New Defense Bill: Pentagon authorized to Launch Clandestine Cybernetic Warfare

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Offline Dig

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No judge, jury, etc.

If you are seen as a threat via anything they fabricate concerning your Internet usage or anything you own's internet usage, you are a lawful target for the full force of the United States military as well as HAARP, STUXNET, fake identification blackmail/extortion operations, and anything John Yoo authorized George Bush to do "in a time of war."

This is what RAND Corporation said would be the objective of the Internet...to use it as a way to circumvent Posse Comitatus.



New Defense Bill Authorizes Pentagon To Launch Clandestine Warfare via Cybernetics on American Citizens
http://www.prisonplanet.com/new-defense-bill-authorizes-us-government-to-launch-defensive-cyber-attacks.html
Suzanne Kubota
Federal News Radio
Wednesday, May 11, 2011

Within the chairman’s mark of the 2012 Defense Authorization bill is language that would allow DoD to carry out clandestine operations in cyberspace against targets located outside the United States and to defend against all attacks on DoD assets. “In particular, this section (962) would clarify that the Secretary of Defense has the authority to conduct clandestine cyberspace activities in support of military operations pursuant to the Authorization for the Use of Military Force….outside of the United States or to defend against a cyber attack on an asset of the Department of Defense.” According to the mark up, terrorists “are increasingly using the internet to exercise command and control,” and to spread technical information enabling attacks on U.S. and coalition forces, often from the relative safety of “distributed sanctuaries throughout the world. As a result, military activities may not be confined to a physical battlefield, and the use of military cyber activities has become a critical part of the effort to protect U.S. and coalition forces and combat terrorism globally.” The section of the bill expressly “includes the authority to conduct clandestine military activities in cyberspace in support of military operations,” where Congress has authorized the use of “all necessary and appropriate force” or to defend against a cyber attack on a DoD asset. Within the bill, there are more than a dozen items slated for funding labeled “cyber”. The largest amount goes to DISA with $24,085,000 requested and authorized by the House.
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RAND WHITE PAPER 1997:
Cyber Warfare allows obstruction of Posse Comitatus

THIS WAS ALWAYS THE PLAN

THIS WAS ALWAYS THE OBJECTIVE OF 9/11, GLOBAL WARMING, ETC!

WHITE PAPER ON INFORMATION TERRORISM
1997
Brian K. Houghton
Doctoral Fellow
RAND CORPORATION


http://www.devost.net/papers/suntzu.pdf

Offensive information warfare techniques developed for military use at a state level could also be utilized to respond to information terrorism. Law enforcement agencies, in general, do not have similar offensive information warfare capabilities. For this reason a specialized and integrated counter information terrorism group is required. These highly trained information warriors would be the national security equivalent of Carnegie Mellon’s Computer Emergency Response Team, but with an offensive capability. Like a “Digital Delta Force” these Digital Integrated Response Teams (DIRTs) would work from remote computer systems and use information warfare tactics to detect, locate and counter the information terrorists. The DIRTs would be in networked remote cells inside CONUS (with one on the East and West coasts, and an additional cell in the Midwest). The DIRTs would exploit law enforcement IT-oriented assets, investigative capabilities, and intelligence bases. The DIRTs, created by Executive Order, would operate as a cell of the National Security Council and take its directives from the information terrorism counterpart to the White House “Drug Czar.”

These information warriors, comprised of members from the Joint Services, as well as Justice and Treasury Departments, would strike using digital means against computers and networks used by the information terrorists. Using an anonymous response, the U.S. government could strike at information terrorists without large display or legitimizing the terrorists, both of which would occur with a physical response. Such a response offers ultimate plausible denial. In addition, the DIRTs close integration with law enforcement agencies would provide legal guidance and accountability, and avoid a “Posse Comitatus” syndrome.

This structure would combine the investigative and jurisdictional assets of the law enforcement community with the offensive capabilities of the military. If the United States is going to enter the Information Age, we need to have policy that spans the spectrum of information-related threats to our national security, driving offensive and defensive assets that can respond symmetrically and effectively. Our offensive capabilities against peer or near-peer competitors are formidable, whether in information or conventional warfare.

All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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http://datacide.c8.com/information-war-cyberwar-netwar-anti-war-technowar/

http://www.powerbase.info/index.php/Terrorexpertise:RAND_Corporation



The RAND Corporation has been an influential institution in terrorism studies since the 1970s and says it "remains dedicated to an investigation of the origins, development, and implications of terrorism for policy officials, the private sector, and first responders."[1]

In her study of the terrorism research field, Edna Reid describes how RAND's research developed over the years in collaboration with other right-wing think-tanks and research centres:
During the 1970s, governments, international organizations, and research centers such as the RAND Corporation, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Georgetown University, and the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University…sponsored numerous terrorism conferences, research projects, specialized anthologies, study groups, and official inquiries into terrorism. The efforts helped to nurture terrorism research and create numerous forums which allowed cross-fertilization of ideas, sharing of resources, and creation of an invisible college of terrorism researchers. [2]

Tracing the growth of the field from its origins to the present, Reid found that RAND and its British offshoot the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence as a result of these networks continue to exert an enormous influence over the study of and understanding of terrorism:
Both RAND and CSTPV are major centers for the recruitment, nurturing, and training of researchers in contemporary terrorism. Results further indicate that newer and highly cited (core) researchers, such as Rohan Gunaratna, an expert on al Qaeda and a former research associate at CSTPV, (a former Ph.D. student of Bruce Hoffman at St. Andrews; Hoffman is currently Vice President at RAND), are influenced by the early terrorism authors and their research foci. [3]

According to RAND's own account it "began exploring [terrorism] in the wake of the murder of Olympic athletes in Munich",[4] although Brian Houghton writes that RAND's terrorism research began two years earlier in 1970.[5] RAND's terrorism work was first developed by its resident counter-insurgency expert during the 1970s and 1980s Brian Jenkins, who oversaw RAND's terrorism work until 1989. The focus during the 1970s seems to have been on the development of a database of terrorism incidents called the RAND Terrorism Chronology Database[6]. A 1998 RAND Press Release suggests that RAND's in depth research into terrorism did not start until the early 1980s. The press release boasts that:
Terrorism studies as a scholarly discipline date to the launching of RAND’s own research effort in the early 1980s. In addition to identifying trends in terrorist activity and counter-terrorist strategy, the program has made major contributions in analyzing such problems as hostage situations, possible terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction, constraints on intelligence gathering in a free society, and the threat of attacks on nuclear installations and other sensitive targets.[7]

During the 1980s RAND maintained a Security and Subnational Conflict Group, which in addition to maintaining the terrorism database, sponsored conferences and seminars, published articles and monographs dealing with terrorism and counterinsurgency, and provided experts to those in need.[8] In 1989 Jenkins left RAND and Bruce Hoffman - who had been affiliated with RAND since the early 1980s - assumed directorship of the terrorism programme.[9] In 1994 Hoffman left the RAND staff to set up the Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St. Andrews. At St. Andrews Hoffman continued to consult for RAND[10] and predictably RAND developed close connections to the new Centre. They collaborated on the terrorism database until 1997 and to this day share staff and board members.

From 2001 RAND's terrorism project received substantial funds from the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (which in turn is heavily funded by the Department of Homeland Security). Between 2001 and 2006 MIPT accounts reveal that RAND received over $2.6 million from MIPT.[11] The funds were either partly or wholly for RAND's part in the development of the now discontinued Terrorism Knowledge Base which combined RAND's information with several other sources. MIPT discontinued the Terrorism Knowledge Base in March 2008, making RAND's research was no longer publicly available. RAND however continues to develop its Worldwide Terrorism Incident Knowledge Database which is currently maintain by Michael Wermuth and Kim Cragin.[12]

RAND's other major terrorism related project is the Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy which it runs jointly with the corporate security company Risk Management Solutions (RMS).[13] The Center was set up in 2002 and focuses on the financial implications of terrorism, dealing with risk management, insurance, liability, and compensation.[14]

RAND has also developed the RAND Voices of Jihad Database, a compilation of speeches, interviews, statements, and publications of jihadist leaders. Nearly all content is in English translation, and has been collected from publicly-accessible websites.[15] The database mimics similar projects undertaken by less prestigious instutions such as the Investigative Project or the NEFA Foundation.
Resources
Jonny Burnett & Dave Whyte, 'Embedded Expertise and the New Terrorism (PDF)', Journal for Crime, Conflict and the Media 1 (4) 1-18
Notes
↑ RAND Website, RAND Voices of Jihad Database, (accessed 30 May 2008)
↑ Edna F. Reid, Hsinchun Chen, ‘Mapping the contemporary terrorism research domain’, International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 42–56
↑ Edna F. Reid, Hsinchun Chen, ‘Mapping the contemporary terrorism research domain’, International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 65 (2007) 42–56
↑ RAND Website, The RAND Worldwide Terrorism Incident Knowledge Database Project, (accessed 22 March 2008)
↑ Brian K. Houghton, 'Terrorism Knowledge Base: A Eulogy (2004-2008)', Perspectives on Terrorism Volume II, Issue 7
↑ RAND Corporation News Release, 'BRUCE HOFFMAN TO HEAD RAND’S WASHINGTON OFFICE. LEADING TERRORISM EXPERT RETURNS AS THINK TANK BEEFS UP PROGRAM. ALSO BACK AT RAND: BRIAN JENKINS', 31 August 1998
↑ RAND Corporation News Release, 'BRUCE HOFFMAN TO HEAD RAND’S WASHINGTON OFFICE. LEADING TERRORISM EXPERT RETURNS AS THINK TANK BEEFS UP PROGRAM. ALSO BACK AT RAND: BRIAN JENKINS', 31 August 1998
↑ see Rand Corporation, extract from The "Terrorism" Industry
↑ RAND Corporation News Release, 'BRUCE HOFFMAN TO HEAD RAND’S WASHINGTON OFFICE. LEADING TERRORISM EXPERT RETURNS AS THINK TANK BEEFS UP PROGRAM. ALSO BACK AT RAND: BRIAN JENKINS', 31 August 1998
↑ RAND Corporation News Release, 'BRUCE HOFFMAN TO HEAD RAND’S WASHINGTON OFFICE. LEADING TERRORISM EXPERT RETURNS AS THINK TANK BEEFS UP PROGRAM. ALSO BACK AT RAND: BRIAN JENKINS', 31 August 1998
↑ for more information see Former Board Members and Staff on Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism
↑ RAND Corporation Website, The RAND Worldwide Terrorism Incident Knowledge Database Project, (accessed 30 May 2008)
↑ RAND Corporation Website, Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy, (accessed 30 May 2008)
↑ RAND Corporation Website, About the Center for Terrorism Risk Management Policy (accessed 30 May 2008)
↑ RAND Corporation website, RAND Voices of Jihad Database
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Terror and Its Networks: Disappearing Trails in Cyberspace
(DRAFT)
Vinay Lal
Associate Professor, Department of History
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)
http://oldsite.nautilus.org/gps/virtual-diasporas/paper/Lal.html

