Saturating occupied or target cities with micro-scale and even nano-scale sensors and cameras is also being investigated by the CTS Programme and an associated programme labelled HURT.
Figure 1: DARPA urban ‘Reconnaissance, Surveillance and Target Acquisition’ (RSTA) platforms as envisaged‘Persistent Area Dominance’: Towards Robotic Killing Systems in Urban Warfare
by its HURT Programme (Darpa, 2004).(LOS=Line of Sight)
Military leaders are developing a vision of the tactical operations future where adversaries will have to decide if they should send flesh and blood troops to fight nuts, bolts, circuits and sensors. (Lawlor 2003)
The second main area of defence research and development to help assert the dominance of US forces over global south cities focuses on a shift towards robotic air and ground weapons which, when linked to the persistent surveillance and target identification systems just discussed, will be deployed to continually and automatically destroy purported targets in potentially endless streams of automated killing. The dreams of linking sentient, automated and omnipotent surveillance – which bring God-like levels of ‘situational awareness’ to US forces attempting to control intrinsically devious global south megacities – to automated machines of killing, pervades the discourses of the urban turn in the RMA (see, for example, Huber and Mills 2001). A telling example comes from the discussion of a model near-future US ‘urban operation’, described by Defense Watch magazine during its discussions of DARPA’s CTS Programme just discussed (2004).
In their scenario, swarms of micro-scale and nano-scale networked sensors pervade the target city, providing continuous streams of target information to arrays of automated weaponry. Together, these systems produce continuous killing and ‘target’ destruction: a kind of robotised counter-insurgency operation with US commanders and soldiers doing little but overseeing the cyborganised, interlinked and increasingly automated killing systems from a safe distance. Defense Watch (2004) thus speculate about “a battlefield in the near future” that is wired up with the systems resulting from the CTS programme and its followers. Here 13 unbound technophiliac dreams of omnipotent urban control blur into long-standing fantasies of cyborganised and robotised warfare. “Several large fans are stationed outside the city limits of an urban target that our [sic] guys need to take”, they begin, and go on to explain that:
Upon appropriate signal, what appears like a dust cloud emanates from each fan. The cloud is blown into town where it quickly dissipates. After a few minutes of processing by laptop-size processors, a squadron of small, disposable aircraft ascends over the city. The little drones dive into selected areas determined by the initial analysis of data transmitted by the fan-propelled swarm. Where they disperse their nano-payloads.
“After this, the processors get even more busy”, continues the scenario:
Within minutes the mobile tactical center have a detailed visual and audio picture of every street and building in the entire city. Every hostile [person] has been identified and located. From this point on, nobody in the city moves without the full and complete knowledge of the mobile tactical center. As blind spots are discovered, they can quickly be covered by additional dispersal of more nano-devices. Unmanned air and ground vehicles can now be vectored directly to selected targets to take them out, one by one. Those enemy combatants clever enough to evade actually being taken out by the unmanned units can then be captured of killed by human elements who are guided directly to their locations, with full and complete knowledge of their individual fortifications and defenses […]. When the dust settles on competitive bidding for BAA 03-15 [the code number for the ‘Combat Zones That See’ programme], and after the first prototypes are delivered several years from now, our guys are in for a mind-boggling treat at the expense of the bad guys. (2004 [sic])
Such omnipotence fantasies extend even further to the automated surveillance, through emerging brain scanning techniques, of people’s inner mental attitudes to any U.S. invasion. This way ‘targets’ deemed to be resistant can be automatically identified and destroyed:
Robotic systems push deeper into the urban area […]. Behind the fighters, military police and intelligence personnel process the inhabitants, electronically reading their attitudes toward the intervention and cataloguing them into a database immediately recoverable by every fire team in the city (even individual weapons might be able to read personal signatures, firing immediately upon cueing […]. Smart munitions track enemy systems and profiled individuals […] Satellites monitor the city for any air defense fires, curing immediate responses from near-space orbiting ‘guns’. Drones track inhabitants who have been ‘read’ as potentially hostile and ‘tagged’. (Defense Watch 2004)
Such dreams of continuous, automated, and robotised urban targeting and killing are far from being limited to the realms of such futuristic speculation, however. Rather, as with the CTS programme, they are fuelling very real multimillion dollar research and weapons development programmes aimed at developing ground and aerial vehicles which not only navigate and move robotically but select and destroy targets without ‘humans in the loop’, based on algorithmically-driven ‘decisions’.
