Several of these documents that were released had been released before in a much less redetected form in the DOJ IG report.
This was email from Tom Wilshire, former Deputy Chief of the CIA bin laden unit who had been moved over to the FBI as Deputy Chief of the FBI ITOS unit in mid-may, to CIA officer in the bin Laden unit, Clarke Shannon, on May 24, 2001;
“Khalid al-Mihdhar in Malaysia, can't see Khallad [redacted] ["in the three photos of Mihdhar"] I'm either missing something or someone saw something that wasn’t there.” Wilshire said prior to this sentence that he remembered the cable that had identified Khallad bin Attach at Kuala Lumpur but he did not have the cable in his possession. He was asking CIA officers Clarke Shannon if he remembered if bin Attash had been identified in the Kuala Lumpur photos. Shannon confirmed that in deed he did remember the fact that bin Attash had been identified in the Kuala Lumpur photos.
In this email Wilshire had been trying to identify Khallad in the three photos of Khalid al-Mihdhar taken at Kuala Lumpur that he had obtained from the CIA in order to see if he could to identify Khallad any of the photos with Mihdhar. In April 2001 FBI Agent Ali Soufan had sent his second request directly to the CIA asking for any information that the CIA had on Walid Bin Attash and/or any al Qaeda meeting in Kuala Lumpur in January 2000. The CIA did not reply to his request.
The CIA had been sufficiently worried because of Soufan’s request that somehow the FBI Cole bombing investigators had gotten enough information on this Kuala Lumpur meeting, information that the CIA had been keeping absolutely secret, that they moved CIA bin Laden deputy chief Tom Wilshire over to the FBI ITOS unit to be Deputy chief of this FBI unit to spy on these investigators and find out what they knew about the Kuala Lumpur meeting. This was the information that the CIA had been keeping super secret since Khallad had been identified in one of the Kuala Lumpur photos on January 4, 2001. This letter along with information in the DOJ IG report proves that both Tom Wilshire and CIA officer Clarke Shannon had Soufan’s request for information, a request that also had attached a passport photo of bin Attash. The CIA wanted to know, did the FBI Cole bombing investigators know that Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting with bin Attash actually planning the Cole bombing?
Instead of giving Soufan the information the CIA already had on this meeting and on bin Attash, the CIA had Wilshire, direct FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi to set up a meeting with the people who worked for Soufan in the FBI New York field office, his assistant FBI Agent Steve Bongardt and his team. This meeting was set for June 11, 2001 at the FBI New York field office. At this meeting Corsi presented the three photos of Mihdhar taken at Kuala Lumpur that Wilshire had obtained from the CIA, and CIA officer, Clarke Shannon, who worked in the CIA bin Laden unit, asked Bongardt if he or any one on his team could recognize anyone in these photos.
It is clear that since one photo only had Mihdhar and Hazmi in it and no one else, and the CIA knew exactly what Mihdhar and Hazmi looked like, that the CIA only wanted to know if in their search for Walid bin Attash, had the FBI Cole bombing investigators uncovered that fact that Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting with bin Attash actually planning the Cole bombing? At this meeting in spite of Bongardt’s questions, “who are these people in these photos, and what do they have to do with the Cole bombing?”, Clarke Shannon said nothing even though he knew that both Mihdhar and Hazmi had been at the Kuala Lumpur meeting with bin Attash actually planning the Cole bombing. Clarke finally admitted that one al Qaeda terrorist in the photos was named Khalid al-Mihdhar who had a Saudi passport, but gave no further information that could have lead the Cole bombing investigators to start any investigation for Mihdhar or Hazmi.
Beyond all belief, Shannon, as did Wilshire, who had set up this meeting knew that al Qaeda terrorist Nawaf al-Hazmi was already inside of the US to carry out some horrific al Qaeda terrorist attack and knew that Khalid al-Mihdhar had a US multi-entry visa for the US so he could join Hazmi later in this terrorist attack inside of the US.
In November 2000, almost 6 months earlier, Soufan had sent almost the same request to the CIA Yemen station, and in spite of the fact that the CIA Yemen station knew about the meeting in Kuala Lumpur and even knew that Mihdhar and Walid bin Attash had both been at that meeting planning the Cole bombing, had told Soufan that the CIA had none of this information. Using the passport photo that Soufan had attached to his request, the Yemen station had the CIA/FBI joint source identify bin Attash on December 16, 2000. Just after this identification, the Yemen Station requested from the CIA Bin Laden unit the photos of bin Attash and Mihdhar taken at the Kuala Lumpur meeting. On January 4, 2001 the Yemen requested photo of bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur, was identified by the CIA/FBI Joint source.
