CBS, the war cost $686B in 2008 dollars. We lost. In April 1975, NVA forces captured Saigon, and North and South Vietnam simply became (Communist) Vietnam with Hanoi as its capital. From 1971 to 1974 I was a Marine officer. I still feel the chagrin and curse the COIN strategy with blasphemy that would never make it past OEN's "kind" censors.

Iraq is America's third longest war. Unfortunately, the clock is still ticking. It began on March 19, 2003, and continues to this day, seven years, four months later. Here again COIN is the operating strategic theory. Put a different way, after killing an estimated one million Iraqi civilians, causing thousands upon thousands of Iraqi refugees while destroying Iraq's infrastructure and economy the goal here is to win the hearts of Iraqis. I don't think so. Unfortunately, because the MSM no longer bothers to say much about Iraq because the flow of body bags returning to the U.S. has been marginalized, many Americans think Iraq is all but over. There may even be some who think we have won the war. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The war in Iraq is far from over. As a result of the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) between the U.S. and Iraq, American military forces have withdrawn from Iraq's cities, leaving the Iraqi Army and police to secure Iraq's most dangerous places, her city streets. American troops are now ensconced on their powerful military bases. A sand gnat can't approach the perimeter of these bases without being detected. An experienced resistance force commander with limited financial resources and weaponry will always demur from charging such an impenetrable fortress. The commander would seek more lucrative and vulnerable targets as American troops languish on their bases while being virtually useless, targets like government buildings,Iraqi army bases and recruiting centers, Iraqi police headquarters and their recruiting centers, and other sensitive areas, highways, bridges, oil infrastructure, etc. Guess what, that is exactly what they are doing as we speak under the umbrella of a MSM blackout to American viewers. In the meantime the government in Baghdad is in chaos. Elections were held in March. Iraq has yet to form a government due to rivalries, hatreds, corruption, politics, and God knows what else. The resistance movement in Iraq is taking full advantage of the vacuum while being under the radar of the American public. Victory there, under the auspices of COIN, is an unachievable goal. Over 4,400 Americans have been killed in Iraq, over 30,000 wounded. The cost of the war in Iraq is over $730B and counting.

The war in Afghanistan, in its ninth year, is now America's longest war. With COIN being the operational strategy still again intuitive readers might begin to see a trend, an ominous trend, a trend that embodies failure by its very definition and wars without end. Coalition dead as of July 7 stands at 1908, but there is an alarming pattern. The war began in October 2001. The worst year for fatalities was 2009, 521 killed. 2010 promises to be even worse. Already 340 have been killed and the Kandahar offensive which will be quite deadly has been postponed to early fall. At 102 June 2010 was the worst month of the war in terms of NATO fatalities.Worse, contrary to earlier projections that envisioned offensive action by coalition forces by now, it is abundantly clear that it is not we who are on the offensive. The Taliban, which is stronger than ever, are on the offensive. They are so bold now that they are attacking America's strongest bases. This is progress? No, this is COIN. The cost of the war in Afghanistan is over $282B and counting.

To closely examine COIN one must go by the book, thee book, Field Manual 3-24, the soldiers' guide to counterinsurgency operations. The book was written by none other than General David Petraeus, the general who was demoted from CENTCOM commander to become commander, NATO forces, Afghanistan, after the Stanley A. McChrystal debacle. Formerly, Petraeus was McChrystal's boss. The key points of FM 3-24 are shown below. For the sake of brevity, I will not comment on each one. It is assumed the reader is savvy on the topic of our current wars and that the futility of each point is self-evident. However, I will admit that I will be sorely tempted. Temptation will be somewhat relieved by the use of emphasis and brackets.

1-4. Long-term success in COIN depends on the people taking charge of their own affairs and consenting to the government's rule [which government].

1-10. For the reasons just mentioned, maintaining security in an unstable environment requires vast resources, whether host nation, U.S., or multinational.

1-30. Protracted conflicts favor insurgents, and no approach makes better use of that asymmetry than the protracted popular war.

1-113. The primary objective of any COIN operation is to foster development of effective governance by a legitimate government.

1-116. Six possible indicators of legitimacy that can be used to analyze threats to stability include the following:


The ability to provide security for the populace (including protection from internal and external threats).
Selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of the populace.
A high level of popular participation in or support for political processes.
A culturally acceptable level of corruption.
A culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development.
A high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions.

1-121. Unity of effort must be present at every echelon of a COIN operation.

1-131. The cornerstone of any COIN effort is establishing security for the civilian populace.You are joking, of course, General. Darn, I promised.

1-134. Insurgencies are protracted by nature. Thus, COIN operations always demand considerable expenditures of time and resources. Well, we sure as hell know that to be true. Gosh darnit, I did it again. Sorry.

Speaking of unity of effort, A recent Rasmussen Reports telephone survey of likely voters finds that a plurality of 48 percent now say ending the war in Afghanistan is a more important goal than winning it. 48%, that low? That is shocking. Meanwhile, 53 percent of those polled by Newsweek disapprove of how Obama is managing the war a sharp reversal since February when 55 percent supported Obama on Afghanistan and just 27 percent did not. Put another way, the percentage of Americans who disapprove of Obama's Afghan policy has nearly doubled in four months.

Brad Knickerbocker, Christian Science Monitor, writes, "Part of this has to do with the nature of a counterinsurgency (COIN) effort a phrase and acronym which has been around at least since the early days of Vietnam. Even when it works, counterinsurgency can take years. And the two most recent major examples France in Algeria and the United States in Vietnam hardly worked. Hearts and minds must be won, not only in the war zone, but at home as well."

Columnist Mike Ludwig opines, "Things aren't looking good on the "hearts and minds" front. The United Nations (UN) reported that in 2009 nearly 6,000 Afghan civilians lost their lives due to armed conflict, the highest number since the fall of the Taliban regime in 2001."

Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville, McChrystal's chief of operations at the time, added, "It's not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win."

Ann Jones, author and an embedded reporter for TomDispatch, observes, "[COIN is] not working for a significant subgroup of Americans in Afghanistan either: combat soldiers. I've heard infantrymen place the blame for a buddy's combat injury or death on the strict rules of engagement ("courageous restraint," as it's called) imposed by General McChrystal's version of COIN strategy. Taking a page from Vietnam, they claim their hands are tied, while the enemy plays by its own rules. Rightly or wrongly, this opinion is spreading fast among grieving soldiers as casualties mount."

Boy, is COIN popular or what? My preference is "or what."

Proven by two centuries of warfare, COIN is not only a failed strategy, it is the antithesis of actually winning a war. The corollary to that is that COIN promotes the elongation of war and severely endangers the troops of nations that engage in such strategy. COIN embodies the ludicrous idea that wars should be fought nice. Nobody gets hurt, and the invaded country's populace will rise up and embrace a beneficent conqueror. The result of such an asinine strategy is that a lot of people get hurt or killed over a very long period of time, witness Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan.

It is virtually impossible to describe the serious nature of one nation going to war against another. Why? The enemy of man is war itself. When one nation decides to go to war against another, the reasons for doing so should not be ambiguous, nor speculative, but clear-cut, obvious to all. The decision for war is to be a result of intense deliberations, not hurriedly made nor capricious in nature. Once this horrible decision has been made, concentrated effort should be made onthe strategic and logistical effort to limit the war's duration. Go in with overwhelming force, subdue the enemy quickly, and end the war and suffering as soon as humanly possible. No aftermath of resistance operations, and certainly no COIN ops. The war is over, period, and the conqueror instills some stability over the conquered. This has been done before, witness Germany and Japan.

COIN notwithstanding, that is war. War is not heroic. War is brutal. On the battlefield there are no bugles blaring, no flags waving, no drums drumming, only merciless killing. High school teenagers, basketball and football stars and academic achievers, are turned into stone cold killers. COIN strategy only prolongs the tragedy with never-ending wars with impossible objectives.

To put it quite simply, COIN strategy never has worked and never will work because it runs "counter" to every culture on the globe. It assumes the occupied will endear themselves to the occupier once the occupier becomes nice. In essence, once we leave Iraq and Afghanistan, if ever, never again should our nation become involved in COIN operations. It simply doesn't work.




Author's Bio: I am the author of two novels, "The Bode Testament" and "Impeachment." I am also a retired columnist who keeps a wary eye on other columnists.

[bigron]

Blasts kill 11 in south Afghanistan

Mon, 12 Jul 2010 17:52:47 GMT
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=134471&sectionid=351020403

 
Afghans protest the US killing of civilians.

 
Three powerful bomb explosions have killed 11 people and wounded seven others in the troubled southern Afghanistan.

One bomb ripped through a minibus in Helmand province, killing five civilians and wounding another six.

The other explosion hit a tractor in Zabul province. Three people were killed and another wounded.

Also in Uruzgan, a bomb blast killed three guards of a road-building company.

Southern Afghanistan is at fever pitch as US-led foreign troops carry out regular security crackdowns against Taliban militants there.

Scores of civilians have been killed in the crossfire between the two sides.

Civilians have been the main victims of violence in Afghanistan, particularly in the country's troubled southern and eastern provinces.

The developments come as a human rights group says 2010 has been the most violent year in Afghanistan since the 2001 US-led invasion.

Afghanistan Rights Monitor says 1076 civilians were killed during the first six months of 2010.

The figure shows a sharp increase from a civilian death toll of 684 for the same period in 2007.

The group has also recorded 1200 violent incidents last June. This is the highest number in any single month since 2002.

June 2010 was also the deadliest month for the US-led forces in which 103 foreign troops were killed, 60 of them Americans.

This comes despite a massive US-led troop surge in the war-torn country. The increasing violence against civilians has undermined support for the presence of US-led forces in the country.

JR/AKM
Related Stories:
2010 deadliest year in Afghanistan
Afghanistan governor killed in blast
US-led soldier killed in Afghanistan
Taliban attacks kill 15 in Afghanistan

[bigron]

Afghan soldier kills 3 British troops

Tue, 13 Jul 2010 08:23:28 GMT
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=134551&sectionid=351020403

   
 More than 310 of British troops have died in Afghanistan since ‎‎2001.‎


An Afghan soldier has killed three British troops during a joint patrol in the country's southern province of Helmand, a provincial security official has said.

Two more British soldiers were injured in the attack, which took place near Lashkar Gah, the provincial capital of Helmand, where some 9,000 British troops are based as part of the US-led forces, a security source told Reuters on Tuesday.

Meanwhile, NATO released a statement saying that three of its soldiers were killed in an attack by militants in southern Afghanistan.

Their deaths bring to 36 the number of foreign soldiers killed so far this month in Afghanistan.

American and NATO military casualties are on the rise as they step up attacks against Taliban strongholds in southern Afghanistan.

Britain has about 10,000 boots on the ground in Afghanistan, the largest international force after the United States. The UK says it is going to withdraw all its troops from Afghan combat zones by 2015.

The British government is under fire at home over the rising number of casualties in Afghanistan. Opinion polls show that most Britons want their troops back home.

MVZ/TG/MVZ

[bigron]

'Petraeus wrote anti-Islamic manual'

Tue, 13 Jul 2010 02:08:23 GMT
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=134511&sectionid=3510203

 

General David Petraeus

According to a manual allegedly co-authored by General David Petraeus, the new commander of US, NATO, and other US-led forces in Afghanistan, associates insurgency with Islam.

Petraeus reportedly wrote the counter-insurgency manual, which refers to "Islamic insurgents," "Islamic extremists" and "Islamic subversives," in 2006.

The manual, which also details an alleged link between Muslim groups and terrorists, was reportedly co-authored by General James Amos.

US President Barack Obama has picked Amos as the next head of the Marine Corps, and thus also a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The manual's reported contents contradict a recent policy address by Obama's chief national security adviser for counter-terrorism, John Brennan.

He called on the US to avoid using the term Islamic terrorist, saying the use of such terms could cause more problems for the United States in the long run.

The manual reportedly also says that the White House's official policy of banning the word "Islam" in describing the United States' terrorist enemies is in direct contradiction to the US military's war-fighting doctrine now guiding commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan.

FTP/HGL

[bigron]

Tuesday, July 13, 2010
14:26 Mecca time, 11:26 GMT
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2010/07/201071391543308826.html
   
News CENTRAL/S. ASIA 
 
Afghan soldier kills Nato troops 

 
More than 350 foreign troops have died in Afghanistan since the beginning of 2010 [File]
 
At least three foreign soldiers have been killed by an Afghan soldier in the south of the country, according to sources.

Two other soldiers with the Nato-led force in Helmand province were wounded in the incident on Tuesday.

"We confirm that an Afghan army solider has opened fire and killed three British soldiers," Mohammad Zahir Azimi, the Afghan defence ministry spokesman, said.

The Nato military alliance confirmed the deaths but gave no details about the circumstances of the incident or the nationality of the troops.

A investigation into the incident is under way, officials said.

"This is a combined, joint mission, Afghan and Alliance troopers fighting shoulder-to-shoulder against the Taliban and other extremists," General David Petraeus, US and Nato commander in Afghanistan, said in a statement.

"We have sacrificed greatly together, and we must ensure that the trust between our forces remains solid in order to defeat our common enemies. On behalf of all the troopers of Isaf [International Security Assistance Force], I offer sincere condolences to the families and the fellow service members of our fallen comrades."

'Unfortunate attack'

Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president, sent a letter of condolence to Nato and Britain and offered his apologies over the incident.

Waheed Omar, a spokesman for the president, said that Karzai had asked the defence ministry to find out more about the incident.

"If it is confirmed, it's a very unfortunate attack and the government of Afghanistan will do everything to make sure the proper traitors are brought to justice," he said.

A police official in Helmand told the AFP news agency that the Afghan soldier had escaped after the attack.

Tuesday's deaths bring to 356 the number of foreign troops to have died in the Afghan war so far this year, according to an AFP news agency tally based on a count kept by icasualties.org.

The total number for the whole of last year was 520 people.

In November, an Afghan police officer killed five British troops at a checkpoint in Helmand, where the UK has more than 9,000 soldiers.
 
 

[bigron]

In an Afghan Hole? Dig Deeper

By Joel Bleifuss

http://www.informationclearinghouse.info/article25922.htm

July 12, 2010 "In These Times" -- Gen. Stanley McChrystal’s trash talking and his subsequent sacking by President Barack Obama is a sign: America’s foreign policy elite is starting to realize the United States has lost the war.

Maj. Gen. Bill Mayville, McChrystal’s chief of operations, told Rolling Stone’s Michael Hastings: “It’s not going to look like a win, smell like a win or taste like a win.”

Like a hapless crew on a foundering ship, those holding the reins in the Afghan war have begun to scramble for reputation preservers. And they are scarce.

One person whose reputation may survive is Ambassador to Afghanistan Karl Eikenberry who last November warned that the United States “will become more deeply engaged here with no way to extricate ourselves.” In Rolling Stone, McChrystal scoffs at Eikenberry’s pessimism: “Here’s one that covers his flank for the history books. Now, if we fail, they can say, ‘I told you so.’ “

Others are not so lucky.

On June 22, the day after he first read the Rolling Stone article, Obama said U.S. strategy “is determined entirely” by two criteria: the first is whether it “ultimately makes this country safer,” the second is whether it “justifies the enormous … sacrifice that those men and women are making over there.”

OK, if the war in Afghanistan is winnable, Obama must tell how it will be won. If victory is impossible, as Mayville and other experts assert, Americans deserve to know how fighting a futile war makes their country safer.

Second, if the war is a mistake, how does continuing the fight “justify” the sacrifice soldiers have already made? How is the death of one soldier who died in vain justified by the death of a second … a thousandth?

Part of the reason we aren’t getting straight answers is that the mainstream press plays along with the administration’s we-can-win-in-Afghanistan fantasy.

Listen to the establishment press in the wake of the McChrystal kerfuffle.

On June 24, a New York Times editorial advised: “Reports that some State Department officials are also advocating a swift deal with the Taliban are worrisome. [How so?] … Mr. Obama needs to do a better job of explaining why [the war] is so central to American security. [Why is it?] More important, he and his aides have to do a better job managing it. [By doing what?]” Enlighten us, Gray Lady.

On June 24, Time magazine’s Mark Halperin fawned: “Obama turned what could have been a crippling blow into one of the strongest moments of his presidency to date.”