I: Prologue: Cyberspace and the Politics of Networks

Much has been made in the American and international press of the “al-Qaeda network”, an organization said to have been responsible for the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. The word “network” brings to mind a number of associations, and there is the clear imputation of a rather far-flung and rather sinister organization whose members, while appearing to have acted with perhaps some degree of independence and autonomy, have similar ideological sentiments. There was even some speculation, in the immediate aftermath of September 11th, that the attacks had been carried out by an al-Qaeda cell without the knowledge of Osama bin Laden, much in the way in which revolutionary cells in colonial Algeria generally operated, during the movement of resistance to French rule, independent of other cells. However, the precursors to the al-Qaeda network, as that term is deployed in the mainstream American media, appear to be “the terrorist networks” that allegedly operated at the behest of the former Soviet Union.[1] When Reagan described the then-Soviet Union as an “evil empire”, one can reasonably assume that he had in mind more than communism: his political rhetoric fixated on the Soviet Union’s sponsorship of terror, and administration officials spoken often of a widespread terrorist network that was calculated to foment revolution in Third World countries and destabilize the industrialized nations of the North and their free market allies in the South. Something at once “sinister” – reeking of conspiracy, calling to mind the shadowy world of espionage, political assassination, the cult of violence, and ruthless self-aggrandizement – and ominously grand in scope – men of steely determination with indeterminate sources of funding backed by the power of “rogue” states and widely dispersed around the world – was called to mind in the evocation of “terror networks”.

There is, evidently, a more common usage associated with the word “network”, a usage which points to the more alarmist and far-reaching possibilities that are sought to be conjured in the evocation of terror networks. In the American idiom, “networks” have preeminently meant “media networks”, and it is CNN, CBS, and other principal media outlets that are being evoked in this usage. No one, needless to say, has ever suggested that these “media networks” and “terror networks” are quite the same thing; indeed, it is no exaggeration to suggest that media networks in the United States have entirely lent their services to the work of counterterrorism. When, for example, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld suggested that the bin Laden videotapes being broadcast by al Jazeera television were most likely conveying coded messages to bin Laden’s followers and other al-Qaeda terrorists, and therefore ought not to be broadcast by American networks, both patriotism and the media’s self-appointed role as a functionary of counterterrorism demanded immediate compliance with the sentiments of the Pentagon. Media networks have done more than any government agency to promote an impoverished conception of terrorism as political acts of desperate individuals who carry out their political agendas without any regard for civilians or any consideration for the sanctity and dignity of human life.

Yet, from the standpoint of a dissenting and radical politics, American media networks are something like terror networks: they point to the inextricable connections between mass media, the corporate domination of American political and public life, and the corridors of political power. The synchronization of the worlds of politics, business, and media such that they together embody the purposeful and orchestrated exercise of power constitutes its own form of terror, all the more frightening and totalizing for appearing to work in the name of democracy. The shadowy world of “terror networks” would certainly seem to mimic the “media networks” of American society, with their expansive reach, control over large segments of civil society, political influence, ample funding, accessibility to men with power, and even the relatively easy transgression of borders and boundaries. The exponents of globalization may not have been thinking of terrorism when they were championing unregulated entry of goods, ideas, and American-style youth culture into the remotest parts of the world, but it is precisely this disdain for borders which seems to characterize the political aspirations and movements of members of the al-Qaeda network. In retrospect, whatever the political realities of the “al-Qaeda network” or of its ideologues whose political life is commonly thought to be defined by the twin towers of a radical commitment to Islam and an equally radical hatred for the political fabric of American life, al-Qaeda will be viewed as one of the earliest and clearly unanticipated manifestations of globalization in practice.

Howsoever one might be inclined to view American media networks, one cannot but speculate whether the invocation of the “al-Qaeda network” was not also meant to call to mind the intricate web of networks created in cyberspace. As details of the simultaneous hijacking of four aircraft on the morning of September 11th began to emerge, a number of questions arose about the links between the hijackers, their modes of communication, and the wider networks to which they might have been attached. The initial supposition was that not all the hijackers were aware that their mission would end with their own deaths, and it has been argued that each of the four teams of hijackers, while equally bound to the authority of some commanding figure, might also have been unaware of the role or even presence of the other three teams in the macabre symphony of death planned for September 11th.[2] Thus, while disassociated from each other, the teams of hijackers might have been networked to a common source and perhaps to wider network neighborhoods. One scholar, Valdis Krebs, who has attempted to establish the links between the hijackers notes that they “appeared to have come from a network that had formed while they were completing terrorist training in Afghanistan.”[3]

Some appeared to have known each other from childhood; others were mates at university; a few shared lodgings; some seem to have been related by kinship ties; and all, apparently, were graduates of the bin Laden terrorist training school. Applying social network analysis to terrorist activity, Kerbs concedes that several difficulties are encountered in such analysis: the links are not always transparent, and can lend themselves to conflicting interpretations; moreover, “these networks are not static, they are always changing.”[4] Kerbs notes that even hijackers from the same team appear to have been at considerable distance from each other, and that the points of intercourse between the teams were largely allowed to lapse once the master plan had been hatched in order to prevent detection. Much as Chicago serves as the hub for United and Detroit does so for Northwest, Mohamed Atta appears to have been the nodal point for the terrorist activity that saw its culmination on September 11th.[5]

While social network analysis is not without its insights, a more obvious set of questions about the al-Qaeda network remains: how far did members of the al-Qaeda deploy the internet in furtherance of their designs? Can one reasonably speak of an online trail that the terrorists might have laid, or is it the precise characteristic of the internet that it facilitates terrorist activity as much as it assists those functionaries of the state and international agencies who are charged with the tasks of surveillance, interception of criminal activity, and the maintenance of “law and order” on the information superhighways? Can one, moreover, go so far as to aver that terrorist activity and cyberspace activism mirror each other, insofar as both rely upon some notion of nomadic politics, reject the idea that constitutional politics furnishes the appropriate parameters for political activity, and seek to bypass the “media networks”, as that term is generally understood, for the transmission of information? In seeking to understand the particular nexus, if any, between terrorist activity and cyberspace, is one compelled to revisit the arguments that have generally been advanced about the information superhighway as a space of either authoritarianism or democracy?[6] Is it any longer meaningful to speak of the use or abuse of the information superhighway and the internet, in the same way in which some people are still habituated to speaking of the use or abuse of science, and does this mean that the internet has been assimilated within the dominant frameworks of knowledge as merely another “form” of media which waits for “content” to be fulfilled?

II: Terrorism and Its Trails in Cyberspace

More than six months after the events of September 11th, the internet appears to be revealing few secrets about the al-Qaeda network or Osama bin Laden. Even the mere and frequently voiced assertion that bin Laden “uses the internet to communicate to his followers and to issue orders” remains largely unverified,[7] and a recent article published in the New York Times admits that simple measures to evade detection, such as moving from one internet café to another, or using websites – rather than email, which is more easily intercepted – to communicate messages appear to have thwarted intelligence agencies in their attempt to monitor suspected terrorist groups.[8] Some of the principal characteristics of the internet – its easy accessibility, low cost, and relative anonymity – make it attractive to terrorists.[9] Similarly, it is widely rumored that bin Laden and other terrorists use encryption programs – which scramble data or messages into existing pictures that can only be unlocked with a code known only to the recipient – to plan terrorist activities on the internet and relay messages to followers, and there has been a report that two computers recovered from Kabul and apparently in use at an al-Qaeda office contained files protected by encryption.[10] This, in itself, scarcely constitutes a revelation: the Anti-Defamation League, among other institutions, warned in its online “Terrorism Update” in Winter 1998 that terrorist groups, as well as other extremist political movements, were increasingly turning to encryption in an attempt to remain ahead of intelligence agencies.[11] Kim Schmitz, a German who runs an investment company and founded the Young Intelligent Hackers Against Terrorism (YIHAT) on September 15th, claims to have conducted a cyberwar against “web vandals sympathetic to Osama bin Laden” and reported uncovering $360 million in assets belonging to terrorists “by hacking into banks”, but no government agency has indicated a willingness to corroborate this claim. Less than a month later, YIHAT, claiming the vandalization of its web site, declared that it was going “underground.”[12]

The use of cyberspace by terrorists is generally understood to have two dimensions, both of which have attracted considerable critical scrutiny.[13] First, an argument has been advanced that terrorist organizations, taking their cue from some guerrilla and liberation movements, are increasingly resorting to the internet to disseminate their views to a wider public, and that they have come to the realization that establishing their presence in cyberspace is nearly just as critical to their long-term success as any military triumph or act of sabotage. The web has become their most critical resource for the solicitation of funds, and according to one source, the Lashkar-e-Taiba, a mujahideen group which is fighting the Indian army in Kashmir, has become the envy of other like-minded groups on account of its ability to attract donors through its extensive web site with its versions in Urdu, English, and Arabic.[14] As has been noticed by several other commentators, HAMAS [Islamic Resistance Movement], Hizbollah [The Party of God], the Tamil Tigers of Eelam,[15] the Mojahedin-e Khalq [of Iran], the Hezb-e-Islami, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC),[16] and the Algerian Armed Islamic Group, among other terrorist organizations, are well-represented on the world wide web; as are indeed, in the United States, a plethora of neo-Nazi and white supremacist groups.[17]

