NWO ran Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague false flag runs 9+years in US

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Anti_Illuminati

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MAKE THIS GO MEGA VIRAL, THIS NEEDS FRONTPAGE COVERAGE EVERYWHERE.  POST THIS ON GDP AND OTHER SITES.

Excepts from a presentation given by Milton Leitenberg:

http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/documents/2006-0714%20Leitenberg%20Presentation.pdf

“We don’t know more about the biological weapons threat than we did five years ago, and five years from now, we will know even less.” -Senior CIA official, CounterproliferationDivision

“…with regard to biological weapons intelligence, ‘there’s still a sense that it’s too hard to do.” - Senior National Security Council official

Quotations from: The Commission on the Intelligence Capabilitiesof the United States Regarding Weapons of Mass Destruction, Report to the President of the United States, March 31, 2005.

“THE GREATEST EXISTENTIAL THREAT WE HAVE IN THE WORLD TODAY IS BIOLOGICAL.”
US Senate Majority Leader William Frist, Davos, January 27, 2005

“THIS [BIOTERRORISM] IS ONE OF THE MOST PRESSING PROBLEMS WE HAVE ON THE PLANET TODAY.”
Dr. Tara O’Toole, Director, Center for Biosecurity, University of Pittsburgh, Davos, January 27, 2005



WE HEARD THE SAME KEY ELEMENTS IN THE MID-1980s:

US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT ON THE BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM, MAY 1986:
RE “THE USE OF POTENT, PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (TOXINS)…THEY ARE INCREASINGLY EASIER TO PRODUCE AND VARY THROUGH THE USE OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGY – …THEY ARE VERY ATTRACTIVE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS”

THIS WAS AT A TIME WHEN THERE WERE NO KNOWN “INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS” KNOWN TO BE WORKING WITH ANY BIOLOGICAL AGENTS, AND THE ONLY KNOWN EVENTS TO THAT DATE HAD BEEN BY THE RAJNEESH GROUP IN THE US IN 1984.

RECALL, TOO, THAT THE SECOND STATED PURPOSE IN 1990 OF THE US IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION FOR THE BWC WAS TO “PROTECT THE UNITED STATES AGAINST THE THREAT OF BIOLOGICAL TERRORISM.”



DOUGLAS FEITH, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR NEGOTIATIONS POLICY,
AUGUST 8, 1986, TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE:

“…NEW BIOLOGICAL AGENTS ARE SO ‘SIMPLE’TO MAKE,
AND CAN BE MANUFACTURED ‘IN HOURS’.”




TESTIMONY OF CHARLES E. ALLEN,
CHIEF INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY,
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY, THURSDAY, MAY 4, 2006

•“...we must exercise caution and not confuse the capabilities of bioterrorists with state-level BW programs. There is no doubt that the knowledge and technologies today exist to create and manipulate bio-threat agents; however, the capability of terrorists to embark on this path in the near-to mid-term is judged to be low. Just because the technology is available does not mean terrorists can or will use it.”


•“In general, terrorist capabilities in the area of bioterrorism are crude and relatively unsophisticated, and we do not see any indication of a rapid evolution of capability. It is, therefore, unclear how advancements in high-end biotechnology will impact the future threat of bioterrorism, if at all.”


•“With respect to the evolution of bioterrorism, we would expect to see use of traditional biological agents (anthrax, plague, tularemia, and others) before the appearance of advanced BW agents.”





THE WORLD THAT WE EXIST IN: ONE


  • GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE: Food crop growth cycles, food production
  • OCEAN QUALITY DETERIORATION, DEFORESTATION, DEPLETION OF FRESH WATER AQUIFERS, DESERTIFICATION
  • GLOBAL POPULATION GROWTH, FOOD PRODUCTION, RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS (ENERGY, RAW MATERIALS), PRODCUTION OF WASTE PRODUCTS (SOLID, LIQUID, GASEOUS)
  • MILLENNIUM PROJECT “15 GLOBAL CHALLENGES”: Only one relates to pathogens, increase in incidence of antibiotic resistance
  • DEATHS IN WARS AND CONFLICTS IN THE 20THCENTURY: ~230 million
  • DEATHS DUE TO POVERTY IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (“STRUCTURAL VIOLENCE”): 20,000 per day; 7.3 million per year, ~75 million over ten years

POTENTIAL FOR CYBERTERRORISM: Currently occurring daily




THE WORLD THAT WE EXIST IN: TWO

MAJOR INFECTIOUS HUMAN DISEASES

  • TB, MALARIA, AIDS: 5 million deaths annually; 50 million deaths in 10 years
  • MALARIA: 515 million people infected globally
  • TB: 1 billion people infected; 1 billion new cases by 2020; 35 million will die
  • MEASLES: 1999 annual mortality, 873,000; 2003, 530,000; 3.6 million children dead in past 5 years
  • US FLU MORTALITY: 1977-1999, 788,000 people or 36,000/year; 360,000 deaths in the next decade
  • EXPECTATION OF PANDEMIC FLU

TOBACCO-RELATED MORTALITY: 13,500/day globally; 5 million/year; 50 million every 10years



Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat

1.The evolution of state biological weapons programs.
2.The evolution of non-state actors (“terrorist”) biological weapon capabilities.
3.Framing “the threat”and setting the agenda of public perceptions and policy prescriptions.
4.Costs of the US biodefenseR&D program.




The evolution of state biological weapons programs
July 2001: US government states 13 offensive national BW programs

  • SOUTH AFRICA: TERMINATED 1995
  • CUBA: US WITHDRAWS CLAIM, 2004
  • LIBYA: US WITHDRAWS CLAIM, 2004
  • IRAQ: TERMINATED, 1990s
  • RUSSIA: ? Reduction, certainly

US “reducing”nature of public descriptions of other ostensibly offensive BW programs



The Requirements to Produce Biological Agents by Non-State Groups
There are five essential requirements that must be mastered in order to produce biological agents:

• One must obtain the appropriate strain of the disease pathogen.
• One must know how to handle the organism correctly.
• One must know how to grow it in a way that will produce the appropriate characteristics.
• One must know how to store the culture, and to scale-up production properly.
• One must know how to disperse the product properly.
• “Most of the agents are notreadily available,
• most of the agents are noteasy to make, and
• most of the agents are not easy to disperse.”


(Reminder from earlier in the presentation:
US DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE REPORT ON THE BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM, MAY 1986:
RE “THE USE OF POTENT, PREVIOUSLY UNKNOWN BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS (TOXINS)…THEY ARE INCREASINGLY EASIER TO PRODUCE AND VARY THROUGH THE USE OF NEW BIOTECHNOLOGY – …THEY ARE VERY ATTRACTIVE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISTS”
Hello? - Get your story straight... ???)



The Evolution of non-state actors (“terrorist”) biological weapon capabilities
1984: Rajneesh, The Dalles, Oregon Salmonella
1990-1994: Aum Shinrikyo, Tokyo Botulinum toxin and Anthrax –Failed
1998-9 to November 2001: al Queda, Afghanistan, Anthrax and ? –Failed
October –November 2001: United States, “Amerithrax”/Anthrax
Outlier: Significance re: anticipation of technical proficiency by “terrorists”
2004: al-Queda affiliates, NO ricin


(Note: were any of these NOT false flag practice attacks?... practice makes perfect...)



US BIOTERRORISM EXERCISE SCENARIOS

1.1988, Mexico-Texas border: “Alibek” smallpox chimericviral agent

2.TOPOFF1, May 2000: aerosolized pneumonic plague,
 FEMA, and US Department of Justice

3.[Unnamed], July 2000: aerosolized pneumonic plague,
 US Department of Justice and DOD/DTRA


4.Dark Winter, June 2001: aerosolized smallpox, Johns Hopkins Center for Biosecurityand 3 collaborating groups

5.Sooner Spring, April 2002: smallpox, National Memorial Institutefor the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT), Oklahoma

6.TOPOFF2, May 2003:
aerosolized pneumonic plague,
US Department of Homeland Security and US Department of State

7.Atlantic Storm, January 2004: aerosolized dry powder smallpox, Center for Biosecurity(now affiliated with the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center)

8.TOPOFF3, April 2005: aerosolized pneumonic plague, US Department of Homeland Security

_________________________________________________________________
Assessing the Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism Threat
Authored by Milton Leitenberg.
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=639

    * Added December 01, 2005
    * Type: Book
    * 123 Pages


Brief Synopsis


It is nearly 15 years since biological weapons (BW) have become a significant national security preoccupation. This occurred primarily due to circumstances occurring within a short span of years. First was the official U.S. Government suggestion that proliferation of offensive BW programs among states and even terrorist groups was an increasing trend; second was the discovery, between 1989 and 1992, that the Union USSR had violated the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) since its ratification in 1975 by building a massive covert biological weapons program; third was the corroboration by the UN Special Commission in 1995 that Iraq had maintained a covert biological weapons program since 1974, and had produced and stockpiled large quantities of agents and delivery systems between 1988 and 1991; and, fourth was the discovery, also in 1995, that the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo group, which had carried out the nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway system, also had spent 4 years attempting—albeit unsuccessfully—to produce and disperse two pathogenic biological agents. The distribution of professionally prepared anthrax spores through the U.S. postal system in the weeks afterwards September 11, 2001, magnified previous concerns by orders of magnitude. In December 2002, after U.S. forces had overrun much of the territory of Afghanistan, it was discovered that the al-Qaida organization also had spent several years trying to obtain the knowledge and means to produce biological agents. These new factors shifted the context in which BW was considered almost entirely to "bioterrorism." Within 4 years, almost $30 billion in federal expenditure was appropriated to counter the anticipated threat. This response took place in the absence of virtually any threat analysis. The purpose of this monograph is to begin to fill that gap.

Offline Satyagraha

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Re: ALERT: DHS ran Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague false flag runs 9+years in US
« Reply #1 on: December 12, 2009, 09:20:39 AM »
They PRACTICED dropping Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague in the US.

Was this a test before Ukraine?

Is Ukraine a final test before the US?

And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40

Offline Satyagraha

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Re: ALERT: DHS ran Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague false flag runs 9+years in US
« Reply #2 on: December 12, 2009, 09:33:22 AM »
Note: They make full use of left/right paradigm... but this development was not a left/right issue: it's the NWO agenda:

Bush "Developing Illegal Bioterror Weapons"
http://www.truthout.org/article/bush-developing-illegal-bioterror-weapons
    Wednesday 20 December 2006

    In violation of the US Code and international law, the Bush administration is spending more money (in inflation-adjusted dollars) to develop illegal, offensive germ warfare than the $2 billion spent in World War II on the Manhattan Project to make the atomic bomb.

    So says Francis Boyle, the professor of international law who drafted the Biological Weapons Anti-Terrorism Act of 1989 enacted by Congress. He states the Pentagon "is now gearing up to fight and 'win' biological warfare" pursuant to two Bush national strategy directives adopted "without public knowledge and review" in 2002.

    The Pentagon's Chemical and Biological Defense Program was revised in 2003 to implement those directives, endorsing "first-use" strike of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) in war, says Boyle, who teaches at the University of Illinois, Champaign.

    Terming the action "the proverbial smoking gun," Boyle said the mission of the controversial CBW program "has been altered to permit development of offensive capability in chemical and biological weapons!" [Original italics.]

(Hearkens back to "smoking gun/mushroom cloud...)

    The same directives, Boyle charges in his book Biowarfare and Terrorism (Clarity Press), "unconstitutionally usurp and nullify the right and the power of the United States Congress to declare war, in gross and blatant violation of Article 1, Section 8, Clause 11 of the United States Constitution."

    For fiscal years 2001-2004, the federal government funded $14.5 billion "for ostensibly 'civilian' biowarfare-related work alone," a "truly staggering" sum, Boyle wrote.

    Another $5.6 billion was voted for "the deceptively-named 'Project BioShield,'" under which Homeland Security is stockpiling vaccines and drugs to fight anthrax, smallpox and other bioterror agents, wrote Boyle. Protection of the civilian population is, he said, "one of the fundamental requirements for effectively waging biowarfare."

    The Washington Post reported December 12 that both houses of Congress this month passed legislation "considered by many to be an effort to salvage the two-year-old Project BioShield, which has been marked by delays and operational problems." When President Bush signs it into law, it will allocate $1 billion more over three years for additional research "to pump more money into the private sector sooner."

    "The enormous amounts of money" purportedly dedicated to "civilian defense" that are now "dramatically and increasingly" being spent," Boyle writes, "betray this administration's effort to be able to embark on offensive campaigns using biowarfare."

    By pouring huge sums into university and private-sector laboratories, Boyle charged, federal spending has diverted the US biotech industry to biowarfare.

    According to Rutgers University molecular biologist Richard Ebright,
over 300 scientific institutions and 12,000 individuals
have access to pathogens suitable for biowarfare and terrorism
.
Ebright found that the number of National Institute of Health grants to research infectious diseases with biowarfare potential has shot up from 33 in 1995-2000 to 497.

    Academic biowarfare participation involving the abuse of DNA genetic engineering since the late 1980s has become "patently obvious," Boyle said. "American universities have a long history of willingly permitting their research agendas, researchers, institutes, and laboratories to be co-opted, corrupted, and perverted by the Pentagon and the CIA."

    "These despicable death-scientists were arming the Pentagon with the component units necessary to produce a massive array of ... genetically-engineered biological weapons," Boyle said.

    In a forward to Boyle's book, Jonathan King, a professor of molecular biology at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, wrote that "the growing bioterror programs represent a significant emerging danger to our own population" and "threaten international relations among nations."

    While such programs "are always called defensive," King said, "with biological weapons, defensive and offensive programs overlap almost completely."

    Boyle contends the US is "in breach" of both the Biological Weapons and Chemical Weapons conventions and US domestic criminal law. In February 2003, for example, the US granted itself a patent on an illegal long-range biological-weapons grenade.

    Boyle said other countries grasp the military implications of US germ-warfare actions and will respond in kind. "The world will soon witness a de facto biological arms race among the major biotech states under the guise of 'defense,' and despite the requirements of the Biological Warfare Convention."

    "The massive proliferation of biowarfare technology and facilities, as well as trained scientists and technicians all over the United States, courtesy of the Neo-Con Bush Jr. administration the NWO elitist eugenicists currently under the Obama administration will render a catastrophic biowarfare or bioterrorist incident or accident a statistical certainty," Boyle warned.

    As far back as September 2001, according to a report in the New York Times titled "US Pushes Germ Warfare Limits," critics were concerned that "the research comes close to violating a global 1972 treaty that bans such weapons." But US officials responded at the time that they were more worried about understanding the threat of germ warfare and devising possible defenses.

    The 1972 treaty, which the US signed, forbids developing weapons that spread disease, such as anthrax, regarded as "ideal" for germ warfare.

    According to an article in the Baltimore Chronicle & Sentinel of last September 28, Milton Leitenberg, a veteran arms-control advocate at the University of Maryland, said the government was spending billions on germ warfare with almost no analysis of threat. He said claims terrorists will use the weapons have been "deliberately exaggerated."

    In March of the previous year, 750 US biologists signed a letter protesting what they saw as the excessive study of bioterror threats.

    The Pentagon has not responded to the charges made by Boyle in this article.

    Sherwood Ross is a Virginia-based free-lance writer on political and military issues. Contact him at sherwoodr1@yahoo.com.
And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40

Offline Satyagraha

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Re: ALERT: DHS ran Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague false flag runs 9+years in US
« Reply #3 on: December 12, 2009, 10:18:26 AM »
Updated May 13, 2009
New Homeland Security Science Chief Nominee Sparks Debate on Bioterror Threat
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/05/13/new-homeland-security-science-chief-nominee-sparks-debate-bioterror-threat/
By Stephen Clark

Opponents of Tara O'Toole say she has overblown the bioterror threat -- leading to an enormous increase of the number of research labs and researchers handling deadly agents and an increased risk of their release.

