The war is fake

[David Rothscum]

http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/apr/18/nato.afghanistan?gusrc=rss&feed=worldnews
Nato forces mistakenly supplied food, water and arms to Taliban forces in southern Afghanistan, officials today admitted.

Containers destined for local police forces were dropped from a helicopter into a Taliban-controlled area of Zabul province.

The coalition helicopter had intended to deliver pallets of supplies to a police checkpoint in Ghazni, a remote section of Zabul late last month.

By mistake they were dropped some distance from the checkpoint where it was taken by the Taliban, the Internal Security Affairs Commission of the Wolesi Jirga — the Afghan parliament's lower house — was told.

Hamidullah Tukhi, a local politician from Zabul, told the parliamentary commission that the consignment had been taken by a local Taliban commander.

A Nato spokesman said the pallets were carrying rocket propelled grenades, ammunition, water and food.

Afghan politicians have said they do not believe the drop was an accident.

Nato's General Carlos Branco blamed it on "human error" when the navigator confused two very similar grid references.

A spokesman at Nato headquarters in Brussels denied the suggestion the alliance had deliberately armed the Taliban. "We are aware of it but we are not fired up about it. It sounds like someone made a mistake. It was a cock-up rather than a conspiracy.

"The forces on the ground are working to get the message across that we do not deliberately supply the Taliban with arms."

[David Rothscum]

http://web.archive.org/web/20030216202358/http://www.msnbc.com/news/664935.asp?0si=-Prior+knowledge&cp1=1

The airlift of evil

Why did we let Pakistan pull volunteers out of Kunduz
   
By Michael Moran
MSNBC
NEW YORK, Nov. 29, 2001 —  The United States took the unprecedented step this week of demanding that foreign airlines provide information on passengers boarding planes for America. Yet in the past week, a half dozen or more Pakistani air force cargo planes landed in the Taliban-held city of Kunduz and evacuated to Pakistan hundreds of non-Afghan soldiers who fought alongside the Taliban and even al-Qaida against the United States. What’s wrong with this picture?

          THE PENTAGON, whose satellites and drones are able to detect sleeping guerrillas in subterranean caverns, claims it knows nothing of these flights. When asked about the mysterious airlift at a recent Pentagon briefing, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Gen. Richard Myers, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, denied knowledge of such flights. Myers backpedaled a bit, saying that, given the severe geography of the country, it might be possible to duck in and out of mountain valleys and conduct such an airlift undetected.
       But Rumsfeld intervened. With his talent for being blunt and ambiguous at the same time, he said: “I have received absolutely no information that would verify or validate statements about airplanes moving in or out. I doubt them.”
       
SEE NO EVIL   
          Western reporters actually in Kunduz in the days after it fell this week found much to dispel that doubt. Reports first appeared in the Indian press, quoting intelligence sources who cited unusual radar contacts and an airlift of Pakistani troops out of the city. Their presence among the “enemy” may shock some readers, but not those who have paid attention to Afghanistan. Pakistan had hundreds of military advisers in Afghanistan before Sept. 11 helping the Taliban fight the Northern Alliance. Hundreds more former soldiers actively joined Taliban regiments, and many Pakistani volunteers were among the non-Afghan legions of al-Qaida.
       Last Saturday, The New York Times picked up the scent, quoting Northern Alliance soldiers in a Page 1 story describing a two-day airlift by Pakistani aircraft, complete with witnesses describing groups of armed men awaiting evacuation at the airfield, then still in Taliban hands.
       Another report, this in the Times of London, quotes an alliance soldier angrily denouncing the flights, which he reasonably assumed were conducted with America’s blessing.
       “We had decided to kill all of them, and we are not happy with America for letting the planes come,” said the soldier, Mahmud Shah.
       
IN DENIAL   
   
          The credibility gap between these reports from the field and the “no comments” from the U.S. administration are large enough to drive a Marine Expeditionary Unit through. Calls by MSNBC.com and NBC News to U.S. military and intelligence officials shed no light on the evacuation reports, though they clearly were a hot topic of conversation. “Oh, you mean ‘Operation Evil Airlift’?” one military source joked. “Look, I can’t confirm anything about those reports. As far as I know, they just aren’t happening.” Three other military and defense sources simply denied any knowledge.
       Something is up. It certainly appears to any reasonable observer that aircraft of some kind or another were taking off and landing in Kunduz’s final hours in Taliban hands. Among the many questions that grow out of this reality:
* Was the passenger manifest on these aircraft limited to Pakistani military and intelligence men, or did it include some of the more prominent zealots Pakistan contributed to the ranks of the Taliban and al-Qaida?
* What kind of deal was struck between the United States and Pakistan to allow this?
* What safeguards did the United States demand to ensure the evacuated Pakistanis did not include men who will come back to haunt us?
* What was done with the civilian volunteers once they arrived home in Pakistan? Where they arrested? Debriefed? Taken to safe houses? Or a state banquet?
       
WHY NOT ADMIT IT
       The answers remain elusive. If the passengers were simply Pakistani military and intelligence men, and not civilian extremists, what possible motive is there for concealing the truth about their evacuation? Pakistan may believe that no one has noticed the warmth of its intelligence ties to the Taliban and even al-Qaida, but surely the Pentagon isn’t operating under this illusion, is it? This news organization has quoted U.S. intelligence sources as far back as 1997 as saying that ties between Pakistan’s intelligence service and al-Qaida, and links to the Taliban — a movement nurtured by Pakistan — are undeniable.    
   
      
       
       Furthermore, the United States can easily explain why it would have allowed a military ruler under intense pressure at home to adopt an unpopular pro-American stance in this war to evacuate some elite intelligence and military forces from a chaotic battlefield. But only if, in fact, the planes were limited to evacuating those people.   

          The lack of a forthright answer to this question suggests otherwise, and that is a great shame. The history of American policy in Southwest Asia, from the shah of Iran to Saddam Hussein to Afghanistan and Pakistan, is marred by one example after another of short-term decisions that stored up enormous trouble for later. We failed for decades to find common ground with the world’s largest democracy, India. We failed to temper the shah’s domestic abuses in Iran in the name of anti-communism and wound up with the ayatollahs. We decided not to rile our Gulf War coalition allies by pushing onto to Baghdad and find ourselves a decade later wondering how to deal with Saddam Hussein. We pumped Afghanistan and Pakistan with billions of dollars worth of weapons and military know-how to fight the Soviet invasion, but then adopted the Pontius Pilate approach in victory, washing our hands of these struggling nations as soon as Moscow withdrew.
       Now, are we careening down the same road with a nuclear-armed Pakistan? Are we allowing an army of anti-American zealots to live and fight another day for the sake of our convenient marriage with Pakistan’s current dictator? I wish I could quote Rumsfeld. I wish I could say “I doubt it.” I can’t.

[David Rothscum]

How about the leader of the Taliban, Mullah Omar?
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/searchResults.jsp?searchtext=mullah+omar&events=on&entities=on&articles=on&topics=on&timelines=on&projects=on&titles=on&descriptions=on&dosearch=on&search=Go
January 8, 2002: Intensive Search for Bin Laden and Mullah Omar in Afghanistan Comes to a Halt

Military spokesperson Navy Rear Adm. John Stufflebeem says, “We’re going to stop chasing… the shadows of where we thought [bin Laden and Mullah Omar were] and focus more on the entire picture of the country, where these pockets of resistance are, what do the anti-Taliban forces need, so that we can develop a better intelligence picture. The job is not complete and those leaders whom we wish to have from the al-Qaeda and Taliban chain of command, we are casting a wide net—a worldwide net, as well as regional, for where they are.” This announcement comes just two days after reports that Mullah Omar escaped an encirclement near Kandahar and fled into the nearby hills (see January 6, 2002). [Reuters, 1/8/2002]