Both militia groups in the US and Islamic fundamentalist organizations, which are united at least by their disdain for the US government, have been known to post bomb-making instructions and manuals on the web, a matter of sufficient interest to the Congress that it sought to regulate such activity on the web through congressional legislation.[18] HAMAS webpages carry military communiqués issued by the leaders of various armed Palestinian resistance movements, besides furnishing a catalog and visual montages of atrocities perpetrated by Israel (especially upon Palestinian children) and exhortations to carry out attacks against Israel and Jews.[19] The extent of Hizbollah’s presence on the web can be gauged by the fact that its principal work is distributed among three sites, one of which largely documents attacks on Israeli targets. This dispersal of business, so to speak, is sound political practice, since the closure of one site still keeps Hizbollah afloat in cyberspace; it is also illuminative of the diasporic characteristics of cyberspace, which terrorist groups and non-state actors, among many other agents, are particularly poised to exploit.[20]

The story, consequently, of the cyberspace presence of terrorist groups, revolutionary and secessionist movements, and other political organizations that operate largely outside the realm of constitutional and legislative politics creates its own intricate web and has barely begun to be told. In 1998, nearly half of the 30 organizations designated as Foreign Terrorist Organizations under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [AEDPA] maintained websites[21]; by the end of 1999, nearly all terrorist groups had established their presence on the net.[22] These websites, whatever other language versions they might be available in, are invariably in English and pose complex and hitherto unexplored questions about the constituencies which find cyberspace hospitable for the fulfillment of their political designs. Moreover, since the preponderant number of these groups are presumed to be hostile to Westernization and globalization (not that the two are by any means congruent), most commentators have assumed that the use of English, a more global language than any other, points ultimately to the ineffectiveness of resistance to globalization. Similarly, the hostility of many of these organizations towards the United States in no manner prevents them from using American internet providers, or being hosted by American groups: thus, to take one example, the political manifesto and communiqués of the Peruvian revolutionary organization MRTA (Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru), which has been designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization by the State Department, are readily found on a website operated by students at the University of California, San Diego.[23]

With what confidence and skill do terrorists or others with extreme political persuasions use English on the web, and what are the different registers of the language with they work? Should the wide use of English alert us to the possibility that the constituencies attracted by such websites themselves hail from relatively privileged backgrounds, and that virtual terrorists, so to speak, have not arisen (as is commonly argued about terrorists) from backgrounds of poverty and deprivation, but rather they are the products (as was demonstrably clear from the profiles of the terrorists associated with the September 11th events) of Western universities and secular institutions? The deployment of the internet by political extremists may yet be the most ironical instantiation of the disenchantment with modernity.

If the internet and the world wide web is a fecund ground for the dissemination of political ideologies, there is also considerable apprehension that terrorists and other political extremists could wage cyberattacks on computer networks and therefore cripple or at least disable the military, financial, and service sectors of advanced economies. An entire arsenal of words – cybercrime, cyberwar, infowar, netwar, cyberterrorism, cyber harassment, cyber break-ins – has found its way into our lexicon to describe the network piracy characteristic of what some military and political strategists describe as the “new terrorism” of our times.[24] In 1997, the Internet Black Tigers, which is affiliated with the Tamil Tigers of Eelam, a secessionist movement that has fought the Sri Lankan state to a stalemate over the last two decades, “flooded” Sri Lankan embassies throughout the world with email messages and rendered their computer systems inoperable. A year later, the Department of Defense was reporting 60 cyberattacks on its website every week, and there have been periodic reports of systemic efforts by, if I may coin this neologism, “computerrorists” to disable Pentagon computing systems. The Pentagon did not take these attacks lying down, and struck back with a Java applet that loads and reloads an empty browser on the attacker’s desktop, forcing him or her to reboot the computer.[25] That same year, pursuant to India’s nuclear tests, web activists waged concerted attacks on the website of the Homi Bhabha Research Center, the country’s preeminent agency for nuclear research, and superimposed peace slogans, an image of a mushroom cloud, and data on the probable effects of nuclear war on the site.[26]

Conflicts on the ground are echoed, as one can imagine, in cyberspace. This should not surprise us: an earlier generation relentlessly waged cartographic wars, a matter that confounds those who are accustomed to thinking of maps as scientific representations of physical geographies and political boundaries. When India and China went to war briefly in 1962 over disputed territory in the former North-east Frontier Agency (NEFA), maps were produced on both sides to advance their respective claims;[27] and, again, both India and Pakistan have conducted cartographic wars over disputed territory in Kashmir and along other sectors of the border between the two countries. Cyberspace offers even more fertile territory for sabotage, misinformation, and what in the cliched formulation is termed the war over minds. An oft-mentioned case is that of Kosovo, which is sometimes described as the stage for the first internet war.[28] Both Milosevic and his opponents, in and outside Yugoslavia, and some opposed to NATO as much as to Serbian nationalists, took to cyberspace – as did indeed civilians caught in the fray, who found it a medium for the expression of sentiments about life under the twin tyrannies of dictatorship and carpet bombing.

A reporter for the Los Angeles Times appeared to have caught traces of this conflict over cyberspace early in the spin war, and observed that the dispute over Kosovo was “turning cyberspace into an ethereal war zone where the battle for the hearts and minds is being waged through the use of electronic images, online discussion group postings, and hacking attacks.”[29] In Britain, the Daily Telegraph reported that it had learned of an order passed by President Clinton that authorized “American government computer hackers to break into Slobodan Milosevic’s foreign bank accounts and drain his hidden fortune as part of a clandestine CIA plan to overthrow the Yugoslav president,”[30] but a more reasoned assessment of the utility of untethered cyberwar against Milosevic appears to have been offered by James Rubin, spokesperson for the US State Department, when he stated that it was American policy to keep internet service providers in Yugoslavia in business. “Full and open access to the Internet”, Rubin remarked, “can only help the Serbian people know the ugly truth about the atrocities and crimes against humanity being perpetrated in Kosovo by the Milosevic regime.”[31]

The second intifada, likewise, lurched straight into cyberspace when negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian National Authority broke down in October 2000. Israeli hackers subjected Hezbollah and other Palestinian sites to FloodNet attacks, and Hezbollah’s web logo, “a raised fist clenched around an automatic weapon”, was replaced by “photos of Israelis captured by Hezbollah set against a field of waving Israeli flags.”[32] Palestinians responded with attacks on the web sites of the Israeli military, the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange, the Bank of Israel, and the finance ministry. Some Israeli online activists then constituted themselves into the Israeli Internet Underground (IIU) and stated it as their mission “to inform and provide solutions wherever we can and therefore protect our sites against political cyber vandalism.”[33] Meanwhile, Palestinian activists came together in a group called Unity, which one commentator has described, without furnishing any evidence, as a “Muslim extremist group with ties to Hezbollah and other terrorist groups”.[34] Palestinian chatrooms are said to be abuzz with talk of “e-jihad” and “cyber-jihad”.

Wars that go cold on the ground -- or perforce cannot be conducted with arms -- might still remain hot in the air, howsoever lopsidedly. When a mid-air collision between an American spy plane and a Chinese jet fighter took place in April 2001, leading to heated exchanges between the two countries, activists immediately took to cyberspace. An American group known as PoizonBox was said to have attacked over 100 Chinese websites in the first two weeks following the collision; a Chinese retaliation, promised for the week beginning May 1st, was announced with the claim that the “crackers” intended to persuade the American people to influence their government from pursuing war-like gestures.[35] An American hacker known as “PrOphet” conceded that the cyber war amounted to little, and had not generated any political influence, but he described the goal as “just to f**k with China in any little way we can.”[36] One might think, of course, that the Americans were bound to have the edge over the Chinese. There were, in the year 2001, at least 10 times as many computers in the US as in China, and American computing power dwarfs that of China, estimated recently as 42 times greater.[37]

By the same token, as has been argued often enough, this makes the United States, where financial, commercial, military, educational, and administrative systems are entirely computerized, more vulnerable. Some of the strengths of the United States might also be the source of its weaknesses, though therein lies another tale which has yet to be told. But what is immediately striking in the cyberwar between Chinese and American hackers is that no commentator has thought it desirable to term them cyber-terrorists, as though this designation had to be reserved for Islamic fundamentalists, whose use value for Western commentators as exemplary terrorists can scarcely be disguised, or for those cyber activists, whether belonging to the Shining Path or the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), whose stated avowal of Marxist-Leninist ideologies, or disdain for free-trade arguments, immediately renders them suspect. Now that China has been admitted to the WTO, and is clearly veering towards a consumer-type society, it will most likely not be producing terrorists.

III: Terrorism, Virtual Reality, and Nomadism: Some Concluding Observations

In a frequently cited article, Dorothy Denning distinguishes between three forms of political activity on the internet, with particular reference to attempts to influence foreign policy.[38] She refers to activism as “normal, non-disruptive use of the internet in support of an agenda or cause”: such activity includes browsing the web, compiling a digital library, submitting electronic petitions, or coordinating political meetings open to the public. This form of activism has varying degrees of success, however that may be measured: for instance, the arrest of the Kurdish rebel leader Abdullah Ocalan became known in a matter of hours to Kurds scattered around the world, and they responded more quickly than did governments[39]; but demonstrations staged around the world, while they put the world on notice that the “Kurdish problem” remains unresolved, could not influence the Turkish government into releasing Ocalan or showing him clemency.

Hacktivism, Denning suggests, is a different order of political activity, and represents the marriage of hacking and activism; it generally shades into activity of dubious ethical import, and is often unlawful.

It takes many forms: in a sit-in or blockade, activists generate immense traffic against a targeted website and thus prevent legitimate users from reaching it. A more complex form of civil disobedience entails the creation of a special website with software that, once it is downloaded, accesses the targeted site every few seconds. Tellingly, such sites are called FloodNet sites, and activists term this form of political engagement, with perhaps an inadequate comprehension of how far the idea of theater and spectacle is integral to terrorism (as the sight of aircraft slamming into the World Trade Center towers indubitably established) Electronic Disturbance Theater (EDT). Hacktivism’s arsenal extends beyond all this, as Denning observes, to swarming, email bombing, computer break-ins, creating mirror and mimic websites, and introducing viruses and worms into computer networks.

Finally, to round up her discussion, Denning adverts to cyberterrorism, a term coined by Barry Collin, of the Institute for Security and Intelligence (California), to suggest the marriage of terrorism” and cyberspace”.[40] She finds adequate the definition furnished by a FBI agent: “Cyberterrorism is the premeditated, politically motivated attack against information, computer systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents.”[41] It is the distinctive characteristic of cyberterrorism that it recognizes no boundaries and aims specifically to target the critical infrastructures of the enemy country or organization.