On paper, Tara O'Toole appears eminently qualified to become undersecretary for the science and technology directorate, the primary research and development arm of the Department of Homeland Security.

She's an expert on environmental protection and biosecurity, and her contributions to a series of groundbreaking disaster response exercises served notice on Washington that terrorists with weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to the nation.

But her critics say the real danger is O'Toole herself. They claim she has overstated the bioterror threat, leading to an enormous increase in the number of research labs and researchers handling deadly agents -- and greater risk of those agents being released.

"She's a bad choice," George Smith, a protein chemist and senior fellow at GlobalSecurity.org., told FOXNews.com. "Her predictions on biotoerrorism don't seem to be based on any reality I share."

"This is an administration that claims that it is looking for rational fact-based policies," said Milton Leitenberg, a senior research scholar at the University of Maryland. "If so, this person is a catastrophic appointment."

O'Toole did not respond to a request for comment. Her assistant told FOXNews.com that Homeland Security Department policy prohibits nominees from speaking publicly about matters relating to their nomination. A DHS official also would not comment on the nominee's positions.

O'Toole has spent many years working on improving the country's resilience to major biological threats. She is the founder of the Center of Biosecurity at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center, and a founding member of the Johns Hopkins Center for Civilian Biodefense Strategies. She also served as assistant secretary of energy for environment, safety and health in the 1990s.  

But Richard Ebright, a microbiologist and homeland security policy critic at Rutgers University, told FOXNews.com that O'Toole helped put a response in place after the 2001 anthrax attack that "has dramatically increased the risk of further attack of the same nature" -- because more people are working with biological agents in U.S. laboratories.

He noted that since 2001, more than 400 institutions and 15,000 individuals have been authorized to handle deadly agents, calling the response "irrational" and "counterproductive."

Leitenberg published a study for Army War College in 2005 that found the threat of a biological attack to be insignificant, because terrorists lack the sophistication to handle or produce biological weapons.

He also concluded that the government response to the threat, which includes nearly $57 billion in federal spending, was misguided because it lacked virtually any threat analysis and it diverted funds from combating a more substantial threat: pandemic flu.

"I am against exaggeration," he told FOXNews.com. "I'm for real assessment. I'm for fact-based assessment."

He said exaggeration motivates some people to try the attacks. "They either go out and try to learn those things themselves -- which takes them many years -- or they recruit people who have the competence. The second wave would be more dangerous."

He also concluded that two exercises O'Toole produced were exaggerated.

One exercise by O'Toole investigated how a single smallpox outbreak could endanger millions of lives in 15 countries. But Leitenberg says the exercise, "Dark Winter," tripled the normal transmission rate for the disease, which made it nearly impossible for the outbreak to be contained and guaranteed a "disastrous outcome," regardless of response.

Leitenberg called another exercise by O'Toole, "Atlantic Storm," which aimed to demonstrate the threat of dry-powder smallpox,  "science fiction" because the scenario was not "in the least plausible."

But Randall Larsen, founding director of The Institute for Homeland Security and executive director of the WMD Commission, said the exercises, which he helped designed, were effective, because their purpose was to force authorities to develop a strategy to address certain threats.

"Milt's a nice guy," he said. "He's just wrong on these issues."

He said Leitenberg is unable to provide a comprehensive critique because he lacks security clearance.

"There's so much information he doesn't have access to," Larsen told FOXNews.com, arguing that the threat of bioterrorism is real, even if Al Qaeda terrorists lack the sophistication to produce those weapons. "We're not worried about some guy in a cave making a biological agent. We're worried about a biologist becoming a terrorist."


He said it's a "myth" that spending money on biodefense is diverting funds from more important threats.

"Putting money in biodefense gives you a lot more bang for the buck," he said, claiming that the money improves the infrastructure and delivery of public health.

He said O'Toole's background and experience assure that the money will be spent properly.

"I can't think of a better person to be selected for this job," he said.

But Leitenberg, who said he doesn't need security clearance because his some of his information comes directly from U.S. intelligence sources, argued that most of the money is not dual purpose.

Jena McNeill, a Homeland Security expert at the Heritage Foundation, says O'Toole's focus on bioterror threat doesn't disqualify her from the job.

"I don't think that necessarily impacts her ability to make sure we're researching all different types of threats," she told FOXNews.com. "I think someone who has a background of looking at the bioterror threat doesn't necessarily make them a lesser candidate for the position."
And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40

Anti_Illuminati

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Re: ALERT: DHS ran Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague false flag runs 9+years in US
« Reply #4 on: December 12, 2009, 10:53:07 AM »
Leitenberg called another exercise by O'Toole, "Atlantic Storm," which aimed to demonstrate the threat of dry-powder smallpox,  "science fiction" because the scenario was not "in the least plausible."

But Randall Larsen, founding director of The Institute for Homeland Security and executive director of the WMD Commission, said the exercises, which he helped designed, were effective, because their purpose was to force authorities to develop a strategy to address certain threats.

"Milt's a nice guy," he said. "He's just wrong on these issues."

He said Leitenberg is unable to provide a comprehensive critique because he lacks security clearance.

"There's so much information he doesn't have access to," Larsen told FOXNews.com, arguing that the threat of bioterrorism is real, even if Al Qaeda terrorists lack the sophistication to produce those weapons. "We're not worried about some guy in a cave making a biological agent. We're worried about a biologist becoming a terrorist."

He said it's a "myth" that spending money on biodefense is diverting funds from more important threats.

"Putting money in biodefense gives you a lot more bang for the buck," he said, claiming that the money improves the infrastructure and delivery of public health.


He said O'Toole's background and experience assure that the money will be spent properly.

"I can't think of a better person to be selected for this job," he said.


But Leitenberg, who said he doesn't need security clearance because his some of his information comes directly from U.S. intelligence sources, argued that most of the money is not dual purpose.

Jena McNeill, a Homeland Security expert at the Heritage Foundation, says O'Toole's focus on bioterror threat doesn't disqualify her from the job.

"I don't think that necessarily impacts her ability to make sure we're researching all different types of threats," she told FOXNews.com. "I think someone who has a background of looking at the bioterror threat doesn't necessarily make them a lesser candidate for the position."

The highlighting should speak for itself.

Offline Cryptvill

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Re: ALERT: DHS ran Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague false flag runs 9+years in US
« Reply #5 on: December 12, 2009, 10:59:20 AM »
Just amazing how they admit it in the open.

Thank you A.I.
Babylon-->Battycon-->Batikon-->Vatican

Offline Dig

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All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Anti_Illuminati

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Re: ALERT: NWO ran Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague false flag runs 9+years in US
« Reply #7 on: December 13, 2009, 10:55:18 AM »
Here's a bunch of complete insanity:

http://www.gao.gov/htext/d08180.html


This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-180
entitled 'Homeland Security: First Responders’ Ability to Detect and
Model Hazardous Releases in Urban Areas Is Significantly Limited' which
was released on June 27, 2008.

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this
document to Webmaster@gao.gov.

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this
material separately.

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-08-180, a report to congressional requesters.

Why GAO Did This Study:

First responders are responsible for responding to terrorist-related
and accidental releases of CBRN materials in urban areas. Two primary
tools for identifying agents released and their dispersion and effect
are equipment to detect and identify CBRN agents in the environment and
plume models to track the dispersion of airborne releases of these
agents. GAO reports on the limitations of the CBRN detection equipment,
its performance standards and capabilities testing, plume models
available for tracking urban dispersion of CBRN materials, and
information for determining how exposure to CBRN materials affects
urban populations. To assess the limitations of CBRN detection
equipment and urban plume modeling for first responders’ use, GAO met
with and obtained data from agency officials and first responders in
three states.

What GAO Found:

While the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and other agencies have
taken steps to improve homeland defense, local first responders still
do not have tools to accurately identify right away what, when, where,
and how much chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN)
materials are released in U.S. urban areas, accidentally or by
terrorists. Equipment local first responders use to detect radiological
and nuclear material cannot predict the dispersion of these materials
in the atmosphere. No agency has the mission to develop, certify, and
test equipment first responders can use for detecting radiological
materials in the atmosphere. According to DHS, chemical detectors are
marginally able to detect an immediately dangerous concentration of
chemical warfare agents. Handheld detection devices for biological
agents are not reliable or effective. DHS’s BioWatch program monitors
air samples for biothreat agents in selected U.S. cities but does not
provide first responders with real-time detection capability. Under the
BioWatch system, a threat agent is identified within several hours to
more than 1 day after it is released, and how much material is released
cannot be determined.

DHS has adopted few standards for CBRN detection equipment and has no
independent testing program to validate whether it can detect CBRN
agents at the specific sensitivities manufacturers claim. DHS has a
mission to develop, test, and certify first responders’ CB detection
equipment, but its testing and certification cover equipment DHS
develops, not what first responders buy.

Interagency studies show that federal agencies’ models to track the
atmospheric release of CBRN materials have major limitations in urban
areas. DHS’s national TOPOFF exercises have demonstrated first
responders’ confusion over competing plume models’ contradictory
results. The Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center
(IMAAC), created to coordinate modeling predictions, lacks procedures
to resolve contradictory predictions.

Table: Top Officials Exercises 1–4, 2000–2007:

Exercise: 1;
Date: May 20–24, 2000;
Place: Portsmouth, N.H;
Type of agent release simulated: Mustard gas.

Exercise: 1;
Date: May 20–24, 2000;
Place: Denver, Colo;
Type of agent release simulated: Pneumonic plague.

Exercise: 1;
Date: May 20–24, 2000;
Place: Washington, D.C;
Type of agent release simulated: Radiological dispersion device.

Exercise: 2;
Date: May 12–16, 2003;
Place: Chicago, Ill;
Type of agent release simulated: Pneumonic plague.

Exercise: 2;
Date: May 12–16, 2003;
Place: Seattle, Wash;
Type of agent release simulated: Radiological dispersion device.

Exercise: 3;
Date: April 4–8, 2005;
Place: New London, Conn;
Type of agent release simulated: Mustard gas.

Exercise: 3;
Date: April 4–8, 2005;
Place: New Jersey;
Type of agent release simulated: Pneumonic plague.

Exercise: 4;
Date: October 15–20, 2007;
Place: Guam;
Type of agent release simulated: Radiological dispersion device.

Exercise: 4;
Date: October 15–20, 2007;
Place: Phoenix, Ariz;
Type of agent release simulated: Radiological dispersion device.

Exercise: 4;
Date: October 15–20, 2007;
Place: Portland, Ore;
Type of agent release simulated: Radiological dispersion device.

Source: DHS.

[End of table]

Evaluations and field testing of plume models developed for urban areas
show variable predictions in urban environments. They are limited in
obtaining accurate data on the characteristics and rate of CBRN
material released.

Data on population density, land use, and complex terrain are critical
to first responders, but data on the effects of exposure to CBRN
materials on urban populations have significant gaps. Scientific
research is lacking on how low-level exposure to CBRN material affects
civilian populations, especially elderly persons, children, and people
whose immune systems are compromised.

What GAO Recommends:

The Secretary of Homeland Security should (1) reach agreement with
agencies on who will have the mission and responsibility to develop,
certify, and independently test first responders’ equipment for
detecting hazardous material releases; (2) ensure testing and
validation of manufacturers’ claims about CBRN detection equipment’s
sensitivity and specificity; (3) refine IMAAC’s procedures for
addressing contradictory modeling predictions in CBRN events; (4) with
IMAAC, work with the federal plume modeling community to accelerate R&D
on model deficiencies in urban areas and improve federal modeling and
assessment capabilities.

To view the full product, including scope and methodology, click
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-18]. For more
information, contact Nancy Kingsbury at 202-512-2700.

[End of section]

Report to Congressional Requesters:

United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

June 2008:

Homeland security:

First Responders' Ability to Detect and Model Hazardous Releases in
Urban Areas Is Significantly Limited:

GAO-08-180:

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

CBRN Detection Equipment Has Significant Limitations for First
Responders' Use:

CBRN Detection Equipment Has Few Performance Standards and Is Not
Independently Tested to Validate Manufacturers' Claims:

Plume Models for Analyzing Urban Dispersion of CBRN Agents Have Limited
Capabilities:

Data Gaps on How CBRN Releases Affect Urban Populations Are
Significant:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents:

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Commerce:

Tables:

Table 1: Fifteen Projected Homeland Security Threats and Their
Consequences:

Table 2: DHS's Radiation and Nuclear Detection Equipment Standards:

Table 3: Agency Missions to Develop, Independently Test, and Certify
CBR Detection Equipment for First Responders' Use:

Table 4: Six CBRN Models Federal Agencies and First Responders Use:

Table 5: Top Officials Exercises 1-4, 2000-2007:

Table 6: Chemical Warfare Agents:

Table 7: Biological Warfare Agents:

Table 8: Radiological Warfare Agents:

Figures:

Figure 1: A BioWatch Aerosol Collector:

Figure 2: NARAC's TOPOFF 2 Plume Prediction:

Figure 3: Dose Response for Healthy and General Population Exposures to
Sarin:

Abbreviations:

AEGL: acute exposure guideline level:

ALOHA: real Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres:

ASTM: American Society for Testing and Materials:

CAMEO: Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations:

CB: chemical and biological:

CBRN: chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear:

CDC: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention:

CFD: computational fluid dynamics:

DHS: Department of Homeland Security:

DNDO: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office:

DOC: Department of Commerce:

DOD: Department of Defense:

DOE: Department of Energy:

DTRA: Defense Threat Reduction Agency:

ECBC: Edgewood Chemical Biological Center:

EPA: Environmental Protection Agency:

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:

FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency:

FRMAC: Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center:

hazmat: hazardous materials:

HHA: handheld immunoassay:

HPAC: Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability:

HSC: Homeland Security Council:

HYSPLIT: Hybrid Single-Particle Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory:

IAB: InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization and
Interoperability:

IDA: Institute for Defense Analyses:

IMAAC: Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center:

IMS: ion mobility spectrometer:

LANL: Los Alamos National Laboratory:

LLNL: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory:

LODI: Lagrangian Operational Dispersion Integrator:

NARAC: National Atmospheric Release Advisory Center:

NIST: National Institute of Standards and Technology:

NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration:

NRC: National Research Council:

OFCM: Office of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and
Supporting Research:

OLES: Office of Law Enforcement Standards:

ORNL: Oak Ridge National Laboratory:

OSTP: Office of Science and Technology Policy:

QUIC: Quick Urban and Industrial Complex:

ppb: parts per billion:

ppm: parts per million:

RASCAL: Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis:

RKB: Responder Knowledge Base:

SAVER: System Assessment and Validation for Emergency:

Responders:

SAW: surface acoustic wave:

SCIPUFF: Second-order Closure Integrated Puff:

SHSP: State Homeland Security Program:

S&T: Science and Technology:

TIC: toxic industrial chemical:

TIM: toxic industrial material:

TOPOFF: Top Officials:

UASI: Urban Areas Security Initiative:

UDM: Urban Dispersion Model:

[End of section]

United States Government Accountability Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

June 27, 2008:

Congressional Requesters:

A terrorist act involving the use of a chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) agent or weapon presents an array of
complex issues to state and local responders. The responders, who may
include firefighters, emergency medical service personnel, and
hazardous materials technicians, must identify the agent or weapon so
that they can rapidly decontaminate victims and apply appropriate
medical treatments. They must also determine whether the agent has
spread beyond the incident site and what actions should be taken to
protect other people.

