IBM Global Movement Management: The Transformation of Human Beings into Cattle

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Motive for globalist supply chain logistics false flags exposed in IBM document

See PDF file itself for embedded images.  Notice IBM pretends they give a damn about "civil liberties" (notice the globalists never use the correct term--unalienable rights).  They pretend to do this throughout the document to try to counter the incredibly treasonous and unconstitutional, false-flag born solutions they are implementing.



Related document:  http://www.hlswatch.com/sitedocs/gmm-v20-final.pdf

Executive Summary

The global movement system is the engine of global prosperity today. Economic integration and improvements in system efficiency have created a single global economy, but one whose very strengths – speed, openness, and efficiency – put it at risk of disruption from external threats. There have always been threats to the global movement system, but the attacks of 9/11 provided a paradigm shift in the potential severity and nature of these threats. This new and greater threat creates the need for a comprehensive framework for securing the system: Global Movement Management.

Global Movement Management (GMM) is a comprehensive and achievable framework for securing the key flows – people, goods, conveyances, money, and information – in the global economy against disruptive threats and building resiliency into the system. The framework is aligned with the existing commercial imperatives of the global system and the protection of important societal values such as privacy and civil liberties. The framework consists of two conceptual parts: a governance structure  and a system architecture.  

Numerous steps have been taken to improve the security of the global movement system since 9/11, but these have been largely piecemeal. Many efforts have stalled due to an uncertain governance structure, both among nations and between the public and private sectors. Key stakeholders have been hesitant to adopt new security measures, uncertain of their potential impact on commerce, or on privacy and data protection. The Global Movement Management framework meets these challenges by proposing a governance structure  that is distributed and decentralized, using rules, standards, and market-driven incentives to encourage investment in the security and resilience of the system.

Global Movement Management is an integrated framework that looks holistically at the key variables in the system – flows, locations, modes of transport  and exchange, and time – and finds areas of convergence across the existing system that are building blocks for enhancing security. These include: (a) common security and business functions, (b) existing borders and checkpoints, (c) existing data sources and information flows, and (d) existing relationships among key system participants. These system elements can be woven together to form a common system architecture – one that is flexible, adaptable, and largely decentralized, with the exception of a core set of seamless and closely controlled security applications.
 
This Global Movement Management framework can help overcome the key impediments to efforts to promote  security in the global movement system, and motivate key stakeholders to work together to integrate security and resilience into the system. It can protect and strengthen the common foundations of global interconnectedness and prosperity.

I.  The Global System Today

The global economy of the 21st century is built upon a foundation of openness and mobility. Goods are shipped across oceans and continents, and delivered to consumers with efficiency and breakneck speed. People can travel by plane to the far corners  of the world in a matter of hours. Information moves instantly around the world via the Internet and the global communications grid, connecting people and nations. Money flows across borders just as quickly through the global financial system by means of electronic transactions. Business is conducted collaboratively and virtually on a global basis.

All of these flows – of people, goods, conveyances, money, and information – are the connective tissue of globalization, and the foundation upon which the global economy is able to endure and grow. The system is the result of successive waves of innovation in the 20th century – built on technologies such as flight, containerized shipping, ground transport,  telecommunications, computing, and the Internet. As a result, the global economy is interconnected today to a degree that is unprecedented in human history.

But this interconnectedness creates new risks. The impacts of negative events, such as a hurricane or earthquake in the United States, a terrorist attack in Europe, or the outbreak of an infectious disease in Asia, are no longer isolated, but can ripple through the system and have a profound and multiplying disruptive effect around the world. And various types of bad actors – rogue states, drug cartels, organized crime syndicates, or terrorist groups – can exploit the system’s openness and anonymity to facilitate their illicit and harmful activities. Criminals, fanatics, and terrorists  no longer need to leave the isolation of the basement or the cave to conduct their business on a global scale.1 The system’s core strengths – its performance, speed, efficiency, interconnectedness, precision, and predictability – are also now sources of systemic risk and vulnerability. One of the most important challenges that leaders in the public and private sector currently face is finding new ways to strengthen this system in an evolving political environment, and protecting it from the buffeting forces of external disruption and misuse.

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 exposed the intrinsic fragility of this system and the need for greater security within it. The global economic system has always been at the risk of misuse, but after 9/11, the known risks are different. The threat of large-scale terrorism  or rogue state aggression involving weapons of mass destruction poses an existential threat to the civilized world – and puts the global system at the risk of massive disruption or total breakdown.  

There are two important aspects to the threat as it specifically pertains to the global economic system. First, the system itself is a target. One of al-Qaeda’s2 key tactical objectives is to undermine the economies of the Western  world. The attacks of 9/11 were directly aimed at the commercial aviation system and the financial, political, and military nerve centers in New York and Washington. But they were also collaterally targeted at the global economy itself. In a video released in April 2002, Osama Bin Laden famously joked with his cohorts about $640 billion in short-term lost value on the stock market as a result of 9/11. In November 2004, he boasted that for every single dollar that al-Qaeda was spending on insurgency in Iraq, the United States was spending $1 million there to combat the insurgency. This kind of economic calculus is a critical element of al-Qaeda’s strategy of asymmetric force and is likely to inform its future goals and activities.

1 The geographic footprint of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 are the most notable example of this globalization of terror  – the planning and recruitment for the attacks took place in at least 11 countries around the world, including Afghanistan, Czech Republic, Egypt, Germany, Lebanon, Malaysia, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Spain, United Arab Emirates, and the United States.
 
2 Al-Qaeda is referenced here rather than all terrorist groups, because the group’s millenarian intentions far surpass those of any other major terrorist  group today. But it is probable that future terrorist groups – ones which do not exist today – will emulate al- Qaeda’s intentions and match or surpass its capabilities.


Second, the terrorist  threat operates inside of the broader global economic system, and terrorists use its capabilities to move people, goods, conveyances, information, and money in support of their operations. The attacks of 9/11 were carried out within and through  the global economic system.

The terrorists  involved in planning and carrying out the attacks leveraged the global economic system to maximize their opportunity for success and multiply the effects of the attacks. They exploited gaps and flaws in visa and entry systems to get attackers and their support networks into a country. They understood  the operational imperatives of the aviation industry, and chose specific flights that would maximize their probability of success. They compartmentalized their operations, reducing the vulnerability that the capture or exposure of one person or one cell would expose the entire plot. They used the global financial system to acquire the funds necessary to carry out the attacks. Essentially, the terrorists were able to create their own “terrorist supply chain” and “terrorist travel system” within the broader system. Since 9/11, terrorist  groups have continued to develop their capabilities to exploit the system, using the Internet to disseminate information, raise funds, and conduct recruiting.

These two aspects contribute  to the need for a new framework to secure the global economic system: one that is aligned with the existing and complex realities of the system, but recognizes the paradigm shift in the nature of threat that it faces today. We call this framework Global Movement Management.

II.  Global Movement Management Defined

Global Movement Management (GMM) is a comprehensive and achievable framework for securing the key flows – people, goods, conveyances, money, and information – in the global economy against disruptive threats and for building resiliency into the system. It is a framework that sustains and protects  the core strengths of the current global system – its performance, speed, efficiency, interconnectedness, precision, and predictability – and adds two new system imperatives: security and resilience. It is a framework that recognizes and protects  core societal values such as privacy and civil liberties. Security means protecting the system from being disrupted or attacked, or exploited as a means of carrying out or planning an attack. Resilience means ensuring that the system can minimize the impacts of a disruption and recover easily from its direct or secondary effects.  

Efforts to secure and build resilience into the global economic system are not new, and have antecedents that are hundreds of years old, in the form of efforts to protect  nations and commerce against the threats of piracy, foreign infiltration, and commercial fraud. Since 9/11, many measures have been taken around the world to respond to these new imperatives and develop security for each of the five system flows, including:

#   People: Numerous efforts to improve security at national border checkpoints, including the Schengen Information System, US-VISIT, and the Australian Advanced Passenger Processing System. Remote border area security initiatives such as the planned America’s Shield Initiative (ASI). Passport, visa, and identification issuance systems in dozens of countries around the world, the supporting architecture for credentialing, checking backgrounds, and watch-listing people, and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Machine Readable Travel Documents (MRTD) standards for these forms of identification. Passenger screening systems, both physical (e.g., explosive detection equipment, metal detectors  for the commercial aviation system and rail systems) and informational (e.g., Secure Flight in the United States, Project Semaphore in the United Kingdom).

#   Goods: Measures to certify cargo at the point of loading or embarkation (the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism  (C-TPAT)), screen it at points of departure  or other system chokepoints (the Container Security Initiative (CSI) and Megaports Initiative in the United States), track it across the supply chain, and certify it before its arrival into a country such as through the Advance Manifest Rules implemented by Canada, the European Union, and the United States.  

#   Conveyances: Efforts to track the conveyances, including planes, ships, trains, and trucks that move cargo around the world, whether at sea (Maritime Domain Awareness), or in the air (Air Traffic Control modernization), or on land (GPS-based truck-tracking systems).  

#   Money: Initiatives aimed at disrupting terrorism-related finances and money laundering, led by groups such as the international Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and agencies such as FINTRAC in Canada, the Terrorist Finance Unit in the United Kingdom, and FinCEN and OFAC in the United States.

#   Information: Measures aimed at monitoring and disrupting the communications of terrorist cells and related groups, through channels such as e-mail, chat room communications, telephony, and mail and courier services.  
 
There have also been a range of efforts undertaken to improve the physical and cybersecurity of the fixed assets of the global movement system, including airports, seaports, transportation centers and bottlenecks, border checkpoints, and major network hubs.
All of these initiatives and efforts contribute  to security and system resilience, and deter terrorists and other bad actors from carrying out attacks within it. But they are today a collection of tactics, not guided by a coherent  and overarching strategy. In the absence of such a strategy, the system is suboptimized in a number of ways. Governments lack the ability to make informed decisions about priorities among competing missions and needs. Private sector stakeholders are unable or unwilling to take the first move and invest their own resources. The risk of security gaps in the system is unnecessarily high. Potential system synergies and efficiencies cannot be easily created.  

To understand why a true strategy for securing the global economic system has not emerged, we need to look at four challenges within the system today.

III.  Challenges to a Strategic Approach

There are four key challenges to adopting a strategy that promotes security and resilience in the system today:

1.   Integration of security and resilience with the commercial imperatives of the system.
2.   Integration of security and resilience with societal imperatives such as privacy and civil liberties.
3.   International cooperation and harmonization.
4.   Cooperation between the public sector and the private sector.
 
A Global Movement Management framework enables the system to overcome these challenges through its two most important elements: a governance structure and a system architecture.

These are detailed in later sections of this report. Before that, it is necessary to look in detail at these systemic challenges.  
The first critical challenge is integrating security and resilience with the commercial imperatives of the system, including speed, performance, efficiency, interconnectedness, and predictability. Any new security-related activity will be more readily adopted if it enhances the performance and efficiency of the system, and will be resisted if it degrades that performance.

The key private sector stakeholders in the system are likely to fund security investments only if they deliver concrete benefits beyond the often intangible benefits of security and resilience. If a good security concept is flawed in execution and harms the stakeholders who are responsible for implementing it on a day-to-day basis, then it will not be used – a worse outcome than having no security at all. Ultimately, security and resilience need to become embedded into these broader system imperatives, creating a culture of “Total Security Management,” in a manner similar to the drive for “Total Quality Management” in manufacturing, or the growth of safety as a paramount engineering norm in the aviation system and in automotive design.
 
A second critical challenge derives from the existence of national laws and standards for privacy, data protection, and civil liberties. Privacy is a critically important civil and personal right around the world, and often leads to the creation of legal and regulatory constraints on the collection and use of personal and other sensitive information. There are good reasons why certain activity should be regulated and constrained, but it is often challenging to define where the line should be drawn, and for which activities the benefits of security outweigh the losses of privacy and personal freedom. Compounding this challenge is the fact that privacy means different things to different societies.

For example, in Europe, privacy is a fundamental right protected by cross-sectoral laws that apply to both the public and private sectors, and Europeans seem more comfortable sharing information with the government than with the private sector.  In the United States, the opposite is true, and people are generally more wary about use of personal information by the government.  Several existing frameworks and policies are applicable to cross-border transfers of personally-identifiable information,3 and need to be reconciled with the new security imperatives of the system. Civil liberties issues also sometimes pose a challenge to a strategic approach, in cases where societal norms such as non- discrimination and the right to due process might clash with the operational performance of some types of security activities, such as personal profiling in aviation screening or the detention
and removal of illegal aliens.

A third critical challenge is international cooperation, and finding ways to overcome and resolve the disparate interests among sovereign national governments in the GMM system. Governments are wary of sharing information about their citizens with other nations, especially in cases where safeguards are not in place or countries have different attitudes about where to strike the balance between privacy and security. Also, governments may have different perceptions of the terrorist threat, and thus may choose security investments that are optimal from a national perspective, but suboptimal from a global perspective. For example, a country in Europe that believes it is at low risk for terrorism could make only small investments in counter-terrorism, and create a permissive environment for groups that might carry out attacks on a broader international basis. The GMM system is intended to overcome the consequences of these disparate interests, and create a framework that aligns the interests of stakeholders and supports optimal participation by each country while allowing different policy choices.
                                                
3 Such as the OECD’s Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data

A fourth critical challenge is cooperation between public sector and private  sector stakeholders. The Global Movement Management system is largely a privately-owned and operated system, and private sector stakeholders understand the intricacies of the system better  than any bureaucracy. But national governments understand the threat of terrorism  much better  than any private company, and are in the best position to assess risk at the macro-level and establish priorities about how to secure the system.

This imbalance of information between private sector domain knowledge and public sector threat-related knowledge means that no single party has the ability to operate solely on its own, and it creates uncertainty about how to distribute and share the costs of upgrading security and resilience in the system, Taken together, these four challenges pose a formidable barrier to the implementation of a coherent  and effective security and resilience strategy for the global economic system. The complexity and heterogeneity of the system make it difficult to move forward strategically, which is why activity to date has been tactical and bite-sized. What is needed to overcome this barrier is a framework that distills the current system’s complexity and heterogeneity to its essential elements, and uses this understanding of the system to propose a governance structure and system architecture  that can enhance security and resilience in the entire system: a framework of Global Movement Management.

IV.  Building A GMM Framework

Given the scope and scale of the global economic system, establishing a GMM framework is a daunting task. But the system can be made comprehensible by breaking it down to its essential parts, and looking at it from a modular and decentralized perspective. This perspective makes it possible to proceed step-by-step, and use a spiral development approach to integrate new activities into the existing system – in a way that is coordinated in its design and delivers the level of security and resilience that the system needs, while at the same time maintaining or improving the commercial and privacy-related imperatives of the system.

The establishment of this framework is a four-step process:

1.   Analyze the current system to reveal its key building blocks.
2.   Use these building blocks to construct a clear picture of security- and resilience-relevant linkages and commonalities across the current system.
3.   Develop a governance structure on the basis of this system picture that can enable and manage GMM activities.
4.   Develop a common architecture for Global Movement Management that defines the basic requirements for human and technical capabilities needed to build the system of systems.
 
These four steps – moving from an analysis of the parts of the system, through a synthesis of common attributes, to the proposal of a governance structure  and system architecture – are discussed in detail in the remainder of Section IV as well as Sections V and VI.

A.   Analyzing the Global Economic System

The global economic system can be broken down along multiple dimensions. By analyzing the system and attempting to find patterns in its complexity, we can develop a strategy to manage security and resilience within it. Within a broader set of system dimensions and attributes (including efficiency, performance, cost, and identity), the five most relevant of these as they pertain to security and resilience are flow type, location, custody, mode of transportation and exchange, and time, as follows:

1.   Flow type: The first dimension of the system is what is moving through it. The five main flow types in the system, as identified earlier, are people, cargo, conveyances, information, and money.4  

2.   Location: The second dimension is the location where something is taking place. This can be looked at generically, such as internal to a country, at a border, or in a foreign country; or specifically, examining the critical differences among key countries (by things like national motivations, political frameworks, and resources) in the system.

3.   Custody:  The third dimension is who or what is in control and/or ownership of what is moving through the system. This includes both custody in a formal, legal sense (e.g., cargo moving through the supply chain) and in a less formal sense (e.g., passengers on an airplane or in a border queue).

4.   Mode of transport or exchange: The fourth dimension is the mode of transport and/or the mode of exchange. For people and goods, key modes of transport include air, sea (including ships and inland barges), and land (including cars, trucks, and rail).5 For money and information, important modes of exchange include telephony systems, the Internet, satellite- based communications systems, narrow-range communications technologies, including, for example, RFID and Bluetooth, and financial payment and settlement systems.

5.   Time: The fifth dimension of the system is the factor of time. Some transactions and interactions within the system are instantaneous; others are bound by the physical realities of the global transport system. In some parts of the system, it is possible today to have real- time situational awareness about the system state; in other parts, this awareness does not yet exist (and might be difficult to create).  

B.   System Commonalities and Linkages

Looking closely at the system along these five dimensions, a number of trends and commonalities start to emerge. System activities that had seemed unrelated reveal their linkages and commonalities. Patterns of human, physical, and informational interaction become self- evident. System activities that had no obvious connection to security or resilience reveal their potential utility for advancing these imperatives.  

Ultimately, four types of commonalities and linkages emerge:

1.   Common security and resilience-related business functions.
2.   Common control points, including national borders, movement chokepoints, and physical infrastructure.
3.   Existing data sources, transactions, and information flows that can provide inputs into the system.
4.   Relationships among key system stakeholders.
 
These four commonalities and linkages are the baseline building blocks of the GMM framework, and are discussed in the following four sections. They provide the leaders responsible for building security and resilience into the system with information on what they have to work with today, and what they need to create to plug gaps and weave together the system. The sections below describe each of these four types of commonalities and linkages in detail.

4 Some of these flows are both objects and agents of the global system; that is, as agents they also facilitate the movement of other flows within the system. For example, activities and transactions involving people, money, conveyances, and information are all necessary in order to move goods through the system.

5 These modes of transport are the same thing as the “conveyances” flow. But we treat it in this paper in two distinct places because conveyance-centric security is a security alternative distinct from the people or goods that conveyances carry.


1.  Security and Resilience-Related Business Functions in the GMM Framework
 
In terms of security and resilience activities in the global economic systems, there are six overarching business functions that cut across flow, location, mode, and time. These functions are: (1) risk management, (2) credentialing, (3) screening and inspections, (4) tracking, (5) enforcement and interdiction, and (6) command, control and integration (CCI). Chart I plots the business functions on the vertical axis against generic location types on the horizontal axis, with respect to multiple flows in the system.

Chart I: Security And Resilience Business Functions

Risk management is the collection and analysis of data about many different types of flows – such as people, cargo, and financial transactions – to identify the level of risk for a given entity. Risk management processes information in the aggregate, illuminating anomalies and identifying otherwise imperceptible threats. Most importantly, risk management programs facilitate efficient resource management and the expedited movement of low-risk people and cargo (the vast majority of the flow), focusing limited resources on the entities that pose the highest risk.

Credentialing is the business function that asserts that at a given point in time, people are who they claim to be and/or that the conditions of those types of flows (e.g., people, cargo, data sources, financial transactions) meet a certain standard. Generally, credentials are issued at points of surety, where a credentialing authority is convinced that certain standards have been met. These credentials are used at later points in time to help validate claims of identity, content, or other conditions.

In the event that the integrity of an identity or shipping credential is determined to be intact, any information related to the individual, cargo, or shipper can be used more effectively to manage risk and allocate inspection resources appropriately. Credentialing increasingly follows a model of registering trusted and authorized frequent users of a system and pre-clearing them, such as the piloted Registered Traveler programs in the United States; the Border Crossing Card programs involving Canada, Mexico, and the United States (FAST, SENTRI, NEXUS); and the Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism within the physical supply chain. These are tied internationally to emerging standards for mutual recognition of credentials, such as the WCO Framework v2.0 or EU Customs 2007.

Screening and inspection includes business functions that conduct inspection and accounting activities to verify that flows that cross national borders or move through a chain of custody are properly identified and registered. Screening and inspection helps to validate that only lawful or low risk people or things enter intentional openings in perimeter boundaries such as ports of entry and that authorities are able to track the duration of their stay within those boundaries effectively. It is used throughout the supply chain to allocate additional inspection and/or enforcement and interdiction resources, and it informs compliance programs such as warnings, training, audits, and facilitation programs. Screening and inspection is highly dependent upon risk assessment to gauge the risk of the targets of inspection.

Tracking includes business functions that monitor and track people, cargo, conveyances, or transactions that have entered or intend to enter perimeter  boundaries lawfully. It includes processes and systems to track people, cargo, conveyances, and money to validate that their location and integrity is consistent with that authorized upon entry. It includes the process of attributing the ownership and control of items moving through the system. It includes traceability processes: tracking backward to find the source or origin of a system disruption (e.g., poultry infected with avian flu or WMD materials intercepted in a cargo container), isolating the problem and thus decreasing the need for a broad system shutdown.

Tracking is typically non-intrusive and the information from this business function can be aggregated to create a comprehensive real-time picture of the state of the system, which can be used both for security functions and business efficiency functions (e.g., inventory management, optimizing use of assets). Many of today’s legacy tracking systems are immature and unable to track flows moving across borders or chains of custody.  

Enforcement and interdiction facilitates the integrity of a country’s borders and interdicts illicit activity within countries. It includes enforcement of the law at and between lawful ports of entry, identifies breaches in the perimeter, and takes action to prevent entry of illegal immigrants or unauthorized cargo, including weapons of mass destruction. It includes the ability to respond effectively to changes in the at-entry conditions of people, cargo, and conveyances. Finally, it includes interior enforcement activities, including the detention and removal of illegal entrants and investigations into the smuggling of terror-related or other illicit substances.

Command, control and integration (CCI) includes net-centric command and control activities (involving both the public and private sectors) that monitor all available information about global movement, and fuse that information to create real-time intelligence about potential threats to the system, in a manner consistent with privacy and civil liberties standards.

It supports efforts across all of the business functions to share and analyze data more effectively, particularly from risk assessment, and it optimizes enforcement and interdiction response times and effectiveness.  

These six business processes in the global movement system interact with each other and with multiple other existing business processes that are not directly relevant to security, but are either affected by security or provide data inputs into the security business processes. These include:

1.   Regulatory compliance (legacy customs, immigration, border control, and financial oversight missions)
2.   Economic development (trade, travel, and investment facilitation)
3.   Border clearance (legacy customs and immigration missions)
4.   Revenue collection (duties, tariffs, and taxes)
 
Breaking down the strategic framework into these six business functions can help to reveal synergies and commonalities in the global economic system. For example, in the area of risk assessment, there are literally dozens of projects in governments around the world and in the private sector that are focused on some variant of the “needle in the haystack” problem – trying to find a potential terrorist  crossing a border checkpoint, or a cargo container containing a bomb, or an illicit financial transaction, amid the vast sea of people, goods, and data moving around the world. In each of these areas, it is possible to use subject-based queries or pattern- based predictive algorithms to focus inspection activities on high-risk people or things and associations of interest. System stakeholders can use this insight to find ways to create linkages between these diverse sets of activities.  

2.   Control Points in the GMM Framework
 
A second key building block of a GMM framework is an assessment of the existing control points in the system. There are three key types of control points in the system (represented in Chart II below):

1.   National borders
2.   Movement chokepoints
3.   Physical infrastructure
 
National borders exist as a means to enforce sovereignty. These are controlled both at formal checkpoints (either on the border  or at internal points-of-entry, such as airport immigration stations) and to a lesser extent, along remote  borders where attempts at smuggling or illegal immigration take place. Some countries, most notably the Schengen group within the European Union, have effectively removed their internal border  controls to promote international movement and exchange among a core set of countries.  

Chart II: GMM System Control Points

At the second level are chokepoints determined by the physical realities of movement and transport in the global economic system. These include key shipping bottlenecks such as the Panama and Suez Canals, the Straits of Bosporus, Gibraltar, Hormuz, and Malacca, and the mouths of the Mississippi and the Rhine rivers.  

They include non-redundant  transportation assets such as the Holland and Lincoln tunnels into Manhattan, the Ambassador Bridge and Detroit & Canada Tunnel connecting Detroit and Windsor, Ontario, the Jing Hu Freeway between Shanghai and Beijing, or the Channel Tunnel between England and France. Other chokepoints include major payments and clearance systems such as key communications switches, or hub or root servers in the global information grid. Each of these chokepoints is a place that unmanaged and disparate activity must “pass through” if it is to be anything above localized activity. Because of this, they are both places of criticality (impairing the entire system if shut down) and places where certain types of security activities (e.g., inspection) can be effectively organized and conducted.  

At the third level are a set of infrastructure-specific borders and control points such as fences and physical barriers to prevent entry into secure facilities. They also include passenger, baggage, and cargo screening systems for aviation and other modes of transportation as well as cybersecurity and information assurance activities for financial and communications systems.  
At each of these three control  point levels, there are existing security activities as well as new security activities that could be developed with minimal additional effort. It is also possible to integrate the three levels and prioritize security activities specific to certain flow types, locations, modes, and times.

3.   Data Sources, Transactions and Information Flows in the GMM Framework
 
A third key building block of the GMM framework is the availability of existing data sources, transactions, and information flows in the global economy – all of the moving bits, bytes, signals and sentences coursing through the global economy. The ability to carry out the security business functions in the first section above in conjunction with the control points in the last section is dependent upon information about what is moving through the system – in both physical and transactional terms.

It is unrealistic to expect a system that provides perfect real-time information about what is moving through the system.  Implementing such a vision for the system would be cost-prohibitive and likely to violate personal and commercial privacy norms. Instead, the framework should be built primarily upon data streams and information flows that exist today, many of which are imperfect and incomplete on their own, but collectively provide sufficient information about the near-real-time state of the system and its contents to facilitate and promote security.  

Examples of such data sources include: 6

People: Passenger name records (PNR) for commercial aviation. Visa and passport applications. Immigration declaration forms. Government and international watch lists. Pilot licenses. Commercial driver’s licenses. Border crossing cards. Registered traveler program enrollments. Lost or stolen passport information.

Goods: Shipping manifest data. Customs declarations and clearances. Known shipper program enrollments. Container or pallet tags. Credit service bureau databases. Other supply chain messages and transactions (e.g., orders, invoices, shipment status, freight booking confirmations).

Conveyances: Maritime vessel registrations. Airplane registrations. Container or pallet tags.