It is instructive, and alarming, that Denning takes her cues, in speaking of cyberterrorism, from figures of the political and defense establishment, since nearly all of the purportedly theoretical literature on information warfare, the larger category under whose rubric cyberwar, cyberterrorism, and internet terrorism are generally subsumed and discussed, has been generated by officials working for the Pentagon, Air Force, the National Defense University, other branches of the military and intelligence services,[42] and so-called think tanks, such as the RAND Institution.[43]

Surprisingly, there is little if any theorizing in this literature on what constitutes “information”, how it comes to be assessed as information, and its politics -- and how it is to be distinguished from “knowledge”. Cliches about the “information revolution” proliferate, and its votaries are profuse in expressing sentiments whose inanity matches their crudity: thus, we are told, information struggles or wants to be free, and information belongs to all.

The definition of information warfare furnished by the Department of Defense is accepted as a template by nearly every commentator: “Actions taken to preserve the integrity of one’s own information system from exploitation, corruption, or destruction, while at the same time exploiting, corrupting, or destroying an adversary’s information system and in the process achieving an information advantage in the application of force.”[44] Information warfare is perceived as a zero-sum game, as another aspect of man’s innate tendency to gravitate towards competition, the preservation and enhancement of self-interest, and the destruction of the interests of others. Speaking in a particularly American idiom, which recognizes only “winners” and “losers”, the two principal officers of the US Air Force opine that “the competition for information is as old as human conflict”, predating “the dawn of history”, “virtually a defining characteristic of humanity”; more to the point, “Nations, corporations, and individuals each seek to increase and protect their own store of information while trying to limit and penetrate the adversary’s.”[45] Cyberterrorism is, understandably, placed within this framework: it represents an attempt, by non-state actors, to “deny, exploit, corrupt, destroy, or protect information.”[46]

[Here will follow several paragraphs about the use of the internet in Chiapas, the Zapatista network, the place of the internet in the organization of the Seattle demonstrations, and the Electronic Intifada.]

To unravel the politics of the discourses around cyberterrorism, it becomes imperative to ask who produces knowledge about terrorism, how terrorism is constituted, and the politics of knowledge disguised by conventional definitions of terrorism. If our understanding of terrorism, as I would argue, derives primarily from the counterterrorism experts, it may help illuminate why government officials, military strategists, policy planners, and the consultants who work for RAND and the like are so resistant to any definition of terrorism that seeks to exonerate states and fixates only on subnational, transnational, and other non-state actors. . . . . .

[INCOMPLETE]

[1] Valdis E. Krebs, “Uncloaking Terrorist Networks”, First Monday: Peer-Reviewed Journal on the Internet 7, no. 4 (April 2002), seems to be wholly unaware of the pre-history of “terrorist networks”, though Krebs is right in advancing the claim that “in the non-stop stream of news and analysis” following the events of September 11th, “one phrase was continuously repeated – ‘terrorist network.’” On-line (accessed 8 April 2002) at: http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue7_4/krebs/index.html

The phrase “terror network” was first made famous by Claire Sterling, The Terror Network (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston/Reader’s Digest, 1981), a work whose “scholarly” merit can be surmised from the involvement of “Reader’s Digest”; an apt rejoinder to her, which dissects the idea of “networks”, is Edward S. Herman, The Real Terror Network: Terrorism in Fact and Propaganda (Boston: South End Press, 1982).

[2] A videocassette prepared by Osama bin Laden and released on or around 13 December 2001 appears to confirm the existence of different cells which appear to have acted independently of each other: “Those who were trained to fly”, bin Laden is heard saying, “didn’t know the others. One group of people did not know the other group.” See: http://www.defenselink.mil/news/De2001/d20011213ubl.pdf for the full transcript. A similar argument about independent cells may reasonably be advanced about the American Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, which have been linked to bin Laden and which, like the attacks of September 11th, took place within minutes of each other.

[3] Krebs, “Uncloaking Terrorist Networks”, p. 2.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., pp. 3-8.

[6] For a brief resume of, and reflection on, these arguments see Vinay Lal, “The Politics of History on the Internet: Cyber-Diasporic Hinduism and the North American Hindu Diaspora”, Diaspora 8, no. 2 (Fall 1999), pp. 137-73, esp. pp. 137-43.

[7] “Osama Bin Laden: Planning Terrorist Attacks on the Internet”, accessed 10 Jan. 2002 online at: <wysiwyg://122/http://www.allfreecontests.com/bin_laden/bin_laden_web.htm>

[8] Susan Stellin, “Terror’s Confounding Online Trail”, New York Times (28 March 2002), accessed online (16 April 2002) at: <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/28/technology/circuits/28TERR.html?>

[9] Charles Piller, “Terrorists Taking Up Cyberspace”, Los Angeles Times (8 Feb. 2001), p. A1; Varvara Mitliaga, “Cyber-Terrorism: A Call for Governmental Action?” Paper presented at the 16th BILETA Annual Conference (April 2001), Edinburgh, online (accessed on 15 January 2002) at: http://www.bileta.ac.uk/01papers/mitliaga.html. A lengthier treatment of these issues is offered by Michael Whine, “Cyberspace: A New Medium for Communication, Command and Control by Extremists” (April 1999), online at: http://www.ict.org.il/articles/cyberspace.htm (accessed 25 March 2002). The anonymity of the internet – for example, both Hotmail and Yahoo make it possible to set up a free and anonymous email account, and some technologies, such as AOL’s “Instant Messages”, make no provision for the storage of messages – is cited most frequently as the reason why terrorist activity online is hard to track down. Where a sophisticated technology for the interception of messages does exist, there remain questions, on which the literature is profuse, about how security and privacy concerns must be reconciled. A technology known colloquially as “Carnivore” to monitor electronic communications watches “for specific words or codes” and saves “copies of any messages containing these elements.” See Jason Krause, “New Tools sought to track terror online”, Chicago Tribune (15 October 2001), online at: http://www.chicagotribune.com/technology/chi-0110150199oct15.story?null. The language of cyberspace will doubtless soon find deserving lexicographers, grammarians, and semanticians.

[10] Stellin, “Terror’s Confounding Online Trail”.

[11] See http://www.adl.org/Terror/focus/16_focus_a4.html, accessed on 10 January 2002.

[12] Erik Baard, “Outside Chance”, Village Voice (7-13 November 2001), online at: sysiwyg://57/http://www/villagevoice/com/issues/0145/baard.php

[13] Mitliaga, “Cyber-Terrorism: A Call for Governmental Action?”, offers a brief summary. Online (accessed on 15 January 2002) at: <http://www.bileta.ac.uk/01papers/mitliaga.html>

[14] Piller, “Terrorists Taking Up Cyberspace”, p. A15.

[15] http://www.eelam.com

[16] http://www.farc-ep.org/pagina_ingles [English version]

[17] A useful CD-ROM compendium of such websites, though slightly dated, is Digital Hate 2000 (Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1999).

[18] Senator Diane Feinstein (D-California) proposed new legislation that would make illegal the dissemination of bomb-making literature as a form of incitement to commit violence. An article published in the Columbus Dispatch (29 April 1996) provided details of several episodes of amateur bomb-making: see Mike Lafferty, “Blueprints for Bombs Are Not Hard to Find”, p. C1. The most well-known of such manuals goes by the name of the Anarchist’s Cookbook, first written by Jolly Roger in the mid 1980s and since published in several editions. The website [www.anarchistcookbook.net] on which it is featured describes the book as a “collection of files compiled by a computer pirate detailing many underground activities such as hacking, phreaking (telephone hacking), pranks, drugs, explosives and home made bombs. The Cookbook has come under attack from many including the press in the past, but is essentially only a collection of publicly available information that can be found in your pubic library.” Advocates of censorship on the net consistently encounter the rejoinder that information and material on the net deemed to be illegal, harmful, or exploitative is also found in more traditional forms, such as the print media.

[19] http://www.palestine-info.org

[20] The main home page is: http://www.hizbollah.org, while news and information are carried on: http://www.almanar.com.lb; attacks on Israeli targets are conveyed on http://www.moqawama.org

[21] Kevin Whitelaw, “Terrorists on the Web: Electronic Safe Haven”, U.S. News & World Report (22 June 1998), p. 46.

[22] For links from one extraordinary site prepared by Barry Cromwell, and last modified on 19 April 2002, see < http://www.cromwell-intl.com/security/netusers.html >

[23] http://burn.ucsd.edu/~ats/MRTA. See also Robert Grollier, “Terrorists Get Web Sites Courtesy of U.S. Universities”, San Francisco Chronicle (10 May 1997), online at: http://burn.ucsd.edu/archives/ats-1/1997.May/0042.html

[24] Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Victor Gollancz, 1998). Describing the almost “revolutionary change in terrorism” induced by the internet, Hoffman remarks that “in the past, terrorists had to communicate through an act of violence and hope that the communiqué would effectively explain their ideological justification or their fundamental position.” Quoted in Piller, “Terrorists Taking Up Cyberspace”, p. A1.

[25] Niall McKay, “Pentagon Deflects Web Assault”, Wired News (10 Sept. 1998), online (accessed on 17 April 2002) at: wysiwyg://6/http://www.wired.com/news/print/0%2C1294%2C14931%2C00.html

[26] James Glave, “Crackers: We Stole Nuke Data”, Wired News (3 June 1998), online (accessed 28 March 2002) at: http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,12717,00.html

[27] Unfortunately, John W. Garver, Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), though unusually comprehensive, is insensitive to such considerations.

[28] A recent documentary film, Bringing Down a Dictator (director Steve York, 2001), highlights the role of the student-led group, Otpor, which trained activists in non-violent action and maintained the channels of communication largely through the internet. The Balkans is also often the stage for imaginary scenarios of cyberwar: see Matthew G. Devost, Brian K. Houghton, and Neal A. Pollard, “Information Terrorism: Can You Trust Your Toaster?” (1996), available online from the archives of the Terrorism Research Center at www.terrorism.com

[29] Ashley Dunn, “Crisis in Yugoslavia – Battle Spilling Over Onto the Internet”, Los Angeles Times (3 April 1999).

