While the neocon sheeple are busy being distracted by a Russian-ran civilian nuclear power plant in Iran, and boogeymen (CFR member) "Muslims" are building a foundation-funded cultural center near Ground Zero, a war is brewing right at their backdoor step.
I don't think for a minute that the foundation-funded "Reconquista" movement is the end all to be all to bring in a NAU. I believe "Reconquista", La Raza, Mexican-state sponsored emigration into America (remember those comic books?), and the open borders are the false flag(s) necessary for what's ahead. The only way a NAU can be pulled off, is for NORTHCOM to fully occupy Mexico militarily. This report I'm about to show is the recipe book for pulling that off.
Alex Jones predicted 9/11; birther truther tenther predicts a false flag attack in the Southwest to be blamed on Mexicans. I had a feeling about this since 2008, but this report by Joint Special Operations University really reinforced my gut feeling with concrete.
PDF report retrieved from here:http://jsoupublic.socom.mil/publications/jsou/JSOU10-2turbivilleMexico_final.pdf
My summarized version of this report is that the United States and Mexico have had a bitter history up to World War II. Mexico has lost lots of land to the US, and that Mexico City was once occupied by American forces. In WWII, Mexico allied with the US because of German plots to take over America by way of Mexico. After the 1970s, and exponentially increasing after the 1990s, the Mexican Military has been INCREMENTALLY doing merger exercises with the United States. Historical distrust of American military forces by Mexican forces has had an inverse effect in the last 4 decades. They went from distrusting to almost the verge of being dependent on America. After being buttered up with pomp and circumstance parades, marches, drills, speeches, etc. the Mexican military is ready to play ball WITH America's military.
With Mexico becoming a "failed state", American military intervention is necessary. The United States will NOT fight Mexican troops; they will fight WITH Mexican troops.
More of my commentary:My opinion, is that this will be "Mexicanization" just like Kissinger's detente policy of Vietnamization. America's boys will be conducting supporting roles and "assisting" Mexican soldiers in "counterinsurgency". Mexicanization will be perpetual, due to the Mexicans receiving the counterinsurgency training, and then "joining the bad guys", the narcoparamilitaries, because they pay better.
I'm sure you'll figure out who the enemy is in all of this, it is the Mexican citizenry, just like DHS was set-up to fight American citizenry. With US military intervention will come wanton abuses of Mexican peasants, all in the name of fighting the "counterinsurgency" of the drug cartels. Sombreros will be the new turban, if you know what I am saying.
IMHO, legalization of cocaine will cause this murderous/treasonous plot to fail flat on its face. I'd rather some kids get high off of OTC cocaine bought from a drug store, then have this upcoming war. Kids do "huffing" all of the time, and spray paint, thinner, and gasoline are easy to buy, but we don't have a gigantic police state to enforce that. We don't need a gigantic police state mechanism to enforce poor decisions such as drug abuse. I believe cocaine can be destructive, but if it was OTC at a drug store, it probably wouldn't be a big deal. Aspirin is OTC, kids down the whole bottle and end up in the emergency room on suicide watch, but society rolls along.
If the borders were guarded along time ago, cocaine was decriminalized, and we imposed tariffs on imports, none of this mess would have happened. If Mexicans had gun rights, private property rights, and economic liberties, they wouldn't emigrate here by the tens of millions illegally.
It's classical problem-reaction-solution
Problem: Drug cartels/illegal immigration/ crime
Reaction: Demand more "security" and demand military assist "failed state" Mexico
The false Solution: Second Mexican-American war resulting in a North American Union.
Here are some excerpts from that JSOU report:
9/11 and Beyond: U.S. Northern Command and the Quickening Pace of U.S.-Mexican Military Interaction. The 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States had an early, substantial, and continuing impact on relations with Mexico. The U.S. had an immediate imperative to impose tightened border security and other measures. While Mexico City may not have had the same level of concern—and felt somewhat insulted by the identification
of Mexico as a potential source of terrorism—the Mexican leadership recognized that a far more vigorous border security regimen was upcoming. None of the former security issues disappeared, of course, but attention was turned to the terrorist threat coming across a porous border.