6 See also Markle Task Force Report, Protecting America’s Freedom in the Information Age, Appendix H, “The Landscape of Available Information” for a fuller list of security-relevant data sources. Available at http://www.markletaskforce.org/documents/Markle_Full_Report.pdf

Money: Reporting requirements in many countries for large (ca. +$10,000) financial transactions. Counterfeiting monitoring systems.  
Information: Domain name registrations. Patent and trademark databases. Telephone directories. SIM Card purchases.

These data sources and information flows have security-relevant utility when used both on a stand-alone basis and (more importantly) in relation to one another. By mapping out the data sources that currently exist, it is possible to determine  the existing or potential linkages between the different types of data, develop new information by integrating existing data streams, and locate any gaps in the system where new data might be required. It is also likely that commercial benefits can emerge from this process: key public and private stakeholders can find new ways to increase their overall efficiency. Further, by having a completed and integrated picture of these information flows, it is possible to build privacy and data protection  into the system, and prevent misuse and unwarranted dissemination of personal information, by controlling access, using immutable audits, and anonymizing sensitive data as it moves through the system.

4.  Stakeholder Relationships in the GMM Framework
 
The fourth key building block of the GMM framework is the existing set of relationships among stakeholders in the system – governments (both national and sub-national), private sector companies of many types (e.g., shippers, manufacturers, banks, airlines, telecoms, retailers, service providers), international organizations (e.g., International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), World Customs Organization (WCO), Interpol), public interest groups (including privacy and civil liberties advocates), and individuals.

These stakeholders interact with one another in a complex and disorderly framework, and many of their interactions are tacit rather than formal. Some stakeholders are primarily facilitators and intermediaries, whereas others have responsibility more operational in nature. By mapping out the relationships among these various stakeholders, and understanding where interests  converge and diverge, we can anticipate many of the obstacles that must be overcome to adopt an integrated strategy, and then use existing strong relationships to support the development of the framework. We can also start to envision a more orderly framework of stakeholder relationships, one in which relevant information is shared through standardized processes across the entire global economic system. Chart III on the next page provides a generic top-level map of these stakeholder relationships.

Chart III: GMM Stakeholder Relationships

These four building blocks – business functions, control points, data sources, and stakeholder relationships – provide the common template, the mesh canvas, upon which it is possible to build an integrated Global Movement Management framework. They make it possible to envision and develop a true “system-of-systems” for GMM. An overall understanding of these four building blocks and their interactions makes it possible to integrate dispersed security activities, and ensures that far-flung and unconnected activities can be potentially woven together and integrated as the system evolves. Chart IV below provides a representation of these last three building blocks and their interactions.

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Chart IV: Interactions Among System Control Points,  Data Sources, And Stakeholder Relationships

By going through the process of identifying and mapping these control points, data sources, and stakeholder relationships in the system (or in a single part of it), and integrating this analysis with a view of the key security activities in the Chart I business function framework, we can develop a clearer understanding of the challenges of security and resilience within the broader system or a component part of it.  

The integrated Global Movement Management framework includes two elements, both of which are necessary to meet the key challenges, integrate security and resilience into the system, build new capabilities where needed, and translate this theoretical common picture into an operational reality. These are a governance structure and system architecture for GMM.

V.  Governance Of Global Movement Management

The governance structure for Global Movement Management includes the set of relationships, rules, standards, policies, incentives, and penalties among system stakeholders that are necessary to develop and manage the system. A key reason why security and resilience have not been embedded into the global economic system since 2001 is the lack of an effective and responsive governance structure. Building cooperation and interconnectedness among GMM stakeholders is not easy, but it is critical to the development of the system. This section of the report discusses options and models for governance in Global Movement Management.
 
The form of any governance system must follow its basic function. The functions of the governance system for GMM are numerous and diverse, but come together  to achieve a common outcome of system efficiency and operability. As such, the form of governance for GMM needs to be evolutionary and adaptable, using existing models and mechanisms but also developing new mechanisms that can achieve new outcomes for the system.

Given the nature and realities of the global economic system, the governance framework for Global Movement Management needs ultimately to have the following general characteristics:

1.   Distributed and decentralized: The diverse nature of the system creates the need for power and decision-making need to be shared among all key system stakeholders, not localized in a single country or company. The structure  should ideally resemble that used to govern “open source” software development, where stakeholders collaborate across borders, and key decisions are arbitrated openly and based on merit.

2.   Standardized and federated: At first impression, this seems contradictory to the characteristics above. But it is possible to develop a system that is both decentralized and operates according to a common set of rules, standards, and interfaces, similar to the Internet. This contradiction can be solved through the proper sequencing of activities (agreeing upon standards in a decentralized process, but then enforcing their use once adopted).

3.   Incentive-driven: The critical governance challenge for GMM is motivating system adoption. Many parts of the governance framework will be inherently voluntary, and it is necessary to find non-mandated ways to align the interests and resources  of those who are concerned about threats  to the system with those who have the ability to make investments in it. Private sector companies often resist making security-related investments unless they offer a demonstrable benefit (i.e., high-value threat protection, lower insurance rates) or a financial return unrelated to their security value (i.e., loss prevention, decreased logistics costs). Developing nations or nations perceiving themselves as low-risk are in many cases unlikely to invest in security for similar reasons. Both of these funding imbalances can be overcome through the appropriate use of incentives. Also, liability issues are often a make- or-break concern when security-related investments are considered.  

4.   Adaptive: Able to change in response to new system imperatives and threats, and the introduction of new stakeholders.  
There are a number of governance systems already in existence that can be building blocks for GMM governance and/or provide appropriate analogies for future governance activities. These include:

#   Traditional general or domain-specific international organizations (e.g., UN, International Civil Aviation Organization, International Maritime Organization, World Customs Organization)
#   International law enforcement organizations (e.g., Interpol, Europol, Financial Action Task Force)
#   Negotiated treaties and agreements (e.g., Law of the Sea, Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty)
#   National laws, mandates, or programs as de facto global standards (e.g., C-TPAT, Advanced Manifest Rule)
#   Formal groups of nations (e.g., G8, OECD, APEC)
#   Joint intergovernmental ventures (e.g., Space Station, high-energy particle physics)
#   Open non-governmental collaborative networks for technology development and adoption (e.g., Linux, Apache, XML)
#   Multinational business alliances and consortia (e.g., Bluetooth, W3C)
#   Regulation-driven business oversight and compliance (e.g., GAAP, IAS, Sarbanes-Oxley)
  
A governance structure for GMM can be designed using, in part, proven approaches borrowed from many of these organizational types. Such approaches should not be applied uniformly across the system – instead, options should be considered based upon the characteristics of activity in individual parts of the system, broken out by business function and flow or mode.
Key questions to ask when considering a governance structure for a part of the system include:

1.   Who has the domain knowledge and relevant expertise in this area?
2.   Who has the legal, political, and operational control over the domain?
3.   Are there potential non-security externalities, such as commercial benefits, from
investments in security and resilience in this area?
4.   Are the key stakeholders in this part of the system relatively homogenous or
heterogeneous? Are they many or few?
5.   Do existing stakeholders operate largely in an informal, trust-based environment, or are
their relationships with each other very formal and legalistic?
6.   Are there legacy governance activities in this part of the system that can be used as a
foundation?

By answering these questions for a particular part of the system – e.g., financial transaction tracking, cargo certification, or immigration enforcement – we can begin to think about appropriate governance models for that part of the system. In many cases, it will be appropriate to have distinctions within the model for the various stages of the system, including system development, rules-setting, and operations.

Take cargo tracking as an example. Shipping and transportation is almost exclusively a private sector activity on a global basis, with the exception of some defense and security-related shipping activities. It is quite likely that dual-use commercial benefits would be created by the development of security-driven investments in tracking capabilities, making it easier for companies to plan activities, monitor inventory, prevent theft, and reroute  goods in-transit in response to shifts in demand or other external forces. There are millions of stakeholders in the system, of many different types, large and small, with diverse and competing interests – but a common interest in system efficiency and performance. Parts of the system have been traditionally very informal and trust-based, but the system has become increasingly formal in response to volume, automation, and new security requirements. A number of existing governance activities are relevant to cargo tracking, including the IMO’s International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS) and the industry-driven consortium EPCglobal.

Given these current  realities, it is possible to envision a governance model for cargo tracking where the private sector is motivated to fund security-related investments due to the potential dual-use commercial benefits of these investments, and the public sector is shaping the conditions that allow them to make these investments: leveling the playing field by creating alignment on standards, providing liability protection where necessary, and ensuring privacy and protection  of commercially-sensitive data. Chart V provides additional detail on key parameters for governance within the cargo tracking example:

Chart V: Governance Model Characteristics: Cargo Tracking Example

A similar thought process can be carried out for any other part of the system, using these six questions to determine what mix of relationships, rules, standards, policies, incentives and penalties that can motivate and enable the development of governance in that part of the system.

Incremental and evolutionary developments in multiple subcomponents (e.g., R&D, pilot projects, policy formation, standards-setting, public-private partnerships) can ultimately converge to form the de facto governance system for GMM. At some point it may become necessary to create an overarching governance structure  that binds together  these disparate parts of the system, but the potential near-term benefits of that comprehensive approach are outweighed by the likely delays and burdens of a top-down approach.

If the governance framework is developed in accordance with these parameters,  the system will be more likely to overcome the four challenges highlighted earlier in Section III: integration of security and resilience with the commercial imperatives of the system; integrated of security and resilience with societal imperatives such as privacy and civil liberties; international cooperation and harmonization; and, cooperation between the public and private sector.  

The integration of security and resilience with the commercial and societal imperatives of the system will be easier to achieve because private sector stakeholders and citizens groups will participate in the development of the governance framework for the system, and ensure that commercial imperatives and privacy and civil liberties interests are integrated from the start.

The need for both international cooperation and public-private sector cooperation will be addressed by more closely aligning the marginal costs and marginal benefits of security and resilience in the system through the use of incentives. Wealthy countries that have a direct incentive to improve security and resilience in developing countries will offer grants or loans to these countries to spur their investment. Critical private sector stakeholders will in certain cases be eligible for grants or other  types of incentives that will ensure that investing in security is not a drain on profits, but aligned with improved long-run business performance.

VI.  The GMM System Architecture

As discussed in Section IV, the global economic system is complex and heterogeneous  – encompassing billions of interactions and transactions each day around the world. However, in spite of this complexity and heterogeneity, it is possible to break it down into its constituent security-relevant elements, and use these building blocks to create a holistic system architecture for GMM.
This system architecture has two key components. The first is general in nature: a way of thinking about Global Movement Management from a systems perspective, and a related set of critical and overarching system requirements. The second part is a specific core system application, called the Global Movement Security Application (GMSA), which augments security and resilience in the global economy and leaves only a light footprint.  

A.  GMM System Requirements

An ideal Global Movement Management system would have a “Muhammad  Ali” effect; it would “float like a butterfly,” and not disrupt or degrade normal activity in the system, and then “sting like a bee,” only manifesting itself after detecting anomalous or suspicious activities.  

But such a system is likely to be impractical, at least in the near to medium term, for both cost and performance reasons. In the sprawling commotion of the global system there is no quick and easy way to identify an illicit flow, such as a potential terrorist  or a suspicious cargo container. However, this system complexity and diversity can be turned from weakness into strength, through the process of identifying the elements of the existing system (as in Section IV, Building a GMM Framework) and applying a set of system requirements that can inform specific operational and technological choices related to Global Movement Management.  The five most important requirements of a GMM system architecture are that it is integrated, net- centric, layered, corrective, and risk-driven.

The GMM system architecture needs to be integrated for three main reasons: to coordinate action, establish a common operational picture that creates new insights about potential threats, and share information across and among key system participants. If the GMM system architecture is not able to achieve these three goals, investments in the security and resilience of the system are likely to be wasted. It serves little purpose to develop a robust intelligence and risk analysis capability at a single port, or within a single mode of transportation, and not develop means to fuse that information to spot worrisome trends, and share it appropriately among critical stakeholders. Integration drives the need to create a service-oriented architecture that is loosely-coupled but uses common standards, common system platforms and interfaces, and/or middleware to bridge gaps between different systems.

Second, the system architecture needs to be net-centric in its design. The key imperatives of net-centric warfare – knowledge, speed, and precision – are also highly relevant to security and resilience activities in the global economic system, given its dispersed nature and the critical need for precise and real-time capabilities in many situations. This requirement creates the need to consider using a wide range of net-centric design principles and architectures.7

Third, the system architecture needs to be layered  in recognition of the fact that no single defensive tool can ensure security, but that layered and redundant defenses can serve as a very effective means of prevention and deterrence to terrorist activities. As numerous experts on security and counter-terrorism have pointed out, if you have five independent layers that are “80% effective,” you’ve created a system that is 99.97% effective, likely at a cost that is lower than creating one stand-alone “99.97% effective” tool.8 This is a level of defense that is likely to deter terrorists from carrying out an attack against, or using, that element of the GMM system. The layered requirement drives the need for modular and federated architectures.

Fourth, the system architecture needs to be corrective – able to integrate human factors into any technology-driven solution, and give people the means to override warnings and correct false data that disrupt legitimate activities in the system. The passenger no-fly list in the United States today is an example of a system element where the capability for correction is lacking, and users are unable to easily remedy false information in the system. This is the direct result of using an insufficiently discerning metric such as someone’s name, instead of a unique biometric identifier, for the no-fly list. This corrective  requirement creates the need for data rectification tools, as well as auditing functions that prevent insider system misuse.

7 A thorough list can be found here: http://www.defenselink.mil/nii/org/cio/doc/NetCentric_Checklist_v2-1-3_May12.doc 8 1-((100%-80%)^5)=99.97%.

Finally, the system architecture needs to be risk-driven, allocating resources within the system in proportion  to the potential severity and likelihood of the threat, the vulnerability of the particular asset or system, and the potential effectiveness of countermeasures within the system. This requirement creates the need to establish and track real-time performance metrics that can be used both for operational decision-making and for planning about future needs and requirements.

B.  The Global Movement Security Application (GMSA)  

Until now, this paper has not recommended a specific system, application, or project for Global Movement Management. GMM is first and foremost a way of looking at security and resilience in the global economy, and for the most part this paper draws back from proposing a single, unified vision for the system, instead suggesting that the appropriate system will naturally emerge if the right governance structures and system requirements are encouraged and established.

But this is true only up to a point. There is an urgent need to improve security and resilience in the global economic system, and this can only be accomplished through the addition of a new core set of tools and applications that can serve as the “brain” of the entire system.  

Two key security imperatives for the system will be unfulfilled without this kind of intervention. First, it will be unable to integrate and analyze data across multiple flow types. Currently, within many flows it is possible to conduct risk management and targeting activities for people, or for containers, or for financial transactions. But it is difficult to conduct risk management in a way that is integrated across all of these flow types, and potentially reveal non-obvious information from such examinations. With such a capability, it is possible to move the analysis from Stage A to Stage B as depicted in Chart VI:

Chart VI: GMSA Risk Management Value Proposition

In Stage A of this chart, risky or suspected people, goods, conveyances, transactions, and communications are spotted but only analyzed in the context of risk management tools for that single flow type. Moving to Stage B, the relationships among risk information across the five flow types is analyzed, expanding the knowledge base about potential threats to the system.
Second, without a core system, the system will lack the ability to respond effectively and quickly to suspicious information or alerts moving through the system. The architecture below addresses both of these system gaps.  

GMSA is intended to serve as the backbone for GMM security, as a core element of the broader “system of systems,” supporting all of the other security and resilience activities that take place within the global economic system. Many elements of this “global utility” exist already in various legacy systems around the world – it would both interface with these systems and could provide new functionality where legacy systems do not provide the requisite level of security. It would work in a manner similar to a number of existing global utilities, such as the global financial clearing and settlement system, the International Telecommunications Union’s payments system, and the four major airline computer reservation systems.  

The system architecture for the GMSA concept is illustrated in Chart VII on the next page. The chart shows how GMSA fits conceptually into the broader Global Movement Management framework, as described in Section IV and the earlier parts of this chapter, and defines the core elements of the system.  

Chart VII: GMSA System Architecture

Starting from the left-hand side of Chart VII, there are data inputs into the system, for each of the five key system flows (people, goods, conveyances, money, data) entering the system. They cross the system boundary – the point at which security activities are theoretically feasible (perhaps a national border, or the loading of a container, or the posting of a financial transaction) either with or without having been pre-credentialed and made a known entity to the system. These Pre-Credentialing Tools can take multiple forms and involve a number of methods, such as applying for a passport or visa, or establishing a “known shipper” program.  

These flows then interact with a System Entry Tool that is the gateway to the GMSA and the interface for the key functional and analytical tools of the system. The System Entry Tool registers the object in the system, certifies it in cases where pre-credentialing is relevant, and replicates and distributes the data inputs, based upon sets of established permissions, into further nodes in the system.

This data is then used by three distinct but interrelated  “engines” in the system: a Tracking Engine, an Analytic Engine, and an Enforcement and Alert  Engine. These three engines are essential to any GMM system, working together  to deliver improved security and resilience to the system. Each is a distributed network of applications, running on tens of thousands of computers around the world, but interacting with each other  to allow appropriate users a real- time picture of the parts of the system state that can inform security decisions.

The Tracking Engine is intended to monitor the progress of objects and flows within the system. It includes traditional supply chain management tools, and should be deeply integrated with existing commercially-relevant systems around the world. It allows users to see where objects are within the system and make decisions in response to changes in the environment, such as the shutdown of a key hub airport in Asia. The primary users of a Tracking Engine are commercial.

The Tracking Engine interacts with an Analytic Engine that uses all of the data that is aggregated across the system to detect system anomalies and provide government and law enforcement officials (who are its primary users) with the information that they need to protect the system. This Analytic Engine uses data analysis tools to find non-obvious relationships among the scattered billions of data points moving through the system. It protects  privacy by anonymizing the identity of sensitive data moving through it. To prevent system misuse, it establishes immutable audits for user queries and for enforcement-related requests for additional (de-anonymized) information. This same data can be used to inform the users of the system about congestion, resources, availability of transport  capacity, and other important issues that can support better decision-making and improve economic performance.

The information from the Analytic Engine is then the basis for activity in the Enforcement and Alert Engine, which can be used by law enforcement officials to communicate with key stakeholders in the system, closely monitor suspicious activity short of interdicting it, and where appropriate, take targeted steps to halt suspicious or illicit activity and trace its origins.

After an object has moved through the system and crossed outside of its boundaries (e.g., a person exiting an immigration station in their home country, or a package arriving on a truck at its destination), it then exits the system via a System Exit Tool, which certifies that the object is the same one that entered  the system earlier, removes identifiable private data as appropriate, and archives other data where desired or required.

This system architecture:

#   Takes a federated approach that leverages the capabilities of existing systems and processes and builds on them.

#   Allows for and embraces open standards, including XML standards and industry specific vocabulary and identifiers, to allow more effective integration of these systems.

#   Provides loose coupling of systems based on industry-accepted approaches and technologies such as Service Oriented Architecture  to promote  resiliency, flexibility and scalability. This approach avoids single points of vulnerability and enhances scalability by only routing required information.

#   Places a high priority on privacy and data protection, using such tools as data anonymization, user authentication, immutable audits, and double-encrypted data, while enhancing the flow and quality of information shared. Only information required based on pre-defined events is “published” by the source systems and delivered to the authorized “subscribers” based on their requirements.

#   Uses an iterative approach that allows participation at a measured pace while lowering risk for the participants.

A high level conceptual architectural diagram for the practical implementation of GMSA, based on these principles, is shown in Chart VIII:

Chart VIII: GMSA System Architecture

This system architecture is related to healthcare surveillance systems in several ways, including similarities in its means of protecting privacy and personal data. Many envision that personal healthcare information can be aggregated and assessed, without compromising privacy, to create regional or national baseline profiles against which outbreaks, epidemics, and bioterror attacks can potentially be detected. In the same way, the GMSA can use aggregated and/or anonymized data to create risk management baseline profiles against which potential system threats and vulnerabilities can be detected and addressed.

Its implementation and enhancements can be iterative, moving outward from core nodes (created by earlier adopters of the system) to new points within the broader network,  thereby lowering risk while enhancing system value to its many stakeholders. Chart IX depicts this iterative process and the relationship between the core and peripheral nodes in the system:  

Chart IX: GMSA Iterative Functional Enhancement

The system architecture and approach places a strong focus on flexibility and adaptability. The system must be flexible enough to operate in a wide range of conditions – everything from high- tech operations centers to remote  outposts in developing countries. It must be able to adapt in response to changes in the nature and severity of the threat, and changes in the resources and interests of system stakeholders.

This approach also allows the system to be set up in a way that provides tiered access and pricing capability, where the system (but not the data) may be leased as a service by companies or countries. This would align benefits with costs: wealthy countries that benefit the most from its adoption would bear the largest share of the costs, and developing nations can start participating at an earlier stage than would otherwise be the case. If the cost burden is shared progressively, then these developing nations can participate and strengthen the value of the system to all stakeholders.

VII.   Jumpstarting GMM: Near-Term Recommendations

The implementation of a Global Movement Management framework will be neither swift nor easy. But there are many things that policymakers and companies can do to hasten this process. Below are seven priority recommendations that would assist the implementation of Global Movement Management:

1.   Put GMM security on the agenda of key existing  multilateral institutions and forums.  There have been many steps taken to develop security and resilience-related policies, international agreements, and standards in a number of international forums (e.g., G8, OECD, WTO, WCO, ICAO, IMO), but not in a way that is comprehensive and consistent with the GMM framework. In particular, the Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative (SAFTI) within the G8 might provide a good starting point for a broader international engagement on the question of security in the global economic system.  

2.   Reorganize certain  elements of national  agencies consistent with the business function  framework in this paper. This functional approach to organizational structure and governance has been proposed by a number of leading academics practitioners, including the National Commission on the Public Service (“Volcker Commission”) in the United States. For example, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is creating a new Screening Coordination and Operations (SCO) office inside of DHS responsible for assuring the consistency and quality of the application of screening technology across the Department. Similar changes might be warranted for other business functions (credentialing in particular) and in other countries. Reorganization should not be undertaken lightly, and is often an undesirable option due to the short-term pains of integration, but in certain cases the long-term benefits of rationalizing key operations outweigh these short-term difficulties.  

3.   Encourage multilateral and national  funding organizations to develop security benchmarks and funding mechanisms. Multilateral organizations such as the World Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Inter-American Development Bank and national aid agencies such as USAID, CIDA, and DFID should consider new metrics to benchmark countries on security and should prioritize loan and grant activities to less-developed countries for basic GMM security capabilities such as electronic visa systems and customs automation. This can help to strengthen the weakest links in the system, many of which are likely to be otherwise targeted by terrorist  groups as places to plan or originate their activities.

4.   Create a standing  forum to resolve standards  disputes. There have been a number of protracted international disputes in the last few years, in areas such as biometric standards for passports. International organizations such as ICAO, IMO, and WCO  have played a key role in developing these standards in their respective domains, but not enough attention has been paid to the linkages and interdependencies among related standards across the Global Movement Management system. A new limited-duration forum should be created, perhaps under the combined auspices of all of the groups noted above and working with technical organizations such as the ISO, to drive the adoption of high-level GMM- related security standards in critical areas where they are missing today.

5.   Create an independent standing forum to mediate on privacy and data protection issues as they pertain to the GMM system. National differences on privacy and data protection issues are unlikely to be negotiated or compromised in the near term. But these honest disagreements can be mitigated if they are discussed openly, and if a new model of global reciprocity is developed for balancing security with privacy and data protection rights. This model could be developed by an international consortium of existing think tanks and research institutes, building off the work of groups such as the Markle Foundation, and working in coordination with international domain experts on privacy and inviting participation from the public and private sectors. A forum to discuss these issues can build trust and make it easier in the long run to implement challenging aspects of a GMM security and resilience strategy.

6.   Create a set of multinational pilot projects, with public sector and private  sector participation, to test  the core  systemic and operational concepts of Global Movement Management. These pilot projects should involve multiple flow types, operate across international boundaries, and be open to a wide and diverse set of participants. Lessons learned from these initial pilot projects, in addition to a longitudinal study of the relevant pilot projects that have been conducted in the recent past, can be used to refine the GMM concept and provide the agenda for the next stage of pilot and developmental activities.

7.   Develop mechanisms to conduct and test  GMM security-related R&D on an international basis. There are a number of specific areas in which investment in R&D has the potential to improve the effectiveness of security and resilience measures for the GMM system. Examples include radiological and nuclear detection  technology, new means of biometric identification and authentication such as facial recognition, and privacy-enhancing anonymization and immutable audit technologies. There are certainly competitive reasons to keep R&D activities at the national level, especially if there are non-security applications for such technologies. However, these national benefits are often outweighed by the compelling need to develop breakthrough security technologies internationally, test them in cross- border pilot projects and testbeds, and promote their mass adoption on a global scale.

VIII.   Conclusion: The GMM Imperative

Global Movement Management is not a vision of the perfect end-state for security in the global economic system. Instead, it is a process driven by a framework – a way of looking at the world and using certain insights to inform decisions about how to improve the security and resilience of the system. GMM is motivated today largely by the threat of terrorism  – but with full awareness that threats and vulnerabilities change over time, and that all efforts must be undertaken in a way that preserves and protects the system’s performance and core societal values. Given the vastness and complexity of the system, and the elusiveness of the threat, this is no easy task, and the ideas in this report  are no panacea for challenges facing the global economic system. But if implemented thoughtfully and more widely over time, they can embed security and resilience into the system, protect it against threats known and unknown, and sustain global commerce and societal well-being in the years ahead.

For questions or comments about this white paper, please contact Scott Gould at   w.scott.gould@us.ibm.com and Christian Beckner at cbeckner@us.ibm.com.