Lawlor (2003), for example, discusses the development of ‘autonomous mechanized combatant’ air and ground vehicles or ‘tactical autonomous combatants’ for the US Air Force. These are being designed, he notes, to use ‘pattern recognition’ software for what he calls ‘time-critical targeting’, i.e. linking sensors very quickly to automated weapons so that fleeting ‘targets’ both within and outside cities can be continually destroyed. Such doctrine is widely termed ‘compressing the kill chain’ or ‘sensor to shooter warfare’ in US military parlance (Hebert 2003). Lawlor states that the ‘swarming of unmanned systems’ project team at US forces JOINT Command Experimentation Directorate, based in Suffolk, Virginia, are so advanced in such experimentation that “autonomous, networked and integrated robots may be the norm rather than the exception by 2025”.
By that date, Lawlor predicts that “technologies could be developed […] that would allow machines to sense a report of gunfire in an urban environment to within one meter, triangulating the position of the shooter and return fire within a fraction of a second” providing a completely automated weapon system devoid of human involvement. Such plans form part of a $200 billion project to massively robotise US ground forces known as ‘Future Combat System’. Under this program, it is planned that robotic vehicles will replace one third of US armoured vehicles and weapons by 2015.
Lawlor quotes Gordon Johnson, the ‘Unmanned Effects’ team leader for the US Army’s ‘Project Alpha’, as saying of an automated anti-sniper system that:
if it can get within one meter, it’s killed the person who’s firing. So, essentially, what we’re saying is that anyone who would shoot at our forces would die. Before he can drop that weapon and run, he’s probably already dead. Well now, these cowards in Baghdad would have to play with blood and guts every time they shoot at one of our folks. The costs of poker went up significantly […]. The enemy, are they going to give up blood and guts to kill machines? I’m guessing not. (Hebert 2003: 3)
Lawlor (2003: 2) predicts that such robo-war systems will “help save lives by taking humans out of harm’s way”. Here, tellingly, only US forces are considered to fall within the category ‘human’.
In addition, unmanned aerial vehicles armed with ‘intelligent munitions’ are already being designed that will, eventually, be programmed to fire on, and kill, ‘targets’ detected by US Force’s real-time surveillance grids, in a completely autonomous way. Such munitions will loiter over targets for days at a time, linked into the data links, until ‘targets’ are detected for destruction (Kenyon 2004). A programme called TUDLS – or ‘Total Urban Dominance Layered System – for example, is currently underway to provide what Plenge (2004) describes as: “long hover and loiter propulsion systems, multidiscriminant sensors and seekers, mini- and micro-air vehicles, mini-lethal and non-lethal warheads, autonomous and man-in-the loop control algorithms, and a strong interface with the [urban] battlespace in formation network.”
Crucially, such munitions will be equipped with algorithms designed to separate ‘targets’ from ‘non-targets” automatically. The ultimate goals, according to Pinney, an engineer at Raytheon, is a “kill chain solution” based on “1st look, 1st feed, 1st kill” where each armed unmanned vehicle continuously “seeks out targets on its own” (2003 16). Tirpak (2001), a US air force specialist, envisages that humans will be required to make the decisions to launch weapons at targets only “until UCAVs establish a track record of reliability in finding the 15 right targets and employing weapons properly”. Then the “machines will be trusted to do even that”. Nascent Robotisation in Iraq and Palestine/Israel
By 2007, such military discourses and technophiliac fantasies were quickly moving towards the first stages of implementation on the streets of Iraq’s cities. In June 2006 the first armed and remotely-controlled ground robots in the history of warfare – so-called ‘SWORDS’1 machines armed with M249 machine guns – were deployed in Baghdad (Blech 2007). These allow soldiers to fire the systems guns from up to a kilometre away by remote control. “Many people are fearful that armed robots will run amok on the battlefield,” admits a press release describing trials of this system from the US Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center (2007). In an attempt at reassurance, the piece states that the robots still “employ a ‘man in the loop’ where they are always under director control of a soldier. The soldier issues commands to the robot and weapons through an operator control unit. Commands to rocket and grenade launchers are communicated through a newly developed remote firing and control system.”
Col. Terry Griffin, head of joint US Army and Marine Corps robot program, and tasked with deploying the next armed machine known as ‘Gladiator’, argues that the machines first job will be to disband groups of ‘undesirables’. He cites three stages of escalation: “First the robot issues warnings through a loudspeaker. It fires rubber bullets. Finally, the robot starts firing its machine gun” (quoted in Blech 2007).
