Intelligence for a New World Order Foreign Affairs Magazine Fall 1991

[Murray Von Hayek]

Stansfield Turner who I believe from memory was CIA director under Carter wrote this wonderful little piece of crap. It is only an excerpt online unless you subscribe to the globalist rag.

http://www.foreignaffairs.org/19910901faessay6107/stansfield-turner/intelligence-for-a-new-world-order.html

But I found the original magazine at a garage sale recently and it goes on to say now that the cold war is over who will be the new enemy to gather intellegence on? Who is the US going to use as a boogey man. Interesting. There is also an article by Brzezinski in there called Selective Global Commitment I will quote the scumbag from the article.

" A politically united Europe, together with America, can assist such a peaceful transformation more deliberatley than a Europe that itself remains susceptible to internal and national rivalries."

" In time one might even envisage the expansion of the emerging NAFTA across the Pacific, thereby creating a larger framework for a cooperative American- Japanese relationship.

" America's special status( military reach, political clout, economic impact, as well as social and cultural appeal)  is threatened by it's own domestic shortcomings. Unless America pays more attention to it's domestic weaknesses a new global pecking order could emerge early in the next century, in the event that a unifying Europe and an economically sound Japan were to assume large political and military responsibilites."

" Isolationism, given the emergence of the global economy and the impact of modern communications, is also not a practical option."

[Murray Von Hayek]

MORE FROM THE ARTICLE SELECTIVE GLOBAL COMMITMENT BY BRZEZINSKI


There is a pervasive sense that the world is on the threshold of a new era. The dilemmas, passions and especially utopias of the recent past have suddenly become irrelevant. Yet before a new world order is proudly proclaimed and majestically inaugurated, some serious geostrategic rethinking is necessary, lest global disorder comes to dominate the onset of the post-Cold War era.
The end of the Cold War marks this century's third grand transformation of the organizing structure and motivating spirit of global politics. The first two great transformations did not enhance international security. The question now is, will the third?

The catalyst for the third transformation is the success of the West and, specifically, the United States in the outcome of the Cold War. Much therefore depends on the geostrategic implications drawn from the conclusion of that era, especially by America and those nations that were its principal partners in that prolonged engagement.

II

The first transformation was generated by the collapse of Europe's balance of power and thus its decisive position in the world. That balance was sustained by several European-centered but global empires. Dominant worldwide and conservative in spirit, the European system-in existence since 1815-eventually came undone because it was able neither to assimilate the rise of German national power nor contain the centrifugal forces of rising chauvinism. The first "world" war was in reality the last European war fought by globally significant European powers.

That war gave rise to an abortive attempt to reorganize Europe and thus, indirectly, the international system as a whole on the basis of a new principle: the supreme primacy of the nation-state, with nationalism fueling political emotions. The attainment-or enhancement-of national independence became the sacred goal of politics, and the protection-or expansion-of national frontiers was viewed as the key measure of success.

The result was massive failure. That new European order was too precarious to survive for long. With the territorial imperative igniting interstate conflicts and with weak nation-states dotting the map of the new Europe, it was only a question of time before a new eruption occurred. Germany was again the precipitator, though not entirely the root cause, of the resulting explosion.

The Second World War, in reality the first truly global war, completed Europe's historical suicide. In the course of that war Europe ceased to be the effective center of world politics and became instead the critical theater of a global competition waged by two powerful extra-European states. Both realized that geostrategic control over Europe would be tantamount to eventual control of Eurasia, and that control of Eurasia would yield global preponderance. Accordingly, throughout the resulting Cold War, Europe was for each of them the central stake.

World politics were again transformed, but for the first time in almost half a millennium they were no longer decisively affected by either the competition or the decisions of the principal European powers. Europe, instead of being the subject, now became the object of global contest.