In a June 23 interview with National Public Radio, Time’s executive editor, Nancy Gibbs, explained her magazine’s special function: “The discipline has always been, not what do you cover, but what do you not cover. It has always been an exercise in ignoring things … in saying, ‘That’s not important enough.’ ” Judging from Halperin’s analysis of the McChrystal affair, Time has determined that what is “important enough” is how the selection of Gen. David Petraeus will play in the Beltway, not whether the substantive policies guiding the United States in Afghanistan are doomed to fail.

A senior adviser to McChrystal told Rolling Stone: “If Americans pulled back and started paying attention to this war, it would become even less popular.”

But how are they to learn what is going on? Digesting empty New York Times editorials? Waiting for Nancy Gibbs to decide what deserves to be ignored?

Americans have made enormous sacrifices for this war in Afghanistan. They deserve honest answers from the president and from the press.

Joel Bleifuss is the editor and publisher of In These Times, where he has worked as an investigative reporter, columnist and editor since 1986. He is on the board of the Institute for Public Affairs, which publishes In These Times.

 
 Buzz ItShare

[bigron]

The Dark Legacy of Gen. McChrystal

by Kelley B. Vlahos, July 13, 2010

http://original.antiwar.com/vlahos/2010/07/12/the-dark-legacy-of-gen-mcchrystal/

Gen. Stanley McChrystal might have left town through the back door with his four stars barely intact, his 35-year career in the Army humiliatingly cut short by a lack of judgment with a counterculture magazine. But in reality, he got off easy.

As a four-star popular with his peers, McChrystal will have professional options most retirees only dream about. In no time, he could be brought on as a highly paid consultant or “mentor” with the Army, and at the same time, as a board member at Raytheon, Northrop Grumman, or any of the other megalodon defense contractors in town.

No doubt he will be lionized, particularly by partisans who already think he was duped by Rolling Stone and hastily thrown over by the White House.

He certainly won’t be blamed for losing the war. That’s because he was pushed out for what he and his staff said, not for anything they did. This allows an easy path to spin and victimhood. The fact is, Stanley McChrystal has never faced the white, hot lights of public scrutiny. Maybe if he had, we’d have realized that locker room talk and an arrogant attitude were the least of our problems. How about the fact the president put a renowned manhunter in charge of a population-centric counterinsurgency strategy in the first place?

McChrystal came and went and we still know very little about who he really is, or what he did as chief of (JSOC) Joint Special Operations Command from 2003 to 2008. We do know JSOC operates as a highly classified branch of Special Operations Command with elite Delta Force and Navy SEALs, among others, and a singular mission to “find, fix, and finish” the enemy. We have some idea that for five years under McChrystal’s command, JSOC task forces ran secret detention facilities and engaged in harsh interrogations and targeted killings. They have been accused of illegal renditions, torture, assassinations, and teaming up with Blackwater mercenaries to mount covert “snatch and grab” missions inside Pakistan.


But on the details, we are largely groping in the dark, because everything JSOC does is clandestine or “off the books.” Instead of demanding the truth, our lawmakers demurred time and again and gave the military carte blanche to pursue what arguably amounts to a self-destructive strategy. And it is corrupting, because without oversight, we have essentially failed to hold top brass accountable when bad things are done in our name.

“Gen. McChrystal, like most of the officers, contractors, and high-level civilians who new about the secret interrogation facilities and torture at numerous locations in Iraq, was never held accountable. He was questioned during his [2009] confirmation hearing, but it was generally glossed over,” charged retired Army Col. Janis Karpinski, who was demoted from brigadier general in the course of the 2004 Abu Ghraib prisoner abuse scandal. Karpinski maintains she was a scapegoat for senior officers who “knew, allowed it, and directed” the abusive interrogation techniques system-wide – including McChrystal. She told Antiwar.com in a recent e-mail exchange she believes there is highly classified information that would implicate McChrystal and even his patron, Gen. David Petraeus, but like other senior officers involved, they  “ultimately have a great deal of leverage and ‘protective cover’ available in many circumstances.”

We know a little. During McChrystal’s time, JSOC’s missions in Iraq– particularly what has become known as Task Force 6-26 or Task Force 121, at the unofficially named “Camp Nama” – had been the target of a major report by Human Rights Watch and a government investigation into accusations of torture and abuse and even murder. In 2006, hundreds of documents were released under a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request, revealing a sickening pattern of abuse that jibed with what had already been exposed at Abu Ghraib and other military and CIA detention centers throughout the theater. From the New York Times in 2006:

“As the Iraqi insurgency intensified in early 2004, an elite Special Operations forces unit converted one of Saddam Hussein’s former military bases near Baghdad into a top-secret detention center. There, American soldiers made one of the former Iraqi government’s torture chambers into their own interrogation cell. They named it the Black Room.

“In the windowless, jet-black garage-size room, some soldiers beat prisoners with rifle butts, yelled and spit in their faces, and, in a nearby area, used detainees for target practice in a game of jailer paintball. …

“The abuses at Camp Nama continued despite warnings beginning in August 2003 from an Army investigator and American intelligence and law enforcement officials in Iraq. The C.I.A. was concerned enough to bar its personnel from Camp Nama that August. …

“The secrecy surrounding the highly classified unit has helped to shield its conduct from public scrutiny. The Pentagon will not disclose the unit’s precise size, the names of its commanders, its operating bases, or specific missions. Even the task force’s name changes regularly to confuse adversaries, and the courts-martial and other disciplinary proceedings have not identified the soldiers in public announcements as task force members.”

There was more in an Esquire profile in 2006:

“It was a point of pride that the Red Cross would never be allowed in the door, Jeff [Garlasco of Human Rights Watch] says. This is important because it defied the Geneva Conventions, which require that the Red Cross have access to military prisons. ‘Once, somebody brought it up with the colonel. “Will they ever be allowed in here?”  And he said absolutely not. He had this directly from General McChrystal and the Pentagon that there’s no way that the Red Cross could get in – they won’t have access and they never will. This facility was completely closed off to anybody investigating, even Army investigators.’

“Given Task Force 121′s history, that was a remarkable promise. Formed in the summer of 2003, it quickly became notorious. … Then two Iraqi men died following encounters with Navy Seals from Task Force 121  –  one at Abu Ghraib and one in Mosul  –  and an official investigation by a retired Army colonel named Stuart Herrington, first reported inthe Washington Post, found evidence of widespread beatings. ‘Everyone knows about it,’ one Task Force officer told Herrington. Six months later, two FBI agents raised concerns about suspicious burn marks and other signs of harsh treatment. Then the head of the Defense Intelligence Agency reported that his men had seen evidence of prisoners with burn marks and bruises and once saw a Task Force member ‘punch [the] prisoner in the face to the point the individual needed medical attention.’”

Despite these damning revelations in 2006, the nation’s top newspapers decided to suppress the more garish details of their own reporting in favor of a more flattering narrative ahead of McChrystal’s 2009 confirmation as head of U.S. forces in Afghanistan. Instead of emphasizing the general’s responsibility for fostering a hothouse of abuse and moral turmoil that not only stained the reputation of the military, but likely served as yet another recruitment tool for the insurgency, the press settled in with a simpler caricature, that of an intensely self-disciplined action hero, whose elite subordinates rid the world of hated terror suspect Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and of countless other terror suspects often without the messiness of war trials or lengthy detentions.

 
“I do know that many policy-makers and journalists think that McChrystal’s work as the head of the super-secret Joint Special Operations Command was the untold success story of the Surge and the greater war on terror campaigns,” gushed Andrew Exum, a former Army Ranger who would later serve on Commander McChrystal’s Afghan assessment team, to writer Marc Ambinder just before the 2009 confirmation hearings.

Not only that, McChrystal was a purported disciple of the Petraeus Doctrine, or COIN, which in theory, calls for winning “hearts and minds” as much as manhunting. What seemed pretty counterintuitive – putting a man who for the last five years led teams of elite killers who not only dragged off husbands and brothers and sons, but kicked in doors and called in air strikes on the urban battlefield, to engage in some amorphous, “population-centric,” clear, hold, and build mission – the press found perfectly rational, especially when he started hinting he would need more boots on the ground.

 “[McChrystal] is arguing for resources for a shift in emphasis from aggressive war of confrontation with the Taliban to a focus on protecting Afghanistan’s civilian population,” declared Peter Beaumont in the Guardian, in an assertion that became a comfortable trope during the hearings and beyond.

Even John Richardson, the man who wrote the flammable Esquire piece, seemed reluctant to ask the obvious question: Was McChrystal damaged goods? Was this manhunter even equipped for soft-power counterinsurgency? Why McChrystal?

From Richardson in 2009:

“But I’m not eager to judge soldiers on the battlefield who pushed the line to save their lives. I’m certainly not going to call them torturers for violating the Geneva Convention with a 14-hour interrogation. And, like Garlasco, I would be very cautious judging someone like McChrystal, a soldier my president has chosen to put his confidence in, a man who could end up saving tens of thousands of lives.”

Just before the 2009 hearings, Spencer Ackerman reported that a former intelligence officer had approached Sen. Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, with additional, potentially incriminating information:

“A former military interrogator who contributed to the manhunt for a senior Iraqi terrorist has urged the Senate Armed Services Committee staff to press Lt. Gen. Stanley McChrystal, the Obama administration’s nominee to lead U.S. troops in the Afghanistan war, on what he knew about detainee abuse committed by troops in Iraq under his command when McChrystal goes before the panel Tuesday morning for his confirmation hearing.

“’Gen. McChrystal, he was there in Iraq often, and he may have been separated from these things by couple layers [of subordinates] but it would’ve been his responsibility to know what was going on,’ said Matthew Alexander, the pseudonym of a former Air Force interrogator whose non-coercive interrogations in 2006 helped identify and kill Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, then the leader of al-Qaeda in Iraq.

“Alexander, who wrote about his Iraq experiences in his 2008 memoir How To Break a Terrorist and who works with Human Rights First to oppose torture, recalled that several of his colleagues attempted to use coercive interrogation techniques in the Zarqawi hunt, despite Alexander’s concerns over their dubious efficacy. ‘When I would go up to my boss and say there’s a better way’ to interrogate detainees without torturing them, ‘his answer would be “I’m sorry… because there’s something above me controlling the interrogators and those interrogators have carte blanche to interrogate how they want,”‘ Alexander said. ‘I don’t know Gen. McChrystal’s involvement in that, [or that of] his staff or below him. But I do know that mentality was extremely counterproductive and almost cost us our chance at finding Zarqawi.’

“He continued, ‘We found Zarqawi in spite of the way the task force did business.’”

The Zarqawi capture was and still is McChrystal’s greatest public claim to fame. He has never seen direct combat, but “bagging” this high-value target, in concert with anecdotes provided by Rolling Stone and others that place McChrystal near the action, like riding along on dangerous patrols, have nonetheless earned him the moniker of “fighting general.”

But would any of it make him a successful commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan? We are told that killing these terror suspects will save lives, but factor in the countless civilians whose lives and livelihoods have been destroyed by JSOC raids and targeted bombings in Iraq and Afghanistan, plus the new insurgents who step into the breach and the retaliatory attacks on our own troops. When you consider that two children were sacrificed during the capture of Zarqawi alone, do we truly know the net gain of it all?

Despite these loose ends, the general faced no opposition during his confirmation hearings, save for a brief, obligatory muttering about Camp Nama and McChrystal’s role in what has become the Pat Tillman cover-up, which can be considered the second bullet dodged. A Pentagon investigation ruled that McChrystal was “accountable for the inaccurate and misleading assertions” following Tillman’s killing, but again, no one seemed to care (except for Tillman’s mother, who reportedly tried to warn the president about McChrystal shortly before the hearings).

From Ackerman:

“Several senators praised McChrystal effusively, even as committee staffers spent time during the past few weeks vetting whether or not McChrystal knew about abuses of Iraqi and Afghan detainees committed by Special Operations Forces under the general’s former command. … But only one senator, panel chairman Sen. Carl Levin (D-Mich.), asked McChrystal about the incidents, which have been documented by Human Rights Watch. …

“When questioned by Levin about detainee abuse, McChrystal conceded that the task forces he oversaw from 2003 to 2008 had received interrogation instructions from a December 2002 memorandum from then-Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld authorizing such techniques as stress positions, the use of dogs and nudity. Without providing any specificity, McChrystal said that ‘constant improvement’ in refining interrogation techniques with which he was ‘uncomfortable’ eventually produced an interrogation regimen ‘I could be more proud of.’ No senator followed up Levin’s line of query.”

McChrystal went on to his command and began bringing in his old Special Ops friends to “quietly sway” the strategy in Afghanistan. At the same time, he issued new directives for reducing civilian casualties, though it wasn’t until March 2010 that he started reining in special operations forces (SOF) accused of perpetuating a climate of fear within Afghan communities. Even then, some units of Delta Force and Navy SEALs were exempted.

Not surprisingly, despite reports that civilian casualties are down, Afghans remain in the crosshairs, leading to fresh protests and local suspicions of – right or wrong – American and NATO cover-ups. Just this month, reporters Gareth Porter and Ahmad Walid Fazly interviewed eyewitnesses to a botched Special Operations Forces raid in Gardez in February. The Afghans said they saw American soldiers digging bullets out of the bodies of the three women killed in the raid, but they were never interviewed by investigators engaging in a probe of the initial investigation.

Perhaps this is McChrystal’s legacy. He dodged a 500-pound bomb of truth when he was hired and again when he was fired, and for that he is pretty lucky. But nine years of blowback from killing, collateral damage, and thwarted truth, festering at the center of this war like a tumor – so much that trying to dig it out with a knife only makes it worse – keeps taking its toll. It is not that he lost the war singlehandedly, but rather that his leadership at a crucial moment may have sealed an already failing strategy.

[bigron]

‘Til the Fat General Sings

by Jeff Huber, July 13, 2010

http://original.antiwar.com/huber/2010/07/12/til-the-fat-general-sings/



President Obama’s troop withdrawal deadlines continue to vanish like a blind dowager’s silverware.

At his June 15 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, “King David” Petraeus fainted like Blanche DuBois when inquisitors from both sides of the aisle tried to wedge him into saying that he thought President Obama’s July 2011 withdrawal date for Afghanistan was a moronic idea even though he fully supported it.

Petraeus didn’t take long to redeploy from his endorsement of Obama’s policy. At the June 29 confirmation circus that made him the new top Banana in the Bananastans*, Petraeus and his allies on the committee returned with a new script that was polished to a spit shine and loaded with combat-ready talking points.

Petraeus allowed to the committee as how poor old Obama, as elected official in chief, had to take into account sticky issues like campaign promises so as to suck up to the liberals who put him in office, the kind of thing real men like generals don’t have to worry about.

When ranking war pug John McCain asked Petraeus on cue if there had been “a recommendation from you or anyone in the military that we set a [drawdown] date of July 2011?” Petraeus took a beat and replied, “There was not.” To ensure that anyone who might have a shorter attention span than his got his point, McCain followed up with, “There was not – by any military person that you know of?” “Not that I’m aware of,” Petraeus answered. A regular Abbott and Costello, those two were.

McCain’s Mayberry-boy sidekick Lindsey Graham joined the act and told Super Dave, “This is all not your problem to fix.” The withdrawal date issue is a “political problem,” Opie opined. “Somebody other than you came up with this whole July get out of Afghanistan deadline, and I think it’s all politics. But that’s just me.” (Please, Paw, can we never have to listen to Lindsey Graham again ever? Please, Paw? Please?)

Petraeus decreed that July 2011 would mark the beginning of a “process” that would lead to a “responsible drawdown.” Petraeus said the 2011 date is not the date the U.S. will be “looking for the light switch to turn it off.” By paraphrasing Obama’s think-tanked statement that the U.S. would not be “switching off the lights,” Petraeus signaled that the president and his velvet junta generals are in rigid lockstep.

Counterinsurgency experts and other charlatans now guess that Afghan forces may be able to fight without bringing hired goons along by 2014, an estimate so optimistic that Pollyanna would look askance at it. Moreover, as Doyle McManus of the L.A. Times observes, Petraeus now says that the July 2011 date only applies to the 30,000 “surge” troops Obama approved last year, not to the 70,000 troops who were already there. Even at that, Petraeus says his support of withdrawing the surge troops will depend on “conditions that we hoped we’d obtain,” whatever on earth they might be.