Among new terrorism-associated efforts were the formation of new U.S.-Mexican border working groups aimed at identifying and mitigating
terrorist dangers including threats to infrastructure, transportation, water, agriculture, energy, and other resources; the reorganization of U.S. Federal law enforcement, elements of the Intelligence Community and other security organizations; and efforts to prod other slow-moving U.S. Government
agencies into a more focused and energetic posture of engagement with Mexican counterpart organizations. The 22-point “U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership Agreement” that advanced these issues in a formal way was signed by Mexican President Vicente Fox and U.S. President George W. Bush on January 2002 in Monterrey, Mexico, to be followed by many other initiatives. However, the biggest military development of the post 9/11 period with implications for Mexico was the organization and October 2002 standup of a new regional combatant command (COCOM) designated the United States Northern Command (USNORTHCOM).
Northern Command’s mission was to provide “command and control of DoD homeland defense efforts” and to “coordinate defense support of civil authorities.” It was an important and well-conceived effort to consolidate disparate elements and to focus its assets. Its unique status of exercising dedicated operational military responsibility for the U.S. homeland was notable in itself. The new COCOM’s area of responsibility, which would include air, land, and sea approaches and encompass the continental United States, Alaska, Canada, Mexico, and the surrounding water out to approximately 500 nautical miles, was central to the post-9/11 security environment.
The creation of USNORTHCOM received attention in the United States regarding its composition, command and control, activities, and constitutional
or legal issues associated with the command’s responsibilities inside the country. Ordinarily, changes in the Unified Command Plan—which sets out the responsibilities of regional and functional COCOMs and the areas of responsibility (AORs) for the former—elicits little popular interest or commentary. Foreign military and intelligence analysts of course follow such changes with close attention and a critical eye and sometimes express concern or dismay over the inclusion of their national territory—for example,
Russian suspicion a decade ago at being newly included in the United States European Command (USEUCOM) AOR when it had not earlier been associated with a specific COCOM.
The establishment of USNORTHCOM, however, attracted immediate public and official attention in Mexico many months before its composition and mission became entirely clear. As the dimensions began to take shape as early as spring 2002 with the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, and other U.S. spokesmen adding more to the record, criticism became more specific. It was initially held at arm’s length by the military, and commentary was often negative in the public media. It raised longstanding intervention sensitivities along with existing criticisms of earlier “militarization” on both sides of the border, drug and other criminal violence attributed to a U.S. drug habit, illegal immigration frictions, and the new face of terrorism.
The Sedena declared in the early months of 2002 that the new American command would alter nothing in terms of U.S.-Mexican military interaction. The Sedena’s deputy chief of Operations, Brigadier General Javier del Real Magallanes, declared that “They are creating the Northern Command to oversee the protection of their areas of interest in the northern hemisphere, but only from their perspective. This does not involve Canada at all, much less Mexico: in other words, Mexico has absolutely nothing to do with the Northern Command.” Subsequent USNORTHCOM suggestions of joint air defense structures and other interaction elicited similar Sedena public denials or silence when asked for more specific responses. Other nonmilitary government commentary followed in a similarly cautious and sometimes more negative vein, which continues sporadically to date. Popular media commentary in Mexico was sometimes measured, more often than not suspicious, and not infrequently in the realm of wild assertion about U.S. “secret” plans.
The U.S.-Mexican military relationship has nevertheless slowly advanced in a variety of useful ways—moved by continuing U.S.-Mexican talks and visits at the most senior and lower levels, ongoing training and instruction venues, growing threats to stability inside Mexico and north of the border requiring assistance and cooperation, and confidence-building outreach programs. A few developments illustrate the advances. Even when the first Mexican concerns over USNORTHCOM were being voiced in 2002, Mexico participated in the long-established phased annual naval deployment exercise
UNITAS 2002 for their first time. Seven countries participated in the Caribbean phase, and the Mexican frigate Mariano Absalo (a U.S. Knox-class ship purchased by the Mexican Navy) constituted a most important advance in Mexico’s regional security engagement.
A new U.S.-Mexican initiative in the fall of 2003 was not military per se, but indicative of growing trust in U.S.-Mexican security affairs and cooperation
against terrorism. The initiative, which according to Mexican media was designated XBase, concentrated on “groups and arms involved in terrorist
attempts or bombings.” The concept was based on a shared database that included information on bomb construction and terrorist group intelligence.