[30] Philip Sherwell, Sasa Nikolic, and Julius Strauss, “Clinton orders ‘cyber-sabotage’ to oust Serb leader”, Daily Telegraph (7 April 1999), online at: <http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/a3780596c7940.htm>

[31] David Briscoe, “Kosovo-Propaganda War”, Associated Press (17 May 1999).

[32] Piller, “Terrorists Taking Up Cyberspace”.

[33] Cited by Larisa Paul, “When Cyber Hacktivism Meets Cyberterrorism” (19 February 2001), online (accessed 16 April 2002) at: http://rr.sans.org/hackers/terrorism.php

[34] Carmen J. Gentile, “Hacker War Rages in Holy Land”, Wired news (8 November 2000), online (accessed 17 April 2002) at: wysiwyg://8/http://www.wired.com/news/print/0%2C1294%2C40030%2C00.html

The discrepancy in how Israeli and Palestinian cyberattacks are described tells its own story; it is enough to make allegations about the links of Palestinian cyber activists to the Hezbollah, and since the state is not seen as a perpetrator of terrorism, Israeli cyber activists are not seen in the same light.

[35] Michelle Delio, “Crackers Expand Private War”, Wired News (18 April 2001), and Michelle Delio”, “It’s (Cyber) War: China vs. U.S.”, Wired News (30 April 2001), both online (accessed 28 March 2002) at, respectively: wysiwyg://83/http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,43134,00.html and wysiwyg://80/http://www.wired.com/news/print/0,1294,43437,00.html

[36] Delio, “Crackers Expand Private War”, p. 1.

[37] Mitliaga, “Cyber-Terrorism”, p. 3.

[38] Dorothy Denning, “Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism: The Internet as a Tool for Influencing Foreign Policy”, online (accessed 14 January 2002) at: <http://www.terrorism.com/documents/denning-infoterrorism.html>

[39] Ibid., p. 8.

[40] Barry Collin, “The Future of Cyberterrorism”, Crime and Justice International (March 1997), pp. 15-18, online at: http://www.acsp.uic.edu/OICJ/CONFS/terror02.htm

[41] Denning, “Activism, Hacktivism, and Cyberterrorism”, p. 17, citing Mark M. Pollitt, “Cyberterrorism: Fact or Fancy?”, Proceedings of the 20th National Information Systems Security Conference (October 1997), pp. 285-89, online (accessed 28 March 2002) at: http://www.cs.georgetown.edu/~denning/infosec/pollitt.html

[42] For a representative set of articles on “information warfare”, see Thomas G. Mahnken [Office of Naval Intelligence], “War in the Information Age”, Joint Forces Quarterly (Winter 1995-96), pp. 39-43; Lawrence E. Casper [US Army] et al, “Knowledge-Based Warfare: A Security Strategy for the Next Century”, Joint Forces Quarterly (Autumn 1996), pp. 81-89; Ronald R. Fogleman [Chief of Staff, US Air Force] and Sheila E. Widnall [Secretary of the Air Force], “Cornerstones of Information Warfare”, online on Infowar.com site at http://www.infowar.com/mil/_c4i/mil_c4ia.html-ssi (accessed 28 March 2002); Chris Morris, Janet Morris, and Thomas Baines [all Air University], “Weapons of Mass Protection: Nonlethality, Information Warfare, and Airpower in the Age of Chaos” [pdf. file]; Ronald R. Fogleman [Chief of Staff, US Air Force], “Information Operations: The Fifth Dimension of Warfare”, online (accessed 28 March 2002) at: http://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/1995/di1047.html; Dan Kuehl [National Defense University], “The Ethics of Information Warfare and Statecraft”, online at: http://www.infowar.com/mil_c4i/mil_c4ij.html-ssi (accessed 15 March 2002); Matthew G. Devost [Security Design International], “Organizing for Information Warfare: ‘The Truth is Out There’”, online at: www. terrorism.com (accessed 15 March 2002); and Martin C. Libicki [National Defense University], “Information Dominance”, Strategic Forum, no. 132 (November 1997), online (accessed 28 March 2002) at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/forum132.html. The pretensions of some commentators, who fancy themselves modern-day Sun Tzus, can be surmised from the papers published by the Institute for National Strategic Studies in its “Sun Tzu Art of War in Information Warfare” series. See, in particular, Brian Fredericks [US Army], “Information Warfare: The Organizational Dimension”; Charles B. Everett, Moss Dewindt and Shane McDade, “The Silicon Spear: An Assessment of Information Based Warfare (IBW) and U.S. National Security”; and John H. Miller, “Information Warfare: Issues and Perspectives”, all online at: http://www.ndu.edu/inss/siws.

[43] John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt of RAND (Santa Monica, California) have built an entire career around the ideas of “netwar” and other aspects of information warfare, but their numerous books all recycle a couple of ideas that are rather slim to begin with. See, for instance, The Zapatista ‘Social Netwar’ in Mexico (RAND, 1998); In Athena’s Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (edited, RAND, 1997); and Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy (edited, RAND, 2001).

[44] Cited by Devost, “Information Terrorism: Can You Trust Your Toaster”, p. 6.

[45] Fogleman and Widnall, “Cornerstones of Information Warfare”, p. 1.

[46] Ibid., p. 5.
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Obama's Cybersecurity Plan will require false flag to justify its total insanity

Obama's Cybersecurity Plan
Bring in the Contractors!
http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=13848
by Tom Burghardt
Global Research, June 4, 2009 Antifascist Calling

With billions of dollars in federal funds hanging in the balance, President Barack Obama unveiled the Cyberspace Policy Review May 29 at the White House.

During his presentation in the East Room Obama said that "America's economic prosperity in the 21st century will depend on cybersecurity" and that efforts to "deter, prevent, detect and defend" against malicious cyberattacks would be run from the White House.

How this debate is being framed however, has a familiar ring to it. Rather than actually educating the public about steps to prevent victimization, state prescriptions always seem to draw from the same tired playbook.

First, issue dire warnings of an imminent national catastrophe;

second, manufacture a panic with lurid tales of a "digital Pearl Harbor;"

third, gin-up expensive "solutions" that benefit armies of (well-paid) experts drawn from officialdom and the private sector (who generally are as interchangeable as light bulbs however dim).


As Wired magazine's "Threat Level" editor Kevin Poulsen said during a panel at the Computers, Freedom and Privacy conference in Washington June 3, "the threat of cyber-terrorism is 'preposterous'," arguing that "long-standing warnings" that hackers will attack the nation's power grid is so much hot-air. Poulsen contends "that calling such intrusions national security threats means information about attacks gets classified unneccessarily."

While the president claims the new office "will not include--I repeat will not include--monitoring private sector networks or Internet traffic," and that his administration "will preserve and protect the personal privacy and civil liberties that we cherish as Americans," the devil is in the details and when they're added together "change" once again, morphs into more of the same.

As with all things Washington, lurking wraith-like in the background, amidst bromides about "protecting America" from "cyber thieves trolling for sensitive information" are the usual class of insiders: the well-heeled corporations and their stable of retired militarists and spies who comprise the Military-Industrial-Security Complex.

Take Dale Meyerrose, for example. The former Air Force Major General served as U.S. Northern Command's Chief Information Officer. After a stint at NORTHCOM, Meyerrose became Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Information Sharing for U.S. Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell, the former NSA Director and ten-year executive vice president at the spooky Booz Allen Hamilton firm.

Last week, Meyerrose told The Wall Street Journal that "one important challenge will be finding a way to persuade private companies, especially those in price-sensitive industries, to invest more money in digital security. 'You have to figure out what motivates folks,' he said."

He should know. After serving as McConnell's cyber point man, Meyerrose plotted a new flight plan that landed him a plum job with major defense contractor, the Harris Corporation, where he currently directs the company's National Cyber Initiative.

Headquartered in Melbourne, Florida, the firm boasts $5.4 billion in annual revenue and clocked in at No. 13 on Washington Technology's "2008 Top 100 Government Contractors" list, with some $1.6 billion in defense-related income. Under the General Services Administration's Alliant contract worth some $50 billion, the firm is competeing with other defense giants to provide an array of IT services to various federal agencies. Major customers include the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Reconnaissance Office and Defense Department.

Let's be clear: "What motivates folks" is cold, hard cash and there's lots of it to go around courtesy of the American people. The New York Times reported May 31, "The government's urgent push into cyberwarfare has set off a rush among the biggest military companies for billions of dollars in new defense contracts." According to the Times,

The exotic nature of the work, coupled with the deep recession, is enabling the companies to attract top young talent that once would have gone to Silicon Valley. And the race to develop weapons that defend against, or initiate, computer attacks has given rise to thousands of "hacker soldiers" within the Pentagon who can blend the new capabilities into the nation's war planning.

Nearly all of the largest military companies--including Northrop Grumman, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin and Raytheon--have major cyber contracts with the military and intelligence agencies. (Christopher Drew and John Markoff, "Contractors Vie for Plum Work, Hacking for the United States," The New York Times, May 31, 2009)
As Washington Technology reported June 1, Zal Azmi, CACI International's senior vice president for strategic law enforcement and national security programs, told the insider publication: "The timing is perfect. There is a lot of enthusiasm for it. "It's a very comprehensive plan. It lays out a very good strategy."

And there you have it.

A Cybersecurity Dream: Bundles of Cash

Although the position of Cybersecurity Coordinator has yet to be filled, its a sure bet whoever gets the nod will be drawn from a narrow pool of security executives, the majority of whom transit effortlessly between the Pentagon and defense corporations. That individual will oversee billions of dollars in funding for developing and coordinating the defense of computer systems that operate the global financial system as well as domestic transportation and commerce.

Under the administration's plan, the Cybersecurity Coordinator will report to the president's National Economic Council (NEC) and the National Security Council (NSC). The CSC will be a member of both NEC and NSC, Obama said in his East Room statement, "an acknowledgment that the threat is both to national security and to the economy," The Washington Post reports.

According to the Post, Obama's top economic adviser, Lawrence H. Summers, fought for a dominant role for the NEC, ensuring that "efforts to protect private networks do not unduly threaten economic growth." This however, is unlikely to happen given the make-up of the administration's team. Which raises the question: who exactly were Obama's "private sector partners" who helped devise current state policy? The Cyberspace Policy Review sets the record straight.

