National Clandestine Service - The CIA of the CIA

[Dig]

National Clandestine Service
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Clandestine_Service

The National Clandestine Service (NCS) (formerly known as the Directorate of Operations) is one of the four main components of the Central Intelligence Agency. Created in 2005, the NCS "serves as the clandestine arm of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the national authority for the coordination, de-confliction, and evaluation of clandestine operations across the Intelligence Community of the United States".[1] The current Director of the NCS is John D. Bennett.[2]
Creation of the National Clandestine Service

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, a report by the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities before and after the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 conducted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the 9/11 Commission Report released by the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States identified serious shortcomings in the HUMINT capabilities of the US Intelligence Community ranging from the lack of qualified linguists to the lack of information sharing within the IC. These efforts resulted in the passage of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act in 2004 which created the position of the Director of National Intelligence and tasked the CIA Director with developing a "strategy for improving the human intelligence and other capabilities of the Agency.".[3]

Going even further, in 2004, Senator Pat Roberts, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, drafted the 9/11 National Security Protection Act[4] in which he proposed that the Directorate of Operations be removed from the CIA and established as an independent agency known as the National Clandestine Service. The creation of the National Clandestine Service was also recommended by the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, the "WMD Commission".[5] The investigation by the WMD Commission found that HUMINT capabilities had been severely degraded since the end of the Cold War and were ill-suited to targeting non-state actors such as terrorist organizations. The WMD Commission also noted that HUMINT operations were poorly coordinated between the various federal entities who conducted them and encouraged the development of better methods of validating human sources, in light of the revelations about the source known as Curveball.

Beginning its study of the Intelligence Community in 1995, a non-governmental group, which included former Director of the National Security Agency Lieutenant General William Odom, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency Lieutenant General Harry E. Soyster, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and current Director of National Intelligence Lieutenant General James Clapper, and former General Counsel for the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency Elizabeth Rindskopf Parker, issued a report, first in 1997 and in an updated form in 2002, which recommended the creation of the National Clandestine Service.[6]

The CIA announced the creation of the National Clandestine Service in a press release on October 13, 2005.[7] Contrary to Senator Roberts' proposal, the National Clandestine Service would be a component of the CIA, rather than an independent executive branch agency.
Historical Predecessors of the NCS

The Directorate of Operations (DO) was the branch of the CIA that ran covert operations and recruited foreign agents. The DO reportedly employed 1,000–2,000 people[citation needed] and was headed by a deputy director for operations (DDO). This directorate consisted of, among other subdivisions, a unit for political and economic covert action (the Covert Action Staff, or CAS), for paramilitary (PM) covert action (the Special Operations unit), for counterintelligence (the CI staff, or CIS]), and for several geographic desks responsible for the collection of foreign intelligence. It was created August 1, 1952, as the Directorate of Plans and was renamed the Directorate of Operations on March 1, 1973.[8]

The Directorate of Operations also housed special groups for conducting counterterrorism and counternarcotics, for tracking nuclear proliferation, and other tasks. Administrated by the DO, the paramilitary (PM) operations officers from the legendary Special Operations Group or (SOG) are maintained in the elite Special Activities Division (SAD). They are highly skilled in weaponry; covert transport of personnel and material by air, sea, and land; guerrilla warfare; the use of explosives; assassination and sabotage; and escape and evasion techniques. They are prepared to respond quickly to myriad possible needs, from parachute drops and communications support to assistance with counter narcotics operations and defector infiltration. Special Activities maintains a symbiotic relationship with the Joint Special Operations Command, and is run largely by former members of JSOC.[9] SAD/SOG is one of three special missions units. The other two are Delta and SEAL team six.[9]

In the 2003 book, Special OPS: America's elite forces in 21st century combat, the author states:
"Highly classified, the SAD is regarded as the preeminent special operations unit in the world. Members are the elite of the elite; "the best period." This results from the sources from which the organization recruits its members: Special missions units (SMUs); such as Delta Force and NSWDG (United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group)..." [10]

For special operations missions and its other responsibilities, the Special Operations staff attempted to recruit people with the appropriate specialized skills, although the geographic desks remain the principal units involved in the recruitment of personnel in so-called denied areas (Libya, Iraq, Iran, etc.). Special operations also provided special air, ground, maritime and training support for the Agency's intelligence gathering operations.

The DO has been subject to harsh criticism in the media, and due to its covert and independent nature did not, or could not, effectively respond. Its capabilities had been in decline since the public outcry resulting from the revelations of highly questionable actvities by the Church Committee. Furthermore, the DO fought frequent "turf" battles amongst the Executive Branch bureaucracies, most prominently with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, State Department and the Department of Defense. This was one of the principal reasons that the NCS was formed.
Organization

The current structure of the National Clandestine Service, under the Director of the NCS, is as follows, according to the Official CIA Organizational Chart:[11]

Deputy Director of the NCS
Counterproliferation Division
Counterterrorism Center
Counterintelligence Center
Regional & Transnational Issues Divisions
Technology Support Divisions
Deputy Director of the NCS for Community HUMINT
Community HUMINT Coordination Center

A major headquarters element was the Counterintelligence Staff, most powerful when headed by James Jesus Angleton. It was the principal US organization responsible for vetting potential new clandestine HUMINT assets, and for US offensive counterespionage and deception.

Under an assortment of names, such as Special Activities Division, there is a paramilitary function that may enter and prepare an area of operations before United States Army Special Forces enter in a more overt military role. This may or may not include psychological operations, especially black propaganda; paramilitary and psychological functions have split and joined under various historical reorganizations.

Various groups provide support services, such as cover documentation and disguise.[12] A technical services unit, sometimes in the clandestine division and occasionally in the Directorate of Science and Technology, contained both espionage equipment development and sometimes questionable research, such as the MKULTRA mind control program.
NCS Officers

The National Clandestine Service consists of six different types of officers[13] :

Below are brief descriptions of these six types of officers. For a more detailed description, visit the CIA website.

1) Operations Officers:
Operations Officers (OOs) are focused full time on clandestinely spotting, assessing, developing, recruiting, and handling individuals with access to vital foreign intelligence on the full range of national security issues.[14]

2) Collection Management Officers:
Core Collector-certified Collection Management Officers (CMOs) oversee and facilitate the collection, evaluation, classification, and dissemination of foreign intelligence developed from clandestine sources. CMOs play a critical role in ensuring that foreign intelligence collected by clandestine sources is relevant, timely, and addresses the highest foreign policy and national security needs of the nation.[15]

3) Staff Operations Officers:
Based out of CIA Headquarters in Washington, DC, Staff Operations Officers (SOOs) plan, guide and support intelligence collection operations, counterintelligence activities and covert action programs.[16]

4) Targeting Officers:
Officers in this career track will directly support and drive complex worldwide NCS operations to develop actionable intelligence against the highest priority threats to U.S. national security.[17]

5) Paramilitary Operations Officers:
Qualified candidates can expect to focus on intelligence operations and activities for U.S. policymakers in hazardous and austere overseas environments.[18]

The National Clandestine Service's primary action arm is the Special Activities Division (SAD), which conducts direct action-like raids, ambushes, sabotage, assassinations, unconventional warfare (e.g. training and leading guerrillas), and deniable psychological operations, the latter also known as "covert influence." While special reconnaissance may be either a military or intelligence operation, these usually are executed by SAD officers in denied areas.[9][19] Paramilitary operations officers are chosen mainly from the ranks of: the United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group and other SEAL teams; the U.S. Army's Combat Applications Group (Delta Force), Army special forces, and U.S. Army Rangers; the United States Marine Corps Forces Special Operations battalions (MARSOC); and the Air Force Combat Controllers and Air Force Pararescuemen.[9] SAD operatives are the most specialized because they combine the best special operations and clandestine intelligence (spy) capabilities in one individual. They operate in any environment (sea, air, or ground) and with limited to no support. They originate in the Special Operations Group (SOG) of SAD, considered one of the most elite special operations units in the world.[20] Paramilitary operations officers are the primary recipients of the coveted Distinguished Intelligence Cross and the Intelligence Star, the two highest medals for valor in the CIA. Not surprisingly, the majority of those memorialized on the Wall of Honor at CIA headquarters were covert operatives.[21]

6) NCS Language Officers
Performing a critical and dynamic function within the National Clandestine Service (NCS), the Language Officer applies advanced foreign language skills, experience, and expertise to provide high-quality translation, interpretation, and language-related support for a variety of NCS clandestine operations.[22]
Covert action

A covert action is defined as "an activity or activities of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the United States Government will not be apparent or acknowledged publicly".[23] A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the identity of the sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.[19]

Covert operations include paramilitary and psychological activities. See Psychological Operations (United States) for a more general discussion of US psychological operations, including those operations for which the CIA is responsible and those that belong to other agencies.

Executive Order 12333 bans assassinations by persons employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government.[24]
Clandestine Collection of HUMINT

Legal Authorities

A number of statutes, executive orders, and directives assign the task of conducting HUMINT operations to the CIA:

1) By federal statute, the Director of the CIA is tasked with the collection of intelligence through human sources and by other appropriate means.[25]

2) Executive Order 12333[26] states that:

The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency shall coordinate the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence collected through human sources or through human-enabled means and counterintelligence activities outside the United States.

3) National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5 (NSCID 5)[27] provides that:

The Director of Central Intelligence shall conduct all organized Federal espionage operations outside the United States and its possessions for the collection of foreign intelligence information required to meet the needs of all Departments and Agencies concerned, in connection with the national security, except for certain agreed activities by other Departments and Agencies.

4) Intelligence Community Directive Number 340 designates the Director of the CIA as the National HUMINT Manager.[28]

Tradecraft

Techniques for the clandestine collection of HUMINT are collectively known as tradecraft. A discussion of many of these techniques can be found at Clandestine HUMINT operational techniques.

Very few statutes and publicly available regulations deal specifically with clandestine HUMINT techniques. One such statute forbids the use of journalists as agents unless the President of the United States makes the written determination to waive this restriction based on the "overriding national security interest of the United States.".[29] In the Intelligence Authorization Act for the Fiscal Year 2002, Congress directed the CIA Director to rescind what Congress viewed as overly restrictive guidelines regarding the recruitment of foreign assets who had a record of human rights violations.[30]

Camp Peary, often referred to as "The Farm", near Williamsburg, Virginia is purportedly a CIA training facility for clandestine operatives.
Clandestine technical collection

The Agency also may be responsible for developing communications systems appropriate for clandestine operations. In 1962, the Central Intelligence Agency, Deputy Directorate for Research (now the Deputy Directorate for Science and Technology), formally took on ELINT and COMINT responsibilities.[31] "The consolidation of the ELINT program was one of the major goals of the reorganization... it is responsible for: ELINT support peculiar to the penetration problems associated with the Agent's reconnaissance program under NRO. Maintain a quick reaction capability for ELINT and COMINT equipment."

"CIA's Office of Research and Development was formed to stimulate research and innovation testing leading to the exploitation of non-agent intelligence collection methods....All non-agent technical collection systems will be considered by this office and those appropriate for field deployment will be so deployed. The Agency's missile detection system, Project [deleted] based on backscatter radar is an example. This office will also provide integrated systems analysis of all possible collection methods against the Soviet antiballistic missile program is an example."

Sometimes in cooperation with technical personnel at other agencies such as NSA when the collection discipline is SIGINT, or DIA when the techniques come MASINT, or other appropriate agencies such as the United States Department of Energy for nuclear information, CIA may work to place technical collection equipment in denied territory. They have also cooperated in placing such equipment into US embassies. Emplacing and servicing such equipment is another form of clandestine operation, of which the adversary should not be aware.

These include:[31]
Research, development, testing, and production of ELINT and COMINT collection equipment for all Agency operations.
Technical operation and maintenance of CIA deployed non-agent ELINT systems.
Training and maintenance of agent ELINT equipments
Technical support to the Third Party Agreements.
Data reduction of Agency-collected ELINT signals.

See MASINT from clandestinely placed sensors. CIA took on a more distinct MASINT responsibility in 1987.[32] The National Security Archive commented, "In 1987, Deputy Director for Science and Technology Evan Hineman established... a new Office for Special Projects. concerned not with satellites, but with emplaced sensors – sensors that could be placed in a fixed location to collect signals intelligence or measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT) about a specific target. Such sensors had been used to monitor Chinese missile tests, Soviet laser activity, military movements, and foreign nuclear programs. The office was established to bring together scientists from the DS&T’s Office of SIGINT Operations, who designed such systems, with operators from the Directorate of Operations, who were responsible for transporting the devices to their clandestine locations and installing them".
Overt HUMINT

In addition they may produce HUMINT from overt sources, such as voluntary interviews with travelers, businesspeople, etc. Some of the latter may be considered open source intelligence OSINT and be performed by other agencies, just as reports from diplomats are another form of HUMINT that flows into the Department of State.

At times, this function may be assigned to CIA, because its counter-intelligence staff has biographical indexes that let them check the background of foreign citizens offering information. For example, there may be a name check on a business or scientific contact who meets either with CIA representatives or staff of the National Open Source Enterprise
Approval of clandestine and covert operations

The Directorate of Plans (DDP) was created in 1952, taking control of the Office of Policy Coordination, a covert action group that received services from the CIA but did not go through the CIA management. The other main unit that went into the Directorate of Plans was the Office of Special Operations, which did clandestine intelligence collection (e.g., espionage) as opposed to covert action.