In Israel/Palestine, meanwhile, the Israeli military are already deploying robotic and remotely controlled machine gun turrets, part of the “See-Shoot” system developed by Rafael, to deploy lethal force along the 37 mile border with the Gaza strip. Such robotic turrets have also been sold to US forces. “Combined with a Rafael-developed acoustic sensor detection and direction-finding device, [they] essentially becomes a robotic anti-sniper weapon for wheeled or tracked vehicles.” (Opall-Rome 2004). According to Defence News’ Tel Aviv correspondent “each machine gun-mounted station serves as a type of robotic sniper, capable of enforcing a nearly 1,500-meter-deep no-go zone” (Opall-Rome 2007). The guns and their long sensors are “tied in by optic fibre to a command network which will also be able to draw information from existing ground sensors, manned aircraft, and overhead drones.” (Page 2007).
Whilst the longer term shift towards the true automation of firing is envisaged, Initially, at least, Israeli soldiers are required to approve ‘See-Shoot’s’ decisions to fire. “At least in the initial phases of deployment, we’re going to have to keep the man in the loop,” an unnamed IDF commander remarked recently. “We don’t want to risk making tragic and politically costly mistakes with such a lethal system.” (cited in Opall-Rome 2007).
Israel is also planning to deploy mobile armed robots to support military incursions into Palestinian towns and cities. The hope, according to the manufacturing company, Elbit Ground Systems, is that “such robotic vehicles will become “triggers” which could discriminate between innocent and peaceful activities along the [Gaza-Israel] perimeter, to hostile or suspicious actions, based on the target’s responses” (Defense Update 2007).
______________1 The Special Weapons Observation Reconnaissance Detection System
The Israeli military also now operates robotic 60-ton bulldozers to aid in house demolition and landscape clearance in areas that are deemed to hazardous for human-driven bulldozers.
Meanwhile, US investment in the field of armed Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) dwarfs that in armed ground robots. Initially, attention is centring on introducing more and more armed drones which are piloted, and fired, by remote human pilots – such as the ‘Predator’ and its more heavily armed successor – the ‘Reaper.’ In the case of the Predator, the many attack missions in the Middle East carried out by this drone have actually been ‘piloted’ by CIA personnel in a US Air Force base on the other side of the world on the edge of Las Vegas.
As with armed ground robots, however, the shift towards autonomous aerial weapons systems is already underway. The US Air Force’s emerging Low Cost Autonomous Attack System (LOCAAS), for example – one output of the Future Combat Systems Program – is a jet powered ‘stand off’ munition which has been designed to “autonomously search for, detect, identify, attack and destroy theatre missile defence, surface to air missile systems, and interdiction/armour targets of military interest” (Sparrow 2007: 63). It will be equipped with a Laser Radar system as well as an Autonomous Target Recognition capability that will allow it to search for and identify targets within a 33 sq. mile area (Sparrow, 2007).
In both the air and ground domains, much effort is already going in to establishing the technologies and ethical protocols that would allow armed robots to use artificial intelligence technologies to autonomously ‘decide’ to launch their weapons at targets. Integrated within the Future Combat Systems Program within the US military (Sparrow, 2007), efforts here are focusing on the shift from piloted armed drones to ones that automatically fire at targets, at armed ground robots that operate independently, and at armed missiles, bombs and munitions that ‘loiter’ over a district or city ‘seeing’ out targets to attack over extended periods of time.
Armed autonomous ground vehicles, labelled ‘Tactical Autonomous Combatants’ (TACs), are being developed for missions deemed too dangerous, lengthy or simply long for humans. The previously cited Gordon Johnson, ‘unmanned effects team leader’ at the Project Alpha, cites the advantages of such a strategy for US forces addressing the challenges of future urban warfare:
At the tactical level, TACs aren’t going to get hungry, they’re not going to get tired, they’re not going to get ‘Dear John’ letters and have their minds concentrating on something other than what they are supposed to be thinking about. They have all the information they require that is available to blue forces at their disposal to help make decisions because they are all networked together. And if they need information that they don’t have in their local database, they’ll send out a request to ‘The Net’ and would get the information they need or collaborate with other machines and get the information they need (cited in Lawlor 2003).
A whole universe of ‘automated target recognition’ software is also evolving here, allowing robots’ computers to continuously compare the electronic signatures of ‘targets’ with those stored on electronic databases. “Before SWORDS fires its first salvo at terrorists in Iraq,” writes Jörg Blech (2007) inDer Spiegel, “it needs the permission of two human operators. […] However, it is only logical that decisions over life and death will increasingly be 17 transferred to the machine – just as soon as engineers have figured out how to overcome the problem of distinguishing between friends and foes.”