On July 3, as he took command of the Bananastans theater of war, Petraeus declared that we’re in a “contest of wills” and our “clear objective” is to win. That’s super, Dave. So we’re in a contest to see if we have the will to stay in a country we don’t belong in longer than the people who do belong in it, and we’re committed to an objective that can’t be achieved because there’s nothing in Afghanistan to actually win. This follows the prime directive of the Long War policy; we can’t win any of our wars, but since the loser decides when the war is over, we can’t lose as long as we don’t quit, and since the other guys can’t quit, our wars can go on forever.

That’s the precise stratagem Petraeus used in Iraq, where he was so successful at not achieving the political reconciliation that the surge was supposed to enable that the Obama administration recently sent Vice President Joe Biden there to try to smooth things over. Talk about last-ditch efforts. Sending Biden on a diplomatic mission is like trying to douse a fire with lighter fluid. What, they couldn’t get John Bolton?

Meanwhile, our commander in Iraq, Ray “The Thing” Odierno, is floating the possibility of a UN peacekeeping force to replace U.S. troops in the country’s northern region where there’s no end in sight to the duke-’em-out between Arabs and Kurds. Odie has said some pretty dumb things in the past. It’s as if there’s no buffer between his medulla oblongata and his vocal cords; his ideas seem to spring from his deep subconscious and lunge straight into a microphone. At first glimpse, the notion that a brigade or so of UN sad sacks can accomplish what we have failed to do for seven years and change seems profoundly witless, even for the Desert Ox.

But under the surface is Ray’s on-the-record ambition – one that the rest of the Long Warmongers share – to delay the fat lady from singing in Iraq by keeping 30,000 or so U.S. troops in Iraq until at least 2014 (funny how that year keeps popping up). Nobody in the Pentagon took the December 2011 exit deadline in the status of forces agreement seriously when the document was signed at the end of 2008. Both Odierno and Joint Chiefs Chairman Mike Mullen winked and nudged about how the agreement could be renegotiated, and Odierno smirked to reporters that “Three years is a very long time.”

There’s little doubt that the Pentarchs could have bullied the Iraqi government into extending the SOFA indefinitely. But as Biden’s recent bungled boondoggle to Iraq reminded everyone, Iraq doesn’t have a government for the Pentarchs to bully right now. It may not be able to form one by the end of 2011, and if it does it may not form a government as pliant as our military brass would like. So a possible fix is to see if we can get another UN mandate to stay in Iraq to protect those blue-helmeted peacekeeper bozos who will be the same I Suck At Fighting NATO allies we’re dealing with in the Bananastans.

The most recently telegraphed signal of the Pentarchy’s intentions came from Gen. George Casey, who was removed as commander in Iraq to make room for Petraeus and who was made Army chief of staff in return for stifling his objections to the Iraq surge. On July 9 Casey made a public statement that we are “likely to be fighting” in Afghanistan and Iraq for another decade “or so.”

Obama and his generals appear determined to drive America off a Khyber cliff, and you can bet the last dollar we borrow from China that the hawks in Congress, led by the ménage de guerre of McCain, Graham, and their gal-pal Joe Lieberman, will support the Pentagon’s “persistent conflict” until our nation goes splat at the bottom of the gorge.

*The Bananastans are Afghanistan and Pakistan, our banana republics in Central Asia.

[bigron]

US IED Strategy: Kill More Insurgents

Gen. Oates Predicts Killings Will Start to Work by December

by Jason Ditz, July 12, 2010

http://news.antiwar.com/2010/07/12/us-ied-strategy-kill-more-insurgents/


Lieutenant General Michael Oates, the general in charge of combating the rising number of IED attacks in Afghanistan, today outlined the official US plan for combating them. In short, the US plans to “kill more bomb-planting insurgents.”

Lt. Gen. Oates

Of course the US has been killing “insurgents” across Afghanistan for nearly nine years now, in every increasing numbers, and with more and more IED attacks coming all the time. Lt. Gen. Oates predicted that the strategy would start working around December.

Which is perhaps an extremely clever prediction, as of course the number of IED attacks and attacks in general drop precipitously in late November or early December every year, with the first frost rendering much of the country virtually impassable until Spring.

In that sense Lt. Gen. Oates has made a “can’t miss” prediction, and it will almost certainly be seen to come to pass in December, and will last for a few months before the thaw of spring leads to another upsurge in violence. At that point officials will need to come up with another “new” strategy, which will likely also involve killing enough people to make the war finally work.

[bigron]

NATO chief: Pullout plans put troops at risk: report

Mon Jul 12, 8:34 pm ET

http://news.yahoo.com/s/nm/20100713/wl_nm/us_afghanistan_nato
 
LONDON (Reuters) – Setting timetables to withdraw from the war in Afghanistan could encourage the Taliban to step up their attacks on coalition forces, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen said in a newspaper report on Tuesday.

"The Taliban follow the political debate in troop contributing countries closely," Rasmussen told Britain's Daily Telegraph newspaper.

"If they discover that through their attacks, they can weaken the support for our presence in Afghanistan, they will just be encouraged to step up their attacks on foreign troops," he said.

Record casualties in June have undermined public support for the war in allied NATO countries.

Canada, the Netherlands and Poland have announced plans to withdraw troops, while British Prime Minister David Cameron has said he would like to see British troops pull out of Afghanistan within five years.

But Rasmussen said NATO countries should only withdraw troops when "the Afghans can actually take responsibility for themselves."

"We can have our hopes, we can have our expectations, but I cannot give any guarantee as far as an exact date or year is concerned."

Rasmussen said a premature withdrawal from Afghanistan could make the West vulnerable to a renewed terrorist threat from al Qaeda and risk destabilizing neighboring Pakistan.

"The Taliban would return to Afghanistan and Afghanistan would once again become a safe haven for terrorist groups who would use it as a launch pad for terrorist attacks on North America and Europe," he said.

Rasmussen also said cuts to defense budgets could limit the ability of European countries to work with U.S. troops in the future because of a shortage of up-to-date technology.

"Militarily, in the case that we would like to co-operate with the Americans, we might end up in an absurd situation where we can't because of an extreme technology gap," he said.

(Reporting by Caroline Copley; Editing by Elizabeth Fullerton)

[bigron]

Taliban attacks highest since early in Afghan war

Rights group: Afghan insurgent attacks highest since early in war, killing more civilians

KAY JOHNSON
AP News
http://wire.antiwar.com/2010/07/12/taliban-attacks-highest-since-early-in-afghan-war/

Jul 12, 2010 12:20 EDT

Taliban insurgents are carrying out more attacks this year than at any time since early in the war, killing increasing numbers of civilians as U.S.-led forces push into the militants' southern strongholds, an Afghan rights group said Monday.

International troops were responsible for about one-fifth of civilian deaths — down from previous years, thanks to restrictive rules of engagement that some soldiers feel put their own lives at risk.

That so many noncombatants are dying shows that the international force has yet to succeed in its goal of protecting the Afghan people, whose trust and support are key components of NATO's new counterinsurgency strategy in the nearly 9-year-old war.

At least 1,076 civilians died in the first half of this year, triple the number of international forces killed over the same period, the Afghanistan Rights Monitor said in a report that called 2010 the worst year for security since shortly after the demise of the Taliban regime.

Violence has soared as coalition forces, bolstered by 30,000 American reinforcements, move into Taliban strongholds in the south and east to try to wrest the areas from the militants, strengthen Afghan government control and win Afghans' trust. The insurgents have responded with a wave of ambushes, suicide attacks, roadside bombs and assassinations.

The number of civilian deaths are up in 2010, though only slightly, over the previous year's first half, but the number of insurgent attacks — and their share of the civilian deaths — has spiked.

Afghanistan Rights Monitor director Ajmal Samadi said the group recorded 1,200 violent incidents in June alone, the most in a single month since early 2002. The number included coalition actions such as airstrikes against insurgents, but Samadi said the vast majority were attacks by the Taliban and their militant allies.

"Insurgents are certainly carrying out more attacks across the country than at any time before," Samadi said.

Fierce resistance had been expected in the south, but as reports of bombings and assassinations mount from all over the country, some ordinary Afghans are feeling increasingly uneasy.

"Unfortunately, I am hopeless with the current situation and I don't see a bright future," said Ahmad Fahim, 28, who works in the education ministry in Kabul.

Fahim has no trouble believing this year is the most violent since the war's early months. He said he and his friends see and hear the evidence in daily news reports on casualties — not only in the south, but in the previously calm north and west. He holds the Taliban ultimately responsible but says the U.S. and its coalition partners still kill too many innocent civilians, even if by accident.

Still, insurgents were responsible for 661 of war-related civilian deaths so far this year, or 61 percent. Of those, 282 were killed by roadside bombs, Afghan Rights Monitor said.

The Taliban's frequent use of homemade, hidden explosives on roads is just as likely to kill ordinary Afghans as security forces. The insurgents also target civilian government officials in a campaign of terror.

International forces were responsible for 20 percent of the deaths and Afghan security forces for 10 percent. The report said the remaining deaths were either unclear or attributed to criminal gangs or private security forces. The Afghan group compiles its statistics from interviews with witnesses, families of victims, local officials and media reports.

The share of accidental deaths by coalition and Afghan government forces — which can turn people against the government and foreign troops — is falling, the statistics showed.

Accidental deaths from NATO airstrikes dropped by half, to 94, and overall international forces were responsible for 210 civilian deaths from Jan. 1 to June 30 this year — down from 276 for the same period last year. Deaths attributed to Afghan security forces were down from 386 to 108.

Samadi credited the policy of restraint issued by former international forces commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal last year that severely limits the circumstances in which troops can call in an airstrike or fire into buildings.

He urged Gen. David Petraeus, who replaced McChrystal this month and who many credit with turning around the war in Iraq, not to change those rules of engagement. If American and other international troops are allowed to use firepower more frequently, he said, then they will. "Then you could be back in a situation where more civilians could die."

The strict rules of engagement are unpopular among many, including some troops who believe they cost American lives and force them to give up the advantage of overwhelming firepower to a foe who shoots and melts back into the civilian population.

NATO spokesman Brig. Gen. Josef Blotz, however, stressed that Petraeus is committed to the current guidelines for use of force.

"Our strategic imperative to reduce civilian casualties has not and will not change," Blotz told reporters Sunday.

Monday continued the trend in deaths of innocents: NATO reported that six Afghan civilians were killed and four were wounded when their car hit a roadside bomb in Helmand province's Lashkar Gar district. A coalition helicopter evacuated the wounded for treatment and came under fire from militants.

Various organizations track civilian casualties in Afghanistan, with differing numbers. Afghanistan Rights Monitor's statistics were higher than NATO's tally of 592 noncombatants killed in the first half of this year, 82 percent of them by insurgent attacks and the rest accidental deaths by international forces.

The United Nations' statistics also tend to be higher than NATO's. The world body has not yet released its report on casualties for the first half of the year, but in 2009 its count was similar to Afghanistan Rights Monitor's tally.

___

Associated Press Writer Rahim Faiez contributed to this report.

Source: AP News

[bigron]

July 12, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/world/asia/13afghan.html?_r=1&hp

U.S. and Afghanistan Debate More Village Forces

By ALISSA J. RUBIN and RICHARD A. OPPEL Jr.


A militia member in windy Kandahar Province. Officials say an agreement on armed village forces may be reached within days.


KABUL, Afghanistan — With American commanders pushing to expand the number of armed village forces in areas where their troops and the local police are scarce, the Afghan president is signaling that he has serious concerns that such a program could return the country to warlordism, challenging the power of the central government.

The village forces have been one of the top subjects under discussion in frenetic daily meetings for the past week between Gen. David H. Petraeus, the American military commander in Afghanistan, and Hamid Karzai, the Afghan president. The two are scheduled to meet again on Tuesday, according to senior NATO military officials here.

They will discuss a modified version of the plan that tries to assuage Mr. Karzai’s doubts by agreeing to his request that the Afghan government be involved at every stage of the program. Officials close to both the Afghans and the Americans sound cautiously optimistic that they will reach an agreement in the next few days.

“We have to make sure that we don’t develop militias or any other kinds of forces that might undermine the government and become another kind of instability,” said the president’s spokesman, Waheed Omar.

Among Mr. Karzai’s demands are that any local force be under the control of the local Afghan police commander, wear uniforms, be paid through the Ministry of Interior, and be under the ministry’s command, Mr. Omar said.

“Our concern comes from what we experienced in our history where governments in the 1980s developed local militias that then became a source of problems for law and order in the country,” he said, noting that the Soviets, who then ruled Afghanistan through local proxies, created armed local forces that provoked anti-Soviet forces to rebel against them.

For the American military and especially General Petraeus — who witnessed a widespread Sunni insurgency in Iraq rapidly dwindle after the creation of local protection forces, many of whose members had previously been insurgents — it is important to see if there is a way to change the balance of power, especially in remote local communities, where the Taliban might otherwise gain ground.

“It could be a real game changer, but only if done very carefully, correctly and with proper oversight and supervision,” said a senior military official in Kabul.

American military officials say that they are prepared to accede to Mr. Karzai’s demands and that there will be procedures to vet members of the forces and track their weapons.

The debate between Mr. Karzai and General Petraeus picks up the thread of a running disagreement between the Afghan government and the Americans over the sustainability of backing local groups outside of the government, even if they offer to join the Americans in fighting the Taliban.

The discussion also takes place against a backdrop of a growing number of shadowy, often semiofficial armed forces that operate under an array of titles, but that ultimately have only tenuous ties to the central government. These groups are the latest iteration of militias that have plagued the country for much of the past 30 years.

“Essentially, the use of militias has been a bitter experience in Afghanistan,” said Nasrullah Stanekzai, a law professor at Kabul University and Mr. Karzai’s legal adviser, who said he was not speaking on behalf of the government.

“It will be a disaster to form militias, because the government will not be able to control them,” Mr. Stanekzai said. “The United States should know that Afghanistan is different from Iraq, that we are in a frail state coming out of years of civil war caused by militias.”

The village defense forces, which General Petraeus and his predecessor, Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, wanted to expand, and the new version that is now under discussion, were first set up in a test form by Special Operations forces in a handful of communities. They were intended to act as local protection in areas where there were neither Afghan police officers nor army units nor many American forces.

In addition, there are a number of other militia-type organizations, including many security companies, some of whom wear police uniforms but do not answer to the local police chief. There are also armed groups with darker intentions, like ones that sprang up in Kunduz to fight the Taliban but that soon began to prey on locals. And there are tribal groups that have the blessing of the Americans to keep the Taliban out of their communities.

With such a legacy, Mr. Karzai’s government, while willing to accept the need for local protection forces, wants to be sure that their numbers are kept to a minimum, Mr. Omar said.

Defense analysts think the program is unlikely to grow in the way the Sunni Awakening did in Iraq, where it eventually had more than 100,000 members, said Stephen Biddle, a senior defense analyst at the Council on Foreign Relations.

“A very significant fraction of former Sons of Iraq were former insurgents who switched sides,” Mr. Biddle said, referring to the Awakening. “This is not a situation where the local Taliban are going to come over to a local village security program and work with a local American brigade.”

However the program develops, Mr. Karzai’s government wants to be sure that it can dismantle it if need be, Mr. Omar said.

“If they become a problem,” he said, “the president wants to be sure the national security forces can deal with them.”

[bigron]

EU suspends Afghan aid package

Tue, 13 Jul 2010 16:10:16 GMT
http://presstv.com/detail.aspx?id=134613&sectionid=351020403

   
 

Afghanistan is hit hard by poverty and insecurity.

The European Union says it has suspended a 600-million-euro aid package to Afghanistan in a bid to ensure that the fund will be used for the country's top priorities.

EU Ambassador to Afghanistan Vygaudas Usackas said on Tuesday that a decision on releasing the aid package intended to be used for the next three years was postponed until September.

"The EU deliberately postponed the three-year aid package from May until September to see what the Afghan priorities are and how our program fits into those priorities," Usackas explained.

The European bloc added that it would delay the decision until after a major international conference is held in Kabul on July 20.

During the conference, Western countries are expected to discuss future plans for the country and whether progress is being made in various areas.

The aid suspension comes as reports claim that billions of dollars in international aid money is being transferred out of Kabul to foreign safe havens, with some of the suitcases being shipped out reportedly belonging to top Afghan officials.

According to Transparency International, a monitoring organization, Afghanistan is one of the world's most corrupt countries.