Approval of clandestine and covert operations came from a variety of committees, although in the early days of quasi-autonomous offices and the early DDP, there was more internal authority to approve operations.[33] After its creation in the Truman Administration, the CIA was, at first, the financial manager for OPC and OSO, authorized to handle "unvouchered funds" by National Security Council document 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function.
Early autonomy of OPC

At first, the supervision by committee allowed the OPC to exercise

"early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, defining them as all activities "which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them".

NSC 10/2 defined the scope of these operations as: "propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [sic] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations." [34]

Guerrilla warfare was outside this statement of scope, but such operations came under partial CIA control with NSC 10/5 of October 1951. See "Psychological Strategy Board" below. To implement covert actions under NSC 10/2, OPC was created on September 1, 1948. Its initial structure had it taking "guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through CIA's administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions. In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to OPC through the DCI. During the Korean War the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of CIA's activities.

"Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper "scope and magnitude" of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy."

Putting special operations under a "psychological" organization paralleled the military's development of United States Army Special Forces, which was created by a Pentagon unit called the Psychological Warfare Division. "NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded CIA's authority over guerrilla warfare"[35] The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of CIA's covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.[33]

As the Truman administration ended, CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects ...no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.
Increasing control by CIA management

After Smith, who was Eisenhower's World War II Chief of Staff, consolidated of OSO, OPC, and CIA in 1952, the Eisenhower administration began narrowing CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad". A series of committees, containing reprresentatives from State, Defense, CIA, and sometimes the White House or NSC, reviewed operations. Over time and reorganizations, these committees were called the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB), NSC 5412/2 Special Group or simply Special Group, Special Group (Augmented), 303 Committee, and Special Group (Counterinsurgency).[33]
Controversy

Former Director of the NCS Jose Rodriguez was criticized for his role in the 2005 CIA interrogation tapes destruction.
See also
CIA operations
Intelligence Community
Special Operations
"Wild Bill" Donovan
Office of Strategic Services
Church Commission
Special Activities Division
References
^ "Mission of the National Clandestine Service". CIA Website. https://www.cia.gov/offices-of-cia/clandestine-service/index.html. Retrieved April 28, 2011.
^ By Adam Goldman and Matt Apuzzo, Associated Press Writers (2010-07-21). "Retired spy hired to run CIA clandestine service". San Diego Union-Tribune. http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/2010/jul/21/retired-spy-hired-to-run-cia-clandestine-service/. Retrieved 2010-11-23.
^ "Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Section 1011". PL 108-458. http://intelligence.senate.gov/laws/pl108-458.pdf.
^ "9-11 Act". 9-11 Act National Security Protection Act. http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2004_cr/roberts-911nspa.pdf.
^ "Unclassified Version of the Report of the Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction". http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wmd/index.html.
^ "Moderning Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21st Century". Modernizing Intelligence: January 2002 Edition. National Institute for Public Policy. http://www.nipp.org/National%20Institute%20Press/Archives/Publication%20Archive%20PDF/rev%20intel%20complete.pdf. Retrieved April 29, 2011.
^ Central Intelligence Agency (2005-10-13). "Establishment of the National Clandestine Service". Press release. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-2005/pr10132005.html. Retrieved 2008-11-14.
^ "CIA Celebrates 60 Years". Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/cia-celebrates-60-years.html.
^ a b c d Waller, Douglas (2003-02-03). "The CIA Secret Army". TIME (Time Inc). http://www.time.com/time/covers/1101030203/
^ Special OPS: America's elite forces in 21st century combat, Fred J. Pushies, MBI Publishing, 2003, page 20. http://books.google.com/books?id=TLu2K11cXSMC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q=&f=
^ Organizational Chart. Central Intelligence Agency. https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/leadership/cia-organization-chart.html
^ Mendez, Antonio J. (1999). Master of Disguise: My Secret Life in the CIA. William Morrow and Company, Inc. ISBN 0-06-095791-3
^ "NCS Career Opportunities". Clandestine Service Fields. https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/clandestine/view-jobs.html.
^ "Operations Officers". Core Collectors. https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/clandestine/core-collector.html.
^ "Collection Management Officer". Core Collectors. https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/clandestine/core-collector.html.
^ "Staff Operations Officer". Headquarters-based Officers. https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/clandestine/headquarters-based-trainee-program.html.
^ "Targeting Officers". Headquarters-based Officer. https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/clandestine/headquarters-based-trainee-program.html.
^ "Paramilitary Operations Officer". Paramilitary. https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/clandestine/paramilitary-operations-officer-specialized-skills-officer.html.
^ a b Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. United States Department of Defense. 12 July 2007. JP 1-02. http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf. Retrieved 2007-11-21
^ Waller, Douglas (2003-01-25). "The CIA's Secret Army". TIME Magazine. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1004145,00.html. Retrieved 2008-11-13.
^ Gup, Ted (2000). The Book of Honor: Cover Lives and Classified Deaths at the CIA.[page needed]
^ "NCS Language Officers". Language Officers. https://www.cia.gov/careers/opportunities/clandestine/ncs-language-officer.html.
^ "50 U.S.C. § 413b(e)". Title 50, United States Code, Section 413b Presidential approval and reporting of covert actions. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sec_50_00000413---b000-.html.
^ "E.O. 12333 (2.11) Ban on Assassination". E.O. 12333. http://www.archives.gov/federal-register/codification/executive-order/12333.html#2.11.
^ "50 U.S.C § 403–4a". United States Code. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/50/usc_sec_50_00000403----004a.html.
^ "Executive Order 12333, as amended". Executive Order 12333, as amended. https://www.cia.gov/about-cia/eo12333.html.
^ "NSCID 5". National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5. http://cryptome.sabotage.org/0002/nscid-5-47-61.pdf.
^ "ICD 304". Intelligence Community Director No. 304. http://www.dni.gov/electronic_reading_room/ICD_304.pdf.
^ "50 U.S.C. § 403–7". Title 50, United States Code. http://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/html/uscode50/usc_sec_50_00000403----007-.html.
^ "Intelligence Authorization Act 2002". Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002. http://intelligence.senate.gov/laws/pl107-108.pdf.
^ a b Central Intelligence Agency (May 1998). "Deputy Director for Research". CIA-DDR. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB54/st18.pdf. Retrieved 2007-10-07
^ Central Intelligence Agency (July 21, 1988). "Organization chart, mission and functions of the Office of Special Projects". http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB54/st39.pdf. Retrieved 2007-10-07
^ a b c "U.S. Covert Actions and Counter-Insurgency Programs". Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, Volume XXIV. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_xxiv/covert_actions.html
^ "Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment". U.S. Department of State. pp. Document 292, Section 5. http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/intel/290_300.html. Retrieved 2007-04-15.
^ Warner, Michael, ed (October 23, 1951). "NSC 10/5, Scope and Pace of Covert Operations". The CIA Under Harry Truman. Central Intelligence Agency

[Dig]

National Clandestine Service Video
2 min - 6 Nov 2008 - Uploaded by ciacareers
Learn what it's really like to work as an overseas Operations Officer within the National Clandestine Service of the CIA.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gUby1HWZv9w
National Clandestine Service Commercial
31 sec - 5 Nov 2008 - Uploaded by ciacareers
Are you ready to make a world of difference? If you have high integrity and a deep sense of patriotism, consider global opportunities with ...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BZYFjRhmy9o
CIA Gets in Your Face(book)
http://www.wired.com/techbiz/it/news/2007/01/72545
Chaddus Bruce  01.24.07

If you're a Facebook member, a career as a government spook is only a click away. Since December 2006, the Central Intelligence Agency has been using Facebook.com, the popular social networking site, to recruit potential employees into its National Clandestine Service. It marks the first time the CIA has ventured into social networking to hire new personnel. The CIA's Facebook page (login required) provides an overview of what the NCS is looking for in a recruit, along with a 30-second promotional YouTube video aimed at potential college-aged applicants. U.S. citizens with a GPA above 3.0 can apply.

"It's an invaluable tool when it comes to peer-to-peer marketing," says Michele Neff, a CIA spokeswoman. The NCS, one of the four directorates of the CIA, was established following 9/11 to gather intelligence from sources both domestic and abroad. In 2004, President Bush directed the CIA to increase the "human intelligence capabilities" of the agency and hire more officers that can "blend more easily in foreign cities." The search for better spies led the NCS to set up shop on Facebook, which is used primarily by college students. Every Facebook user has her or his own page, and users can choose to join Facebook "groups," which can be created by individuals or sponsored by companies as paid promotions. The NCS-sponsored Facebook group was launched on Dec. 19, 2006 and will stay active for two months. The group currently has over 2,100 members, up from around 200 one week after its debut. Scores of companies and organizations have set up shop on Facebook, using the site's interactive tools like chat, video and personal messaging to establish relationships with potential hires. However, compared to most recruitment pages, the CIA's page is remarkably light on interactive content. For example, Ernst & Young's Facebook group (login required) offers resume advice, interaction with current employees and videos of actual interns. But like the CIA group, the accounting agency's page operates mostly as a gateway to its corporate careers website. Like many corporations or nonprofit organizations, the CIA has long turned to colleges with diverse and intelligent student bodies when hiring. But its foray into social networks is a new strategy not yet adopted by other agencies. There are strict federal regulations that guide recruitment and hiring, which are tightly controlled by the Office of Personnel Management. The bureau audits the recruitment practices of five to six government agencies a year on a rotating basis, according to Kevin Mahoney, OPM's associate director for human capital leadership.

Yet the CIA is an "exempted agency," meaning it has its own hiring authority and isn't audited by OPM. As a result, the CIA is less encumbered by bureaucratic recruitment procedures. Basically, it runs its own show. "We don't have to obtain permissions on any of the venues we have scheduled for print or web," says the CIA's Neff. According to Robert Danbeck, associate director for OPM's human resources products and services division, there is talk about using social networks to let people know about other government jobs. However, most of the focus remains on the one-stop government job site USAJOBS.gov, which currently has around 220,000 job vacancies. "Right now, we really don't know about (social networking). We haven't gotten our arms around it yet," Danbeck says. Government agencies may be forced to turn to social networks and other web-based means for recruitment in the future. Hundreds of thousands of government workers are set to retire in the coming years, and new talent can increasingly be found on websites like Facebook and LinkedIn. However, dealings between social networks and the government may raise the hackles of citizens concerned about their privacy online. "If (the CIA) knows about Facebook, and they have a page on Facebook, it would be surprising if they weren't using it in other ways," says Nicole Ozer, civil liberties and technology policy director for the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California.

Facebook's privacy policy states that outside companies sponsoring groups don't have access to personal information or profiles. However, it does say that information may be shared with "other companies, lawyers, agents or government agencies," in order to comply with the law. Besides the fact that it isn't technically a company, the CIA says it is only using Facebook as an advertisement for new recruits. "The (CIA Facebook) page is only for information purposes; people cannot leave messages or engage in commentary," says Neff. "There is no collection of names, bio information or resume collection from this site, nor do we engage members in any way." Neff's claim is reinforced by Facebook's director of marketing Melanie Deitch, who refers to the agency as an "advertiser." "The CIA has no direct access to any user's profile," Deitch says. "They adhere to the same rules as all of our advertisers. We do not publish or disseminate our users' information to any advertiser." Ozer says that there's no way we can be sure what the CIA is up to online. "It seems if they would go to the trouble to infiltrate peace groups that they are also online looking at information."

[Dig]

National Clandestine Service recruiting future False Flag Arab Patsies
http://www.boingboing.net/2010/12/11/the-cia-honeypot-wik.html

So I am now digging around to see what else the CIA and NCS might be doing these days in the back halls of power that other Americans might want to know about.

Iranian American CIA Recruiting TV Advertisement video Note the voice-over states “I support global intelligence” – that’s a” very new world order” sounding phrase. I wonder if these new recruits are taking oaths of allegiance to a UN global governance, rather than the United States of America?

Arab American CIA Recruiting TV Commercial video This TV commercial shows Arab Americans living the good life, entertaining at home. Voice over: “Your nation, your world, the world is protected, careers at the Central Intelligence Agency…”

The words America, or American, or United States, or USA are never spoken in this advertisement. Think it over. Whose nation? It’s a dark and unnerving message in the ad, with implications I don’t like at all. American patriots should be keeping a close eye on the alphabet spy orgs that claim to keep a close eye on American National Security. Those are our tax dollars they are using you know. And if all this makes you as squeamish as it does me, you can cap off this post read by playing around on the CIA’s Kid’s Page on their website. Not to be outdone, the NSA also has a kid’s page. Whooppee.

[chris jones]

Unquestionable authority under a layer of impenetrable  secrecy. Eyes only clearance, with a battalions of lackeys, command of Gov agency's on the highest level. Supreme oversight of clandestine operations and unlimited black cash.
 If not within the masters circle of power directly, they are however the iron fist deeply involved in the culmination of the masters goals.
 Any government throughout history has spys, assassins, etc. These powermeongers have declared this territory supreme, above the law, unquestionable, and deem it be a necessity for national safety and the hunt for WMD's. They have been there for decades,in the smoke, only now have they gained the power to establish a authorized agency.
           

[Dig]

NATIONAL CLANDESTINE SERVICE
http://www.northgeorgia.edu/uploadedFiles/Enrollment/Cadet_Admissions/International_Education/CIA%20Recruiting%20Flyer%20Pg1%20Jun%202011.pdf

The CIA‘s National Clandestine Service is the cutting edge ofAmerican Intelligence. It is an elite corps, providing vital information needed by US policymakers, the military and law enforcement services to protect the national security interests of the American people. Individuals serving in the National Clandestine Service face new challenges every day, in a world with increasingly complex and constantly changing issues.