Since at least 2001, it has been recognized that CBRN materials might
be released by a terrorist act when letters laced with anthrax were
sent through the mail to two U.S. senators and members of the
media.[Footnote 1] The letters led to the first cases of anthrax
disease related to bioterrorism in the United States. In all, 22
persons contracted anthrax disease and 5 died in four states and
Washington, D.C. The anthrax attack highlighted the nation's
vulnerability. In 2002, the Congress enacted legislation to create the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), merging 22 separate agencies,
with the primary mission of protecting the United States against
conventional and unconventional attacks. In addition, the Homeland
Security Council (HSC), in coordination with DHS and other federal
agencies, identified nine possible scenarios involving the release of
CBRN materials in urban areas.[Footnote 2] In one scenario, for
example, terrorists release sarin in three city office buildings. In
this scenario, it is estimated that 6,000 people are killed and
economic damages amount to $300 million.

Typically, the first to show up in emergency situations like these are
local first responders.[Footnote 3] Local first responders are
responsible for identifying the nature of an emergency. In order to
respond to a CBRN event, first responders need timely and accurate
information about the type and quantity of agents released, where and
when they were released, and how far contamination is likely to spread.
Also critical for first responders is information on the potential
effects on civilian populations from exposure to concentrations of CBRN
materials.

In incidents caused by airborne CBRN releases, first responders' two
primary tools are (1) detection equipment to identify CBRN materials
released into the atmosphere and (2) information from plume models that
track airborne dispersion of CBRN materials and define the area of
contamination.[Footnote 4] In this report, we focus on the limitations
of these tools for first responders. Detection devices identify and
confirm in real time the chemical or particle stimuli by triggering
signals or alarms when certain sensitivity and specificity parameters
are detected. With respect to equipment first responders purchase with
DHS grant funds, DHS is required to establish and implement procedures
for developing and adopting standards for such equipment to ensure that
it meets a minimum level of performance, functionality, adequacy,
durability, sustainability, and interoperability. Information from
plume models is intended to help inform first responders--from analyses
of the models' mathematical and computer equations and incorporation of
field data--on the extent of a contaminated area. A comprehensive model
takes into account the material released, local topography, and
meteorological data, such as temperature, humidity, wind velocity, and
other weather conditions, and continually refines predictions with
field data.

In response to your request, we addressed the following questions: (1)
What are the limitations of detection equipment currently available for
first responders' use in identifying CBRN materials released in the
atmosphere? (2) What has DHS done with regard to developing and
adopting performance standards for CBRN detection equipment and testing
this equipment to verify its performance? (3) What are the limitations
of plume models first responders can use to track the dispersion of an
airborne release of CBRN materials, including toxic industrial
chemicals (TIC) and toxic industrial materials (TIM), in an urban
environment? and (4) What information is available to first responders
for determining the effects of exposure to CBRN materials on
populations in urban areas?

To assess the limitations of CBRN detection equipment available for
first responders' use, we interviewed federal program officials from
the Science and Technology (S&T) directorate of DHS and its Homeland
Security Advanced Research Projects Agency, from the Department of
Defense (DOD) Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) and Joint Program
Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense, and from the
Department of Energy's (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
(LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and Oak Ridge National
Laboratory (ORNL). We reviewed DHS, DOD, and DOE detection programs in
place and being developed, as well as these agencies' studies on CBRN
detection systems. We attended conferences and workshops on CBRN
detection technologies.

To obtain information on detection equipment standards and the testing
of CBRN detection equipment for first responders, we met with program
officials from DHS's Responder Knowledge Base (RKB) and the Department
of Commerce's (DOC) National Institute of Standards and Technology's
(NIST) Office of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES). We also interviewed
local responders in Connecticut, New Jersey, and Washington regarding
their acquisition of CBRN detection equipment. We chose these states
because of their participation in DHS-sponsored Top Officials (TOPOFF)
national counterterrorism exercises. In addition, we interviewed
members of the InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization and
Interoperability (IAB). IAB, made up of local, state, and federal first
responders, is designed to establish and coordinate local, state, and
federal standardization, interoperability, compatibility, and responder
health and safety to prepare for, train and respond to, mitigate, and
recover from any CBRN incident.

To assess the limitations of plume models, we interviewed modeling
experts from DHS, DOD, DOE national laboratories, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the Office of the Federal
Coordinator for Meteorological Service and Supporting Research (OFCM)
in DOC. We interviewed operations staff of the Interagency Modeling and
Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC) at LLNL. We also interviewed
local responders in Connecticut, New Jersey, and Washington regarding
the use of plume models during the TOPOFF 2 and TOPOFF 3 exercises.

We reviewed documentation on the various plume models and reports and
studies evaluating models available for tracking CBRN releases in urban
environments and studies identifying future needs and priorities for
modeling homeland security threats. We attended several conferences and
users' workshops sponsored by the American Meteorological Society, DOD,
OFCM, and George Mason University, where modeling capabilities were
evaluated. We also reviewed DHS internal reports on lessons learned
from the use of modeling during TOPOFF national exercises.

To identify the information first responders have for determining the
effects of exposure to CBRN materials on heterogeneous civilian
populations, we reviewed agency documentation and studies on urban land
use and population density. We also reviewed documentation on acute
exposure guideline levels published by the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and other organizations. In addition, we reviewed studies
on human toxicity estimates by the U.S. Army and DOE national
laboratories. (More detail on our scope and methodology is in appendix
I.)

We conducted our review from July 2004 to January 2008 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief:

More than 6 years after the events of September 11, 2001, local first
responders do not have tools that can accurately and quickly identify
the release of CBRN material in an urban environment. While DHS and
other agencies have undertaken initiatives to improve first responders'
tools, these tools have many limitations for identifying CBRN materials
released in urban environments, the extent of their dispersion, and
their effect on urban populations. While equipment first responders use
for the detection of radiological and nuclear materials may be able to
identify the presence of these materials, they cannot predict the
dispersion of these materials in the atmosphere. No agency now has the
mission to develop, certify, and test equipment first responders can
use for detecting radiological materials in the atmosphere. Commercial
chemical and biological detectors that are available cannot detect all
agents and have varying sensitivity and specificity. According to DHS,
current detectors are considered generally inadequate to provide
information on the presence of chemical warfare agents at less than
lethal but still potentially quite harmful levels--that is, at higher
than permissible exposure levels. For suspected exposure to biological
threat agents, commercially available detection devices, such as
handheld immunoassays (HHA), are not always reliable, and evaluation
studies show that the devices have not passed acceptable standards for
effectiveness. BioWatch--DHS's nationwide environmental monitoring
system--does not allow first responders to obtain immediate real-time
information on potential biological pathogens released in the
atmosphere. Under the current BioWatch system, identification and
confirmation of biological warfare agents does not occur until several
hours to more than 1 day after release of the agent, and the quantity
of the agent released cannot be determined.

DHS has adopted very few performance standards for CBRN detection
equipment. As of October 30, 2007, DHS had adopted 39 total standards
for CBRN equipment but had adopted only 4 standards for radiation
detection instruments targeted at the interdiction and prevention of
smuggling radioactive material and none for chemical and biological
(CB) detection equipment. The remaining standards address personal
protective equipment such as respirators and protective clothing.

DHS officials told us that it has the mission to develop, independently
test, and certify CB detection equipment for first responders' use.
However, DHS officials stated that their mission to test and certify
chemical and CB detection equipment is limited to equipment that DHS is
developing for first responders; it does not extend to detection
equipment first responders buy from manufacturers. DHS does not have an
independent testing program to validate manufacturers' claims regarding
detection equipment for first responders. Consequently, first
responders are buying detection equipment that may or may not be
effective.

A number of nonurban plume models, supported by various agencies such
as DOD, DOE, EPA, and NOAA, are being used to track the atmospheric
release of CBRN materials for operational real-time applications.
However, interagency studies have concluded that these models have
significant limitations for analyzing the dispersion of CBRN materials
in urban settings. These models have not been adequately validated and
are not designed for complex built-up urban environments. DHS's
national TOPOFF 2 exercise in 2003 demonstrated that using several of
these models and different model inputs can produce contradictory
results, causing confusion among first responders. To overcome the
confusion over the use of multiple models during TOPOFF 2, DHS created
IMAAC in 2004. IMAAC was expected to serve as a single point for the
coordination and dissemination of federal dispersion modeling and
hazard prediction products during actual or potential CBRN incidents
requiring federal coordination. However, the results from the TOPOFF 3
exercise conducted in 2005 showed that despite IMAAC, problems with
coordinating modeling inputs and results continued. Exercise results
from the TOPOFF 4 exercise, conducted in 2007, showed improvement in
IMAAC's ability to minimize differences in plume modeling outputs and
provide one source for consequence predictions. However, decision
makers had difficulty interpreting the plume and consequence models
predicting radiation dispersal.

In addition, federal agencies have developed urban plume models
specifically for use in urban areas. Evaluation and testing of urban
plume models DHS, DOD, and DOE conducted in several full-scale field
experiments has shown an unpredictable range of uncertainty in urban
plume models' analyses that will not give first responders ground
truth--that is, the actual hazard area and the level and extent of
contamination on the ground. Model evaluations and field studies have
also shown that urban plume models cannot determine with certainty the
source term from a CBRN release--that is, the characteristics of the
material that was released and its rate of release--particularly for
estimating the source term of the release of TICs from accidents or
terrorist acts.

Significant gaps exist in information first responders have for
determining the effects of exposure to CBRN materials on heterogeneous
urban populations. Scientific research on the effects of low-level
exposure to CBRN material on civilian populations is severely lacking,
especially for vulnerable populations such as elderly people, children,
and individuals with compromised immune systems. A dose that may not be
lethal for a healthy young adult might be lethal for them. For example,
in the 2001 anthrax attack, many postal workers exposed to high
concentrations over a prolonged period did not develop the anthrax
disease, while an elderly woman in Connecticut with a compromised
immune system died, presumably from inhaling very few spores. Dose
response parameters for the general population also do not exist for
most chemical warfare agents believed to pose a threat to civilians.
Data are needed on exposure and dose assessments to identify vulnerable
populations and how to adjust individual and population post-event
activities and behavior to reduce casualties. Information on population
density, land use, and nearby complex terrain is especially critical.

We are making recommendations in this report to the Secretary of
Homeland Security for executive action to address shortcomings in
detection and modeling capabilities. Specifically, we recommend that
the Secretary of Homeland Security (1) reach agreement with other
agencies on which agency should have the mission and responsibility to
develop, test, and certify detection equipment that first responders
use to detect hazardous material releases in the atmosphere; (2) ensure
that manufacturers' claims are independently tested and validated
regarding whether their commercial off-the-shelf CBRN detection
equipment can detect given hazardous material at specific
sensitivities; (3) refine IMAAC's procedures by working with other
federal, state, and local agencies to (a) develop common/joint IMAAC
emergency response practices, including procedures for dealing with
contradictory plume modeling information, (b) refine the concept of
operations for chemical, biological, and radiological releases, and (c)
delineate the type and scale of major CBRN incidents that would qualify
for IMAAC assistance; and (4) in conjunction with IMAAC, work with the
federal plume modeling community to accelerate research and development
to address plume model deficiencies in urban areas and improve federal
modeling and assessment capabilities. Such efforts should include
improvements to meteorological information, plume models, and data sets
to evaluate plume models.

We obtained general comments on a draft of this report from DHS and DOC
(see apps. III and IV). DHS concurred with our recommendations but
stated that GAO should consider other scenarios as alternative ways of
looking at the present national capabilities for CBRN response and the
current status of testing and certification of detection equipment. DHS
stated that in one alternative scenario, first responders, in the event
of a terrorist attack, will use a variety of prescreening tools, and
they will be assisted immediately by state and federal agencies that
will bring the best available state-of-the-art CBRN detection
equipment.

In our report, we have considered scenarios in which first responders
are on the scene before federal assets arrive, not knowing what
hazardous materials (including CBRN agents) have been released, either
accidentally or by terrorist acts. In these situations, it is the first
responder who has to first determine what was released and what tools
to use to make that determination before receiving assistance from
state and federal agencies. As discussed in our report, by DHS's own
assessments, these state-of-the-art tools have significant limitations.

In its general comments on our draft report, DOC stated it believed
that even with the implementation of GAO recommendations aimed at
improving IMAAC operations, the plume models would still have several
limitations as a primary tool for tracking the release of CBRN
materials in urban areas. To improve information available for
emergency managers, DOC suggested offering a recommendation that DHS
work with the federal plume modeling community to accelerate research
and development to address plume model deficiencies in urban areas.
Such efforts should include improvements to meteorological information,
plume models, and data sets to evaluate plume models. We believe that
DOC's recommendation has merit and have included it in our final report
for DHS's consideration.

We received technical comments from DHS, DOD, DOE (LLNL), and NIST and
we made changes to the report where appropriate. Technical comments we
received from LLNL, in particular, proposed broadening the
recommendation related to revising IMAAC standard operating procedures
to deal with contradictory modeling inputs. IMAAC operations staff at
LLNL believed that integrated procedures with other emergency response
agencies are the key to clarifying plume modeling information. We
agreed and have revised our recommendation accordingly.

Background:

The National Strategy for Homeland Security characterizes terrorism as
"any premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human life or public
welfare that is intended to intimidate or coerce civilian populations
or governments."[Footnote 5] This definition includes attacks involving
CBRN materials. The National Strategy recognizes that the consequences
of such an attack could be far more devastating than those the United
States suffered on September 11: "a chemical, biological, radiological,
or nuclear terrorist attack in the United States could cause large
numbers of casualties, mass psychological disruption, contamination and
significant economic damage, and could overwhelm local medical
capabilities."[Footnote 6]

Government Responsibilities for Responding to CBRN Events:

State and Local Responsibilities:

State and local responders share in the responsibility for responding
to CBRN events, but local first responders play the key role because
they are the first to respond. The first line of defense in any
terrorist attack on the United States is its first responder community-
-police officers, firefighters, emergency medical providers, public
works personnel, and emergency management officials. Their role is to
protect against, respond to, and assist in recovery from emergency
events. Traditionally, first responders have been trained and equipped
to arrive at the scene of a natural or accidental emergency and take
immediate action.

Federal Responsibilities:

If state and local resources and capabilities are overwhelmed,
governors may request federal assistance. In his February 28, 2003,
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-5, the President
designated the Secretary of Homeland Security the principal federal
official responsible for domestic incident management. The directive
empowered the Secretary to coordinate federal resources used to respond
to or recover from terrorist attacks, major disasters, or other
emergencies in specific cases.[Footnote 7] The Secretary, in
coordination with other federal departments and agencies, is to
initiate actions to prepare for, respond to, and recover from such
incidents. The directive also called for the Secretary to develop a
National Response Plan to provide the framework for federal interaction
with nonfederal entities.[Footnote 8]

In addition, HSPD-8, issued on December 17, 2003, established policies
to strengthen first responder preparedness for preventing and
responding to threatened or actual domestic terrorist attacks.[Footnote
9] Among other things, it required DHS to provide assistance to state
and local efforts, including planning, training, exercises,
interoperability, and equipment acquisition for terrorist events. HSPD-
8 also required DHS to coordinate with other federal agencies and state
and local officials in establishing and implementing (1) procedures for
developing and adopting first responder equipment standards and (2)
plans to identify and address national first responder equipment
research and development needs.

First Responders' Challenges in CBRN Events:

First responders face difficult challenges when they arrive at the
scene of an accidental or terrorist release of CBRN agents in an urban
environment. Local police, fire, and emergency medical units would be
the first on the scene, attempting to control the situation while
requesting technical assistance, specialized units, and backup. County
and local hazardous materials (hazmat) teams and bomb squads would be
among the first units called to augment the first responders. A major
terrorist act involving CBRN materials might cause significant
casualties among the first responders. It is therefore critical that
they be able to quickly identify, locate, characterize, and assess the
potential effect of CBRN, explosive, or incendiary threats and
communicate this information rapidly and effectively.