Reacting to the corruption reports, a senior US lawmaker said earlier that Washington will not give "one more dime" to Afghanistan until President Hamid Karzai takes action against corruption in the country.

JR/CS/MMN

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July 13, 2010
http://counterpunch.com/tripathi07132010.html

The Beginning of the End?

The Dwindling of Afghanistan's Coalition of the Willing


By DEEPAK TRIPATHI

The British government’s decision to withdraw troops from Sangin in Helmand province marks a watershed in the relentless conflict in Afghanistan. The military mission has been very costly for the United Kingdom, with a third of the total casualties sustained in one district alone. More than a hundred lives of soldiers lost and many more wounded coming home is a sign of how difficult the mission has been. In a classic display of guerrilla tactics of asymmetrical warfare, the armed opposition has refused to fight a modern army equipped with high-tech weaponry on its enemy’s terms. Instead, the insurgents have fought on their terms, using rudimentary explosive devices and small weapons with devastating effect. Reaction of Afghans in Sangin will shock many in Britain.

Writing in the Daily Telegraph (July 7, 2010), Ben Farmer reported local residents saying little that is complimentary about the British. One resident openly complained that, in their four-year deployment in Sangin, the British brought only fighting and too little development. The previous Anglo-Afghan wars have left a particularly bitter legacy, although there is also a tendency that things look far better on the other side. Afghanistan remains a fragmented country like it has been for centuries. Rubbing salt in British wounds, an Afghan from a small neighboring settlement said that areas under American control had done better. Ask people in US-controlled areas and their reaction would likely be the opposite. Afghans regularly protest against civilian deaths at the hands of US-led occupation forces all over the country, although many die in suicide attacks directed against people supposed to be cooperating with NATO and the US-installed government in Kabul. Among the latest this month were anti-US and anti-government demonstrations in the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif. Residents come out to protest against civilians killings in the south and the east. News travels fast in that devastated country.

‘Afghanistan: Now It’s America’s War,’ said the Independent newspaper’s front-page story loudly in black. For eight years, the British people’s growing unease had been ignored. The United Kingdom, with a population of 62 million and fewer than 200000 regulars (and 42000 volunteers) in the armed forces, had been punching way above its weight. Former prime minister Tony Blair’s personal kinship with George W Bush in his ‘war on terror’ cost the United Kingdom dearly, in economic, political, moral terms. With Blair’s New Labour losing the May 2010 general election, it was relatively easier for the emerging Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government to face up to the reality of the Afghan conflict. The inevitable was bound to happen.

There has been a distinct cooling in the relationship between London and Washington since President Obama’s inauguration. Partly it is because President Bush and Prime Minister Blair are no longer in power. But equally significant, Britain’s new prime minister, David Cameron, and Obama have not made a good start. The Conservative Party is generally pro-military and, in opposition in parliament, voted for war against Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. The Liberal Democratic Party, with a much more democratic structure, has significant sections in its membership opposed to, or circumspect about, war. The overall effect of a coalition between the two parties now runs counter to Britain’s continuing involvement in the Afghan conflict that has taken a heavy toll. The rhetoric about continued military involvement in Afghanistan is gloomy. Official statements emphasize the need for British troops to come home as soon as Afghanistan is ‘stable’. What it means remains undefined. The timescale often mentioned is 3-4 years, meaning before the next election.

Initial encounters have a determining effect on relations between leaders. From this perspective, Obama and Cameron did not appear to connect well. Of course, diplomatic niceties were maintained. The British are particularly adept at that. But the difference of emphasis in Washington and London over Afghanistan cannot be hidden. And the megaphone diplomacy over the BP oil spill laid bare the reality that the days of ‘special relationship’ – an exaggerated claim – were decidedly over. President Obama did not hesitate to resort to raw nationalism undermining that ‘special relationship’ to deflect domestic criticism of his handling of the environmental disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.

In doing so, Obama stepped back a decade into the past before British Petroleum and Amoco merged to form an international oil giant that was regarded as much American as it was British until the accident. He resorted to new rhetoric, way below his previous standards, to speak of an assault on US shores (not true because the rig that broke down was extracting oil within US continental waters). The Deepwater Horizon drilling rig leased by BP was owned by Transocean, a company that traces its origins to Alabama in the 1950s. With its headquarters now based in Switzerland and offices in the United States and other countries, Transocean quenches the business ethos of ‘drill baby drill’ very well. And Obama’s ‘kicking ass’ remark was not the sort of political language heard in Europe. Senior figures, including ex-diplomats and politicians, began to react publicly, calling for the need to ‘send a message’ to the Americans. A telephone call from the British prime minister David Cameron followed. The conversation was courteous, the message clear. The oil disaster was saddening and frustrating. But it would be in no one’s interest to crush BP and to let the temperature rise any further. Obama responded that he had no interest in undermining the value of BP, but that was precisely the result. Obama was accused of holding ‘his boot on the throat’ of pensioners whose incomes depended on investments in the company.

Expediency, always a strong motive, propels political leaders to do the unexpected. They are not averse to injecting political venom into the body of an ally when they want to deflect domestic criticism. Eight years on, the ‘coalition of the willing’ President George W Bush assembled following his infamous threat ‘you’re either with us, or against us’ to invade Afghanistan and then Iraq, that alliance is unraveling. And we may be witnessing the beginning of the end of yet another phase of great power adventurism in Afghanistan.

Deepak Tripathi set up the BBC Bureau in Afghanistan in the early 1990s and was the resident correspondent in Kabul. His latest book Overcoming the Bush Legacy in Iraq and Afghanistan is available from Amazon.com. His next book Breeding Ground: Afghanistan and the Origins of Islamist Terrorism (Potomac Books, Inc), an inside account of the Afghan conflict and great power intervention in the country since the 1970s, is to be published in August 2010. He can be reached at: DandATripathi@gmail.com.

 

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South Asia
Jul 15, 2010  
http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LG15Df01.html

  
Rules of engagement bear fruit


By Philip Smucker



WASHINGTON - The numbers are in and they are both ugly and unacceptable. At least, 1,074 Afghan civilians were killed in armed violence and security incidents in the first six months of 2010, according to the respected Afghanistan Rights Monitor.

Crucially, however, the number of people killed in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and United States air strikes in the same period fell by half. An earlier tightening of allied rules of engagement - overseen by former NATO commander General Stanley McChrystal - helped to reduce that figure, according to the Afghan authors of the report.

In the six months between the start of January and the end of June, insurgents were responsible for killing some 661 civilians and of those 282 were killed in improvised roadside bombs. The numbers show that, despite fighting from behind a human shield and melting away, the Taliban and related insurgents are killing far more innocents than NATO and Afghan forces. That cannot be good for their own "hearts and minds" campaign.

By comparison, NATO and other international forces were responsible for 210 Afghan civilian deaths. Afghan security forces also appear to be improving their aim, killing 108 civilians this year, down from 386 in the previous six months. This suggests that NATO can begin to provide more airlift and firepower assets to the Afghans as they move closer to the tip of spear in the war against the Taliban. (Memo to the Pentagon: Don't forget to train Afghan helicopter pilots.)

As US commanders debate the military's restrictions on the use of firepower in Afghanistan, these numbers are worth keeping close at hand. Any loosening of NATO's current "rules of engagement" and reversal of the trend towards fewer killings by NATO and Afghan forces could undermine American efforts both in Afghanistan and across the more important theater of the Islamic world.

Heightened pleas in Washington and on the ground from US fighters to be given leeway to significantly increase lethality also miss the central focus of counter-insurgency, which is the protection of the Afghan population.

Citizen groups with an interest in war and peace are already pushing back. "Winning the population isn't just a cliche," wrote Sarah Holewinski, executive director of the Campaign for Innocent Victims in Conflict (CIVIC,) in a recent letter to The Washington Post. "Those soldiers now condemning the restraint they must use in this war fail to see that what's good for the Afghans is good for them."

The Afghan war with all its current troubles is an apt metaphor for America's larger struggle against a clever foe who seeks to draw US forces into myriad fights around the world.

Indeed, it is no secret that al-Qaeda and its affiliates want to tie the United States down like Gulliver and condemn America with a long war of attrition while the US military flails around trying to swat small and often invisible threats. The Barack Obama administration has displayed adequate circumspection, thus far, towards these global designs.

Similarly, in Afghanistan it is essential that policymakers continue to distinguish the forest - peace - from the trees - terrorists.

In extended stays with small US units in Afghanistan over the past three years, I discovered that the most successful American counter-insurgents are those who remain disciplined - even reluctant - in their application of force.

These young officers recognize, as Australian David Kilcullen, formerly a top counter-insurgency advisor to McChrystal, writes in a new book on the subject: "Killing the enemy is easy. Finding him is nearly impossible."

In Pashtun areas, which embody the heart of the Afghan insurgency, guerrillas closely monitor NATO tactics and local opinion. If American forces are doing their best to avoid civilian casualties, tribal elders are more likely to embrace their American colleagues. Intelligence flows over candy and cups of green tea. When the environment is soured by unexpected civilian deaths, however, these same elders retreat behind mud walls - brooding and aloof.

When US forces kill civilians by accident, as I've witnessed, a vicious cycle of killing ensues. This, in turn, creates a stalemate and a lockdown in development resources that undermines the Obama administration's planned-for exit.

Destroying a village to "save it", works no better in Afghanistan than it did in Vietnam. The current Pentagon civilian leadership and top brass, schooled in the lessons of that much-bloodier conflict, are all too aware of this. They are paying far more attention to groups like Holewinski's CIVIC, which has been instrumental in persuading the US military in the past decade to step up direct financial amends for accidental civilian injuries and deaths in the field.

It is worth recalling - as do most Afghans - that in the first four years of the war, US forces carried out standard damage assessments then simply turned their backs on the Afghans.

Make no mistake, though, the next year in Afghanistan will be a bloody one. When NATO fighters risk their necks on patrol in ideal guerrilla terrain, the Taliban will either emerge from the shadows or fire wildly from behind a civilian shield. New evidence that the Taliban fighters are relying more and more on improvised explosives to attack NATO and Afghan forces, including civilians, suggests that they are really not as keen as some of their admirers would have it to fight toe-to-toe with US and allied patrols. Afghan civilians see this first hand.

If the United States were to step up the zero-sum hunt for individual Taliban fighters and markedly intensify the lethality of its own firepower - including more Apache and Warthog attacks - Washington would merely be reverting to strategy that failed between 2001 and 2008.

The Taliban and their al-Qaeda mentors in Pakistan are anxious that US forces step up the fight, but also want to see their foe commit targeting errors. They are poised to deploy many scores of jihadis to troubled corners of Afghanistan where increased civilian casualties increase due to errant US attacks. More death and civilian angst makes villagers more pliable and likely to respond to insurgent requests to embed new gun posts and fighters.

On the other hand, where restraint is evident and where tribal elders cooperate openly with US forces in exchange for development, the Taliban and their associates have far less mobility. This is also enhanced when US compensation for innocent victims works quickly and systematically.

Parallels between the fight in Afghanistan and the Obama administration's struggles to pacify the broader Islamic realm are many. As I discovered in research for my book, My Brother, My Enemy, Islamic militants with a global agenda are trying to disrupt local politics from placid fishing villages in the Spice Islands of Indonesia to the mosques of Sahelian Africa.

Osama bin Laden has long made known his adamant desire to draw US forces into protracted struggles in order to drain off American resources and point his long, boney finger at America's so-called "imperialist designs".

America should be wise enough by now, in this its longest war ever, to work more through Islamic allies and not to fall for his ploys.

And while there is still plenty of room to criticize Obama's anti-terrorism strategy, it remains in striking contrast to the excesses of that of his predecessor. The new US chief in Afghanistan, General David Petraeus, and his officer's corps are rightfully war-weary and despite conspiracy theories to the contrary, do not relish a long stay in Afghanistan.

They understand that a highly militarized America abroad - as it remains today - is less capable of doing the business of America, which is, after all, business and not imperialism or occupation.

It is the Obama administration's apparent long-term goal to try to drain the sea of recruits that Bin Laden and company tap into daily. For that to happen any time soon, however, the stars would have to align perfectly.

In the meantime, let's hope good sense prevails and that NATO forces fire off only as many rounds as are required to protect Afghan civilians. That's the best and only hope for getting out and moving on.

Philip Smucker is a commentator and journalist based in South Asia and the Middle East. He is the author of Al-Qaeda's Great Escape: The Military and the Media on Terror's Trail.

 
 
 

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Published on Tuesday, July 13, 2010 by CommonDreams.org

Killing For Fun; Military Madness

by Tom Turnipseed

Successful professionals enjoy their work. The Obama administration has picked a successful and happy warrior in Marine Corps Gen. James N. Mattis to head the US Central Command. The command includes all US forces in Afghanistan, Iraq, the entire Middle East and Central Asia. Mattis has gloated that it is "fun to shoot some people" and "have a plan to kill everybody you meet".

Killing is the key to success in military actions. Killing enough insurgents by invading and occupying US forces enables the winners to subdue and subjugate the survivors. The real winners in the Middle East are the US based corporations who seek to exploit the resources of energy and mineral rich countries like Iraq, Afghanistan and Iran. Also the corporate war profiteers of the defense industry are making out like bandits. They furnish the killing tools, the hired mercenaries and other wasteful and expensive materials, equipment and supplies for our never-ending wars-on-terror.

Mattis has a strong resume in the military killing business. He was a lieutenant colonel in the US invasion of Iraq in 1991, directed the Marines in the 2003 invasion of Iraq, headed the US assault on the Iraqi city of Fallujah in 2004 and helped design the siege that destroyed the city and killed thousands of Iraqi civilians. Mattis also commanded the initial troops that went into Afghanistan in 2001.

Describing his feelings about the people in Afghanistan, General Mattis said, "... It's a hell of a lot of fun to shoot them. Actually it's quite fun to fight them, you know. It's a hell of a hoot. It's fun to shoot some people. I'll be right up there with you. I like brawling."

Author Thomas Ricks wrote that Mattis told his troops to, "Be polite, be professional, but have a plan to kill everybody you meet."

During Operation Desert Storm in Iraq, Mattis reportedly told his troops, "It's the mission of every Marine in the battalion to send one dead Iraqi home to Mama."

Perhaps World War II Army General George S. Patton, Jr. is a role model for Mattis in his glorification of military madness and the joy of killing. Patton said "Magnificent! Compared to war all other forms of human endeavor shrink to insignificance. God help me, I do love it so!", and "No bastard ever won a war by dying for his country, He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country." Patton also said, "America loves a winner, and will not tolerate a loser, this is why America has never, and will never, lose a war." Of course that was before our ill-fated military ventures in Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates called Mattis "one of our military's outstanding combat leaders and strategic thinkers, bringing an essential mix of experience, judgment and perspective to this important post." Asked about Mattis's bloodthirsty rhetoric, Gates brushed off an official rebuke against Mattis saying it was five years ago.

In Afghanistan, US and NATO forces casualties continue to escalate. The number of Americans killed so far this month is at least 23 with 14 killed last week. In June, 102 occupation troops were killed including 60 Americans. 1,149 American soldiers have been killed in the war in Afghanistan, and countless numbers of Afghan civilians have died. We don't do body counts of "the enemy" because, as former Defense Secretary Rumsfeld said, "death has a tendency to encourage a depressing view of war."

Our economic crisis is directly tied to the cost of the war. It costs $1 million per year to maintain a single soldier in Afghanistan. The 2010 Pentagon budget is $693 billion, which surpasses all other discretionary spending programs combined--while our deficit soars. We desperately need money to create green jobs, rebuild our crumbling infrastructure and improve education.

President Obama replaced General McChrystal with General Petraeus as commanding general of US and NATO forces in Afghanistan. McChrystal had made derogatory remarks about Obama and his administration's conduct of the war. Petraeus was head of the Central Command and will be replaced by Mattis. Obama said, "War is bigger than any one man or woman, whether a private, a general or president."

The war in Afghanistan is a big loser. Rearranging deck chairs to include one more "fun to kill" military madman will not keep it from sinking like the Titanic. Only ending the war will save Obama.

A recent ABC/Washington Post poll found that people felt the war was not worth fighting by a 53 to 44 margin. An NBC/Wall Street Journal poll had 62% of the American people saying the country was going in the wrong direction and Obama's approval rating at 45% with 48% disapproval.