For the extraordinary person who wants more than just a job, the National Clandestine Service offers a unique career — a way of life that challenges the deepest resources of an individuaI’s intelligence, self reliance and responsibility. It demands an adventurous spirit, a forceful personality, high intellectual ability, toughness of mind, a superior degree of personal integrity, courage and love of country. Individuals serving in the National Clandestine Service deal with fast-moving, ambiguous and unstructured situations that challenge the full range of their abilities on a daily basis. Applicants should possess impeccable integrity, strong interpersonal skills, excellent written and oral communication skills,unquestionable patriotism and a strong desire to be part of something vital that makes a difference for family, friends and country. Qualified applicants possess a minimum of a bachelor's degree with a preferred GPA of 3.0 or higher and an interest in international affairs and foreign security. Foreign language skills are highly desirable, particularly in those critical languages listed on our website. New or refresher language training will be provided for all positions requiring language proficiency. Language bonuses are awarded for demonstrated proficiency. Although not required, overseas experience and military service are important pluses. All applicants for National Clandestine Service positions must successfully undergo several personal interviews, complete medical and psychological exams, aptitude testing, a polygraph interview and a background investigation. Following entry on duty, candidates will undergo extensive training and must complete a certification course designed for each career thrust. US citizenship is required.The maximum age for entering on duty in field-based positions is 35, but the age requirement may be waived.There is no age requirement for Washington, DC-based positions.

Field-Based Careers

I Operations Officer. Operations Offlcers serve on the front lines of the human intelligence collection business by clandestinely recruiting and handling sources of foreign intelligence. It takes special skills and professional discipline to establish strong human relationships that result in high-value intelligence from clandestine sources. An Operations Officer must be able to deal with fast moving, ambiguous and unstructured situations.This requires physical and psychological health, energy, intuition, street sense” and the ability to cope with stress. Operations Officers serve the bulk of their time in overseas assignments.

I Collection Management Officer. As the link between the National Clandestine Service Operations Officer in the fieId,the US foreign policy community and Intelligence Community analysts, it is the responsibility of the Collection Management Officer (CMO) to manage the collection, evaluation and dissemination of CIA intelligence information. Managing the collection effort requires determining what US policymakers need to know and then communicating those requirements to the Operations Officer.To be effective, the CMO must know how National Clandestine Service operations are conducted and have a solid understanding of international issues and overseas operating environments.

The Clandestine Service Trainee (CST) Program and the Professional Trainee (PT) Program are the launching pads for field-based careers. CSTs have a minimum of a bachelor's degree and several years of solid work or military experience under their belts before applying. PTs also have a minimum of a bachelor's degree but lack substantial work or military experience.

[Dig]

Student Internship Opportunities at the National Clandestine Service
http://www.campuscareercenter.com/full_jobs/7270309/CIA/Undergraduate_Internship_Program_NCS.html

Join a limited number of talented undergraduate peers as you support the NCS mission of collecting human intelligence on critical international developments. As a paid NCS intern, you will be part of a unique world of important events and meaningful accomplishments, working at our Headquarters facility outside of Washington, DC.

This internship requires a commitment to two 90-day summer internships, or one summer internship and a semester internship prior to graduation. Apply now; applications for internships next summer (2011) are being accepted now through November 1, 2010. All applications received after that time will be considered for internships starting in the summer of 2012. US citizenship is required.

The CIA is an equal opportunity employer and a drug-free workplace.

A History of Premier Intelligence

In 1947, President Harry S. Truman signed the National Security Act, creating the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) with a mission to advise the President on intelligence matters related to national security. Today, as the premier agency responsible for providing global intelligence on the ever-changing political, social, economic, technological and military environment, the CIA accomplishes its mission through research, development, and deployment of high-leverage intelligence-gathering technology. The agency also works closely with other organizations within the Intelligence Community to ensure that government policymakers and warfighters receive the best intelligence possible.

Our Careers Are of Utmost Importance to America

CIA career opportunities are unique and diverse - from Clandestine Service Officers serving on the front line of human intelligence to individuals skilled in science, engineering, technology, analysis, foreign languages and administration. Each one has a paramount goal: to protect the national security of the United States, which means that no matter what position you hold, you can truly make a difference for the nation working in the U.S. or around the world.

Analysts: Monitor and assess foreign political developments, leadership, economic issues, military threats and science and technology.

Clandestine Service: This career presents a unique way of life that challenges the deepest resources of an individual’s intelligence, self-reliance and responsibility.

Language Institute: Native speakers utilize the latest instructional technology in teaching 16 different foreign languages. Employees who attain tested levels of language expertise through full-time training, part-time classes or self-study are eligible for monetary incentives.

Science and Technology: Our mission requires us not only to apply existing science and technology, but to develop and implement breakthrough technologies that may never see the commercial marketplace.

Support Services: A wide variety of highly talented professionals serving at home and abroad enable us to meet our mission with skills in ranging from finance to logistics, linguistics to architecture, law to cartography.

A Workforce as Diverse as the Nation We Serve

Meeting our mission of protecting our national security interests requires a workforce as diverse as America itself - the most diverse nation on earth. Our professionals offer their own individual perspective, nationality, race, ethnicity, gender, age, language, culture, sexual orientation, education, values, beliefs, abilities, and disabilities. These assorted attributes create differing demographic, functional, and intellectual views that are vital to our innovation, agility, collection, and analysis. By combining smart, focused people from a myriad of occupations and cultures, and who have various abilities and experiences, we produce a dynamic workforce with unlimited potential.
Other Jobs at CIA
Sign Language Interpreter
Machinist
Computing Services Manager - Mid Level and Senior
Environmental Safety Officer
Contract Auditor
NRO Financial Management: Cost Estimator
NRO Financial Management: Program Control Officer
Police Officer - Security Protective Service (SPS)
Project Manager for IT
Protective Agent


From above...

The CIA is an equal opportunity employer and a drug-free workplace.

bwaaaaaaaaaaahahhaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa

[Dig]

The old revolving door...


Jose Rodriguez, former Director of the CIA National Clandestine Service, joins National Interest Security Company
http://www.nisc-llc.com/news/20081007.php

Fairfax, VA, (October 7, 2008) -  National Interest Security Company, LLC, (“NISC”) announced today that Jose Rodriguez, former Director of the CIA National Clandestine Service, has joined NISC as a Senior Vice President. Mr. Rodriguez will immediately bolster NISC's capabilities in helping the company's intelligence community, Department of Defense, and Department of Homeland Security clients.

Mr. Rodriguez led a range of increasingly critical operations over his 30 year CIA career. After serving in a variety of field commands, Mr. Rodriguez was selected to lead the CIA's Counter-Narcotics Center, bringing together intelligence analysts and operations officers to improve performance in pursuit of complex narco-trafficking networks. In the aftermath of 9/11, Mr. Rodriguez led the CIA Counterterrorism Center's worldwide collection program against international terrorist organizations and subsequently was selected as Director of the National Clandestine Service (“NCS”). Mr. Rodriguez is a seasoned executive, deeply knowledgeable of the intelligence community and its operations, and he is well known for his leadership in managing and evolving the NCS in a new era of missions and capabilities.

Mr. Rodriguez joins NISC's Mission Services vertical as a Senior Vice President in Edge Consulting. He will shape and lead engagements that improve the current value of intelligence and create new intelligence capabilities that integrate technology into new concepts of operations. Edge Consulting is a technology and strategy consulting company within NISC Mission Services which provides analytically-based portfolio strategies and capability prototyping to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, and several government agencies.

“We are thrilled to have Jose Rodriguez join our team and I am confident that his expertise will add great value as NISC continues to help our U.S. intelligence customers solve their most difficult challenges,” said Andrew Maner, CEO of NISC.

Chris Whitlock, President of NISC Mission Services added, “Jose is a well-known and highly respected professional within the intelligence community and national security community. The breadth and depth of Jose's experience in the clandestine service is unsurpassed and we are honored to have him on our team.”

About National Interest Security Company, LLC:
Headquartered in Fairfax, Virginia, NISC is a leading provider of innovative information technology, information management, and management technology consulting services and solutions in support of national interest and security initiatives for the intelligence community; the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, and Energy; and the Federal Health Information Technology community. NISC's expertise includes systems engineering, biometrics, document and media exploitation, systems integration, software development, enterprise architecture, cyber security, information assurance, intelligence operations, analysis support, network and critical infrastructure protection. NISC has nearly 1,000 employees, with the majority holding high-level security clearances.

[Effie Trinket]

https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-releases-statements/press-release-archive-2007/february-28-2007.html

Transcript of Interview of Major General Michael E. Ennis
Transcript of Interview of Major General Michael E. Ennis, USMC Deputy Director of the National Clandestine Service for Community HUMINT by WTOP Radio's J.J. Green

March 7, 2007

February 28, 2007

Green: General, I'm going to ask you as a matter of record and protocol, to give us your name, your title, and your connection to the Agency, please.

Ennis: My name is Major General Michael Ennis, and I'm the Deputy Director of the National Clandestine Service for Community HUMINT. Prior to that, I was the Director of Defense HUMINT for the Defense Intelligence Agency. I came here in February 2006, so I've been on board almost 13 months now.

Green: OK, General, let's get started. As you said, you are the Deputy Director for Community HUMINT with the National Clandestine Service. Please demystify this organization for us. Tell us what it is that you and your team do.

Ennis: The National Clandestine Service really is nothing more than the old Directorate of Operations under the CIA. Perhaps the biggest difference is that the National Clandestine Service also includes this new office called Community HUMINT. What is that? The Community HUMINT office is tasked to do several things. First and foremost, is to coordinate and deconflict the HUMINT activities that go on throughout the world. You may not know this, but there are almost a dozen agencies or organizations that actually conduct clandestine HUMINT, or human operations overseas. Each one has its own authorities, its own budget, its own priorities, and its own requirements. It's kind of like taking 14 Energizer bunnies, turning them on, and throwing them into a room, and they're all over the place. What we need to do is to try to deconflict and coordinate them so we don't duplicate our effort or so that we don't influence or affect somebody else's operation overseas. So what we have done is create a coordination center, here at the National Clandestine Service, that is comprised of representatives of about six or seven of the major organizations who conduct HUMINT operations. And on a daily basis, they get the reports in from the field if there are problems with coordination or deconfliction, they handle them, try to resolve them at the lowest possible level, so that those operations continue to go forward, and hopefully successfully.

Green: General, let's back up just for a second and explain for our audience, most of who are lay people, what HUMINT means.

Ennis: That's a great question, and a lot depends on who is asking the question, or who is giving the answer, because HUMINT means different things to different people. If you are from the Intelligence Community, you would probably say HUMINT is intelligence that is collected by a human being, by organizations from the Intelligence Community. But there are other organizations that are not collecting intelligence, but who also are conducting human intelligence. Let me explain what I'm saying. There are organizations who have as their primary mission law enforcement, or drug enforcement, or, in the case of the Special Operations Command, operational preparation of the environment, they call it, where they are not collecting intelligence, they are doing their other missions. But they are utilizing tradecraft, or clandestine methodologies, or they are using human sources, or they are establishing networks of sources. In other words, things that look like it might be espionage, but is actually being done under the auspices of another mission. So HUMINT actually includes some of the law enforcement, drug enforcement, Special Operations Command, as well as members of the Intelligence Community.

Green: In your case, it means the actual collection of intelligence and dissemination of it, and making sure that conflicts, where they may arise, are worked out and sorted out. But it doesn't mean law enforcement, it doesn't mean those other things.

Ennis: Correct.

Green: It means the actual information collection.

Ennis: That's right. That is exactly right.

Green: OK, so you have sort of explained what your mission is. But let's just get the official definition of what your mission is, sir.

Ennis: Rather than putting it in the sense of a mission, if I put it in the tasks that we have been assigned, I think I can explain a little bit more clearly what it is we are trying to do. In addition to doing the deconfliction and coordination, the WMD Commission -- the recommendations of the WMD Commission, from which the National Clandestine Service basically evolved, we were charged with going beyond the mere deconfliction and coordination of our HUMINT activities and operations, but actually we were tasked with integrating the capabilities of the various HUMINT partners within the Community, and synchronizing our operations against high-priority targets of national interest to the United States. This makes a lot of sense because it is the most effective use of the HUMINT resources that we have in this country. And so if we have a particular hard target or a particularly difficult operational problem, we are no longer working in separate areas. We are actually integrating our capabilities and synchronizing our operations against those particular targets. That is one of the missions that we have.

A third one is that we as a Community, because there are so many different players out there who are conducting human intelligence, we have been tasked with setting standards. Setting standards for training, setting standards for tradecraft, setting standards for source validation, for cover, how we manage our cover, how we manage our communications. So that even though we have different organizations, right now they are with varying levels of capability. We want to standardize the training and the capabilities that we have throughout the Community.

Green: Another thing I wanted to go back to, that you mentioned already, is there are, I think you said, something like a dozen agencies overseas that have their own authorities and their own processes. Correct me if I'm wrong, but these are all official adjuncts of the US Government.

Ennis: Absolutely...

Green: They function under the capacity of the US Government. Can you say what they are?

Ennis: First of all, we have the FBI, we have the Drug Enforcement Administration, we have the CIA, or the National Clandestine Service, we have the Defense Intelligence Agency, there is Special Operations Command which includes JSOC, we have our Army, Navy, and Air Force counterintelligence organizations...those are the ones that come to mind right now.

Green: And these are the ones that you were saying have their own overseas authorities and operations.

Ennis: That's right.