The U.S. depends upon a privately owned, globally operated digital infrastructure. The review team engaged with industry to continue building the foundation of a trusted partnership. This engagement underscored the importance of developing value propositions that are understood by both government and industry partners. It also made clear that increasing information sharing is not enough; the government must foster an environment for collaboration. The following industry groups and venues participated: the Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA), Business Executives for National Security (BENS), the Business Software Alliance (BSA), the Center for Strategic and International Studies' (CSIS) Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency, the Communications Sector Coordinating Council (C-SCC), the Cross-Sector Cyber Security Working Group (CSCSWG), the Defense Industrial Base Executive Committee, the Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure Committee (FBIIC), the Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council (FS-SCC), the Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA), the Internet Security Alliance (ISA), the Information Technology Sector Coordinating Council (IT-SCC), the National Infrastructure Advisory Council (NIAC), the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), TechAmerica, and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. (Cyberspace Policy Review, Appendix B: Methodology, pp. B 2-3.)

A bevy of heavy-hitters in the defense, banking, financial services, intelligence and security industries if ever there were one. And much like their predecessors in the Oval Office, the Obama administration has failed to "guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence" by the Military-Industrial-Security Complex which president Dwight. D. Eisenhower so eloquently warned against--and expanded--decades ago.

Round Up the Usual Suspects

Who then are the new peddlers of "unwarranted influence"? Let's take a look.

Armed Forces Communications and Electronics Association (AFCEA): The Fairfax, Virginia group describes itself as a "non-profit membership association serving the military, government, industry, and academia" to advance "professional knowledge and relationships in the fields of communications, IT, intelligence and global security." AFCEA was founded at the dawn of the Cold War in 1946. It serves as an "ethical forum" where "a close cooperative relationship among government agencies, the military and industry" is fostered. With 32,000 individual and 1,700 corporate members, AFCEA was described by investigative journalist Tim Shorrock in his essential book Spies For Hire as "the largest industry association in the intelligence business." Its board of directors and executive committee are studded with players drawn from major defense and security firms such as CACI International, Booz Allen Hamilton, Science Applications International Corporation, ManTech International Corporation, QinetiQ North America, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin and the spooky MITRE Corporation.

Business Executives for National Security (BENS): This self-described "nationwide, non-partisan organization" claims the mantle of functioning as "the primary channel through which senior business executives can help advance the nation's security." BENS members were leading proponents of former vice president Al Gore's defense reform initiative that handed tens of billions of taxpayer dollars to BENS members in the heavily-outsourced intelligence and security industries. An advocacy group with a distinct neoconservative tilt, BENS "one special interest: to help make America safe and secure" is facilitated by executives drawn from the Pentagon. Its current Chairman and CEO is retired Air Force General Charles G. Boyd who served as former House Speaker Newt Gingrich's "defense consultant." Its board of directors and executive committee include members from Biltmore Capital Group, LLC; Janus Capital Group, Booz Allen Hamilton, Cisco Systems Inc., Perot Systems Inc., Goldman Sachs and The Tupperware Corporation (!) to name but a few. BENS Advisory Council includes major war criminal Henry Kissinger, former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin, former U.N. Ambassador Thomas Pickering, former FBI and CIA Director William Webster, former CIA head honcho Michael V. Hayden and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Peter Pace. "Non-partisan" indeed!

Business Software Alliance (BSA): BSA describes itself as "the largest and most international IT industry group" comprised on the "most innovative companies in the world." Its members are drawn from the top corporations in the computing and software industries and include Adobe, Apple, Cisco Systems, Dell, Hewlett-Packard, IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Siemens and Symantec. Most of these firms have extensive contractual arrangements with the Defense Department.

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS): For decades, CSIS has been a major right-wing think tank closely tied to the defense and security industries. Since its founding in 1962 by David Abshire and Admiral Arleigh Burke, CSIS has been a mouthpiece for the Defense and Intelligence Complex. Its current President and CEO, John J. Hamre was a former Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Clinton administration and was hired by SAIC to work on the National Security Agency's scandal-plagued Trailblazer program. The $361 million project to build a new communications intercept system for NSA was described as a "colossal failure" by investigative journalists Donald Bartlett and James Steele in a 2007 piece in Vanity Fair. CSIS was a major behind-the-scenes force urging the 2003 U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq and was an apologist for the Bush administration's bogus allegation that the Iraqi government possessed "weapons of mass destruction," citing "poor intelligence" rather than political mendacity on a grand scale. In the aftermath of the invasion, Booz Allen Hamilton organized a "major conference on rebuilding Iraq that attracted hundreds of corporations eager to cash in on the billions of dollars in contracts about to be awarded by the Bush administration," according to Tim Shorrock. The closed-door event was held in the CSIS conference room and outlined the Bush regime's plans for Iraq's economic make-over--one that would sell-off state assets "in a way very conducive to foreign investment." The Obama administration's Cyberspace Policy Review has drawn extensively from CSIS' Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency report, an alarmist screed that avers that "cybersecurity is now a major national security problem for the United States." Indeed the CSIS report urges the Obama administration to "reinvent the public-private partnership" with "a focus on operational activities" that "will result in more progress on cybersecurity." How might this be accomplished? Why by regulating cyberspace, of course! CSIS avers that "voluntary action is not enough," and states "we advocate a new approach to regulation that avoids both prescriptive mandates, which could add unnecessary costs and stifle innovation, and overreliance on market forces, which are ill-equipped to meet national security and public safety requirements." But with a dubious track record dating back to the Cold War, and a board of directors manned by multinational defense grifters and neoconservative/neoliberal insiders such as former U.S. Senator Sam Nunn, Henry Kissinger, Richard Armitage, Zbigniew Brzezinski, former Defense Secretary William S. Cohen, James R. Schlesinger and Bush crime family insider Brent Scowcroft, CSIS' cybersecurity prescriptions are anything but reliable.

Communications Sector Coordinating Council (CSCC): Created in 2005 "to represent the Communications Sector, as the principal entity for coordinating with the government in implementing the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP)," CSCC's "unique industry-government partnership" facilitates the "exchange of information among government and industry participants regarding vulnerabilities, threats, intrusions and anomalies affecting the telecommunications infrastructure." Certainly one "anomaly" not addressed by CSCC is the National Security Agency's driftnet surveillance of Americans' private communications. A major hub where telecommunications' grifters meet, CSCC members include AT&T, Boeing, Cisco Systems, Comcast, Computer Sciences Corporation, Level 3, the MITRE Corporation, Motorola, the National Association of Broadcasters, Nortel, Quest, Sprint, Tyco, U.S. Internet Service Provider Association, VeriSign and Verizon. Many of the above-named entities are direct collaborators with the NSA and FBI's extensive warrantless wiretapping programs.

Intelligence and National Security Alliance (INSA): As Antifascist Calling reported May 26, INSA was created by and for contractors in the heavily-outsourced world of U.S. intelligence. Founded by BAE Systems, Booz Allen Hamilton, Computer Sciences Corporation, General Dynamics, Hewlett-Packard, Lockheed Martin, ManTech International, Microsoft, the Potomac Institute and Science Applications International Corporation, The Washington Post characterized INSA as "a gathering place for spies and their business associates." According to an INSA paper on cybersecurity, Critical Issues for Cyber Assurance Policy Reform: An Industry Assessment, the group recommended "a single leadership position at the White House-level that aligns national cyber security responsibilities with appropriate authorities." Among other prescriptions, reflecting the group's close ties to defense firms and the Pentagon INSA calls on the Obama administration to "establish a stronger working relationship between the private sector and the U.S. Government" (!) With their members heavily-banking on an expansion of Pentagon development of cyber attack tools, the group calls on the state to "Incorporate private sector cyber threat scenarios within government cyber-related test beds (e.g., DARPA's Cyber Test Range). Government cyber-related test beds should reflect private sector operational scenarios, especially to demonstrate how similar threats are detected and deterred, as well as to demonstrate private sector concerns (e.g., exploitation of electric utility control system)." As I previously reported, INSA founding members BAE Systems, General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin and SAIC have all been awarded contracts by DARPA to build and run the National Cyber Range.

Internet Security Alliance (ISA): According to a self-promotional blurb on their website, ISA "was created to provide a forum for information sharing" and "represents corporate security interests before legislators and regulators." Amongst ISA sponsors one finds AIG (yes, that AIG!) Verizon, Raytheon, VeriSign, the National Association of Manufacturers, Nortel, Northrop Grumman, Tata, and Mellon. State partners include the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Congress, and the Department of Commerce. Among ISA's recommendations for the Obama administration's Cyberspace Policy Review was its unabashed claim that "the diversity of the internet places its security inescapably in the hands of the private sector." When one considers that the development of the Internet was the result of taxpayer dollars, ISA's cheeky demand is impertinent at best, reflecting capitalism's inherent tendency to "forget" who foots the bill! In this vein, ISA believes that "government's first role ought to be to use market incentives to motivate adhering to good security practices." In other words, taxpayer-financed handouts. Considering the largess already extended to ISA "sponsor" AIG, "regulation for consumer protection" that use "government mandates" to "address cyber infrastructure issues" will be "ineffective and counter-productive both from a national security and economic perspective." Give us the money seems to be ISA's clarion call to the new "change" regime in Washington. And why not? Just ask AIG!

The Information Technology Sector Coordinating Council (IT-SCC): According to their website, the IT-SCC was established in 2006 and brought together "companies, associations, and other key IT sector participants," in a forum that "envisions a secure, resilient and protected global information infrastructure that can rapidly restore services if affected by an emergency or crisis," and may "consider the use of government resources to support appropriate tasks such as administrative, meeting logistics, specifically defined and mutually agreeable projects, and communications support (particularly in response to government requests or needs)." With some six dozen corporate members, the majority of whom are heavily-leveraged in the defense and security industries, IT-SCC affiliates include the usual suspects: Business Software Alliance, Center for Internet Security, Computer Sciences Corporation, General Dynamics, IBM, Intel, Internet Security Alliance, ITT Corporation, Lockheed Martin, Microsoft, Northrop Grumman, Perot Systems, Raytheon and Verizon, to name but a few. One IT-SCC affiliate not likely craving public scrutiny is Electronic Warfare Associates, Inc. (EWA). According to Wired, one EWA company, the Herndon, Virginia-based EWA Government Systems, Inc., "is one of several firms that boasts of making tiny devices to help manhunters locate their prey. The company's 'Bigfoot Remote Tagging System' is a "very small, battery-operated device used to emit an RF [radio frequency] transmission [so] that the target can be located and/or tracked." Allegedly in use along the AfPak border, the devices are RFID beacons planted by local operatives "near militant safehouses," which guide CIA Predator and Reaper drones to their targets. Sounds like any number of government-sponsored "mutually agreeable projects" to me!