Acronyms
APEC     Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASI        America’s Shield Initiative
CCI        Command, Control and Integration
CIDA      Canadian International Development Agency
CSI        Container Security Initiative
C-TPAT     Customs Trade Partnership against Terrorism
DFID       Department  for International Development (UK)
DHS        Department of Homeland Security
EU        European Union
FAST      Free and Secure Trade
FATF      Financial Action Task Force
FinCEN    Financial Crimes Enforcement Network
FINTRAC    Financial Transactions Reports Analysis Centre
G8        Group of Eight
GAAP     Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
GMM       Global Movement Management
GMSA     Global Movement Security Application
GPS        Global Positioning System
IAS        International Accounting Standards
ICAO      International Civil Aviation Organization
IMO         International Maritime Organization
ISPS        International Ship and Port Facility Security Code
ISO        International Organization for Standardization
MRTD     Machine Readable Travel Document
NATO    North Atlantic Treaty Organization
OECD     Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OFAC     Office of Foreign Assets Control
PNR        Passenger Name Record
POE        Point-of-Entry/Point-of-Exit
RFID       Radio Frequency Identification
SAFTI     Secure and Facilitated International Travel Initiative
SCO        Screening Coordination and Operations
SENTRI    Secure Electronic Network for Traveler Rapid Inspection
SIM        Subscriber Identity Module
UN        United Nations
USAID    US Agency for International Development
US-VISIT    US Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
W3C       World Wide Web Consortium
WCO      World Customs Organization
WMD      Weapons of Mass Destruction
WTO      World Trade Organization
XML        Extensible Markup Language


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OECD. “Security in Maritime Transport: Risk Factors and Economic Impact.” July 2003.

Perimeter Clearance Coalition. “The North American Perimeters: Advantages vs. Disadvantages.” June 2003.

Rice, James B., Jr. and Federico Caniato.  “Supply Chain Response to Terrorism: Creating Resilient and Secure Supply Chains” MIT Center for Transportation and Logistics Interim Report. August 8, 2003.

Sheffi, Yossi. “Supply Chain Management under the Threat of International Terrorism.” International Journal of Logistics, 2001.

Sun, Shuang and John Yen. “Information Supply Chain: A Unified Framework for Information Sharing.” In Proceedings of IEEE International Conference on Intelligence and Security Informatics (IEEE ISI-2005). Atlanta, GA, May 19-20, 2005.

Swedish Customs. “White Paper on Accreditation of Operators and Supply Chain Security.” June 2003.

Webber, Joel. “Network-Centric Security for Canada-U.S. Supply Chains.” Center for Strategic and International Studies and The Fraser Institute, 2005.

Willis, Henry H. and Davis S. Ortiz. “Evaluating the Security of the Global Containerized Supply Chain.” RAND, 2004.
 

About the Global Leadership Initiative

IBM’s Global Leadership Initiative (GLI) consists of former public sector executives, CEOs and leading academics who develop strategic thinking, relationships and opportunities for IBM Business Consulting Services Public Sector. GLI identifies critical public sector challenges, convenes expertise and develops thought leadership to address these stakeholders, and communicates its original ideas to key stakeholders through direct outreach and public discourse.  

GLI supports the vision of BCS Public Sector – making a difference in peoples’ lives by delivering innovative solutions for the world’s greatest challenges.  GLI partners with leading universities, international organizations, think tanks, and other public sector institutions in its pursuit of its mission. GLI interests cross a broad range of issue domains including security, governance, demographics, healthcare, economy, environment, education and energy.

Offline Satyagraha

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There's a repeated phrase throughout that PDF document: must be a government 'buzzword' du jour:

security and resilience

It appears 41 times in that PDF.

Jane Lute, speaking at the Aspen circle jerk, used that phrase repeatedly, in fact - cited that phrase in her definition of the mission of the Department of Homeland Security. IBM knows how to be synergistic with the facilitators of tyranny; they've got lots of experience. Bet they had the buzzwords all over their proposals for the tracking of Auschwitz prisoners too.

Run an ixquick.com search for "Security and Resilience" and you'll get 19 unique top-ten pages selected from at least 3,129,159 matching results. My God - they are all lemmings following their leaders. They fall over each other trying to use the 'right words'. A walk through the kiss-ass MIC companies can be started with that one search.
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~ Thomas Paine, A Dissertation on the First Principles of Government, 1795

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Another Buzzword is "Global Movement Management" This following document is a "smoking gun"!  The authors W. Scott Gould, Daniel B. Prieto, and Jonah J. Czerwinski have a CFR, NSA, Naval Intelligence, DHS, Treasury, JP Morgan background!



Global Movement Management:
Commerce, Security, and Resilience
in Today’s Networked World

http://www-935.ibm.com/services/us/gbs/bus/pdf/global-movement-management-exec-summary.pdf

Excerpt from PDF Pages 10-12
Quote

Addressing the governance gap – Governance is the collection of institutions, rules, standards, norms, decision rights, practices and processes that administer, coordinate and/or direct activity within a system or enterprise. Governance for global movement systems is the means by which a diverse and interdependent community of global stakeholders pursues improvements to the performance of global movement systems. Governance of those systems today is characterized by the lack of a coordinated approach that is necessary to address networked risk. We call this the “governance gap.”
To bridge this gap, participants in the global movement systems need to embrace a more comprehensive set of factors to understand the actual risks, costs and benefits that accrue to an organization in a networked environment. Participants need a means by which to organize their efforts to address these risks, costs and benefits at scale. Our research shows that the challenges of organizing efforts across national boundaries in the global movement system, for maritime cargo and the Internet, for example, have been met before by organizations in the international community. These success stories provide a model for establishing a new global movement system governance framework.
Therefore, we call for the creation of a Global Movement Management Organization (GMMO) based on key attributes of these models for success. We envision a new international entity to fill the governance gap that presently limits the effectiveness of international efforts. The GMMO can serve to bring together key stakeholders with a shared interest in strengthening global movement systems and provide an effective forum and process to enable cooperation among regional, national and sector-specific stakeholders.
The GMMO can leverage existing international organizations through dedicated and visionary leadership to facilitate three important activities. First, it can align security and resilience with commercial imperatives in global movement systems. Second, it can improve international cooperation and harmonization among public and private stakeholders to strengthen global movement systems. Third, it can integrate security and resilience with a deliberate effort to connect screening and management systems globally and to enfranchise Tier 3 economic actors through a number of mechanisms, including grants, loans, services and training.

Further, as we studied the use of people, technology and governance in the global movement system, several principles that support this GMMO approach emerged: aligning with market incentives, layering horizontal and vertical approaches to improve security and placing useful information in the hands of front-line employees while helping to ensure that they have the training and authority to act. Improved information-sharing will require greater standardization of technologies, tools and protocols. Privacy and other data protections must be addressed at the architecture and design layer. Finally, mechanisms and metrics to measure, assess and optimize policies and programs are required to help make efficiency, security and resilience initiatives work.






The following is a repost of the entire document:

IBM Global Business Services

Global Movement Management:
Commerce, Security, and Resilience
in Today’s Networked World

W. Scott Gould, Daniel B. Prieto, and Jonah J. Czerwinski

About the Authors

W. Scott Gould
Vice President, Public Sector Strategy and Growth, IBM Global Business Services
Dr. Scott Gould directs strategy formulation for the Homeland Security, Intelligence and Federal Civilian line of business in IBM Global Business Services. Previously, he was CEO of The O’Gara Company, where he provided strategic advisory and investment services in the homeland security market. A Naval Intelligence reservist, Capt. Gould was recalled to active duty for Operation Noble Eagle and Enduring Freedom, where he served as Deputy to the Director, Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS). He has served as the CFO and Assistant Secretary for Administration at the U.S. Department of Commerce and as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Finance and Management at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. As a 1993-1994 White House Fellow, Scott served in the Export-Import Bank of the United States and in the Office of the White House Chief of Staff. He is a fellow of the National Academy of Public Administration and a former member of the National Security Agency (NSA) Technical Advisory Group. Scott holds an A.B. degree from Cornell University and M.B.A. and Ed.D. degrees from the University of Rochester.

Daniel B. Prieto
Vice President, IBM Global Business Services, Senior Fellow, IBM Global Leadership Initiative
Daniel Prieto directs the Global Movement Management initiative for the Homeland Security, Intelligence and Federal Civilian practice in IBM Global Business Services. He is Project Director for the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Independent Task Force on Civil Liberties and National Security, Senior Advisor to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve, adjunct Senior Fellow at the Reform Institute and at the George Washington University, and a member of the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. Dan has served as Research Director of the Homeland Security Partnership Initiative and been a Fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government, where he also served as a graduate-level lecturer. He has been a Fellow at the CFR and has served on the professional staff of the Homeland Security Committee in the U.S. House of Representatives. Before this, he was Director of Corporate Development for America Online and an investment banker with JP Morgan. He is co-author of “Neglected Defense: Mobilizing the Private Sector to Support Homeland Security.” Dan is an honors graduate of Wesleyan University and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS).

Jonah J. Czerwinski
Managing Consultant, IBM Global Business Services, Senior Fellow, IBM Global Leadership Initiative
Jonah Czerwinski is responsible for developing analysis and policy guidance for the Global Movement Management initiative and for consulting in the Homeland Security, Intelligence, and Federal Civilian practice in IBM Global Business Services. Jonah is also a Senior Advisor at the Center for the Study of the Presidency (CSP) and a 2007 Senior Fellow at the Homeland Security Policy Institute of George Washington University. From 2003-2006, he was Senior Research Associate and Director of Homeland Security Projects at CSP. Jonah served on the Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on Strategies for Defense Against Nuclear Terrorism in 2006. From 2001-2004, he directed the Center’s Homeland Security Roundtable and led a Center project on strengthening transatlantic homeland security relations through NATO. Jonah has testified before Congress on the budget and strategy of the Department of Homeland Security and writes for the homeland security blog www.HLSwatch.com. Jonah holds an A.B. from Salve Regina University and is a member of the class of 2009 at the Darden School of Business, University of Virginia.


Global Movement Management: Commerce, Security, and Resilience in Today’s Networked World1

Executive summary

The health and well-being of modern society depend on highly integrated, complex economic systems that serve to move people, goods, conveyances, money and information around the world every day. These systems include, for example, immigration, aviation and transit systems for the movement of people; maritime, trucking and air cargo for the movement of goods; pipelines and electric grids to transport fuels and energy; and the Internet and other communications networks to move information and to enable financial flows. Collectively, these systems comprise a circulatory system for the global economy: what we refer to in this paper as the “global movement system.”

Global movement systems embody a unique intersection of public and private interests. They are largely owned by the private sector and users are mostly companies and the general public. At the same time, the functioning, availability, security and stability of these systems are essential economic “public goods,” in which governments have significant economic, national security and public welfare interests. Society expects global movement systems to be like water, electricity and other utilities: People simply expect them to work and expect them to be available on demand. When they fail, consequences are rapid, widespread and significant.

Twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, the global movement system shuttles goods and services, capital and labor and bits and bytes around the globe to provide the substance of daily life: jobs, wages, food, electricity, education, news and information, leisure and entertainment. As a result, nations and economies are becoming increasingly integrated and interdependent. The United States relies on the rest of the world to supply two-thirds of its oil and to finance 44 percent of its public debt. China relies on exports for 36 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP). The primary engine of India’s recent economic growth has been information technology outsourcing, even though it accounts for only 5 percent of India’s GDP. Tourism accounts for almost 20 percent of GDP in many Latin American countries. Emerging markets’ share of global exports doubled from 20 percent in 1970 to 43 percent today and emerging markets hold 70 percent of foreign exchange reserves. Africa has recently emerged as a major petroleum exporter and is developing strategic economic relationships with China and India, providing commodities for their rapid industrialization.

Global movement systems as exploitation targets

At the same time, however, the same systems can threaten societies and economies if they are exploited by malicious actors to do harm, or if naturally occurring disruptions are managed poorly. The tight integration of global systems means that disruptions that may seem small or localized at first, can rapidly magnify, spill over into other systems and cause more serious harm that is difficult to envision or predict.
These challenges are the natural result of the networked nature and sheer complexity of today’s modern global economy. The effects are well described by chaos theory, which asserts that even relatively simple systems that obey known rules and behaviors can display unpredictable outcomes depending on the slightest variations in the nature of an event or disruption. As individual movement systems become increasingly networked, interconnected and interdependent, small disruptions and events can create an even higher level of unpredictability. Making matters worse, the transmission of disruptions around the world is occurring at an ever faster pace.

Today, countries are not alone in facing and influencing the challenges and opportunities of complex internetworked global systems: Fifty-one of the top 100 global economies are companies, 300 multinational corporations account for 25 percent of total global assets and more than 40 percent of total world trade occurs within corporations.

Individuals have also gained new prominence on the global landscape. As a result of globalization and technology, individual actors can intentionally cause disruptions and inflict damage on a massive scale that was previously the sole domain of nation-states. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks undertaken on U.S. soil by 19 individuals at a cost of approximately US$500,000 caused an estimated US$80 billion in damages. The attacks shut down the entire U.S. aviation system. Cascading effects rippled around the world, affecting many countries and industries. As then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld lamented, “The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists’ cost of millions.”

The 9/11 hijackers exploited U.S. immigration systems, benefited from poor information-sharing within the U.S. government and used our own airplanes as weapons against our centers of finance and government. The 9/11 terrorist attacks drew the world’s attention to the following:

The efficiency, security and resilience of the global movement system are integrally linked in today’s highly networked and interconnected global economy.

The drive to improve efficiency has made global movement systems more vulnerable.

Much of the physical infrastructure in global movement systems is in poor condition as a result of age, everyday wear and tear, deferred maintenance, and underinvestment in new capital projects.

The 9/11 attacks heightened awareness of the fact that while global movement systems are the lifeblood of the global economy, they are also a potential pathway for pathogens in the global movement system.

Security improvements and performance can work together

Because greater efficiency can make global systems more vulnerable and brittle, many observers assume that the converse is true; that investments in greater security and resilience inevitably must come at the expense of business performance. However, we assert that the relationship between business performance and security is not as many observers believe. This paper explains that improvements in security and resilience can help improve overall economic performance. Security and commerce are not in opposition.

Economic performance, security and resilience are mutually reinforcing goals and can be achieved in tandem. In addition, this paper suggests that in a networked economy, business leaders must expand the frame of their investment decisions to give greater weight to considerations beyond their immediate bottom lines and beyond the four walls of their organizations. Company executives need to give greater consideration to their roles in supporting public goods like resilience, stability and the benefits that come with economic interdependence. The same is true for public sector policy makers, who now must consider a broader range of commercial factors in recognition of the private sector’s ownership of and influence over global movement infrastructure. In short, we must learn to realign our thinking to address the networked nature of the global economy.

This paper, therefore, offers a new analysis of the challenges facing countries, corporations and individuals in today’s highly interconnected world. It also proposes a comprehensive framework to improve the performance, security and resiliency of global movement systems.

Key ideas in this paper

The key ideas presented in this paper focus on 21st century risk, intelligent immunity, the Global Movement Management analytical framework, strategic human capital, leveraging unique data assets and skills through technology and addressing a critical governance gap. These topics are summarized below.

21st century risk – Risk in the 21st century is unique because, for the first time, individual actors or individual events pose viable strategic threats to international systems. Threats are asymmetric. Small groups of undesirable actors can create global harm many orders of magnitude greater than their cost of operations. Seemingly small local disruptions can potentially cascade and be magnified through tightly interconnected systems to create far-reaching and more extensive damage than can often be predicted. And this trend is forecast to continue.

Intelligent immunity – We developed a new approach to guide the formation of policies, plans and implementation efforts to address terrorism and other threats to global economic systems. We call this approach “intelligent immunity.” This approach is designed to address the economic and security risks in global movement systems. It seeks to make critical economic systems more resistant to disruption by improving their overall health. Commerce, security and resilience constitute the essential elements of a healthy system. Achieving this requires an integrated and evolving mix of preemptive, preventive, preparatory and responsive measures that leverage human capital, technology and governance in new ways.

The intelligent immunity approach focuses not only on making systems more secure against intentional threats like terrorism, but also on making them more resilient in the face of virtually all manner of disruptions, as well as seeking to improve their overall performance. Intelligent immunity sets the stage for a holistic approach to improve the overall health and well-being of global movement systems while avoiding actions that impede commerce and impair daily functioning.

Global Movement Management framework – A consistent analytical framework is valuable to better understand and assess the complicated systems and subsystems that comprise the global movement system. The analytical framework through which we can understand how to achieve intelligent immunity identifies five key flows – people, goods, conveyances, money and information – as the lifeblood of the global economy.

We broaden and deepen our original Global Movement Management framework to include both the physical and logical aspects of each flow. We provide a robust framework for analyzing the complex global movement systems that make these flows possible, including the global aviation system, maritime cargo shipping, immigration systems and the Internet. The simple yet powerful foundation of the framework is that even the most complex global systems can be reduced to their components and the systems are more alike than they are dissimilar. Focusing on similarities can provide the means to harmonize decisions, investments and activities to improve performance, security and resilience across the board. The analytical framework can be a valuable aid to guide thinking and action by global leaders to manage risk in global movement systems and achieve common goals.

A strategy to overcome the asymmetric risk posed by terrorism and natural disasters in the highly networked global movement system should link the full range of available tools to achieve these goals. Our analysis suggests three main opportunities to achieve intelligent immunity that involve new strategies for people, technology and governance.

Strategic human capital – We believe that individuals within companies and governments face increasingly complex choices about how to improve performance and address risk. Individual managers and employees face unprecedented volumes of information, new technologies and competitive pressures that complicate their work. At the same time, in a networked economy, decisions made at the individual level can have increasingly global ramifications.   Unfortunately, the critical role of people in managing risk and complexity in a networked environment is too often overlooked. From the front office to the front line, people make global movement systems work. We call for a new strategic approach to human capital that transforms the relationship between individuals and their organizations by improving trust and access at virtually all levels. This results in a greater shared ownership of mission and objectives and empowers individuals to make “the right decisions at the right time.” This approach, adopted by individual organizations in the global community, will help promote intelligent immunity across the entire system.

Strategic human capital requires leaders to employ emerging techniques for managing in a networked environment. These techniques include improved collaboration, latitude to reach across and outside organizational boundaries, investment in organizational transformation, new and more flexible structures, enhanced technology and, above all, greatly improved training for managerial and supervisory skills. To address these challenges, we recommend:

Taking a strategic approach to front-line employees in global movement systems

Leading, organizing, training and equipping front-line employees for the new tasks at hand

Engaging society on a more comprehensive basis in recognition of the new level of personal responsibility that each user has for the system in a more connected and interdependent world.

The goal of this effort is to enhance the individual employee’s understanding of his or her important role in improving enterprise performance and reducing risk. We argue that a significant initiative to invest in human capital and to establish standards for human capital development in the areas of security and preparedness will make companies and governments better able to prevent, withstand and respond to disruption. Increased investments in this approach will allow people to assume higher-order responsibilities and automate tasks that do not require human intervention, further leveraging the time that front-line personnel have to focus on their unique contribution to the safe and reliable operation of the global movement system.

Leveraging unique data assets and skills through technology – As those who have worked on the front lines in government or the private sector to manage and operate a portion of the global movement system likely know, we need to change how we use technology to simplify work processes and make human activity more effective. Despite widespread recognition of the importance of sharing information, companies and governments are failing to fully leverage natural advantages that they possess in information and technology to strategically address asymmetric risk in global movement systems. Global Movement Management sets forth a vision for data collaboration at scale to make it easier for individuals to do their jobs, for companies to improve their performance and for societies to maintain the global economy.
The paper sets forth a technology strategy for global movement systems that includes three major components:

Adoption of a “micro-macro” approach that unlocks currently trapped data to achieve greater information granularity and that promotes greater information federation/aggregation

Building the “connective tissue” needed to enable greater collaboration both vertically between individuals and organizations, and horizontally among organizations

Peer production that results from unlocking information and sharing it more widely, helping to drive innovation to dramatically improve the performance, security and resilience of global movement systems.

In sum: Unlock trapped information, share it broadly and create new knowledge and innovation.

We can improve the use of technology to enable individuals to be more effective in their jobs, especially when they have been given the training and authority to make good use of it. But more importantly, we can use technology as a strategic advantage by leveraging our ability to manage information to which dangerous elements do not have access – and to do so at scale in order to prevent, detect and interdict malicious activities.

The sharing of currently trapped data at scale will not occur until tools and services become affordable and widely available for data harmonization and interoperability; permissioning, anonymization and encryption; and data aggregation, analysis and visualization. If such tools become widely available and currently trapped data becomes shared at scale, the resulting greater awareness of global systems will allow companies to improve economic performance by identifying opportunities for improvements in critical economic flows. In addition, this same action will improve security by making it easier to identify vulnerabilities and to spot anomalies. It also will improve resilience by enabling companies and governments to isolate disturbances, avoid overreacting to disruptions and more quickly restart operations after an event.

Finally, we assert that greater enterprise visibility can help partners and competitors identify mutually beneficial best practices. Upstream companies can be better equipped to provide warnings of supply shortages or other disruptions before they affect downstream partners. Downstream companies can provide early warnings about demand or delivery disruptions to those upstream. Companies can benefit from greater communication with government and law enforcement officials about intentional threats. Governments can augment counterterrorism efforts with more accessible commercial data, while also providing a higher degree of protection for privacy and civil liberties than is currently the case. By freeing up trapped data and sharing greater volumes of information, companies and governments can take advantage of open-source techniques or “peer production” to drive innovation and help make global systems more efficient, resilient and secure.

Addressing the governance gap – Governance is the collection of institutions, rules, standards, norms, decision rights, practices and processes that administer, coordinate and/or direct activity within a system or enterprise. Governance for global movement systems is the means by which a diverse and interdependent community of global stakeholders pursues improvements to the performance of global movement systems. Governance of those systems today is characterized by the lack of a coordinated approach that is necessary to address networked risk. We call this the “governance gap.”

To bridge this gap, participants in the global movement systems need to embrace a more comprehensive set of factors to understand the actual risks, costs and benefits that accrue to an organization in a networked environment. Participants need a means by which to organize their efforts to address these risks, costs and benefits at scale. Our research shows that the challenges of organizing efforts across national boundaries in the global movement system, for maritime cargo and the Internet, for example, have been met before by organizations in the international community. These success stories provide a model for establishing a new global movement system governance framework.

Therefore, we call for the creation of a Global Movement Management Organization (GMMO) based on key attributes of these models for success. We envision a new international entity to fill the governance gap that presently limits the effectiveness of international efforts. The GMMO can serve to bring together key stakeholders with a shared interest in strengthening global movement systems and provide an effective forum and process to enable cooperation among regional, national and sector-specific stakeholders.

The GMMO can leverage existing international organizations through dedicated and visionary leadership to facilitate three important activities. First, it can align security and resilience with commercial imperatives in global movement systems. Second, it can improve international cooperation and harmonization among public and private stakeholders to strengthen global movement systems. Third, it can integrate security and resilience with a deliberate effort to connect screening and management systems globally and to enfranchise Tier 3 economic actors through a number of mechanisms, including grants, loans, services and training.

Further, as we studied the use of people, technology and governance in the global movement system, several principles that support this GMMO approach emerged: aligning with market incentives, layering horizontal and vertical approaches to improve security and placing useful information in the hands of front-line employees while helping to ensure that they have the training and authority to act. Improved information-sharing will require greater standardization of technologies, tools and protocols. Privacy and other data protections must be addressed at the architecture and design layer. Finally, mechanisms and metrics to measure, assess and optimize policies and programs are required to help make efficiency, security and resilience initiatives work.

In summary, the performance, security and resilience of global movement systems have always been deeply intertwined. September 11 provided a catalyst to invest in security, but, too often, security initiatives have been viewed as being at odds with commerce. This paper supports the idea that commerce, security and resilience are mutually reinforcing objectives. Importantly, we propose a strategy that employs assets that we have and the terrorists do not. These include large numbers of dedicated people, the better use of technology to unlock trapped commercial data and dramatically improve information sharing and the formation of international organizations to leverage the combined weight of governments, non-government organizations and corporations around the world. This strategy will help to counter the asymmetric risk posed by terrorists and manage the unpredictable consequences of unintentional disruptions. The ideas and recommendations in this paper – promote intelligent immunity, strengthen human capital, better use technology and create a new international governance organization – provide a starting point for stakeholders across virtually all sectors to help build more secure, resilient and efficient global movement systems.

About this paper

IBM first introduced its global movement management strategy in 2005 with “Global Movement Management: Securing the Global Economy.” That paper asserted that, despite the daunting complexity of so many of these global systems, virtually all movement systems are more alike than they are different. We believe that policymakers, business leaders and security professionals should focus on these similarities as the key to developing sound strategies for improving the performance, security and resilience of global movement systems, while also seeking to preserve core societal values.

Reactions to the central ideas proposed in that first paper were overwhelmingly positive. Many of the stakeholders we engaged – homeland security, military and intelligence officials in the United States; customs, ports and border organizations around the world; Congressional members and staff; think tank experts; and members of the business community – acknowledged the validity of the central ideas, especially the need for a common vision and framework. Many called for additional depth and detail as they delved into their specific areas of interest. IBM itself realized a deep connection between risks in the global movement system and IBM’s own ability to deliver products and services around the world as a globally integrated enterprise.

The more we understood the common needs of all stakeholders in the global movement system, the more we came to understand that there is an urgent need for virtually all companies and governments to maintain the health and welfare of global movement systems and strengthen them wherever possible. Further, there is enormous potential to create new markets for products and services that strengthen the global movement system. And finally, a strategic approach to global movement systems can help strengthen public policy, promote more cooperation between stakeholders and guide investment decisions.

As a result, we developed “Strengthening commerce, security and resilience in today’s networked world.” This paper builds on the previous paper in four ways:

We analyze risk in the 21st century using a new approach for managing the unique risks the global community faces today.

We provide an updated and more comprehensive analytical framework for analyzing strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats in specific individual movement systems.

We provide examples of how to apply the revised Global Movement Management analytical framework to help guide policymakers, business leaders and the public concerned with strengthening global movement systems.

And we present a strategy and specific recommendations to build what we call “intelligent immunity” through strategic human capital, technology and governance.

Most importantly, the paper presents a strategic vision to guide the efforts of a vast network of stakeholders that is largely absent from today’s efforts. It is a call to action for individuals, companies and governments to work together to help make the global economy more secure and resilient while improving commerce and protecting privacy. It provides the means for corporations to drive greater harmonization in the global movement system, resulting in lower total costs and higher overall performance. Finally, it also provides government and other regulatory organizations with a means to improve security and resilience without harming commercial interests. There is no doubt that achieving these goals is a challenge with profound economic, human, technological and governmental implications. We invite our readers to engage in this effort to strengthen commerce, security and resiliency in today’s networked world.