This is where software development efforts in the field of automatic target recognition are now concentrating. Geared specifically towards the apparently impossible challenge of automatically picking out individual cars and individuals within the density and confusion of a major city, these techniques, informed closely by experience in Iraq, are now centring on whether spectral imaging, using 70 different wavelengths, can differentiate apparently identical vehicles in cities (McCarter 2005).
Dr. John Kerekes, head of one such programme, labelled RASER, at MIT, explains that, rather than developing software that automatically identifies the signatures of military vehicles, the focus now is on tracking and identifying civilian cars and trucks in urban contexts. “Nowadays,” he argues, “the problems are in a more urban area or a smaller town, but typically not out in the open somewhere, and the nature of the threat is much more elusive in the sense that the enemy may not be driving military vehicles at all.” In such a context, he wonders: “Can you indeed distinguish between vehicles? These are just ordinary civilian vehicles, not of any particular distinguishing characteristics visually. But through this extra-spectral information and these additional channels, there may be features that we can use to identify them and tell them apart.” (Cited in McCarter 2005).
Once again, it is in the scenarios being proffered by the US military industrial complex that we see the possible future of the nascent architectures of robotised military power in Iraq and Israel/Palestine. Gary Graham (2004), of DARPA’s Tactical Technology Office, introduced a talk at the 2004 DARPAtech conference as follows:
I’d like you to imagine the battlefield of the future. Unmanned combat aircraft dominate the skies above the theater. A swarm of unmanned ground vehicles prowls the forests and fields of our enemies. These vehicles have sensors that can see, hear, and maybe even smell. High above the theater, peering down from space, are spacecraft that are being refueled on-orbit. Their on-board electronics and software are also being upgraded and replaced as easily as sliding a PCMCIA card in-and-out of a laptop. A helicopter glides over the battlefield and drops a box of missiles. This box is identical to dozens of missile boxes that are already in place on the battlefield, many sitting in the rear compartments of Humvees. These boxes of missiles are very different, though. They aren’t attended by human operators, and they already know where they are – each has GPS and a COMM [unications] link. They sit, poised, waiting for command signals.
A corporal out in the field sees the enemy coming over the hill. He radios, “I need fire support NOW!” The box just dropped by the helo knows where the corporal is and it knows where the bad guys are. It launches its first flight of missiles. Some are loitering missiles that fly a little slower. They are launched first. They go up and post a highwatch over the battlefield. Next, faster, precision attack missiles are launched and detonate on their targets, and we have lots of smoking holes...but we missed one or two. One of the missiles loitering overhead surveys the scene, detects a surviving moving target, and says, “You missed one; I can take him.” On command, he dives in and takes out his target. The battle is over. The enemy never even knew the corporal was there! But now you have a lot of smoking holes where the bad guys used to be. (cited in Morrish 2004)Conclusions
“The ultimate expression of sovereignty resides […] in the power and capacity to dictate who may live and who must die” (Mbembe 2003: 11)
A large-scale military research and development programme is currently underway in the United States to tailor the ‘Revolution in Military Affairs’ to the specific micro-geographies of the global south cities that many US military theorists envisage to be their main ‘battlespaces’ on the 21st century. Here the cutting-edge techno-scientific efforts and priorities of the world’s dominant military power are being shifted dramatically from an emphasis on globe-spanning control, networking and vertical targeting – treating planet Earth as some unitary, ageographical ‘battlespace’ – to one aimed at bringing maximum control, surveillance and killing power to the detailed micro-geographies of the burgeoning urban environments of the global south.
Such dreams of omnipotence must, of course, be treated with caution. The US military and its associated complex of R & D outfits have, after all, long held fantasies of superweapons that would deterministically realise their dreams of mastery and omnipotence (Franklin 1988). As now, such technophiliac dreams of mastery have usually evolved closely with the wider discourses of speculative fiction and popular geopolitical domains and entertainment industries (Gannon 2003). The ‘technological fanaticism’ of both has deep roots within US political, popular and military culture (Sherry 1987). As Jeremy Black (2001: 97) suggests, we therefore need to be careful to interpret the RMA, and its latest ‘urban turn’, not as some quasi-rational response amongst US military and political elites to changing geopolitical conditions, but, rather, as “symptomatic of a set of cultural and political assumptions that tell us more about modern western society than they do about any objective assessment of military options”.