Green: And you have to make sure that everybody is on the same page.

Ennis: That's right. Exactly.

Green: How important is the National Clandestine Service, from your point of view, for what you do, to US national security? And how does your job, how does your office, fit into this puzzle? If I could put that a better way, HUMINT, and the collection of it, and the organization of it, the dissemination of it, is clearly one of the most important objectives for the Intelligence Community, as we know it. So how important is your part of the NCS mission to US national security?

Ennis: Well, I think it is a very important part of the whole process. And it is not one that you are going to see readily. It's [not] going to be very transparent. But if we have to conduct operations against a particular target, the CIA recognizes that it is not alone. It does not possess all the capabilities. There are capabilities that other organizations, departments, and agencies within the US Government have, that can be applied to the problem. So what we do is to avoid the duplication, and to have the most effective use of the resources available, we bring them together, we integrate them, and we synchronize them against a single problem. And that is simply proper management of a scarce resource that we have in the government, and those are our human resources.

But the second thing I would say is that as we begin to work together, our capabilities, our abilities, improve. And the quality of the operation is actually getting better. Those two things. The effective stewardship of the resources, and the improvement in the quality of the operation. Those are things that my organization, my part of the NCS, bring to the table.

Green: General, I want to veer off course here just for a moment, and this may be something you don't want to deal with, or it may be something you are very interested in dealing with. What we have heard -- time and time again since 9-11 -- is that Osama bin Laden and Al-Qaida are perhaps the biggest threat to the nation and indeed the world, considering the thought process and their Wahabi-ist tendencies. How does your organization view that problem, and collecting intelligence on that organization, and working with that intelligence. How do you and your Community approach it?

Ennis: Well, I certainly wouldn't want to speak on behalf of the Director of the National Clandestine Service or General Hayden, but my observation, from where I sit, is that they take this threat very seriously. Having been involved in this business now for three years -- two years with the Defense Intelligence Agency and now a year out here at the CIA -- I can assure you that we take that threat very seriously. I am not sure that the average American realizes the depth and the extent of the threat that this radical element, this terrorist element...the extent of this threat. It is very serious. These people are dedicated, they are committed to taking down Western values and Western cultures. And they have been at it now for nearly 20 years. It is a very serious threat, and we take it seriously.

Green: And collecting intelligence from this particular organization has to be challenging, just by nature and by virtue of the way in which they approach what they do. Very compartmentalized, very separated, and very hard to find. But there have been some success stories. Would you care to talk about any of them, or would you prefer that I just allude to the fact that there have been?

Ennis: Well, I would prefer that you could allude to the fact that there have been successes. And actually, that is what the word "clandestine" is all about, OK? We obviously can't go around bragging about some of our successes, because it reveals some of the sources and methods that we use. This is the "silent service," and it is so for a reason. But I can assure you there have been successes, and there are great men and women -- all over the world right now -- working under that veil of secrecy, if you will, who are dedicated to the values of the United States of America and are carrying out this battle, if you will, every single day.

Green: So when we hear stories, like we have recently, that Al-Qaida is reconstituting itself, the Taliban are regaining strength, and a lot people who hear these things on the radio or read it in the newspaper or see it on television get scared, it should be known that there are people out there -- good guys and women out there -- who are making some gains as well. So it's not just Al-Qaida reconstituting and preparing to storm the world.

Ennis: There is always that other side of the story. Absolutely. And they are out there. And we are blessed. I have seen some of the greatest young men and women here -- creative, innovative, energetic, patriotic -- who are absolutely dedicated to the values of this country, and are out there fighting that battle every single day.

Green: General, one of the big issues that is out there now, and you, being a military man, you may bristle at this, and I'm going to apologize in advance for having to do it. But there has been some talk out there about how CIA and the military can't get along, don't play well together. Specifically, as far as sharing intelligence and Community HUMINT, and the National Clandestine Service as a whole, I suppose. What is the real story behind that, because we know there have been some difficulties. With the previous Director and the previous Secretary of Defense, there was that history. Where are we now, where do we stand today?

Ennis: I think we are in a great position. I think this is one of the greatly misunderstood issues that we've had out here in the past. The issue is really about authorities -- when it comes to DoD's authorities or the FBI's authorities or DEA's authorities to conduct operations, OK? What DoD was asserting was that they had the authority to conduct operations in the pursuit of the Global War on Terrorism. Unfortunately, that translated, in many arenas, as an unwillingness to coordinate these activities -- to just go out and do what they want and how they want. And that is absolutely not true. I have been dealing with this now for well over a year. DoD is committed....always has been, and is sincere about it, their desire to coordinate their activities with the CIA and others, if necessary. As a matter of fact, they are so serious about it, DoD has sat down with the National Clandestine Service and actually done a document outlining coordination procedures that are really quite rigorous, that both sides are abiding by -- DoD and the CIA.

We had been working under coordination procedures that were developed in the Cold War. And now, with a number of different organizations out there conducting operations overseas, you have Chiefs of Station who are looking at them and saying, "These old coordination procedures don't necessarily fit the new environment." We are creating these new coordination procedures. We've done so at the FBI, we've done so with DoD, and both sides are committed to making this work. This coordination issue, I believe, is way overblown.

Green: But it won't go away, though. When I spoke with the General [Hayden] earlier about this, he said to me, at that point in time, that "as far as we and the Pentagon go, speaking at the CIA, we are on the same page." But there have been some questions about how things have not been going as smoothly as possible. Would you chalk that up to two things, or more, or something totally different, and I'm going to suggest those two things -- one, the National Clandestine Service, as you said, being a remake of the old DO, being new, having a new challenge, being in a situation where you are having to create some things and be innovative at the same time in a very difficult time in our history, and the second thing is, the same thing appears to be going on at the Pentagon. Or am I not on the same page?

Ennis: No, I think you are on the same page. It is a couple of things. In a way, the NCS is kind of like a leopard that is changing its spots. I think it is important to remember that from 1947 to 1997, the CIA had pretty much a clear running field overseas when it came to doing clandestine HUMINT operations. But with the advent of the Khobar Towers bombing, then there was the Cole bombing. there were the bombings of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, all of a sudden you had Navy and Air Force counterintelligence units that were out overseas, you had FBI elements that were overseas, Defense HUMINT came about in 1995 and began to work more overseas, it became a crowded field. So all of a sudden, the bold procedures for coordination didn't necessarily fit with all of these new players.

Secondly, with the advent of the National Clandestine Service, where it was our mandate to have more of a Community approach overseas, in addition to having to develop new procedures, we had to break old habits. Because all of the people who were part of the old DO just didn't go away. They are still here, as part of the new National Clandestine Service, with an additional mission, and that is not to control another organization's activities, not to challenge their authorities, but to work with them, to enable them to be successful. They will assess somebody else's operation and say, "Yes, we think this is weak here, here, and here, and this is what you need to do to improve it in order for it to be successful in this particular environment." That is a new role for the Chiefs of Station. So it is getting used to the new procedures, getting used to the new mission.

Are there occasional hiccups in the field? Absolutely. There are going to be. But I would argue that these are acts of omission as opposed to commission. Will these problems of coordination continue in the future? I hope not, because I would like to see nothing better than, as we begin to synchronize our operations, the problems of coordination just fade away, as we become used to the new procedures.

Green: How much do problems like that hurt the United States, hurt US national security? How much of an issue is it, when these things come up, and how important should it be to get over those things?

Ennis: I would not say that any one incident constitutes a grave threat or a breach in our security or something like that. But in total, as we begin to look, longer-range, at the threats that this country faces, we have got to be able to combine our efforts and integrate those capabilities. So there is less and less room for independent action by any one agency. We have got to work in concert with each other. And so, for the future, as good stewards of resources, we need to be able to integrate better.

Green: What do you say to your critics? What do you say to people who have been overblowing the hiccups that are taking place?

Ennis: I just tell them. I just tell them that coordination is not the issue. And I can look them straight in the eye and mean it with a great deal of sincerity, because I have been working these issues on a day-to-day basis for three years now. And there are no rogues out there. And really, on the military side, military commanders understand the need to coordinate their operations in the field. They do not want to cross the line of departure without having coordinated on their right and left flanks. It is no different in the HUMINT world. They understand the importance of coordination. But they also understand the importance, that they feel that they have the authority to conduct certain operations, and no other agency really has the authority to tell them, "No." But that doesn't mean, that just because someone has the authority to conduct an operation, that they can go ahead and do it in a way that is not going to be successful. And that's where we come in . We help them, we enable them to be successful.

Green: What is job one? What is the most important task on the list for the National Clandestine Service right now, and what is your role in that?

Ennis: Now we are talking about the National Clandestine Service writ large, as opposed to just the Community aspect. I would say one of the biggest challenges the National Clandestine Service faces is managing the growth of all the young men and women that are coming into this agency. As I mentioned before, we are every day bringing in folks -- young, energetic, bright -- we have to get them well trained, we have to keep them motivated, we have got to keep them engaged, get them out in the field -- and managing that growth so that they have the proper career paths, that they have the right advancement opportunities, that they have a variance in their careers, that's going to be important, managing that influx is very important.

Green: You may have answered this in another context, but I'm going to ask it again in that context you just mentioned, getting these young people in and managing them and their growth, and certainly making sure that they are plugged into the organization and producing, is clearly what you have to do. So when you look at that, what would you say is your principal challenge right now? Would it be something like getting people who speak a certain language, or people who understand certain cultures, or is that something that does not fall under your purview?

Ennis: That doesn't fall under my purview, but having dealt with this for two years at Defense HUMINT, with DIA, and seen it here, the CIA faces the same challenges that DIA faced. Absolutely. If we can get people who understand the cultures and have a basic understanding of the language, that is a definite plus. But we really also looking for kids who can think on their feet, who can work in stressful environments, who are innovative, think out of the box, they bring creative approaches to the HUMINT world, that's what we are looking for.

Green: We already talked about the collaborative environment between the CIA and the Pentagon to some degree, and you talked about that in detail. But the NCS was born in the wake of the 9-11 attacks, and HUMINT, at that point in time, was I guess perceived, or at least approached, a little differently before then. So, since your office has been stood up, certainly since you have been for, how would you characterize the progress that you have made, based on what your challenges have been, and what have been some of the sticking points?

Ennis: Great question. Remember I talked a little about the leopard changing his spots. I would say one of the biggest sticking points is we have tried to bring people on board and to work with them to help develop standards, develop common training. There is a reluctance, there is a sense of distrust, by the other organizations, of the CIA. I think they are a little bit afraid that this is going to be a CIA-led effort to control their operations, or take them over, or co-opt them in some way. You know, the CIA was the first among equals for many, many years, and there wasn't a lot of room for these other organizations. And now when they are coming on the scene, we have to overcome this concern, or this fear. And it is going to take a little bit of time. It's only natural, where they begin to trust that we are very sincere about enabling them, working with them, and enabling them to be successful in what they are trying to do. And working together, as a team. This is all about leadership. It's not about ownership or control.

Yes, we would like to act as a role model, as a good role model in the HUMINT world. But overcoming that concern that these other organizations have -- that we are somehow going to control their operations -- is going to take some time. But we are making progress. Because as we get involved in these working groups and these operational initiatives, they are beginning to see that yes, we are serious about this. We are serious about the HUMINT enterprise, and moving forward as one team.

Green: These other organizations you are talking about are other parts of the DNI...

Ennis: No, I'm talking about Defense HUMINT, the FBI, Joint Special Operations Command, SOCOM, etc.

Green: So, if that's the case then, give me a scenario of how you win these people over. You are talking about the working groups and some of the things that you have underway. Can you give us a scenario?

Ennis: Absolutely. I can give you an example. We're working operations against Country X. An organization, it could be Special Operations Command, it could be Defense HUMINT, or somebody comes up, and as we're working, we begin to realize that there is an operation that one of our other partners could conduct. And they come to us with a proposal, and they say, "This is something we would like to do." Instead of just saying "no," because we felt that operation was just not up to snuff -- that the training and the tradecraft that they were going to employ was not commensurate with the risk and complexity of the operation -- what we did is go back and work with them, we'll say, "You know we think that your cover is not really adequate here, we think the training that you have is not quite right, and one or two other things. And we'll work with you to raise the level, raise the bar to the point where we think this operation has a chance of succeeding." And we have actually done that, in some very sensitive places, with organizations. The missions have been conducted, and the results have been very successful. And once we do that -- once or two or three or four times -- they are going to begin to realize that no, we are not trying to take over their operation, we really are serious about working with them. And this is happening in the war zones, on the periphery of the war zones, and outside of the war zones.

Green: Go on. Details? ((laughter)) I know you can't go into details here.

Precisely an example of what I think people who aren't in your business, or aren't in the industry, just the average "Joe" or "Susie" can understand, is basically what happens on a retreat. You know, people within an organization who have some issues, who need to work those issues out, they go on a retreat and they work them out. But you've got to do this on the job. You've got to do this under some significant pressure.

Ennis: We do retreats, too, if I may interrupt. We are doing retreats too. We will have a particular problem, not even a problem, an issue. And I'll give you an example. DoD and the FBI and some others have come to us and they say, we need help in developing better HUMINT training. And we have put together an advisory group comprised of education specialists -- HUMINT education specialists -- and we have also included members from FBI, DEA, Department of Homeland Security, DoD, in this group. We are meeting for two days next week, and we are going to sit down and look at the courses that are being taught, we are going to analyze them, and we are going to see where they can be improved for each of these organizations. And it's not just going to be a CIA show, it's going to be a Community effort, to look at these and come up with some common standards and guidelines for them. So yes, we do retreats too, but we don't do it in isolation. We do it with members of the Community.