President Obama was the most successful politician in the US who seemed to enjoy being elected to the highest office in the land. Fulfilling his promise of peace, hope and change is a winner. However his failure to conclude killing for fun military madness will make him a loser in 2012 and doom his party in November.

Tom Turnipseed is an attorney, writer and peace activist in Columbia, SC. His blog is http://tomandjudyonablog.blogspot.com/ [1]


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Article printed from www.CommonDreams.org

URL to article: http://www.commondreams.org/view/2010/07/13-3

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Afghanistan Rights Monitor SLAMS Washington Spin About “Progress” in Afghanistan

Posted by derrickcrowe on @ 3:02 pm
Article printed from speakeasy: http://blogs.alternet.org/speakeasy

URL to article: http://blogs.alternet.org/speakeasy/2010/07/13/afghanistan-rights-monitor-slams-washington-spin-about-progress-in-afghanistan/

WATCH TRAILER:
Rethink Afghanistan (Part 4): Civilian Casualties - TRAILER
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BQsoxtjo7E4&feature=player_embedded


Watch the full video, Rethink Afghanistan (Part 4): Civilian Casualties.
http://rethinkafghanistan.com/cc.php


The Afghanistan Rights Monitor’s (ARM) mid-year report on Civilian Casualties of Conflict (.pdf)
http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/retrieveattachments?openagent&shortid=NROI-87A9PB&file=Full_Report.pdf
blasts the happy-talk coming out of the Obama Administration about the deteriorating security situation and its effect on civilians:

Despite the high-profile spin in Washington and Kabul about progress made in Afghanistan, the Afghan people have only witnessed and suffered an intensifying armed conflict over the past six months. Contrary to President Barrack Obama’s promise that the deployment of additional 30,000 US forces to the country would “disrupt, dismantle and defeat” Taliban insurgents and their al-Qaeda allies in the region, the insurgency has become more resilient, multi-structured and deadly. Information and figures received, verified and analyzed by Afghanistan Rights Monitor (ARM) show about 1,074 civilian people were killed and over 1,500 were injured in armed violence and security incidents from 1 January to 30 June 2010. This shows a slight increase in the number of civilian deaths compared to the same period last year when 1,059 deaths were recorded.

…In terms of insecurity, 2010 has been the worst year since the demise of the Taliban regime in late 2001. Not only have the number of security incidents increased, the space and depth of insurgency and counter-insurgency-related violence have maximized dramatically. Up to 1,200 security incident were recorded in June, the highest number of incident compared to any month since 2002.

The administration and their allies have continuously that "we’re making progress," "we’re turning the tide," or "we’ve begun to reverse the insurgents’ momentum," but the data doesn’t support their assertions. As ARM’s report shows, civilian casualties continue to climb even as more troops flood into the country–troops executing a counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy supposedly premised on "protecting the population." The rise in troop levels and civilian casualties has been accompanied by an increasingly large and sophisticated insurgency and a widening lead in sympathy or support for the insurgents in key districts of Afghanistan.

Even the portion of the report that blasts the insurgent factions for their outrageously immoral tactics is bad news for the U.S. The report slams insurgents use of IEDs and suicide bombings as weapons of choice. A number of news outlets have noted this portion of the report along with the drop in U.S./NATO-caused civilian deaths, but it’s a safe bet you won’t find too many honest-to-God COIN-lovers cheering about the stats noted in this report. COIN doctrine asserts the importance not just of the protection of civilians from killings by counterinsurgents (in this case, U.S. and allied forces), but the protection of the people in general. Counterinsurgency doctrine says that people aren’t going to switch to your side if they think they’ll get killed for it, no matter how few cause civilian deaths your team causes.

ARM was similarly blunt when it came to the issue of the corruption and abuse rampant in the Afghan government and their police force:

Amidst widespread concerns about rampant corruption and abuse of power by the police, NATO has not only continued to recruit ill-qualified people to swamp police numbers but has reportedly reduced the training period to only four weeks.

An overwhelming majority of the police is illiterate and lack adequate knowledge about the basics of civil policing and human rights. Many police officers are addicted to drugs, have notorious criminal backgrounds or maintain allegiance to powerful militia or criminal commanders…Pervasive corruption and abuse of authority by the police have devastating impacts on individuals and communities that desperately need a sense of security, protection and the rule of law. Corrupt and abusive police also contributed to widespread criminality, criminal impunity and denial of peoples’ access to justice and other essential services.

If you can’t protect the population generally, from the perspective of COIN doctrine, you lose. If you lack a legitimate host nation government as a partner, you lose. And guess what? According to that doctrine–the doctrine used as the rationale for the troop-heavy American strategy in Afghanistan–the United States is losing. Badly.

If you’re tired of seeing blood and treasure wasted on a brutal, costly war that’s not making us safer, join Rethink Afghanistan on Facebook and sign up for a local Rethink the Afghanistan War Meetup.

LINKS:
http://facebook.com/RethinkAfghanistan

http://www.meetup.com/Rethink-the-Afghanistan-War/

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Why Can't Mainstream American Journalists Tell the Truth About the Horrors of America's Wars?

Sebastian Junger's new documentary "Restrepo" presents the story of US soldiers at an isolated combat outpost, keeping Afghan suffering safely off the screen.

By Nick Turse, Tomdispatch.com
Posted on July 13, 2010, Printed on July 14, 2010
http://www.alternet.org/story/147533/

I’ve never heard a shot fired in anger.  But I might know a little bit more about war than Sebastian Junger.

Previously best known as the author of The Perfect Storm, Junger, a New York-based reporter who has covered African wars and the Kosovo killing fields, and Tim Hetherington, an acclaimed film-maker and photographer with extensive experience in conflict zones, heard many such shots, fired by Americans and Afghans, as they made their new documentary film Restrepo -- about an isolated combat outpost named after a beloved medic killed in a firefight. There, they chronicled the lives of U.S. soldiers from Battle Company, 2nd Battalion, 503rd Infantry Regiment of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, during a tour of duty in eastern Afghanistan’s Korengal Valley.

The film has been almost universally praised by mainstream reviewers and was awarded the Grand Jury Prize at this year’s Sundance Film Festival.  A New York Times “critics’ pick,” Restrepo moved the newspaper’s A.O. Scott to end his glowing review by telling readers: “As the war in Afghanistan returns to the front pages and the national debate, we owe the men in ‘Restrepo,’ at the very least, 90 minutes or so of our attention.”  In the Los Angeles Times, reviewer Betsy Sharkey concluded in similar fashion: “What ‘Restrepo’ does so dramatically, so convincingly, is make the abstract concrete, giving the soldiers on the front lines faces and voices.”

Along with Hetherington, Junger, who has also recently experienced great success with his companion book War, shot about 150 hours of footage in the Korengal Valley in 2007 and 2008 during a combined 10 trips to the country.  “This is war, full stop,” reads website prose above their directors’ statement about the film.

It isn’t.

Junger and Hetherington may know something about Afghanistan, a good deal about combat, and even more about modern American troops, but there’s precious little evidence in Restrepo that -- despite the title of Junger’s book -- they know the true face of war.

War on Your Doorstep

Earlier this year, Junger reviewed a new Vietnam War novel, veteran Karl Marlantes’s Matterhorn, for the New York Times Book Review.  In a glowing front-page appraisal, he wrote, “Combat is not really what ‘Matterhorn’ is about; it is about war. And in Marlantes’s hands, war is a confusing and rich world where some men die heroically, others die because of bureaucratic stupidity, and a few are deliberately killed by platoon-mates bearing a grudge.”  Analyzing Junger’s misreading of Matterhorn helps to unlock his misconceptions about war and explains the problems that dog his otherwise cinematically-pleasing, and in some ways useful, film.

Millions of Vietnamese were killed and wounded over the course of what the Vietnamese call the “American War” in Southeast Asia.  About two million of those dead were Vietnamese civilians.  They were blown to pieces by artillery, blasted by bombs, and massacred in hamlets and villages like My Lai, Son Thang, Thanh Phong, and Le Bac, in huge swaths of the Mekong Delta, and in little unnamed enclaves like one in Quang Nam Province.  Matterhorn touches on none of this.  Marlantes focuses tightly on a small unit of Americans in a remote location surrounded by armed enemy troops -- an episode that, while pitch perfect in depiction, represents only a sliver of a fraction of the conflict that was the Vietnam War.

It’s not surprising that this view of war appealed to Junger.  In Restrepo, it’s his vision of war, too.

Restrepo’s repeated tight shots on the faces of earnest young American soldiers are the perfect metaphor for what’s lacking in the film and what makes it almost useless for telling us anything of note about the real war in Afghanistan.  Only during wide shots in Restrepo do we catch fleeting glimpses of that real war.

In the opening scenes, shot from an armored vehicle (before an improvised explosive device halts a U.S. Army convoy), we catch sight of Afghan families in a village.  When the camera pans across the Korengal Valley, we see simple homes on the hillsides.  When men from Battle Company head to a house they targeted for an air strike and see dead locals and wounded children, when we see grainy footage of a farm family or watch a young lieutenant, a foreigner in a foreign land, intimidating and interrogating an even younger goat herder (whose hands he deems to be too clean to really belong to a goat herder) -- here is the real war.  And here are the people Junger and Hetherington should have embedded with if they wanted to learn -- and wanted to teach us -- what American war is really all about.

Few Americans born after the Civil War know much about war.  Real war.  War that seeks you out.  War that arrives on your doorstep -- not once in a blue moon, but once a month or a week or a day.  The ever-present fear that just when you’re at the furthest point in your fields, just when you’re most exposed, most alone, most vulnerable, it will come roaring into your world.

Those Americans who have gone to war since the 1870s -- soldiers or civilians -- have been mostly combat tourists, even those who spent many tours under arms or with pen (or computer) in hand reporting from war zones.  The troops among them, even the draftees or not-so-volunteers of past wars, always had a choice -- be it fleeing the country or going to prison.  They never had to contemplate living out a significant part of their life in a basement bomb shelter or worry about scrambling out of it before a foreign soldier tossed in a grenade.  They never had to go through the daily dance with doom, the sense of fear and powerlessness that comes when foreign troops and foreign technology hold the power of life and death over your village, your home, each and every day.

The ordinary people whom U.S. troops have exposed to decades of war and occupation, death and destruction, uncertainty, fear, and suffering -- in places like Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Iraq, and Afghanistan -- have had no such choice.  They had no place else to go and no way to get there, unless as exiles and refugees in their own land or neighboring ones.  They have instead been forced to live with the ever-present uncertainty that comes from having culturally strange, oddly attired, heavily armed American teenagers roaming their country, killing their countrymen, invading their homes, arresting their sons, and shouting incomprehensible commands laced with the word “f**k” or derivations thereof.

Since World War I, it’s been civilians who have most often born the disproportionate brunt of modern warfare.  It’s been ordinary people who have lived with war day after day.  In Restrepo such people -- Afghan elders seeking information on someone the Americans detained, villagers seeking compensation for an injured cow the Americans butchered into fresh steaks, and a man who angrily asks the Americans and their translator to point out the Taliban among civilians killed by a U.S. air strike -- are just supporting characters or extras.

“[W]e did not interview Afghans,” Junger and Hetherington write in their directors’ statement.  These are, however, precisely the people who know the most about war.  And somehow I can’t believe Junger doesn’t intuitively know this.  Surely it stands to reason that Afghan civilians in the Korengal Valley and elsewhere -- some of whom have lived through the Soviet occupation, the bloody civil war of the early 1990s that saw the Taliban take power, and now almost a decade of American and allied foreign occupation -- have a better understanding of war than any of Junger’s corn-fed twenty-somethings who are combat tourists for about a year at a time (even if they serve multiple tours of duty).

War in the Dark

This critical local knowledge, all but missing from Restrepo, is driven home in footage from a PBS Frontline report in which one of Restrepo’s “stars,” Captain Dan Kearney, speaks to an Afghan elder, Haji Zalwar Khan, in the Korengal Valley in July 2008.  It’s around the time Restrepo ends, just as Kearney is about to hand-off his command to another American officer-cum-war-tourist.

“You people shoot at least one house a day.  Last night you shot a house in Kandalay,” says Khan.  In response, Kearney offers a visibly skeptical smile and predictable excuses.

“You people are like lightning when you strike a house, you kill everything inside,” Khan continues.  Later, when Frontline correspondent Elizabeth Rubin is able to talk to him alone, the elder tells her that the conflict will end when the Americans depart.  “When they leave there will be no fighting,” he assures her. “The insurgents exist to fight the Americans.”

Perhaps it’s only natural that Junger is focused (or perhaps the more appropriate word would be fixated) not on Afghans wounded or killed in their own homes, or even guerillas seeking to expel the foreign occupiers from the valley, but on the young volunteers fighting the U.S. war there.  They are a tiny, self-selected minority of Americans whom the government has called upon again and again to serve in its long-festering post-9/11 occupations.  And presumably for reasons ranging from patriotism to a lack of other prospects, these mostly baby-faced young men -- there are no female troops in the unit -- volunteered to kill on someone else’s orders for yet others’ reasons.  Such people are not uninteresting.

For an American audience, they, and their suffering, provide the easiest entree into the Afghan war zone.  They also offer the easiest access for Junger and Hetherington.  The young troops naturally elicit sympathy because they are besieged in the Korengal Valley and suffer hardships.  (Albeit normally not hardships approaching the severity of those Afghans experience.)  In addition, of course, Junger speaks their language, hails from their country, and understands their cultural references.  He gets them.

Even in an American context, what he doesn’t get, the soldiers he can’t understand, are those who made up the working-class force that the U.S. fielded in Vietnam.  That military was not a would-be warrior elite for whom “expeditionary” soldiering was just another job choice.  It was instead a mélange of earnest volunteers, not unlike the men in Restrepo, along with large numbers of draftees and draft-induced enlistees most of whom weren’t actively seeking the life of foreign occupiers and weren’t particularly interested in endlessly garrisoning far-off lands where locals sought to kill them.

In his review of Marlantes’s Matterhorn, Junger confesses:

“For a reporter who has covered the military in its current incarnation, the events recounted in this book are so brutal and costly that they seem to belong not just to another time but to an­other country. Soldiers openly contemplate killing their commanders. They die by the dozen on useless missions designed primarily to help the careers of those above them. The wounded are unhooked from IV bags and left to die because others, required for battle, are growing woozy from dehydration and have been ordered to drink the precious fluid. Almost every page contains some example of military callousness or incompetence that would be virtually inconceivable today, and I found myself wondering whether the book was intended as an indictment of war in general or a demonstration of just how far this nation has come in the last 40 years.”

As the American War in Vietnam staggered to a close, U.S. troops were in an open state of rebellion.  Fraggings -- attacks on commanders (often by fragmentation grenade) -- were rising, so was the escape into drug use.  Troops bucked orders, mutinied, and regularly undertook “search and evade” missions, holing up in safe spots while calling in false coordinates.

AWOLs and desertions went through the roof.  During World War II, Marine Corps desertion rates peaked at 8.8 per 1,000 in 1943.  In 1972, the last full year of U.S. combat in Vietnam, the Marines had a desertion rate of 65.3 per 1,000.  And precious few Marines were even in Vietnam at that point.  AWOL rates were also staggering -- 166.4 per 1,000 for the much more numerous Army and 170 per 1,000 for the Marines.  In a widely-read 1971 Armed Forces Journal article, retired Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., wrote, “By every conceivable indicator, our army that now remains in Vietnam is in a state of approaching collapse, with individual units avoiding or having refused combat, murdering their officers and noncommissioned officers, drug-ridden, and dispirited where not near-mutinous.”

It didn’t take rocket-scientists to figure out that you couldn’t conduct long-term, wheel-spinning occupations in distant lands with a military like that.  And so the long-occupation-friendly all-volunteer force that Junger has come to know was born.  That he has such a hard time understanding the citizen-soldier response to the American lost cause in Vietnam essentially ensures that the civilian story of war, especially that of alien civilians in a distant land, would evade his understanding.  This is what makes the relative isolation of the unit he deals with in Restrepo so useful, even comfortable for him as he assesses a very American version of what war is all about.

By 1969, it was apparent where the Vietnam War was going and, increasingly, soldiers balked at the prospect of being the last man to die for their country in a disastrous war.  While it turned out that about 15,000 Americans would die in Vietnam from 1969 to 1971 (almost as many as had died from 1965 to 1967), the troops were increasingly angry about it.