The primary challenge facing first responders is knowing how to
identify and distinguish between CBRN releases. The first responders
need to be able to communicate what was released, the quantity of the
material released (and its purity, in the case of chemical agents),
where it is going, who is at risk, and how to respond. Of ultimate
interest are the human health and environmental effects, since exposure
to CBRN materials can kill or seriously injure people through their
physiological effects. A chemical agent attacks the organs of the human
body so as to prevent them from functioning normally. The results are
usually disabling and can even be fatal. However, DHS S&T officials
said that for biological agents, there "will be no first responders" in
the traditional sense of being present while the aerosol cloud is
present, and so they are not preferentially exposed in the initial
exposure. Follow-up investigation does pose additional risk to the
first responders from contamination and reaerosolization, but they can
be suitably protected by both personal protective equipment and
antimicrobials.[Footnote 10]

The danger that TICs and TIMs will be released in urban areas from
industrial and transportation accidents is also of concern.
Approximately 800,000 shipments of hazardous materials such as liquid
chlorine and ammonia travel daily throughout the United States by
ground, rail, air, water, and pipeline. Many are explosive, flammable,
toxic, and corrosive and can be extremely dangerous when improperly
released. They are often transported over, through, and under densely
populated areas, where a release could cause injury or death and
significant environmental damage.

Both international and domestic accidents illustrate the potentially
catastrophic effects of the release of TICs and TIMs. An accidental,
large-scale hazardous release in Bhopal, India, in 1984, killed
approximately 3,800 people and left thousands of people with permanent
or partial disabilities.[Footnote 11] More recently, on January 6,
2005, in Graniteville, South Carolina, a freight train pulling three
chlorine tanker cars and a sodium hydroxide tanker car collided with a
train parked on an industrial rail spur. Almost immediately, 11,500
gallons of chlorine gas released from the tankers caused 9 people to
die, 8 from inhaling chlorine gas, and at least 529 to seek medical
care for possible chlorine exposure. A visible cloud that spread
initially in all directions led local emergency officials to issue a
shelter-in-place order. South Carolina officials later declared a state
of emergency, under which local authorities evacuated 5,453 residents
within a mile's radius of the collision.

In contrast to chemical agents, biological agents can multiply in the
human body, significantly increasing their effects. Many biological
agents are highly virulent and toxic; they may have an incubation
period so that their effects are not seen for hours to days. According
to DHS, biological attacks that have the greatest potential for
widespread catastrophic damage include, but are not limited to,
aerosolized anthrax and smallpox.

When radioactive materials are incorporated and retained in the body,
the tissues in which the materials are concentrated, or in some
instances the whole body, can suffer significant radiation injury.
Radiation from deposited radiological material is a significant cause
of radiation exposures and potential casualties once the airborne plume
has passed. (Appendix II lists chemical, biological, and radiological
agents and their effects on human health.)

Planning scenarios DHS developed for use in federal, state, and local
security preparedness illustrate the difficult challenges first
responders face in CBRN events and the extent of potential injuries and
fatalities. Nine of the 15 possible scenarios in table 1 involve the
release of CBRN agents or toxic industrial materials in metropolitan
areas.

Table 1: Fifteen Projected Homeland Security Threats and Their
Consequences:

[See PDF for image]

Source: Congressional Research Service, The National Preparedness
System: Issues in the 109th Congress (Washington, D.C.: 2005).

[A] Includes injuries.

[End of table]

Tools Used to Identify and Track CBRN Materials:

First responders have two primary tools in CBRN events: (1) equipment
to identify CBRN materials in the atmosphere and (2) information from
plume models and field measurements that track the atmospheric
dispersion of CBRN materials. Detection devices identify and confirm
CBRN material stimuli by triggering signals or alarms when certain
sensitivity and specificity parameters are detected.

The sensitivity, specificity, and selectivity of CB detection equipment
are key performance characteristics. Biological detection equipment has
to be sensitive enough to detect very small amounts of biological
agents and also has to have a high degree of specificity in order to
distinguish biological agents from harmless biological and
nonbiological material in the environment. For chemical detectors,
sensitivity is the lowest concentration at which a chemical agent can
be detected. As with biological agents, the most challenging aspect of
identifying chemical agents with a detector is its selectivity in
extracting the agent of interest from other chemicals in the
environment. The sensitivity, specificity, and selectivity of CB
detection equipment also determine false positive or negative alarm
rates. Detectors should have minimal false positive and false negative
alarm rates.

Information from plume models is intended to help tell first
responders--from analyses of the models' mathematical or computer
equations or both--the extent of the contaminated area. In emergency
response, plume models are used to provide early estimates of
potentially contaminated areas and should be used in combination with
data gathered from the field. Model results are used to guide field
sampling, data from which, in turn, are used to update plume
predictions in a cyclical process until the effects have been
accurately characterized.

A comprehensive model takes into account the material released, local
topography, and meteorological data, such as temperature, humidity,
wind velocity, and other weather conditions. Plume modeling requires
several accurate components:

* meteorological data (for example, temperature, humidity, barometric
pressure, dew point, wind velocity and direction at varying altitudes,
and other related measures of weather conditions);

* data from global weather models to simulate large-scale weather
patterns and from regional and local weather models to simulate the
weather in the area of the chemical agent release and throughout the
area of dispersion;

* the source term, or the characteristics or properties of the material
that was released and its rate of release (for example, its quantity
and purity, vapor pressure, the temperature at which the material
burns, particle size distribution, its persistence and toxicity, and
height of release);

* temporal and geographical information (for example, transport and
dispersion processes such as whether the agent was initially released
during daylight hours, when it might rapidly disperse into the surface
air, or at night, when a different set of breakdown and dispersion
characteristics would pertain, depending on terrain, and plume height,
complex terrain, urban effects, and agent processes such as
environmental degradation and decay and growth rates for radiological
agents); and:

* information on the potentially exposed populations, such as dose
response (conversion of exposures into health effects), animals, crops,
and other assets that may be affected by the agent's release.

CBRN Detection Equipment Has Significant Limitations for First
Responders' Use:

Current CBRN detection equipment has significant limitations for first
responders' use in an event involving the release of CBRN materials in
an urban environment. First, the detection equipment first responders
now use for radiological and nuclear incidents cannot detect the
dispersal of radiological contamination in the atmosphere. Second,
according to DHS, chemical detection equipment is generally inadequate
to provide information on the presence of chemical warfare agents at
less than lethal but still potentially harmful levels. Third, for
biological detection equipment, the handheld assays first responders
use do not provide accurate information because of this equipment's
high level of false positives. In addition, BioWatch, the nationwide
environmental monitoring system, does not enable first responders to
obtain immediate real-time information about the effects of biological
pathogens released in the atmosphere.

Anti_Illuminati

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Re: ALERT: NWO ran Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague false flag runs 9+years in US
« Reply #8 on: December 13, 2009, 10:56:04 AM »
Current Radiological and Nuclear Detection Equipment First Responders
Use Cannot Detect the Dispersion of Releases in the Atmosphere:

While equipment first responders use for detecting radiological and
nuclear materials can detect the presence of significant amounts of
these materials, they cannot predict their dispersion in the
atmosphere. In addition, current handheld, compact devices such as
dosimeters and pagers are not able to detect low energy beta radiation
from some isotopes and are not capable of handling rugged and harsh
environments. DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) is
responsible for acquiring and supporting the deployment of radiation
detection equipment. However, this office has primarily emphasized
developing and deploying radiation detection equipment to secure cargo
container shipments at U.S. ports of entry to prevent smuggling
radioactive material into the United States. DNDO's Chief of Staff told
us that it does not consider its mission to include the development of
radiological detection equipment for local first responders to use in
identifying the release of radiological materials in the atmosphere. It
does not evaluate radiological detection equipment for first responder
use in consequence management.

We surveyed federal agencies involved with CBRN defense about their
mission in relation to radiological detection equipment for first
responders. DHS, DOD, DOE, EPA, NIST, and NOAA responded that they do
not have specific missions to develop, independently test, and certify
detection equipment for use by first responders in detecting
radiological materials in the atmosphere. However, DOD and DOE program
officials said that first responders can certainly use radiological
detection equipment DOD and DOE develop for other missions. In
addition, agencies such as DOE and EPA have some capability for
tracking airborne radiological materials--a capability that first
responders do not have. For example, we previously reported that DOE
can deploy teams that use radiation monitoring equipment, including
sensors mounted on aircraft and land vehicles, to detect and measure
radiation contamination levels and provide information to state and
local officials on what areas need to be evacuated.[Footnote 12] EPA
also has its RadNet system for airborne radiation monitoring.[Footnote
13]

Current Chemical Detection Equipment First Responders Use Cannot Detect
Harmful Concentrations:

According to DHS S&T's CB Division, significant investments have been
made toward the detection of chemical agents, largely led by DOD
investments, followed up by investments in the private sector to
exploit the marketplace. As a result, a number of options are available
for detecting these materials as vapor and liquids. However, according
to DHS S&T, current detectors can be used for rapid warning of
chemicals (warfare agents and TICs) as vapor but are considered
generally inadequate to provide information on the presence of chemical
warfare agents at less than lethal but still potentially quite harmful
levels--that is, higher than permissible exposure levels. DHS S&T
acknowledged that improvements are needed to meet sensitivities
necessary for real-time protection of the population and for
eliminating a tendency for high false-alarm rates. Improvements are
also needed in the selectivity of most common chemical detector
platforms. Anecdotal information led DHS S&T to make the following
general observations with regard to currently available detectors and
their ranking for performance for first responders' use:

* Mass spectrometer devices are the most sensitive chemical detectors
but are significantly costly and least frequently used by first
responders. These devices are also significantly heavier and larger, so
that they are typically bench-top, laboratory devices and not robust
handheld detectors that are more suitable for field deployment.

* Ion mobility spectrometers (IMS) and surface acoustic wave (SAW)
devices are next in selectivity but encounter frequent false positive
responses and are susceptible to interference by common materials such
as cleaners, pesticides, paint fumes, fire-fighting foams, and
combustion products. Hazmat teams and other responders use both types,
and they are used in protecting occupants of buildings, transit
systems, and the like.

However, DHS S&T has assessed the sensitivity of IMS and SAW for V and
G nerve agents as being in the low parts per billion (ppb) range--
approximately 2 ppb to 20 ppb--while the limit of detection is higher-
-at 200 ppb to 300 ppb--for blister agents such as mustard and
lewisite. According to DHS S&T, these sensitivities would detect some
agents at concentrations immediately dangerous to life and health but
would not easily detect other agents such as VX at concentrations that
are immediately dangerous to life and health. DHS S&T stated that first
responders could use IMS, SAW, and similar devices to monitor a
condition that is changing from dangerous to tolerable if the detectors
were used to provide guidance on the use of personal protective
equipment but cannot be used for rapid warning of dangerous conditions.

Photo-ionization, flame-ionization, and flame photometric detectors--
according to DHS S&T, prone to false positive alarms--can be improved
if chromatographic separation techniques are incorporated before
analyte streams are presented. However, DHS S&T officials state that
few current detectors first responders use have this technology.

DHS S&T officials stated that the limitations noted for detectors of
chemical warfare agents (cost and size; propensity for false positive
alarms) also apply to TICs, many of which can be detected by IMS and
SAW devices commonly in use. DHS S&T stated that electrochemical cells
(and a variety of slower responding detector tubes) are used to fill
the gaps in detection presented by IMS and SAW devices and expand the
number of TICs that can be detected. Detection sensitivity of the
electrochemical cells can range from ppb to low parts per million (ppm)
concentration ranges. In general terms, TICs can be detected at
concentrations considerably less than immediately dangerous, ranging in
times from seconds to a few minutes, depending on the detector. DHS
officials stated that these observations are based on an examination of
manufacturers' claims that in some cases have been independently tested
and evaluated.

First Responders' Handheld Biological Detectors Are Ineffective:

During the emergency response phase of a suspected exposure to a
biological threat agent, the only tool most likely available to first
responders would be HHAs. HHAs are small test strips that contain an
antibody to a specific biological agent. The assays require a
suspension of the suspect sample in a liquid supplied with the test
assay. Applying the liquid suspension to the strip yields a result in
approximately 15 minutes. A quality control test is built into all the
strips to indicate whether the assay materials are working properly.

However, according to officials in DHS S&T, HHAs do not have the
sensitivity to detect the atmospheric concentrations of agents that
pose health risks without large volume air collectors. A 2002
memorandum from the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
(OSTP) recommended against first responders' using HHAs. It stated
that:

"Recent scientific evaluation of these commercially available detection
systems concludes that this equipment does not pass acceptable
standards for effectiveness. Specifically, Bacillus anthracis detection
thresholds for these devices are well above the minimum level that can
infect personnel, and are not suitable for determining biological
determinants of personnel, rooms, or pieces of equipment. Many devices
have been shown to give a significant number of false positives, which
could cause unnecessary medical interventions with its own
risk."[Footnote 14]

OSTP's recommendation was based on a joint evaluation study by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Federal Bureau
of Investigation (FBI). Manufacturers of HHAs have expressed concern
regarding the study's methods, objectivity, and overall quality.

According to DHS S&T officials, since the 2002 OSTP guidance, DHS has
sponsored the development of standards for HHA detection of Bacillus
anthracis through AOAC International, AOAC testing of a number of HHAs,
and the development and propagation of ASTM International (originally
known as the American Society for Testing and Materials) standards for
sampling of white powders.[Footnote 15] ASTM International developed
standard E2458, Standard Practices for Bulk Sample Collection and Swab
Sample Collection of Visible Powders Suspected of Being Biological
Agents from Nonporous Surfaces, published in 2006. This standard was
developed by CDC, DHS, EPA, the FBI, and state and local hazmat
specialists.

DHS S&T officials noted that a biological attack is likely to be
covert, and since no visible signatures or odors are associated with a
release and people do not immediately fall ill, there will be no
indicators for a first responder to know there was an attack. First
responders for biological events are not likely to appear on the scene
until well after the primary release cloud has dispersed. Therefore,
all characterization is likely to be after the atmospheric release
cloud has passed. The hazards first responders will encounter are
surface contamination and any possible reaerosolization. In that case,
S&T officials stated, the information to characterize the affected
region is likely to come from environmental sampling (for example,
BioWatch, surface sampling, or native air collectors) coupled with
plume modeling and, as disease progresses, epidemiological information.

BioWatch Does Not Provide First Responders Real-Time Detection of
Biological Pathogens:

BioWatch is a nationwide environmental monitoring system for selected
biological pathogens but does not provide first responders real-time
detection of them. Under the current BioWatch system, a threat agent is
not identified until several hours to more than a day after the release
of the agent, and the system does not determine how much material was
released. DHS BioWatch officials said that the system gives a
qualitative rather than quantitative assessment of the release of
biological material.

BioWatch is funded and managed by DHS and coordinated with CDC and EPA.
LANL and LLNL provide technical support. BioWatch was designed to
detect the release of biological pathogens in the air through aerosol
collector units installed in several major U.S. cities. The units
collect airborne particles on filters, which are transported to
laboratories for analysis. Set up very quickly in early 2003, according
to DHS BioWatch Program officials, more than 30 jurisdictions now
participate in BioWatch. DHS spending for the BioWatch program during
fiscal years 2005 to 2007 was about $236 million.[Footnote 16]

The BioWatch network of sampling units collects aerosol samples daily
(fig. 1). Each aerosol collector has a single filter that traps aerosol
particles. Couriers collect the air filters every 24 hours and deliver
them to state or local public health laboratories, where they are
tested for the presence of the genetic material of six specific
biothreat pathogens. The BioWatch Laboratory assay, however, cannot
differentiate between infectious and noninfectious agents (that is,
live or dead germs).