Green: OK. Moving on toward the end of this here, General. Some basic questions I would like to ask -- semi-personal -- but I think that is part of the story here. What really bothers you the most about what's going on, and what makes you happy? I'll get you to answer both of those, and you can choose whichever one you want to answer first, but primarily what I mean when {I ask] what bothers you, when you go home at night, when you are done with this for the day, what is it that is on your mind that probably bothers you more than anything else, and how do you handle that?

Ennis: I think the thing that bothers me more than anything else, is that some of the things that we are trying to do, or some of the issues that we deal with, are misconstrued and they are taken out of context for somebody's own agenda or for public consumption or something like that, and we waste a lot of time trying to defend ourselves against things that have never really happened. The example of the coordination with DoD. This was really more of an issue about authorities than it was about coordination. But yet we have spent so much time explaining the coordination problem. It has taken time away from what we could really be doing to do other things here within the Community HUMINT program. That concerns me.

What makes me happy when I go home at night is the absolute enthusiasm with which the other Community players have come in and been willing to sit down, roll up their sleeves, and get to work on issues of common concern. When we are dealing with threats of common concern, we get operators coming out of the woodwork, who want to sit down and begin to really plan, strategically, operations, and coordinate them. And when it comes time to setting standards for the Community, they want to participate, they want to be a part of it, they don't want to be dictated to. This has been really, tremendously heartwarming for me, to see this...this has been something the Community has wanted for a long time. What we want is to just be able to get on with the job and get it done.

Green: General, it's interesting that we are having this conversation in part, because most folks think that after 9-11, you wouldn't have these kinds of issues--not to say that they are small. But you have a huge Community of people here, all of whom have their interests, their concerns, their plans, their goals, and missions. But most folks after 9-11 thought that we would remain that galvanized country, and intelligence organizations would follow. But apparently, it's not that way. Give me your view of the future, how long it is going to take to get there.

Ennis: I don't mean for this to sound pessimistic, but I always say that whenever you undertake a major initiative, one that involves cultural differences, legal differences, procedural differences, historical differences, it's going to take about a generation, 20 years, for it to completely change. And that's just because you've got people who were born or came into this organization and do things a certain way, or another organization and do things a certain way, but as you train the young kids coming in, and you build them up, and they understand that this is the way of the future, this is the norm for them. And it is going to take a while, I would say 20 years, to get it fully changed. We are talking tectonic plate shifts here. We have organizations who have very, very deeply ingrained cultures, and you just can't change cultures overnight, because cultures evolve around the mission. And the only way for the culture to change is the mission to change, and the mission is changing a bit. The FBI is getting more involved in foreign intelligence collection. The CIA, with the National Clandestine Service, is becoming more of a Community organization. DoD is becoming more involved overseas in HUMINT operations. These are changes in mission. Now the cultures have got to change to catch up with that, and it's not something that is done overnight.

Green: A couple of quick things. General, you clearly have had a long and illustrious career, and you have done a number of things, you've been a number of places. Why did you take this job, because it is clear that this is no cakewalk. Why did you take this job?

Ennis: I'll be honest with you, J.J. I didn't want the job. I was actually going over to be General Casey's Chief of Staff at MNFI. I got a call from General Hayden, who at that time was the Principal Deputy Director to Ambassador Negroponte at the DNI, and he told me that they wanted me to go over to this job. And I told him that I actually had orders to go to Baghdad to be the Chief of Staff for General Casey, but I appreciated the offer. And he told me it wasn't an offer. ((laughter)) Here I am. But I have to tell you. As much as I really did not initially want to come over here, I am so glad now that I did, for the reasons I explained earlier. I am gratified by the way NCS has approached this, and my position. It would have been very easy for them to just put me on the outside and let me do the Community thing, while they continued to do the old DO thing, and that's not the way this has happened at all. I have been brought in as part of the DO, as part of the NCS, I know what they are doing, and it helps me, as I work with Community partners, to understand better how the NCS, the CIA work. Because if we are going to be a role model, I need to understand how they operate.

But secondly, I am so pleased with the way the Community partners have come to this mission, have come to this concept of coordination, deconfliction, synchronization, integration. For the Community and for the United States, this is really an important concept and an important initiative, and I'm just very pleased to be part of it.

Green: When Americans go to bed at night after hearing this interview, or reading it, whichever they do, or both, what is it that you want them to know? What is it that you want to leave with them, based on what we talked about, based on what your job is, based on what your mission is, and what it is that you are charged with doing? What is it that you want the average person to know?

Ennis: I would like the average person to know that no matter what they hear on television, or on radio, or read in the papers or the magazines about how "screwed up" things are, that there are men and women who are absolutely dedicated to the values of this country, who are working very hard, doing what they think are in the best interests of this country, to somehow make this a better place than it was yesterday. They can't always go into detail about what they are doing, but there are definitely people there who are working on what they believe are the best interests [of the nation]. And they are a very dedicated group.

Green: Anything you want to add, sir, that we haven't talked about that you think is important as we discuss this particular topic today?

Ennis: No, I think that just about wraps it up. I am very pleased to have been out here for the last 13 months. I think this is a wonderful organization. We have great leadership. We have a group of people now in position. Secretary of Defense Gates, Admiral McConnell over at the DNI, with General Hayden in place here, and I know General Clapper has been nominated to be the USDI [Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence], he has not yet been confirmed. But if he is confirmed, and we have these four individuals at the very top, as the Secretary of Defense and our intelligence agencies, I think the stars are aligning and this is going to be a very great year, next year, 18 months to work. And we are going to see some wonderful, positive changes.

Green: General, thank you for your time, and I appreciate the opportunity to talk to you.

Ennis: Thank you, J.J. It has been a pleasure.

Historical Document
Posted: Mar 16, 2007 12:09 PM
Last Updated: Jun 18, 2008 09:48 AM
Last Reviewed: Mar 16, 2007 12:09 PM
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http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/tag/john-d-bennett/

CIA Drone Guy Becomes New Top Spy
By Spencer Ackerman July 21, 2010  3:24 pm



How crucial have drone strikes become to the CIA? A senior official involved with them just became the agency’s new top spy.

CIA Director Leon Panetta named John D. Bennett the next chief of the National Clandestine Service, the operations side of the agency. Bennett, a retired Marine and four-time agency station chief who returned in 2007 CIA after a brief retirement, previously headed the Special Activities Division. That’s the CIA’s paramilitary wing.

While that division doesn’t oversee the drone strikes, it is — and Bennett was — involved with them in ways we haven’t yet been able to precisely learn, according to our sources. (This AP story claims that Bennett actually directed the drones while in Pakistan during the Bush administration.) Panetta put it this way in a statement: “He has been at the forefront of the fight against al-Qa’ida and its violent allies.”

Bennett’s exact role with the drones may not be clear. What isn’t in question is that the drones are one of the highest profile (and most controversial) programs that the CIA has operated in years. The Panetta and the agency swears up and down is a hugely effective counterterrorist tool. Continuing a pattern from the end of the Bush administration, the Obama-era CIA has sharply ratcheted up the use of missiles fired from drones to kill terrorist targets in Pakistan. The New America Foundation tallies that there have already been 46 drone strikes in the tribal areas of Pakistan from January 1 to July 15, compared to 53 in 2009, 36 in 2008 and just 9 from the program’s 2004 inception to 2007. Check out this GoogleMap and you’ll see they’re concentrated in a rather compact area. All this has raised questions about whether it’s time to admit to ourselves that we’re at war in Pakistan.
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http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2002/021027-cia1.htm

The Dallas Morning News  October 27, 2002
CIA commandos remain covert

BY TOD ROBBERSON

KABUL, Afghanistan - They don't play by the normal rules because they don't have to. That's a big reason why the United States increasingly prefers to deploy CIA paramilitary troops whenever it prepares to enter global hot spots such as Afghanistan or Iraq.U.S. military officials and other analysts say the CIA has a long history of sending highly trained commandos to some of the world's most dangerous places, sometimes well in advance of conventional fighting forces but often right alongside them.

The commandos' job is to gather intelligence, work as forward observers and perform covert operations that mainstream U.S. forces legally are not allowed to do or cannot do because of their more public, high-profile status.

"The CIA gets a bad rap. People tend to think that if the CIA is involved, there must be some kind of nefarious intent," said Lt. Col. Kevin M. McDonnell, commander of the U.S. Army's 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Forces Group. His troops spent much of the past six months working alongside CIA agents and paramilitary units in operations against al-Qaeda and Taliban guerrillas in isolated areas of Afghanistan. "They complement our mission. But the experience in our ranks complements their mission as well. They could not do what they do without us, and we could not do what we do without them," he explained.

Allende and the Shah

The CIA's reputation for nefarious behavior flourished in the 1970s and '80s, when the agency became linked to military coups, such as the one that overthrew Chilean socialist leader Salvador Allende in 1973; political assassinations; and support of dictators such as Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran.

The agency maintained such a guarded silence about its activities that it wasn't until 1997 that the CIA officially acknowledged its military role in the Bay of Pigs attack in Cuba in 1961.

At the insistence of Congress, the CIA has undergone multiple reforms that made its activities seem more palatable to the public.

Analysts say the agency today is trying to polish its image by acknowledging a role in the early military campaign in Afghanistan - a rare admission that tries, in part, to offset the bad publicity surrounding intelligence failures that led to the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks.

When American bombs started to fall on Afghanistan one year ago, military analysts said, CIA paramilitary units on the ground were already determining where U.S. attacks should be focused, where the enemy's defenses were vulnerable, and how best to deploy conventional ground forces. They interrogated prisoners on the spot to glean crucial battlefield intelligence.

Special activities

With the United States moving closer to military confrontation with Iraq, the CIA's paramilitary force, known as the Special Activities Division, is making ready, said Charles Heyman, editor of London-based Jane's World Armies.

"These units have been in Iraq for quite some time," Mr. Heyman said. "It would be inconceivable for them not to be," given the magnitude of preparations by the Bush administration for a possible attack.

The CIA declined to comment. A spokesman said the intelligence agency does not discuss any such operations.

At Bagram Air Force Base outside Kabul, where the bulk of U.S. military forces are based, officials make no attempt to hide the presence of CIA paramilitary units in their midst - or the fact that they deploy regularly with conventional forces on combat missions.

Col. Roger King, the chief spokesman for U.S.-led coalition forces in Afghanistan, typically responds to questions about the CIA's military role by acknowledging the presence on missions of "personnel from other U.S. government entities." He appears to take pains not to use the word "agency."

Journalists are advised not to photograph the CIA agents or attempt to interview them. There have been times when American men in military combat uniform, but without military insignia, have threatened to shoot reporters or photographers who encountered them during operations. One confrontation erupted in northern Afghanistan in November, shortly before CIA paramilitary agent Johnny "Mike" Spann was killed during a battle with al-Qaeda and Taliban prisoners.

Col. King said the Pentagon had wanted to send reporters on military missions with U.S. special forces units throughout the American deployment in Afghanistan. But the presence of "personnel from another entity" on those missions frequently made it impossible, he said.

"At the end of the day, the most important aspect of these operations is that no one knows about them," Mr. Heyman explained, adding that the CIA will go to extraordinary lengths to protect the identities and activities of its paramilitary agents.

"One of the great worries is that one of these guys is going to get killed. No man is irreplaceable, but these guys almost are. They are almost the jewel in the crown," he said. "They are so out of the ordinary, so valuable, that losing one or two of them can be an absolute disaster."

Lt. Col. McDonnell said that, in many cases, the CIA selects its Special Activities Division agents from the ranks of retired special-operations personnel - experienced members of the Army's Special Forces, the Marines' Delta Force or the Navy Seals.

"These are not supermen. It would probably surprise you how normal and mundane they really are," he explained.

"The common thread they have is that they are an unusually patriotic group. They don't do this so they can participate in a parade or so they can have stories to tell their families," he added. "They do it so they can serve something bigger than themselves."

Col. King insisted that there was no redundancy in having a CIA special operations force on hand to perform functions that might be handled by non-clandestine military units. But he acknowledged that, early in the Afghan campaign last year, there was a lack of coordination between the two groups.

"There is a maturing process that goes on in any theater of operations. There was no central command early on," he said. Today, "we have pretty good cooperation and coordination" between the CIA and the U.S. military in Afghanistan. "We have a specific group that does nothing but coordinate" between the two groups.

Friend or foe?

Other analysts say the competition is fierce between the CIA and other military units.

"The turf wars between these organizations are horrendous. They all loathe each other," said one analyst, asking not to be identified. "But they have to coordinate. Otherwise, they might well end up performing the same operation or, worse, shooting at each other."

Competition grew so bitter between the Pentagon and CIA in the 1990s that the U.S. government seriously considered absorbing the CIA's paramilitary wing into the Pentagon's special operations branch, arguing that there was no need for the CIA to operate its own army.

Former CIA analyst John A. Gentry disagreed in a 1995 paper about reforming the intelligence agency. "The military cannot handle the job. And there are major diplomatic and domestic political risks associated with use of uniformed military personnel in such activities" as those performed by the CIA units.

"It is important to be able to maintain plausible deniability. Use of American citizen-soldiers, poorly able or untrained in concealing their national heritage, sharply reduces our ability to conceal involvement," Mr. Gentry wrote.

Undercover troops

Today, given the widely acknowledged success of the CIA's paramilitary activities in Afghanistan, the opposite is being proposed: deactivating some military special operations personnel to enable them to work temporarily undercover with the CIA. Analysts say there are many advantages.