Body armor, drone warfare, ultra-rapid medevacs, and a host of other technological innovations, not to mention battling tiny numbers of relatively weak, ill-armed, and generally unpopular guerillas, has meant that Junger’s new model military can fight its wars with minimal American casualties and, so far, less upset at home (or even perhaps in the field).  Today, the numbers of dead Americans like Juan S. Restrepo, the medic for whom the outpost in Junger’s film was named, remain relatively few compared, at least, to Vietnam.  Just over 1,100 U.S. troops have died in and around Afghanistan since 2001.

On the other hand, who knows how many Afghan civilians have died over that span, thanks to everything from insurgent IEDs, suicide attacks, and beheadings to U.S. air strikes, special operations forces’ night raids, and road checkpoint shootings, not to speak of every other hardship the American war in Afghanistan has unleashed, exacerbated, or intensified?  Who knows their stories?  Who has documented their unending suffering?  Few have bothered.  Few, if any, have risked their own lives to chronicle day-to-day life for months on end in embattled Afghan villages.  Yet it's there, not in some isolated American outpost, that you would find the real story of war to film.  In the place of such a work, we have Restrepo.

Even an all-volunteer army will eventually collapse if pushed too far for too long.  Soldiers will eventually slip, if not explode, into revolt or at least will begin to evade orders, but the prospect looks unlikely any time soon for the U.S. military.  Unlike Afghan civilians, U.S. troops go home or at least leave the combat zone after their tours of duty.  And if most Americans don’t necessarily give them much thought much of the time, they evidently have no problem paying them to make war, or engaging in effortless tributes to them, like rising at baseball games for a seventh-inning stretch salute.

In what passes for a poignant scene in Restrepo, Captain Kearney addresses his troops after a sister unit takes uncharacteristically heavy casualties.  He says that they can take a few moments to mourn, but then it’s time to get back into the fight.  It’s time for pay-back, time to make the enemy feel the way they’re feeling.  He then gives his men time for prayer.

If Kearney ever called his troops together and set aside a moment for prayer in memory of the civilians they killed or wounded, Junger and Hetherington missed it, or chose not to include it.  Most likely, it never happened.  And most likely, Americans who see Restrepo won’t find that odd at all.  Nor will they think it cold, insensitive, or prejudiced to privilege American lives over those of Afghans.  After all, according to Junger, “military callousness” has gone the way of America’s Vietnam-vintage F-4 Phantom fighter-bomber.

If Americans care only sparingly for their paid, professional soldiers -- the ones A.O. Scott says deserve 90 minutes of our time -- they care even less about Afghan civilians.  That’s why they don’t understand war.  And that’s why they’ll think that the essence of war is what they’re seeing as they sit in the dark and watch Restrepo.


Nick Turse is the associate editor of TomDispatch.com.  An award-winning journalist, his work has appeared in the Los Angeles Times, the Nation, and regularly at TomDispatch. He is the author of The Complex: How the Military Invades Our Everyday Lives.  His latest book, The Case for Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Verso), which brings together leading analysts from across the political spectrum, will be published in September.  His website is NickTurse.com.

© 2010 Tomdispatch.com All rights reserved.
View this story online at: http://www.alternet.org/story/147533/

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- Associated Press

 - July 13, 2010
http://www.foxnews.com/world/2010/07/13/afghan-soldier-attacks-british-troops-rocket-propelled-grenade-killing/?test=latestnews

Afghan attacks kill 8 American soldiers as Taliban push back against US-led op in south


   KANDAHAR, Afghanistan (AP) — Eight American troops died in attacks in southern Afghanistan, including a car bombing and gunfight outside a police compound in Kandahar, officials said Wednesday as the Taliban push back against a coalition effort to secure the volatile region.

A suicide attacker slammed a car bomb into the gate of the headquarters of the elite Afghan National Civil Order Police late Tuesday in Kandahar, a NATO statement said. Minutes later, insurgents opened fire with machine guns and rocket-propelled grenades.

Three U.S. troops, an Afghan policeman and five civilians died in the attack, but NATO said the insurgents failed to enter the compound.

The special police unit, known as ANCOP, had only recently been dispatched to Kandahar to set up checkpoints along with international forces to try to secure the south's largest city, the spiritual birthplace of the Taliban.

The dead civilians included three Afghan translators and two security guards, Kandahar provincial police chief Sardar Mohammad Zazai said.

Taliban spokesman Qari Yousef Ahmadi telephoned reporters Wednesday to claim responsibility for the attack. The insurgents, which are prone to exaggerate death tolls inflicted on Afghan and international security forces, claimed 13 international troops and eight Afghan security forces died in the raid.

NATO and Afghan troops are fanning out elsewhere in Kandahar province to pressure insurgents in rural areas. The strategy is to improve security with more and better-trained police and troops so that capable governance can take root and development projects can move forward and win the loyalty of ordinary Afghans.

The Taliban have responded by ratcheting suicide attacks and bombings, making last month the deadliest of the nearly 9-year-old war for international forces.

On Wednesday, four more American troops were killed by a roadside bomb in the south, while one more U.S. service member died the same day of wounds from a gunbattle.

So far in July, 45 international troops have died in Afghanistan, 33 of them Americans.

In other attacks around the country, nine Afghan civilians died in the south when their vehicle hit a roadside bomb in the volatile district of Marjah in Helmand province, the Ministry of Interior said. Another homemade bomb killed two security guards traveling on a road in eastern Paktika province.

Two suspected Taliban also died in Helmand's Lashkar Gar district when the roadside bomb they were trying to plant exploded prematurely, the ministry said.

Homemade explosives planted in roads and pathways are a leading killer of international forces and also kill hundreds of civilians each year.

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Twelve US-led soldiers killed in 48 hours


Wed, 14 Jul 2010 11:27:56 GMT
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=134745&sectionid=351020403   
 
Five more US-led soldiers have lost their lives in Afghanistan's volatile south, bringing to 12 the number of US soldiers killed over the past 48 hours.

NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) says the soldiers were killed in a Taliban attack on police headquarters on Wednesday.

Five Afghan civilians and an Afghan officer were also killed in the attack.

The latest casualties brought the total number of US-led soldiers killed in the war-torn country since Tuesday to 12.

Over 350 foreign troops have been killed in the so far this year.

Some 140,000 US-led troops are currently stationed Afghanistan. A further 10,000 are expected to be deployed there in the coming weeks.

NATO's mounting death toll has caused public support to plummet for the Afghan war across Europe and the US.

JR/MMN

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Poll: US in no-win Afghan scenario

Wed, 14 Jul 2010 09:44:48 GMT
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=134710&sectionid=3510203

 
The results of an opinion poll conducted in the US show that 62 percent of Americans believe in no-win scenario in Afghanistan for US President Barack Obama.

According to the new CBS news poll, this is while only 49 percent of Americans were discontent with the US military presence in Afghanistan in May.

The poll also indicated that over half of all Americans (54 percent) want a timetable for withdrawal from Afghanistan, nine years into the US-led war there.

Americans are divided over President Obama's handling of Afghanistan: 43 percent say they approve of his handling of the Afghan war, while 44 percent disapprove. Just 31 percent maintain the war in Afghanistan is going well.

There is also a partisan rift on the issue: 73 percent of Democrats think the US should set a timetable, while only 32 percent of Republicans say the US should do so. Fifty-four percent of independents want a timetable.

The prolonged presence of US military personnel in Afghanistan, increasing casualties, and failure of Washington in the war-torn country have resulted in President Obama further losing his popularity.

On Iraq, Americans continue to hold more positive views of the war. Fifty-five percent of them say things are going well for the US there, while over 60-percent don't want large numbers of US forces to stay there for another year.

HSH/HRF

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On the road to defeat in Afghanistan


BY Judith Orr

http://uruknet.info/?p=m67900&hd=&size=1&l=e

July 13, 2010

As British troops announce a humiliating withdrawal from Sangin in Helmand province, Judith Orr looks at why the West is losing the war

Britain’s role in the Afghan war is in crisis. Commanders are planning to pull troops out of Sangin in Helmand province.

Sangin has seen some of the heaviest loss of life for British soldiers. The politicians and generals are calling it "reconfiguration", but handing over to the US troops is a recognition of defeat.

At the start of this week 314 British soldiers had died in the war – one third of them in Sangin.

There are currently 9,500 British troops in Afghanistan, with numbers expecting to top 10,000 by the end of the year.

The final stage of Barack Obama’s surge will bring US troops numbers in the area to 30,000.

Yet none of this firepower is providing a solution and the war is bloody chaos – with ordinary Afghans suffering most. More Afghan civilians died last year than any other, and just last week new US commander General David Petraeus had to apologise for the deaths of five Afghan soldiers who were killed in a "friendly fire" incident by their allies in the US forces.

Over 1,000 US troops have died and billions of pounds have been spent on waging what has become the longest war in US history.

The US says it wants to hand over to the Afghan army as soon as the Taliban have been cleared from areas. They call it the "Afghanisation" of the war and plan to build up the Afghan army to over a quarter of a million troops.

But last month Time magazine reported, "Nine out of ten Afghan enlisted recruits can’t read a rifle instruction manual or drive a car… Commanders routinely steal their enlisted men’s salaries.

"Soldiers sell off their own American-supplied boots, blankets and guns at the bazaar – sometimes to the Taliban… Recruits tend to go Awol after their first leave, while one-quarter of those who stay in service are blitzed on hashish or heroin according to an internal survey carried out by the Afghan National Army."

This is not because of the nature of Afghan people – this is because of the fracturing of people’s lives and livelihoods.

The Afghan army costs $6 billion a year – the Kabul’s government’s annual earnings in tax revenues are only $1 billion.

Any standing army will always be massively subsidised by the US. The prospect of using the Afghan people as a tool of defending the US is both a sham, and a cruel misuse of Afghanistan’s resources.

There is a deep crisis within the ruling classes in the US and Britain about what do about the war. In Britain, defence secretary Liam Fox said, "any attempt to describe this as a retreat is, in my view, quite contemptible." But he cannot avoid the truth that the Sangin pullout comes after a string of other hammer blows against the occupation.

Obama’s sacking of General Stanley McChrystal was a sign of deep divisions about the war following the failure to defeat the Taliban.

Negative

Surge after surge has failed, and the Taliban have reclaimed Marja just weeks after 15,000 Nato and Afghan forces poured in. After the Marja battle a survey of Afghan opinion showed that 61 percent felt more negative about Nato forces as a result.

The planned Kandahar offensive has been postponed until the autumn at least.

Afghans know that the occupation is not there to protect or serve them. Instead it is seen as propping up President Hamid Karzai’s unpopular government, which is steeped in corruption.

Karzai has openly flaunted the fact that he is willing to negotiate with the Taliban. The New York Times recently reported that Karzai said he had "lost faith in the Americans and Nato to prevail in Afghanistan."

The US would like a more credible partner, but there is no one to replace Karzai.

The imperialist interests of the US are at stake. Obama’s method is to compel other states to cooperate in pursuing these interests. "The burdens of a new century cannot fall on American shoulders alone," he said. But the US cuts an ever more lonely figure in Afghanistan.

The first thing Obama did was order a surge of 30,000 troops into the country. Any talk of multilateralism was silenced.

Anti-war sentiment among the populations of the occupying nations is having an impact. In Britain, which has the second largest force in Afghanistan after the US, 72 percent of the population believes the war is unwinnable.

The war can still get even bloodier. Under pressure after the deaths of so many Afghan civilians at the hands of Nato troops McChrystal had been forced to introduce a new policy called "courageous restraint".

The desperation to win could mean that Petraeus drops even this pretence to protect ordinary Afghans.

Last week Obama named Marine Corps General James Mattis to replace General Petraeus as chief of US Central Command. This gives Mattis overall command of US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq and across the Middle East.

Mattis, also known as "Chaos", "Warrior Monk" and "Mad Dog Mattis," has a long record of leading murderous combat operations in US wars of aggression in the Middle East and Central Asia. In April 2004 he led the first US assault on the Iraqi city of Fallujah and helped plan the siege that destroyed the city.

In February 2005, at a public forum in San Diego, Mattis said that "it’s a hell of a lot of fun to shoot" Afghans. He added, "Actually, it’s a lot of fun to fight. You know, it’s a hell of a hoot. It’s fun to shoot some people."

Mattis received an official rebuke for his comments – but now he’s in charge of the slaughter.

As the fighting becomes more desperate and more reckless, countless more Afghans will die. The forces are destroying any infrastructure that exists and making life ever more uncertain.

There is only way to end the slaughter – pull all the Nato troops out.

Judith Orr is a national officer of the Stop the War Coalition. She writes in a personal capacity




 

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Kyrgyzstan, America and the Global Drug Trade:

Deep Forces, Coups d'Etat, Narcotics and Terror


By Peter Dale Scott
 
Global Research, July 14, 2010
The Asia-Pacific Journal - 2010-07-13

THIS IS A MUST READ ARTICLE HERE:

http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=20126

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Bastille Day Edition
July 14, 2010
http://counterpunch.com/dimaggio07142010.html

Obama's Rhetoric Undermined By On-the-Ground Reality

Afghanistan in Ruins
 
By ANTHONY DiMAGGIO

Violence in Afghanistan spiked in 2010 in light of the U.S. “surge,” its targeting of the Taliban, and growing attacks on Afghan civilians.  Attacks reached an all time high since the U.S. invaded in 2001, according to the group Afghanistan Rights Monitor (ARM).  ARM estimates that more than 1,000 civilians have been killed this year, with another 1,500 injured, while the Taliban “has become more resilient, multi-structured and deadly.” 

The U.S. is said to be responsible for approximately one third of all the civilian deaths, although Taliban forces were found to have incited more than 60 percent of all deaths.  The recent ARM report from this month represents an important admission from those on the ground that the U.S. promise to help “stabilize” Afghanistan and reduce violence and terrorism remain more rhetoric than reality.  The 140,000 troops the U.S. has added to Afghanistan appear to have increased the threat to Afghans by causing an escalation of violence to the point where the country is further spiraling out of control. 

Recent social indicators from the United Nations indicate that Afghanistan remains one of the worst off countries in the world.  Life expectancy is at a pitiful 44 years, as the country ranks the second lowest in this area (behind only Niger) in all countries throughout the globe.  The 2009 UN Human Development Index finds that Afghanistan remains in the bottom 10 percent of countries in terms of its Gross Domestic Product, in the bottom 20 percent in terms of literacy, in the bottom four percent in life expectancy, and in the bottom 30 percent in child malnutrition.  Afghanistan excels in one area, however: outmigration.  Afghanistan actually finishes in the top 30 percent of countries in terms of people leaving the country, a damning indication of the dangers civilians face throughout the U.S.-NATO occupation. 

The Afghan war’s popularity is at a historic low as of mid 2010.  Americans appear to be recognizing that the situation in the country is not improving, but in fact worsening in terms of Afghan civilian and U.S. soldiers’ lives lost.  Growing public opposition is a testament to the weakness of Obama’s rhetorical defense of the war, which is becoming less convincing each day.  According to Newsweek polling, the percent of Americans opposing Obama’s handling of the war increased by a whopping 26 percent from just 27 percent of Americans in February to 55 percent in June.  According to Washington Post-ABC polling, while 52 percent of Americans thought the war was “worth fighting” immediately following Obama’s December 2009 speech, that figure fell to 44 percent by early June 2010.  General opposition to the war as not “worth” it reached a majority of Americans by April of this year.

U.S. casualties throughout 2010 have been the worst in the war’s history.  They averaged 32 per month, compared to the average of 26 per month in 2009 and 13 deaths per month in 2009.  U.S. casualty rates have actually increased steadily every year since 2001, a sign of the increasing toll the war is exacting on the American people.  The story of growing U.S. deaths, however, has remained largely under the radar in the American press, which has rarely featured any stories about the historical levels casualties since it first emphasized the topic in late 2009.  It appears that journalists have learned well the lesson not to “rock the boat” for a war in which both parties are strongly supportive, despite the growing public rebellion.