Figure 1: A BioWatch Aerosol Collector:

This figure is a photograph of a BioWatch aerosol collector.

[See PDF for image]

Source: DHS.

[End of figure]

First responders cannot use BioWatch to immediately determine an
adequate response. While BioWatch is a detect-to-treat system designed
to detect a biological attack in advance of symptoms arising within a
population, it cannot help first responders make immediate medical
intervention decisions. BioWatch is not intended to detect a release
while it is in progress. It is intended to detect a release as soon
after an event as practical and before the onset of symptoms so as to
speed the delivery of medical countermeasures. DHS officials stated
that BioWatch was not intended as a tool for first responders. A
confirmed laboratory test result from a BioWatch sample, known as a
"BioWatch Actionable Result," is a data point used by the local
Director of Public Health and BioWatch Advisory Committee to determine
if the result has public health significance and, if it does, what
actions are necessary to address a potential problem. If a response is
necessary, the local jurisdiction's Incident Management System is used
to determine the nature and logistics of the response. First responders
may or may not be deployed.

The current BioWatch system can detect an aerosol attack with specific
threat agents within several hours to more than 1 day after the release
of the agents. This period of time includes the sample collection cycle
of 24 hours, transportation to public health laboratories, and
laboratory analysis to identify and confirm the agents used. According
to DHS BioWatch officials, in general, symptoms would not develop until
days to weeks after an attack.

However, experts have emphasized the importance of "real-time
detection" of biological agents as an element of an effective
biological detection system.[Footnote 17] The system should rapidly
recognize the release of likely biological agents before the onset of
clinical illness. Without the benefit of real-time biological
detection, a terrorist biological attack cannot be detected until the
clinical analysis of the initial outbreak of patients' demonstrating
symptoms and early fatalities. This delayed detection will allow
disease to progress rapidly within the population and grow to
potentially epidemic proportions. Real-time detection enables first
responders to take action to limit the number of people exposed to the
agent, allowing time to warn others before they are exposed and reduce
the number of infections. Real time has been defined as 30 seconds or
less from the time potential material reaches the device until an alarm
is triggered.[Footnote 18]

DHS officials stated that public health officials in the jurisdictions
where BioWatch collectors are located can and plan to use BioWatch
information immediately to make decisions about responses. They noted
that a wide range of decisions is possible and that a specific course
of action depends on such factors such as current intelligence about
threats, the type of agents detected, the amount detected, the number
of BioWatch collectors affected, and information from medical
surveillance systems. BioWatch is moving toward next- generation
technology, which will provide autonomous collection and detection and
better time resolution than current BioWatch collector units.

CBRN Detection Equipment Has Few Performance Standards and Is Not
Independently Tested to Validate Manufacturers' Claims:

First responders are hampered by the slow development of CBRN equipment
detection standards. The CBRN detection equipment that first responders
and other DHS grantees buy with DHS grant funds must comply with
equipment performance standards adopted by DHS. However, DHS has
adopted very few standards for this equipment, and the adoption of
accepted standards has lagged behind the pace at which new products
enter the market. In addition, according to our survey of federal
agencies, DHS has the primary mission to develop, independently test,
and certify CB detection equipment for first responders' use. However,
DHS does not independently test and validate whether commercially
available CBRN detection equipment can detect specific agents at
specific target sensitivities claimed by the manufacturers.

DHS Grant Funds Allow First Responders to Acquire CBRN Detection
Equipment:

DHS's grant funding to states allows first responders to purchase
commercially available CBRN detection equipment. First responders may
use DHS's major grant funding under the State Homeland Security Program
(SHSP) and Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) to buy equipment from
the 21 categories on DHS's authorized equipment list. Detection
equipment, category 7, is available for CBRN detection. For biological
detection, for example, this includes field assay kits, protein test
kits, DNA and RNA tools, and biological sampling kits, but descriptions
and features, models and manufacturers, and operating considerations
are not identified.

In the states we visited, we obtained information on detection
equipment bought with DHS grant funds in 2003-2005. For example, in
Seattle and the state of Washington, state agencies, hazmat teams, and
local fire departments in 11 counties acquired CBRN detection equipment
with about $3.2 million of SHSP and UASI grant funds in 2004-2005.
Seattle alone purchased CBRN detection equipment, mostly chemical
detection equipment, at a cost of about $500,000, primarily with UASI
grants. According to the Assistant Chief of the Seattle Fire
Department, about 20 to 26 hazmat teams served nine counties, varying
widely in composition and equipment, with small populations and rural
teams not having the capabilities of those in urban areas. Connecticut
spent about $1.8 million in DHS grants for CBRN detection equipment in
2003-2005.

DHS Has Adopted Few Performance Standards for CBRN Detection Equipment:

The purpose of standards for equipment is to ensure that equipment
meets a minimum level of performance, functionality, adequacy,
durability, sustainability, and interoperability. Adopting uniform
standards for equipment helps first responders in procuring and using
equipment that is safe, effective, and compatible. DHS works with a
number of federal agencies and private organizations in developing
standards for CBRN detection equipment, including NIST and
IAB.[Footnote 19] DHS's Standards Subject Area Working Groups and these
organizations work, in turn, with standards development organizations
such as ASTM and the National Fire Protection Association.

DHS's S&T directorate is the focal point for adopting CBRN detection
equipment standards. According to a 2006 DHS Office of Inspector
General report on DHS's adoption of equipment standards, S&T can adopt
standards that apply to equipment first responders purchase with DHS
grant funds, but it cannot develop mandatory standards for equipment
because it has no authority to regulate the first responder
community.[Footnote 20] In addition, DHS S&T has no regulatory
authority to compel first responders to purchase equipment not
purchased with federal funds that conforms to S&T adopted standards or
to order manufacturers not to sell equipment that does not meet these
standards. NIST's OLES identifies needed performance standards and
obtains input from others, such as IAB.[Footnote 21]

As of October 30, 2007, DHS had adopted 39 total standards, but only 4
of them were for CBRN detection equipment. In February 2004, it adopted
4 standards for radiation and nuclear detection equipment. These
standards address first responders' priorities for personal radiation
detection and devices for detecting, interdicting, and preventing the
transport of radioactive material rather than the detection of the
atmospheric spread of radiation materials. Table 2 shows standards DHS
adopted for radiation and nuclear detection equipment.

Table 2: DHS's Radiation and Nuclear Detection Equipment Standards:

Standard: Performance criteria for alarming personal radiation
detectors for homeland security;
Requirement: Design and performance criteria and testing methods for
evaluating performance;
Function: Pocket-sized instruments carried on the body to detect the
presence and magnitude of radiation.

Standard: Radiation detection instrumentation for homeland security;
Requirement: Design and performance criteria, test and calibration
requirements, and operating instruction requirements;
Function: Portable radiation detection instruments to detect photon-
emitting radioactive substances for detection, interdiction, and hazard
assessment.

Standard: Performance criteria for handheld instruments for detecting
and identifying radionuclides;
Requirement: Test procedures and radiation response requirements and
electrical, mechanical, and environmental requirements;
Function: Instruments to detect and identify radionuclides, gamma dose
rate measurement, and indication of neutron radiation.

Standard: Evaluation and performance of radiation detection portal
monitors for use in homeland security;
Requirement: Testing and evaluation criteria;
Function: Radiation detection portal monitors to detect and interdict
radioactive materials that could be used for nuclear weapons or
radiological dispersal devices.

Source: DHS.

[End of table]

However, DHS has not adopted any standards for CB detection
equipment.[Footnote 22] The remaining standards address personal
protective equipment such as respirators and protective clothing. NIST
officials told us that it generally takes 3 to 5 years for an equipment
standard to achieve full consensus from the network of users,
manufacturers, and standards development organizations before final
publication. DHS, however, noted that standards for radiation detection
equipment and powder sampling were developed in 12 to 18 months.

DHS Has the Primary Mission to Develop, Independently Test, and Certify
First Responders' Chemical and Biological Detection Equipment:

We surveyed major federal agencies involved with CBRN defense about
their missions to develop, independently test, and certify CBR
detection equipment for first responders' use. To certify CBR detection
equipment is to guarantee a piece of equipment as meeting a standard or
performance criterion into the future. Certification must be based on
testing against standards. According to DHS, certification is the
attestation that equipment has been tested against standards using
approved testing protocols by an accredited test facility. Table 3
shows agency responses to our survey, in which we found that only DHS
indicated it has the missions to develop, independently test, and
certify CB detection equipment for first responders' use.

Table 3: Agency Missions to Develop, Independently Test, and Certify
CBR Detection Equipment for First Responders' Use:

[See PDF for image]

Source: GAO.

[End of table]

According to DHS, DHS's components, principally the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA) and the Office of Health Affairs, in
conjunction with IAB, identify first responders' needs for CB detection
equipment. However, DHS officials stated that their mission to test and
certify CB detection equipment is limited to equipment that DHS is
developing for first responders; it does not extend to detection
equipment they purchase from commercial manufacturers.

DHS Is Not Independently Testing Manufacturers' Claims about CBRN
Detection Equipment:

DHS does not independently test and validate whether commercially
available CBRN detection equipment can detect specific agents at
specific target sensitivities claimed by the manufacturers. Although
manufacturers may test equipment in a controlled laboratory environment
using simulants, live agent testing and field testing by independent
authorities provides the best indication of performance and
reliability.

DHS S&T acknowledged that it does not have a testing program to
independently test the performance, reliability, and accuracy of
commercial CBRN detection equipment and determine whether specific,
currently available detectors can detect at specific target
sensitivities. No organized DHS evaluation and qualification program
now guides and informs first responders on their purchases of chemical,
biological, and radiological detection equipment. DHS relies on
manufacturers' claims and anecdotal information in the open literature;
it has not routinely tested or verified manufacturers' claims regarding
equipment's ability to detect hazardous material at specific
sensitivities.

DHS stated that test data may be found for some systems examined under
its earlier Domestic Preparedness Program or other agency programs such
as EPA's Environmental Technologies Verification Program.[Footnote 23]
However, we have not independently evaluated what, if any, CBRN
technologies they have evaluated. Moreover, the testing is often at the
anecdotal level since few copies of a given detector model are tested
in these programs. DHS further stated that because the manufacturers'
claims and, where available, limited testing data for different models
of the detector systems are quite varied, compiling data at a
reasonable confidence level would require a substantial current market
survey.

DHS S&T officials said that manufacturers have asked DHS to establish a
process for validating biodetection equipment. One official said that
first responders are purchasing biodetection equipment that is "junk"
because there are no standards and testing programs. Local and state
first responders we interviewed also said that they often test and
validate manufacturers' claims on their own. For example, Washington
State Radiation Protection officials said that in one instance they
tested one brand of new digital dosimeters they were planning to
purchase against those they already used. They found that the brand
tested consistently read only 40 percent of what their current
dosimeters and instruments read.

DHS has two programs in place to provide first responders with
information about CBRN detection equipment. One program, DHS's System
Assessment and Validation for Emergency Responders (SAVER) program,
assesses various commercial systems that emergency responders and DHS
identify as instrumental in their ability to perform their jobs. The
assessments are performed through focus groups of first responders who
are asked for their views on the effectiveness of a given technology
based on a set of criteria.[Footnote 24] The criteria address the
equipment's capability, usability, affordability, maintainability, and
deployability. However, DHS officials acknowledged that SAVER neither
conducts independent scientific testing to determine the extent to
which the equipment can detect actual chemical warfare agents nor tests
or verifies manufacturers' claims regarding the equipment's ability to
detect given hazardous material at specific sensitivities. As of
October 2007, SAVER had conducted assessments of IMS chemical
detectors, multisensor meter chemical detectors, photo-ionization and
flame-ionization detectors, radiation pagers, and radiation survey
meters, but it had not tested or verified manufacturers' claims
regarding commercial off-the-shelf CBRN detection equipment's ability
to detect given hazardous material at specific sensitivities. We have
not independently evaluated the SAVER assessments.

The other information source for first responders is DHS's RKB, a Web-
based information service for the emergency responder community. RKB is
a one-stop resource that links equipment-related information such as
product descriptions, standards, operational suitability testing, and
third-party certifications. As of October 2007, it included 1,127
certifications for equipment on DHS's authorized equipment list and 268
reports of operational suitability testing of CBRN equipment by such
organizations as the U.S. Army's Edgewood Chemical Biological Center
(ECBC).[Footnote 25]

Information available to first responders on CBRN detection equipment
sensitivities comes largely from vendors' claims, either directly from
a vendor or through vendor-maintained specification sheets on the RKB,
reference guides NIST has developed, and reference guides ECBC has
developed. The information in the guides is based on literature
searches and market surveys and includes manufacturers' statements on
product capabilities. However, the guides do not contain any testing
data that would validate the manufacturers' claims. The guides,
recently incorporated on DHS's SAVER Web site, also have not kept pace
with emerging technology. They include the 2007 ECBC biological
detector market survey, the 2005 NIST biological agent detection
equipment guide, and the 2005 NIST chemical agent detection equipment
selection guide.

Plume Models for Analyzing Urban Dispersion of CBRN Agents Have Limited
Capabilities:

Federal agencies such as DHS, DOD, DOE, and EPA have developed several
nonurban plume models for tracking the atmospheric release of CBRN
materials. Interagency studies, however, have concluded that these
models have major limitations for accurately predicting the path of
plumes and the extent of contamination in urban environments. Current
models commonly used in emergency response do not have the resolution
to model complex urban environments, where buildings and other
structures affect wind flow and the structure and intensity of
atmospheric turbulence. DHS's national TOPOFF exercises have also
demonstrated that the use of several competing models, using different
meteorological data and exercise artificiality, can produce
contradictory results, causing confusion among first responders.

Evaluations and field testing show that urban plume models federal
agencies have developed specifically for tracking the release of CBRN
materials in urban areas have some of the same limitations as the older
models used for emergency response. The new models show much
variability in their predictions, and obtaining accurate source term
data on the release of TICs is also a problem.

Nonurban Plume Models Have Limitations for Emergency Response to CBRN
Events in Urban Environments:

When using information from nonurban plume models in CBRN events, first
responders may have to choose from the multiple models that various
agencies support for tracking the release of CBRN materials. Several
federal agencies operate modeling systems, including DHS, DOD, DOE,
EPA, NOAA, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. U.S. interagency
studies, however, have concluded that these models have major
limitations. For example, according to OFCM, in the Department of
Commerce, most of the more than 140 documented modeling systems used
for regulatory, research and development, and emergency operations
purposes, and for calculating the effects of harmful CBRN materials,
are limited in their ability to accurately predict the path of a plume
and the extent of contamination in urban environments. Table 4 shows
examples of models that federal agencies and first responders have
developed and used to predict the path of the plume for multiple CBRN
materials.

Table 4: Six CBRN Models Federal Agencies and First Responders Use:

Agent modeled: Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear;
Model: * HPAC: Hazard Prediction and Assessment Capability;
* SCIPUFF: Second- order Closure Integrated Puff;
Agency: Defense Threat Reduction Agency.

Agent modeled: Chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear;
Model: LODI: Lagrangian Operational Dispersion Integrator;
Agency: * Department of Energy;
* Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory/National Atmospheric Release
Advisory Center.

Agent modeled: Chemical;
Model: * ALOHA: Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres;
* CAMEO: Computer-Aided Management of Emergency Operations;
Agency: * Environmental Protection Agency;
* National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Agent modeled: Chemical;
Model: HYSPLIT: Hybrid Singe-Particle Lagrangian Integrated Trajectory;
Agency: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration.