The National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC): As Antifascist Calling reported last year (see: "Comcast's Spooky Employment Opportunities") NSTAC is comprised of telecom executives representing the major communications, network service providers, information technology, finance and aerospace companies who provide "industry-based advice and expertise" to the President "on issues and problems relating to implementing national security and emergency preparedness communications policy," according to SourceWatch. Created in 1982 when former president Ronald Reagan signed Executive Order 12382, in all probability NSTAC facilitates U.S. telecommunication firms' "cooperation" with NSA and other intelligence agencies' efforts in conducting warrantless wiretapping, data-mining and other illegal surveillance programs in highly-profitable arrangements with the Bush and Obama administrations. NSTAC's current Chair is Edward A. Mueller, Chairman and CEO at Qwest. The group's Vice Chair is John T. Stankey, the President and CEO at AT&T. Additional corporate members include: The Boeing Company, Motorola, Science Applications International Corporation, Lockheed Martin, Rockwell International, Juniper Networks, the Harris Corporation, Tyco Electronics, Computer Sciences Corporation, Microsoft, Bank of America, Inc., Verizon, Raytheon and Nortel.

TechAmerica: Self-described as "the driving force behind productivity growth and jobs creation in the United States," TechAmerica represents some 1,500 member companies and "is the industry's largest advocacy organization," one that "is dedicated to helping members' top and bottom lines." Indeed, the lobby shop offered lavish praise for president Obama's Cyber Security plan. Calling the administration's Cyberspace Policy Review a "historic step in the right direction," one that will "protect America" (wait!) "from a digital 9/11."

Conclusion

The Obama administration's Cyberspace Policy Review is a corporatist boondoggle that will neither ameliorate nor frankly, even begin to address the most pertinent cybersecurity threats faced by the vast majority of Americans: hacking and spoofing attacks by criminals. Why? The wretched programs riddled with bad code and near non-existent "security" patches breeched as soon as they're written are not part of the playbook. Indeed, the corporations and software developers who've grown rich off of the Internet have no incentive to write better programs!

After all, from a business perspective its far better to terrorize the public into demanding more intrusive, and less accountable, minders who will "police" the Internet--for a hefty price.
Posted by Antifascist at 2:49 PM 

Tom Burghardt is a frequent contributor to Global Research.  Global Research Articles by Tom Burghardt
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Effie Trinket

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Offline Satyagraha

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An Enron-like cyber false flag to justify the new "E-Patriot Act".
Pearl Harbor for explosions.
Enron for financial meltdowns - all your money vanishes in an instant by some 'hacker' out there in the cyber world.
Now give us your fingerprints, iris scan, dna, step into the body scanner, and here's a chip implant...
all to keep you safe from cyber terrorists.
And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40

Offline SUPREMEMASTER

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Is this only limited to cyber-mattes within the United States? (I'm assuming that it isn't...)
Automatic User Post Signature:
The message has to be put out in the right way.
Website Still Needs to be updated |ActivismOverDrive.comze.net|

Offline Dig

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http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=132923.msg801948#msg801948

You gotta be fricking kidding me!

2 years ago!

Guys, almost everything going on right now has already been exposed like 10x on this forum by solid researchers!

uggghhhhhhhh
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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Is this only limited to cyber-mattes within the United States? (I'm assuming that it isn't...)

Anything connected to the Internet anywhere on, above, or below the planet.

Wait, I take that back...anything that could connect to the internet...intranets, toasters, cars, your brain, bees outfitted with nano-carbon censors, video barbie, Bill Gates' flying syringes...EVERYTHING!

This also includes the noosphere which is consciousness itself.

That is right, the DoD wants authority to control human consciousness!
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline Dig

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CIA used US software industry to 'blow up a Russian gas pipeline' [Actual Title]

US software 'blew up Russian gas pipeline'
http://www.zdnet.co.uk/news/it-strategy/2004/03/01/us-software-blew-up-russian-gas-pipeline-39147917/
ZDNet UK / News and Analysis / Business of IT / IT Strategy
By Matt Loney, ZDNet.co.uk,  1 March, 2004 15:10

Faulty US software was to blame for one of the biggest non-nuclear explosions the world has ever seen, which took place in a Siberian natural gas pipeline, according to a new book published on Monday. At the Abyss: An Insider's History of the Cold War, written by Thomas C. Reed, a former Air Force secretary who served in the US National Security Council during the Reagan administration, documents how software and other technology was deliberately created with flaws as part of US attempts to undermine the Soviet economy.

In his book, Reed says the pipeline explosion was just one example of "cold-eyed economic warfare" against the Soviet Union at a time when the US was trying to block Western Europe from importing Soviet natural gas. The CIA slipped the flawed software to the Soviets in a way they would not detect it, according to Reed. The book is likely to add fuel to the debate over open-source software, which many governments are examining with increasing interest. The Chinese government is one such, with Red Flag Linux gaining increasing traction in China, and proprietary software companies such as Microsoft scrambling to reassure them that the closed-source model does not pose risks. "In order to disrupt the Soviet gas supply, its hard currency earnings from the West, and the internal Russian economy, the pipeline software that was to run the pumps, turbines, and valves was programmed to go haywire, after a decent interval, to reset pump speeds and valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to pipeline joints and welds," Reed wrote. "The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space."

"While there were no physical casualties from the pipeline explosion, there was significant damage to the Soviet economy. Its ultimate bankruptcy, not a bloody battle or nuclear exchange, is what brought the Cold War to an end. In time the Soviets came to understand that they had been stealing bogus technology, but now what were they to do? By implication, every cell of the Soviet leviathan might be infected. They had no way of knowing which equipment was sound, which was bogus. All was suspect, which was the intended endgame for the operation."

The faulty software was slipped to the Russians after an agent recruited by the French and dubbed "Farewell" provided a shopping list of Soviet priorities, which focused on stealing Western technology. Exactly one year ago, China officials announced that the country had signed a pact with Microsoft that would give them access to the highly protected Windows operating system source code. Microsoft chairman Bill Gates hinted at the time that China would be privy to all, not just part, of the source code its government wished to inspect. The Chinese government and military have previously stated their preference for the rival Linux operating system because its source code is made publicly available. Source code makes it easier to understand the inner workings of an operating system, and without access to the code, governments like China fear that back doors may be installed to leak out sensitive information. China is also said to be readying its own 64-bit server chip, as part of an effort to control more of the intellectual property that the country uses.
____________________________________________
CIA plot led to huge blast in Siberian gas pipeline
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1455559/CIA-plot-led-to-huge-blast-in-Siberian-gas-pipeline.html
By Alec Russell in Washington 12:00AM GMT 28 Feb 2004

A CIA operation to sabotage Soviet industry by duping Moscow into stealing booby-trapped software was spectacularly successful when it triggered a huge explosion in a Siberian gas pipeline, it emerged yesterday. Thomas Reed, a former US Air Force secretary who was in Ronald Reagan's National Security Council, discloses what he called just one example of the CIA's "cold-eyed economic warfare" against Moscow in a memoir to be published next month. Leaked extracts in yesterday's Washington Post describe how the operation caused "the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space" in the summer of 1982. Mr Reed writes that the software "was programmed to reset pump speeds and valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to pipeline joints and welds". The CIA learned of Soviet ambitions to steal the software via a French KGB source, Col Vladimir Vetrov, codenamed Farewell. His job was to evaluate the intelligence collected by a shadowy arm of the KGB set up a network of industrial spies to steal technology from the West. The breakthrough came when Vetrov told the CIA of a specific "shopping list" of software technology that Moscow was seeking to update its pipeline as it sought to export natural gas to Western Europe. Washington was keen to block the deal and, after securing President Reagan's approval in January 1982, the CIA tricked the Soviet Union into acquiring software with built-in flaws. "In order to disrupt the Soviet gas supply, its hard currency earnings from the West, and the internal Russian economy, the pipeline software that was to run the pumps, turbines and valves was programmed to go haywire after a decent interval, to reset pump speeds and valve settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to pipeline joints and welds," Mr Reed writes. The project exceeded the CIA's wildest dreams. There were no casualties in the explosion, but it was so dramatic that the first reports are said to have stirred alarm in Washington. The initial reports led to fears that the Soviets had launched a missile from a place where rockets were not known to be based, or even had detonated "a small nuclear device", Mr Reed writes in his book. While some of the details of the CIA's counter-offensive have emerged before, the sabotage of the gas pipeline has remained a secret until now. Mr Reed told the Post he had CIA approval to make the disclosures. Mr Vetrov's spying was discovered by the KGB and he was executed in 1983.
_____________________________________
From the CIA's own library:
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/farewell.htm

Excerpt:
__________________________________________________
How to Prevent Cyber Espionage
Security expert Gadi Evron has plenty of experience helping governments fight cyber attacks. In this column, he offers a roadmap companies can use to prevent computer espionage
http://www.csoonline.com/article/455979/how-to-prevent-cyber-espionage
By Gadi Evron October 22, 2008 — CSO —

This column is about computer-based espionage and how we can defend our organizations against it. But I'd like to start with a mood piece of sorts.  There has been too much noise about information warfare lately. Distributed denial of service and defacement attacks like what happened in Estonia and Georgia come to mind.  The following two stories give a better understanding of what it is really about, without resorting to more scary stories about what China is or isn't doing. We'll also touch on other interesting cases such as the Israeli Trojan horse case, when we talk about defensive measures against computer-based espionage and targeted attacks. The first is a report (without much detail or proof) on North Korea being involved in operations against South Korea using Trojan horses for espionage. The second is a lesson from history called the Farewell Dossier - a collection of intelligence documents KGB defector Colonel Vladimir Vetrov (code-named Farewell) handed over to NATO during the Cold War. This information led to a mass expulsion of Soviet technology spies. The CIA also mounted a counter-intelligence operation that transferred modified hardware and software designs over to the Soviets, resulting in the spectacular trans-Siberian incident of 1982, in which a huge explosion ripped apart a trans-Siberian pipeline. The resulting explosion was so big, it was supposedly confused for a nuclear explosion by American decision makers until the CIA said, "Oh, that's one of our operations."