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Protecting the Global Commons: A Strategy
http://www.hstoday.us/content/view/3008/128/
by Phil Leggiere Tuesday, 22 April 2008

IBM Global Business Services lays out a vision of cooperatively secured “global movement system”. Like water, electricity and other utilities the “global movement system”, the patchwork systems that serve to move people, goods, conveyances, money and information around the world every day, belong to every nation as a sort of global commons. Like other essential core infrastructures they tend to be invisible and, except when they suddenly break down, ignored and taken for granted by the media and public alike. In an increasingly interdependent economy, however, this global commons is a shared resource that needs to be maintained and secured on a global basis.   In a new report on Global Movement Management: Commerce, Security and Resilience in Today’s Networked World, IBM Global Business services lays out a strategic vision for securing the global movement and logistics system.   The authors insist that, “Economic performance, security and resilience are mutually reinforcing goals and can be achieved in tandem.” In a networked economy, they say, “business leaders must expand the frame of their investment decisions to give greater weight to considerations beyond their immediate bottom lines and beyond the four walls of their organizations. Company executives need to give greater consideration to their roles in supporting public goods like resilience.”  

Presenting a new approach that can guide the formation of policies, plans, and implementation efforts, the report introduces three key ideas:  

Intelligent Immunity - Make critical economic systems more resistant to disruption through a strategy built on resilience that addresses terrorism and other threats to global economic systems. Security policies need to do more than simply prevent attacks; the best security policies will allow organizations to isolate disruptions and recover from them quickly.  

Strategic Human Capital - Transform the relationships between individuals and their organizations to enhance the individual employee's understanding of his or her role in improving performance and reducing risk. Empowering front-line employees through strategic investments in training and education can be the best defense that many organizations have against the threats they face.

Leverage Data and Skills Through Technology - Build technologies that ensure that people have the right information at the right time to do their jobs better and to keep their organizations secure. New tools and standards for information sharing and privacy protection will be required to help these new technologies become as cost effective and ubiquitous as web browsers and HTML were for the development of the worldwide web.

The report addresses how risk has changed in the 21st century, noting that today, technology and globalization allow individuals and individual events to create disruptions and damage on a scale never before seen. As a result, organizations are increasingly faced with the need for dramatic changes in the level of information sharing and public and private collaboration. In addition, the authors call attention to the lack of sufficient international coordination to make economic systems more secure and resilient. Their findings suggest that a new effort is needed to energize and provide direction for governance efforts. Such an initiative would augment the efforts of existing security and commerce organizations around the world, while creating a leading new forum for public and private cooperation.
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Statement by Jonah J. Czerwinski
Senior Fellow, Homeland Security, IBM Global Leadership Initiative
Managing Consultant, IBM Global Business Services
to the
Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection United States House of Representatives
for the hearing entitled
“Partnering with the Private Sector to Secure Critical Infrastructure:
Has the Department of Homeland Security Abandoned the Resilience-based Approach?”

May 14, 2008


http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20080514143358-14814.pdf

Chairwoman Jackson Lee, Ranking Member Lungren, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today. I commend you on your leadership to focus on a resilience-based approach to securing the homeland. Given the unique risks of the 21 st century, resilience is a necessary goal.

I am a Senior Fellow with IBM’s Global Leadership Initiative where I work on public sector homeland security challenges from a private sector perspective, much of it on resilience. I am also Managing Consultant for IBM’s Global Business Services practice.  And for the past fifteen months I have worked on a framework for strengthening commerce, security, and resiliency.

Today, I thought it would be useful to focus on three things.

• First, really defining resilience, which can be an elusive concept meaning different things to different stakeholders;

• Second, the unique role served by the private sector; and

• Third, a recommendation for how DHS can better engage the private sector in making this a more resilient nation

Chairman Thompson said that “we all have a role to play” because resilience is the responsibility of the federal government, states and localities, academia, and the private sector.

The first step toward accomplishing this is establishing an agreed upon vision for how we as a nation can become more resilient. That vision rests upon a clear understanding of what is meant by resilience.

I. Defining Resilience

Resilience is the ability to reduce the risk and impact of a terrorist attack or disruption while also improving the facilitation of trade and travel. In the context of natural disasters, resilience enables people closest to the crisis to act, provides them with the authorities and information necessary to succeed, and employs an effective governance framework.

Resilience helps to avoid unintended consequences: Resilience — if done right — affords the decision maker the enhanced ability to focus response efforts on the part of the system that is actually stressed and limits the risk of over-reacting, which often time leads to unintended consequences. Many suggest that resilience is the ability to “bounce back.” And it is, but resilience is different from response and recovery.

Redundancy is not resiliency. Having costly back-up systems or two of everything is the easy yet most expensive way for infrastructure to “bend and not break.” If done correctly, resiliency is more akin to the concept of Intelligent Immunity that we put forth in the most recent IBM report on Global Movement Management, and which I’ll touch upon in a moment.

II. Unique role of the private sector

Finally, the private sector is an asset first, and a vulnerability second: It is an asset because the goods, people, conveyances, and information that comprise private sector activity interact at critical nodes that must be both protected and viewed as a source of resilience.

This is a critical step toward being able to make the case for private sector engagement and to establish the form of partnership this Committee rightly calls out as a priority.

At IBM we have been working on the issue of resilience in the global trade system for the past several years. We found that the global trade system can be organized and viewed as a circulatory system of goods, people, conveyances, money, and information.

While many things that move through our system of commerce are monitored to a greater or lesser extent, a lot isn’t monitored at all. Even fewer things are monitored in conjunction with one another.

And yet it is those linkages that often give us the clearest picture of what’s going on… and what might be going wrong.

A robust framework that embraces the fundamental complexity and networked nature of these systems will identify critical interrelationships, inefficiencies, and vulnerabilities across the flows. Staying within a stovepiped system puts our competitiveness and possibly our security at risk.

III. A framework to support DHS leadership in building a resilient nation

IBM recently released our paper entitled “Global Movement Management: Commerce, Security, and Resilience in Today’s Networked World,” in which my coauthors and I outline an analytical framework we developed to strengthen the global trade system by helping to identify and address vulnerabilities in and across the elements that make up our global movement system. It brings the interrelationships into focus. This framework requires a partnership between the government and the private sector because it involves an integrated and evolving mix of preemptive, preventive, preparatory and responsive measures across three vital areas: Human Capital, Technology, and Governance.

Strategic Human Capital [a.k.a. Slaves to the Bilderberg Master Control Program]

Individuals within companies and governments face increasingly complex choices about how to improve performance and address risk. Individual managers and employees face unprecedented volumes of information, new technologies and competitive pressures that complicate their work. At the same time, in a networked economy, decisions made at the individual level can have increasingly global ramifications. Strategic human capital requires leaders to employ emerging techniques for managing in a networked environment. These techniques include improved collaboration, latitude to reach across and outside organizational boundaries, investment in organizational transformation, enhanced technology and, above all, greatly improved training.

Technology [a.k.a. Supressed Technology that only the Bilderberg Master Control Program is allowed to utilize as it sees fit]

We need to change how we use technology to simplify work processes and seek efficiencies. By sharing greater volumes of information, companies and governments can take advantage of open-source techniques to drive innovation and help make global systems more efficient, resilient, and secure. Upstream companies can be better equippedto provide warnings of supply shortages or other disruptions before they affect downstream partners. Downstream companies can provide early warnings about demand or delivery disruptions to those upstream. Governments can augment counterterrorism efforts with more accessible commercial data while also providing a higher degree of protection for privacy and civil liberties than is currently the case.

Governance [a.k.a. Feudalistic Scientific Technocracy authorized by the all powerful Bilderberg Master Control Program]

Governance in this context can be characterized by the lack of a coordinated approach that is necessary to address networked risk. Call this a “governance gap.” To bridge this gap, participants in the global movement systems need to embrace a more comprehensive set of factors to understand the actual risks, costs, and benefits that accrue to an organization in a networked environment. Moreover, participants need a means by which to organize their efforts to address these risks, costs, and benefits. Our research shows that organizations have successfully met the challenges of organizing efforts across national boundaries but not yet across sectors.

Conclusion [a.k.a. Seemless depopulation and global enslavement when the Bilderberg Master Control Program is fully implemented, free to control all sectors of society]

In summary, to create a system in which security improvements and performance improvements are not mutually exclusive, but mutually reinforcing, requires a partnership between the owners and operators of this global movement system and the federal homeland security enterprise. For this reason, today’s hearing represents a productive step forward. With a common vision, better information, with the right technology and well trained government and commercial employees who are empowered to take action – a more resilient nation is within reach. Thank you.



Global Movement Management: Strengthening Commerce, Security and Resiliency in Today’s Networked World
W. Scott Gould, Daniel B. Prieto, and Jonah J. Czerwinski

Executive summary


The health and well-being of modern society depend on highly integrated, complex economic systems that serve to move people, cargo, conveyances, money and information around the world every day. These systems include, for example, immigration, aviation and transit systems for the movement of people; maritime, trucking and air cargo for the movement of goods; pipelines and electric grids to transport fuels and energy; and the Internet and other communications networks to move information and to enable financial flows. Collectively, these systems comprise a circulatory system for the global economy: what we refer to in this paper as the “global movement system.”

Global movement systems embody a unique intersection of public and private interests. They are largely owned by the private sector, and users are mostly companies and the general public. At the same time, the functioning, availability, security and stability of these systems are essential economic “public goods,”1 in which governments have significant economic, national security and public welfare interests. Society expects global movement systems to be like water, electricity and other utilities: People simply expect them to work and to be available on demand. When they fail, consequences are rapid, widespread and significant. Twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week, the global movement system shuttles goods and services, capital and labor, and bits and bytes around the globe to provide the substance of daily life: jobs, wages, food, electricity, education, news and information, and leisure and entertainment. As a result, nations and economies are becoming increasingly integrated and interdependent. The United States relies on the rest of the world to supply two-thirds of its oil and to finance 44 percent of its public debt.2 China relies on exports for 36 percent of its gross domestic product (GDP).3 The primary engine of India’s recent economic growth has been information technology outsourcing, even though it accounts for only 5 percent of India’s GDP. Tourism accounts for almost 20 percent of GDP4 in many Latin American countries.5 Emerging markets’ share of global exports doubled from 20 percent in 1970 to 43 percent today and emerging markets hold 70 percent of foreign exchange reserves.6 Africa has recently emerged as a major petroleum exporter and is developing strategic economic relationships with China and India, providing commodities for their rapid industrialization.

Global movement systems as exploitation targets [In other words... as Rand and others have explained in countless white papers...global movement systems are the most batshit crazy psychopathic and degenerate inventions since Carnegie, Rockefeller, and Ford (CFR) founded the Eugenics Records Office in 1899]

At the same time, however, the same systems can threaten societies and economies if they are exploited by malicious actors to inflict harm or if naturally occurring disruptions are managed poorly. The tight integration of global systems means that disruptions that may seem small or localized at first can rapidly magnify, spill over into other systems and cause serious harm that is difficult to envision or predict.

These challenges are the natural result of the networked nature and sheer complexity of today’s modern global economy. The effects are well described by chaos theory, which asserts that even relatively simple systems that obey known rules and behaviors can display unpredictable outcomes depending on the slightest variations in the nature of an event or disruption. As individual movement systems become increasingly networked, interconnected and interdependent, small disruptions and events can create an even higher level of unpredictably.7 Making matters worse, the transmission of disruptions around the world is occurring at an ever faster pace.8 Countries today are not alone in facing and influencing the challenges and opportunities of complex internetworked global systems. Fifty-one of the top 100 global economies are companies, 300 multinational corporations account for 25 percent of total global assets, and more than 40 percent of total world trade occurs within corporations.9 Individuals have also gained new prominence on the global landscape. As a result of globalization and technology, individual actors can intentionally cause disruptions and inflict damage on a massive scale that was previously the sole domain of nation-states. The September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks undertaken on U.S. soil by 19 individuals at a cost of approximately US$500,000 caused an estimated US$80 billion in damages.10 The attacks shut down the entire U.S. aviation system. Cascading effects rippled around the world, affecting many countries and industries.11 As then U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld lamented, “The cost-benefit ratio is against us! Our cost is billions against the terrorists’ cost of millions.”12

The 9/11 hijackers exploited U.S. immigration systems, benefited from poor information sharing within the U.S. government and used our own airplanes as weapons against our centers of finance and government. The 9/11 terrorist attacks drew the world’s attention to the following: [In other words... If you continue believing anything else we have to say after invoking the already exposed 9/11 false flag created by our subcontractor...Ptech, then you deserve the depopulation and global enslavement plans we have in store for you.]

• The efficiency, security and resilience of the global movement system are integrally linked in today’s highly networked and interconnected global economy.

• The drive to improve efficiency has made global movement systems more vulnerable.

• Much of the physical infrastructure in global movement systems is in poor condition due to age, everyday wear and tear, deferred maintenance and underinvestment in new capital projects.  

The 9/11 attacks heightened awareness of the fact that while global movement systems are the lifeblood of the global economy, they also present important vulnerabilities and serve as a potential pathway for pathogens and disruptions.

Security improvements and performance can work together  [In other words, you pay us for false security against our team of black ops cyber terrorists and we will allow a 50% SLA. If you do not sign our agreements...get ready for our Stuxnet II and Cyber Storm IV plans, you slaves!]

Because greater efficiency can make global systems more vulnerable and brittle, many observers assume that the converse is true: that investments in greater security and resilience inevitably must come at the expense of business performance. However, this need not be the case. This paper explains that improvements in security and resilience can help improve overall economic performance. Security and commerce are not in opposition.

Economic performance, security and resilience are mutually reinforcing goals and can be achieved in tandem. In addition, this paper suggests that in a networked economy, business leaders must expand the frame of their investment decisions to give greater weight to considerations beyond their short-term bottom lines and beyond the four walls of their organizations. Company executives need to give greater consideration to their roles in supporting public goods like resilience, stability and the benefits that come with economic interdependence. The same is true for public sector policy makers, who now must consider a broader range of commercial factors in recognition of the private sector’s ownership of and influence over global movement infrastructure. In short, we must learn to realign our thinking to address the networked nature of the global economy.

This paper, therefore, offers a new analysis of the challenges facing countries, corporations and individualsin today’s highly interconnected world. It also proposes a comprehensive framework to improve the performance, security and resilience of global movement systems.

Key ideas

The key ideas presented in this paper focus on 21st century risk, intelligent immunity, the Global Movement Management analytical framework, strategic human capital, leveraging unique data assets and skills through technology, and addressing a critical governance gap. These topics are summarized below. 21st century risk – Risk in the 21st century is unique because, for the first time, individual actors or individual events pose viable strategic threats to international systems. Threats are asymmetric. Small groups of malicious actors can create global harm many orders of magnitude greater than their cost of operations. Seemingly small local disruptions can potentially cascade and be magnified through tightly interconnected systems to create far-reaching and more extensive damage than often can be predicted. And this trend is forecast to continue.

Intelligent immunity [In other words...Total and complete immunity to all members of the Bilderberg Club from all surveillance, investigative, and prosecutorial initiatives. We already have technology to (in real time) erase faces, body images, voices, text relating to any of the "friends of ours". Of course the information and details of these temporarily "immune" friends of ours is subject to be released to the general public should a club member step outside the "circle of trust".] – We developed a new approach to guide the formation of policies, plans and implementation efforts to address terrorism and other threats to global economic systems. We call this approach “intelligent immunity.” This approach is designed to address the economic and security risks in global movement systems. It seeks to make critical economic systems more resistant to disruption by improving their overall health. Commerce, security and resilience constitute the essential elements of a healthy system. Achieving this requires an integrated and evolving mix of preemptive, preventive, preparatory and responsive measures that leverage human capital, technology and governance in new ways.

The intelligent immunity approach focuses not only on making systems more secure against intentional threats like terrorism, but also on making them more resilient in the face of virtually all manner of disruptions as well as seeking to improve their overall performance. Intelligent immunity sets the stage for a holistic approach to improve the overall health and well-being of global movement systems while avoiding actions that impede commerce and impair daily functioning.  Global Movement Management framework – A consistent analytical framework is valuable to better understand and assess the complicated systems and subsystems that comprise the global movement system. The analytical framework through which we can understand how to achieve intelligent immunity identifies five key flows – people, goods, conveyances, money and information – as the lifeblood of the global economy.

We broaden and deepen our original Global Movement Management framework to include both the physical and logical aspects of each flow. We provide a robust framework for analyzing the complex global movement systems that make these flows possible, including the global aviation system, maritime cargo shipping, immigration systems and the Internet. The simple yet powerful foundation of the framework is that even the most complex global systems can be reduced to their components, and the systems are more alike than they are dissimilar. Focusing on similarities can provide the means to harmonize decisions, investments and activities to improve performance, security and resilience across the board. The analytical framework can be a valuable aid to guide thinking and action by global leaders to manage risk in global movement systems and achieve common goals.

A strategy to overcome the asymmetric risk posed by terrorism and natural disasters in the highly networked global movement system should link the full range of available tools to achieve these goals. Our analysis suggests three main opportunities to achieve intelligent immunity that involve new strategies for people, technology and governance.

Strategic human capital [a.k.a. Slaves...how hard is this one to see?] – We believe that individuals within companies and governments face increasingly complex choices about how to improve performance and address risk. Individual managers and employees face unprecedented volumes of information, new technologies and competitive pressures that complicate their work. At the same time, in a networked economy, decisions made at the individual level can have increasingly global ramifications.

Unfortunately, the critical role of people in managing risk and complexity in a networked environment is often overlooked. From the front office to the front line, people make global movement systems work. We call for a new strategic approach to human capital that transforms the relationship between individuals and their organizations by improving trust and access at virtually all levels. This results in a greater shared ownership of mission and objectives and empowers individuals to make “the right decisions at the right time.” This approach, adopted by individual organizations in the global community, will help promote intelligent immunity across the entire system.

Strategic human capital requires leaders to employ emerging techniques for managing in a networked environment. These techniques include improved collaboration, latitude to reach across and outside organizational boundaries, investment in organizational transformation, new and more flexible structures, enhanced technology and, above all, greatly improved training for managerial and supervisory skills across the workforce. To address these challenges, we recommend:

• Taking a strategic approach to front-line employees in global movement systems

• Leading, organizing, training and equipping front-line employees for the new tasks at hand

• Engaging society on a more comprehensive basis in recognition of the new level of personal responsibility that each user has for the system in a more connected and interdependent world.

The goal of this effort is to enhance the individual employee’s understanding of his or her important role in improving enterprise performance and reducing risk. We argue that a significant initiative for investing in human capital and establishing standards for human capital development in the areas of security and preparedness will make companies and governments better able to prevent, withstand and respond to disruption. Increased investments in this approach will allow people to assume higher-order responsibilities and automate tasks that do not require human intervention, further leveraging the time that front-line personnel have to focus on their unique contribution to the safe and reliable operation of the global movement system.

Leveraging unique data assets and skills through technology – Those who have managed and operated portions of the global movement system — on the front lines in government or in the private sector — almost universally agree that we need to change how we use technology to simplify work processes and make human activity more effective. Despite widespread recognition of the importance of sharing information, companies and governments are failing to fully leverage natural advantages that they possess in information and technology to strategically address asymmetric risk in global movement systems. Global Movement Management sets forth a vision for data collaboration on a significant scale to make it easier for individuals to do their jobs, for companies to improve their performance and for societies to maintain the global economy.

This paper sets forth a technology strategy for global movement systems that includes three major components:

• Adoption of a “micro-macro” approach that unlocks currently trapped data to achieve greater information granularity and that promotes greater information federation/aggregation
• Building the “connective tissue” needed to enable greater collaboration both vertically between individuals and organizations, and horizontally among organizations
• Peer production that results from unlocking information and sharing it more widely, helping to drive innovation to dramatically improve the performance, security and resilience of global movement systems.

In sum: Unlock trapped information, share it broadly and create new knowledge and innovation.  We can improve the use of technology to enable individuals to be more effective in their jobs, especially when they have been given the training and authority to make good use of it. More importantly, we can use technology as a strategic advantage by leveraging our ability to manage information to which dangerous elements do not have access – and to do so on a broad scale in order to prevent, detect and interdict malicious activities.

The sharing of currently trapped data will not occur until tools and services become affordable and widely available for data harmonization and interoperability; permissioning, anonymization and encryption; and data aggregation, analysis and visualization. If such tools become widely available and a significant amount of currently trapped data becomes shared, the resulting greater awareness of global systems will help enable companies to improve economic performance by identifying opportunities for improvements in critical economic flows. In addition, this same action will help improve security by making it easier to identify vulnerabilities and to spot anomalies. It also will help improve resilience by enabling companies and governments to isolate disturbances, avoid overreacting to disruptions, and restart operations more quickly after an event.

Finally, we assert that greater enterprise visibility can help partners and competitors identify mutually beneficial best practices. Upstream companies can be better equipped to provide warnings of supply shortages or other disruptions before they affect downstream partners. Downstream companies can provide early warnings about demand or delivery disruptions to those upstream. Companies can benefit from greater communication with government and law enforcement officials about intentional threats. Governments can augment counterterrorism efforts with more accessible commercial data while also providing a higher degree of protection for privacy and civil liberties than is currently the case. By freeing up trapped data and sharing greater volumes of information, companies and governments can take advantage of open-source techniques or “peer production” to drive innovation and help make global systems more efficient, resilient and secure.

Addressing the governance gap [In other words...Transforming society to cooperate with our total enslavement grid. By now the general population has woken up to the fact that we need their cooperation to do anything. We must provide Pavlovian behavioral modification systems to create total cooperation into our Fourth Reich that will use RFID and Bio-ID in place of the "Joo-Tattoo" we created for Hitler] – Governance is the collection of institutions, rules, standards, norms, decision rights, practices and processes that administer, coordinate and/or direct activity within a system or enterprise. Governance for global movement systems is the means by which a diverse and interdependent community of global stakeholders pursues improvements to the performance of global movement systems. Governance of those systems today is characterized by the lack of a coordinated approach that is necessary to address networked risk. We call this the “governance gap.” To bridge this gap, participants in the global movement systems need to embrace a more comprehensive set of factors to understand the actual risks, costs and benefits that accrue to an organization in a networked environment. Moreover, participants need a means by which to organize their efforts to address these risks, costs and benefits. Our research shows that organizations have successfully met the challenges of organizing efforts across national boundaries in the global movement system before – for example, for international maritime cargo and for the Internet. These success stories provide a model for establishing a new global movement system governance framework.

Therefore, we call for the creation of a Global Movement Management Organization (GMMO) based on key attributes of these models for success. We envision a new international entity to fill the governance gap that presently limits the effectiveness of international efforts. The GMMO can serve to bring together key stakeholders with a shared interest in strengthening global movement systems and provide an effective forum and process to enable cooperation among regional, national and sector-specific stakeholders.  The GMMO can leverage existing international organizations through dedicated and visionary leadership to facilitate three important activities. First, it can align security and resilience with commercial imperatives in global movement systems. Second, it can improve international cooperation and harmonization among public and private stakeholders to strengthen global movement systems. Third, it can integrate security and resilience in a deliberate effort to harmonize risk management activities globally and to enfranchise less developed economic actors through a number of incentivizing mechanisms, including grants, loans, services and training.

Furthermore, as we studied the role of people, technology and governance in the global movement system, several principles that support this GMMO approach emerged: aligning with market incentives, layering horizontal and vertical approaches to improve security, and placing useful information in the hands of front-line employees while helping to ensure that they have the training and authority to act. Improved information sharing will require greater standardization of technologies, tools and protocols. Privacy and other data protections must be addressed at the architecture and design layer. Finally, mechanisms and metrics to measure, assess and optimize policies and programs are required to help make efficiency, security and resilience initiatives work.

In summary, the performance, security and resilience of global movement systems have always been deeply intertwined. September 11 provided a catalyst to invest in security, but, too often, security initiatives have been viewed as being at odds with commerce. This paper supports the idea that commerce, security and resilience are mutually reinforcing objectives. Importantly, we propose a strategy that employs assets that we have, and the terrorists do not. These include large numbers of dedicated people, the better use of technology to unlock trapped commercial data and dramatically improve information sharing and the formation of international organizations to leverage the combined weight of governments, non- governmental organizations and corporations around the world. This strategy will help to counter theasymmetric risk posed by terrorists and manage the unpredictable consequences of unintentional disruptions. The ideas and recommendations in this paper – promoting intelligent immunity as a means to  manage 21st-century risk, applying a global movement management framework, strengthening human capital, making better use of technology and creating a new international governance organization – provide a starting point for stakeholders across virtually all sectors to help build more efficient, secure and resilient global movement systems. To request a complete copy of Global Movement Management, visit: ibm.com/government/gmm.

Endnotes

1 A public good is defined as a society-wide good such as national defense and environmental sustainability that is normally provided by governments by way of taxation since no market forces exist to provide public
goods. Additionally, it costs little or nothing for an extra individual to enjoy a public good while the costs of withholding that good or depriving any individual of it are high.

2 “The World Fact Book 2007,” section on United States of America, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2007. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/us.html. “The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, September 20, 2007, http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/BPDLogin?application=np

3 Poole, William. “Chinese Growth: A Source of U.S. Export Opportunities.” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 31 July, 2006. http://stlouisfed.org/news/speeches/2006/07_31_06.htm

4 Rai, Saritha. “India’s Outsourcing Industry Is Facing a Labor Shortage.” New York Times, February 16, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/16/business/worldbusiness/16cnd-INDIA.html?ex=129746000&en=5f012f3c9f224f72&ei=5088&partner=rssn

5 “Latin Business Index 2007.” Latin Business Chronicle. October 2007. http://www.latinbusinesschronicle.com

6 “The New Titans.” The Economist. September 14, 2006. http://www.economist.com/surveys/displaystory.cfm?story_id=787959

7 This is known as dynamic instability, a key component of chaos theory, which was discovered by physicist Henri Poincare in the early 20th century.

8 See, for example, Gleick, James. “Faster: The Acceleration of Just About Everything.” Pantheon, 199.

9 Piasecki, Bruce. “World Inc.” SourceBooks Inc, 2007.

10 Robb, John. “Brave New War: The Next Stage of Terrorism and the End of Globalization.” Wiley. 2007, p. 99.

11 In the United States, for example, the 9/11 attacks disrupted trade flows across the Canadian and Mexican borders, which soon resulted in the shutdown of much of Ford Motor Company’s manufacturing, as parts shortages halted the company’s near-just-in-time deliveries.