Anthony DiMaggio is the editor of media-ocracy (www.media-ocracy.com), a daily online magazine devoted to the study of media, public opinion, and current events.   He is the author of When Media Goes to War (2010) and Mass Media, Mass Propaganda (2008). He can be reached at: mediaocracy@gmail.com

 

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Taliban say they welcome turncoat Afghan soldier

Taliban say Afghan soldier who killed British troops now being protected by insurgents

Staff
AP News
http://wire.antiwar.com/2010/07/13/taliban-say-they-welcome-turncoat-afghan-soldier/

Jul 13, 2010 14:15 EDT

The Taliban say the Afghan soldier who attacked coalition allies and killed three British troops is now being sheltered by insurgents.

In a message posted Tuesday on its website, the Taliban said the Afghan soldier assigned to a patrol in Helmand province opened fire on sleeping troops at a base.

It says that after the attack, the soldier fled a Taliban-controlled area, surrendered to them and was taken to a "safe place."

The Taliban message claimed that eight British soldiers died, not three as the Afghan government and international coalition reported.

Officials said the motive of the attack was unclear. It was the second time in eight months that an Afghan turned against British troops partnering with local security forces.

THIS IS A BREAKING NEWS UPDATE. Check back soon for further information. AP's earlier story is below.

KABUL, Afghanistan (AP) — An Afghan soldier attacked his coalition allies with a rocket-propelled grenade and other weapons early Tuesday, killing three British troops and wounding four more before fleeing, officials said.

British Prime Minister David Cameron condemned the killings as "appalling" but insisted the incident should not change the strategy of working alongside the Afghan army.

Officials said the motive of the attack was unclear.

It was the second time in eight months that an Afghan turned against British troops partnering with local security forces. In November, an Afghan policeman killed five British soldiers at a checkpoint — also in southern Helmand province, where Tuesday's attack happened.

Afghan police in the past have also attacked American soldiers and their own police stations. While such intentional attacks are rare, they emphasize the difficulties in rapidly expanding the Afghan forces to take over responsibility for security from international troops.

Critics have said a rushed schedule — aimed at allowing U.S. forces to begin drawing down by next year — makes it difficult to screen out insurgent sympathizers and also to properly train up Afghan forces in military discipline.

President Hamid Karzai quickly sent a letter of apology to the British government. Gen. David Petraeus, the commander NATO forces in Afghanistan, called for unity among international troops and the Afghan soldiers in the fight against the Taliban.

"We have sacrificed greatly together, and we must ensure that the trust between our forces remains solid in order to defeat our common enemies," Petraeus said in a statement.

Britain's Ministry of Defense said the soldiers from 1st Battalion Royal Gurkha Rifles died in a "suspected premeditated attack" by an Afghan soldier "using a combination of weapons." They were serving at a base in Helmand's Nahr-i-Saraj district.

The renegade Afghan soldier used a shoulder-mounted launcher to fire a grenade at British soldiers inside a base control room at around 2 a.m., Afghan Defense Ministry spokesman Gen. Mohammad Zaher Azimi said.

The soldier escaped and is being sought, he said, adding that the motive of the attack was not yet clear. A joint coalition-Afghan team is investigating.

Afghan army Chief of Staff Gen. Sher Mohammad Karimi expressed regret and pledged to capture and prosecute the attacker.

"The loss of any of our coalition partners affects us deeply," Karimi said.

Deputy commander of the NATO-led forces, Lt. Gen. Nick Parker, said details of the attack are still unclear but it appeared the soldier betrayed his unit and international partners.

"It does look to us as if this is another example of a member of the Afghan National Security forces attacking our soldiers," Parker said, referring to the earlier, November incident.

The speed with which Afghan security forces are growing — the allies set an interim goal of expanding the Afghan army from 85,000 in 2009 to 134,000 troops by 2011 — has raised concerns about infiltration by the Taliban and the professionalism of the recruits. The police force is facing similar challenges.

Previous turncoat attacks include a policeman who threw a grenade and opened fire on a U.S. foot patrol, killing one soldier in October 2008. One month before, a policeman opened fire at a police station, killing a soldier and wounding three before he was fatally shot.

"Our Afghan partners have got to look very carefully at what's happened and they've got to reassure us that they are doing everything they can to minimize it happening again," Parker said Tuesday.

Liam Fox, Britain's defense secretary, echoed Cameron's reaffirmation of Britain's policy to work alongside Afghan forces to reverse Taliban gains and eventually turn over security to the national force.

"Training and developing the Afghan National Security Forces is vital to the international mission in Afghanistan and today's events will not undermine the real progress we continue to make," Fox said, adding that British forces would continue "working shoulder to shoulder with Afghans."

Britain is the largest contributor to the NATO force after the United States, with about 10,000 troops in Afghanistan, most deployed in volatile Helmand, an insurgent stronghold. Since 2001, a total of 317 British forces have died serving in Afghanistan.

Last month was the deadliest of the war for international forces, with 103 foreign troops killed.

___

Associated Press Writer David Stringer in London contributed to this report.

Source: AP News

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Bomb blast kills 9 in Afghanistan


Wed, 14 Jul 2010 14:46:21 GMT
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=134770&sectionid=351020403

 
Statistics show that 2009 was the deadliest year for Afghan children.


A bomb blast has killed at least nine people, including three children, in southern Afghanistan as public discontent is growing over the rising number of civilian casualties.

The roadside blast hit a bus in the town of Marjah in Helmand province. Several people were also reported to have been injured.

Meanwhile, a provincial official blamed Taliban militants for the attack. The Taliban, however, have yet to claim responsibility for the deadly incident.

Civilians have been the main victim of violence in Afghanistan, particularly in the country's troubled southern and eastern provinces.

The latest civilian casualties come as a human rights group declared 2010 as the most violent year in Afghanistan since the start of the US-led invasion in 2001.

In its latest report, Afghanistan Rights Monitor said that 1,076 civilians were killed during the first six months of 2010.

The figure shows a sharp increase from a civilian death toll of 684 for the same period in 2007.

The group has also recorded 1,200 violent incidents in the month of June. The announced figure is the highest number in any single month during the war since 2002.

The violent incidents and rising casualties in Afghanistan come despite a massive US-led troop surge in the war-torn country.

The increasing violence against civilians has led to a sharp decline in support for the presence of US-led forces in the country.

JR/CS/MMN

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The other, powerful Karzai boss in Afghanistan

To many Ahmed Wali Karzai, the half brother of Afghan president, is the key to taming the Taliban in the critical city of Kandahar. But to others he's a highly controversial figure.

Ahmed Wali Karzai (c.) talked on the phone as he sat with supporters celebrating the reelection victory of his brother President Hamid Karzai in Kandahar this past November.(Banaras Khan/AFP/Getty Images/File)


By Dan Murphy, Staff writer
posted July 14, 2010 at 8:11 am EDT
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/0714/The-other-powerful-Karzai-boss-in-Afghanistan?sp_rid=NTI5OTY0NzMzNAS2&sp_mid=4505760


Kandahar, Afghanistan — Ahmed Wali Karzai, leader of the Popalzai tribe and the most powerful man in Kandahar, settles down in his chambers for another round of grievance hearing, dispute settling, and political strategizing.

Gazed down upon by a photo of his assassinated father and bathed in the aura of his half brother, Afghan President Hamid Karzai, Wali Karzai's avid eyes flit over the tribal chieftains and petitioners around him as he dispenses the business of the day.

Increasingly, the business of the day in Kandahar and the business of Ahmed Wali Karzai are indistinguishable. To his supporters, that's all to the good – a supporter of the United States effort with his hand on the tribal political levers in a province and city that's the key to defeating the Taliban.

Encouraging corruption?
But to others, Mr. Karzai is building a traditional patronage network – with his family at the top of the heap – that is encouraging corruption, creating tribal divisions, and shifting support to the Taliban from the NATO-backed government of his brother.

Kandahar, awash in drug money and contractor profits, where Taliban assassinations occur almost daily, is currently the focus of a US military buildup. Karzai – or AWK in the language of the blossoming diplomatic cables and military intelligence dossiers on his activities – is the man in the middle.

He's been accused of having business ties to the heroin traders and warlords that have proliferated across the south since NATO ousted the Taliban in 2001. Almost everyone – local journalists, businessmen, political rivals – alleges he's amassed a fortune, though Kandaharis, when pressed for details, often respond with the Pashtun phrase, "My mouth is full of water."

'I'm like a spice'
AWK denies all the charges against him, and says he's simply a tribal leader and politician whose power comes from a famous and respected name among the Pashtun tribes of the south. He says his critics are trying to weaken President Karzai, with family ties and his influence proving an easy target. "I'm like a spice," he says. "To make the dish more delicious, you add a little Ahmed Wali."

Whatever the source, a few days spent with him demonstrates his local power. A Kandahar without AWK could be as problematic, or more so, than one with him.

It's a point that a US officer in Kabul – who thinks NATO should hold its nose and deal with him – makes: "We think there's some dirt on him. But everyone's got dirt on him. And we know that he's working with us to deal with the Taliban."

Karzai the problem solver?
At his sprawling guesthouse where he entertains requests and complaints for five hours on most days (and twice a week at the provincial council he chairs), Karzai is running a cross between Tammany Hall and the tribal jirgas that Afghanistan's Pashtuns have used to order their affairs for centuries.

First in his line of supplicants is a former mujahideen commander who led troops in the 1980s war against the Soviets. His son is running for parliament, and he's seeking Karzai's blessing. Support granted. Karzai urges the young politician to "listen to the people."

Next is a delegation warning that a dispute between the Achakzai and Barakzai tribes could get violent. After taking advice from a circle of advisers, he tells the men to "bring the leaders of the tribe here and I'll solve it." They shuffle out.

A wheat farmer comes in charging that another man harvested his land. A provincial employee complains he was falsely accused of corruption. A delegation of tribal elders comes in with a World War I Luger pistol as a gift. A stooped old man requests that his jailed son be transferred to a prison closer to home.

AWK helps them all, leaning forward in his chair, asking questions in staccato bursts. It feels as if a page should shout "Next!" after each issue has been dealt with.

The unemployed son of a tribal leader is promised a job at the election office; a letter is dispatched to a friendly businessman asking him to give $1,300 to a farmer whose wheat was burned by a US illumination flare; a tribal leader whose brother's house was surrounded by the Taliban two days earlier is consulted.

Fortunately the brother had gotten through to Karzai on the phone. Afghan forces raced to the compound. "A few years ago, that probably wouldn't have happened. He'd be dead," says one of Karzai's aides.

On it goes amid the clacking of prayer beads and the cracking of nuts. Finally it's time for lunch, with heaping plates of lamb meatballs, stewed okra, chicken, and rice eaten sprawled on Afghan carpets.

Karzai's influence explained
Ahmed Wali Karzai explains his influence as a matter of tradition in a region where tribal ties remain strong. "It's not like we popped up like mushrooms when Hamid Karzai became president. My father was the head of the Popalzai for all of Kandahar. Everyone respects him. It's a family thing," he says.

Well, not everybody. Karzai has survived two Taliban assassination attempts and travels with gunmen. He straps on a pistol when he leaves the house for the provincial council.

There, a man convinces him that his father was wrongly detained by the police on charges of selling arms to the Taliban. One phone call and the elderly father enters the chamber about half an hour later to thank him (Karzai says later that the police "were about to release him anyway").

More ominous allegations of release have surfaced. Dad Mohammed Khan, a former intelligence chief in neighboring Helmand Province, the center of Afghan opium production, told a McClatchy reporter earlier this year that an associate of Karzai had ordered him to release a Taliban commander linked to the drug trade. Mr. Khan died soon after in a roadside bombing blamed on the Taliban.

Allegations brushed aside
AWK brushes aside allegations that he receives a cut of the hundreds of millions of dollars spent on guarding the trucks that deliver food, fuel, and ammunition to NATO forces. "I haven't received one penny from the international contracts here. If someone can find I've made one, then I'll admit to everything."

His critics disagree. A member of parliament in Kabul, who asked not to be named, charges that AWK has steered contracts to the Popalzai and that officials who stand in his way are removed. "Contracts and jobs all flow through him. From a tribal point of view, he's a big problem. People that get cut out could be turning to the Taliban," he says.

Carl Forsberg at the Institute for the Study of War in Washington wrote in an April report: "Ahmed Wali Karzai's influence over Kandahar is the central obstacle to any of [NATO's] governance objectives…. Wali Karzai's behavior and waning popularity among local populations promote instability and provide space for the Taliban to exist."

One of the largest security contractors in Afghanistan, the Asia Security Group, is run by a cousin, Hashmat Karzai. The family link is one reason some believe Karzai profits from the business, though Ahmad Wali Karzai says he has no involvement in his cousin's security business, financial or otherwise. The family cut ties with Hashmat a few years ago, after he was accused of killing a relative in a blood feud.

[Editor's note: The original version misstated Wali Karzai's relationship to Hashmat Karzai. They are cousins.]

US officials have also privately said Karzai is on the CIA's payroll. "I haven't signed a paper saying I'm working with anyone," Karzai says. "But yes, I fought against Al Qaeda with the US in 2001, yes I work with USAID. I talk to the military and I help every American that comes to me."

He says he's in the "front of the fight against the Taliban" and that it's natural that he works with US Special Forces and others.

"When the international forces came, they needed us to show them the way. The understanding they have now mostly came from us," he says. "I'm living in the region, I know the people. When it comes to getting things done, we're the ones to come to."

[bigron]

South Asia
Jul 16, 2010 
http://atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/LG16Df01.html 
 
'Terror' threat to Karzai's Taliban plan

By Abubakar Siddique

The administration of United States President Barack Obama is reportedly considering blacklisting major Taliban factions, a move aimed at undermining groups linked closely to al-Qaeda, but which could also jeopardize Afghan President Hamid Karzai's efforts to reconcile with Afghan insurgent leaders based in neighboring Pakistan.

General David Petraeus, commander of US and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) forces in Afghanistan, discussed the idea of blacklisting the Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani network with senior administration officials last week, according to The New York Times. Senator Carl Levin (Democrat, Michigan), meanwhile, called on the State Department on July 13 to also place the Quetta shura, the Taliban's leadership council led by Mullah Mohammad Omar, on its list of terrorist organizations.

Sirajuddin Haqqani currently leads the network founded by his father, Jalaluddin Haqqani, a former Taliban minister and anti-Soviet commander in the 1980s. The network has a reputation for being ruthless, and is accused of being behind many of the most high-profile attacks in the Afghan capital, Kabul.

The Haqqani network is also seen as having ties to the Quetta shura, which is based in the southwestern Pakistani city of Quetta and made up of remnants of the former Taliban regime loyal to Mullah Omar.

Both Sirajuddin Haqqani and Mullah Omar have long been on the US blacklist of fugitive terrorists, with a State Department program offering US$5 million and $10 million, respectively, for information leading to their capture.

But while expanding the US blacklist is intended to strike deeper into the core of organizations affiliated with the two men, with the aim of undermining the insurgency being waged in Afghanistan, doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of the move.

Kabul-based Afghan analyst Wahid Muzda argues that designating Taliban groups, in particular the Haqqani network, as terrorists would do little to persuade its followers to give up fighting.

"I don't think that the Haqqani network can ever break away from the Taliban ranks and come here [to join the government]," Muzda says. "On the other hand, blacklisting is nothing new for them, and the Americans will gain little from this. If they want to pressure or threaten Sirajuddin Haqqani it won't work and the fighting will continue."

End to rapprochement
Some suggest a move to expand the blacklist could also undermine the Afghan president's reconciliation efforts.

International media recently reported that the Pakistani military brokered direct negotiations between Karzai and Sirajuddin Haqqani, reports both Islamabad and Kabul denied.

If the reports are true, however, a terrorist designation could make it even harder for Karzai to explore rapprochement with the Taliban. It could also push Washington to consistently pressure Islamabad to move against the group in North Waziristan. For years Pakistan has resisted going after the network because its sees the Haqqanis as potential future allies after an eventual US withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The network is widely believed to be based in Pakistan's North Waziristan tribal district along the Afghan border, which is also believed to shelter Arab jihadis from al-Qaeda and militants affiliated with Central Asian extremist groups.

Who to talk to
The move comes as Karzai has apparently persuaded Washington to push for de-listing certain Taliban leaders from a United Nations sanctions list first established in 1999.

Kabul-based Afghan analyst Ahmad Sayedi tells RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan that the move indicates that Washington wants to make a clear distinction between reconcilable and irreconcilable elements among the Afghan insurgents, "to understand who is being talked to and where [and on what terms]."