At least two other countries were involved as well. Following its establishment, USNORTHCOM sponsored numerous Mobile Training Team (MTT) activities with Mexico. The MTT topics included “countering illegal activities near and across our borders, increasing information sharing, and counterterrorism” among other topics. USNORTHCOM Personnel Exchange Programs were characterized by U.S. and Mexican officers performing duties in both countries.
In February 2004, Mexico also sent observers to the NORTHCOM exercise Unified Defense phase held at Fort Sam Houston, Texas under the auspices of U.S. Army North (formerly Fifth Army). In 2005 and for the first time, the USNORTHCOM commander was invited to attend the Mexican Independence Day celebration Grito (Shout) taking place on 16 September. The Secretary of the Navy invited him. Subsequent invitations for Grito were forthcoming as well. Continuing USNORTHCOM outreach to Mexican legislative and media representatives added a new and worthwhile
dimension to confidence-building activities and fostering a better civilian understanding of USNORTHCOM’s missions.
USNORTHCOM supported various doctrinal and force structure initiatives as requested by Mexico. In the years immediately following 9/11, newly articulated concepts took place in the areas of military intelligence and counterintelligence as well, with the drafting of new field manuals and associated training that was in some cases provided by foreign trainers including the U.S. While such doctrinal materials are typically classified at some level or otherwise restricted from public dissemination, they do occasionally surface in the Mexican media. A case in point in the realm of “special” units was the appearance of a new counterintelligence manual in 2006 that elaborated a far more offensive counterintelligence concept to include the establishment of “secret cells” trained to target and eliminate hostile intelligence activities.
As noted, in the development of Special Forces, the additional GAFES that began forming in the mid-1990s were company-size mobile light infantry
units with more advanced and specialized training in desert, mountain, and jungle operations. Special operations training, as noted, was provided by experienced foreign armies including the Guatemalan Kaibiles special operations forces, employed throughout Guatemala’s long communist insurgency.
In 2002 the GAFE units were reorganized as Special Forces battalions and brigades, though they are typically still referred to informally as GAFES. By 2004, total GAFE troop strength was estimated at about 5,500.
The mandated Special Forces Command (Corps) (Cuerpo de Fuerzas Especiales), created in 1997 and the Special Forces School (Escuela de Fuerzas
Especiales) in 1998, continued to be the beneficiary of foreign training. GANFES intended for riverine and coastal operations were also created that same year and continued to be developed. In addition, Naval and Marine (Naval Infantry) Special Forces were maintained as well as air and naval support elements. While these forces have individually and collectively been employed in counterinsurgency operations, they have been particularly
active against drug trafficking organizations and their increasingly well-armed and trained paramilitaries—incorporating former military and police personnel and especially special operations elements.
An enduring and significant U.S.-Mexican military venue, initially conducted under the auspices of Fifth U.S. Army, had begun in 1987 when such venues were less common than two decades later. With the establishment of USNORTHCOM and the renaming and/or reorganizing of components,
the Border Commanders’ Conference (BCC) fell under U.S. Army North (formerly Fifth U.S. Army). As before, the BCC has continued to offer “a forum for improving mutual understanding, communications, and cooperation between area headquarters on both sides of the U.S.-Mexico border.” It furthers the “increase in shared information between the two armies and enhanced cooperation and interoperability along the border and has begun to help both nations’ effectiveness in the fight against the criminal drug cartels.” The 2008 BCC was held in El Paso, Texas. As in past years, the U.S.-hosted venue included leadership from the three Mexican military regions and U.S. counterparts among other invited U.S. and Mexican defense participants who reviewed joint progress on border security issues, shared information, and addressed lessons learned.