Table of Contents for Complete Version of “Global Movement Management: Commerce, Security, and Resilience in Today’s Networked World”

Acknowledgments

Foreword

Executive Summary

I. The Unique Character of Risk in the 21st Century
II. Intelligent Immunity: A New Approach to Address Global Risk
III. Applying a Global Movement Management Framework
IV. Strategic Human Capital: Baseline for Success
V. Technology to Enable Information Sharing
VI. Governance: A Coordinated Approach
VII. Moving Forward

About the Authors

Acronyms and Glossary of Key Terms

Appendix A. Global Movement Management Analysis of the Maritime Cargo Sector
Appendix B. Additional Detail on Maritime Security Programs
Appendix C. Direct and Indirect Benefits of Security Investments
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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Can IBM get in touch with UPS?

Offline Dig

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Here is the basic fact of the IBM Global Movement Management...

There is no way the American people or the world will cooperate with this total enslavement strategy without (as stated in the PNAC Bible) a "New Pearl Harbor".

IBM's 2005 document exposes the very fact that they plan on murdering thousands of people to help gain acceptance for this new Mein Kampf of the 21st century.

Why are they sponsoring Jane Lute and others at the Nazi Aspen Bullshitter's conference of genocidal demented psychopaths?

Why aren't they being indicted for crimes against humanity over the past 80 years?

Shit, Edwin Black has enough evidence on these psychos to initiate thousands of grand jury investigations.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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Statement by Jonah J. Czerwinski
Senior Fellow, Homeland Security, IBM Global Leadership Initiative
Managing Consultant, IBM Global Business Services

to the
Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection United States House of Representatives
for the hearing entitled
“Partnering with the Private Sector to Secure Critical Infrastructure:
Has the Department of Homeland Security Abandoned the Resilience-based Approach?”

May 14, 2008

http://homeland.house.gov/SiteDocuments/20080514143358-14814.pdf

Do you know what this guy is doing right now? HE IS IN CHARGE OF CONTROLLING AND ENSLAVING OUR MILLIONS OF VETERANS!!!!!!!!! I SHIT YOU NOT!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!



Jonah J. Czerwinski
Director, VA Innovation Initiative

http://www4.va.gov/VAI2/VAi2XAboutLeadership.asp
Jonah J. Czerwinski is Special Assistant to the Secretary of Veterans Affairs for Budget and Management, and directs the VA Innovation Initiative. He assists the Secretary on a range of strategy and policy issues regarding VA budget, management, and transformation. He advises senior VA leadership in identifying, articulating, and disseminating strategic guidance and management priorities.
Prior to joining VA, Mr. Czerwinski was Managing Consultant, Global Business Services at IBM, and was a Senior Fellow in IBM’s Global Leadership Initiative. Jonah also served as a Senior Advisor for the Center for the Study of the Presidency, a Senior Fellow at the Homeland Security Policy Institute of the George Washington University, and a member of the Board of Directors at the Partnership for a Secure America. Before joining government, he served on the Task Force on Leveraging National Laboratory S&T Assets for 21st Century Security. He is the co-author of “Global Movement Management: Strengthening Commerce, Security, and Resiliency In Today’s Networked World.” Mr. Czerwinski graduated magna cum laude from Salve Regina University (A.B., Philosophy), and earned his M.B.A. from the University of Virginia Darden Graduate School of Business.



THE ENTIRE INITIATIVE IS FILLED WITH NAZI PSYCHOPATHIC CYBERNETIC/PHARMACEUTICAL/BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION-CONTROL FREAKS!!! ALL THE INSANITY OCCURING TO OUR VETERANS WHO GET USED AND ABUSED UP AND DOWN THE CHAIN OF COMMAND CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THIS TOTALLY BACK ASSED INSANE INITIATIVE!!!!!!!!!!



VAi2 is a department-wide program that brings the most promising innovations to VA’s most important challenges to create visionary solutions in service to Veterans.

Mike O’Neill - Senior Advisor
[Cybernetic Marketeer, Venture Anti-Capitalist...and total psychopath to take on this role of enslaving our soldiers via profiteering via cybernetic enslavement. HIS MAIN JOB - GETTING AN IBM BRAIN CHIP IN EVERY US SOLDIER!]
As Senior Advisor to the Director of VAi2, Mike drives the operational aspects of the programs that make up the Innovation Initiative. Mr. O’Neill has been involved in the commercialization of new products and technology as an executive in both startups and large companies, and as an early stage venture capital investor. He was Senior Vice President of AMI Semiconductor’s Digital ASIC and Communications Products division, and continued to run the division following ON Semiconductor’s acquisition of AMI. At semiconductor startup Philsar Semiconductor, he served as Vice President of Sales, Marketing & Business Development through Philsar’s acquisition by Conexant Systems. Mr. O’Neill led a number of seed and early stage investments as a General Parter with Kodiak Venture Partners. He started his career in engineering and management positions with IBM. Mr. O’Neill received a Bachelor’s and Master’s degree in Electrical Engineering from Virginia Tech.

Thomas Gates - Deputy Director, VA Innovation Initiative
[He is an investment bankster who can get huge investments into funding this insane initiative of cybernetic fascism using our veterans as a Bilderberg experiment.]
Thomas Gates is a Presidential Management Fellow and Management Analyst in the Office of Policy and Planning, and works full-time on the VA Innovation Initiative.  Prior to joining Veterans Affairs, Mr. Gates was Assistant Secretary of Technology in Virginia.  His focus in Virginia was on Health Information Technology and improving performance and productivity in government operations.  In this role, he served as the Director of Virginia’s Productivity Investment Fund, a multi-million dollar program designed to fund innovative projects to lower costs and improve quality in state operations. Mr. Gates graduated with honors from the College of William and Mary (B.A., Government), and earned his Master’s in Public Policy from Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government.

Smitha Dante -Management Analyst
[She is the pharmaceutical fascist whose main job is to use our soldiers in illegal trials of the most insane depopulation and zombie creating vaccines, pills, food additives, etc.]
Smitha Dante is a Presidential Management Fellow and Management Analyst in the Veterans Health Administration, and she works full-time on the VA Innovation Initiative. Prior to joining the team, Ms. Dante completed her J.D. at the University of Virginia School of Law, where she conducted in-depth research into healthcare policy as part of her studies. She was also a member of the Editorial Board of the Virginia Journal of Law and Technology. Before beginning law school, Ms. Dante was a management consultant at ZS Associates. Her focus there was on the sales and marketing of pharmaceutical and biotechnology products in all stages of development. Ms. Dante graduated from Princeton University (A.B., Chemistry), and received a Master’s in Chemistry at UC Santa Barbara.

Matthew G. Robinson - Program Analyst
[His job is profiling of the veterans to put them into compartmentalized groups/lists, behavioral modification systems, and slave computation/logistics.]
Matt Robinson is a Program Analyst in the VA Office of Policy and Planning, and a full-time member of the VAi2 team. He graduated with honor from the Michigan State University Honors College (B.A., Political Science), and is currently pursuing his Master's in Public Policy at the George Washington University's Trachtenberg School. Before beginning his studies at GW, Mr. Robinson served as an AmeriCorps Volunteer in Service to America (VISTA) at the Helping Hand of Goodwill Industries in Kansas City, where he worked to develop a new Job Hunters' Program for individuals who are homeless, on probation/parole, or receiving public assistance.



MORE INFORMATION:

None of these people served or ever saw combat as far as I can see!

Also, Czerwinski was on the same Homeland Security Task Force with Major Hasan who was the only patsy blammed for the Fort Hood False Flag. Did this iniative have something to do with the Fort Hood False Flag?

http://www.veteranstoday.com/2009/11/09/terrorist-hasan-was-bush-homeland-security-advisor/
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Offline birther truther tenther

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All "cybersecurity" and "supply chain" roads lead to CSIS

One of the authors of these IBM documents is Daniel B. Prieto

http://csis.org/expert/daniel-b-prieto

Quote


Daniel B. Prieto
Senior Associate (Non-resident), Homeland Security & Counterterrorism Program

    *

      Daniel B. Prieto has worked for two decades in the private sector, academia, and government at the intersection of technology, public policy, and national and homeland security issues. He is currently vice president and practice leader for IBM’s Public Sector Strategy & Change consulting practice. He also leads IBM’s Global Leadership Initiative, which provides corporate development and thought leadership campaigns in the areas of homeland security, cybersecurity, "smarter government," and healthcare for IBM’s Public Sector Division.

      From 2007 to 2009, Mr. Prieto was project director for the Independent Task Force on Civil Liberties and National Security at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), where he also served as adjunct senior fellow for counterterrorism and national security. From 2002 to 2007, he held various fellowship appointments at CFR, Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and the George Washington University. Mr. Prieto was one of the first professional staff members on the Democratic Staff of the Select Committee on Homeland Security in the U.S. House of Representatives. He has served as senior adviser to the Commission on the National Guard and Reserve and on the Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. Prior to 9/11, he was an executive with AOL/Time Warner and an investment banker with J.P. Morgan. Mr. Prieto is the author, most recently, of the IBM white paper “Meeting the Cybersecurity Challenge: Empowering Stakeholders and Ensuring Coordination.” He is the author of War About Terror: Civil Liberties and National Security after 9/11 (CFR, 2009) and coauthor of Neglected Defense: Mobilizing the Private Sector to Support Homeland Security (CFR, 2006). He has testified before the U.S. Senate, and his commentary and analysis have appeared widely, including in the Atlantic Monthly, Baltimore Sun, Chicago Tribune, New Republic, Time, Wall Street Journal, and Washington Post, and on ABC, Al Jazeera, BBC, CNN, FOX, MSNBC, and NPR. Mr. Prieto is an honors graduate of Wesleyan University and the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the International Institute for Strategic Studies.




Independent Task Force on Civil Liberties and National Security (CFR)
http://www.cfr.org/project/1320/independent_task_force_on_civil_liberties_and_national_security.html

Quote
Independent Task Force on Civil Liberties and National Security
Staff:    
Daniel B. Prieto, Adjunct Senior Fellow for Counterterrorism and National Security
Chairs:    
Bob Kerrey, President, The New School
William H. Webster, Partner, Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP

November 21, 2006 - February 6, 2009

Chaired by former Nebraska Senator and Governor Bob Kerrey and former Director of the CIA and FBI William H. Webster, the Task Force will address how to maintain America's longstanding democratic traditions while protecting against real and serious threats. Council member Daniel B. Prieto, vice president for Homeland Security and Intelligence at IBM Corporation, will direct the project.

Comprised of roughly two dozen national security and human rights experts, the Task Force aims to craft a set of recommendations for the country's mid- to long-term national security policy, addressing a range of issues including congressional and judicial oversight, secrecy and the free exchange of information, and privacy in a world of increased surveillance.



“Meeting the Cybersecurity Challenge: Empowering Stakeholders and Ensuring Coordination.”

READ THE PDF HERE:
https://www-304.ibm.com/easyaccess3/fileserve?contentid=192188

Excerpt from PDF Page 12:
Quote
Implementing The New Model
This section sets forth three recommendations based on a public health and safety model for cybersecurity. The recommendations can advance the national cybersecurity agenda and can help the U.S. achieve a flexible and balanced approach to addressing cyber threats. They better allow the Federal Government’s national Cyber Coordinator to prioritize and focus attention on those threats that most clearly involve national security assets, threaten national and economic security, or threaten systemic risk.
The recommendations align with the Near-Term Action Plan presented in the Administration’s 2009 Cyberspace Policy Review. Notably, our recommendations can be implemented in relatively short order because they leverage existing organizations and structures. The recommendations do not require completely new federal structures, only better coordination and focus from what already exists.

• Recommendation 1. Create a national Cyber equivalent to the Centers for Disease Control (Cyber-CDC): Monitor, report, coordinate, and collaborate on cyber threats and trends, nationally and internationally.
• Recommendation 2. Create a national Cyber Federal Emergency Management Agency (Cyber-FEMA): Manage the response to cyber events of national significance.
• Recommendation 3. Create a Cyber National Response Framework (Cyber-NRF): Prevent, plan, and execute under clearly defined roles and responsibilities to address the full range of cyber threats.
[/size]



Related Discussion:
Topic: Microsoft/Government want power to "quarantine" any PC they feel is "sick"
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=188725.0

Offline birther truther tenther

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I went to hlswatch.com which was in Jonah's bio and pulled up all of the blogs on there either mentioning him or authored by him.  Read here:

http://www.hlswatch.com/index.php?s=Czerwinski


April 28, 2009
Stockton for Homeland Defense
Filed under: General Homeland Security — by Philip J. Palin on April 28, 2009

Paul Noble Stockton has been nominated by the President to serve as Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense and Americas’ Security Affairs).  Below I have copied the brief bio included in the White House announcement.

Readers of this blog will recall that Paul and I were announced as the co-contributors to succeed Jonah Czerwinski.  Shortly after that partnership was made public, Paul learned that he might be considered for a position in the administration.  For obvious reasons, Paul was never able to make a post, but has remained an avid reader of HLSwatch and, especially, the comments.

I have known Paul for many years.  He has had fabulous mentors.  His father was in the thick of Illinois politics, which as we have seen can be an effective  schoolhouse.  Paul’s political wisdom was well-nurtured by Senator Moynihan.  But I perceive Paul’s most important guide has been James Madison.  When you meet him, ask something about the Federalist Papers.  Dr. Stockton will bring to Homeland Defense a profound sense of the role of the States in the defense of the nation… and of liberty.

From the White House announcement:

Mr. Stockton is a senior research scholar at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He was formerly the associate provost at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and was the founding director of its Center for Homeland Defense and Security. His research focuses on how U.S. security institutions respond to changes in the threat (including the rise of terrorism), and the interaction of Congress and the Executive branch in restructuring national security budgets, policies and institutional arrangements. From 2000-2001, he founded and served as the acting dean of NPS’ School of International Graduate Studies. From 1995 until 2000, he served as director of NPS’ Center for Civil-Military Relations. From 1986-1989 Stockton served as legislative assistant to U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Stockton received a bachelor’s degree from Dartmouth College in 1976 and a doctorate in government from Harvard University in 1986.
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April 22, 2009
Jonah Czerwinski
Filed under: — by Philip J. Palin on April 22, 2009

Jonah Czerwinski is Managing Consultant, Global Business Services at IBM, working on homeland security policy issues, and is a Senior Fellow for Homeland Security in IBM’s Global Leadership Initiative. Jonah is also a Senior Advisor, Homeland Security Projects, for the Center for the Study of the Presidency and a 2007-2008 Senior Fellow at the Homeland Security Policy Institute of George Washington University.

Jonah serves as a member of the Board of Directors at the Partnership for a Secure America and serves on the Task Force on Leveraging National Laboratory S&T Assets for 21st Century Security under The Henry L. Stimson Center. He is the co-author of “Global Movement Management: Strengthening Commerce, Security, and Resiliency In Today’s Networked World.”

From 2003 to 2006, Jonah was Senior Research Associate and Director of Homeland Security Projects at the Center for the Study of the Presidency (CSP). He led the Center project on combating the smuggled nuclear threat, which worked across the Executive Branch in an effort that led to establishment of the national Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. He also served on the Council on Foreign Relations Study Group on Strategies for Defense Against Nuclear Terrorism. From 2001-2004, he directed the Center’s Homeland Security Roundtable, which regularly convened senior Homeland Security leadership of the Executive Branch and Congress with leaders of the think tank community, academia, and private sector to discuss critical Homeland Security issues.

Jonah led a Center project on strengthening the transatlantic relationship through NATO, which published Maximizing NATO in the War on Terror in May 2005. He also directed the Center’s working group on The U.S.-Canada Strategic Partnership in the War on Terrorism in 2002. He served as a member of the Taskforce for Examining the Roles, Mission, and Organization of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, which published its recommendations as DHS 2.0 (December 2004). In 2005, he was Senior Fellow at the Homeland Security Policy Institute of George Washington University and in 2004 was named a Manfred Woerner Fellow.

Jonah was a contributing writer to and research coordinator of the Center’s 2001 report on Comprehensive Strategic Reform. He was project coordinator and principal writer of Forward Strategic Empowerment: Synergies Between CINCs, the State Department, and Other Agencies, and assistant editor and contributor to In Harm’s Way: Intervention and Prevention.

Professional media appearances include interviews on CNN and CNN-International, in addition to interviews for The New York Times, Wall Street Journal, The National Journal, Los Angeles Times, Congressional Quarterly, National Defense, and other major news outlets. In addition to authoring, editing, or co-authoring a number of publications, Mr. Czerwinski has spoken at the Elliott School of International Affairs at the George Washington University, the Center for International Security Studies at the University of Maryland, and the Graduate School at Salve Regina University. He has testified before the U.S. Congress on efforts to combat the threat of smuggled nuclear weapons.

Prior to joining the Center in late 1999, Mr. Czerwinski was an analyst with the program in International Finance and Economic Policy and a research assistant to the CEO at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). He has served as a consultant to CSIS and as coordinator for the Trinity National Leadership Roundtable. He serves on the Advisory Council of the Salvation Army of Washington, DC, as chairman of the nominating committee. Mr. Czerwinski earned his undergraduate degree (A.B., Philosophy) from Salve Regina University and is a member of the Class of 2009 at the University of Virginia’s Darden Graduate School of Business.

Disclaimer
The comments by Jonah Czerwinski on this website are consistent with IBM’s guidelines on employee blogs. These posts reflect solely the personal views of the author and do not necessarily represent the views, positions, strategies or opinions of IBM and IBM management.
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February 24, 2009
Hello to HLSwatch
Filed under: General Homeland Security — by Philip J. Palin on February 24, 2009

On Monday Jonah Czerwinski announced he has asked us – Paul Stockton and Phil Palin - to contribute to HLSwatch on a sustained basis. That invitation is an honor and a significant responsibility. Under Jonah and his predecessor, Christian Beckner (who founded HLSwatch), this blog has provided a unique forum to identify and analyze new policy challenges. Sustaining that record of excellence will not be easy. We have two factors in our favor, however. First, and most important, we have you — the readers and fellow contributors to this blog — as partners. During our own years as readers of HLSwatch, we have learned a great deal from your postings and are counting on you to remain as active, and often feisty, colleagues in keeping the blog on the cutting edge. Our second advantage: there is no shortage of important new policy issues to address. Our own bias is that homeland security is very much a work in progress. Our gratitude goes out to those who serve on the front lines of homeland security in local, state and federal governments and in the private sector. Our commitment is to keep HLSwatch a valuable, provocative forum to support their work and to fuel broader debate over how homeland security should evolve in the years to come.
Permalink | | 3 Comments »
November 26, 2008
Chertoff, TSA Chief Hawley Convene Blogger Roundtable
Filed under: Aviation Security,Humor — by Jonah Czerwinski on November 26, 2008

On November 17, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff and TSA Administrator Kip Hawley convened the next blogger roundtable, this time at TSA Headquarters. Topics covered Secure Flight, general aviation security regulations, holiday security measures, technology investments, and other issues. This may have been the final roundtable Secretary Chertoff convenes with the bloggers. However, it was the first time HLSwatch.com was singled out by the Secretary for a recent post with which he took issue. After the usually round-the-table introductions, S1 said the following with a smile:

    Mr. Czerwinski: Jonah Czerwinski. Good to see you again, Mr. Secretary.

    Secretary Chertoff: By the way I’m going to call you out on one thing. So you disagree with my saying that when I do risk, I put the most weight on consequence? And you said, but on Wall Street they disagree with that. They think it’s more a matter of probability than consequence. I rest my case.

    Mr. Czerwinski: They may not be the people to watch–

    Secretary Chertoff: Right. It was my position on consequence, which I’ve articulated for a couple years now, is what I’ve now learned that in the trade they call it the fat tail. If you read Black Swan so it’s inside baseball.

    Mr. Czerwinski: I noted that, thank you.

    Secretary Chertoff: All right, shoot.

Sheesh. Chertoff was referring to my 29 OCT 08 post entitled Chertoff Addresses the Beta, in which I suggest that he described risk assessment in his speech to the Wharton School in such a way that could trigger extremes of excessive caution or excessive spending. I made the ill-timed analogy of how risk is assessed on Wall Street. Oops. The full roundtable transcript is available on the TSA blog.

Fortunately, we won a small victory after that playful jab at my criticism of the Secretary’s risk assessment formula. The roundtable concluded as follows:

    Secretary Chertoff: I have to say, people say, why do you do blogging? I’m not saying this to feed your egos. I said, I thought that by and large, in terms of focused, sustained, engaged, and knowledgeable questions, the bloggers who cover us regularly do a great job, and it is useful for me to get feedback because I actually do read these – I read the good ones, I don’t read the nutty ones – to get feedback about stuff that is working and not working, and I think that it is a great way for us to communicate, because we do get, you know, good questions come from a knowledge base. You guys do follow this stuff on a regular basis.

    Mr. Czerwinski: When you hand over the “Leadership Journal,” can we get you to guest blog at some point?

    Secretary Chertoff: Yeah, I probably will.

Fellow bloggers in attendance included:

Rich Cooper – Security Debrief

Barbara Peterson – Conde Nast Traveler & Daily Traveler

Matt Phillips – Wall Street Journal & The Middle Seat Terminal

Tom Smith – ACI-NA

Benet Wilson – Aviation Week & Towers and Tarmacs

Chad Wolf – Security Debrief

Have a great Thanksgiving everybody. I’ll keep up with developments and update HLSwatch.com over the long weekend if something is time sensitive. If, however, the next few days are as uneventful as I hope, I’ll see you on DEC 1.
Permalink | | 1 Comment »
November 14, 2008
DHS Cyber Security Plans, Progress, and Strategies for Success Subject of IBM Roundtable
Filed under: Cybersecurity — by Jonah Czerwinski on November 14, 2008

The new Administration will inherit a multi-billion dollar National Cyber Security Initiative with lead roles served by DHS and its component agencies, the Director of National Intelligence, and the Defense Department. In practice, all agencies will serve some role in reducing cyber-based threats. To address some of the governance and strategy issues in this context, the Center for the Study of the Presidency (CSP) and IBM’s Global Leadership Initiative today convene the next Homeland Security Roundtable on the topic of “DHS Cyber Security Plans, Progress, and Strategies for Success.”

Since 2001, CSP has convened senior leadership from the Executive Branch and leading minds from the policy community and private sector to address critical homeland security issues in an invitation-only, off-the-record setting. Today, I’ll facilitate this roundtable as I used to when I was at CSP as director of homeland security projects. A group of leading experts from the policy community and private sector will join me and our lead discussant, Mr. Andrew Cutts, director of cyber security policy at the Department of Homeland Security. Participants include:

• Steven Bucci, Cyber Lead, IBM Global Leadership Initiative, IBM Global Business Services, and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense – Homeland Defense

• Frank Cilluffo, Associate Vice President for Homeland Security and Director, Homeland Security Policy Institute, The George Washington University, and Former Special Assistant to the President for Homeland Security

• P.J. Crowley, Senior Fellow and Director of Homeland Security at the Center for American Progress, and former Special Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs, serving as Senior Director of Public Affairs for the National Security Council, and former Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

• Andrew Cutts, Director, Cyber Security Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security

• Jonah J. Czerwinski, Senior Fellow, Homeland Security, IBM Global Leadership Initiative, and Senior Adviser Homeland Security Projects, Center for the Study of the Presidency

• Bryna Dash, IBM Public Sector – DHS/NPPD

• W. Scott Gould, Partner and Vice President, IBM Global Business Services, , Public Sector , and former Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, former Assistant Secretary of Commerce

• Job Henning, Director, Political and Legal Affairs, Project on National Security Reform and Senior Fellow, Center for the Study of the Presidency

• Henry H. Horton, Associate Partner leading the Information Assurance and Strategic Initiatives, IBM Global Services, Public Sector, and former Federal Special Agent in Charge of a strategic counter-espionage and counter-terrorism organization, Director of Security for an Independent Federal agency.

• Daniel B. Prieto, Partner and Vice President, IBM Global Business Services, Public Sector

Mr. Cutts will provide a substantive overview of where the DHS efforts currently stand, what remains as defined goals, and areas that should receive better focus. This session will be held at the unclassified level and is not for attribution. All comments are off the record and so, unfortunately, I will not be posting here about the roundtable.
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June 26, 2008
Technology Task Force Presents 7 Recommendations to Chertoff
Filed under: Business of HLS,Organizational Issues,Technology for HLS — by Jonah Czerwinski on June 26, 2008

I’ve covered the work of the DHS Essential Technology Task Force here and here, and yesterday the ETTF reported out its final recommendations to the Secretary during the public portion of the HSAC’s bi-annual meeting with the Secretary.

The Secretary of Homeland Security tasked the Homeland Security Advisory Council with establishing an Essential Technologies Task Force (ETTF) to address the following questions:

• What are the legal, financial and operational issues that must be understood to assess whether and to what extent DHS should acquire various types of technology on a service or lease basis, rather than as a purchase/capital investment?

• What types of technology might be considered as candidates for different approaches?

• What types of financial arrangements would the private sector likely be prepared to accept, and how should DHS assess the pros and cons of each?

IBM’s Scott Gould and I were among those invited to testify before the Task Force. On the two occasions that I presented to them, my testimony focused on key attributes of successful technology acquisition from other parts of the USG, as well as opportunities for DHS to collaborate with international partners for joint technology development, the models for which reside at the EU, NATO, and elsewhere.

Both Scott and I made the point that without an overarching framework to guide a Department-wide acquisition strategy, little progress is likely. Scott actually recommended using the Global Movement Management framework as a model, which the Task Force chose to include as a specific example in their final report. That report described in detail the following seven top-level recommendations:

1. Build a high performance acquisitions and program management function implemented by capable staff.

2. Adopt a rigorous Department-wide requirements management process.

3. Develop a Department-wide acquisition strategy with a clear implementation plan.

4. Improve engagement with the private sector.

5. Manage innovation though a variety of approaches.

6. Use the regulatory and standards setting role of DHS to generate economies of scale across stakeholder domains.

7. Continue to advocate for the reduction of homeland security Congressional committees.

The Secretary stayed only to delivery praise to the Task Force and swear in three new members to the HSAC. He left before ETTF chairman George Vradenburg delivered his presentation on the Task Force’s findings. This is unfortunate. The ETTF is another example of how the HSAC is becoming a more focused and more useful advisory entity to the DHS leadership. Kudos to Chuck Adams and Amanda Rittenhouse for their tireless efforts over the last several months in leading the Task Force’s staff team.

Before he left, Chertoff charged the HSAC membership with one more task: “What are the ten tasks for the next Administration to take up and accomplish over its first year or two?”

It seemed odd to charge this group with something so trite. However, he explained, rightly, that it is important that efforts be made to preserve the institutional knowledge of the Department into and through its first ever Presidential transition.