The CIA at that point knew that they had photographed all of the attendees at this al Qaeda planning meeting, all known to be long time al Qaeda terrorists, and then let then all walk away to carry out the Cole bombing. The al Qaeda terrorists at the Kuala Lumpur meeting were in fact connected to the east Africa bombings that had killed over 200 people including 12 Americans, and the FBI had an active FBI investigation going on this bombing.
In spite of this information known at the CIA bin Laden unit, the CIA Yemen station and the CIA Pakistan station, all of these units kept this information absolutely secret from Soufan. Even when Soufan flew out to Islamabad on February 1, 2001 and had the CIA/FBI Joint source re-identify the passport photo of bin Attash, the Pakistan CIA alat who was sitting right next to Soufan when the joint CIA/FBI joint source re-identified Soufan’s passport photo of Bin Attash, said nothing about the fact that bin Attash had been identified in his photo taken at the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planing meeting just the month before, or that the CIA/FBI joint source had also been shown a photo of Mihdhar also taken at Kuala Lumpur.
At this point a huge criminal conspiracy had been put into effect that involved the CIA Yemen station, the CIA Pakistan station and the CIA bin Laden unit, and clearly most of the upper management of the CIA who were the only ones that had direct control over these CIA overseas stations to hide the Kuala Lumpur information from the FBI Cole bombing investigators. Since this involved committing major Federal felonies, this criminal obstruction of the Cole bombing investigation clearly had to have come from the very top of the CIA, George Tenet himself and his other high level CIA managers.
July 13, 2001, Email from Tom Wilshire back to his CIA managers Blee, Black and Tenet:
“OK this is important, after an inordinate amount of digging I finally found the cable identifying Khallad...[redacted]
This is a major league killer, who orchestrated the Cole attack and possibly the Africa bombings...[redacted] also can this be sent to the [redacted]. This last redaction was "to the FBI (FBI Cole bombing investigators).”
At this point this email shows that Wilshire had finally, located the cable that he had referred to in his earlier May 24, 2001 email, after an inordinate amount of digging , that he had remembered but did not have, that had been described above. This cable also included the photo of Walid bin Attash taken at the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting
This was email sent on July 13, 2001 just three days after Blee, Black and Tenet had requested an emergency meeting at the White House with Rice, Hadley, and Clarke in order to discuss the fact that Blee, Black and Tenet were convinced that a huge al Qaeda attack was immenent and was aimed right at the US.
Why these emails would still be redacted on June 19, 2012 when most of these emails were in the DOJ IG report in un-redacted form is at first a mystery. But upon closer examination it is clear that even though this email was un-redacted in the DOJ IG report, the CIA did not want a broad distribution of this information in these emails since it shows that Tom Wilshire, the CIA spy inside of the FBI ITOS unit, was concerned enough about a huge al Qaeda attack inside of the US involving the people who were at the Kuala Lumpur al Qaeda planning meeting on January 5-8, 2000 that he wanted this Kuala Lumpur information passed on to the FBI. This was the information that Walid Bin Attash, (Khallad) had been identified at this meeting with Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi actually planning the Cole, bombing. In this email, it is clear that Wilshire had identified Khallad as the mastermind of the Cole, bombing. His request to pass this information to the FBI was never answered.
On July 23, 2001 in an email kept absolutely secret by both the CIA and FBI and not even released with these other emails, but ultimately released under subpoena as part of the Moussaoui trial documents, DE #939, Wilshire makes this same request again, to pass the Kuala Lumpur information to the FBI, and again he is denied this request. In this later email Wilshire identifies by name Khalid al-Mihdhar as an al Qaeda terrorists with a direct connection to Khallad who will be found at the next big al Qaeda operation.
After being turned down for a second time in his request to transfer the Kuala Lumpur information to the FBI Cole bombing investigators, Wilshire realizes that his role at the FBI and the reason for him to have been moved over from the CIA to the FBI ITOS unit was not just to spy of the FBI Cole bombing investigators, and find out what they knew about the Kuala Lumpur meeting, but to criminally withhold and block the Kuala Lumpur information from ever getting to the FBI Cole bombing investigators, and FBI Agents Ali Soufan and Steve Bongardt.