An important development in U.S.-Mexican engagement, security relations, and security assistance took shape in 2007. While not a USNORTHCOM
initiative per se, it was associated in various ways. In the fall of 2007, U.S. President George W. Bush and newly elected Mexican President Felipe Calderón agreed to, and jointly announced, an undertaking designated the Merida Initiative. It was intended to promote regional stability through stepped-up efforts against drug and arms trafficking, other forms of organized crime, and the accompanying violence that was continuing to undermine security. U.S. congressional funding for Mexican initiatives was forthcoming beginning in fiscal year 2008 and aimed specifically at supporting counterdrug, counterterrorism, and border security; public safety and law enforcement; institution building and judicial/law enforcement
reforms; and associated program support. Limited funding was made available for Central American countries as well. The U.S. military has had a supporting but significant role in this effort, concerned principally with the provision of helicopter and fixed-wing transport and surveillance aircraft, communications and other equipment, and some associated logistic and training support.
Following up on the October 2007 Merida Initiative inauguration, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates visited Mexico several months later in April. This was the first such visit by a defense secretary since William Perry’s in 1995—6 years before 9/11. During his “very cordial” and “very open” discussions with Mexican Secretary of Defense, General Guillermo Galvan; Secretary of Foreign Relations, Patricia Expinosa; and Government
Secretary Juan Mourino, Secretary Gates emphasized the value of the Merida Initiative in the joint fight against transnational threats to include drug trafficking and other criminal organizations and gangs and associated issues. The U.S. Defense Secretary better defined the U.S. military role. He indicated that while the Merida Plan was managed by the U.S. State Department
and Mexican interests were centered on reforming and improving law enforcement and civilian security agencies, the Defense Department for their part would train and support the forces involved and seek to develop other venues like educational and informational exchanges. Although the State Department would manage the program, the Defense Department would train and support the forces involved.
In recognition of Mexican sensitivities that had been sometimes underestimated
in the past, Secretary Gates acknowledged that the U.S.-Mexican military relationship was relatively new, progress would be cautious and carefully considered, and deference would be given to Mexican sovereignty. He indicated that U.S. support would be toward helping Mexico go after the cartels and other criminals without the U.S. overstepping its bounds and emphasized that no “U.S. combat troops or anybody like that” would be involved and that Mexico would identify its requirements. While seeming a common enough thing in such international exchanges, Secretary Gates wreath-laying at the 201 Fighter Squadron Memorial—commemorating the Mexican aviation unit that fought as a U.S. ally in World War II—certainly had a most salutary effect. As with General Sullivan’s visit more than a decade earlier, the ceremony constituted a recognition that the Mexican Armed Forces took most seriously.
Overall, advances in U.S. Mexican military interaction by the end of 2008 had advanced in ways that would have been unrecognizable in the decade or so earlier. Mexico’s security environment continued to deteriorate, however, at least initially, even with newly promised aid, closer U.S.-Mexican ties, and other efforts. A deteriorating public safety and national security environment
in the Mexican interior, along the Southwest border, and with spillover into parts of the United States at a substantial distance from the border sparked pessimistic predictions in the media about future prospects.
Near the end of 2008, an official U.S. military publication by the U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) called into question the future stability of Mexico and the prospect that it may become a failed state. The publication, designated the Joint Operational Environment (JOE), is updated yearly and intended to be a “historically informed, forward-looking effort to discern most accurately the challenges we will face at the operational level of war, and to determine their inherent implications.” The following JOE judgment
had been a concern for years:
The growing assault by the drug cartels and their thugs on the Mexican
government over the past several years reminds one that an unstable Mexico could represent a homeland security problem of immense proportions to the United States.
But seeing it articulated in even a speculative Defense Department estimate
garnered popular media attention as well. More specifically, the JOE continued:
The Mexican possibility may seem less likely, but the government, its politicians, police, and judicial infrastructure are all under sustained assault and pressure by criminal gangs and drug cartels. How that internal conflict turns out over the next several years will have a major impact on the stability of the Mexican state. Any descent by Mexico into chaos would demand an American response based on the serious implications for homeland security alone.
In 2008, Gates claimed that no “U.S. combat troops or anybody like that” would be involved, but later that same year, an official publication comes out saying there would be an "American Response". It's a newspeak gimmick. A recent example is that Obama claims there are no longer "combat troops" in Iraq, because they renamed themselves to "support", same mission continues, but a new window dressing is painted. This is Mexicanization under NORTHCOM control.
More excerpts in (JPEG format)