I’d like to know what you think should make the top ten list. Comment below.
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May 15, 2008
House Homeland Subcommittee Sheds Light on Resilience
Filed under: Infrastructure Protection,Strategy — by Jonah Czerwinski on May 15, 2008

Yesterday the Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee held its hearing entitled “Partnering with the Private Sector to Secure Critical Infrastructure: Has the Department of Homeland Security Abandoned the Resilience-based Approach?”

I had the opportunity to testify along with DHS Assistant Secretary Bob Stephan, Bill Raisch of the International Center for Enterprise Preparedness at NYU, Dr. Kevin Stephens, Director of the New Orleans Health Department, and Shawn Johnson, Vice Chairman (soon-to-be chair), Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council. Dr. Stephens provided stark details about the state of the health system’s ability to manage another crisis in New Orleans, given the poor state of the infrastructure there nearly three years after Hurricane Katrina.

The 14th is part of a month of hearings the Homeland Security Committee is dedicating to resilience. Wednesday’s hearing focused on clarifying exactly how DHS views resilience as a priority in the overall strategy of the Department and on identifying ways that DHS can do better in working with the private sector to increase our resilience. Perhaps the best way to paraphrase everyone’s position would be as follows:

Chairwoman Jackson-Lee: Resilience should be part and parcel of the nation’s effort to protect the homeland. To do so requires that DHS effectively share threat information with the private sector, measure resilience (since protection can’t be measured: when is enough, enough?), and think creatively about the enterprise value to a company that invests in resilience. Citing the number of times we use the term resilience isn’t proof enough that action is being taken.

A/S Stephan: We already do resilience. It is mentioned ## times among our existing documents, such as the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP), the National Response Framework, and various sector specific documents. Through the NIPP, sector-specific plans are developed to accomplish the goal of security, resiliency, and preparedness. Moreover, the emphasis on resilience is a red herring generated by some in academia and think tanks to suggest that (a) DHS is misguided and (b) we ought to sacrifice efforts to prevent and protect in order to bounce back from likely fatal attacks.

Czerwinski: Resilience is more than the ability to “bounce back.” Measures to make the private sector more resilient must provide a “double bottom-line” that delivers both the ability to minimize the impacts of terrorism or natural disasters, but also the value of increased performance and improved commerce during the majority of the time when a threat isn’t present. Doing so requires connecting effectively across the sectors with a balanced approach to three key factors: strategic human capital, technology, and governance. Naturally, the framework offered in our paper on Global Movement Management would be a brilliant step forward.

Johnson: Nothing to see here. The Financial Services Sector has worked closely with the Treasury Department since long before 9/11 to manage an interdependent relationship among partners and competitors in this sector. DHS, through the FS-Sector Coordinating Council, works well in coordinating our efforts to be resilient, which for this sector means the ability to get business back online if ever a disruption were to interrupt our operations. I wouldn’t change a thing.

Raisch: If resilience is the goal, then a method to measure or assess progress is indispensable in order for businesses to determine if their investments in resilience are actually accomplishing anything and to be able to claim to stakeholders or possible adversaries that they are prepared to manage a crisis or disruption. Voluntary accrediting measures provided for in the 9/11 Act (H.R. 1) require the government to take the initiative “as a catalyst and investor in this process.”

Stephens: Help.

Main take-away is this: Resilience is still a complex concept that can be approached from a variety of different angles. DHS is doing a lot to make sure the private sector is prepared and protected, but more can be done through an overarching framework that recognizes the interdependencies among the different sectors and the ways in which the risks of the 21st century make those interdependencies more important than any specific sector. Incentivizing the private sector to take action can be done by embracing a broader definition of resilience to include some level of value that actually improves commerce during those times when no attack or disaster is taking place. Investments in security and performance can be mutually reinforcing, not just mutually exclusive.

The streamed recording is available at the Subcommittee’s website on the hearing.
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March 6, 2008
DHS Anniversary Prompts Wave of Judgement in CQ
Filed under: Strategy — by Jonah Czerwinski on March 6, 2008

CQ ran a story today commemorating the fifth anniversary of DHS by citing the roundtable Secretary Chertoff convened on Monday with about ten bloggers. At the roundtable, Chertoff outlined the Department’s goals over the next year and fielded questions on a range of topics. Details about this gathering are available here.  In follow-up, CQ Homeland Security’s editor invited more than two dozen experts in government, think tanks, and the private sector to comment (in about 200 words) on whether the creation of DHS was a good idea and, if you had the chance to do it all over again, what would you have done differently?

My response is listed second under the Academia and Think Tanks grouping.  Since its available by subscription, I’ll only excerpt my comments below.

All are worth a read, but I recommend reading the contributions from Clark Ervin (former DHS IG), P.J. Crowley, Scott Hastings (former US-VISIT CIO), James Lee Witt, Bennie Thompson, and Sec. Chertoff.

    Jonah Czerwinski, managing consultant for Global Business Services at IBM and a senior adviser on Homeland Security Projects at the Center for the Study of the Presidency

    “The stand-up of DHS has delivered both winners and losers during a tumultuous start challenged by self-inflicted wounds. The path forward requires a strategy that rebalances the homeland security mission with clear priorities and a new strategic framework.

    Some pre-existing organizations, like the Coast Guard, enjoyed heightened authorities and larger budgets due to the reorganization that created the Department of Homeland Security. Others, such as FEMA, suffered an “org” chart demotion with real consequences on peoples’ lives as seen in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Newly created entities, such as the Science and Technology Directorate, continue to struggle with the growing pains of integration and the battle for interagency legitimacy. A lot could have been done differently.

    Initial objections by the Bush administration to creating a unified Homeland Security Department gave in to a real-word political science experiment that Congress passed in the form of the Homeland Security Act of 2002. The lack of initial administration support for DHS slowed progress and forced DHS to fight unnecessary bureaucratic battles with the Pentagon and the intelligence community, not to mention new counterparts overseas.

    The department’s strategy to this day falls short of prioritizing its resources and investments around its uniquely difficult mission: combat significant threats while maintaining — even enhancing — daily operation of the economy and overall quality of life for all Americans and visitors. And don’t forget natural disasters. A framework that puts this entire mission into a workable perspective may be achieved by the forthcoming — and first ever — Quadrennial Homeland Security Review. Regardless, the next president inherits DHS with a responsibility to elevate this department’s stature, rationalize its White House coordinating entities, and craft a strategy sufficient to the task.”

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January 29, 2008
DHS Essential Technologies Task Force Meets Today
Filed under: Technology for HLS — by Jonah Czerwinski on January 29, 2008

Looking forward to writing up something on the SOTU from last night, but I have to run to this meeting of the Essential Technologies Task Force, under the Homeland Security Advisory Council.  The agenda follows and my remarks for the hearing are here.  Nothing profound, but the subject matter for this group is important: Find ways for DHS to better think about — and acquire — essential technologies.

March 8, 2007
House Science Hearing on DHS S&T
Filed under: Congress and HLS,Radiological & Nuclear Threats,Technology for HLS — by Jonah Czerwinski on March 8, 2007

Congressman David Wu, chairman of the House Science Committee‘s Subcommittee on Technology and Innovation, convened a hearing today on funding for homeland security R&D.  Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Vayl Oxford testified, along with Admiral Cohen, Under Secretary for Science and Technology at DHS.  I testified on the role of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, the applicability of risk assessments, and other items.  Jerry Epstein, Senior Fellow at CSIS, testified on the Department’s biosecurity investments.  And, from a first responder-as-user perspective, Marilyn Ward of the National Public Safety Telecommunications Council testified.

Fortunately, the hearing avoided the non-starter subject of whether DNDO should be consolidated into the S&T Directorate.  The whole reason it is separate is due the special nature of nuclear terrorism and nuc detection R&D.  The hearing focused instead on the importance of strategic level judgments about how to balance near-term needs to deploy technology solutions to the challenges of securing the homeland with long-term commitments to R&D that can lead to major leaps in capability down the road.

My statement focused on the nuclear challenge from a non-physicist perspective by introducing a different view of success factors for the DNDO, and the public sector in general.  There’s a certain amount of attention given to the use of a broader framework for gauging value in R&D investments in there, too, that makes use of an IBM model — Global Movement Management – developed originally by Scott Gould and Christian Beckner.  Full disclosure: I’m now on that project to generate the 2.0 iteration.  I’d welcome any reactions to my testimony, and you can view the statements offered by the other expert witnesses by clicking below.

Vayl Oxford testimony for 3-8-07 hearingÂ

Admiral Cohen testimony for 3-8-07 hearingÂ

Dr. Epstein testimont for 3-8-07 hearing

Ms. Ward’s testimony for 3-8-07 hearing

Czerwinski testimony for 3-8-07 hearing

Update 3/11/07: GovExec’s Winter Casey covered the hearing in this story.
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January 29, 2007
Tough Act to Follow
Filed under: Border Security,Congress and HLS,Technology for HLS — by Jonah Czerwinski on January 29, 2007

When Christian Beckner unplugged from Homeland Security Watch, which he created and led, he called on some of us to maintain the blog. His are big shoes to fill. My name is Jonah Czerwinski and I will be one of the many required to pick up where Christian left off. More about my background will follow shortly. In the meantime, on with the Watch:

House Homeland Chairman Outlines Committee Priorities

During a luncheon discussion today Congressman Bennie Thompson, Chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee, offered a glimpse of what will populate his Committee’s agenda for the 110th. Jointly hosted by the Homeland Security Policy Institute and The Aspen Institute , the luncheon was an opportunity for Chairman Thompson to introduce what he calls a “Real Deal for Homeland Security.” His prepared remarks can now be found on the Committee website, but there are some points he highlighted – and even added – during his delivery before a few dozen HLS wonks:

Mass transit. Chairman Thompson said to look for legislation next month aimed at strengthening mass transit security. In his remarks, he listed a few demands that legislation will likely include: vulnerability assessments, information sharing measures, and security training programs, among others.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita represent a failure that should never be repeated, he said, but they also revealed equities that need better Congressional support. He called out the National Guard and U.S. Coast Guard for special attention and suggested the two need better federal support. The USCG Deepwater Project must be fully funded. That was not in the prepared remarks.

FEMA reorganization is unfinished. Chairman Thompson characterized efforts to reorient FEMA as insufficient. The audience was given the impression that current plans fall short of a solution to prevent the kind of under-performance witnessed in the Gulf Coast.

Other aspects of the Department are due for “aggressive oversight.” The Chairman identified both the DHS Management and S&T Directorates as needing scrutiny in three areas: leadership, mission, and accounting. Both the House Homeland Security and House Science Committees are preparing for a hearing on S&T after the President’s budget is released next month.

The Chairman called out Biowatch by name. This is the program that deploys detectors to provide early warning of an intentionally introduced pathogen. According to today’s remarks, Biowatch can expect renewed scrutiny.

While it was not in his prepared remarks, Chairman Thomson pointed out during his comments the lack of screening for air cargo and suggested that his Committee would seek measures aimed providing some kind of visibility into the contents of cargo placed on passenger planes. He also noted that sea-borne cargo (“anything entering our ports”) must be subject to better screening. It was unclear if his call for transparency was intended to support 100% radiography screening of shipping container bound for the U.S. His prepared speech made no mention of ports or screening.

DHS contracting accountability made the list. The Chairman named both the Secure Border Initiative (SBI Net) and US-VISIT as likely targets of oversight. He directly questioned the use of a “border fence” to manage immigration and security needs.

“Secure Borders, Open Doors” Makes Progress, Sets Goals, Requests Input

That leads into another message today that Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary of State for Consular Affairs, circulated through an email to outline measures intended to improve visa processing under the joint State Department-DHS “Secure Borders, Open Doors” policy. Her message as I received it today (bold emphasis added, immaterial language snipped):

    January 29, 2007

    SUBJECT: A Message from Maura Harty, Assistant Secretary for Consular Affairs, regarding Improvements to U.S. Visa Processing

    The United States is one of the most open and engaged societies on Earth, maintaining vibrant family, commercial and educational links with peoples and countries across the globe. As a leader in the travel industry, you fully appreciate the national economic impact of international visitors. Foreign travelers contribute almost $105 billion annually to the American economy; international students account for an additional $13 billion.

    [...snip....]

    Our task is to vigilantly protect U.S. border security and at the same time to maintain America’s openness to legitimate travelers – a policy we call “Secure Borders, Open Doors.” Working closely with the international business and travel community, academic groups, and other stakeholders, we have introduced features designed to streamline visa processing. Recent improvements include:

    * An electronic visa application form, which reduces errors, eliminates duplicative data-entry, and so increases the number of applicants each office can interview daily;

    * All consular offices post their visa appointment wait times on-line, so travelers can plan accordingly;

    * We give scheduling and processing priority to students and urgent business travelers;

    * We have added 570 consular positions worldwide, and are transferring some positions to ensure that workloads are evenly distributed;

    * We are making significant investment in technology to speed processing and improve data sharing with other government agencies.

    I am pleased to say that these efforts have produced results. In Fiscal Year 2006, overall nonimmigrant visa issuance rose 8% over the previous year. Business/tourist visa issuance rose 12% worldwide, and student visa issuances were up 14%. Processing delays have been cut dramatically: 98% of qualified visa applicants are approved within two days of their visa interview. We have “turned the corner” and will continue our efforts in this positive direction.

    Meanwhile, visa demand is surging, especially in key emerging travel markets such as China, India and Brazil. Adding more staff and more resources are part of the answer; we are also piloting creative new approaches, leveraging technology and proven best business practices, to meet this challenge. Over the next two years we plan to introduce a variety of enhancements, including:

    * A start-to-finish all-electronic visa process;

    * A centralized visa appointment management system that will ensure that over 90% of requests for visa appointments can be handled within 30 business days;

    * Technological innovations including remote data collection and interview via digital videoconference.

    As we implement our plans, we genuinely welcome suggestions and comments from private sector stakeholders. At the same time, we depend on you and others in the private sector to help spread the word that the U.S. welcomes international visitors and that the visa application process is not a daunting ordeal, as it is sometimes still depicted in the press. News media are quick to report negative stories – many of which recycle complaints about problems that have long since been addressed and solved, or describe increasingly rare instances of long waits for visa approval.

    We believe our efforts are striking the right balance between security and openness. The Bureau of Consular Affairs is committed to working with the international business and travel community to maintain and enhance our welcome to legitimate travelers. I look forward to hearing your thoughts.

    Sincerely,

    Maura Harty
    Assistant Secretary
    Bureau for Consular Affairs
    Department of State
    Washington, DC

More To Come

My posts on Homeland Security Watch will focus on organizational challenges, WMD issues, international aspects of homeland security, and developments that relate to the homeland security marketspace. Expect me to veer from this pretty regularly if I can. I’ll also make an effort to share useful materials pertaining to these and other issue areas as often as possible.

Final Note: I join Christian in thanking all the readers of Homeland Security Watch. Please keep up with this site as I’ll be joined by other contributors posting regularly. And, naturally, your comments are always greatly valued.
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October 12, 2006
Heritage looks at international R&D for HLS
Filed under: International HLS,Technology for HLS — by Christian Beckner on October 12, 2006

The Heritage Foundation issued a report within the last week by James Carafano, Jonah Czerwinski, and Richard Weitz entitled “Homeland Security Technology, Global Partnerships, and Winning the Long War.” The report provides a solid overview of the current state of international homeland security R&D cooperation, and offers several recommendations about how the U.S. federal government can enhance this cooperation:

    * Leverage NATO, including its Security through Science and Partnership for Peace Trust Funds programs;
    * Apply lessons learned through the Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP);
    * Establish an online clearinghouse of homeland security technologies;
    * Apply export control regulations in a way that distinguishes more clearly between technologies that have a military purpose and those that have a homeland security and/or law enforcement purpose – and govern the latter by the Export Administration Regulation at the Dept. of Commerce.

For more on this topic, see this previous post on H.R. 4942, a bill in the House put forward this year that focused on this issue.
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December 24, 2005
About Homeland Security Watch
Filed under: — by Philip J. Palin on December 24, 2005

Homeland Security Watch is a blog that features breaking news, rigorous analysis, and informed commentary on the critical issues in homeland security today. It takes a cross-disciplinary approach to the subject of homeland security, spanning issues such as transportation security, preparedness and response, infrastructure protection, and border security. Its content is intended both for an expert-level policy audience as well as the broader general audience of people interested in homeland security. The blog is non-partisan and non-commercial.

Homeland Security Watch was founded by Christian Beckner in December 2005, and he was the primary contributor to the site until January 2007. In January 2007, Beckner handed it off to Jonah Czerwinski, who contributed to the site until February 2009, at which point in time it was passed off to new contributors including Phil Palin and Christopher Bellavita.



Offline birther truther tenther

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Essential Technology Task Force

DHS, Booz Allen, MITRE, GE, Carlyle Group, Civitas, and IBM all under one roof with no press allowed!!!


Here's the ETTF White Paper from DHS website
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/hsac_dhs_ettf_report_update.pdf

Quote
•Recommendation 1: Build a high performance acquisitions function implemented by capable staff.
•Recommendation 2: Adopt a rigorous Department-wide requirements management process.
•Recommendation 3: Develop a Department-wide acquisition strategy with a clear
implementation plan.
•Recommendation 4: Improve engagement with the private sector in the acquisitions
process.
•Recommendation 5: Manage innovation through a variety of approaches.
•Recommendation 6: Use the regulatory and standards setting role of DHS to generate economies of scale across markets.
•Recommendation 7: Continue to advocate for the reduction of Congressional committees overseeing DHS.




Offline Dig

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THE TRUE AL-QAEDA HAS BEEN EXPOSED!
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

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Re: EXPOSED: IBM's 2005 document shows they have most to gain from fake terror!
« Reply #13 on: November 02, 2010, 02:46:01 am »
Jonah J. Czerwinski
and a 2007 Senior Fellow at the Homeland Security Policy Institute of George Washington University.

Take a look at the "partnerships" of HSPI

http://www.gwumc.edu/hspi/about/partnerships.cfm

Northrop Gruman
BAE Systems
ICF
Raytheon
CSC
General Dynamics
IBM
ManTech
QinetiQ
The George Washington University

Outreach and Partnerships

HSPI’s work resonates with the public and across the policy spectrum. We have hosted Secretaries of Homeland Security Tom Ridge and Michael Chertoff on multiple occasions for major policy addresses. We regularly testify before Congressional committees and government commissions on topics such as after-action reforms following Hurricane Katrina. HSPI has also has presented reports on extremism and counter-radicalization efforts before the Senate and House Homeland Security Committees. These reports served as Congress’ framework for multiple oversight hearings in which government policymakers and international subject matter experts were asked to respond.

HSPI staff engage the policy community and public through various publications, speeches, and conference presentations, as well as through the media. We are a leading source of insight and analysis for a variety of national and international media outlets, including major newspapers and television networks.

HSPI is a founding member of the Consortium for Homeland Defense and Security in America, together with the Heritage Foundation, the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the U.S. Army War College, and co-hosts the annual Threats at our Threshold symposium. HSPI also co-hosted the 2009 Homeland Defense and Security Education Summit together with partners, including the Homeland Security and Defense Education Consortium Association (HSDECA).

Offline birther truther tenther

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Christian Beckner is ...you guessed it... another CSIS stooge:


http://www.hlswatch.com/beckner/
HLS Watch: Founder and Editor

Christian Beckner is the founder and editor of Homeland Security Watch. As of February 2007, he is no longer actively involved with the site.

Until January 2007, Beckner was a senior homeland security analyst in the Business Consulting Services division of IBM Corporation. Before joining IBM, he worked as a fellow in the Homeland Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), was a senior advisor to the Civitas Group LLC, and was a senior associate at the consulting firm The O'Gara Company. He holds an MBA and Master of Science in Foreign Service (MSFS) from Georgetown University, a BA from Stanford University, and is originally from Washington state.

Disclaimer

The posts by Christian Beckner on this website were written consistent with IBM’s guidelines on employee blogs. These posts solely reflected the personal views of the author and did not necessarily represent the views, positions, strategies or opinions of IBM and IBM management.


Beckner is a member of the neoconservative organization CENSA

Here is bio from that site
http://www.censa.net/membership-directory-B.asp

Christian Beckner 

Christian Beckner is Senior Homeland Security Analyst in IBM's Global Leadership Initiative, a think tank within the company's Business Consulting Services division, focusing his research on homeland security and intelligence issues.  Prior to joining IBM, he worked at the Center for Strategic and International Studies as a fellow in the CSIS Homeland Security Program and also project manager of the Center's Human Space Exploration Initiative .  While at CSIS, he was the lead author of a number of reports, including Untangling the Web, a report on congressional oversight of the Department of Homeland Security; The Still Untrodden Heights, a report on the future of human space exploration; and a report on U.S.-Japan Space Policy: A Framework for 21st Century Cooperation.  He worked as a senior advisor to The Civitas Group simultaneous with his employment at CSIS, co-authoring a number of research reports on the homeland security market.  Prior to joining CSIS, he was a senior associate at The O'Gara Company, a strategic advisory services firm in Washington, D.C.  While there, he coauthored a report entitled The Homeland Security Market: Corporate and Investment Strategies for the Domestic War against Terrorism, issued in May 2003.  Mr. Beckner holds a B.A. in international relations and English from Stanford University and both an M.S. in Foreign Service (MSFS) and an MBA from Georgetown University.

Offline birther truther tenther

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http://www.lhc.ca.gov/studies/184/emergprep06/CzerwinskiJan06.pdf
Jonah J. Czerwinski
Senior Research Associate and Director of Homeland Security Projects
Center for the Study of the Presidency
Testimony before the
State of California Little Hoover Commission
January 26, 2006

Commissioners, Distinguished Witnesses, and Members of the Public:

Thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today. The work of the Commission is invaluable, and the scope of your present inquiry reflects the urgency of the manner in which you pursue that work. I am here today to offer my observations of federal level decision-making processes as they bear on specific issues of interest to the Commission.  In particular, I was asked to comment on certain organizational aspects of a full range of emergency preparedness and homeland security responsibilities.  The State of California has taken significant initiative on its own to close the apparent readiness and preparedness gaps after September 11, 2001. At the expense of details pertaining to implementation, my written testimony seeks to offer specific observations and recommendations in response to your questions. My hope is that the following can serve as productive starting point for an exchange and I look forward to your questions.  Bolstering management flexibility. Evolving homeland security threats and emerging awareness of natural disaster risks require management flexibility in emergency preparedness. But public sector management is risk averse, poorly equipped to evolve with shifting needs and design for reliability rather than flexibility. How can the State bolster its management flexibility while ensuring reliability?

•   Institutionalize decision-making organizations with inherent cross-agency structure that reflect the complex mission of uncertain homeland security contingencies. The Interagency Incident Management Group (IIMG) model, while typically stood up at the federal level to engage during a crisis, could also serve a planning function during non-emergency periods. To the same extent that managing the response to terrorist attacks and natural disasters requires a robust interagency approach, so also do the strategic planning measures required to prepare for them. Replicating an IIMG-type model could allow for ongoing coordination at the State level across bureaucracies.

•   Eliminate unnecessary bureaucratic redundancy. Duplication and gaps are inevitable in a complex system. On the other hand, extreme efficiency obtained by eliminating all duplication tends to increase vulnerability to single point and catastrophic failures.  Certain types of redundancy are desirable to increase robustness with minimum impact on efficiency.

Organizing for decision-making. Traditional bureaucratic compartmentalization, by function or specialty, hampers efforts to integrate decision-making across departments.  What strategies should the State pursue to organize for effective decision-making for emergency preparedness, recognizing both the need for preparation and episodic disaster responses, as well as long-range prevention and recovery strategies?

•   Establish Joint Task Forces focused on large-scale emergencies. Joint homeland security taskforces at the Federal level coordinate roles and missions in developing, deploying, and managing an all hazards strategy. These integration mechanisms can be tailored to the State’s needs by knitting together new and legacy decision-making entities, as well as connecting up the local and state-level authorities. Moreover, planning and coordination task forces can be tailored to the demands of different scenarios and would match up with the National Incident Management System and adhere to the National Response Plan.

•   Coordinate within the State government to avoid duplication of effort and conflicting guidance. Authorities and responsibilities must be clear to state and local decisionmakers.  Whether from the Office of Homeland Security or the Office of Emergency Services, the trade-off between planning for terrorism or natural disasters is very real and should be informed by cross-agency consultation, but directed by the Governor’s office.

•   Hurricane Katrina was a perfect storm of inadequacies – infrastructure as well as leadership – that led to a cascading catastrophe. One possible lesson that other states can take away from that case, however, is that jurisdictional authorities peculiar to a state will inevitably impact the tempo and thoroughness of a response, especially where local assets are overwhelmed and response authority transfers to the state level or higher. That means that California’s implementation of the National Response Plan, for example, will depend greatly on the scenario as it unfolds in California.  Exercises emerge as the best option to test the threshold. Gaming the National Response Plan in California would demonstrate at what point on the scale of severity do local assets and authorities stop acting as emergency responders and start becoming victims themselves. These are some of the seams in the NRP and any state response plan that require the most attention. Variables along the way include the roles of the private sector, National Guard, and, in the case of California, the Office of Homeland Security and the Office of Emergency Services.

•   Surge capabilities must be a priority investment and must be tested. In major contingencies, surge means more than extra wards and hospital beds. It requires mobilizing and informing the public. Mitigating the impact of an attack already underway involves such complex and manpower-heavy operations as shelter-in-place, mass vaccinations, or mass evacuations. To undertake these missions, the State will have to build – in advance – a trained and equipped resource to lead the effort on the ground. What used to be a National Guard role must now be considered the domain of larger and, at present, less trained groups. State Defense Forces, Citizen Corps, Civil Air Patrol, the private sector, and other alternatives to an overstretched National Guard can provide a crucial civilian component to the State’s preparedness, in addition to the first responder community.

•   Crisis Communications is vital. It is important to consider how the state government, particularly California, should consider the implications of an attack on another part of the country. The likelihood of synchronized attacks on different high-value targets within the country is increasingly likely. California has itself been a terrorist target in the past. The crisis communications function between the public and local authorities immediately following an attack elsewhere will prove critical. Exercises can illustrate the gaps in this function state-wide, but it can also help determine how the public will react or fail to react (when decision-makers need them to). It also triggers the role of the private sector. Other countries, such as England, have law enforcement liaisons with major oil companies for just this reason. The energy sector is absolutely a critical node requiring priority attention in this sense.