July 2002: US Special Forces Not Given Permission to Target Mullah Omar

A CIA case officer tells Adam Rice, a US Special Forces operations sergeant working out of a safe house near Kandahar, Afghanistan, that a figure believed to be top Taliban leader Mullah Omar has been tracked by a Predator drone to a location in Shah-i-Kot Valley, a short flight away. Omar and the group with him would be vulnerable to a helicopter assault. However, whenever Rice’s team wants to move more than five kilometers from their safe house, they are required to file a request in advance. If fighting is involved, the request has to pass through several layers of bureaucracy, and a three-star general has to give the final okay. The process can take days, and in this case it does. The target eventually moves on before permission is given. [Newsweek, 8/28/2007]

Spring 2003: US Green Berets Repeatedly Denied Permission to Go After Mullah Omar

There are several credible sightings by CIA and military informants of top Taliban leader Mullah Omar entering a mosque in Kandahar, Afghanistan. A Green Beret team located at a base just minutes away are ready to deploy to go after Omar, but each time US military commanders follow strict protocol and call in the Delta Force commando team instead. But this team is based hundreds of miles away near Kabul and it takes them several hours to arrive in Kandahar. By that time, Omar has disappeared. Apparently this is part of a pattern only allowing certain Special Forces units to go after important targets. The Washington Post will report in 2004 that any mission that takes Special Forces farther than two miles from a “firebase” requires as long as 72 hours to be approved. And on the rare occasions that such forces are authorized to act, they are required to travel in armed convoys, a practice that alerts the enemy. [Washington Post, 1/5/2004]

Mullah Omar still leads the Taliban today...

[Hetware]

[chris jones]

War, has and all will be Human Sacrifice for the profits those pulling the strings.

[David Rothscum]

February 7, 2005: South Waziristan Truce Gives Taliban and Al-Qaeda a Safe Base to Launch Attacks into Afghanistan

The Pakistani government signs a little-noticed agreement with Baitullah Mahsud, the chieftain of the Mahsud tribe in South Waziristan. Waziristan is in the tribal region of Pakistan near the Afghanistan border, and numerous media accounts suggest that Osama bin Laden and other top al-Qaeda leaders may be hiding out there. The deal, signed in the town of Sararogha and known as the Sararogha peace pact, prohibits forces in South Waziristan led by Abdullah Mahsud, another member of the same tribe as Baitullah Mahsud, from attacking the Pakistani army and giving shelter to foreign terrorists. However, it does not prevent these forces from attacking US troops across the border in Afghanistan. It also does not require these forces to surrender or register foreign terrorists in Waziristan. Abdullah Mahsud is a wanted fugitive in Pakistan and has pledged his loyalty to Taliban leader Mullah Omar. But as part of the deal his forces are even given some money to repay debts owed to al-Qaeda-linked foreign militants. As a result of this deal, the Pakistan army soon leaves South Waziristan entirely. A similar deal will be made with North Waziristan in September 2006 (see September 5, 2006). The area becomes a Taliban base to attack US and NATO troops across the border in Afghanistan. The number of Taliban attacks there will rise from 1,600 in 2005 to more than 5,000 in 2006. [Asia Times, 5/4/2005; Levy and Scott-Clark, 2007, pp. 433] Abdullah Mahsud was held by the US in the Guantanamo prison from December 2001 to March 2004. In July 2007, after renewed fighting between the Pakistani army and tribal militants, he will blow himself up to avoid capture. [New York Times, 7/25/2007] The CIA will later claim that Baitullah Mahsud was involved in the assassination of former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in December 2007. [Washington Post, 1/18/2008]

So, if we're no longer fighting the Taliban, then who are we fighting?
http://www.cooperativeresearch.org/context.jsp?item=a091701outsidethebox#a091701outsidethebox
September 17, 2001: US Special Forces Presentation Meant for President Bush Suggests Poisoning Afghanistan Food Supply
 
President Bush is briefed at the Pentagon on upcoming special operations in Afghanistan. National Security Council staffer Franklin Miller reviews a classified slide presentation that an unnamed two-star general is going to give Bush in a few minutes. One slide in the presentation is labeled, “Thinking Outside the Box—Poisoning Food Supply.” Miller shows this to National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice and points out that the US is legally prohibited from committing chemical or biological attacks. Rice talks to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, and the two of them agree to take the slide out of the presentation before Bush sees it.


Freezing, starving and dying
Remote Afghan villagers say at least 1,000 children have been killed in devastating winter blizzards

by Tom Coghlan, Chronicle Foreign Service | March 3rd, 2005

Tulak, Afghanistan -- Cut off by the worst winter in 15 years, at least 1,000 children in a remote province of Afghanistan are believed to have died in the past three weeks from cold, chronic malnutrition and disease, according to aid workers.

The overwhelming majority of them are under 5, and there is evidence to suggest that the death toll could be much higher, the aid workers say.

While most of the western province of Ghor in the Hindu Kush mountains has remained inaccessible after blizzards and temperatures as low as minus 22 Fahrenheit cut all road access a month ago, three aid workers from Catholic Relief Service recently reached the interior on horseback.

In the 80-family village of Dehan, a cluster of low mud-brick homes clinging to the steep sides of the barren Gaw Kusht Valley, local men compiled a list for aid workers of 19 children lost to the cold weather.

"I have lost two of my sons," said Mullah Ahmed. "When my 1-year-old son died 25 days ago, he could not breathe, and his body had turned black."

Villagers across the remote Tulak and Shahan districts gave consistent reports of deaths of both children and adults: In Sier Tulak, seven children died from illness, residents said, and two men froze to death trying to reach another village to beg for food. In Ghash Laq Pain, eight children died, and a young man was killed by an avalanche. In Sam Sengi, seven children and three adults have died; in Seia Khak, 11 children and seven adults.

The aid workers, accompanied by a reporter and photographer, visited more than 20 villages and were told of an average five to 10 deaths per village.

Only the 11-family village of Jar-e-Kerminge did not suffer any children's deaths. Here, Ismael Korban, a father of 10, managed to reach the main town of Tulak five hours away through the snow to buy medicine, although he suffered frostbite of the fingers of both hands.

Pneumonia has been the primary killer, its spread made easy by extreme cold and the chronic poverty, poor hygiene and malnutrition of the local population. In one village, aid workers found 23 pneumonia cases.

There are 270 villages in Tulak district and more than 1,000 in Ghor, although it is difficult to ascertain whether the impact has been even across the region.

Ghor is one of the least developed regions of Afghanistan, despite the billions of dollars that have been poured into the country since the fall of the Taliban in 2001. Only two international aid agencies work regularly in the province.

Catholic Relief Services workers said that when they managed to reach a village in a previously inaccessible valley by four-wheel-drive vehicle last June, the villagers -- who had never before seen a car -- had tried to feed the vehicle grass.

For seven consecutive years, the region has been gripped by drought. In terms of health and income, it ranks near the bottom in Afghanistan, according to a U.N. report released last week. More than 80 percent of its inhabitants have no safe drinking water. The village of Jehan, for example, is surrounded by feces. No systems of latrines or waste disposal are apparent.

During the winter, people keep livestock in their homes for warmth. In Gar-e-Hasar village, a man complained that medicine he had been taking for months against persistent headaches was ineffectual. The medicine turned out to be for diarrhea.

"Twenty-five years of war and then the drought has destroyed the infrastructure of this region," said Haji Abdul Satir Khan, the governor of Tulak district. "Now, we have suffered this terrible winter, and no one has helped us."

A food drop of 4.5 tons by U.S. forces on Sunday has not been distributed, the local governor said, because it was insufficient to disperse evenly through the population, and so it risked violence.

Some private aid workers privately have expressed frustration at the slow response to what they believe would have been an avoidable situation if the airlifted food had been made available earlier. "There will have to be an inquest amongst the donors and aid agencies into why this was allowed to happen," said one aid worker, who spoke on condition of anonymity.

The United Nations and the Afghan government have both expressed skepticism at the figures for infant deaths in the province, suggesting there has been widespread exaggeration by local people.

"We go through agonies questioning whether the villagers may have exaggerated the figure of infant deaths because they believe that the number may be tied to aid," said Donal Reilly of Catholic Relief Services. "Our people are coming on too many funerals for this to be a big hoax."

Local officials in Tulak dismissed suggestions that villagers would lie about the deaths of their children to attract aid money. However, one official said he believed some locals were failing to clear blocked mountain passes because they hoped that if they waited long enough, aid agencies would pay them to do so.