Agent modeled: Radiological;
Model: HOTSPOT;
Agency: * Department of Energy;
* Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory.

Agent modeled: Radiological, nuclear;
Model: RASCAL: Radiological Assessment System for Consequence Analysis;
Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Source: OFCM.

[End of table]

OFCM provides the coordinating structure for federal agencies involved
in modeling and has established interagency forums and working groups
that have developed studies evaluating models available to address
homeland security threats. In an August 2002 study, OFCM and other
agencies evaluated 29 modeling systems used operationally by either
first responders or federal agencies.[Footnote 26] The study concluded
that (1) few models had been tested or validated for homeland security
applications; (2) their ability to predict the dispersal of chemical,
biological, or radiological agents through urban buildings, street
canyons, and complex terrain was not well developed; and (3) they could
provide only a rudimentary description of the nocturnal boundary layer
and not the more complex turbulence resulting from complex buildings,
terrain, and shorelines.[Footnote 27]

According to DOD officials, many of these models were not developed for
emergency response. For example, DOD developed HPAC as a model for
counterproliferation purposes, but first responders also use
it.[Footnote 28] In addition, DOD officials said that some of the
deficiencies OFCM noted have been somewhat addressed with the
development of urban plume models. (We discuss urban plume models later
in the report.)

A 2003 National Research Council (NRC) study on modeling capabilities
reached essentially the same conclusions, stating that plume models in
operational use by various government agencies were not well designed
for complex natural topographies or built-up urban environments and
that, likewise, the effects of urban surfaces were not well accounted
for in most models.[Footnote 29] No one model had all the features
deemed critical--(1) confidence estimates for the predicted dosages,
(2) accommodation of urban and complex topography, (3) short execution
time for the response phase, and (4) accurate if slower times for
preparedness and recovery. Both fast execution response models and
slower, more accurate models needed further development and evaluation
for operational use in urban settings, according to NRC.

In urban areas, buildings and street canyons separating them often
cause winds that are almost random, making it exceedingly difficult for
models to predict or even describe how CBRN materials are dispersed
when released. Buildings create complex wind and turbulence patters in
urban areas, including updrafts and downdrafts; channeling of winds
down street canyons; and calm winds or "wake" regions, where toxic
materials may be trapped and retained between buildings. Since most
existing models have little or no building awareness, they could be
misapplied in urban settings with fatal consequences. According to LLNL
modeling experts, misinterpretation of modeling results is a key issue
facing first responders. Many users assume that models are more
accurate than warranted, because of the impression left by model
predictions showing that individual buildings may actually not be
accurately predicting fine-scale features, like the location of hot
spots and plume arrival and departure times.

Obtaining information on the source term, or the characteristics of
CBRN materials released, is also a problem with current models,
especially in complex urban environments. When modeling is used in an
emergency, characterizing the source term and local transport is
typically the greatest source of uncertainty. First responders' key
questions are, What was released, when, where, and how much? Locating
the source and determining its strength based on downwind concentration
measurements is complicated by the presence of buildings that can
divert flow in unexpected directions. Answers may not be available or
may be based on uncertain and incomplete data that cannot be confirmed.
For example, evidence of the release of a biological agent may not be
known for days or weeks, when the population begins to show symptoms of
exposure, becomes ill, and is hospitalized.

Information from four basic categories of models is available to first
responders today:

1. Gaussian plume or puff models, widely used since the 1940s, can be
run quickly and easily by nonspecialists. They typically use only a
single constant wind velocity and stability class to characterize
turbulence diffusion. They can be reasonably reliable over short ranges
in situations involving homogeneous conditions and simple flows, such
as unidirectional steady state flow over relatively flat terrain. The
CAMEO/ALOHA model is a Gaussian plume model that has been widely
distributed to first responders.

2. Lagrangian models (puff and particle) provide more detailed
resolution of boundary layer processes and dispersion. Puff models
represent plumes by a sequence of puffs, each of which is transported
at a wind speed and direction determined by the winds at its center of
mass. Lagrangian particle models use Monte Carlo methods to simulate
the dispersion of fluid marker particles.[Footnote 30] These models can
capture plume arrival and departure times and peak concentrations.
Examples of models in this category include HPAC (puff model), HYSPLIT
and LODI (particle models).

3. Computational fluid dynamics (CFD) are first principles physics
models that simulate the complex flow patterns created in urban areas
by large buildings and street canyons. CFD models provide the highest
fidelity transport and diffusion simulations but are computationally
expensive compared to Gaussian or Lagrangian models. They can take
hours or days to run on a large computer. However, CFD models can
capture plume arrival and departure times and peak concentrations.

4. Empirical urban models are derived from wind tunnel and field
experiment data. These models incorporate urban effects by explicitly
resolving buildings. Such models are not considered as accurate as CFD
models because of their empirical basis, particularly for the highest
temporal and spatial resolutions and near-source regions. They need to
be carefully validated. Examples include the Urban Dispersion Model and
the Quick Urban and Industrial Complex dispersion modeling system.

For example, EPA and NOAA developed the CAMEO/ALOHA model specifically
for first responders' use. Widely used by state and local first
responders, it originated as an aid in modeling the release of TICs but
has evolved over the years into a tool for a broad range of response
and planning. CAMEO is a system of software applications used to plan
for and respond to chemical emergencies and includes a database with
specific emergency response information for over 6,000 chemicals. ALOHA
can plot a gas plume's geographic spread on a map. It employs an air
dispersion model that allows the user to estimate the downwind
dispersion of a chemical cloud based on the toxicological and physical
characteristics of the released chemical, atmospheric conditions, and
specific circumstances of the release.

However, like any model, CAMEO/ALOHA cannot be more accurate than the
information given to it to work with. Even with the best possible input
values, CAMEO/ALOHA can be unreliable in certain situations, such as at
low wind speeds, very stable atmospheric conditions, wind shifts and
terrain steering effects, and concentration patchiness, particularly
near the spill source of a release. CAMEO/ALOHA does not account for
the effects of byproducts from fires, explosions, or chemical
reactions; particulates; chemical mixtures; terrain; and hazardous
fragments. It does not make predictions for distances greater than 6.2
miles (10 kilometers) from the release point or for more than an hour
after a release begins, because wind frequently shifts direction and
changes speed.

TOPOFF 2 Revealed Weaknesses in Coordinating Plume Modeling Efforts:

That using several competing models supported by different agencies can
produce contradictory results and confuse first responders was
highlighted during DHS's TOPOFF 2003 and 2005 exercises. The TOPOFF
exercises are biennial, congressionally mandated, national
counterterrorism exercises designed to identify vulnerabilities in the
nation's domestic incident management capability. They test the plans,
policies, procedures, systems, and facilities of federal, state, and
local response organizations and their ability to respond to and manage
scenarios depicting fictitious foreign terrorist organizations
detonating or releasing simulated CBRN agents at various locations in
the United States. One important aim is to identify any seams, gaps,
and redundancy in responsibilities and actions in responding to the
simulated attacks. DHS's after-action reports for each exercise showed
continuing problems in the coordination of federal, state, and local
response and in information sharing and analysis. The four TOPOFF
exercises conducted 2000-07 are summarized in table 5.

Table 5: Top Officials Exercises 1-4, 2000-2007:

Table: Top Officials Exercises 1–4, 2000–2007:

Exercise: 1;
Date: May 20–24, 2000;
Place: Portsmouth, N.H;
Type of agent release simulated: Mustard gas.

Exercise: 1;
Date: May 20–24, 2000;
Place: Denver, Colo;
Type of agent release simulated: Pneumonic plague.

Exercise: 1;
Date: May 20–24, 2000;
Place: Washington, D.C;
Type of agent release simulated: Radiological dispersion device.

Exercise: 2;
Date: May 12–16, 2003;
Place: Chicago, Ill;
Type of agent release simulated: Pneumonic plague.

Exercise: 2;
Date: May 12–16, 2003;
Place: Seattle, Wash;
Type of agent release simulated: Radiological dispersion device.

Exercise: 3;
Date: April 4–8, 2005;
Place: New London, Conn;
Type of agent release simulated: Mustard gas.

Exercise: 3;
Date: April 4–8, 2005;
Place: New Jersey;
Type of agent release simulated: Pneumonic plague.

Exercise: 4;
Date: October 15–20, 2007;
Place: Guam;
Type of agent release simulated: Radiological dispersion device.

Exercise: 4;
Date: October 15–20, 2007;
Place: Phoenix, Ariz;
Type of agent release simulated: Radiological dispersion device.

Exercise: 4;
Date: October 15–20, 2007;
Place: Portland, Ore;
Type of agent release simulated: Radiological dispersion device.

Source: DHS.

[End of table]

TOPOFF 2, 3, and 4 used plume models. In TOPOFF 2, on May 12-16, 2003,
federal, state, local, and Canadian responders, leaders, and other
authorities reacted to a fictitious foreign terrorist organization's
detonation of a simulated radiological dispersal device, or dirty bomb,
in Seattle.[Footnote 31] It showed the federal government's inability
to coordinate and properly use atmospheric transport and dispersion
models. According to DHS internal reports, critical data collection and
coordination challenges significantly affected the response to the
attack in Seattle and the ability to get timely, consistent, and valid
information to top officials.

During the exercise, different federal, state, and local agencies and
jurisdictions used different plume models to generate predictions,
which led to confusion and frustration among the top officials. Seattle
and Washington state officials told us that federal agencies provided
modeling results not based on the preplanned series of scenario events
exercise planners had established. They said that some of the data used
to create the differing models had been made up in order to drive a
federal agency's objectives for the exercise and bore no relationship
to data that responders gathered at the scene.

For example, Seattle City Emergency Management officials from the fire
and police departments said that the city was operating on readings it
received from the Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center
(FRMAC) while the state modeled a larger area for the plume.[Footnote
32] Washington state officials also said that the deposition data
received from field teams were not consistent with the National
Atmospheric Release Advisory Center's (NARAC) plume modeling
predictions.[Footnote 33] NARAC modeling experts, however, stated that
NARAC provided plume model predictions and worked with FRMAC to update
model predictions as data became available. NARAC plumes were later
found to be consistent with the ground truth used in the exercise. They
attributed the disparity of data from the field to plume modeling
predictions to exercise artificiality and the improper generation and
interpretation of simulated exercise data for state-deployed field
teams.

Washington State Emergency Management officials stated that the
"canned" weather patterns factored into the model conflicted with real-
time weather reports. Running counter to typical norms, they went
almost directly against the prevailing winds and "straight as an arrow"
where the terrain would certainly have diverted their path. Confusion
resulted from models being generated using different meteorological
inputs. The resulting plume models were contradictory. NARAC/IMAAC
modeling experts stated that the exercise called for the ground truth
scenario to be based on the canned winds and that contradictory results
were obtained by exercise players who did not use the ground truth
scenario canned weather.[Footnote 34] However, NOAA modeling experts
said that the ability of the TOPOFF exercises to identify gaps in plume
modeling was limited by the use of canned weather patterns. In a real
situation, the models would be run with current weather data.

Further, in TOPOFF 2, coordination was lacking between state and local
and federal plume modeling. For example, the Seattle Emergency
Operations Center contacted NARAC after the explosion, as called for in
the exercise scenario, to have it generate a prediction of where the
plume would travel. NARAC's product (shown in fig. 2) was provided to
the Seattle, King County, and Washington State emergency operations
centers, as well as to FEMA and other federal agencies. However, the
Washington State Department of Health also generated a plume prediction
with a HOTSPOT modeling program, adding to the confusion. In addition,
several federal agencies developed their own plume predictions to make
internal assessments concerning assets that might be required. As a
result, while Seattle, King County, Washington State, and federal
officials all had access to NARAC plume modeling results, state and
federal agencies still chose to use other available models for
information from which to make their preliminary decisions.

Figure 2: NARAC's TOPOFF 2 Plume Prediction:

This figure is a map of NARAC's TOPOFF 2 plume prediction.

[See PDF for image]

Source: NARAC, LLNL.

[End of figure]

The Creation of the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment
Center:

The confusion over the use of multiple modeling tools in TOPOFF 2 led
DHS to establish IMAAC in 2004 as an interagency center responsible for
producing, coordinating, and disseminating predictions for airborne
hazardous materials. NARAC is the designated interim provider of IMAAC
products. According to NARAC and IMAAC program officials, IMAAC's goals
are to provide one point of contact for decision makers, eliminate
confusing and conflicting hazard predictions, and distribute "common
operating picture" predictions to federal, state, and local agencies
with key information such as plume hazard areas, expected health
effects, protective action recommendations (such as for sheltering or
evacuation), and the affected population. NARAC and IMAAC staffs are
available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to provide support and
detailed analyses to emergency responders.

IMAAC does not replace or supplant the atmospheric transport and
dispersion modeling activities of other agencies whose modeling
activities support their missions. However, IMAAC provides a single
point for the coordination and dissemination of federal dispersion
modeling and hazard prediction products that represent the federal
position during actual or potential incidents requiring federal
coordination. IMAAC aims to draw on and coordinate the best available
capabilities of participating agencies. It entered into a memorandum of
understanding with several agencies in December 2004, including DOD,
DOE, EPA, and NOAA, on their roles and responsibilities for supporting
and using IMAAC's analyses and products. According to NARAC and IMAAC
operations staff, NARAC and IMAAC can provide an automated prediction
for CBRN events within 5 to 15 minutes.

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Re: ALERT: NWO ran Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague false flag runs 9+years in US
« Reply #9 on: December 13, 2009, 10:57:47 AM »
TOPOFF 3 Revealed Continuing Problems in Coordinating Plume Modeling
Results:

TOPOFF 3, conducted April 4 to April 8, 2005, simulated the release of
mustard gas and a high-yield explosive in New London, Connecticut.
Despite the creation of IMAAC and its mission to coordinate the best
available modeling capabilities of federal agencies, TOPOFF 3 revealed
continuing problems in coordinating the results of competing modeling
outputs. Exercise results from DHS internal reports indicated that
IMAAC did not appear to have adequate procedures for dealing with
discrepancies or contradictions in inputs or modeling requests from
various agencies. Although numerous modeling analyses and predictions
were continually refined and confirmed as evidence and field
measurements were collected, conflicting and misleading data other
agencies submitted on the source of attack and hazard areas resulted in
confusion.

According to NARAC and IMAAC operations officials, however, IMAAC was
continuously in contact with state and local responders to resolve
discrepancies in modeling inputs and requests and to correct
misinformation. IMAAC provided its first modeling analysis 49 minutes
after it was notified of a truck bomb explosion near a large public
gathering in New London, Connecticut. The modeling prediction had
estimated that a 55-gallon drum of mustard agent could be released in a
small explosion involving a small truck and that the public could
suffer serious health effects. Connecticut officials said that initial
modeling was done when the hazmat teams arrived at the explosion site;
NARAC and IMAAC were contacted after 30 minutes, and the hazmat team
gave NARAC input. The NARAC modeling analysis was reviewed, but
information received from the FBI resulted in tweaks to the model.

A second IMAAC modeling analysis more than 2 hours after the explosion
determined that the truck explosion had not caused the observed blister
agent effects. Instead, reports of a small aircraft flying over the New
London City Pier area had led IMAAC to develop another analysis that
concluded that only an airplane's release could have caused the
casualties. In fact, about 2 hours before the truck explosion, a small
aircraft had flown over the New London City Pier, releasing mustard in
a gaseous form over the area. IMAAC operations officials stated that
they determined that the bomb could not have caused the mustard gas
casualties based on (1) information that exposure victims were
reporting at the time of the explosion and (2) its own analysis that
the size of the truck bomb explosion would have destroyed virtually all
chemicals that might have been associated with the bomb.