•   State-wide, multi-level exercises can strengthen the relationships among policymakers, authorities, and operators/first responders. When tested in a comprehensive or “full scale” exercise, the first gap to emerge tends be among the authorities and between the levels of government. Identifying the crucial relationships that a response requires allows planners to build reinforced decisionmaking structures around them.

Integrating science, technology and innovation into policy. Advances in science and technology have greatly aided emergency preparedness and threat assessment capabilities. But the State has a weak record of integrating research and science into decision-making and adopting innovation. How can the State better integrate better science and research into its policy and practices? What models might guide California’s efforts to improve that integration?

•   Decision-makers must know and articulate the needs and problems California confronts. That may come from better integration of science policy with emergency preparedness policy. To increase the likelihood that research and development reflects the needs of the operators in the field, the federal Homeland Security leadership adopted the model of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office. The need was identified as inadequate defense against smuggled nuclear weapons. The solution was to marshal the minds of the national labs with the user community in a more systematic fashion. Among other things, the DNDO has an Interagency Coordination Council with representation by members from all interagency partners, such as the Departments of Energy, Justice, State, Defense, Transportation, and others to coordinate and de-conflict research priorities.

•   The Technical Support Working Group identifies, prioritizes, and coordinates interagency research and development requirements for combating terrorism. Since 1986, the TSWG has pursued homeland defense technologies by defining technical requirements from the user perspective across the Federal interagency. In doing so, TSWG seeks to maximize U.S. and foreign industry, academic institutions, government, and private labs. With shared oversight by the Departments of State and Defense, and supervisory roles by the FBI and Departments of Energy and Homeland Security, TSWG uses rapid prototyping and development with an investments strategy across the what it calls the “four pillars of combating terrorism”:

Antiterrorism – Defensive measures to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts.

Counterterrorism – Offensive measures to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism.  Intelligence Support – Collection and dissemination of terrorism-related information used to combat all forms of terrorism, including chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials or high-yield explosives.  Consequence Management – Preparation for and response to the effects of a terrorist attack.

A similar working group model could be created at the State level that would help inform the setting of emergency response policy based on current or potential technology capabilities. It would also help shape the priorities for the private sector as it understands the State’s objectives in terms of innovation needs, technology, and basic research.

Leveraging strengths of the private sector. California’s residents and businesses cannot rely on the public sector to respond to all hazards. How can the State leverage private sector expertise to bolster public sector preparedness, response, recovery, and prevention?

While my responses to some of the above questions involved specific options for leveraging private sector expertise, the use of exercises is worth revisiting here. The Commission is knowledgeable of the Congressionally-funded Full Scale Exercises called TOPOFF. Carried out every two years, these FSEs incorporate multi-state, and even international, dimensions. Authorities from the President through the local police and fire departments are engaged and tested. And the private sector is significant element in the overall execution.

Last year’s TOPOFF3, at a federal cost of $16 million, included the participation of 190 private sector entities. Almost 50 were from the commercial/industrial service, with 14 from consumable products. Six represented the public services sector, nearly 70 joined from the “structures and commercial facilities” sector, and about ten came from the transportation sector.

TOPOFF 3 illustrated how the private sector collects its own information that could be of use to emergency response decision-makers as it attempts to protect its own assets.  Response mechanisms must find ways to open the exchange of information between these parties in a way that avoids compromising industry competitiveness as much as possible.

Conversely, the DHS Taskforce on Preventing Attack with Weapons of Mass Effect heard a consistent complaint from private sector representatives that a government-driven demand for information from the private sector without adequate explanations of why certain information is needed and what the private sector could be using that information for had forced an unfair burden on industry. A demand for transparency on one part of the equation without sufficient reciprocal transparency, the Taskforce found, can lead to resistance at the very worst time: during a crisis.

By incorporating a strategic cross-section of the private sector, bolstering public sector preparedness, response, recovery, and prevention is a primary objective of these Full Scale Exercises. The next exercise will include a west coast scenario and the threat of a smuggled nuclear weapon. The event will surely demonstrate a severe effect on the shipping industry and Pacific coast sea ports, the energy industry, and the ability of the public and private sectors to work in unison during a catastrophic emergency. California so far has declined to participate in TOPOFF.

Thank you for your time this morning, and for your attention to these important issues. I am happy to answer any further questions.

Offline birther truther tenther

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Jonah J. Czerwinski shilling for Biometrics:


http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0906/091106tdpm1.htm

U.S. seeks improvements to sharing of security info
By Winter Casey National Journal's Technology Daily September 11, 2006


Since attacks in the United States five years ago Monday focused world attention on terrorism, the European Union has taken strides to help fight terrorism. However, the United States is currently in discussions with Europe on two information-sharing agreements.

According to Jarrod Agen, a spokesman from the U.S. Homeland Security Department, the United States currently is given passenger data of those traveling from the European Union 15 minutes after airplanes depart. The information includes basic information such as names and birthdates. The United States wants to get that information before take-off, he said.

Secondly, the United States is negotiating for improvements in the information the United States receives about the booking of tickets, as well as itinerary details. Currently, the U.S. is restricted on how much it can share the information and for how long it can be retained, Agen said.

The European Union has probably been the most productive in the field of biometrics, according to James Carafano, a Heritage Foundation homeland security scholar. The European Commission recently said that by June 2009, two fingerprints will be added to the microchips in biometrics-based passports.

Jonah Czerwinski, a homeland security director for the Center for the Study of the Presidency, said the "EU is moving farther than anyone else in developing passports with biometrics."

Biometrics in passports could help alleviate some concern related to an agreement on travel within the European Union and a U.S. program that waives the need for visas from people in friendly countries. Under EU rules, citizens in participating countries can move freely without being subject to internal border controls.

According to Czerwinski, more countries are moving to join the agreement, which he said has a "border security cost" but an "economic payoff."

The European Union has databases with people's security information, according to Telmo Baltazar, the EU counselor for justice and home affairs. "We can only afford to create this possibility by putting in place adequate security measures," Baltazar said. The union also is considering a full biometric-based entry-exist system similar to the US-VISIT program for tracking visitors.

Czerwinski said Europe must find a way that addresses a cultural issue that dates to World War II: people not wanting to show identification papers.


Visa reciprocity between the United States and Europe remains an issue. Americans traveling to all EU nations do not require visas, but citizens from 10 of the 25 EU nations must have visas for U.S. travel. "This creates a serious issue of a lack of full reciprocity," Baltazar said.

Biometrics could provide more faith in passports and result in the visa program becoming less of an issue, Czerwinski said.


The European Commission on Monday released a list of initiatives it has taken in the fight against terrorism, including a pending decision on electronic customs and a framework on security and safeguarding liberties.


Related Thread
"Identity Dominance"
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=187829.0

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Jonah Czerwinski penned an article in our "favorite" magazine.

SOURCE: http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/archive/2006/January/Pages/SB-With5473.aspx

Quote

With an Overstretched Military, U.S. Should Create 'Home Guard'
January 2006
By David Abshire and Jonah Czerwinski 




The United States holds an enormous stake in Iraq. Although initiated to counter a perceived terrorist threat, the U.S. presence in Iraq has in many ways made near-term gains in the war on terror more difficult and thrown America's homeland security into question. But a creative solution with roots reaching far back into American history may be the answer.

Today, the presence of coalition troops in Iraq provides terrorists with a virtually constant training ground to develop battleground experience. As when Mujahedeen battled the Soviets in Afghanistan 20 years ago, which spawned Al Qaeda's evolvement through the 1990s, Iraq today has itself become a "cause for Jihad."

In fact, Iraq has eclipsed Afghanistan as a terrorist seedbed. A recent CIA report suggests that the urban nature of the war in Iraq affords assailants opportunity to learn how to carry out assassinations, kidnappings, car bombings and other kinds of attacks that were never a staple of the fighting in Afghanistan during anti-Soviet campaigns.

Today, insurgents in Iraq average 90 attacks daily - the highest amount since Saddam Hussein was overthrown.

The length of engagement and nature of daily conflict provide rich propaganda for terrorist recruiters - especially al-Qaeda and its associates - to use in the all-important battle for hearts and minds among the youth of the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Europe.

The advent of the Internet ignited terrorist communications. The CIA's National Intelligence Council finds that terrorists are enabled to converse, train, and recruit through the Internet, and their threat will become "an eclectic array of groups, cells and individuals that do not need a stationary headquarters." According to a study by Gabriel Weimann, a professor at Israel's University of Haifa, terrorist websites have increased from around a dozen to 4,500 in the last four years.

The July bombings in London further bolster the notoriety of terrorist organizations. British engagement in Iraq was among several reasons cited by those claiming responsibility. This sort of propaganda upends the notion that by fighting terrorists in Iraq, we avoid facing them in the streets of New York, Atlanta or Los Angeles.

The stresses are internal, too. While America's military in Iraq struggles in this context, it is composed largely by an overstretched National Guard and Reserve Force. Repeat call-ups, extended tours, low recruitment and re-up rates, and poor supply reflect a massive crack in the system. The Army National Guard recruitment for 2005 missed its goal by more than 12,000 and the Army Reserve recruitment was off by more than 5,000. Moreover, troops at home are not fully equipped for homeland security scenarios because the inventories from non-deployed units are being sent overseas.

The original purpose of the Guard has transformed - so should its organization, supply, and support. If the military draft was the Achilles' heel to the Johnson war effort, the overextension of Reserves and National Guard may become ours today.

A home-front strategy is perhaps the most important aspect in a layered defense, regardless of how Iraq fares. President Bush should convene a group of bipartisan best minds to increase credibility with the public and Congress about the looming crisis in our military. Recognizing that we never anticipated and prepared for the new kind of warfare that came with 9/11, this bipartisan group will review home-front capabilities, mobilization, tactics and strategy. This bipartisan group should collaborate with the Commission on National Guard and Reserves, recently established by Congress.

Without waiting for the commission, however, the president should dramatically reinforce the National Guard.

This is not just a matter of changing policy and practices. The National Guard touches every community in the nation, their small businesses and families. A strengthening of the National Guard and Reserves should include their support groups, families, small businesses, the wounded, and the children and spouses left behind. An emergency grant from Congress matched with a review of existing laws and programs should provide better support structures, such as medical services to those most affected by deployed National Guard units.

The president also needs to make a call for national service. Doing so requires creating a voluntary, well equipped, well organized, congressionally funded and locally based corps. A non-expeditionary "Home Guard" is a strategic solution rooted in American history. Today's application should be composed of citizens from the community, who wear uniforms, train on weekends, and help prevent the chaos from a natural disaster or a weapon of mass effect. In the case of a terrorist attack or natural disaster, there would be an immediately deployable group of trained citizens from each community under control of the state governors ready to share the burden with the Red Cross, police, FEMA, local fire departments and National Guard.

A Home Guard would help mobilize the nation as we did during the Second World War. In some communities, where a percentage of first responders are in Iraq, such a trained force would help manage the shock following a terrorist attack or major natural disaster. Trained in the elements of security, engineering, civil affairs, and basic medicine, the Home Guard would recruit citizens already possessing these critical skills as well as individuals retiring out of the National Guard, active military and the Reserves. For the shorter term, enlistments in the National Guard could be followed by extended duty in the Home Guard. Citizens would have the opportunity to shift experience while retaining earned rank. Even more efficient would be the use of medically discharged or disabled veterans, who can still offer knowledge, skill and low-intensity service.

The untapped talent in the Civil Air Patrol and Coast Guard Auxiliary could serve as a starting point for building the Home Guard. Along our border, it would become a constructive outlet in place of ad hoc voluntary militia attempting to provide border protection in some states. Leaders drawn from their local communities would be trained in crisis communications and crowd control.

Hurricane Katrina proved the lynchpin role played by the National Guard and Reserve. The poor federal response underlines the need for a Home Guard. The aftermath also gives America some idea of the necessary preparation to react following an attack with a weapon of mass effect. This Home Guard would connect the first responders with the very people they serve. In fact, the Home Guard would become a highly organized group of newly recruited first responders

David Abshire is president of the Center for the Study of the Presidency in Washington, D.C. Jonah J. Czerwinski is senior research associate and director of homeland security projects at the Center for the Study of the Presidency.

Offline birther truther tenther

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http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1223557627643.shtm
Secretary Chertoff Hosts Blogger Roundtable on Cybersecurity
Release Date: October 8, 2008


Excerpt of Czerwinski
Quote
Moderator: If I could just ask you to maybe identify yourself before your first question.

Question: Okay. My name is Jonah Czerwinski. Great to see you again, Mr. Secretary. I’m from HLSWatch.com and delighted to be here. You had recently gotten the budget passed, and about $350 million in there for DHS cyber.

Secretary Chertoff: Right.

Question: Could you tell us a little bit about what that is going to go toward? Is it enough for this initial phase of it, and if it isn’t, what’s been put aside? What do you think we should look for down the road?

Secretary Chertoff: Obviously there’s a big piece that’s classified that’s not in our Department which I can’t talk about. From our standpoint in the next year, it is actually slightly more than we requested. And what we’re doing is we’re building the basic infrastructure. We are taking our Einstein 1.0, which is our current detection tool, we are now upgrading it to Einstein 2.0 and testing it out, and we’re going to be also -- we’re also in the process of looking at turning it from a passive detection to an active detection device, active meaning that we would have the ability to actually stop an attack as opposed to merely warn about an attack..

So the money gets spent on things like equipment, personnel. We’re recruiting -- I think we’ve got over 100 people in the pipeline that we’re trying to bring on, that’s programmers and people who can actually operate Einstein. Some of this will be necessary, for example, for additional space, you know, all the kind of prosaic things you need in order to expand capability -- leasing, you know, various utilities and things of that sort.

It will also enable us to kick in our share to support the Cyber Security Center, which we’re in the process of standing up. So I think that’s where the money is going to go. And what we’re looking to do in the first instance is get our control over the dot.gov domain. We are currently every --someone said to me every 45 days we are reducing by half and consolidating the number of Internet connections. So that is part of the process of getting control of the dot.gov once we’ve consolidated those Internet connections down from what started at as a thousand and we hope will be in the neighborhood of a hundred or two. It will be easy for us to then use Einstein 2.0 as a way of getting real time detection warning, which of course will be a big step forward from the current general model, which is after the fact, we find there’s an attack and then we tell people, you know, how to respond to it.

Question: So a quick follow-up on that if I could. There’s a mention you made of Einstein 3.0 even down the road, which would be shifting us even further down the spectrum from defense to offense.

Secretary Chertoff: No, it’s still defense. It’s like -- it’s just a blocking capability. In other words, right now -- what 2.0 does is if I know malicious code is coming in, it enables me to give a real time warning. Someone described it the other day to me; it’s like a traffic cop sitting on the highway seeing people speed and he can immediately call in and say someone with license plate XYZ is speeding, and give warning down there.

3.0 would allow the traffic cop to make the arrest right on the spot.

Question: Gotcha. Okay. So it would still be prompted by [inaudible]

Secretary Chertoff: Right.

Question: [inaudible] an act by somebody else?

Secretary Chertoff: Right. It would be based on -- it would be when you detected the attack, you would stop it cold.

Question: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Related threads
Disinformation: DHS Doesn't Want to Monitor Net, Chertoff Tells Bloggers
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=29666.0

Former DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff Says NSA’s Einstein 3 Is ‘Where We Have To
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=124941.0

False Flag Cyber Command Centers to terrorize 307 million Americans
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=173822.0


Offline birther truther tenther

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There's a repeated phrase throughout that PDF document: must be a government 'buzzword' du jour:

security and resilience

It appears 41 times in that PDF.

Jane Lute, speaking at the Aspen circle jerk, used that phrase repeatedly, in fact - cited that phrase in her definition of the mission of the Department of Homeland Security. IBM knows how to be synergistic with the facilitators of tyranny; they've got lots of experience. Bet they had the buzzwords all over their proposals for the tracking of Auschwitz prisoners too.

Run an ixquick.com search for "Security and Resilience" and you'll get 19 unique top-ten pages selected from at least 3,129,159 matching results. My God - they are all lemmings following their leaders. They fall over each other trying to use the 'right words'. A walk through the kiss-ass MIC companies can be started with that one search.





http://www.aspeninstitute.org/news/2010/06/16/aspen-security-forum-releases-its-2010-agenda


The Aspen Security Forum Releases its 2010 Agenda

Washington, DC, June 16, 2010 –– The Aspen Institute Homeland Security Program announces the release of its schedule for its first annual forum on homeland security and counterterrorism, the 2010 Aspen Security Forum, from June 28-30. The schedule will also be available on the forum website, aspensecurityforum.org.

Notable sessions include:

June 28

    * “Afghanistan/Pakistan: The National Security Challenge” – Admiral Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff will appear in conversation with David Sanger, chief Washington correspondent, The New York Times, at 6:00 p.m.

June 29

    * The Honorable Jane Holl Lute, deputy secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security will appear in conversation with Jeanne Meserve, CNN, at 9:00 a.m.

    * “Aviation Security” – a conversation among Congresswoman Jane Harman (D-CA); Christopher Bidwell, VP, Airport Council International; Erroll Southers, former nominee, TSA Administrator; Jim May, president and CEO, Air Transport Association, moderated by Thomas Frank, USA Today, at 10:00 a.m.

    * The Honorable Fran Townsend, former assistant to the president for homeland security and counterterrorism, will appear in conversation with Walter Isaacson, president and CEO of the Aspen Institute, at 12:45 p.m.

    * “Cyber Securty” – a conversation with Richard A. Clarke, former special advisor to the President for cyber security, moderated by David Ignatius, The Washington Post at 5:15 p.m, followed by a conversation with Clarke, Rod Beckstrom, former director, National Cybersecurity Center, US Department of Homeland Security, and Daniel Prieto, vice president and practice lead, public sector strategy & innovation, IBM.

    * “Terror in Mumbai” – the recent HBO film about the 2008 terror attacks in India will be screened and a panel of terrorism experts (namely, Steven Simon, The Council on Foreign Relations; Peter Bergen, CNN; and Paul Pillar, former senior CIA officer) will discuss those attacks' implications for security here at home. Moderated by Kimberly Dozier, AP, at 8:00 p.m. [INSERT: HAHAHA gimme a break!]

June 30

    * “The Terror Threat Picture and Counterterrorism Strategy” – a conversation with The Honorable Michael E. Leiter, director, National Counterterrorism Center, moderated by Michael Isikoff, NBC News, at 9:00 a.m.

    * “How Prepared are We for the Next 9/11?” – a conversation among former Senator Gary Hart, co-chair, "Hart-Rudman" US Commission on National Security/21st Century; Richard Ben-Veniste, former 9/11 Commission member; former Senator Jim Talent (R-MO), vice-chair, Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation and Terrorism; and Mati Kochavi, chairman, AGT International; moderated by Admiral Steve Abbot, former deputy director, White House Office of Homeland Security, at 1:00 p.m.

    * “The View from Abroad” – a panel featuring His Excellency Husain Haqqani, Pakistani Ambassador to the United States; Richard Barrett, coordinator, Al-Qaida/Taliban Monitoring Team, UN; Ambassador Henry Crumpton, former coordinator for counterterrorism, US Department of State; and moderated by Robert Siegel, NPR, at 2:30 p.m.

    * The Honorable Michael Chertoff, former Secretary of the US Department of Homeland Security, will be in conversation with Brian Ross, ABC News, at 7:30 p.m.

Additional topics discussed will include maritime security; border security; mass transit security; terrorism preparedness; intelligence; counterterrorism strategy; "soft targets" security; and critical infrastructure protection (with a particular emphasis on cyber-terror).

Day passes for the forum are now on sale and available through the website and include admission to all panels each day, as well as meals. Passes to the opening reception and conversation with Admiral Mullen are $60. Full day passes for June 29 and 30 are $450 per day.

Daily video highlights from the Security Forum will be posted at www.aspensecurityforum.org, and event updates will be featured at www.twitter.com/aspeninstitute and http://www.facebook.com/AspenInstitute. For more information on the Aspen Institute Homeland Security Program, please visit www.aspeninstitute.org/policy-work/homeland-security.

To apply for press credentials to the forum, please complete this form. For media questions, please contact Jennifer Myers at jennifer.myers@aspeninstitute.org or 202-736-2906. For general information about the forum, please contact Josh Diamonstein at josh.diamonstein@aspeninstitute.org or 202-736-2904. For sponsorship information, please contact Deborah Cunningham at deb.cunningham@aspeninstitute.org.  All sessions will be on the record.

Sponsors for the 2010 Aspen Security Forum to date are AGT International, Boeing, IBM, the Ford Foundation, and Northrop Grumman.

The Aspen Institute mission is twofold: to foster values-based leadership, encouraging individuals to reflect on the ideals and ideas that define a good society, and to provide a neutral and balanced venue for discussing and acting on critical issues. The Aspen Institute does this primarily in four ways: seminars, young-leader fellowships around the globe, policy programs, and public conferences and events. The Institute is based in Washington, DC; Aspen, Colorado; and on the Wye River on Maryland's Eastern Shore. It also has an international network of partners.

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Re: EXPOSED: IBM's 2005 document shows they have most to gain from fake terror!
« Reply #20 on: November 04, 2010, 08:00:40 pm »

Therefore, we call for the creation of a Global Movement Management Organization (GMMO) based on key attributes of these models for success.

 We envision a new international entity to fill the governance gap
that presently limits the effectiveness of international efforts.


The GMMO can serve to bring together key stakeholders with a shared interest in strengthening global movement systems and provide an effective forum and process to enable cooperation among regional, national and sector-specific stakeholders.
The GMMO can leverage existing international organizations through dedicated and visionary leadership to facilitate three important activities. First, it can align security and resilience with commercial imperatives in global movement systems. Second, it can improve international cooperation and harmonization among public and private stakeholders to strengthen global movement systems. Third, it can integrate security and resilience with a deliberate effort to connect screening and management systems globally and to enfranchise Tier 3 economic actors through a number of mechanisms, including grants, loans, services and training.


Coy bastards think we won't 'get it'. News flash: we got it. We won't stand for it either. Wow - do they underestimate the American people or what?? There are people I work with who have never said one word about what's going on politically - and lately several have been openly talking about these assholes and what they're up to. It is amazing to see. Wonderful to see. And it's just the beginning.
"He that would make his own liberty secure must guard even his enemy from oppression; for if he violates this duty he establishes a precedent that will reach to himself."

~ Thomas Paine, A Dissertation on the First Principles of Government, 1795

Offline birther truther tenther

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Retrieved from:
http://gwumc.gwu.edu/hspi/policy/CHDSA2006.pdf


Page PDF 85:

The Limits and Prospects of Military Analogies for Homeland Security:
Goldwater-Nichols and Network-Centric Warfare
Daniel B. Prieto
Senior Fellow, Global Leadership Initiative, IBM
Senior Fellow, The Reform Institute
Senior Advisor, Commission on the National Guard and Reserve
I. Introduction
Being in favor of coordination…has come to be like being against sin; everyone lines up on the right side of the question. In fact, coordination has become…a word which defies precise definition but sounds good and brings prestige to the user.
—Ray Cline, former Deputy Director, CIA
and Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
State Department
Since the attacks of 9/11, the United States has sought to strengthen its ability to prevent terrorist attacks and respond to high-consequence events affecting the U.S. homeland. Washington’s tactic of choice to improve counterterrorism and homeland security has been to reorganize the federal government. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created in 2003 to rationalize assets and centralize activities related to borders, domestic asset protection, preparedness and response, information integration and dissemination, and science and technology. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) was created to better coordinate the fragmented intelligence community Washington’s decision to turn to far-reaching reorganization in response to new national security challenges has significant historical precedent. The National Security Act of 1947 created the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to help the United States meet the security challenges it faced after World War II. It took another decade, however, to establish the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), deterrence and various other critical institutions and concepts to fight the Cold War effectively. For every step in the right direction, there were missteps, trial and error. It took another 39 years before Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act to foster “jointness” among the military services, something that Dwight Eisenhower had lobbied for both as a general and as President.
U.S. efforts to address homeland security and counterterrorism represent the most significant federal reorganization since 1947. But the “big bang” creation of both the DHS and DNI are not sufficient. Reorganization is only a step in refashioning government and society to meet the challenges of global terrorism and homeland security. The failures of Katrina demonstrated significant DHS shortcomings in preparedness, response and recovery. Bad intelligence on Iraq’s WMD, the slow progress of the intelligence community in retooling to meet terrorist threats, and the slow pace of information-sharing initiatives tell us more about what the DNI still needs to achieve than what it has accomplished.
To meet the demands of counterterrorism and homeland security, the goal of government reform and of new policies and programs is to:
Provide greater clarity of roles and missions; improve coordination among stakeholders;
Enhance the speed and decisiveness of decisionmaking; and Promote jointness of purpose within the federal government and between and among the federal government and non-federal actors.
It has become a popular shorthand to describe these aspirations by calling for a Goldwater-Nichols for the homeland. In the 9/11 Commission Report, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued that agencies should “give up some of their existing turf and authority in exchange for a stronger, faster, more efficient government wide joint effort.” Subsequently, he called for:
A Goldwater-Nichols process for the national security portions of the U.S. Government….The broader [U.S. Government] structure is still in the industrial age and it is not serving us well. It is time to consider…ways to reorganize both the executive and legislative branches, to put us on a more appropriate path for the 21st century. Only a broad, fundamental reorganization is likely to enable federal departments and agencies to function with the speed and agility the times demand.
General Peter Pace, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), similarly argued that the federal interagency process does a good job of presenting the president with options, but that “…once the president decides to do something, our government goes back to stovepipes for execution. Department of State does what they do, DoD does what we do, the Department of Treasury, etc.”
II. Goldwater-Nichols for What?
If Goldwater-Nichols has gained traction in the policy community as an analogy for improving homeland security coordination, it is worth examining what the shorthand implies. Does everyone mean the same thing? What are the limits of the analogy? If the analogy is incomplete or imprecise, what additional or alternative policies need to be pursued to foster “jointness” in U.S. homeland security efforts? To answer those questions, it is worth examining the Goldwater-Nichols Act itself. Goldwater-Nichols sought to improve coordination and effectiveness within the military chain of command and to improve the joint operating effectiveness of the four military service branches. The defense structure was streamlined and unified, and it became a requirement to align strategy and budgets. The major components of Goldwater-Nichols were to:
Strengthen civilian authority over the military by affirming the primacy of the Secretary of Defense and designating the JCS Chairman as the prime military advisor to the President, National Security Council (NSC) and Secretary of Defense;
Clarify the chain of command by creating Commanders in Chief (CINCs)/combatant commanders (COCOMs) with full operational authority and by removing the JCS from the chain of command;
Create a joint officer management system and joint training programs which tied an individual’s career advancement to rotations in billets outside of their own service branch;
Require the President to annually submit a national security strategy;
Require the Secretary and JCS chief to align strategy and missions against budgets and resources to ensure efficient use of resources; and
Seek to improve DoD management and administration.
The first two aspects of Goldwater-Nichols made the military chain of command more effective by delineating clear roles and responsibilities. It is in this area that Goldwater-Nichols is generally considered to have achieved the greatest success. It is important to keep in mind, however, that Goldwater-Nichols only had to deal with creating the chain of command for a limited set of actors: the civilian leadership of the Pentagon, the Joint Chiefs, and the Service branches. Homeland security, on the other hand, involves a far greater number of entities with diverse missions and capabilities. The number and nature of players is far more diverse than what Goldwater-Nichols faced in the military context.
The Department of Homeland Security was created by the combination and reorganization of more than 170,000 employees in twenty-two separate agencies that were formerly in the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Defense, Energy, Health and Human Services, Justice, Transportation, and Treasury, among others. Beyond DHS, and across the federal government, two dozen federal agencies and the military are designated to provide essential support functions for various homeland security scenarios.10 Outside of the federal government, there are “millions of State and local officials, of which approximately two million are firefighters, police officers, public health officials, [and] EMS professionals who are available to not only respond to events within their jurisdiction, but also respond to events across the country [based on] interstate mutual aid agreements. This “force” of state and local civilian personnel is comparable to the size of the U.S. military.”11 A homeland-security equivalent of Goldwater-Nichols, therefore, would need to attempt to promote jointness at a myriad of levels:
Within DHS
Across the federal government
Among civilian agencies (non intelligence, non-defense)
Among members of the intelligence community
Between the U.S. military and federal civilian agencies
Between federal and non-federal entities
State and local officials
The private sector
NGOs
III. Goldwater-Nichols and the Homeland Security Chain of Command
Goldwater-Nichols established very, very clear lines of command authority and responsibilities for subordinate commanders, and that meant a much more effective fighting force.12
—General Norman Schwarzkopf
Commander in Chief of CENTCOM
during Desert Storm
A Goldwater-Nichols-like approach to homeland security suggests that a similar opportunity exists to clarify roles and create unified authority within a streamlined homeland security chain of command. Unfortunately, creating a homeland security line of command that matches the clarity of the DoD/military chain of command is probably not feasible. The diverse set of actors and the complex relationships involved in homeland security make the pursuit of jointness a far greater challenge than was faced with Goldwater-Nichols.
The National Response Plan (NRP), required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, provided a blueprint for responding to national emergencies and to coordinate the response of various local, state, and federal agencies to natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and other high-consequence events.13 Like Goldwater-Nichols for the military, the NRP sought to delineate roles and responsibilities for homeland security and to lay out a definitive chain of command. According to the NRP, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security holds ultimate responsibility for coordinating all aspects of the federal response to an event of national significance. The NRP indicates that the Secretary can designate a Principal Field Officer (PFO) from any federal agency to act as his representative to coordinate overall federal incident management and ensure seamless integration of federal activities in coordination with state, local, tribal entities, media, non-governmental organizations and the private sector.
As well, the NRP directs the Secretary to assign a Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) to manage and direct federal assets on the ground at the disaster site.
In effect, the NRP lays out a homeland security chain of command similar to that laid out for the military under Goldwater-Nichols. The Secretary of Homeland Security, or the PFO acting as the Secretary’s proxy, plays an equivalent role to the Secretary of Defense, providing civilian leadership for the overall chain of command. The FCO acts as a theater commander and takes on a role similar to that of the CINCs. As well, the NRP borrows a page from Goldwater-Nichols by safeguarding the CINC-like operational prerogatives of FCO by making it clear that the PFO “does not direct or replace the incident command structure established at the incident.”14
The easy comparisons between the Goldwater-Nichols chain of command and the NRP’s chain of command end here. The homeland security apparatus is simply not the military. The distributed nature of homeland security assets and actors; the divide between federal and state, local, and private-sector entities; and the unique standalone role of the military prevent federal homeland security officials from having decisive command-and-control authority over assets and actors involved in the homeland security mission.
This fragmentation is evident in the responsibilities that the NRP holds separate from the senior homeland security official/PFO. According to these “carve outs,” the DHS Secretary/PFO does not have “directive authority” over the Senior Federal Law Enforcement Officer (SFLEO),15, 16 does not have authority over the state and local incident command structure or other federal and state officials, and “other federal incident management officials retain their authorities as defined in existing statutes and directives.” As well, military assets remain within their own chain of command reporting to the Secretary of Defense and the President.
Similarly, the homeland security FCO role is far weaker than that of the CINC. The FCO does not have authority over federal law enforcement assets (which are directed by the Department of Justice [DoJ]), military assets (which remain under DoD control), or non-federal actors including state, local, tribal and private-sector entities.
The carve-outs in the NRP mean that senior homeland security officials lack control over significant homeland security assets and capabilities: in effect, “you’re in charge of everything, except for the things that you’re not in charge of.” This falls far short of the decisive authority granted to the Secretary of Defense and the CINCs under Goldwater-Nichols.
Herding Cats: Katrina and the Challenge of Coordination
The limitations of the NRP, the lack of definitive chain of command, and the difficulty of coordinating homeland security activities among myriad homeland security actors was in clear evidence during the response to Hurricane Katrina. A number of specific examples of coordination problems between various homeland security actors provides a better understanding of the complexity of the problem.17
DHS and DoD. Congressional investigations into Hurricane Katrina18 examined coordination problems between DHS and the DoD. In one example, DHS officials conveyed a request from Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff seeking updated information on the New Orleans levees, the status of shelters, and DoD search-and-rescue missions. A response email from the Office of the Secretary of Defense expressed confusion as to why DHS was seeking such information, as the Federal Emergency Management Administration (FEMA, which became part of DHS after DHS’ creation) had not yet even generated requests for these missions for DoD. While DoD and FEMA eventually resolved their conflict and worked out a system to streamline communications and requests for aid, initial coordination between the two agencies was poor.
DHS and DoJ. In the original NRP, the DoJ and DHS jointly share responsibility for providing federal support to state and local security and public-safety officials. After Katrina, local authorities were overwhelmed with rescue missions and desperately needed federal assistance to back up state and local police. A senior Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) officer from DHS and the FBI Special Agent in Charge acted jointly as the SFLEO on the ground. Overlapping responsibility and bureaucratic rivalry between DHS and the FBI/DoJ hampered coordination and delayed response. Eventually, the FBI/DoJ took sole control as the SFLEO. When the NRP was revised in May 2006, DoJ was made the sole lead agency for providing federal law enforcement support to state and local officials.19
Federal and State. Significant coordination issues arose between the federal government and the affected states.20 All aid requests from Louisiana to the military had to pass through FEMA before going to DoD. Exasperated Louisiana officials eventually abandoned the cumbersome process and submitted requests directly to DoD. Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC). In the first days after Hurricane Katrina, the HSOC failed to report the levees had broken, even after the National Weather Service had reported the breaches many hours earlier. HSOC leadership repeatedly mistook the New Orleans convention center and the Superdome for the same building, which led to mistakes in estimating the number of people in need of relief and evacuation. The HSOC repeatedly delayed or prevented accurate information reaching more senior decision makers because it refused to trust valuable information that originated from outside of its chain of command and preferred channels.
Federal and Private Sector. Soon after Katrina hit, Wal-Mart called DHS to report looting at one of its stores in New Orleans. A creative DHS employee turned the situation into an opportunity to get Wal-Mart to agree to provide water and other necessary supplies for victims of the hurricane and flooding. In addition, he challenged the company to find a way to track all supplies even though the computer systems were down. DHS would reimburse Wal-Mart later for the costs of whatever it provided. Eventually, the employee was chastised by DHS superiors for circumventing normal procurement channels, and DHS quietly paid Wal-Mart $300,000 to end the contract.21
During Hurricane Katrina, the federal government launched the National Emergency Resource Registry, an online resource to allow companies to offer or contribute goods and services for relief efforts. Nearly 80,000 pledges and donations came in, but DHS acted on fewer than ten percent of the pledges.22 Due to poor communication between the government and the private sector, goodwill either choked the system with unnecessary items or failed to provide what was needed. DHS’ web site did not specify what items were needed for collection. No one, for example, foresaw the immense need for diapers and baby formula.
The diverse set of actors and the complex relationships involved in homeland security make the pursuit of jointness a greater challenge than was faced with Goldwater-Nichols. As such, there are clear limits to the Goldwater-Nichols analogy, and it will only go so far in indicating legislative, policy, organizational, and programmatic fixes for homeland security jointness and coordination. To the extent that the Goldwater-Nichols analogy falls short, it is worth identifying where the analogy is most problematic as well as examining alternative approaches to foster jointness.
Post Katrina: The Limits of an Organizational Fix
DHS and Congress pursued changes to the NRP, FEMA, and the use of the military in a domestic context in an attempt to address some of the chain-of-command problems encountered after Katrina.
Changes to the NRP. After Katrina, criticism of the NRP was widespread. The Office of the Vice President described the plan as an “acronym-heavy document...not easily accessible to the first-time user.”23 Paul McHale, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, argued that, “We have to bring that high-level document down to a more practical level.”24 After Katrina, the NRP was changed to make it clearer and eliminate some of the confusion that arose during Katrina. To address confusion between DHS and DoJ regarding law enforcement activities, the revised NRP designated DoJ as the primary coordinator for law enforcement support functions. The revised NRP also sought to clarify confusion about the respective roles of the PFO and FCO.25 Changes to FEMA. Congress used the 2007 Homeland Security Appropriations Act to legislate changes to the role of FEMA. One change directs the FEMA administrator to serve as the principal advisor to the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Homeland Security on matters of emergency management. The legislative language is almost identical to provisions in the Goldwater-Nichols Act that set forth the role of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in the military command structure.26 In general, this is a beneficial change that adds greater clarity to roles and responsibilities within the homeland security command structure. At the same time, another change allows the President to temporarily elevate the FEMA administrator to the level of a Cabinet official.27 This provision has the potential to confuse matters. If the FEMA administrator were elevated to a Cabinet level position, what would it mean for the authorities of the Secretary of Homeland Security and for the PFO/FCO structure? While the law made sure to reiterate that the FEMA administrator reports to the Secretary of Homeland Security, and that the authority of the Secretary within the President’s cabinet remains unchanged, Congress appears to have opened the door for future uncertainty and confusion in the homeland security chain of command.
The implications of the changes to FEMA are unclear. On the one hand, the change seems to imply a role for FEMA similar to that of the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Goldwater-Nichols, as a “principal advisor” to the White House and the Secretary. At the same time, does FEMA’s increased access to the White House and potential to serve in a cabinet capacity potentially undermine the roles of the Secretary, PFO and FCO, as set forth in the NRP? Do the changes to FEMA add confusion to the already imperfect homeland security chain of command?

Changes to the Domestic Use of the Military.
 DoD is clearly indispensable when it comes to homeland security. In the midst of a disaster, the public, the media and the government expect the military to take action. DoD’s essential role is reflected in the fact that it is the only federal department that the NRP views as providing essential support functions in all fifteen of its national emergency scenarios.
The role of the DoD in homeland security missions is governed by several important conditions. First, DoD envisions its role as constrained to providing support to civil authorities for emergency management operations during incidents of national significance. The limits on DoD to act within the United States stem from a long legal tradition. The Posse Comitatus Act (PCA) of 1878 generally prohibits the military from acting in a law enforcement capacity within the United States. As well, the Insurrection Act seeks to limit the powers of the Federal government to use the military for law enforcement.
Specific exceptions to these constraints include the National Guard, which is allowed to act in a law enforcement capacity while acting under Title 32 or State Active Duty status. As well, the Army can act under Title 10 to provide law enforcement support so long as authorities at the State level have explicitly requested such support.29 The Coast Guard is also exempt from the PCA.
In any event, military assets under U.S. Northern Command can only be utilized when directed by the President or Secretary of Defense. As such, they exist in a command structure parallel to and supporting, but not within, the homeland security chain of command established by the NRP.
This arrangement proved successful on some fronts and problematic in others during Katrina.
DoD’s deployment of 50,000 National Guard members and 22,000 Title 10 active duty military personnel was the largest and fastest civil support mission ever in the United States.30 During Hurricane Katrina, the Coast Guard and the National Guard operated successfully under Title 32 status. National Guard forces represented more than 70% of the military force for Hurricane Katrina, reinforcing the NRP’s designation of the National Guard as the military’s first responders to a domestic crisis.31 The Coast Guard’s flexible, mission-driven approach, ability to work well with other agencies, and history of operating in a domestic context contributed to their effectiveness during Katrina.32
Nonetheless, Assistant Secretary of Defense McHale admitted that the active-duty military and guard and reserve contingents were not well integrated and not as mutually reinforcing as they should have been. He also conceded that many of the search-and-rescue missions were not executed efficiently, leading to cases where more than one helicopter showed up at the same site. McHale noted that the National Guard needed better interoperability communications and that first responders should communicate seamlessly with the Guard and active duty military forces.
One of the most significant problems faced during Katrina was the trigger mechanism by which military assets are activated in support of homeland security efforts. Much has been made of the critical delay by state officials in invoking federal assistance and how that contributed to delays in rescue and relief missions.34 The White House and Homeland Security officials were under extreme pressure to get control of the situation, but when the President asked the governors of Louisiana and Mississippi to cede their National Guard troops to federal control, both governors refused.35
In response to the conflict between state and federal officials over control of National Guard assets, the 109th Congress modified the Insurrection Act to give the President greater authority to use troops domestically.36, 37 Section 1076 of the 2007 Defense Authorization Act gives the President the authority to deploy troops in the event of a rebellion or during disasters when state authorities are overwhelmed and incapable of maintaining public order.38 In those circumstances, the President does not have to wait for the state to grant permission to bring in federal troops or to take control of the National Guard.
The military chain of command model, in which the Secretary of Defense and the CINCs have clear and decisive authority over all relevant defense assets, is not readily portable to the homeland security bureaucracy and can not account for military and non-federal assets that will not subordinate themselves to a homeland security chain of command. The lack of a unifying authority makes homeland security distinct from the military.
Going forward, homeland security officials will need to continue to find ways to better coordinate with the military chain of command and military assets. DoD itself will need to continue to clarify its roles and capabilities when it acts in a civil support capacity. As well, the mechanisms by which military assets are utilized by state and local officials, used to support federal homeland security activities, and mobilized by the President for domestic purposes need to be further examined and refined.
IV. Other Goldwater-Nichols Components
Training and Strategic Planning and Budgets
Lacking an easy organizational fix for homeland security, it is essential to focus on measures that can increase the likelihood of efficient collaboration and cooperation. Strengthened “joint-service” training and rotations make sense for homeland security as they proved successful under Goldwater-Nichols.
Human Capital, Training and Rotations
Goldwater-Nichols created a joint officer management system, which included joint training programs and linked individual career advancement to rotations outside of their home organizations. The benefits to homeland security of improved and joint training, out-of-service rotations, and career incentives have been widely acknowledged. The Homeland Security Appropriations Act of 2007 sought to promote jointness by providing career incentives for individual homeland security personnel:
The Rotation Program established by the Secretary shall provide middle and senior level employees in the Department the opportunity to broaden their knowledge through exposure to other components of the Department; expand the knowledge base of the Department by providing for rotational assignments of employees to other components; build professional relationships and contacts among the employees in the Department; invigorate the workforce with exciting and professionally rewarding opportunities.39
Similarly, other reforms have sought to improve training and create jointness among intelligence professionals, which is essential for counterterrorism and homeland security purposes. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) requires the ODNI to establish professional intelligence training and to review and revise the curriculum for such training. Additionally, the IRTPA requires the ODNI to provide for the cross-disciplinary education and training of intelligence community personnel, with a particular focus on establishing cross-disciplinary education and joint training.40
In practice, joint operating and training efforts for counterterrorism and homeland security are occurring at a number of levels. The FBI’s more than 100 Joint Terrorism Task Forces combine federal and local law enforcement professionals to work side by side in shared field offices. The Joint Forces Terrorist Training Center is being developed to combine federal, state, and local first responders to train together to prevent terrorist attacks. In addition, there are 26 Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) Groups modeled after initiatives by the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department. The TEW Group was started to analyze trends for potential terrorist attacks within Los Angeles but have now been expanded nationwide. These kinds of joint activities are critical to ensure that state and local officials are working together to gather information from a wide array of sources.41, 42
Within DHS, training and rotation programs face a number of challenges. Chief among them is the difficulty of creating a stable cadre of career homeland security professionals at a time when DHS, as an organization, is suffering significant integration problems stemming from its creation. DHS continues to suffer retention issues, culture and morale problems,43 heavy reliance on outside contractors and detailees,44 shortages of career professionals, and recruiting challenges.45
Looking forward, homeland security rotation and joint training programs should be expanded to increasingly include non-DHS agencies involved in homeland security. Programs should regularly provide rotations at other agencies with significant homeland security roles and responsibilities, including Departments of State, Energy, Justice, Defense, Health and Human Services, and the intelligence community, among others.46 As well, joint training and rotations should be expanded to increasingly allow temporary personnel exchanges and joint training with state and local offices, the private sector and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Strategy and Budgets
Goldwater-Nichols required DoD to increase its focus on strategic planning. Specifically, it required that the President annually submit to Congress a comprehensive report on U.S. national security strategy. The requirement was augmented and refined over the years with the establishment of the Future Years Defense Program (FYDP)47 and with the Quadrennial Defense Review in 1996.48
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 requires the DHS to prepare a Future Years Homeland Security Program similar to DoD’s FYDP. Congress amended the Homeland Security Act with the Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act of 200449 to make more specific the requirements on DHS to develop long-term strategies, establish priorities, and tie strategies and plans to budgets and resources.
DHS’ ability to deliver robust strategies, plans and budgets remains very much a work in progress. We continue to lack a sensible long-term homeland security planning process as well as the ability to measure the performance and efficacy of homeland security programs against objective benchmarks. Congress has yet to require DHS to undertake periodic strategic reviews50 similar to the Quadrennial Defense Review required of the DoD.
Currently, defense planning documents treat homeland security as an afterthought: “They are treated, if at all, as separate line items buried deep within the budget.”51 Nor is there mechanism to assess how DoD and DHS fit together in the overall national security equation.52 Congress should require DHS to conduct quadrennial reviews to assess homeland security risks, strategies, structures, resources, and effectiveness, as well as associated planning budgets.53
V. Beyond Goldwater-Nichols: Network-Centric Homeland Security
The tension between centralization/hierarchy and flattening and empowering distributed nodes in an organization is age-old. It has posed a dilemma ever since the advent of modern organizational and management theory. The problem is well known: Unity of command can lead to excessive chains of authority which hinder communication, innovation and flexibility. Conversely, too much flexibility can lead to lack of decisiveness and create conflicting or inefficient efforts.
Dramatic changes to information technology over the last decade have made distributed models of management increasingly viable as an alternative or a complement to more traditional hierarchical management models. The implications of those changes are in their early stages in the military sphere, and are directly relevant to the homeland security realm.
In general terms, individuals empowered with computing and communications technology and connected by networks 1) have a greater capacity to do more for and by themselves; 2) can do more in loose collaboration with others without having to be organized in traditional hierarchies; and 3) can be more effective within formal hierarchies owing to faster and more efficient information distribution, communications, collaboration, innovation and decision-making. The inherently fragmented nature of the homeland security landscape makes it necessary to find ways to achieve greater unity of effort from actors and assets distributed widely among the federal civilian bureaucracy,
the military, federal law enforcement agencies, state and local governments and law enforcement, the private sector, and NGOs.
Given the limits of a top-down Goldwater-Nichols-like approach to streamline the homeland security chain of command, homeland security should look to other areas of military doctrine for valuable approaches, strategy and lessons. Current doctrines of Network-Centric Warfare (NCW) are highly relevant to the homeland security context. NCW recognizes the limits of hierarchical command and control structures and seeks to improve decision-making by leveraging improved information and communications among participants distributed throughout a network.
The implications of networked technologies for military operations began to come to the fore in the mid-1990s. The military’s concept of NCW first appeared in the open literature in 1998.
NCW promises faster, more precise, more decisive operations thanks to information sharing….NCW is oriented to increasing the operational freedom of choice for military commanders…[At the same time] the military context is an environment of strict control and direction….If too much operational freedom is delegated to subordinate units, control is lost to commanders; if too much control is retained, operational flexibility is compromised.55
NCW has also been defined as “the conduct of military operations using networked information systems to generate a flexible and agile military force that acts under a common commander’s intent, independent of the geographic or organizational disposition of the individual elements, and in which the focus of the war fighter is broadened away from individual, unit or platform concerns to give primacy to the mission and responsibilities of the team, task group or coalition.” Applied to homeland security, a network-centric approach would mean that the right information must be available to the right people at the right time in the right form, but also it must be put to the right use. It is essential to note that network-centricity is not just about technology and gadgets. Human aspects and relationships are essential. The numerous examples of poor coordination during the response to Katrina illustrate the value of information sharing, empowerment of individuals in the field, and distributed decision-making in the absence of clear unified command authority.
Various components of a network-centric homeland security framework are arguably in place. At a policy level, law and executive orders have called for greater cross-organizational collaboration for counter-terrorism and homeland security via improved business practices and network technologies.57 Organizationally, national strategy documents have endeavored to streamline the homeland security chain of command to the greatest extent possible.58 At the same time, nascent technology programs are seeking to better link federal and non-federal actors.59, 60 Finally, new initiatives are creating intermediate hubs between the federal government and society at large. These intermediary or regional nodes can help distribute information from the federal government to the field; collect, vet and improve information that is sent from the field up the official chain of command; and distribute information laterally to other intermediary/regional nodes. While nascent, many of the structures for an effectively self-governing network-of-networks for homeland security are being put in place today. One can envision a future where the lack of unitary authority within the homeland security chain of command does not lead to coordination failures in the field following an incident of national significance. Instead, what we lack in definitive homeland security command and control is more than made up for by empowered individuals and nodes in the network. Over time, homeland security players will build established trusted relationships across traditional bureaucratic, regional, and sectoral (e.g. private vs. governmental) boundaries and seams. As well, we will be better able to create effective ad-hoc teams post-disaster because of a more mature set of intermediary institutions, better technology, and a greater ability by Washington to accept that homeland security will never be a unified system, but rather a system of systems, and to increasingly trust information origination and decision-making outside of traditional hierarchies and stovepipes.
In fact, the concept of ‘network-centric homeland security’ akin to ‘network-centric warfare’ may be a far more effective model than Goldwater-Nichols to improve homeland security going forward. NCW concepts are highly applicable in a homeland security environment where assets are broadly distributed across a myriad of actors who do not fall under a unified chain of command. Such an approach recognizes the limits of top-down fixes to an environment where the federal government does not have command authority over all of the necessary homeland security assets and capabilities, and where operational effectiveness will be more about collaboration and cooperation than about command and control. VI. Conclusion
Goldwater-Nichol’s ability to improve military jointness relied primarily on its ability to streamline the military chain of command and clearly define roles and responsibilities among key stakeholders. Its successful focus on inter-service rotations and joint training helped reduce inter-service rivalry and foster greater cooperation. Goldwater-Nichols also stressed the need to focus on strategic planning and align strategies with resources.
While Goldwater-Nichols can provide general lessons to improve homeland security coordination and effectiveness, its ability to serve as a comprehensive model for homeland security reforms has its limits. This paper comes to conclusions and makes recommendations in four areas.
First, homeland security will not be able to develop a chain of command that begins to approach the military command structure articulated in Goldwater-Nichols. Civilian agencies will simply not respond like a military organization. Senior homeland security officials do not wield command authority over components of other federal departments. The military chain of command is separate from the homeland security chain of command. The NRP explicitly put DoJ in charge of federal law enforcement efforts. State, local, private sector and NGO assets do not take orders from DHS. While fixes to the NRP since Katrina address some of the coordination and decision-making problems exposed by Katrina, they obscure the fact that the clarity and decisiveness embedded in the military chain of command by Goldwater-Nichols is unachievable for homeland security.
Second, efforts at homeland-security joint training and rotations need to mature and be increasingly extended beyond DHS and the ODNI. Joint training and rotation programs should provide greater exposure to the full range of federal, state, local and non-governmental actors that play an important homeland security role. Employee turnover at DHS needs to be reduced and recruitment improved in order for joint training and rotations to have the intended effect on promoting jointness within a professional homeland security cadre.
Third, to improve homeland security coordination and effectiveness, it is essential to develop processes for long-term strategic planning. In the absence of a robust strategic planning process, too many homeland security programs are ad hoc, reactive, and do not contribute to a coherent vision. Strategies should be based on comprehensive and up-to-date threat and vulnerability assessments, establish clear national priorities, provide definitive guidance for action, and establish goals against which activities and programs can be measured. Strategic plans should be tied to robust assessments of capabilities and to a multiyear budgeting process that aligns missions and resources. Congress should require DHS to conduct quadrennial homeland security reviews. Congress should press DHS to fully meet their statutory requirement to produce multiyear budgets in the form of a Future Years Homeland Security Program that links operational and financial requirements together to meet strategic goals. It is essential that a homeland security strategic planning and budgeting process also be informed by the strategic planning of the DoD. Homeland security, homeland defense, and national security must all be viewed as part of a whole. The full national security game plan must do a good job of integrating both offense and defense.
Fourth, since Goldwater-Nichols does not provide a model for the kind of management that homeland security will require, policymakers should increasingly look to current military doctrines of NCW to improve homeland security coordination and management. The wide variety of actors—within federal civilian agencies, the military, federal law enforcement and intelligence, within state and local governments and law enforcement, and outside of the government in the private sector and NGOs—strongly suggest that homeland security will never achieve unified authority like that which exists in the military chain of command. When future disasters strike, the homeland security chain of command will remain fragmented, and management will necessarily be based more on matrixed management than on command and control authority. With centralization of authority unachievable, homeland security will need to rely on distributed but coordinated management. Achieving that requires creating trust among homeland security stakeholders, efficient communication between players at multiple levels, an ability to rely on the edges of the network to gather information, and an empowerment of the edges of the network to make decisions based on the best available local knowledge but within the framework of the overall mission. To complement and address the limits of a Goldwater-Nichols approach to homeland security, the concept of “network-centric homeland security” should increasingly play an important and guiding role.