Aid workers blame the death toll in Ghor on a complete lack of preparation after many mild winters, combined with the toll on the immune systems of people of the province caused by drought, chronic poverty and the lack of medical facilities.

District officials warn that a rise in temperature will cause flooding across the region in the coming weeks.

However, as one official noted, "Their children may have died, but the people are relieved that the snow has ended the drought."

But haven't we dropped food supplies for the starving civilians?


Congresswoman McKinney (hero) holds up a mockup of a food packet and an unexploded cluster munition, both of which are being dropped on Afghanistan. Can you tell which is okay to pick up and try to eat?

They couldn't:





As many as 98 per cent of victims of cluster bombs over the past three decades have been civilians, a third of them children...

[David Rothscum]

Forget not going after them, when we catch them we actually release them!
http://www.prisonplanet.com/soldiers_say_us_let_taliban_general_go.htm

Soldiers say U.S. let Taliban general go

U.S. troops say that the military mistakenly released one of the most-wanted Taliban leaders in Afghanistan in the summer based on faulty intelligence.

U.S. Special Forces soldiers said that in late July, a Green Beret A-Team, backed by about 20 local Afghan fighters, apprehended Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani as he left his compound at daybreak in a town west of Kandahar. Soldiers identified him as Osmani, handcuffed him and brought him by truck to Kandahar.

Osmani, among the top six most-wanted Taliban, was flown to a detention center at Bagram air base, north of Kabul, for interrogation, the Special Forces soldiers said. He was one of the Taliban's top generals, leading thousands of troops as coalition forces ousted the hard-line regime.

But, according to these soldiers, Task Force 180 � the overall command in Afghanistan � released Osmani a few weeks later.

U.S. government spokesmen expressed skepticism about the soldiers' account in written responses to The Washington Times.

The Times sources maintain their account is accurate. Two Army soldiers and a senior administration official said in interviews that a U.S. intelligence report placed Osmani in another location after his apprehension. This led to his release.

Rather than return to his village, Osmani quickly fled to Pakistan, where he remains today, military officials said.

A spokesman for U.S. Central Command, which runs operations in Afghanistan, declined to comment on questions submitted by The Times.

Col. Roger King, chief spokesman for Task Force 180 in Bagram, said, "We don't discuss specifics of persons captured, neither names nor nationalities. I will tell you that Osmani is one of those we seek."

Col. King quoted Lt. Gen. Dan K. McNeill, the task force commander, as saying, "If we had captured Osmani we would still have him."

Asked if a detainee by the name of Akhter Osmani had been listed at the detention center in the summer, Col. King referred to Gen. McNeill's statement.

The Defense Intelligence Agency, which coordinates the distribution of information to commanders, said in a statement, "DIA has no knowledge that Mullah Akhter Mohammed Osmani was ever in U.S. custody in Afghanistan. Given Osmani's high profile and our interest in detaining him, misidentification by experienced personnel is unlikely."

The soldiers and the administration official, however, are convinced that the United States had Osmani, then mistakenly let him go. They asked not to be identified for fear of reprisal from superiors.

Osmani is one of a handful of top former Taliban leaders trying to organize a guerrilla force of fellow militants to disrupt the U.S.-backed government of Hamid Karzai in Afghanistan.

The list of the six most-wanted Taliban also includes former group supreme leader Mullah Mohammed Omar; Mullah Omar's top aide, Tayeb Agha; and top military commander, Jalaluddin Haqqani.

Mullah Omar is believed to be in hiding in his native Uruzgan Province, an area riddled with drug traffickers and Taliban supporters north of Kandahar.

Helmand Province, famous for its poppy crop, also was a haven for Taliban fighters in the summer, when informants told Special Forces soldiers that Osmani had returned to his home in the province.

The former general was living in a compound in the village of Sangin, west of Kandahar, under the protection of Helmand power brokers, the Afghan informants said.

"Right after the sweep through the country in the early spring, they ran," said one soldier. "But after time when it became obvious we were not actively looking for these people, they returned home or back to the areas they lived in."

A Special Forces team traveled by night, via trucks, to the town. They kept the house under surveillance until the man believed to be Osmani emerged to walk to the local mosque.

The man carried some type of old Taliban identification card that contained his picture and the name Osmani, and the name of Osmani's father. He also had burn scars on his chest that matched intelligence data, the soldiers said.

His Afghan companion was searched. Large amounts of cash in Pakistan's currency were found in secret, sewed compartments.

The man identified as Osmani refused to give his name, saying only in his native Pashtun, "Praise is God."

"He was on our list of Taliban to kill, capture or disrupt, the HVT [high value target] list," said one soldier. "He was in Osmani's house. His ID said he was Osmani."

The one discrepancy was that he appeared too young. Intelligence reports put Osmani at about age 40. This man was in his early 30s.

Still, soldiers said they believed the intelligence in Afghanistan was sometimes shaky, and that the estimated age could be incorrect. They took the man into custody.

"When I heard that the scar was consistent, I think they had all the reason on earth to err on the side of caution," said one Special Forces soldier. "Let's say it was his kid brother, you don't release a guy like that, either."

Soldiers handcuffed the man, loaded him on the back of a truck and drove back to base camp in Kandahar. Osmani stayed there for a few days before he was flown to Bagram.

"All our Afghan fighters kept their faces covered when they were around him," said a soldier.

A few weeks later, Osmani was back on a flight, this time to freedom in Kandahar. Afghan sources later told soldiers that he had fled to Pakistan.

"When they let him go, this guy ran like a mad man for Pakistan. He hit the ground and was gone," said the soldier. "Then I heard, everybody was like 'whoops.' Maybe we should have kept our hand on him."

Some Special Forces soldiers have expressed frustration with Task Force 180 for turning down their written concept of operations, or "conops," to attack suspected Taliban. The soldiers said in interviews that they gained information on several occasions last summer on the whereabouts of Mullah Omar.

But, they said, commanders turned down the missions, citing extreme risk.

[rick reuben]

What a world we live in. We do a better job of providing affordable heroin to the world than we do providing affordable food.

[A K]

Afghanistan ruled by the Taliban in 2001, opium production was :  70 tons

Afghanistan ruled by the US, UK and puppet regime, and in
the year 2007, opium production was  :                                  9,000 tons



Lovely.

[MikiQuick123]

Afghanistan ruled by the Taliban in 2001, opium production was :  70 tons

Afghanistan ruled by the US, UK and puppet regime, and in
the year 2007, opium production was  :                                  9,000 tons



Lovely.

Exactly. They knew going in. Seems part of the motivation for all of this was the Taliban pissing off the major distributors.

End of Taliban will bring rise in heroin
By Richard Lloyd Parry in Islamabad
19 October 2001
The defeat of the Taliban would result in a surge in opium production, which has beenvirtually halted in Afghanistan by the Kabul regime over the last year, United Nations officials have warned.

A new UN survey reveals that the Taliban have completed one of the quickest and most successful drug elimination programmes in history.

The area of land given over to growing opium poppies in 2001 fell by 91 per cent compared with the year before, according to the UN Drug Control Programme's (UNDCP) annual survey of Afghanistan. Production of fresh opium, the raw material for heroin, went down by an unprecedented 94 per cent, from 3,276 tonnes to 185 tonnes.

Almost all Afghan opium this year came out of territories controlled by America's ally in the assault on Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance. Because of a ban on poppy farming, only one in 25 of Afghanistan's opium poppies was being grown in Taliban areas.

However, while poppy cultivation dropped, exports of refined opium and heroin from the Taliban-controlled areas remained unchanged because of stockpiles.

Some UN officials privately believe that the Taliban have not received enough credit for controlling drugs, and that under any post-Taliban regime cultivation, consumption – and the amount of opium and heroin on world markets – would inevitably increase.

"These are things which no one can say," said one UN official who worked in Afghanistan before the terrorist attacks of 11 September. "No other government in the world would have been able to do that. When I travelled through Badakshan [a province largely controlled by the Northern Alliance] you often saw the poppies."