Five hours after the explosion, IMAAC developed a third modeling
analysis, based on the small aircraft's dumping the mustard agent,
estimating that the public gathering at the pier would develop
significant skin blistering, consistent with the casualty reports.
IMAAC refined this prediction, based on field data received from state
and local responders, and a fourth modeling analysis 10 hours after the
explosion predicted significant skin exposures and some inhalation
effects.

NARAC and IMAAC officials stated that IMAAC continuously informed users
that its analyses showed that the plane, and not the bomb, was the only
source of contamination consistent with available data but was unable
to correct other agencies' misperceptions. Several other agencies
insisted that the source of the blister agent was the truck bomb. IMAAC
continued during the next day to receive contradictory requests for
products that did not incorporate dispersion from an airplane. The
Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection requested an updated
model run, based on a ground release, and DHS's S&T instructed IMAAC to
produce model runs that did not include the airplane. The Connecticut
Joint Field Office also sought plume products that assumed either an
air or a ground release but not both. In addition, considerable
misleading information came from the field, according to IMAAC
operations, as additional field measurements were collected. This
misinformation resulted from state officials' claim that the FBI had
determined that the plane contained no chemicals. However, with
additional field data, IMAAC conducted another modeling analysis that
confirmed that a release from the aircraft was the only plausible
source. On the third day, IMAAC, with the full set of 158 field
measurements, again confirmed that the airplane's release was the
source.

According to Connecticut officials, contradictory data and analysis
caused confusion regarding the hazard area and whether to shelter the
population in place or evacuate. They stated that they received
definitive analyses from IMAAC that would allow people to evacuate
their premises. While weather forecasts indicated that rainfall would
wash away any mustard gas on the ground, EPA disagreed, interpreting
its own data as showing more contamination on the ground. EPA could
not, however, explain the origin of these data, and NARAC and IMAAC had
no knowledge of them. The issue was finally resolved by deciding not to
use the EPA data.

Exercise results from DHS internal reports concluded that IMAAC did not
appear to have adequate procedures for dealing with discrepancies or
contradictions in inputs or modeling requests from various agencies.
Among the recommendations made were that IMAAC (1) clarify processes
for receiving and reviewing other modeling products, (2) establish a
protocol for other modeling agencies to distribute to their consumers
on the purpose of IMAAC's product and guidelines for redistribution,
and (3) develop procedures on how IMAAC should handle discrepancies in
data inputs or product requests.

IMAAC officials do not concur with the exercise findings and
conclusions regarding the effectiveness of its federal plume modeling
coordination during the exercise. They state that significant progress
was demonstrated during TOPOFF 3 in coordinating federal plume modeling
despite the fact that TOPOFF 3 was conducted in April 2005, less than a
year after IMAAC's creation and the interagency agreement on its roles.
They further state that IMAAC successfully coordinated the federal
plume modeling to federal, state, and local agencies. There were no
"dueling federal plume models with inconsistent results," as were
observed during TOPOFF 2. However, the exercise did demonstrate a need
for procedures for dealing with conflicting modeling requests for
various agencies. IMAAC officials state that its procedures now call
for an IMAAC Operations Coordinator to coordinate modeling requests and
tasking.

IMAAC officials said that they were unable to obtain a copy of the
internal DHS report on exercise results from TOPOFF 3 and were not
given an opportunity to provide input and review and correct the
contents of the report. An official in FEMA's National Exercise
Division said that TOPOFF 3 had an established process for obtaining
comments from each of the participating agencies and from participants
within DHS. However, the official could not explain why IMAAC was not
given a copy of the report and a chance to provide comments.

An IMAAC Technical Working Group developed the first version of its
standard operating procedures in December 2005. However, it described a
generalized concept of operations that does not specify procedures for
coordinating modeling inputs from other agencies or procedures for CBRN
incidents. The initial procedures identified as a key issue the need to
clarify the type and scale of what would constitute a major CBRN
incident that qualifies for IMAAC assistance. The procedures described
the various levels of engagement and notification for activation of
IMAAC but did not define the type and scale of what constitutes an
incident qualifying for IMAAC assistance.

IMAAC's director said that the use of plume modeling during TOPOFF 2
and 3 primarily showed the lack of coordination among the participants
on how to use technology. State and local responders are not required
to use IMAAC plots, and IMAAC does not become the single federal point
for coordinating and disseminating federal dispersion modeling and
hazard prediction products until a significant CBRN event is declared.
Agreement must be obtained from all federal agencies before a
coordinated response can be implemented.

* Although officials from DHS's S&T stated that the concept of
operations and specific procedures for CBRN incidents were to be
completed by the end of 2006, IMAAC's standard operating procedures
have not yet been revised to (1) develop common/joint IMAAC emergency
response practices with federal, state, and local agencies for dealing
with contradictory plume modeling information from other agencies
during a CBRN event; (2) refine the concept of operations for chemical,
biological, and radiological releases; and (3) delineate the type and
scale of major CBRN incidents that would qualify for IMAAC assistance.

The issue of how a significant CBRN incident is to be defined was
clarified in the 2006 National Response Plan Notice of Change, and the
new IMAAC activation language has been changed to support "incidents
requiring federal coordination." NARAC and IMAAC officials noted that
while these procedures are important, they would not have affected the
confusing field information in TOPOFF 3. In addition, operating
procedures were meant to cover only the interim period, until the
permanent configuration of IMAAC has been determined.

TOPOFF 4 Shows Improvements in Coordinating Plume Modeling but
Difficulties in Interpreting Results:

TOPOFF 4 was conducted October 15-19, 2007, and used a radiological
dispersal device scenario that included coordinated attacks in Guam,
Portland, Oregon, and Phoenix, Arizona. On April 10, 2008, FEMA
released its initial analysis and impressions of the exercise in an
"After Action Quick Look Report." Regarding plume modeling conducted
during the exercise, the report stated that IMAAC provided consequence
predictions and that there were no "dueling plume models," as was
observed during TOPOFF 2. According to the report, the processes
established after TOPOFF 2 to minimize differences in plume modeling
outputs and provide one source for consequence predictions appeared to
be effective. IMAAC models were requested and used in all venues and
decision makers appeared to understand that the model was only a
prediction and would be periodically upgraded as actual data were
collected and analyzed.

However, the report noted that while most federal, state, and local
agencies were familiar with IMAAC and its responsibility for producing
consequence predictions, they had difficulty interpreting the plume and
consequence models predicting radiation dispersal. Local decision
makers had to rely on state and local subject matter experts during the
first 24 to 48 hours of the response for immediate protective action
recommendations. The report stated that it proved to be a challenge to
get that expertise to key state and local decision makers during the
exercise.

The Chief of the Exercise Division at DHS stated that a better format
was needed for decision makers, such as governors and mayors without
scientific backgrounds, to use to interpret model predictions and
communicate these predictions to the public.

Urban Plume Models Give Variable Predictions:

Model evaluations and field testing show that plume models federal
agencies have developed specifically for tracking the release of CBRN
materials in urban areas have some of the same limitations as the older
models used for emergency response. Few models have been sufficiently
validated against meaningful urban tests, and these models are not yet
used regularly in emergency response applications. The urban models
show much variability in their predictions, and obtaining accurate
source term data is also a problem. Three such models are the Urban
Dispersion Model (UDM), Quick Urban and Industrial Complex (QUIC)
dispersion modeling system, and CT-Analyst.[Footnote 35]

UDM, a component of the DTRA HPAC modeling suite shown in table 4, is a
Gaussian puff model designed to calculate the flow of dispersion around
obstacles in an urban environment. According to modeling experts,
Gaussian models are fast (less than a second), but their precision is
poor. DTRA entered into a cooperative agreement in fiscal year 2000
with the United Kingdom's Defence Science and Technology Laboratory and
Defence Research and Development Canada to develop UDM. The program's
objective was to enhance HPAC models in an urban domain.

In fiscal year 2000, the UDM program's first year, it developed an
initial urban modeling capability; it implemented a special version of
HPAC in fiscal year 2001, added three new urban modeling components and
conducted two dispersion experiments in fiscal year 2002, conducted the
largest urban dispersion experiment in history in collaboration with
DHS and performed independent verification and validation of the urban
modules in fiscal year 2003, and included operational urban
capabilities in fiscal year 2004.[Footnote 36] UDM combines the
standard HPAC developed for rural environments with urban canopy wind
and turbulence profiles, urban dispersion models, and an urban flow
model. It was used at the 2001 U.S. presidential inauguration, 2002
Salt Lake Winter Olympics, 2004 Democratic and Republican conventions
in Boston and New York City, and other high- profile events.

UDM was subjected to a validation and verification program that
compared model predictions against a comprehensive selection of
measurements drawn from a database of field experiment trials. It was
compared with three different field trials covering ranges from tens of
meters to kilometers. Model predictions showed a typical error of
greater than 50 percent of the mean, and more than 54 percent of the
predictions were within a factor of 2.[Footnote 37] However, the field
trials also showed a trend toward underprediction at close-in distances
and overprediction at greater distances from the source. The model was
found to overestimate plume width with increasing distance and, as a
result, to underestimate plume concentration.

The QUIC dispersion modeling system produces a three- dimensional wind
field around buildings, accounts for building-induced turbulence, and
contains a graphic user interface for setup, running, and
visualization. QUIC has been applied to neighborhood problems in
Chicago, New York City, Salt Lake City, and Washington, D.C. QUIC has
medium speed (1 to 10 minutes) and fair accuracy, according to modeling
experts.

The Naval Research Laboratory and other groups have developed models,
like CT-Analyst, that use CFD for fast-response applications. According
to LLNL modeling experts, CFD models provide the highest fidelity
simulations of the transport and diffusion of hazardous materials but
are computationally more expensive and slow to operate. They can
capture transient phenomena, such as plume arrival and departure times
and peak concentrations. Accurate knowledge of peak concentrations is
critical for determining the effect of many chemical releases, for
which the health effects depend on instantaneous or short-term peak
exposures rather than time-integrated dose. CFD models can predict the
variation of concentrations over small (1-second) time scales and over
small grid volumes (about 1 cubic meter).

Evaluations and field testing have shown an unpredictable range of
uncertainty in urban dispersion models' analyses.[Footnote 38] A series
of urban field experiments have been sponsored by a number of agencies
since 2000. In October 2000, DOE sponsored a meteorological and tracer
field study of the urban environment and its effect on atmospheric
dispersion. Called Urban 2000, the study included seven intensive
nightlong operation periods in which extensive meteorological
measurements were made and tracer gases of sulfur hexafluoride and
perfluorocarbon were released and tracked across Salt Lake
City.[Footnote 39] Led by DOE and several DOE National Laboratories,
the study covered distances from the source ranging from 10 meters to 6
kilometers. DTRA, U.S. Army Dugway Proving Ground, and NOAA also
participated.

In one evaluation of six urban dispersion models using the Salt Lake
City field data, it was found that while the six models did a good job
of determining the observed concentrations and source term, there were
indications of slight underpredictions or overpredictions for some
models and some distances.[Footnote 40] The urban HPAC model slightly
overpredicted at most distances; another evaluation of HPAC found
consistent mean overpredictions of about 50 percent.[Footnote 41] For
HPAC model predictions of the lateral distance scale of concentration
distribution, HPAC predicted within a factor of 2 only about 50 percent
of the time.[Footnote 42]

In another 2003 evaluation, conducted by the Institute for Defense
Analyses (IDA), it was found that, in general, urban HPAC overpredicted
the observed concentrations and dosages of URBAN 2000.[Footnote 43] Of
20 model configurations examined (four model types each considered with
five weather input options), 19 led to overpredictions of the total
observed concentration or dosage. The IDA study concluded that the
general overprediction of the URBAN 2000 observations by the Urban HPAC
suite is a relatively robust conclusion. HPAC predictions of 30-minute
average concentrations or the 2-hour dosage were plagued, in general,
by substantial overpredicitons. Model predictive performance was also
degraded at the longer downwind distances.

An evaluation of QUIC found that the model predicted concentrations
within a factor of 2 of the measurements 50 percent of the
time.[Footnote 44] According to LANL modeling experts, QUIC performed
reasonably well, slightly underestimating the decay of the
concentrations at large distances from the source. However, it also
significantly underpredicted lower concentrations at large distances
downwind.

A field study called Joint Urban 2003 and sponsored by DHS, DOE, and
DTRA was conducted in Oklahoma City in July 2003. Its objectives were
similar to those of URBAN 2000. The study included a series of
experiments to determine how air flows through the urban area both day
and night and to learn about the concentrations in the air of sulfur
hexafluoride and perfluorocarbon.

A 2006 IDA study that used the Joint Urban 2003 data to assess the
Urban HPAC capabilities found significant differences in model
performance, depending on time of day. Daytime performance was better
than nighttime for meteorology inputs but with a large day-night
discrepancy.[Footnote 45] The urban subcomponents of the HPAC model,
the urban canopy, urban dispersion model, and urban wind field module
all tended to underpredict at day and overpredict at night. A 2007 IDA
study confirmed that there was a substantial difference in the
performance of Urban HPAC as a function of day and night.[Footnote 46]
For all meteorology inputs IDA used, daytime releases tended to be
underpredicted and nighttime releases tended to be overpredicted.

LANL found that QUIC model predictions of Joint Urban 2003 tracer
releases underestimated concentrations up to a factor of 10. An LLNL
assessment of the performance of CFD models that also used data from
Joint Urban 2003 found that CFD models did not capture the effects of
turbulence and winds caused by nocturnal low-level jets--that is, winds
during the night at altitudes of 400 meters above ground. Turbulence
generated by these low-level jets can induce mixing that reaches the
surface, thereby influencing the dispersion of hazardous materials.

The New York City Urban Dispersion Program conducted field studies in
March 2005 and August 2005 that evaluated seasonal variations in the
New York City area. The aim was to learn about the movement of
contaminants in and around the city and into and within buildings and
to improve and validate computer models that simulate the atmospheric
movement of contaminants in urban areas. Inert perfluorocarbon and
sulfur hexafluoride were released to track air movement. More than 200
samplers collected tracer samples at more than 30 locations.

Results from the New York City field experiments found that first
responders should always use wind directions measured at the tops of
tall buildings for making approach and evacuation decisions and that
ready availability of building-top winds is essential. According to
NOAA modeling experts, however, such data are not always routinely
available. NARAC modeling experts also said that wind speeds will not
necessarily reflect the complex flows that occur at ground and building
levels, where the wind may be moving in completely different
directions. In addition, the experiment found that first responders
should be aware that:

* hazardous clouds may be encountered one to two blocks upwind from a
known or suspected release site,

* the roofs of nearby tall buildings for street-level releases should
not be considered safe havens because of the rapid vertical dispersion
around buildings, and:

* wind sensors should not be automatically located with CBRN detectors
and winds should not be measured adjacent to CBRN detectors in street
canyons in order to interpret the direction or extent of a release
location.

According to modeling experts, urban modeling systems require
additional field evaluation. NOAA's modeling experts have noted that
even after several field studies and evaluations have been conducted,
very limited data are available to evaluate models under varying urban
and meteorological conditions and to lead the improved simulations of
difficult situations such as light winds and at the interface with the
environment of buildings, subways, and the like. They believe that
additional tracer studies should be conducted to address these issues.
LLNL modeling experts stated that funding is not sufficient to make use
of all the data generated by field studies in order to improve
understanding of key urban processes, evaluate model performance, and
build improved urban models.