Moreover, we must also remember that the ‘U.S. military’ is far from being some single, unitary actor. All of the discourses, projects and programmes analysed in this paper remain extremely contested. Within the vast institutional complex that together constitutes the ‘US military’, and its associated security and military industries and lobby groups, major political battles are underway – fuelled by the ongoing nightmare in Iraq – over the degree to which technophiliac dreams of omnipotence, through some urbanised ‘RMA’ or ‘network centric warfare,’ are realistic, even in military terms. Many in the US Army, in particular, are deeply sceptical that the horrors and ‘fog of war’ in bloody ‘urban operations’ like the Iraqi insurgency can ever really be technologised, mediated, and saturated with sentient surveillance and targeting systems to anything like the degree that is common in the discursive imaginings driving the programmes discussed above.
Whilst what I have called here the urban turn in the RMA is, of course, being driven by often wild and fantastical discourses, its effects are likely to be very material and profound. Massive techno-scientific efforts to equip the US military so that they can saturate global south cities with real-time surveillance, targeting and killing systems are undoubtedly underway, fuelled by the nascent experimentations on the streets of Iraq’s cities and in and above the West Bank and Gaza. The latest military-industrial-‘security’ research drive is focusing on using new algorithmic surveillance capabilities to try and overcome the ways in which the micro-geographies of global south cities are portrayed as environments that interrupt wider dreams of US military and technological omnipotence.
Above all, as the ‘war 19 on terror’ seeks to project notions of war that are unbound in time and space, so the sovereign power to kill is in the process of being delegated to computer code. Whether such systems will ever function as imagined even in military terms is, then, beside the point. The very existence of a quasi-imperial project for launching the world’s dominant military power’s high-tech warfare systems into global south cities will – if implemented – seem very likely to lead to widespread civilian casualties. This seems especially so as new algorithmic systems seem likely to emerge that are the actual agents of continuous, autonomous killing as ‘kill chains’ are ‘compressed’, ‘sensors’ are linked automatically to ‘shooters,’ and the dreams of ‘persistent area dominance’ achieve full expression through the favourable context of the Bush Administration’s large post-9-11 defence spending increases.
To put it mildly, dreams of clinically identifying and surgically killing only ‘fighters’ within cities, through the use of ‘autonomous’ computer algorithms and fantasies of ‘brain scans’, are both dangerously deluded and deeply disturbing. It seems very probable that deploying such systems would result in the death and injury of many civilians. Here we confront the added and deeply troubling development whereby software agency emerges as the ultimate ‘intelligence’ automatically stipulating who should die and who should live whilst at the same time attempts are made to remove US military personnel as far as possible from risk to death and injury.
In such a scenario, the philosopher Robert Sparrow (2007: 62) worries that it will become increasingly impossible to attribute war crimes to humans at all. “It is a necessary condition for fighting a just war, under the principle ofjus in bellum [or just war], that someone can be justly held responsible for deaths that occur in the course of the war,” he writes. However, “as this condition cannot be met in relation to deaths caused by an autonomous weapon system it would therefore be unethical to deploy such systems in warfare.”References
Ackerman , R. 2002. ‘Persistent surveillance comes into view’, Signal Magazine, Available at www.afcea.org/signal/
, February 2005.
Appadurai, A. 1996. Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization, Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
ARDEC Provides Glimpse of Possible Future Warfare ,Press release available at www.pica.army.mil/PicatinnyPublic/highlights/pdfs/robot.pdf
Arquilla, J. and Ronfeldt, D. (ed). 2001.Networks and Netwars. RAND: Santa Monica:
Armament Research, Development and Engineering Center.
Blech, J. 2007. ‘Attack of the killer robots’,Der Spiegel Online Edition, September, available at http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,500140,00.html
Barnett, T. 2004. The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the 21st Century New York:
Barocas, S. 2002. ‘9-11: A strategic ontology: Pre-emptive strike and the production of (in)security’, InfoTechWarPeace, August 6, www.watsoninstitute.org/infopeace/
accessed March 2005.
Black, J. 2001.War. London: Continuum.
Book, E. 2002. ‘Project metropolis brings urban wars to US Cities’,National Defense,April, available at http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_go2148/is_200204/ai_n6918069
, accessed February 2005.
Booth, B. and Dunne, T. (eds). 2002. Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Calhoun, C., Price, P. and Timmer, A. (eds). 2002.Understanding September 11. New York:
Cockburn, A. and St Clair, J. 2000.Five Days That Shook the World: The Battle for Seattle and Beyond. London: Verso.