In its early years the Taliban justified the cultivation of opium on the basis that it was a drug consumed abroad by unbelievers.

But in 2000, the regime changed its mind and vigorously enforced the ban, apparently in the hope of winning credit with the UN and strengthening its claim to Afghanistan's seat in the General Assembly, currently occupied by the Northern Alliance.

http://www.heroin.org/afghanistan/prediction.html

[setmefree]

This makes me sick.  These kind of pictures need to be shown on the news so all the sheeple will actually see what is going on.  These children are no different than our own children, they have parents who love them just the same.  This is truly disgraceful and makes me very, very sad that this is the world we live in.

[David Rothscum]

This makes me sick.  These kind of pictures need to be shown on the news so all the sheeple will actually see what is going on.  These children are no different than our own children, they have parents who love them just the same.  This is truly disgraceful and makes me very, very sad that this is the world we live in.

I wish they were shown in the news. Unfortunately Ted Turner and Rupert Murdoch seem to think it's more important that we know what Britney Spears wore today than how are tax dollars are being used. I'm so proud of my government when it's dumping depleted uranium in densely populated areas or uses weapons that cause 98% civilian casualties. There's no way that's not intentional, especially considering the food packets they're dumping at the same time.

[Hetware]

I wish they were shown in the news. Unfortunately Ted Turner and Rupert Murdoch seem to think it's more important that we know what Britney Spears wore today than how are tax dollars are being used. I'm so proud of my government when it's dumping depleted uranium in densely populated areas or uses weapons that cause 98% civilian casualties. There's no way that's not intentional, especially considering the food packets they're dumping at the same time.

The only way I see for restoring the honor of the United States of America is to string the schweinhunds up!

[changedname]

"Nato forces mistakenly supplied food, water and arms to Taliban forces in southern Afghanistan, officials today admitted.

Containers destined for local police forces were dropped from a helicopter into a Taliban-controlled area of Zabul province.

The coalition helicopter had intended to deliver pallets of supplies to a police checkpoint in Ghazni, a remote section of Zabul late last month.

By mistake they were dropped some distance from the checkpoint where it was taken by the Taliban, the Internal Security Affairs Commission of the Wolesi Jirga — the Afghan parliament's lower house — was told."

Sure it was just a mistake!! Just another blunder! Now how about a promotion for this blunder too?  Bush Adminiatration=  Blunders R US or Blunders by Design

[David Rothscum]

"Nato forces mistakenly supplied food, water and arms to Taliban forces in southern Afghanistan, officials today admitted.

Containers destined for local police forces were dropped from a helicopter into a Taliban-controlled area of Zabul province.

The coalition helicopter had intended to deliver pallets of supplies to a police checkpoint in Ghazni, a remote section of Zabul late last month.

By mistake they were dropped some distance from the checkpoint where it was taken by the Taliban, the Internal Security Affairs Commission of the Wolesi Jirga — the Afghan parliament's lower house — was told."

Sure it was just a mistake!! Just another blunder! Now how about a promotion for this blunder too?  Bush Adminiatration=  Blunders R US or Blunders by Design

Ofcourse it was a mistake. The supplies were dropped at 300 feet from the home of a Taliban commander called Mohammad Alam: http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=viewArticle&code=20080413&articleId=8670
Can you believe it? They still call it an accident. This isn't dumping supplies in Taliban territory. This is dumping them in front of their home. The 300 feet was probably to prevent Mr. Alam from getting any sand in his eyes from the dust clouds.

[David Rothscum]

Now that I'm busy exposing these guys anway, read this:
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/JD16Df01.html

Britain caught out in Afghan ploy
By Sharif Ghalib

TORONTO - President Hamid Karzai has blamed what he called an "extremely ethnic" report in the London Times for his decision to turn down the appointment of Lord Paddy Ashdown as the United Nations super envoy for Afghanistan.

As history recounts, Afghanistan and Great Britain have been in three major conflicts, known as the Anglo-Afghan wars. Occurring within the span of 70 years, the wars represented the geopolitical situation of the 19th century, giving rise to the Great Game, the competition for territory and influence between the colonial British and the Russian czar empires.

However, centuries later, on the heels of September 11, 2001, history appeared to be repeating itself as the British returned to Afghanistan, this time not as occupiers but as a major ally contributing to the international efforts for the implementation of a United Nations mandate to establish peace, and "to help Afghanistan build a more stable and secure future".

By the same token, the United Kingdom came forward as a key donor nation, pledging substantial development and reconstruction funds to help Afghanistan recover from the scourge of war and mayhem. In early 2006, Britain hosted a historic UN-sponsored international conference on Afghanistan in London, which specified benchmarks for a strengthened partnership between Afghanistan and the international community, set out in the conference's final document known as The Afghanistan Compact.

In 2006, pursuant to an expansion of peacekeeping operations by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a contingent of British troops took over security tasks in the Taliban-dominated southern province of Helmand, superseding US forces.

Deployed as part of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force to provide a secure environment for the rebuilding efforts in the region, the British troops had high hopes of pacifying Helmand without "firing a shot", in the words of then British defense minister John Reid. But with the violence steadily building through the unchallenged cross-border replenishment of the Taliban's manpower and a thriving drug trade, the British forces soon realized they were confronted with a formidable foe.

A year into the fighting and trying to cope with the mounting fatalities among their soldiers, some British commanders called for "playing the British not American card" in Helmand, heralding a shift of policy that eventually led to a change in their rules of engagement with the enemy.

The overhauled modus operandi proved to be none other than the one based on a resuscitated 19th-century colonial school. As a result, the district of Musa Qala, north of Helmand province, was captured by the Taliban. They scored their gain with the support of the local government, intriguingly without a shot being fired. The British had already withdrawn to leave control with the council of elders. The Taliban then brokered an agreement with the local tribal elders to keep the peace; a peculiar exercise that outraged the government of Karzai.

In the meantime, to complement validation of the handling of Musa Qala, British media insensitively resorted to lashing out at Karzai and glorifying ethnic and demographic tendencies while referring to the overall situation. The trend grew to the point that even the ethnic configuration of the Karzai government came under scrutiny, raising alarm across the political spectrum in Kabul and beyond.

Hence, Musa Qala, destined to fall back into the hands of government forces the next year, turned out to become the first known recourse by the British in a series of ensuing attempts, all in tune to the 19th century-era Great Game mantra of ethnic wrangling, dealmaking and disbursement of cash to tribal chiefs in return for short-lived loyalties.

Subsequently, in December 2007, a British and an Irish diplomat were expelled by the Afghan government, accused of holding secret talks with the Taliban in Helmand province. Details of the accusations released by the Afghan government shockingly even spoke of plans by the British to set up a military training camp in southern Afghanistan aimed at providing training for as many as 2,000 Taliban fighters.

The allegations caused an uproar in the Kabul government, whereupon it was reflected in a parliamentary report in which some government officials rather cynically expressed doubt if the British really wanted to bring security to Helmand.

The report in effect put in perspective the furiousness and awe on the part of both the government and the average citizens across the country alike with regard to the new British strategy seeking to extend an olive branch to the enemy and preaching for reaching out to the Taliban.

Although, in principle, consistent with Kabul government's official line of dialogue with the Taliban, those willing to respond without preconditions, the conduct aroused added commotion over the unilateral, secretive and tribe-centric nature of it, which had practically sidestepped the elected government of Afghanistan.

The bizarre revelation, over time, set the more rhythmic tone for Britain's advocacy of conciliation, which culminated in proclamations by British government ranking officials that the Taliban should be brought into the political arena in Kabul.

Months later, as the residual perceived obsolete doctrine of the British of striking deals with chieftains and fiefdoms continued to haunt Afghans, the unforeseeably contentious anecdote of Lord Ashdown's nomination as the succeeding UN envoy in Afghanistan sprung up, which was blocked and, much to surprise of a great many, turned down by Karzai.

In point of fact, it is vitally important that Karzai has finally spoken his mind and spelled out the rationale behind his stance on Ashdown's appointment. His asserted attitude over the issue, by and large, echoes the greater national sentiment across Afghanistan.