On August 22, 2001, FBI Agent Margaret Gillespie, who was working as an IOS agent at the CIA bin Laden unit, and who was actually at the June 11, 2001 New York meeting with Corsi, Shannon, and Bongardt, found out from the INS that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US and immediately gave this information to FBI HQ Agent Dina Corsi and then to Tom Wilshire. Wilshire knew immediately that al Qaeda terrorists Mihdhar and Hazmi were inside of the US in order to take part in a massive al Qaeda attack that the CIA and FBI HQ had been warned about since April 2001.
Wilshire gave Corsi the task to write up an EC to start an intelligence investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. Both Corsi and Wilshire knew that if an intelligence investigation for Mihdhar was started, the FBI OIPR would almost never allow a parallel criminal investigation to be started for the same target, meaning this intelligence investigation will keep Bongardt from investigating and searching for Mihdhar. This information was sent by Gillespie after this meeting to the rest of the CIA, to the State Department and to some as yet unknown destination at the FBI, but it never went to FBI Agent Steve Bongardt or his team. The State Department even had Hazmi’s last visa request on file that listed his California address.
In spite of Wilshire knowing that both Mihdhar and Hazmi were in the US to take part in a huge al Qaeda attack that will cause mass casualties, this EC which was started at the behest of Wilshire, was labeled “Routine” when it was sent to the FBI New York office on August 28, 2001, meaning this investigation had no real importance or urgency to finding Mihdhar or Hazmi quickly. Wilshire even reviewed this EC just before it was sent over to the FBI New York office on August 28.
When this EC was accidently routed to FBI Agent and Cole bombing investigator Steve Bongardt on August 28, 2001, Bongardt called Corsi immediately and said that this of Mihdhar and Hazmi investigation should go to him and his team, because it looked like that Mihdhar and Hazmi were possibly connected to the Cole bombing, and that they were clearly inside of the US in order to carry out some horrific al Qaeda attack. Corsi, and her boss Rod Middleton, told Bongardt, that because the EC contained a NSA cable, and the NSA had restrictions on giving this cable to FBI criminal investigators, he had to destroy her EC and he could not start any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. But we know from the DOJ IG report, that the permission for Corsi to send the NSA cable to the FBI Cole bombing investigators had already been approved by the NSA general counsel the day before, on August 27, 2001. So Corsi had no legal right to block Bongardt’s investigation and knew it.
When Bongardt complained and stated that the NSA information did not appear to be connected to any FISA warrant, he requested that Corsi get a legal ruling from the FBI NSLU to see if he could start an immediate investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi, knowing that they were inside of the US in order to take part in some horrific al Qaeda attack.
On August 29, 2001 Corsi, and her boss Rod Middleton, told Bongardt that the NSLU attorney she had contacted, Sherry Sabol, had ruled that he could have no part in any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. But the 9/11 Commission report states, page 538 in footnote 81, that Sabol told Corsi and Rod Middleton on August 28, 2001 that since the NSA information had no connection to any FISA warrant, Bongardt could take part in any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi.
These lies cost almost 3000 people their lives on 9/11 and this has never been explained, not by the 9/11 Commission not by the DOJ IOG, not by anyone. But it gets worse, much worse.
On August 29, 2001 Corsi send Bongardt an email that stated; “at such time as information is developed of a substantial Federal crime, (by Mihdhar and Hazmi), this information will be passed over the wall”.
But the the DOJ IG report page 301-302 says that Corsi knew by August 22, 2001 that the CIA had a photo of Walid Bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur. This photo directly connected the mastermind of the Cole bombing that had killed 17 US sailors to both Mihdhar and Hazmi who were at this al Qaeda planning meeting at the same time as bin Attash. So Corsi already knew that there was information of a substantial Federal crime at least 6 days before she tells Bongardt that he has to stop his investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi. She also knew that it would be illegal and serious Federal crime for her to block Bongardt's investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi, yet she does this anyway.
She, Middleton, Wilshire and the CIA all knew that the CIA had been deliberately hiding this photo of bin Attash from Bongardt so he would never have the information he needed to start any investigation for these al Qaeda terrorists. They all knew without some connection to the planning of the Cole bombing or some other crime, Bongardt would never have the information he needed to start any investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi.
But they all also know that a huge al Qaeda attack is just about to take place inside of the US that will cause mass American casualties. In spite of knowing about this attack and knowing that blocking Bongardt’s investigation will allow this attack to take place, they all continue to either block Bongardt’s investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi or allow Corsi and Middleton to block Bongardt’s investigation of these two al Qaeda terrorists who will take part in this huge al Qaeda attack.