Sayedi adds that Washington has "information that Jalaluddin Haqqani and some of Mullah Omar's followers have close ties with al-Qaeda or they are part of al-Qaeda. The Americans do not want to negotiate with elements closely tied to al-Qaeda."

Karzai has pursued reconciliation with the Quetta shura for years through informal contacts. But this February's arrest of its military leader, Abdul Ghani Baradar, disrupted the process. Analysts suggest that move pushed Karzai to pursue reconciliation with the Taliban though Pakistan's powerful military, which Kabul has accused of harboring Taliban leaders in the past. Karzai apparently sought new regional alliances after developing critical differences with Washington.

The Obama administration has pushed for reintegrating Taliban foot soldiers and field commanders into Afghan society, but has resisted rapprochement with its fugitive leaders.

US 'red lines'
The Quetta shura and the insurgent networks controlled by its leaders are mostly active in the southern Afghan provinces of Kandahar and Helmand. United States and NATO troops are expected to launch a major stabilization operation in Kandahar in an effort to weaken the Taliban considerably.

Richard Holbrooke, Obama's special regional envoy, told journalists on July 13 that Washington is keen on helping Kabul to succeed with reintegration programs worth $280 million.

Holbrooke said that Washington was even pushing for a revision of the UN blacklist in the Security Council, but that crossing certain red lines won't be acceptable. "Both the president and the secretary of state have laid out the red lines on this issue many, many times, he said.

He said that Washington supports "Afghan-led reconciliation. We are not in direct contact with the Taliban. There may be other indirect contacts going on, track-2 diplomacy, individuals who contact each other, other things, but they don't involve the United States. And that's our position. "People who are willing to lay down their arms, renounce al-Qaeda, participate in the political process, are always ready to be - we're always ready to reconcile them - groups or in - as individuals."

Reconciliation with the insurgents is expected to figure high on the agenda at the international donors conference scheduled for July 20 in Kabul. The Afghan government is touting the gathering as the largest gathering of international leaders in the country since the 1970s.

RFE/RL's Radio Free Afghanistan correspondent Asmatullah Sarwan contributed reporting to this article.

Copyright (c) 2010, RFE/RL Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave NW, Washington DC 20036

 
 
 

[bigron]

Holbrooke: War cannot be won militarily

Thu, 15 Jul 2010 05:14:17 GMT
http://www.presstv.ir/detail.aspx?id=134840&sectionid=351020403


 US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke


Before a July 20th donors conference in Kabul, US Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, Richard Holbrooke, announces the Afghan war cannot be won militarily.

"As you said, Mr. Chairman, there is no military solution here, so as General Petraeus and General McChrystal said, you cannot win this war by killing every member of Taliban," Holbrooke, told US senators on Wednesday, Press TV reported.

He made the remarks as casualties of US-led troops rise in Afghanistan; more than 350 foreign soldiers have been killed in Afghanistan since the beginning of this year.

Meanwhile, Holbrooke defended the Obama administration's decision to push more US troops into Afghanistan, but noted that July 2011 is a deadline for starting a withdrawal of soldiers from the war-torn country.

"The idea here was quite clear: to tell the world and the Afghans that we do not have an open-ended, limitless, Vietnam-type escalation," Holbrooke said.

"The size, scope, timing, pace and an end-point for combat troop presence has not been decided on," AFP quoted the envoy as saying Wednesday.

"I do not want to give an optimism/pessimism report to you... I think there are significant elements of movement forward in many areas but I do not yet see a definitive turning point in any direction," he further explained.

Some 140,000 US-led troops are currently stationed in Afghanistan. A further 10,000 are expected to be deployed there in the coming weeks.

NATO's mounting death toll has caused public support to plummet for the Afghan war across Europe and the United States.

Meanwhile, results of a CBS poll show most Americans believe the war in Afghanistan is a no-win scenario.

According to the poll, 60 percent of American people think the Afghan war is being handled badly. Fifty-one percent of Americans want the US government to set a date for the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan.

DB/JG/HRF

[bigron]

The Raging Revenant: Anti-Imperialism -- Past, Present and Future

by Chris Floyd

July 14, 2010
http://uruknet.info/?p=m67929&hd=&size=1&l=e

Mark Twain is returning to us, in the unexpurgated editions of his much-censored autobiography which will be published in three volumes. And one of his most notable successors in the fine art of anti-imperialist polemic, Arthur Silber, has provided some useful context for some of the views that Twain and his literary executors thought too hot to print in their now-vanished present day.

Many of these passages dealt with Twain's angry railing against America's militarist empire-builders, as they perpetrated mass murder and savage torture during the "liberation" of the Philippines from, er, the Filipinos. I will have much more to say on this and related subjects in an upcoming piece on James Bradley’s remarkable new book, The Imperial Cruise, but Silber is already on the case here, so give it a full read.

In fact, Silber has been a man on fire in recent days, posting a series of remarkable essays in rapid-fire fashion. These range from the first two parts of a major new series, "The Demand for Obedience, and Reverence for Authority," savagely witty takedowns of  media poltroonery across the political spectrum, super-scary Russian spies, the permanent American occupation of Iraq, and much more. Avail yourself of these incisive insights at the earliest opportunity.


Just for good measure, Silber also answers the musical question that has puzzled our pundit puzzlers till their puzzlers are sore: "Why are we in Afghanistan?" Here's part of the answer [see original post for links]:



... We hear gasps that grow more and more frequent, as our protagonist finds it progressively difficult to breathe. Unbearable and steadily increasing anxiety suffuses the air. As we contemplate the nerve-wracking spectacle, goosebumps speckle our soul. Finally, the unanswerable question of the ages bursts forth from frothing lips:

"Why, dear God, oh, why, why, why are we in Afghanistan?"


...Because of the critical nature of Afghanistan's location for those in pursuit of power and control, the primary goal throughout history and continuing today, for Britain, for Russia, for the United States, for others, can be expressed in two words:

Being There.

That's the whole thing. Full stop. Being there -- because Afghanistan is the strategic gateway to further destinations of immense importance, because a presence in Afghanistan serves to shore up expeditions to other countries, because securing Afghanistan is necessary to a continuing power base in Central Asia.

When we understand this, we can see that all the other purported goals -- building a stable democratic government, securing Afghanistan for the Afghans, defeating alleged terrorists, ensuring regional stability for the benefit of all humankind (never solely for the sake of the U.S., or Russia, or Britain or anyone else, may the heavens forfend, but only and always for all humankind, such is the nobility and remarkable lack of self-interest of the ruling class) -- all of that is marketing and public relations. The ruling class offers those justifications because they sound so much nicer and more pleasant. Besides, the public gobbles them up with eager ignorance. Sometimes a few members of the public will behave with astonishing impertinence and point out that the marketing ploys don't seem to comport with facts on the ground. The ruling class doesn't care about any of that. Shred the PR all you wish: it's PR. It doesn't matter. They hope you spend all your time demonstrating in great detail how threadbare and senseless the marketing is. And many of you oblige them. Silly, silly you.


Silber cuts to the crux of the matter. As he notes elsewhere in the piece, the true aims of the imperial project -- dominance and loot for the ruling class -- have always been completely out in the open. And these aims can be -- and have been -- and are being accomplished regardless of the putative outcome of each particular adventure, whether it is regarded as a victory, a defeat, a "tragic blunder," etc. etc.

This is a point I have been trying to get at, in my cack-handed way, for years. The avowed intentions and the public outcomes of our imperial wars don't really matter -- because these churnings of blood and corruption are really about something else altogether. I was writing about this back in 2004, in a piece that was necessarily Bush-centric in language, given his ascendancy at the time, but still applies to our entire bipartisan imperial system, even -- or rather, especially -- under the progressive Peace-Prizer temporarily wearing the Potomac purple:




The whole [Iraq] adventure has been a win-win scenario for the Bushists from the start, no matter how it ends up. This is what many of the opponents of the war – and even most of its now-fretful supporters – have failed to grasp, because they don't understand what the Bush Family is about.

Put simply, the Bushes represent the confluence of three long-established power factions in the American elite: oil, arms and investments. These groups equate their own interests, their own wealth and privilege, with the interests of the nation – indeed, the world – as a whole. And they pursue these interests with every weapon at their command, including war, torture, deceit and corruption. Democracy means nothing to them – not even in their own country, as we saw in the 2000 election. Laws are just whips to keep the common herd in line; they don't apply to the elite, as Bush's own lawyers have openly asserted in the now-famous memos establishing his "inherent power" as Commander-in-Chief to "set aside the law" and order any crime in the name of his self-proclaimed "war on terror."

The Iraq war has been immensely profitable for these Bushist power factions (and their tributary industries, such as construction); billions of dollars in public money have already poured into their coffers. Halliburton has been catapulted from the edge of bankruptcy to the heights of no-bid, open-ended, guaranteed profit. The Carlyle Group is gorging on war contracts. Individual Bush family members are making out like bandits from war-related investments, while dozens of Bushist minions – like Richard Perle, James Woolsey, and Joe Allbaugh -- have cashed in their insider chips for blood money.

The aftermath of the war promises equal if not greater riches. Even if the new Iraqi government maintains state control of its oil industry, there are still billions to be made in refining, distribution, servicing and security for oilfields and pipelines, as in Saudi Arabia. Likewise, the new Iraqi military and police forces will require billions more in weapons, equipment and training, bought from the U.S. arms industry – and from the fast-expanding "private security" industry, the politically hard-wired mercenary forces that are the power elite's latest lucrative spin-off. And as with Saudi Arabia, oil money from the new Iraq will pump untold billions into American banks and investment houses.

But that's not all. For even in the worst-case scenario, if the Americans had to pull out tomorrow, abandoning everything – their bases, their "commissioners," their contracts, their collaborators – the Bushist factions would still come out ahead. For not only has their already-incalculable wealth been vastly augmented (with any potential losses indemnified by U.S. taxpayers), but their deeply-entrenched sway over American society has also increased by several magnitudes. No matter which party controls the government, the militarization of America is so far gone now it's impossible to imagine any major rollback in the gargantuan U.S. war machine – 725 bases in 132 countries, annual military budgets nearing $500 billion, a planned $1 trillion in new weapons systems already moving through the pipeline. Indeed, Democrat John Kerry promises even bigger war budgets and more troops if elected.

Nor will either party conceivably challenge the dominance of the energy behemoths – or stand against the American public's demand for cheap gas, big vehicles and unlimited consumption of a vast disproportion of the world's oil. As for Wall Street – both parties have long been the eager courtesans of the investment elite, dispatching armies all over the world to protect their financial interests. The power factions whose influence has been so magnified by Bush's war will maintain their supremacy regardless of the electoral outcome. ...

So has Bush's war brought democracy to Iraq? Has it dealt a blow to terrorism? Has it made America – or Israel, or the world – any safer? No. But it was never intended to do those things. All this death and chaos – this mass murder – has had but one aim: enhancing the power of a handful of elites. This criminal mission has been accomplished. And there is not the slightest chance that any of the chief perpetrators will ever face justice.

Now that, my friends, is victory.





 

[bigron]

July 14, 2010
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/world/asia/15afghan.html?_r=2&om_rid=NVTZHe&om_mid=_BMPwEyB8OsH77L

Afghans to Form Local Forces to Fight Taliban

By ALISSA J. RUBIN



KABUL, Afghanistan — After intensive negotiations with NATO military commanders, the Afghan government on Wednesday approved a program to establish local defense forces that American military officials hope will help remote areas of the country thwart attacks by Taliban insurgents.

Details of the plan are sketchy, but Americans had been promoting the force as a crucial stopgap to combat rising violence here and frustration with the slow pace of training permanent professional security forces — the bottom-line condition for the American military to begin pulling back from an increasingly unpopular war. Many parts of Afghanistan have no soldiers or police officers on the ground.

Over 12 days of talks, Gen. David H. Petraeus, the new NATO commander, overcame the objections of President Hamid Karzai, who had worried that the forces could harden into militias that his weak government could not control. In the end, the two sides agreed that the forces would be under the supervision of the Afghan Interior Ministry, which will also be their paymaster.

“They would not be militias,” said Geoff Morrell, the Pentagon spokesman, at a briefing in Washington on Wednesday. “These would be government-formed, government-paid, government-uniformed local police units who would keep any eye out for bad guys — in their neighborhoods, in their communities — and who would, in turn, work with the Afghan police forces and the Afghan Army, to keep them out of their towns.”

It is, he added, “a temporary solution to a very real, near-term problem.”

The program borrows from the largely successful Awakening groups that General Petraeus created in Iraq, though the two programs would not be identical. Unlike the Iraqi units, the Afghan forces would not be composed of insurgents who had switched sides. They would be similar as a lightly armed, trained and, significantly, paid force in a nation starving for jobs.

In fact, the program runs the risk of becoming too popular — it will create a demand in poor communities around the nation that could turn it into an unwieldy and ineffective job creation program.

While some American officials said the forces could have as many as 10,000 people enrolled, Afghan officials indicated that they wanted to keep them small, especially in the beginning.

Questions remain, too, about whether the Interior Ministry will be able to manage the forces. While the ministry’s leadership in Kabul has been working recently to reduce graft, the police at every level are widely viewed as corrupt and, in many places, incompetent.

American military officials said, however, that they would be intimately involved, and that United States Special Forces units, which have created smaller-scale programs locally, especially in southern Afghanistan, would continue to set up and train the forces.

The agreement was hammered out during a particularly violent spasm in the war here. Seven American service members were killed on Tuesday and Wednesday in southern Afghanistan, and one NATO soldier died of wounds received earlier in the week in the unstable south of the country.

The negotiations were an early test for General Petraeus, appointed overall commander in Afghanistan last month, both in pushing a difficult war forward and forging ties with Mr. Karzai, an often prickly and unpredictable partner against the Taliban.

The relatively fast agreement on this new force could give momentum to the general’s efforts to work closely with Mr. Karzai’s government and move forward on other, still harder issues, including improving Afghan governing skills and decreasing corruption.

Depending on how quickly the program starts running, it could also help NATO forces control the Taliban in areas where there are few NATO soldiers. People close to Mr. Karzai said he had resisted earlier efforts to expand another iteration of the program that was largely created by the Americans and organized by Special Forces units because he feared that it could undercut his government’s power and foster the creation of militias.

“We have tribal rivalries, and tribes may think they can benefit from this, and it could strengthen rivals in a village,” Waheed Omar, the spokesman for the Afghan president, said in an interview this week. “We don’t want a short-term objective to endanger a long-term objective for security.”

Another worry was creating any government structures reminiscent of the period of Communist rule here, when Muhammad Najibullah, then the president, created local armed forces to help bolster the government’s fight against rebels — a move that alienated many Afghans.

This week, General Petraeus offered a new proposal that included a number of elements to help make the program more acceptable to Mr. Karzai. Mr. Omar said that the president was looking for agreement on safeguards to ensure that the program did not get out of control.

It was particularly important to Mr. Karzai that it come under his government’s jurisdiction, that the forces be uniformed and that their chain of command run through the Interior Ministry because several other local forces created during nearly nine years of war here had only a tangential relationship to the Afghan authorities — or undermined them.

The new Afghan forces will be armed, but their role will be “purely defensive,” said a senior NATO official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because he was not authorized to speak on the record.

“In some cases people may bring their own stuff, but part of the goal of getting government support is to standardize equipment,” he said. “They will be armed and equipped and trained to defend their communities.”

Community defense has deep cultural roots in Afghanistan, where local men form village watch groups to keep out foes. The hope is that villagers will be comfortable with the new units because they are familiar with the concept.

There are now several different semiofficial armed forces operating in the country; they would all be “gradually disbanded and reintegrated” into a single new force named the Local Police Force, according to a statement released Wednesday by the Afghan National Security Council.

One major risk of the program, which all sides tacitly acknowledge, is that it will multiply the number of well-armed people in Afghanistan, which even with safeguards could foster fighting rather than quell it.

For that reason, perhaps, both Mr. Karzai’s administration and the American military are describing it as a short-term remedy to the problem of a lack of police officers and soldiers in many areas of the country.

“Our position has been to develop a solution that bridges between having nothing and having Afghan National Police, and this program does that,” said the senior NATO official. “So it’s a good development and especially so since it has consensus within the Afghan government and the ownership that come with that,” he said.


Richard A. Oppel Jr. contributed reporting from Kabul, and Thom Shanker from Washington.