Cohen, E. 2004. ‘Change and transformation in military affairs’,Journal of Strategic Studies, 27:3, pp. 395-407.
DARPA. 2003.Combat Zones That See Program: Proper Information. Available at www.darpa.mil/baa/baa03-15.htm, accessed February 2005.
DARPA. 2004.HURT- Heterogeneous Urban RSTA Team,Briefing to Industry. Washington DC: Darpa.
Davis, M. 2004a. ‘The urbanization of Empire: Megacities and the laws of chaos’,Social Text, 22:4, pp. 9-15.
Davis, M. 2004b. ‘The Pentagon as global slum lord’, TomDispatch, http://www.tomdispatch.com/
, April 19th, accessed June 10th.
Defense Update. 2007. ‘Elbit Expands Range of Autonomous Ground Vehicles, Available at http://www.defense-update.com/features/du-1-07/elbit_UGV.htm
, accessed September 2007. Defense Watch. 2004. ‘Combat zones that ‘see’ everything’, available at http://www.argee.net/DefenseWatch/Combat%20Zones%20that%20'See'%20Everything.htm
, accessed March 2005.
Der Derian, J. 2001.Virtuous War: Mapping the Military-Industrial-Media-Entertainment Complex. Westview: Boulder, Co.
Dickson, K. 2002a.The war on terror: Cities as the strategic high ground. Mimeo.
Dickson, K. 2002b. Future war as urban war: How asymmetric strategies will affects cities.
Defense Intelligence Reference Document (DIRC). 1997. The Urban Century: Developing World Urban Trends and Possible Factors Affecting Military Operations, Marine Corps Intelligence Agency, Quantico: VA.
Duffield, Mark. 2002. ‘War as a network enterprise: The new security terrain and its implications’, Cultural Values,6, pp. 153-165.
Ek, R. 2000. ‘A revolution in military geopolitics?’, Political Geography, 19, pp. 841-874.
Erwin, S. 2004. ‘Urban battles highlight shortfalls in soldier communication’,National Defense, September, available at www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/
issues/2004/Sep/Urban_Battles.htm, accessed March 2005.
Franklin, H. B. 1988.War Stars: The Superweapon and the American Imagination. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Gannon, C. 2003.Rumors of War and Infernal Machines: Technomilitary Agenda-Setting in American and British Speculative Fiction. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. Glenn, R., Steed, R., and Matsumara, J. (eds). 2001. Corralling the Trojan Horse: A Proposal for Improving U.S. Urban Operations Preparedness in the Period, 2000-2025, Santa Monica: CA. RAND Graham, S. 2003. ‘Lessons in urbicide’, New Left Review,19, Jan/Feb, pp. 63-78. Graham, S. 2004a. ‘Vertical geopolitics: Baghdad and after’,Antipode, 36: 1, pp. 12-19. Graham, S. 2004b. ‘Cities and the ‘war on terror,’’ paper submitted to International Journal of Urban and Regional Research.
Graham, S. 2005. ‘Switching cities off: Urban infrastructure and US air power’, City, 9:2.
Grau, L. and Kipp, J. 1999. ‘Urban combat: confronting the spectre’, Military Review,. Vol.
LXXXIX No. 4, July-August, pp. 9-17
Gray, C. 2003. ‘Posthuman soldiers and postmodern war’,Body and Society, 9:4, pp. 215-226.
Gregory, D. 2004.The Colonial Present. Oxford: Blackwell.
Grubbs, L. 2003.In Search of a Joint Urban Operational Concept.Fort Leavenworth, Ka:
School of Advanced Military Studies.
Hardt, M. and Negri, A. 2000.Empire. Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press.
Hardt, M. and Negri, A. 2004.Multitude, London: Hamish Hamilton. Harris, A. 2003. ‘Can New Technologies Transform Military Operations in Urban Terrain?’,Small Wars Journal, available at: www.smallwarsjournal.com/documents/harris.pdf
Hebert, Adam. 2003. ‘Compressing the kill chain’,Air Force Magazine, March, pp. 34-42.
Hewish, M. and Pengelley. 2001. ‘Facing urban inevitabilities: Military operations in urban terrain’,Jane’s International Defence Review, August, pp. 13-18.
Hewitt K. 1983. ‘Place annihilation: Area bombing and the fate of urban places’, Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 73:2, pp. 257-284.
Hills, A. 2004.Future Wars in Cities. London: Frank Cass.