The CIA faces far fewer accountability problems with Congress than does the Pentagon, said John Pike, director of the Washington-based nonprofit policy group GlobalSecurity.org.

"The CIA's capabilities and activities are intended to be unacknowledged. They are employed in countries where the fact of an American military presence would be damaging," he said.

Mr. Heyman concurred: "It's terribly political. It means the secretary of defense or the president can stand up before Congress and declare, 'We do not have any military forces in this area.' The CIA can do what it has to do in isolation."

In addition to the rigorous training and psychological preparation received by all special operations personnel, members of the Special Activities Division receive specialized training at the Defense Department's Harvey Point Defense Testing Activity, outside Hertford, N.C.

In his book, See No Evil: The True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA's War on Terrorism, former CIA agent Bob Baer describes demolition training he received at Harvey Point using plastic and other types of explosives, along with four months of paramilitary training that began shortly after his recruitment in 1976.

Mr. Pike said the CIA's paramilitary history dates to the agency's creation through the National Security Act of 1947 and even before, when paramilitary intelligence units formed the backbone of the Office of Strategic Services during World War II.

In Stephen E. Ambrose's book Band of Brothers, Sgt. Robert "Burr" Smith alludes to service in the CIA after his service fighting with E Company, 101st Airborne Division in World War II. In a 1979 letter, he said his World War II experience "led me to a new career with a government agency, which in turn led to eight years in Laos as a civilian adviser to a large, irregular force."

Even in Afghanistan, the CIA's dealings with irregular forces have created problems. In the southeastern city of Khost last month, leaders of two rival militias complained that someone from the United States was paying off both sides to win their cooperation in the war against al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Instead, the militias used the money to purchase weapons, which they then turned against each other.

Col. King denied that the U.S. military had anything to do with such payments. He said the denial did not necessarily extend to "other U.S. government entities."

Reports also have been published linking U.S. government entities to militias involved in the opium trade in Afghanistan. Drug smugglers often can obtain information regarding arms purchases and guerrilla activities, Col. King acknowledged. But he said the U.S. military has a strict policy mandating that there be no dealings with any militia involved in the drug trade.

Asked if the policy extended to the CIA, he responded, "I don't speak for them."

[Effie Trinket]

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4340318.stm
Last Updated: Thursday, 13 October 2005, 21:34 GMT 22:34 UK

US setting up new spying agency
The US has announced the creation of a new intelligence agency led by the CIA to co-ordinate all American overseas spying activities.


The new NCS director will report to CIA chief Porter Goss

The National Clandestine Service (NCS) will oversee all human espionage operations - meaning spying by people rather than by technical means.  The move is the latest in the post-9/11 reforms of US intelligence agencies.  Analysts say the NCS restores some authority to the CIA after it lost overall control of US intelligence.

'Expression of confidence'

The chief of the new service will supervise the CIA's espionage operations and co-ordinate all overseas spying, including those of the FBI and the Pentagon.  The director of the new agency, whose identity will remain secret and is simply known as "Jose", will report directly to the head of the CIA, Porter Goss.  "This is another positive step in building an intelligence community that is more unified, co-ordinated and effective," National Intelligence Director John Negroponte said.

Setting up the NCS was one of more than 70 recommendations made by a commission on weapons of mass destruction in March, which was highly critical of the US' intelligence capabilities.  As part of reforms following the 11 September 2001 attacks, the CIA lost overall control of US intelligence to the newly created National Director of Intelligence.  Mr Goss said the new service represents "an expression of confidence in the CIA" from President George Bush and Mr Negroponte.

"No agency has greater skill and experience in this difficult, complex, and utterly vital discipline of intelligence," Mr Goss said.
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http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=National_Clandestine_Service

National Clandestine Service
From SourceWatch
Jump to: navigation, search

The establishment of the National Clandestine Service (NCS) within the Central Intelligence Agency was approved October 13, 2005, by President George W. Bush.

The new Director of the NCS will report directly to the Director of the CIA, Porter J. Goss, and will work with the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, John D. Negroponte, "to implement all of the DNI's statutory authorities." [1]

Established in response to recommendations made in March 2005 by the President's Commission on the Intelligence Capabilities of the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, the NCS will serve as "the national authority for the integration, coordination, deconfliction, and evaluation of human intelligence operations across the entire Intelligence Community, under authorities delegated to the Director of the CIA who serves as the National HUMINT Manager." [2]

The NCS "will oversee all human espionage operations - meaning spying by people rather than by technical means," the BBC reported October 13, 2005. "The move is the latest in the post-9/11 reforms of US intelligence agencies."

The identity of the head of NCS will remain secret -- only known as Jose -- "will supervise the CIA's espionage operations and co-ordinate all overseas spying, including those of the FBI and the Pentagon." Jose will report directly CIA head Porter J. Goss, the BBC said.

The Plan

"The plan was drafted by Goss, based on a suggestion made last March by President [George W.] Bush's commission on intelligence. It keeps the CIA's traditional position as leader of U.S. 'human intelligence' collection overseas as the FBI, the Defense Intelligence Agency and military services are increasing their clandestine operations around the world as part of the terrorism fight," Walter Pincus wrote in the October 13, 2005, Washington Post.

"The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence -- citing past CIA failures in averting the Sept. 11, 2001, attacks and in overstating Iraq's weapons of mass destruction -- recently concluded in a report that coordination of human intelligence should be moved to the office of the director of national intelligence, John D. Negroponte. The director of intelligence position was created in the intelligence-community revision by Congress last year," Pincus wrote. "Although the intelligence director's office will not directly coordinate the human intelligence activities, it will exercise oversight. Negroponte's deputy in charge of collection, Mary Margaret Graham, a former CIA operations officer, will oversee all human intelligence collection overseas and will set broad requirements for what information needs to be collected, sources said. The CIA, the FBI and Pentagon agencies will work out who carries out the clandestine collections, with the clandestine services chief coordinating their activities."

"As currently envisioned, the clandestine services director will have a deputy who would not only coordinate overseas spying operations, but also ensure that agencies do not overlap one another in recruitment or operations, described by one official as 'deconflicting' activities in the community. The deputy will also supervise establishment of common standards for training all human intelligence collectors in tradecraft, including the recruitment, vetting and handling of sources.

"Another clandestine services deputy will run CIA's clandestine operations, as the deputy director for operations does now. The president's commission had originally proposed creating the position to free the deputy director for operations to concentrate on increasing the capability of CIA's operations, which were found lacking based on the agency's performances in failing to prevent the Sept. 11 attacks and to gain accurate information on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction," Pincus wrote.

"Sources inside and outside the government said yesterday they expect that the CIA's current deputy director for operations, referred to as Jose because he is still under cover, will be the first NCS director. 'He is a team builder,' said one of Jose's former colleagues."

Old Proposal Revived? Again?

Apparently Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Pat Roberts (R-Kansas) was aware of the National Institute for Public Policy (NIPP) study, "a detailed 124-page analysis that was entitled Modernizing Intelligence: Structure and Change for the 21st Century," released in 1998.

"The chairman of the study was U.S. Army Lt. General William Odom (ret.), the former director of the National Security Agency. Odom was assisted by a senior advisory group that included retired Air Force Lt. Gen. James Clapper and retired Army Lt. Gen. Harry Soyster, both former directors of the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency. Although admittedly a military view of the issue, the military intelligence veterans pulled no punches in calling for a sweeping structural overhaul and realignment of organizational responsibilities throughout the US intelligence community."

Among those recommendations was to "Restructure the CIA, giving it two major components, the national clandestine service and a component for handling overt HUMINT."

In August 2004, Senator Roberts proposed "legislation to overhaul the intelligence community, recreating it as a National Intelligence Service." Among the changes he proposed was to "break up the CIA into three parts: a National Clandestine Service to direct traditional spy operations; an Office of National Assessments to be responsible for intelligence analysis; and an Office of Technical Support to handle research and development projects." Under Roberts' proposal, the "CIA director's position would be abolished."
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http://www.oss.net/extra/news/?module_instance=1&id=1334



Intelligence Re-Invented

Intelligence at What Cost? An Ethics Case Study

Steele Brief to NSA in Las Vegas 9 January 2002

YouTube Commentary on IC Production Process

KGB Mobile Offers Immediate Answers to Any Texted Question

Citizen cross-walk nails 6 with license to fly overlooked by US IC

Links That Are NOT Included In LIBRARY Document.




2009-07-13 Ethical Case Study on Army Interrogation in Iraq

We salute the officer writing this essay (see link dated today). Intelligence--and how intelligence is done--is an inherent responsibility of command and how intelligence is done not only impact strategically, operationally, tactically, and technical, but is a direct reflection on the integrity and ethical soundness of everyone in the chain of command.

2009-07-10 How time flies....

Preparing a new web site for public intelligence that will become the front end for both OSS and EIN, we ran across the briefing to NSA conference in Las Vegas 9 January 2009.

Laugh or cry, the brief is worth revisiting--planned words in Notes format. Share with others, the permanent shortcut is www.oss.net/Vegas.

2009-07-01 YouTube on IC Production Process

For information. See the link dated today. The same kind of thing could be done on each element of the intelligence cycle, for example:

Requirements: Not really done for Cabinet secretaries, Assistant Secretaries, Division and Branch Heads, and certainly not Action Officers.

Collection: $65 billion on the 20% we can steal, ignoring Open Source Intelligence (OSINT) as well as Multinational Multagency, Multidisciplinary, Multidomain Information-Sharing and Sense-Making (M4IS2)

Processing: still no all-source desk-top analytic workstation, still no aggregate sense-making capability to detect patterns and anomalies.

Analysis: Huge gap in the middle, shut off from SMEs all over the world, cutting out six of the eight tribes of intelligence

Dissemination: Classify what little open source that is done, require separate passwords and protocols such that the average analyst who *tries* (most do not) to access all relevant secret databases will spend a quarter of their day in access and navigation.

And so on. See the second link for the Failure lecture that is still relevant now, as the third DNI in history struggles inside a "closed circle" that is simply not "open" to long-standing ideas for creating truly national intelligence, i.e. a Smart Nation in which we produce intelligence for the President--AND everyone else.

2009-06-28 KGB buries CIA--ask any question via text

Our intrepid never-sleeping Executive Director found this, and we love it. It is the very embodiment of the "education one cell call at a time" that EIN has advocated since 2006, and it takes UNICEF's RapidSMS one step further toward making all human beings both equal, and equally informed. BRAVO!

2009-06-28 With a tip of the hat to "Editor" at The Fallen Grain, see the story at the link followed by a link to The Fallen Grain.

Citizens cross-walked the public threat list with the public FAA list of licenses to fly, and found six considered threats who had been overlooked by the US IC and DHS.

As we have been saying for over a decade, the future of intelligence is not federal, not secret, and not expensive.




We are now entering the third era of national intelligence,

Stage One: Secret War

Stage Two: Strategic Analysis

Stage Three: Smart Nation

Time is the one strategic variable that cannot be bought nor replaced. truth and morality are the entwined strategic variable that cannot be ignored in the long term.

On the basis of attending the first Design Science Lab at Chestnut Hill College in Philadelphia, we strongly recommend the experience which can be brought to any location.

This is a life-changing drill for those with open minds who are truly committed to making a positive difference at any level.

Led by Medard Gabel, #2 to Buckminster Fuller and a gentle genius in his own right, assisted by Wayne Jacoby of Global Education Motivators, the materials received, the practical exercises understaken, and the classmates and UN officials engaged with, are uniquely educational, uplifting, and totally righteous.

See the link dated today and the quote immediately below.

"Reformations and transformations are not the same thing. Reformations are concerned with changing the means systems employ to pursue their objectives. Transformations involve changes in the objectives they pursue....there is a difference between doing things right (the intent of reformations) and doing the right thing (the intent of transformations." Russell Ackoff

SO what does this mean? It means that we have to stop spending $65-75-85 billion a year on "secrets for the President" that leave 96% of his "need to know" decision support needs unmet, and we have to start providing unclassified decision-support to the President AND everyone else--including the UN and NGOs, while creating a Global Range of Needs and Gifts Table that influences how $1 trillion a year is spent waging peace and eradicating the ten high level threats to humanity.

The future of intelligence is NOT federal, NOT secret, and NOT expensive. But then we have been saying that for some time now. Civil Society, not governments, will create the intelligence they need to regenerate the Earth.