Let's remember that, having been through decades of turmoil and upheaval, successive overt and creeping invasions, proxy wars and a historic indigenous resistance against extremism and terrorism with colossal sacrifices, the people of Afghanistan have come a long way.

Seven years ago, the nation enthusiastically embraced the world's collective efforts for bringing democracy to the country. With generous solidarity from the international community, among others Britain, the country has been able to triumphantly follow through an ambitious peace accord signed among the concerned ethno-political forces in Bonn, Germany.

Today, a new constitution, the most enlightened of its kind that Afghans can call to mind, and recognizing inter alia the multiethnic and heterogeneous demographic character of the country, continues to guide the nation through its social and political life with equal citizens of a modern indivisible pluralistic unitary state.

Accordingly, to guard against these hard-won historic achievements, and in the interest of durable peace and of long-term stability, allied governments need to ensure promotion of genuine national unity among all Afghans. They further need to ensure an inclusive approach toward all Afghans and to engage all moderate peaceful ethno-political forces who are part of the government and committed to the success of the peace process.

Moreover, considering the socio-political realities of today's Afghanistan bound to becoming a modern and democratic state, and in line with the new geostrategic imperatives of the region, the world community must avoid creating ethnic divisions and/or tilt among Afghans.

As for the Taliban, allied nations may need to support the government of Afghanistan in its bid - already approved by the nation's parliament - for engaging all those rank and file combatants who choose to break with their past and come into the government fold, in good faith and without any preconditions, pledging allegiance to Afghanistan's constitution in its entirety, and with the sole aspiration to re-integrate into society and pursue a peaceful life.

Without a doubt, the people of Afghanistan highly appreciate the magnanimous contributions made by the United Kingdom to the efforts of the international community to establish peace and stability and to ensure reconstruction in their country. Likewise, they greatly admire the invaluable sacrifices of British soldiers in Afghanistan.

Indispensably, however, London needs to apply more pragmatism to its strategic approach toward modern Afghanistan, as today both nations remain an equal time away from the 19th-century geopolitical ambience.

Sharif Ghalib served at the United Nations for 10 years, and was the first Afghan diplomat to negotiate the establishment of full bilateral diplomatic and consular relations between Afghanistan and Canada at resident-embassy level. He opened the Embassy of Afghanistan in Ottawa in late 2002 and served as the country's charge d'affaires and minister counselor until 2005.

(Copyright 2008 Sharif Ghalib.)

Wake up, we're being conned!!! It's now proven beyond a doubt the war is fake, our governments are more pro-Taliban than the Afghan government. Can you believe this? Britain offering the Taliban to train thousands of terrorists for them?

[David Rothscum]

Here's the Independent reporting on it:
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/revealed-british-plan-to-build-training-camp-for-taliban-fighters-in-afghanistan-777671.html

[David Rothscum]

Ok, so here's a synopsis:
-We have Brzezinski openly admitting he started funding the Mujahideen that grew into the Taliban half a year before the Soviet Union invaded. We still send them money in 2001, supposedly because they outlawed the crops that are grown to produce heroin.
-We have Nato flying hundreds of Al Qaeda and Taliban members to safety in Pakistan, "by accident".
-We have American forces releasing a top Taliban general, "by accident"
-We have Nato dumping supplies 300 feet in front of a top Taliban commander, "by accident".
-We have American forces, on multiple occasion's close to catching Mullah Omar, the top leader of the Taliban, but not being given permission to catch him by their superiors.
-We have British forces, trying to make peace with the Taliban, leaving a big piece of Helmand, an Afghan province, completely undefended, making it possible for the Taliban to take this province over.
-On top of that, these same British forces, supposedly wanting to help build democracy in Afghanistan, offered the Taliban to train 2000 troops for them.

What do we make out of that? Simple: Our governments are knowingly destroying Afghanistan for their own selfish interests!

[A K]

Don't forget when we had OBL surrounded in Tora Bora with our forces on the West, North and East.  For some strange reason we left the South open, a clear path to safety in Pakistan, only a few token hired tribes - many with ties to the ALQ and Taliban - left to guard the South.

[Ponce]

Wake up my people and see who controls our government.......open your eyes and see who is pushing our government into this horror of wars, who is pulling the strings from behind the black curtains?

I know it because I can feel them and not because I was told or read about it....... you may say that I sense The Force and at this time it is not with us.

"God help those who help themselves"........ and unless you start to help yourselves then God will not help you.........you must do the first step on your own and he then will guide you the rest of the way.

You don't buy real freedom with money but with blood........ May The Force help the Palestinian people for they have given a lake of blood and a sea of tears for their freedom..... a few of those tears are my own.

[David Rothscum]

http://www.prisonplanet.com/articles/june2008/160608_b_strike.htm
Report: U.S. Gave Green Light For Taliban Prison Attack
Staged incident to justify continued military occupation in Afghanistan

Paul Joseph Watson
Prison Planet
Monday, June 16, 2008

Reports out of the Middle East indicate that U.S. forces gave the green light for the Taliban to attack a government prison in Kandahar this past Friday and stood idly by while Taliban fighters violently freed more than 1000 inmates.

"Experts in regional affairs believe that Taliban militants attacked the Kandahar prison with the green light from US forces," reports Press TV.

"They say it is questionable - how could the militants dare attack the prison with US-led troops stationed just northeast of the jail?"

"The sources also noted that although clashes between Afghan security forces and the militants lasted for several hours, US-led troops did not intervene."

"Ordinary people share the idea, asking how is it possible that hundreds of militants could attack a government prison, detonating more than 800 kilograms of explosives and foreign forces show no reaction."

Why would U.S. forces stand idly by while 600 hundred Taliban fighters were freed?

The report notes that "Afghans are tired of war and that only a few illiterate people, called Taliban, are fighting foreign forces."

Without an enemy to fight, there would be no justification for a continued U.S. and NATO presence in Afghanistan. There would be no more weapons sales contracts and no more rebuilding contracts for Halliburton.

Remember, this miraculous prison break occurred just days before Gordon Brown agreed to send hundreds more British troops into Afghanistan to put the British presence there at an all time high.

The necessity for continued violence in Afghanistan exists just like it does in Iraq, for the pretext of justifying an endless military occupation and the opportunity to build military bases that will be used as launch pads for future wars, as is now being discussed for Iraq.

As we have highlighted in the past, links between Taliban leadership and the U.S. military-industrial complex are documented.

As Seymour Hersh reported in January 2002, at the height of the war in Afghanistan, hundreds of Taliban fighters "accidentally" ended up on U.S. organized special safety corridor airlifts right before the fall of Kunduz.

The Taliban itself was a creation of the CIA having been set up and bankrolled by the U.S. in tandem with Pakistan's ISI.

“In the 1980s, the CIA provided some $5 billion in military aid for Islamic fundamentalist rebels fighting the Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, but scaled down operations after Moscow pulled out in 1989. However, Selig Harrison of the DC-based Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars recently told a conference in London that the CIA created the Taliban “monster” by providing some $3 billion for the ultra-fundamentalist militia in their 1994-6 drive to power," reported the Times of India.