Houlgate K. 2004. ‘Urban warfare transforms the Corps’,Naval Institute Procedings, November, Available at: http://www.military.com/NewContent/0,13190,NI_1104_Urban-P1,00.html
, accessed February 2005.
Huber, Peter and Mills Mark. 2002. ‘How technology will defeat terrorism.’City Journal, 12, pp. 24-34.
Kenyon, H. 2004. ‘Connectivity, persistent surveillance model future combat’, Signal Magazine. Available atwww.afcea.org/signal/, accessed February 2005. Kirsch, S. 2003. ‘Empire and the Bush doctrine’, Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 21, pp. 1-6.
Lawlor M. 2003. ‘Robotic concepts take shape’,Signal Magazine, Available at www.afcea.org/signal/
, accessed February 2005.
Leonhard, R. 2003. ‘Sun Tzu’s bad advice: Urban warfare in the information age’,Army Magazine, April. Available at http://www.ausa.org/www/armymag.nsf/0/AA1C74DA9302525585256CEF005EED3D?Ope
nDocument, accessed February 2005.
Luft, K. 2005. ‘Urban terrain zone co-ordination project’. US Army Combat Support Team.
Mbembe, A. 2003. ‘Necropolitics’,Public Culture.15:1, pp. 11-40.
McCarter, J. 2005. ‘Revolutionary Target Recognition’,Military Geospatial Technology, Online Edition, 3:4, Nov 15, available at http://www.military-geospatial-technology.com/article.cfm?DocID=1227
, accessed September 2007. Misselwitz, P. and Weizman, E. 2003. ‘Military operations as urban planning’, in Franke, A.
(ed)Territories. Berlin: KW Institute for Contemporary Art, pp. 272-275. Morrish, M. 2004. ‘Introduction to the Tactical Technology Office’, remarks made to the 2004 DARPATech Conference. Available at www.darpa.mil/DARPAtech2004/pdf/scripts/MorrishOverviewScript.pdf
, accessed September 2007.
Negri, A. 2002. (ed)On Fire: The Battle of Genoa and the Anti-Capitalist Movement.
London: AK Press.
Norton, R. 2003. ‘Feral cities’, Naval War College Review, 56:4, pp. 97-106. O’ Mara, R. 2003. ‘Stealth, precision, and the making of American foreign policy’,Air and Space Power Chronicles, June, Available at www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/cc/omara.html
, accessed February 2005. Opall-Rome, B. 2004. ‘Israeli arms, gear aid U.S. troops’, Defense News, Online Edition, 29th March, available at http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2766350&C=America
, accessed September 2007.
Page, L. 2007. ‘Israel deploys robo-snipers on Gaza border’, The Register, Online edition, available at http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/06/05/israel_robo_sniper_gaza/
, accessed September 2007.
Peters, R. 1996. ‘Our soldiers, their cities’, Parameters, Spring, pp. 1-7.
Pieterse, J. 2004. ‘Neoliberal empire’, Theory, Culture and Society, 21:3, pp. 118-140.
Pinney, C. 2003.UAV Weaponization. Washington DC: Raytheon.
Plenge, B. T. 2004. ‘Area Dominance’, Air Force Research laboratory Technology Horizons, 5:2, accessed April 2004.
Project for the New American Century.2000. Rebuilding Americas Defenses, Washington.
Robert, M., Secor, A., and Sparke, M. 2004. ‘Neoliberal geopolitics’,Antipode, 35:5, pp. 886-897.
Sassen, S. 2002. ‘Governance hotspots: Challenges we must confront in the post September 11th world’. In K. Booth and T. Dunne (eds.), Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order, London: Macmillan Palgrave, pp. 313-324.
Scheper-Hughes, N. and Bourgois, S (eds). 2003.Violence in War and Peace: An Anthology.
Sherry, M. 1987. The Rise of American Air Power : The Creation of Armageddon. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sniffen, M. 2003. ‘Pentagon project could keep a close eye on cities’, Philly.Com,accessed February 2005.
Sparrow, R. 2007. ‘Killer robots’,Journal of Applied Philosophy, 24:1, pp. 63-77. Stone, J. 2004. ‘Politics, technology and the revolution in military affairs’,Journal of Strategic Studies, 27:3, pp. 408-427.
Taw, J. and Hoffman, B. 2000.The Urbanization of Insurgency. Santa Monica, Ca: RAND. Tirpak. J. 2001. ‘Heavyweight contender’,Air Force Magazine, 85:7, available at http://www.afa.org/magazine/July2002/
accessed August 15th 2005. Tyson, A. 2004. ‘US tests new tactics in urban warfare’,Christian Science Monitor, Available at csmonitor.com, accessed February 2005.
