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Author Topic: List of cyber-weapons developed by Pentagon to streamline computer warfare  (Read 1114 times)
Satyagraha
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« on: June 01, 2011, 10:06:45 AM »

List of cyber-weapons developed by Pentagon to streamline computer warfare
http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/list-of-cyber-weapons-developed-by-pentagon-to-streamline-computer-warfare/2011/05/31/AGSublFH_print.html
By Ellen Nakashima, Published: May 31

The Pentagon has developed a list of cyber-weapons and -tools, including viruses that can sabotage an adversary’s critical networks, to streamline how the United States engages in computer warfare.

The classified list of capabilities has been in use for several months and has been approved by other agencies, including the CIA, said military officials who spoke on the condition of anonymity to describe a sensitive program. The list forms part of the Pentagon’s set of approved weapons or “fires” that can be employed against an enemy.

“So whether it’s a tank, an M-16 or a computer virus, it’s going to follow the same rules so that we can understand how to employ it, when you can use it, when you can’t, what you can and can’t use,” a senior military official said.

The integration of cyber-technologies into a formal structure of approved capabilities is perhaps the most significant operational development in military cyber-doctrine in years, the senior military official said.

The framework clarifies, for instance, that the military needs presidential authorization to penetrate a foreign computer network and leave a cyber-virus that can be activated later. The military does not need such approval, however, to penetrate foreign networks for a variety of other activities. These include studying the cyber-capabilities of adversaries or examining how power plants or other networks operate. Military cyber-warriors can also, without presidential authorization, leave beacons to mark spots for later targeting by viruses, the official said.

One example of a cyber-weapon is the Stuxnet worm that disrupted operations at an Iranian nuclear facility last year. U.S. officials have not acknowledged creating the computer worm, but many experts say they believe they had a role.

Under the new framework, the use of a weapon such as Stuxnet could occur only if the president granted approval, even if it were used during a state of hostilities, military officials said. The use of any cyber-weapon would have to be proportional to the threat, not inflict undue collateral damage and avoid civilian casualties.

The new framework comes as the Pentagon prepares to release a cyber-strategy that focuses largely on defense, the official said. It does not make a declaratory statement about what constitutes an act of war or use of force in cyberspace. Instead, it seeks to clarify, among other things, that the United States need not respond to a cyber-attack in kind but may use traditional force instead as long as it is proportional.

Nonetheless, another U.S. official acknowledged that “the United States is actively developing and implementing” cyber-capabilities “to deter or deny a potential adversary the ability to use its computer systems” to attack the United States.

In general, under the framework, the use of any cyber-weapon outside an area of hostility or when the United States is not at war is called “direct action” and requires presidential approval, the senior military official said. But in a war zone, where quick capabilities are needed, sometimes presidential approval can be granted in advance so that the commander has permission to select from a set of tools on demand, the officials said.

The framework breaks use of weapons into three tiers: global, regional and area of hostility. The threshold for action is highest in the global arena, where the collateral effects are the least predictable.

It was drafted in part out of concerns that deciding when to fire in cyberspace can be more complicated than it is on traditional battlefields. Conditions constantly shift in cyberspace, and the targets can include computer servers in different countries, including friendly ones.

Last year, for instance, U.S. intelligence officials learned of plans by an al-Qaeda affiliate to publish an online jihadist magazine in English called Inspire, according to numerous current and senior U.S. officials. And to some of those skilled in the emerging new world of cyber-warfare, Inspire seemed a natural target.

The head of the newly formed U.S. Cyber Command, Gen. Keith Alexander, argued that blocking the magazine was a legitimate counterterrorism target and would help protect U.S. troops overseas. But the CIA pushed back, arguing that it would expose sources and methods and disrupt an important source of intelligence. The proposal also rekindled a long-standing interagency struggle over whether disrupting a terrorist Web site overseas was a traditional military activity or a covert activity — and hence the prerogative of the CIA.

The CIA won out, and the proposal was rejected. But as the debate was underway within the U.S. government, British government cyber-warriors were moving forward with a plan.

When Inspire launched on June 30, the magazine’s cover may have promised an “exclusive interview” with Sheik Abu Basir al-Wahishi, a former aide to Osama bin Laden, and instructions on how to “Make a Bomb in the Kitchen of Your Mom.” But pages 4 through 67 of the otherwise slick magazine, including the bomb-making instructions, were garbled as a result of the British cyber-attack.

It took almost two weeks for al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula to post a corrected version, said Evan Kohlmann, senior partner at Flashpoint Global Partners, which tracks jihadi Web sites.

The episode reflected how offensive cyber-operations are marked by persistent disagreement over who should take action and under what conditions. The new list of approved cyber-weapons will not settle those disputes but should make the debate easier to conduct, the senior military official said.