Links:
» Core Readings in Intelligence Reform (Books)
» Core Chapters from OSS.Net Press on Intelligence Reform
» Core One-Pagers on Intelligence Reform
» 2004-07-16 Thoughtful Article on Intelligence Reform Basics
» Press Release on Missing Elements of Senate 9-11 Report
» Press Release on Four Deficiencies of 9-11 Commission Report
» 9-11 Commission Recommends Open Source Agency
» USN&WR Cover Story on Intelligence Reform (Mission Impossible)
» USN&WR Sidebar on Needed Reforms
» USN&WR Graphic on Needed Reforms
» 9-11 Commission Report Cool IT Approach #1
» 9-11 Commission Cool IT Approach #2
» WIRED Overview of Hacks on the 9-11 Commission Report (all of which appear to have missed the Open Source Agency, a hack in itself)
» 2004-07-30 9-11 Commission Chairs Emphasize "Bottom Up" Importance of Page 413 (Open Source Agency at the very bottom of the chart)
» 2004-08-03 Reflections on Secrecy Against Open Sources, Betraying the Public Interest
» 2004-08-04 SecDef Cheney's 1992 Views on Intelligence Reform
» 2004-08-09 Steele Keynote to Texas Law Enforcement
» 2004-08-12 Four Conditions for Confirmation of New DCI
» 2004-08-17 Dr. Andregg on Insanity of Intelligence Reform as Now Planned
» 2004-08-24 Press Release Supporting Senator Roberts' Plan to Break Up CIA, and Cautioning Senator Warner to Not Repeat 1996 Opposition to Intelligence Reform that Helped Cripple Our Ability to Prevent 9-11
» 2004-09-02 High Praise for Intelink as Foundation for Transformation
» 2004-09-02 Bruce Berkowitz on "Secrecy and National Security"
» 2004-09-03 Washington Post on Comical Secrecy
» Steele's 1993 Testimony to Presidential Commission on Secrecy
» Steele's 1993 Comments to Presidential Commission on Secrecy
» Steele's 1993 Primer on "Sources & Methods" Bullshit Used to Blindside Congress
» Steele's 1996 Comments to Congressional Forum on Secrecy
» BOOK REVIEW: Senator Bob Graham, INTELLIGENCE MATTERS
» ORDER Senator Graham's Book (Comes Out 7 Sep 04)
» 2004-09-06 Richard Clarke on Senator Roberts' Plan to Break Up CIA
» 2004-09-15 Press Release on Two Missing Elements of 9-11 Intelligence Reform Legislation
» 2004-09-19 Good Article on CIA Covert Abuses, Supports Idea of CIA Redirection to Being National Analysis Agency
» 2004-09-19 Link to Steele's 490+ Reviews, New Review of Senator Graham's Book Just Posted
» 2004-09-19 Anthony Codesman (CSIS) with 14 Questions and 14 Negative Answers on Intelligence Reform
» 2004-09-19 Steele (OSS) Answers Cordesman (CSIS) 14 Questions on Intelligence Reform, in the Affirmative
» 2005-01-10 CIA Admin Pukes Destroying the Agency
» 2005-01-14 Steve Coll on CIA Mired in Bureaucracy
» 2004-01-14 DCI Porter Goss to 9-11 on Over-Classification
» 2005-01-23 CounterPunch on CIA's Junior Scholars
» 2005-02-01 Reuel Marc Gerecht on Wrong Changes for the CIA
» 2005-02-01 Re-Post of Original OSS Press Release on Reforming the Clandestine Service
» 2005-03-04 Senator Chambliss in Parameters on DoD Intelligence Command
» 2005-05-19 Parameters Commentary--Steele on Chambliss
» 2005-05-14 Geospatial, Clapper, and JIOCs
» 2005-05-28 DNI Organization Charts including ADNI for OSINT
» 2005-06-02 Op Ed on Early Days of the DNI
» 2005-06-05 NSA OSINT Glass Box Project
» 2005-05-27 Herb Meyer on Why DNI Negroponte Will Fail
» 2005-06-03 Robert Steele on DNI's Six Major Mistakes
» 2005-06-13 9-11 Commissioner Critical of DNI
» 2006-06-21 European Intelligence Community & Information Sharing Network
» 2005-06-23 GovExec on House Intelligence Authorization
» 2005-06-25 Terrorism Threat Over-Rated
» 2005-06-29 Google index to current human spying articles
» 200506-29 Google index to General Odom on need for MI-5
» 2005-07-18 Steele Op-Ed on Intelligence Reform
» 2005-07-19 Subscribe to International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence (IJIC)
» 2005-07-18 Steele Interview with AMU Student
» 2005-07-23 US counterterror agency criticized on info-sharing
» 2005-07-25: New Code, "Drinking the Kool-Aid"
» 2005-07-29 FOX News Focuses on OSINT
» 2005-07-31 ASEAN Online Intelligence Information-Sharing
» 2005-07-31 "Advantage, China"
» 2005-07-31 Google Back Door to Advantage, China
» 2005-08-08 TIME Magazine on CIA OSINT "Initiative"
» 2005-08-08 Article on California National Guard "Spy Center"
» 2005-08-09 Four in 9/11 Plot Identified by OSINT A Year Prior to 9-11
» 2005-08-12 More Able Danger Stories
» 2005-08-19 Able Danger New Stories
» 2005-08-19 Today's INSCOM Boss on Search and Sharing
» 2005-08-20 DHS Success Story with Indiana web-sharing
» 2005-09-23 Google Legacy Book by Steve Arnold Rocking the Information and Intelligence Industries
» 2005-08-23 Google Desktop as Navigator
» 2005-08-25 Ralph Peters on the Lost Soul of Intelligence
» 2005-08-25 Ralph Peters new book NEW GLORY
» 2005-08-25 Washington Times Op-Ed on Non-Reforms, Non-DNI
» 2005-08-29 NYT Op-Ed on Two Thirds Not Graduating from High School
» 2005-09-02 Tenet-Bush Fight on Who's to Blame for 9-11 (Washington Times)
» 2005-09-02 9-11 Who's To Blame--One Man's Answer
» 2005-09-02 9-11 Who's To Blame--One Man's Answer
» 2005-09-06 China-India Intelligence Information Sharing
» 2005-09-22 Pentagon Gags Able Danger Team in Cover-Up
» 2005-09-27 Rumsfeld makes brilliant appointment of OPERATOR as D/DIA
» 2005-10-05 Dr. Michael Andress on Intelligence Ethics (Abstract for Comment)
» 2005-10-11 Reform Book (Sims et al), "Transforming Intelligence"
» 2005-11-10 Reform Book (DCI Turner), "Burn Before Reading"
» 2005-10-14 Google Hits on National Clandestine Service
» 2005-10-14 OSS Press Release on Five Paths to Proper NCS
» 2005-10-11 IO Monograph, Forthcoming in Book Form
» 2005-10-18 Latino PR on Mother Nature as Terrorist (May Be Freely Linked, Distributed, and Translated)
» 2005-10-18 Google Earth Replacing NRO Faster, Better, Cheaper
» 2005-10-20 CSM on Corruption in Iraq, Vanishing Billions
» 2005-10-21 BASIC Report "See, Speak, and Hear No Incompetence"
» 2005-10-21 Direct Link to BASIC Report (Back-Up Copy)
» 2005-10-25 DDCI Admiral Bill Studeman on the Hill
» 2005-10-26 Able Danger and USS Cole, Cover-Up Continues
» 2005-10-26 Information Operations Annotated Bibliography (Part III)
» 2005-10-27 National Intelligence Strategy of the USA
» 2005-10-29 BreakAway Games Home Page (the Future of Public Intelligence)
» 2005-10-29 JC Herz on "Harnessing the Hive via Online Games"
» 2005-10-31 Princeton Paper on Intelligence Reform
» 2005-11-02 Google Hits on Torture and Terrorism
» 2005-11-02 Google Hits on Torture and CIA
» 2005-11-02 Google News Hits Today on Torture and CIA
» 2005-11-02 Levy, Bernard Henri, War, Evil, and the End of History
» 2005-11-02 New IO Annotated Bibliography (See Ethics Section)
» 2005-11-09 Mary Margaret Graham Gets an F
» 2005-11-09 Jeff Smith on Why CIA Should Not Do Torture
» 2005-11-14 Steele at Hackers on Google Intelligence
» 2005-11-15 On CIA Lack of Ethics (Review of Baer Movie)
» 2005-11-16 John Lehman on "Getting Spy Reform Wrong" [Google News the Title if Link Leads to Stupid Registration Page]
» 2005-11-19 House Intelligence Chairman Calls for Declassification of Untranslated Documents
» 2005-11-20 Harvard Project to Translate Iraqi Documents
» 2005-11-20 "Is This Intelligence?" by John Brennan
» 2005-11-20 "What I Knew Before the Invasion" by Senator Bob Graham
» 2005-11-20 Chicago Tribune "What We Know Today"
» 2005-11-20 Steele at Hackers on Global Threat and Google Intelligence
» 2005-11-21 Gerecht on Need for New Clandestine Service
» 2005-11-23 Speaker Newt Gingrich Testimony on Intelligence Reform (19 Oct 05)
» 2005-11-27 Google Results for "bad intelligence"
» 2005-11-27 Michael Scheuer's "Net Assessment" of Our Certain Loss to Radicalized Islam If We Stay on This Errant Course
» 2005-11-27 Michael Scheuer in Washington Post Book World on "Bad Intelligence"
» 2005-12-06 Salon Article on Torture, CIA, and DoD
» 2005-12-06 9-11 Report Card Includes 5 F's (Various Stories)
» 2005-12-07 Douglas Rushkoff on Innovation from Inside Out
» 2006-04-12 Judge Posnere on DNI Failures After a Year
» 2006-04-12 General Congressional Criticism of DNI
» 2006-04-13 Press Release OSS CEO Challenges DNI to Intelligence Duel
» 2006-04-17 Open Letter Challenging DNI to Intelligence Duel
» 2006-04-17 Anouncing 20 Apr 06 Press Conference on Duel at NPC
» 2006-04-23 Baltimore Sun on Failing Intelligence
» 2006-04-23 Special Section on Death of US Intelligence & Duel
» 2006-04-25 Susan Turnbull, GODDESS of Information Sharing
» 2006-04-30 Amazon Page for Trento's Rogue CIA Book
» 2006-05-05 Porter Goss, Gone with the Wind....Take the Puppies with You....
» 2006-05-06 Support for General Hayden with Three Conditions
» 2006-05-06 Goss and Foggo Party Hearty
» 2006-05-06 Foggo Follies Unedited
» 2006-05-07 NSA Doesn't Do WWII/Third World SIGINT?
» 2006-05-11 Notional White House Empowerment of Hayden
» 2006-05-11 Anatomy of a Turf War (Direct, No Idiot Registration)
» 2006-05-13 Information Sharing with CIO Push is Heart of Intelligence Reform
» 2006-05-14 Curtains for the CIA?
» 2006-05-31 Proliferation of Idiocy in US IC (Mother Jones)
» 2006-05-31 CIA Loses Major Customer (The Pentagon)
» 2006-05-31 DNI Can Waive SEC Reporting Rules
» 2006-05-31 US Army "Clandestine" Unit with "Global" Reach--The Incompetence Continues
» 2006-06-02 James Carroll, HOUSE OF WAR
» 2006-06-02 Robert Steele, Terms of Reference
» 2006-06-09 CIA Empowers Terrorists Yet Again (readable lin)
» 2006-06-09 CIA Empowers Terrorists (NYT Subscription Link)
» 2006-06-09 SILOBREAKER beats CIA on just about anything
» 2006-06-09 Preliminary Review of Judge Posner's Book "Uncertain Shield"
» 2006-06-11 Amazon Page for Judge Posner's Book "Uncertain Shield
» 2006-06-11 Amazon Page for Judge Posner's Earlier Blistering Critique of 9-11 "Reforms"
» 2006-06-14 Bin Laden, Intelligence, and National Security (60 Slides with Notes)
» 2006-06-14 Reviews of Judge Posner's Two Books on Intelligence
» 2006-06-16 Congressional Oversight Broken Part I (American Progress)
» 2006-06-16 Congressional Oversight Broken Part II (Mary Sturtevant)
» 2006-06-16 Support the Federation of American Scientists
» 2006-06-17 Opening Shot in Hayden-Kappas Campaign
» 2006-06-17 HIST 2004-05-05 Fixing the Clandestine Service
» 2006-06-17 New Brief on Bin Laden, Intelligence, and Reality Based Budgeting
» 2006-06-17 Amazon Page for ON INTELLIGENCE
» 2006-06-17 Amazon Page for NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE
» 2006-06-17 Amazon Page for INFORMATION OPERATIONS
» 2006-06-17 and 18 CNN Presents "(IC) Dead Wrong (on Iraq)"
» 2006-06-19 CNN "Dead Wrong" Rush Transcript
» 2006-06-20 DNI CIO Open Forum--On the Right Track!
» 2006-06-22 DNI Memo to HPSCI re Iraq WMD
» 2006-06-22 Google Links on Iraq mustard sarin (News)
» 2006-06-22 Google links on Iraq mustard sarin (Web)
» 2006-06-22 Google links on Iraq mustard sarin (Images)
» 2006-06-22 Briefing on Bin Laden as 1/96th or less of the threat
» 2006-06-22 Steele's Review of Loch Johnson's "Seven Sins"
» 2006-06-23 Flunking the Government (Especially VP and DNI)
» 2006-06-23 David Isenberg in Asia Times on Hollow US Defense
» 2006-07-04 CIA Gives Up on Bin Laden
» 2006-07-06 Leo Wanta, the Bush Family, and the IC
» 2006-07-06 Axis of Logic on Global Security Fund
» 2006-07-06 The Story of Leo Wanta
» 2006-07-06 Amazon Page for "Global Class War"
» 2006-07-06 Mad Cow Couirtesy of US IC and US Army
» 2006-07-07 UK Intelligence Hostage to Political Posturing
» 2006-07-07 Shortfalls Remain, Centers a Problem
» 2006-07-07 Holistic Analysis from Dick Kerr et al
» 2006-07-14 Intelligence, Integrity, & The Rule of Law
» 2006-07-21 Al Qaeda as US IC Asset, Clinton & Bush as Assets of Neo-Fascist Military-Industrial Complex
» 2006-07-22 Outsider-Insider Advice for D/CIA Mike Hayden
» 2006-07-22 Original OSS Press Release on Fixing the Clandestine Intelligence Service
» 2006-07-22 DNI Negroponte Blocks National Intelligence Estimate for Iraq
» 2006-08-07 Counterinsurgency Doctrine Lacks Intelligence
» 2006-08-07 Wisdom from CMC Al Gray in 1988--DoD and IC Still Do Not Get It....
» 2006-09-08 NSA Outages From Electrical Overload and Lack
» Wiki Justice, Social, Economic, and Ethical Collaboration
» 2006-08-15 Army Gets Smart and Global with Internet Protocols
» 2006-08-18 Observations on Terrorism and Intelligence
» 2006-08-18 New Rules for the New Craft of Intelligence (Chapter)
» 2006-08-18 New Rules for the New Craft of Intelligence (Presentation)
» 2006-08-18 OSINT Chapter in Strategic Intelligence (Forthcoming)
» 2006-08-19 Death of the NRO
» 2006-08-22 DNI CIO Ray of Hope Via IntelWiki
» 2006-08-22 Denver Post Covers Intelink Conference
» 2006-08-25 Johns Hopkins Offers MA in Intelligence Analysis
» 2006-09-07 Death of Secret Intelligence Part I
» 2006-09-07 Death of Secret Intelligence Part II
» 2006-09-07 Death of Secret Intelligence Part III
» 2006-09-07 Death of Secret Intelligence Part IV
» 2006-09-07 Guardian Unlimited Skewers Newt Gingrich
» 2006-09-11 DEBKA Nails: Democracy and Intelligence are Principle Casualties of the "War on Terror" (which is a tactic, not an enemy)
» 2006-09-13 Jack Davis on Producer-Consumer Tensions
» 2006-09-13 Jack Davis on Analytic Tradecraft
» 2006-09-16 NYT on CIA Personnel Concerned About Liability for Tortue et al
» 2006-09-16 Andregg on How IC Makes You Crazy
» 2006-09-17 Contractors Overwhelm Staff in the US IC
» 2006-09-20 AEI on Catching Terrorists--Difference Between US and UK
» 2006-09-27 Accouintability for Flawed Iran Intelligence Report
» 2006-10-10 NYT on FBI Counter-Terrorism: Stinks on All Fronts
» 2006-10-21 Conference Notes on "Intelligence in Viet-Nam"
» 2006-11-04 USN&WR On Intelligence (Short Series)
» 2006-11-14 Speculation on Gates' Role in Overhauling Intelligence
» 2006-11-15 Press Release Praising Gates, Confirmation Condition
» 2006-11-16 Dismantle Intelligence Committees, Joint I2O Alternative
» 2006-11-19 UK Citizens Tracking & Exposing Terrorist Links
» 2006-11-20 Citizen Volunteers Against Online Hate Sites
» 2006-11-20 Open "We" Burying the Secret "Us"
» 2006-11-20 NCI WISER (World Index for Social and Environmental Responsibility)
» 2006-11-22 DNI has a plan...
» 2006-11-28 Ontology Conference (Closed) Overview
» 2006-11-28 Ontology Conference Agenda
» 2006-12-02 NYT Link on US IC Testing Modern IT
» 2006-12-02 NYT Document on US IC Testing Modern IT
» 2006-12-11 Both CIA and Google Pathetic on Iran
» 2006-12-14 Pelosi Creates Appropriations-Intelligence Oversight Group
» 2006-12-21 MASINT Industry Brief on Security Clearance Shortfalls
» 2006-12-24 Web of Lies by Blair and Bush Documented
» 2006-12-28 Self-Inflicted Wounds--the Angleton Era
» 2007-01-06 TIME Commentary on DNI Change
» 2006-01-06 Los Angeles Times on New DNI (Designate)
» 2007-01-07 CIA Immune System Still Working
» 2007-10-08 PFIAB as Payoff Irrelevant to Intelligence Reform
» 2007-01-23 DNI Issues Press Release on Accomplishments
» 2007-01-26 IC Years Away from Reform, Still Doesn't Get "Global Coverage" Comes from OSINT
» 2007-01-26 Global Coverage Report by Buyd Sutton (1997)
» 2007-01-27 Basic OSINT No One on DNI's Team Really Understands
» 2007-02-09 NRO Floodgates of Fraud (USN&WR)
» 2007-02-12 NSA "Turbulence" Program in Trouble
» 2007-02-17 Italy Will Try CIA in Absentia
» 2007-04-14 USA DNI 100-day plan for integration and collaboration
» 2007-04-14 Office of the Advocate for Earth Intelligence 100-day plan
» 2007-04-18 Two Bottom-Up Failures Allowing 30+ instead of 5 Dead
» 2007-04-26 Intelligent Communities Immersion
» 2007-04-26 Ranked Intelligent Communities
» 2007-04-27 Early Summary of George Tenet's Forthcoming Book
» 2007-04-29 Sheuer on Tenet Tries to Shift Blame, Don't Buy It
» 2007-04-30 Background on Open Letter to George Tenet
» 2007-04-30 Open Letter to George Tenet
» 2007-05-01 PBS Discussion of Tenet with Boren & Johnson
» 2007-05-02 In Defense of Tenet from Concurrent Insiders
» 2007-05-03 Robert Baer on George Tenet
» 2007-05-03 CNN Interview of George Tenet
» 2007-05-05 Amazon Page for Tenet's Center of the Storm
» 2007-06-02 Corporate Take-Over of US IC (70%)
» 2007-06-03 Corporations Subject to Suit for Rendition
» 2007-06-12 Domestic Intelligence Off Course
» 2007-06-13 Book Review Ted Gup, NATION OF SECRETS
» 2007-06-15 Heindenrich on Neglect of Strategic Intelligence
» 2007-06-15 Cached Access to Studies in Intelligence
» 2007-06-14 Amazon Page for Heidenrich on Genocide
» 2007-06-15 OSS.Net Hits on "Strategic Intelligence"
» 2007-06-15 Seminal Chapter on OSINT in Relation to All Aspects of Secret Intelligence (Chapter 6 in Loch Johnson, Strategic Intelligence Vol 2 The Intelligence Cycle)
» 2007-06-15 Amazon Page for Russell on Sharpening Strategic Intelligence at CIA
» 2007-06-15 Amazon Page for Quiggin on Seeing the Invisible
» 2007-06-15 Amazon Page for Bozeman on Strategic Intelligence
» 2007-06-15 Amazon Page for Herman on Intelligence Power in Peace and War
» 2007-06-15 Australian Order Page for McDowell on Strategic Intelligence
» 2007-06-15 Amazon Page for Steele, ON INTELLIGENCE
» 2007-06-15 Amazon Page for Steele, NEW CRAFT OF INTELLIGENCE
» 2007-06-15 Amazon Page for Steele, INFORMATION OPERATIONS
» 2007-06-15 Amazon Page for Steele, THE SMART NATION ACT
» 2007-06-15 One-Page Guide to OSINT as a Strategic Asset
» 2008-03-04 Continuing Idiocy in Secret Intelligence Part I
» 2008-03-04 Continuing Idiocy in the Secret World Part II
» 2009-02-02 DoD Creates F/OSS Hub
» 2009-02-02 Intelligence for the President--AND Everyone Else
» 2009-02-02 Fixing the White House and Naitonal Intelligence
» 2009-02-02 OSS CEO Comments on DNI 400-Day Report
» 2008-02-15 Jason Vest on Politicization of Intelligence
» 2009-02-15 Blair Loses Mind and Integrity on Day One
» 2009-02-15 Blair on Economy as Threat (OpEd News)
» 2009-02-15 Blair on Economic Threat (New York Times)
» 2009-02-15 Balir on Economic Threat (Al-Jazeera)
» 2009-02-17 Books on Intelligence Reform Published by OSS/EIN
» 2009-02-17 Annotated Non-Fiction Bibliography by Robert Steele
» 2009-02-17 Robert David STEELE Vivas (CIA KR-594 (EOD 09/79)
» 2009-02-20 Intelligence and Policy Failure in Afghanistan
» 2009-02-20 Intelligence and Policy Failure in Iraq and Iran
» 2009-02-27 CouinterPunch OpEd on Intelligence for Everyone
» 2009-03-02 RAND "Pentagon Papers" on How NOT to Do Intel in AF & IQ
» 2009-03-06 Continuing Intelligence Failures in AF
» 2009-03-06 EIN Press Release on Real Change
» 2009-03-06 RAND Intel AF & IQ "Nuggets Table by Steele (3 p)
» 2009-03-06 Steele Brief on Re-Invention of Intelligence
» 2009-03-10 Markle Foundation (20 Years Late, But Who's Counting?)
» 2009-03-12 Breaking the Taboo on Israel Spying in USA
» 2009-03-12 Steele Reivew of Robert Maxwell, Israel Super-Spy
» 2009-03-12 Steele Review of Friendly Spies
» 2009-03-12 Steele Review of War by Other Means (Allies Spying on USA)
» 2009-03-12 RAND Reorganizing US Domestic Intelligence
» 2009-03-12 RAND Case Studies in Domestic Intelligence
» 2009-03-20 Human Intelligence (HUMINT) The Near Frontier
» 2009-03-31 Scope of US Intelligence Expanding, Some Object
» 2009-04-21 Loch Johnson Reviews Educing Volume
» 2009-04-23 Rebalancing the Instruments of National Power
» 2009-04-23 Perhaps We Should Have Shouted: A Twenty-Year Retrospective
» 2009-05-01 Cyber-Intel vs Cyber-Ops
» 2009-05-01 (2000) Chapter on "Presidential Intelligence"
» 2009-05-01 General Al Gray in 1989 on Global Intelligence Challenges
» 2009-05-01 (1998) AWC SSI JFQ on the Asymmetric Threat
» 2009-05-02 Mobile Rapid Texting The Near Future of HUMINT
» 2009-05-02 FBI Data Dumster Diving: Dead on Arrival
» 2009-05-04 GCHQ "Master of the Internet" Project
» 2009-05-04 Wolfram Alpha Out-Maths Google
» 2009-05-04 Steele on HUMINT (Article, May Become Book)
» 2009-05-04 WSJ on Iranian circles of influence in Africa
» 2009-05-04 PRC Full Spectrum HUMINT Slide (1975)
» 2009-05-04 PRC Full Spectrum HUMINT (Paper)
» 2009-05-07 Dragon Days: Time for 'Unconventional' Tactics
» 2009-05-07 FBI Mishandling of National Terrorism Watchlist
» 2009-05-11 Abu Ghraid Round Two
» 2009-05-13 Psychologists on Torture
» 2009-05-13 Anthropologists at War--and In Revolt
» 2009-05-12 HUMINT 101 for Cyber Czars
» 2009-05-14 US Military Penetrated and Underminded by US Fundamentalists
» 2009-05-14 How Davids Beat Goliaths
» 2009-05-14 (1988) Al Gray on Narcotics as a Type Threat
» 2009-05-14 (1998) Summary of Army Strategy Conference
» 2009-05-14 (2008) Rebalancing the Instruments (Declined by JFQ)
» 2009-05-14 Perhaps We Should Have Shouted (Declined by JFQ)
» 2009-05-24 Citizen Spies Over North Korea
» 2009-05-29 DNI Intelligence Consummer's Guide
» 2009-05-29 (1999) Macartney on Teaching Intelligence
» 2009-06-01 TIME on Interrogation without Torture
» 2009-06-10 CIA DO Fights Panetta and Congress on Disclosure
» 2009-06-24 Design Science Lab UN NYC 6-11 Jul 09
» 2009-06-28 NYT on Citizen Cross-Walk Finding 6 Licensed to Fly
» 2009-06-28 The Fallen Grain (Citizen Intelligence)
» 2009-07-01 YouTube on IC Production Process
» 2009-07-01 Original lecture (words in Notes) on IC Failure
» 2009-07-01 Seminal Chapter on OSINT in Relation to IC Process
» 2009-07-10 Revisting Brief to NSA in Vegas 9 Jan uary 2002
» 2009-07-13 Intelligence at What Cost? Ethical Case Study