[David Rothscum]

 “CIA worked in tandem with Pak to create Taliban”
http://www.multiline.com.au/~johnm/taliban.htm
LONDON: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) worked in tandem with Pakistan to create the "monster" that is today Afghanistan's ruling Taliban, a leading US expert on South Asia said here.
   "I warned them that we were creating a monster," Selig Harrison from the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars said at the conference here last week on "Terrorism and Regional Security: Managing the Challenges in Asia."
   Harrison said: "The CIA made a historic mistake in encouraging Islamic groups from all over the world to come to Afghanistan." The US provided $3 billion for building up these Islamic groups, and it accepted Pakistan's demand that they should decide how this money should be spent, Harrison said.
   Harrison, who spoke before the Taliban assault on the Buddha statues was launched, told the gathering of security experts that he had meetings with CIA leaders at the time when Islamic forces were being strengthened in Afghanistan. "They told me these people were fanatical, and the more fierce they were the more fiercely they would fight the Soviets," he said. "I warned them that we were creating a monster."
   Harrison, who has written five books on Asian affairs and US relations with Asia, has had extensive contact with the CIA and political leaders in South Asia. Harrison was a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace between 1974 and 1996.
   Harrison who is now senior fellow with The Century Foundation recalled a conversation he had with the late Gen Zia-ul Haq of Pakistan. "Gen Zia spoke to me about expanding Pakistan's sphere of influence to control Afghanistan, then Uzbekistan and Tajikstan and then Iran and Turkey," Harrison said. That design continues, he said. Gen.Mohammed Aziz who was involved in that Zia plan has been elevated now to a key position by Chief Executive, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, Harrison said.
   The old associations between the intelligence agencies continue, Harrison said. "The CIA still has close links with the ISI (Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence)."
   Today that money and those weapons have helped build up the Taliban, Harrison said. "The Taliban are not just recruits from 'madrassas' (Muslim theological schools) but are on the payroll of the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence, the intelligence wing of the Pakistani government)." The Taliban are now "making a living out of terrorism."
   Harrison said the UN Security Council resolution number 1333 calls for an embargo on arms to the Taliban. "But it is a resolution without teeth because it does not provide sanctions for non-compliance," he said. "The US is not backing the Russians who want to give more teeth to the resolution."
   Now it is Pakistan that "holds the key to the future of Afghanistan," Harrison said. The creation of the Taliban was central to Pakistan's "pan-Islamic vision," Harrison said.
   It came after "the CIA made the historic mistake of encouraging Islamic groups from all over the world to come to Afghanistan," he said. The creation of the Taliban had been "actively encouraged by the ISI and the CIA," he said. "Pakistan has been building up Afghan collaborators who will sustain Pakistan," he said. (IANS)

[David Rothscum]

http://www.atimes.com/atimes/South_Asia/IB06Df02.html
Taliban too quick off the mark
By Syed Saleem Shahzad

KARACHI - Events in Musa Qala in Helmand province in Afghanistan over the past few days have the potential to bring forward, if not derail, the Taliban's plans for a massive spring offensive.

In October, the British military signed a peace deal with tribal elders in Musa Qala. They promised to secure the district and keep the Taliban out if the British left the city and its environs. The British, who had controlled Musa Qala throughout the summer,



had been engaged in ongoing battles with the Taliban.

Crucially, though, the elders are pro-Taliban, and last week several hundred Taliban fighters took control of the city. On Sunday their flags were reported still to be flying over the regional administrative headquarters.

Media reports say a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strike near Musa Qala on Sunday killed Taliban commander Mullah Abdul Ghafour, who led the takeover of Musa Qala. Some reports say Ghafour led the attack because NATO forces last month killed his brother, Mullah Ibrahim, in an air strike.

Soon after last year's agreement, this correspondent interviewed a key Taliban commander of Musa Qala, Haji Naimatullah. Even though the accord had called for the Taliban's withdrawal, many Taliban foot soldiers were openly collecting contributions and engaged in other assignments.

Indeed, all of the other ceasefire agreements signed in volatile southwestern Afghanistan similarly favor the Taliban, who use them to spread their influence, collect resources and recruit fresh blood.

The extent of the Taliban's influence can be seen from the manner in which they derailed a reconstruction program. As a part of the ceasefire deal, the Helmand government called in Afghan auxiliary police and reconstruction teams to begin work on projects for which substantial funds had already been received from Britain.

The Taliban simply marched into Musa Qala and without firing a shot "asked" the police to leave, which they did.

Backlash and blowback
Information coming across the border suggests that much of the population of Musa Qala has left the area in fear of a NATO attack to retake the city.

NATO's outgoing commander, General David Richards, said that "very surgical and deliberate" force would be used if needed to solve the crisis. Colonel Tom Collins, a spokesman for NATO's International Security Assistance Force, was quoted as saying, "It is only a matter of time before the government re-establishes control."

According to an Interior Ministry spokesman in Kabul, NATO-led troops dropped leaflets on Musa Qala on Sunday, urging the Taliban to leave the city.

Conscious of the Taliban's planned offensive, NATO has attempted over the winter to draw them out prematurely, to no avail. For instance, during NATO operations to take Baaz Tsuka in the Zari and Panjwai districts south of Kandahar, the Taliban initially pulled back, then slowly returned to the area once the heat was off.

Musa Qala is somewhat different, though, as it is the Taliban's most important foothold in the country, from where it draws support and vital supplies. Other important districts in Helmand province, such as Nawzad, Baghran and to some extent Sangeen, are dependent on Musa Qala as a logistical base.

If the British do launch a vigorous campaign to retake Musa Qala, and then strengthen their presence and conduct regular patrols, either with British or Afghan National Army troops, the Taliban's activities will be badly disrupted. Indeed, it would be a tactical disaster as far as preparations for the spring offensive are concerned.

At this stage the Taliban simply don't want to become involved in a serious confrontation with NATO. But even if they retreat from Musa Qala without a fight, the peace agreement will be in tatters and they will not be allowed the virtual free rein they had under the ceasefire. Further, should the Taliban resist, their peace agreements in other parts of the province will likely be scrapped.

The Taliban would therefore be forced to engage in premature battles in the southwest, and would have to shift the focus of their spring offensive to the southeast and east. This would diminish the impact of the offensive, as the Taliban's support base is strongest in the southwest, from where they were relying on a domino effect to spread their offensive to other areas of the country.

As it stands now, Musa Qala has the potential to turn southwestern Afghanistan, including Zabul, Urzgan, Kandahar and Helmand, into a battlefield much sooner than anticipated.

Spring could come early in Afghanistan, and it could be a very bloody one.

Syed Saleem Shahzad is Asia Times Online's Pakistan Bureau Chief. He can be reached at saleem_shahzad2002@yahoo.com.

(Copyright 2007 Asia Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.)
Why do the British keep creating peace deals that just help the Taliban? This isn't a mistake that happened once, the British keep doing things that help the Taliban to rebuild. Once is an accident, twice is a pattern, thrice means it's intentional.

[David Rothscum]

Time to add new information to a months old topic.

http://www.daily.pk/local/other-local/8718-if-indian-army-attacks-tehrik-e-taliban-will-fight-alongside-pakistan-army-baitullah-mahsud.html

Baitullah Mahsud, central head of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) backed and financed by u.s.a, Monday announced full support to the army against archrival India if it makes any aggression against the country. “Thousands of our well-armed Mujahideen are ready to fight alongside the army if any war is imposed on Pakistan,” Baitullah told this correspondent on telephone from an undisclosed location.

He said the time had come to wage a real jihad they had been waiting for. “We know very well that the visible and invisible enemies of the country have been planning to weaken this lone Islamic nuclear power. But the “mujahideen” will foil all such nefarious designs of our enemies,” said the top Mujahideen commander. Baitullah said, he wanted to assure the nation, government and army that they should not worry about Pakistan’s western borders with Afghanistan as, according to him, thousands of his armed Mujahideen had already been deployed to safeguard the strategically important frontier.

Besides thousands of armed Mujahideen, Baitullah Mahsud said, hundreds of would-be bombers were Monday given Martyrdom jackets and explosives-laden vehicles for protection of the border in case of any aggression by the Indian forces. “Our Mujahideen would be in the vanguard if fighting broke out. Our fighters will fall on the enemy like thunder,” he declared.

The Mujahideen commander maintained that many a people might say the Mujahideen had been fighting the army since long, how it would be possible for them now to fight alongside them. “Therefore, I want to make it clear that the army was acting otherwise. But now it would fight for the protection and survival of the country, which is why we will support them,” he said. Baitullah said that Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan were ready to fight under the Army command. But it would be better for the armed forces to give them a separate sector or specify special targets for us where they could fight the enemy in a fitting manner.
It's mainstream news to the Pakistani's that we fund their Taliban, meanwhile we're shocked to find out we're funding Jundullah that's operating in their country.

[David Rothscum]

Lost U.S. Weapons May Be Going to Taliban, GAO Says
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/11/AR2009021103281_pf.html
By Joby Warrick and R. Jeffrey Smith
Washington Post Staff Writers
Thursday, February 12, 2009; A12

Tens of thousands of assault rifles and other firearms in Afghanistan are at risk of being stolen because U.S. officials have lost track of them, according to a congressionally ordered audit that warns that some weapons may already be in Taliban hands.