Some lawmakers also are proposing statutory language that would affirm that the defense secretary has the authority “to carry out a clandestine operation in cyberspace” under certain conditions. The operation must be in support of a military operation pursuant to Congress’s 2001 authorization to the president to use all necessary and appropriate force against those who committed the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

House Armed Services Committee Vice Chairman Mac Thornberry (R-Tex.), who drafted the language as part of the House-adopted 2012 defense authorization bill, said he was motivated by hearing from commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan frustrated by an inability to protect their forces against attacks they thought were enabled by adversaries spreading information online.

“I have had colonels come back to me and talk about how they thought they could do a better job of protecting their troops if they could deal with a particular Web site,” he said. “Yet because it was cyber, it was all new unexplored territory that got into lots of lawyers from lots of agencies being involved.”

Thornberry’s provision would establish that computer attacks to deny terrorists the use of the Internet to communicate and plan attacks from throughout the world are a “clandestine” and “traditional military” activity, according to text accompanying the proposed statute.

But the White House issued a policy statement last week that it had concerns with the cyber-provision. It declined to elaborate.

Thornberry said some Pentagon lawyers thought the proposed statutory language could go further. “But my view on cyber is we need to take it a step at a time,” he said.
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Effie Trinket
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« Reply #1 on: June 01, 2011, 11:38:14 AM »

“You would know where the access points are, you’d know how to get in, you would know where the weaknesses are, you’d know how to destroy it.” --John Zachman, in reference to Ptech’s capabilities

FBI probed Ptech client for making US vulnerable to false flag cyber attacks
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=174384.msg1036356#msg1036356

A Banking System Built for Terrorism
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=169048.msg802735#msg802735

Ptech specialized in what is called enterprise architecture, widely reported as descendant of PROMIS software, the precursor of “artificial intelligence” developed in the early ‘80s. Federal courts and Congress later declared that PROMIS had been stolen from its rightful owners by then Attorney General Edwin Meese and his business associates.

A hidden “back door” feature was then created, enabling those controlling the program to secretly remove, or even replace information in any system where its installed. John Zachman, considered the father of enterprise architecture, later will say that with Ptech software in control “You would know where the access points are, you’d know how to get in, you would know where the weaknesses are, you’d know how to destroy it.”

Indira Singh testimony:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1auI5ewP53I
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tn23b0IYM9I
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QxheqcjYDC4

Eerily unknown is the fact that this Bin Laden banker’s company developed the FAA’s National Airspace System, newly in operation on the morning of September 11. Even less known is that the Ptech computer chief who created and installed the new FAA software was Felix Rausch, former Deputy IT Chief of the White House, and overall IT Chief of INTERPOL.

Court admissible proof Felix Rausch worked at the FAA and at Ptech:

http://www.mitre.org/work/tech_papers/tech_papers_99/broste_nas/broste_nas.pdf

http://www.caasd.org/library/documents/mtr00w0000097.pdf

NAS Information Architecture Committee EXECUTIVE REPORT

http://www.faa.gov/niac/pdf/confexec.pdf

"Felix Rausch, NIAC Co-Chair and NAS Information Architecture “Product Lead”

Felix Rausch publicly admits that he worked at Ptech in an online profile by him showing his work history.

http://www.linkedin.com/pub/9/59/119

The CIO of J.P. Morgan was fully cognizant of the dangers of Ptech and took Sings information extremely seriously.

Senior level FBI confirmed Singh's information.

Senator Grassley acknowledged the danger of Ptech and expressed serious concerns about it on public record.

Ptech gave full interoperability to the Shadow Government and vetoed the decision making, current C2 capability away from what would have otherwise been normally functioning ATC systems to have stopped the black op from occurring, all transparently by directly interfacing with the hardware, bypassing all O/S security systems and putting it in the hands of MITRE Corp, who got in bed with the FAA about 10 years before 9/11 by being designated as a contractor, along with E-Systems and others under a program ordered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff called Cheyenne Mountain Upgrade, with a subsection titled Granite Sentry, which was the system that Felix Rausch compromised with the AI Inference engine, code generating, UML, C++ based C2 Process modeling software designed by Dr. Hussein Ibrahim, with development done in collaboration with George Mason University System Architecture Research laboratory.

John Osterholz, head of Architecture and Interoperability in the DoD, was given this same warning by Singh and was completely ignored.  Mr. Osterholz, in 2003 then stated that Al-Qaeda had network centric warfare capability and the U.S. did not.  Effectively saying that Al-Qaeda was technologically more advanced than the National Reconnaissance Office, Defense Information Systems Agency, National Security Agency, Ptech, IBM, Booz Allen Hamilton, and that we now needed to convert the entire Internet over to IPv6 to prevent terror attacks by implementing a Global Information Grid.

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