Vickers, M. and Armitage, R. 2001. Future Warfare 20XX Wargame Series: Lessons Learned Report, US Government Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment. Warren, R. 2004. ‘City Streets – The War Zones of Globalisation: Democracy and Military Operations in Urban Terrain in the Early 21st Century’, in S. Graham (ed),Cities, War and Terrorism, Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 214-230.
CSRC Series 2 Working Papers
WP1James Putzel, ‘War, State Collapse and Reconstruction: phase 2 of the Crisis States Programme’ (September 2005)
WP2Simonetta Rossi andAntonio Giustozzi, ‘Disarmament, Dembolisation and Reintegration of ex-comabatants (DDR) in Afghanistan: constraints and limited capabilities’, (June 2006) WP3Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, Gabi Hesselbein and James Putzel, ‘Political and Economic Foundations of State making in Africa: understanding state reconstruction’, (July 2006) WP4 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘Genesis of a Prince: the rise of Ismail Khan in western Afghanistan, 1979-1992’ (September 2006)
WP5Laurie Nathan, ‘No Ownership, No Peace: the Darfur Peace Agreement’, (September 2006)
WP6Niamatullah Ibrahimi, ‘The Failure of a Clerical Proto-State: Hazarajat, 1979-1984’ (September 2006)
WP7 Antonio Giustozzi, “Tribes” and Warlords in Southern Afghanistan, 1980-2005’ (September 2006) WP8 Joe Hanlon, Sean Fox, ‘Identifying Fraud in Democratic Elections: a case study of the 2004 Presidential election in Mozambique’ WP9Jo Beall, ‘Cities, Terrorism and Urban Wars of the 21st Century’, (February 2007) WP10 Dennis Rodgers, ‘Slum Wars of the 21st Century: the new geography of conflict in Central America’, (February 2007)
WP11 Antonio Giustozzi, ‘The Missing Ingredient:non-ideological insurgency and state collapse in Western Afghanistan 1979-1992’, (February 2007)
WP12 Suzette Heald, ‘Making Law in Rural East Africa: SunguSungu in Kenya’, (March 2007)
WP13 Anna Matveeva, ‘The Regionalist Project in Central Asia: unwilling playmates’, (March 2007)
WP14 Sarah Lister, ‘Understanding State Building and Local Government in Afghanistan’, (June 2007) WP15 Pritha Venkatachalam, ‘Municipal Finance Systems in Conflict Cities: case studies on Ahmedabad and Srinagar, India’, (July 2007)
WP16 Jason Sumich, ‘The Illegitimacy of Democracy? democratisation and alienation in Maputo, Mozambique’, (September 2007)
WP17 Scott Bollens, ‘Comparative Research on Contested Cities: lenses and scaffoldings’, (October 2007) WP18 Debby Potts, ‘The State and the informal in sub-Saharan African economies: revisiting debates on dualism’, (October 2007)
WP19 Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín, Tatiana Acevedo and Juan Manuel Viatela, ‘Violent liberalism? State, conflict, and political regime in Colombia, 1930-2006: an analytical narrative on state-making’, (November These can be downloaded from the Crisis States website (www.crisisstates.com
), where an up-to-date list of all our publications including Discussion Papers, Occasional Papers and Series 1 Working Papers can be found.
The Crisis States Research Centre aims to examine and provide an understanding of processes of war, state collapse and reconstruction in fragile states and to assess the long-term impact of international interventions in these processes. Through rigorous comparative analysis of a carefully selected set of states and of cities, and sustained analysis of global and regional axes of conflict, we aim to understand why some fragile states collapse while others do not, and the ways in which war affects future possibilities of state building. The lessons learned from past experiences of state reconstruction will be distilled to inform current policy thinking and planning.
Crisis States Partners Colombia:
Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Relaciones Internacionales (IEPRI), Universidad Nacional de Colombia (Bogotá)
Developing Countries Research Centre (DCRC), University of Delhi
Department of Environmental and Geographical Sciences,
University of Cape Town
with collaborators in Uganda and other parts of sub-Saharan Africa
Development as State-Making: Collapse, War and Reconstruction
Cities and Fragile States: Conflict, War and Reconstruction
Regional and Global Axes of Conflict
Crisis States Research Centre
Development Studies Institute (DESTIN)
LSE, Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE
Tel: +44 (0)20 7849 4631 Fax: +44 (0)20 7955 6844