The audit by the Government Accountability Office found that inventory controls were lacking for more than a third of the 242,000 light weapons donated to Afghan forces by the United States -- a stockpile that includes thousands of AK-47 assault rifles as well as mortars, machine guns and rocket-propelled grenade launchers.

There were no reliable records showing what ultimately happened to an additional 135,000 weapons donated by other NATO countries, the report said. Many of the weapons, supplied between 2004 and 2008, were left in the care of Afghan-run military depots with a history of desertion, theft and sub-par security systems that sometimes consist of a wooden door and a padlock, the report said.

The lax controls extended even to such sensitive equipment as night-vision goggles, which have long given U.S. troops a critical edge in fighting Taliban insurgents in Afghanistan's rugged terrain, the GAO found. Basic accounting procedures such as recording serial numbers were routinely skipped, placing millions of dollars of weapons "at serious risk of theft or loss," said the GAO report, which is expected to be presented today to a House oversight panel. A copy of the report was obtained by The Washington Post.

Lawmakers have begun pressing the Pentagon for explanations in advance of the report's official release. Rep. John F. Tierney (D-Mass.) said the failures could lead to American soldiers being killed by insurgents using a weapon purchased by U.S. taxpayers.

"That's what we risk if we were to have tens of thousands of weapons we provided washing around Afghanistan, off the books," Tierney said in a written statement.

A Defense Department spokesman had no immediate response to the report yesterday.

The problems found in Afghanistan mirror those discovered during a similar audit two years ago in Iraq. There, at least 190,000 AK-47s and pistols imported into the country by the United States could not be accounted for, the GAO said in July 2007. That figure represented roughly 30 percent of all the small arms imported into Iraq for use by local forces in 2004 and 2005.

In that country as well, the U.S. military failed to set and follow appropriate accountability standards, the GAO said. Some of the arms, such as Glock automatic pistols, subsequently fell into the hands of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, based partly in the country's north, which Turkey, the United States and the European Union have labeled a terrorist group. Turkey complained to the Pentagon in 2006 and 2007 that arms diverted from Iraq were being used in crimes and assassinations inside its borders.

For the Afghanistan report, a GAO team toured the country last August and attempted to track various lots of weapons delivered to the war-torn country over a period of four years. The auditors found that inventory controls routinely used to track U.S. weapons were not applied in Afghanistan, in part because of manpower shortages and a lack of direction from the Pentagon, the report said. As a result, U.S. officials "cannot be certain that weapons intended for [Afghanistan's army] have reached those forces," it said.

U.S. military teams began attempting to correct the problems last June, shortly before the auditors arrived, the GAO noted.

A separate report by the Pentagon in October provides much of the explanation for the vulnerability of Afghanistan's donated weapons stocks: It said U.S. and allied forces in Afghanistan had basically ignored their mandate to ensure the "accountability, control and physical security" of the arms given to Afghan forces under the $11.7 billion aid program, and in particular had neglected to record the weapons' serial numbers so that they could be monitored.

The inspector general's report, commissioned by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Michael Mullen, blamed the U.S. Central Command for failing to set appropriate standards and procedures for handling weapons imported into Afghanistan.

The report also criticized commanders of the U.S.-led unit charged with training Afghan police and military forces for failing to issue appropriate directives to training teams and mentors.

It said further that the local U.S. office charged with overseeing the $7.4 billion foreign military sales program to Afghanistan is too small and that its personnel lack sufficient rank, skills and experience to monitor whether associated arms are being diverted. Just nine people, led by an Army major, were assigned to oversee a program that disbursed more than $1.7 billion in 2007, in contrast to a team of 77 led by a major general that oversaw a similar program in Saudi Arabia that disbursed 60 percent less money.

None of the nine officers in Afghanistan had prior foreign military sales experience, a circumstance the report called improper "given the strategic importance to the United States military effort" of cultivating adequately armed Afghan forces.

The lack of adequate U.S. oversight left a gaping hole because Afghan security forces lack the capability to monitor the flow of military equipment, the Pentagon's inspectors found during their visits in October 2007 and April 2008. The head of the Afghan army's logistics unit told them he had no idea what arms units had already received, when supplies were arriving or who was sending them.

In an official response to the Pentagon report, Ellen E. McCarthy, a senior security official in the office of the undersecretary of defense for intelligence, acknowledged that "the theft, sabotage, exploitation or misuse" of arms and explosives in Afghanistan would "gravely jeopardize the safety and security of personnel and installations worldwide." She also agreed that the U.S. Central Command needed to attach a higher priority to the problem.

Staff researcher Julie Tate contributed to this report.

[David Rothscum]

http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/20/world/asia/20ammo.html

May 20, 2009
Arms Sent by U.S. May Be Falling Into Taliban Hands
By C. J. CHIVERS

KABUL — Insurgents in Afghanistan, fighting from some of the poorest and most remote regions on earth, have managed for years to maintain an intensive guerrilla war against materially superior American and Afghan forces.

Arms and ordnance collected from dead insurgents hint at one possible reason: Of 30 rifle magazines recently taken from insurgents’ corpses, at least 17 contained cartridges, or rounds, identical to ammunition the United States had provided to Afghan government forces, according to an examination of ammunition markings by The New York Times and interviews with American officers and arms dealers.

The presence of this ammunition among the dead in the Korangal Valley, an area of often fierce fighting near Afghanistan’s border with Pakistan, strongly suggests that munitions procured by the Pentagon have leaked from Afghan forces for use against American troops.

The scope of that diversion remains unknown, and the 30 magazines represented a single sampling of fewer than 1,000 cartridges. But military officials, arms analysts and dealers say it points to a worrisome possibility: With only spotty American and Afghan controls on the vast inventory of weapons and ammunition sent into Afghanistan during an eight-year conflict, poor discipline and outright corruption among Afghan forces may have helped insurgents stay supplied.

The United States has been criticized, as recently as February by the federal Government Accountability Office, for failing to account for thousands of rifles issued to Afghan security forces. Some of these weapons have been documented in insurgents’ hands, including weapons in a battle last year in which nine Americans died.

In response, the Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan, the American-led unit tasked with training and supplying Afghan forces, said it had made accountability of all Afghan police and military property a top priority, and taken steps to locate and log rifles issued even years ago. The Pentagon has created a database of small arms issued to Afghan units.

No similarly thorough accountability system exists for ammunition, which is harder to trace and more liquid than firearms, readily changing hands through corruption, illegal sales, theft, battlefield loss and other forms of diversion.

American forces do not examine all captured arms and munitions to trace how insurgents obtained them, or to determine whether the Afghan government, directly or indirectly, is a significant Taliban supplier, military officers said.

The reasons include limited resources and institutional memory of issued arms, as well as an absence of collaboration between field units that collect equipment and the investigators and supervisors in Kabul who could trace it.

In this case, the rifle magazines were captured last month by a platoon in Company B, First Battalion, 26th Infantry, which killed at least 13 insurgents in a nighttime ambush in eastern Afghanistan. The soldiers searched the insurgents’ remains and collected 10 rifles, a rocket-propelled-grenade launcher, 30 magazines and other equipment.

Access to Taliban equipment is unusual. But after the ambush, the company allowed the items to be examined by this reporter.

Photographs were taken of the weapons’ serial numbers and markings on the bottoms of the cartridge casings, known as headstamps, which can reveal where and when ammunition was manufactured. The headstamps were then compared with ammunition in government circulation, and with this reporter’s records of ammunition sampled in Afghan magazines and bunkers in multiple provinces in recent years.

The type of ammunition in question, 7.62x39 millimeter, colloquially known as “7.62 short,” is one of the world’s most abundant classes of military small-arms cartridges, and can come from dozens of potential suppliers.

It is used in Kalashnikov rifles and their knockoffs, and has been made in many countries, including Russia, China, Ukraine, North Korea, Cuba, India, Pakistan, the United States, the former Warsaw Pact nations and several countries in Africa. Several countries have multiple factories, each associated with distinct markings.