It wasn't a bomb that destroyed the natural gas pipeline and sent shock waves through the economy of what was then the Soviet Union. Instead, it was a software virus created by the CIA, according to a book by Thomas Reed, a former U.S. Air Force secretary and National Security Council member.

What does this mean?

While destructive attacks are certainly of significance and important to defend against as they impact us directly, regardless of who the attacked party is or where in the world they are (DDoS attacks harm the Internet and its users), smarter, quieter attacks are all around us. How do we defend against them? I expect most information warfare acts to be targeted, quiet, and covert. Espionage, or spying if you like, is not relevant to us unless we are the target. The diplomats and the intelligence communities of different countries can figure it out for us. It is an old occupation, and well covered by international law. Computers are simply another tool, or capability, to be used by these same people. There is nothing new here as far as how the game is played. And yet, what if you are a target?

Recognizing there is a threat

You may have to defend against computer-based espionage for your own employer. Recent case studies, as well as research, have shown industrial espionage is indeed a big deal, and here are two examples:

One famous case from a few years ago, which I had the unfortunate opportunity to study as the lead incident response guy for the government, is the Israeli Trojan horse case.  Leading IT companies (most of which were local Israeli branches of Fortune 100 companies) were spied on using a Trojan horse built by an incompetent programmer, leaving traces of itself everywhere on the affected systems. This went on for a long period of time, undetected by any of these companies. The issue was only detected by chance when the creator of the Trojan horse used it for his own private purposes and was discovered during an investigation into a harassment incident. The stolen information was fed directly to their competitors, which was most of the rest of the Israeli IT industry. The services themselves were rendered by civilian intelligence and investigation firms.  In another case Israeli case, the attackers broke into a local branch of the post office (also a small bank in Israel) and placed a wireless gateway connected to a switch inside. Through it they stole a few tens of thousands of Shekels in the few days they were in operation. This case was also broken by complete chance. In other cases, intelligence agencies for various countries such as France have been spying on their own to make sure their own local companies have an edge competing with companies from other countries.

Here is an interesting quote from "The Industrious Spies, Industrial Espionage in the Digital Age":

"This transition fosters international tensions even among allies. 'Countries don't have friends, they have interests!' screamed a DOE poster in the mid-1990s. France has vigorously protested U.S. spying on French economic and technological developments - until it was revealed to be doing the same."

Defending against computer-based espionage

For the purpose of defense, while I'd certainly hope for more resources (read a larger budget) and change my focus on where I apply it - there is no inherent difference in how you defend your organization from computer-based espionage and in protecting against any Joe Hacker.  In espionage, the attacker has more resources, both technical and operational.

Some of what I would do differently

I'd concentrate more of my resources on network behavior analysis (which unfortunately, not many tools exist for, so good network security analysts are the main alternative), as well as on social engineering training and procedures.  Further, I'd prioritize cooperation with the physical security part of the organization, and HR (for personnel screening).  I'd also consider putting up a good deterrent as a cyber security policy, both to add to the attacker's risk and increase their cost. First, I'd make myself too difficult of a target and let people know about it. Second, I'd invest anything I can spare on monitoring my network for anomalies and security incidents, starting with mapping what my network actually looks like. This might add to the risk factor for opponents that can't afford to be caught and scare them. Covertness is the name of the game, or they would have come through the front door.  Entering an "industrial espionage defense" clause into your budget or creating a five-year plan to better protect your organization from organized industrial espionage may just get you a larger budget to cope with your organization's security needs.  Do you have something you'd do differently from (or in addition to) regular security practices when facing espionage from organized hackers? Any experience or thoughts are welcome.

They did it before, they will do it again...

If ANY power plant, ANY infrastructure is attacked or shut down - it was the CIA

U.N. warns of nuclear cyber attack risk
http://www.securityfocus.com/news/9592
Kevin Poulsen, SecurityFocus 2004-09-27

The United Nations' nuclear watchdog agency warned Friday of growing concern about cyber attacks against nuclear facilities. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) announced in a statement that it was developing new guidelines aimed at combating the danger of computerized attacks by outside intruders or corrupt insiders. "For example, software operated control systems in a nuclear facility could be hacked or the software corrupted by staff with insider access," the group said. The IAEA's new guidelines on "Security of Information Technology Related Equipment and Software Based Controls Against Malevolent Acts" are being finalized now, said the agency. The announcement came out of the agency's 48th annual general conference attended by 137 nations. Last year the Slammer worm penetrated a private computer network at Ohio's idled Davis-Besse nuclear plant and disabled a safety monitoring system for nearly five hours. The worm entered the plant network through an interconnected contractor's network, bypassing Davis-Besse's firewall.

News of the Davis-Besse incident prompted Rep. Edward Markey (D-MA) last fall to call for U.S. regulators to establish cyber security requirements for the 103 nuclear reactors operating in the U.S., specifically requiring firewalls and up-to-date patching of security vulnerabilities. By that time the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) had already begun working on an official manual to guide plant operators in evaluating their cybersecurity posture. But that document, finalized this month, "is not directive in nature," says Jim Davis, director of operations at the Nuclear Energy Institute, an industry association. "It does not establish a minimum level of security or anything like that. That isn't the purpose of the manual." A related industry effort will establish management-level cyber security guidelines for plant operators, says Davis, who believes industry efforts are sufficient. "I think we are taking it seriously... and I think if the industry doesn't go far enough in this area we'll see more attention from regulators." Neither the NRC manual nor the industry guidelines will be made public. Separately, the NRC is working on a substantial revision of its regulatory guide, "Criteria for Use of Computers in Safety Systems of Nuclear Power Plants," which sets security and reliability criteria for installing new computerized safety systems in plants. It would replace the current guide, written in 1996, which is three pages long. A working draft of the NRC guide reviewed by SecurityFocus would encourage plant operators to consider the effect of each new safety system on the plant's cyber security, and to develop response plans to deal with computer incidents. Additionally, it would urge vendors to maintain a secure development environment, and to probe their products for backdoors and logic bombs before shipping.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately


Offline chris jones

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RWarfare,killing getet easier
« Reply #12 on: May 12, 2011, 10:18:39 PM »
Killing just gets easier as time rolls on I am with hope thii is realted to the topic.
The variations and transitions of the mindset and values human beings can be altered depending on the given situation.
The average guy witnesses an accident and find himself drawn to scene, knowing the image will be one of pain, suffering and blood. Some may become revolted and sympathetic, others  may find themselves bordering on elation  and remain with the thought, *Jeez, I’m glad it wasn’t me. There are those who will thoroughly enjoy the misery of another, thrilled actually at the sight of the blood and gore.          Human nature and it variations.
I served with a few men in a war, good men, of honor and the belief they served their nation, defended their people, stood up for God and Country. I watched the transition of these men as the war progressed and the slaughters on both sides was a daily occurance. One of these men stated when asked about a infiltrator, he replied, cap him. Never would I have suspected these gents would turn,, war separates in some cases the contact of the soul and the mind.
This may sound strange to you; however there are those people who seem to have an i in graded desire to kill, they exist domestically, in boots and every nation on earth. Labels are plentiful, sociopaths, physcotics, sadists, and those who have been effected so deeply they no longer are in contact with their souls. The military are professionals with the art of profiling, trust me..JUST as those who control our military and the high echelon who in effect dominate their peon troops.
Controllers, does it matter what labels we give them, the three hundred, the Blindenbergs, the elitists, they have been with us since time and memoriam. Beware the inhabitants of this world, and of this nation, they are relentless, without the attribute we consider souls which they believe is a weakens for the moronic masses We have been infiltrated, this nation itself, our government. Not  all, but a defined segment in positions of supreme power  who may believe they are on the winning team, some may have convinced themselves they are the true patriots. Smedly Butler comes to mind, under the impression while in command he was convinced his black ops were for the nation and his people. After leaving the boots the reality of his deeds revealed to him the fact he had been used by the powers to complete sanctions for the elititists, this man suffered through the fire of his conscience , survived and broght hi s message to truth to the American citizenry and to add the upper crust who had manipulated hi and his patriotic philosophy. I feel the need to rant, o hit upon the what I sincerely believe is the essence of my being, my thoughts .
I relate the elites to parasites, I am more than convinced we are nothing but their feeding grounds. The web they weave for the majority of the masses is pure, unadulterated deception. It is proven they have they have the fortunes, the contacts, the lackeys of every imaginable profession at their fingertips.  These Mafias are professional manipulators, not simply in any way comparable to their msm they are but a tool, a brainless, gutless scripted manager of well paid freaks on the high road.
Historical thee have always been those who choose the side of the winners, despite the concequeses to the feeble moronic masses. Their  positions guarantee them a above the law status, or so they are convinced..status, a tile, riches and benefits that was a commoners can not begin to conceive, in effect it matters not what happens to the masses they, are protected, and in power. Demigods  with the power of life or death over the masses, In short a kingdom unto themselves.
I could name lists of Federal agencies that have ultimate power over the us CITIZENRY.
Controll, many haver anted on the tsa, The are but one small facto of the elites dominance, their eletist theme is basic control under the guize of protectionism, this is their function.
Homeland security is on  par with the SS, I feel certain this will be exposed explosively a FF would seal they power in full.
NATO is a dupe, a façade that they are concerned,  the righteous, when after all we know they are controlled. Our illustrious leaders, and their two party scon has gone on for decades, some, though few in number have remained honorable, such as Ron Paul.
Congr essman RP is the man, he will make his run as he did once before. My problem , due to the fact I am a confirmed cynic I have to admit the elitist will not be playing fair, no matter how many of our people are behind thi s man..PS until we reveal to  this entire world the poulacce of this nation was deceived and the criminals are exposed, each and every American will most certainly fall under the category of genocide and torture believers.
Untill that day our flag is cleansed of the blood of the innocents, when our troops return, when our banksters are exposed, the FED is disbanded, the MIC is hung out to dry, our military returns to defensive,and each and every deception is revealed, we are in for hell.
Do I sound as though I am dreaming, perhaps, but I believe this day is our storm, and its coming.