Files:
Intelligence for the President--AND Everyone Else
Fixing White House and National Intelligence
The Ultimate Hack: Re-Inventing Intelligence to Re-Engineer Earth

[chris jones]

 Colby and Westy.
   Pheonix program, Colby (CIA) was a machine, mentally he was in a gear that transends the mind of average and or above average Joes. He was the clandestine Einstein, average looking, but this mans mind ticked away in fith gear, his words, body language-disciplined-untelling-, were mechanical, and eye contact direct to the point of being hypnotic. Evil in a suit and tie.
  Military. Westmoreland was up to anything C. devised, at his disoposal. Is the military On a level with the CIA,NSA, or NCS...hardly, they are on orders.

[chris jones]

 PS. I get the feeling the masters have decided push this propaganda, to make the appearence our miliary in general are all a functiuon part of this affair, simply becasue some brass are involved, please remember some of these shiits may wear a niform, suggesting everything is FK fine. look I'm a military, I have my stars, my ribbons, etc. Whats the rub, it doesn't mean jack Shiiite, once they are inside its literally sell out time.
Have to admitt they make a great show, its not the CIA anymore, we are in this together now.Wooopeee.
Protectors of mankind, YUP, 3 bags full sir.

[amazon]

PS. I get the feeling the masters have decided push this propaganda, to make the appearence our miliary in general are all a functiuon part of this affair, simply becasue some brass are involved, please remember some of these shiits may wear a niform, suggesting everything is FK fine. look I'm a military, I have my stars, my ribbons, etc. Whats the rub, it doesn't mean jack Shiiite, once they are inside its literally sell out time.
Have to admitt they make a great show, its not the CIA anymore, we are in this together now.Wooopeee.
Protectors of mankind, YUP, 3 bags full sir.

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