On August 30, 2001 the photo of Walid Bin Attash taken at Kuala Lumpur was sent by the CIA to Rod Middleton, FBI Agent Dina Corsi's supervisor. So on this date he now has the photographic proof that Mihdhar and Hazmi had taken part in the planning of the Cole bombing. Yet in spite of being on the phone with Corsi shutting down Bongardt's investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, and being at the meeting with Sabol, where she told Corsi Bongardt could take part in any investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, he never gave this horrific information to FBI Agent Steve Bongardt so Bongardt could start an investigation for Mihdhar and Hazmi before they had time to carry out some horrific al Qaeda attack.
On September 5, 2001, after the intelligence investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi was given to an inexperienced FBI Intelligence Agent, Robert Fuller, Fuller called Corsi to say he has gotten nowhere in his investigation and search for Mihdhar and he needed Mihdhar’s credit card number, which was known by Saudi Arabian Airlines, since Mihdhar had flown into the US on July 4, 2001 on this airline. In spite of knowing that Fullers investigation has stalled out without this credit card number, Corsi refused to give Fuller permission to call Saudi Arabian Airlines and get this credit card number. This effectively blocked all forward progress in Fullers investigation. Six days later, on September 11, 2001 the attacks on 9/11 took place. 2001, killing almost 300 innocent people.
It is clear from the documents just released that not only almost all of the high level CIA managers knew this al Qaeda attack was just about to take place, knew the warnings were real, and in fact had no doubt this attack was just about to take place, but also high level Bush administration officials also knew about this huge attack. These new reports even stated, which is new information, that bin Laden was making preparations for air defenses against US air attacks meaning the al Qaeda terrorists thought this attack was going to be so big it would elicit a response from the US.
These additional documents add new depth to the what were called the intelligence failures prior to the attacks on 9/11. But these questions remain.
Why did Blee, Black and Tenet refuse to give the information on Mihdhar and Hazmi to the Rice, Hadley and Clarke on July 10, 2001 at the White House meeting set up to discuss this imminent and expected to be horrific al Qaeda attack. These documents make it clear that there was absolutely no doubt in anyone’s mind that this attack was coming and soon. Tenet even said that had Rice taken him more seriously, she could have prevented the attacks on 9/11. But then why did he refuse to allow Wilshire permission to give the Kuala Lumpur information to the FBI Cole bombing investigators on July 13, 2001 just three days after the July 10, 2001 meeting at the White House, and again on July 23, 2001, as these documents indicated, when he must have known this would block the one investigation that could have prevented the attacks on 9/11?
Why did Wilshire work with FBI Agent Dina Corsi and SSA Rod Middleton to illegally shut down Bongardt's investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi when they all knew that the result would be many Americans would be killed in the al Qaeda terrorist attacks that Bongardt could have prevented?
Why did Blee, Black and Tenet allow their man inside of the FBI, Tom Wilshire, to shut down Bongardt’s investigation of Mihdhar and Hazmi, using Corsi and Middleton, when they knew this would allow a huge attack inside of the US that would kill many Americans? Both Tenet and Wilshire also even knew that someone was blocking FBI Agent Harry Samit’s investigation of Zacarias Moussaoui, and did nothing about this.
Why did none of this information come out at the 911 Commission Public hearings when they had Tenet testify under oath at these hearings?
The 9/11 Commission report asked the question; Why did the CIA and FBI HQ not connect the fact that Mihdhar and Hazmi were in the US to their knowledge of a huge al Qaeda attack the CIA and FBI HQ knew was just about to take place? The July 5, 2001 email from Wilshire back to Blee, Black, and Tenet had connected the people at the Kuala Lumpur meeting to the warnings of a huge al Qaeda attack, and his July 23, 2001 email to Blee, Black and Tenet, directed connected Mihdhar by name and by association Hazmi to this huge attack? This was email collected by the DOJ IG, and was information that the 9/11 Commission claimed to have had. Tom Wilshire’s July 13, 2001 and July 23 email back to Blee, Black and Tenet all showed that in spite of the fact that Wilshire was ostensibly working for the FBI he was really under the control of his former managers at the CIA, who had refused every request he made to transfer the information from the Kuala Lumpur meeting over to the FBI. Why did this fact not come out at the 9/11 hearings?
Not only does this information show that the CIA and FBI HQ had deliberately allowed the al Qaeda terrorists to carry out the attacks that took place on 9/11, but that the 9/11 Commission covered over their criminal and nefarious deeds, even when they claimed to have had all of the same information that I have cited in this blog.