The examination of the Taliban’s cartridges found telling signs of diversion: 17 of the magazines contained ammunition bearing either of two stamps: the word “WOLF” in uppercase letters, or the lowercase arrangement “bxn.”

“WOLF” stamps mark ammunition from Wolf Performance Ammunition, a company in California that sells Russian-made cartridges to American gun owners. The company has also provided cartridges for Afghan soldiers and police officers, typically through middlemen. Its munitions can be found in Afghan government bunkers.

The “bxn” marking was formerly used at a Czech factory during the cold war. Since 2004, the Czech government has donated surplus ammunition and equipment to Afghanistan. A.E.Y. Inc., a former Pentagon supplier, also shipped surplus Czech ammunition to Afghanistan, according to the United States Army, including cartridges bearing “bxn” stamps.

Most of the Wolf and Czech ammunition in the Taliban magazines was in good condition and showed little weathering, denting, corrosion or soiling, suggesting it had been removed from packaging recently.

There is no evidence that Wolf, the Czech government or A.E.Y. knowingly shipped ammunition to Afghan insurgents. A.E.Y. was banned last year from doing business with the Pentagon, but its legal troubles stemmed from unrelated allegations of fraud.

Given the number of potential sources, the probability that the Taliban and the Pentagon were sharing identical supply sources was small.

Rather, the concentration of Taliban ammunition identical in markings and condition to that used by Afghan units indicated that the munitions had most likely slipped from state custody, said James Bevan, a researcher specializing in ammunition for the Small Arms Survey, an independent research group in Geneva.

Mr. Bevan, who has documented ammunition diversion in Kenya, Uganda and Sudan, said one likely explanation was that interpreters, soldiers or police officers had sold ammunition for profit or passed it along for other reasons, including support for the insurgency. “Same story, different location,” he said.

The majority of cartridges in the remaining 13 Taliban magazines bore headstamps indicating they were made in Russia in the Soviet period. Several rounds had Chinese stamps and dates indicating manufacture in the 1960s and ’70s. A smaller number were Hungarian. Much of this other ammunition was in poor condition.

Hungarian and Chinese ammunition had also been provided to the Afghan government by A.E.Y., making it possible that several of the remaining magazines included American-procured rounds.

The American military did not dispute the possibility that theft or corruption could have steered Wolf and Czech ammunition to insurgents.

Capt. James C. Howell, who commands the company that captured the ammunition, said illicit diversion would be consistent with an enduring reputation of corruption in Afghan units, especially the police. “It’s not surprising,” he said.

But he added that in his experience this form of corruption was not the norm. Rather than deliberate diversion, he said, the more likely causes would be poor discipline and oversight in the Afghan national security forces, or A.N.S.F. “I think most A.N.S.F. don’t want their own stuff coming back at them,” he said.

Captured Taliban rifles provide a glimpse at arms diversion as well.

After the battle in the eastern village of Wanat last year, in which 9 Americans died and more than 20 were wounded, investigators found a large cache of AMD-65 assault rifles in the village’s police post, which was implicated in the attack, according to American officers. In all, the post had more than 70 assault rifles, but only 20 officers on its roster. Three AMD-65s were recovered near the battle as well.

The AMD-65, a distinctive Hungarian rifle, was rarely seen in Afghanistan until the United States issued it by the thousands to the Afghan police. They can now be found in Pakistani arms bazaars.

In the American ambush last month, all of the 10 captured rifles had factory stamps from China or Izhevsk, Russia. Those with date stamps had been manufactured in the 1960s and ’70s.

Photographs of the weapons and serial numbers were provided to Brig. Gen. Anthony R. Ierardi, the deputy commander of the transition command. Upon checking the Pentagon’s new database, the general said one of the Chinese rifles had been issued to an Afghan auxiliary police officer in 2007. How Taliban insurgents had acquired the rifle was not clear.

The auxiliary police, which augmented the Afghan Interior Ministry, were riddled with corruption and incompetence. They were disbanded last year.

Speaking about the captured Taliban ammunition, General Ierardi cautioned that the range of headstamps could indicate that insurgent use of American-procured munitions was not widespread. He noted that the captured ammunition sampling was small and that munitions might have leaked through less nefarious means.

“The mixed ammo could suggest battlefield losses; it could suggest captured ammo,” he said. He added, however, that he did not want to appear defensive and that accountability of Afghan arms and munitions was of “highest priority.”

“The emphasis from our perspective is on accountability of all logistics property,” he said. Leakage of Pentagon-supplied armaments to insurgents is an “absolutely worst-case scenario,” he said, adding, “We want to guard against the exact scenario you laid out.”

[David Rothscum]

Taliban defectors: US, Israel funding militants
Fri, 19 Jun 2009 09:30:15 GMThttp://www.presstv.ir/detail/98499.htm?sectionid=351020401
Two militants' leaders who defected from notorious Taliban chief in Pakistan have revealed that their comrade was pursuing a US-Israeli agenda across the country.

A prominent militant leader, Turkistan Bittani, who broke away from Baitullah Mehsud, called him "an American agent".

Mehsud, a warlord in his late 30s, has claimed responsibility for dozens of devastating string attacks on both civilians and security forces throughout the feared region.

Moreover, Baetani emphasized that Mehsud was being funded by US and Israeli intelligence services for brainwashing innocent youths.

The insurgents' chief has recruited several teenagers who have carried out dozens of suicide attacks on Pakistani mosques and educational institutes over some past months.

Baetani also noted that al-Qaeda and Taliban's leadership was never targeted in the dozens of US drone strikes in the country's troubled north-west region.

Another defector, Qari Zainuddin, said that Mehsud had established strong links with Israeli intelligence services which were destabilizing the nuclear armed country. "These people (Mehsud and his men) are working against Islam."

Insurgents have stepped up their attacks on civilian and religious centers in major cities across Pakistan which has fueled anti-Taliban sentiments among the Pakistani people.

The US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 has prompted militants to focus their attention across the border in Pakistan, turning the restive tribal belt between the two neighbors into a scene of daily violence.

The US invaded Afghanistan more than seven years ago to allegedly eradicate insurgency and arrest Taliban and al Qaeda leaders.

JR/DT

[agentbluescreen]

The thing I would like to know is just exactly how does one go about supposedly losing a "war" (by ending the illegal occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq) when there has never been a single "battle" in either theater?

The closest thing there has ever been to a battle in either so-called "war" was a minor skirmish, called the "final battle" in late 2001 at Tora Bora. Since then all western invaders have done is replace one imperial-fascist established Islamic tyranny (the Taleban) with another more corrupt and sinful drug growing and exporting one.

Meanwhile in Al-CIAda's homeland headquarters, the established religious imperial-fascist tyranny of Saudi Arabia, a simple battle of "hearts and minds" has won the war!

A chance to start again for the militants who would be model citizens (Timesonline.uk)

more than 700 Saudi militants ... have been set free after volunteering to be reeducated. Only nine have since reoffended.

“We have found that military action is not the only solution to this problem,” Mr al-Hadlaq said. “We are waging a war of ideas.”

The multimillion-pound programme employs dozens of clerics, psychiatrists and other specialists, who try to persuade the young men that their behaviour goes against the fundamental teachings of Islam.Once free, the Government helps former inmates to find work and in some cases even a wife.

Arguably the toughest job falls to people such as Sheikh Muhammad al-Najeemi, who is in charge of religious indoctrination. He tells the men that jihad (holy war) is admissible in Islam only if it is waged with the consent of the country’s leader, the permission of both parents and if a fatwa (religious decree) is issued. It can take weeks to convince a prisoner.

“Sometimes you have tough questions to answer, like why was it permitted to wage jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan but not the Americans,” said Sheikh Muhammad. He explains that the situation is different. The Soviet Union conquered Afghanistan and imposed a communist, atheist regime. Saudi Arabia encouraged men to go and fight, but today Riyadh supports the Islamic Government in Kabul.

Western diplomats in Saudi Arabia are impressed with the campaign, which they say has contributed to the defeat of al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia.

So what are these "wars" about?  Let's not piss-off any Saudi princes and go home, -ok?