Urban Plume Models Have Limitations for Estimating the Source Term of
Toxic Industrial Chemical Releases:

According to unclassified assessments, the most likely type of toxic
chemical attack on the United States would involve dual-use chemicals
from industrial sources. The 13 highest-priority TICs are inhalation
toxics that are shipped in large quantities; the most dangerous are
those with low boiling points that are transported as pressurized
liquids. According to modeling experts, the highest- priority TICs from
the perspective of rail or truck transport are ammonia, chlorine, and
sulfur dioxide. They are stored and shipped as pressurized liquefied
gases, have low boiling points, and result in dense two-phase (gas and
liquid) clouds. Recent rail accidents have shown that these chemicals,
released as a dense, two-phase cloud of gas and small but visible
aerosol drops, would spread initially in all directions and follow
terrain slopes. Modeling experts believe that this area needs
improvement in source emissions models.

Source emissions formulas and models included in comprehensive, widely
used models such as HPAC have been extensively reviewed. A study for
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, for example, indicated
that while HPAC provides some source emissions algorithms for
industrial chemical release scenarios, many emissions scenarios remain
difficult to model.[Footnote 47] It is difficult to model emissions
scenarios such as the quick release of pressurized liquid ammonia or
chlorine from a rail car or tanker truck, the plume from a burning
pool, the geometry and physical and chemical characteristics of a
boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion or an intentional explosion,
and any release in complex terrain. The 2007 version of HPAC does not
consider two-phase releases. In addition, sufficient field data for
most real scenarios do not exist because it is too dangerous to carry
out a full-size experiment such as the release of the total contents of
a rail car carrying chlorine or the explosion of a large propane
storage tank.[Footnote 48] Available source emissions algorithms are
based on theory and on small-scale field and laboratory experiments.

LANL, the developer of QUIC, has been working to enhance QUIC's ability
to address dense gas two-phase releases in the midst of buildings. LANL
has also been enhancing QUIC's ability to deal with other issues that
arise with chemical, biological, and radiological releases in cities:
multiple-particle size releases and their deposition characteristics on
building surfaces, the buoyant rise of particles after an explosive
release of material, and the influence of building-induced winds on
buoyant rise and dispersion. DHS and DTRA are also investigating
critical data and physics gaps for chemical source term models that
need to be solved in order to develop appropriate source term models.
In addition, NARAC is improving the capability of its CFD urban model,
FEM3MP, to combine complex source terms, dense gas effects, chemical
reactions, and building-scale effects.

DOD's development of the Joint Effects Model relies on the ability to
extract and derive key information on CBRN source term from available
CBRN and meteorological sensors and to use this information to predict
the CBRN downwind hazard. According to DTRA, the Joint Effects Model
will provide the military with a single validated ability to predict
and track CBRN and TIC effects, as well as estimates of the source
location and source term and the ability to make refined dispersion
calculations. It was scheduled for full operation by fiscal year 2009,
and the second increment of JEM, scheduled to be operational by fiscal
year 2011, will include the ability to predict hazard areas and effects
for urban areas.

Data Gaps on How CBRN Releases Affect Urban Populations Are
Significant:

Urban plume models rely, as we have shown, on a wide range of data, but
the difficult challenges in modeling the transport and dispersion of
CBRN materials in complex urban settings have shown significant gaps in
the data on how CBRN releases would affect urban populations. First,
exposure rates the population would experience in an urban environment
would be affected by the physical environment and where people work and
live. Existing urban databases, however, have significant gaps in both
quantity and quality of information on land use and complex urban
terrain; knowledge as to where critical populations are located is also
needed to focus predictions. Second, scientific research on the health
effects of low-level exposure to CBRN material on civilian populations
is lacking, especially for vulnerable populations at risk.

Urban Databases Have Significant Gaps:

Urban land use type--residential, commercial, industrial--is used in
meteorological models to assign building structure and composition
parameters and other surface characteristics to the underlying terrain.
Mesoscale meteorological models and many atmospheric plume models do
not have the spatial resolution to simulate the fluid dynamics near and
around buildings and other urban land features. Urban canopy parameters
have been developed to allow plume models to simulate the effects of
buildings and urban land features on plume transport and dispersion,
wind speed and direction, and turbulent mixing.

Accurate urban land use definition is therefore an important component
in modeling efforts. The ability to conduct modeling in urban areas,
however, is typically limited to the use of a single or simplistic set
of land use categories that do not provide explicit information on the
effect of buildings and surfaces on the flow and transport of hazardous
substances in the air. Determining the structure and composition of
urban areas has resulted in the development of large datasets of high-
resolution urban features for many of the nation's largest cities. The
National Building Statistics Database, for example, contains data for
17 U.S. cities at a 250-meter grid cell resolution. This database
contains mean building heights and other such statistics. It also
contains high-rise district footprints for 46 of the most populous
cities. In addition, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and
the U.S. Geological Survey have created a database of urban building
footprints and heights in various cities.

Several efforts have been made to improve urban databases for urban
plume modeling, such as creating a database for day and night
populations. Geographic information that includes population density
data is essential for a fast, effective first response to disasters and
is the common thread in all planning, response, and recovery
activities. Using geographic information systems and remote sensing,
ORNL developed LandScan, a global population distribution model,
database, and tool from census and other spatial data. LandScan is a
collection of the best available census counts for each U.S. county and
four key indicators of population distribution--land cover, roads,
slope, and nighttime lights. Census tracts are divided into 1-kilometer
grid cells, and each cell is evaluated for the likelihood of its being
populated on the basis of the four indicators. The total population for
each tract is then allocated to each cell, weighted to the calculated
likelihood of being populated. ORNL's LandScan 2006 developed a high-
resolution daytime population database.

According to DTRA, DOD efforts have added the number and quality of
city databases available to 75 cities in the continental United States,
with new ones added periodically. DTRA officials stated that
enhancements in the UDM suite of urban domain characterizers have
significantly improved the overall urban transport and dispersion
modeling capability.

According to NOAA weather experts, the standard national meteorological
observing network does not provide sufficient spatial resolution to
resolve local conditions that influence urban plumes. While a number of
"mesonets" provide meteorological observations with relatively high
spatial resolution over a limited domain, the quality of data from them
varies significantly, according to NOAA officials.[Footnote 49] They
stated that to provide reliable data for plume predictions, mesonet
design should be considered, the quality of data from relevant mesonets
should be characterized, and appropriate data screening and
transformation approaches should be developed. Research is required to
determine how best to incorporate urban mesonet data into plume models.

Establishing Urban test beds has been proposed as a way to provide
critical data to improve urban plume modeling. An Urban test bed is a
multifunctional infrastructure of atmospheric instruments that provide
continuous, multiyear measurement and archival environmental data
across a metropolitan area and through the atmospheric boundary layer.
An Urban test bed would be used to support improvements in a range of
activities from scientific research to user applications. In a
September 2004 study, OFCM and other agencies recommended the
implementation of multiple Urban test beds.[Footnote 50] Urban test
beds would provide (1) long term, continuous, high-resolution,
meteorological observations of the urban domain and (2) long-term
measurement and archiving of measurement data on atmospheric processes
and modeling in urban environments. NOAA has implemented a dispersion
measurement test bed called DCNet in Washington, D.C., to provide
dispersion computations for planning and possible response.

According to LLNL modeling experts, a major issue has been how to
provide cost-effective access to building, land use, population, and
other geographic databases as well as local meteorological data,
establish common formats for databases, and enforce quality assurance
standards.

Data Are Insufficient on How Exposure to CBRN Materials Affects Health:

Significant gaps exist in first responders' information for determining
the effects of exposure to CBRN materials on heterogeneous urban
populations. Scientific research on the effects of low-level exposure
to CBRN material on civilian populations is severely lacking,
especially for vulnerable populations such as elderly people, children,
and individuals with compromised immune systems. A dose that may not be
lethal for a healthy young adult might be lethal for such persons. For
example, in the 2001 anthrax attack, many postal workers exposed to
high concentrations over a prolonged period did not develop anthrax
disease, while an elderly woman in Connecticut with a compromised
immune system died, presumably from inhaling very few spores. Data are
needed on exposure and dose assessments to identify vulnerable
populations and how to adjust individual and population postevent
activities and behavior to reduce numbers of casualties.

Knowing health effects from exposure to chemical agents depends on a
hierarchy of EPA-published chemical exposure limits and chemical dose-
response relationships as used in modeling. EPA has assigned three
acute exposure guideline levels (AEGL) to TICs that could represent
dangerous inhalation exposure from releases to air by accident or
terrorist action. AEGLs are threshold exposure limits for the general
public and apply to emergency exposure periods ranging from 10 minutes
to 8 hours. They are intended to help protect most people in the
general population, including those who might be particularly
susceptible to the deleterious effects of chemical substances, and are
expressed as an airborne concentration in parts per million or
milligrams per cubic meter. However, dose response parameters for the
general population do not exist for most CB warfare agents believed to
pose a threat to civilians. For radiological exposures, DHS and EPA
provide Protective Action Guidelines that identify the radiation levels
at which state and local officials should take various actions to
protect human health during an accident.

At AEGL-1, the general population, including susceptible individuals,
could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain
asymptomatic nonsensory effects. The effects are not disabling and are
transient and reversible when exposure ceases. At AEGL-2, the
experience could be irreversible or could consist of other serious,
long-lasting adverse health effects or an impaired ability to escape.
At AEGL-3, the experience would be life-threatening or fatal.

For chemicals for which AEGLs have not been established, the Emergency
Response Planning Guidelines of the American Industrial Hygiene
Association are used. If neither EPA nor the Association has
established a value for a chemical, then DOE's temporary emergency
exposure limits are used.

AEGLs and other estimates attempt to describe the lower end of the dose
response curve for particular chemical agents. Dose response parameters
for the general population do not exist for most CB warfare agents
believed to pose a threat to civilians. LLNL modeling experts stated
that for chemical weapon and biological agents, they determine health
effects levels from literature reviews. Toxicity estimates for the
general population are required for hazard prediction models. Data are
needed on exposure and dose assessments to identify populations at risk
from primary or secondary contact and how to adjust individual and
population postevent activities and behavior to reduce casualties.
According to the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, 50 percent
lethal concentrations and dosages are unknown for most chemicals, and
detailed information on high-volume chemicals and processes is not
widely available.[Footnote 51]

Little scientific research has been done on the effects of low-level
exposure to CBRN material on civilian populations, especially
vulnerable populations at risk. ECBC has the task of providing human
chemical warfare agent toxicity estimates for the general population,
together with supporting analyses. According to ECBC studies, most of
the available toxicological data underlying human toxicity estimates
for chemical warfare agents were generated in support of chemical
weapons development for offensive battlefield deployment against
military personnel, who at the time of the studies were nearly all
male. Thus, the available human data represent a very limited segment
of the population--relatively young, fit male soldiers. Using military
values for civilian scenarios would therefore result in the
underestimation of civilian casualties and the overall threat to
civilian populations from potential or actual releases. ECBC has been
developing mathematical models to estimate general population toxicity
values from previously established military values. For example, figure
3 shows dose response curves for the fraction of a healthy military
population and of the general population that would be killed by a 2-
minute exposure to sarin.

Figure 3: Dose Response for Healthy and General Population Exposures to
Sarin:

This figure is a combination line graph showing dose response for
healthy and general population exposures to sarin. The X axis
represents the dose, and the Y axis represents the fraction of
population.

[See PDF for image]

Source: LLNL, DOE.

[End of figure]

Conclusions:

Despite several initiatives and investments DHS and other agencies have
undertaken since 2001, first responders do not have effective tools to
respond to events involving the release of CBRN materials in urban
areas. Detection systems are limited in their ability to provide the
timely and accurate information first responders need about the release
of CBRN materials in urban areas to make decisions on expected health
effects and protective action--for example, sheltering and evacuation.
Existing nonurban and urban plume models for emergency response to CBRN
events have several limitations as a primary tool for tracking the
release of CBRN materials in urban areas and for making decisions about
handling them. National TOPOFF exercises have also shown the problems
and confusion that could occur to first responders' responses to CBRN
events from disparate modeling inputs and results. In addition, more
data are needed about the effects of hazardous materials in built-up
urban environments. Continued improvements are needed in urban building
and population databases and for understanding the health effects from
concentrations of hazardous substances, especially on vulnerable
populations, so that first responders are properly prepared for
addressing airborne releases of harmful materials in urban areas.

Led by DHS, ongoing federal efforts have attempted to improve the
capabilities of detection systems and models so that first responders
can accurately identify CBRN materials released in urban environments,
the extent of their dispersion, and their effect on urban populations.
For detection equipment, one shortcoming that should be addressed is
the lack of emphasis on the development of detection equipment that
first responders can use to detect radiological materials in the
atmosphere. DHS has recognized the threat of a terrorist attack
involving the explosion of radiological dispersal devices--or dirty
bombs--and has used this as a scenario in TOPOFF exercises. However,
DHS's development of radiation detection equipment has largely focused
on the interdiction of radioactive material rather than on detecting
the release of radioactive material into the atmosphere in urban areas.
We found that agencies such as DHS, DOD, EPA, NIST, and NOAA do not
have missions to develop, independently test, and certify equipment for
detecting radiological materials in the atmosphere.

Another shortcoming is the lack of a formal DHS system to independently
test and validate the performance, reliability, and accuracy of CBRN
detection equipment that first responders acquire. While DHS indicated
it has missions to develop, independently test, and certify CB
detection equipment for first responders' use, its testing and
certification are limited to equipment DHS is developing and does not
extend to equipment developed by commercial manufacturers. As we have
noted, DHS has no evaluation and qualification program that guides and
informs first responders on the veracity of manufacturers' claims about
the performance of their CBRN detection systems. DHS has no control
over what manufacturers can sell to first responders and cannot order
first responders not to purchase a certain piece of equipment, unless
purchased with federal funds. A formalized process needs to be
established for the evaluation and validation of manufacturers' claims
regarding commercial biodetection equipment.

While existing urban plume models have several limitations as a primary
tool for tracking the release of CBRN materials in urban areas, the
TOPOFF exercises demonstrated the larger problem of confusion among
first responders about the timing, value, and limitations of plume
models and other analyses following a CBRN event. At best, models can
give a close approximation and can help inform a decision maker on the
probable plume. The TOPOFF exercises demonstrated that plume model
results developed without the incorporation of field data are only
estimates that should be used for guidance but are not an accurate
rendition of the actual situation facing first responders. Plume models
are most effectively used to provide early estimates of potentially
contaminated areas in combination with data gathered from the field.
These data, in turn, are used to update plume model predictions.

The major weakness of these models is that any real source release is
nearly always more complicated than the simple scenarios studied in the
field and wind tunnel experiments they are based on. Real sources tend
to vary in time and space and to occur when the atmosphere is variable
or rapidly changing. A small change in wind direction or height of
release can result in a different or a more or less populated area
being affected. During the TOPOFF exercises, first responders and
decision makers used plume model predictions as real- time information
on which to base decisions.

In addition, the TOPOFF 2 and 3 exercises demonstrated that while IMAAC
is designated the focal point for coordinating and disseminating
modeling products, it does not have adequate procedures to deal with
discrepancies or contradictions from competing models from various
agencies. DHS's preliminary assessment of the TOPOFF 4 exercise found
improvement in IMAAC's coordination of federal plume modeling to
minimize differences in model outputs and provide one source for
consequence predictions. However, IMAAC Operations officials said the
key to "deconflicting" plume modeling information is to have procedures
that are coordinated and integrated with those of first responders and
other local emergency response agencies. IMAAC also does not have a
concept of operations or specific procedures for significant CBRN
incidents. A key issue is the need to clarify the type and scale of
what major incident could constitute a potentially significant CBRN
event and qualify for IMAAC assistance.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

We recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security:

* reach agreement with DOD, DOE, EPA, and other agencies involved with
developing, testing, and certifying CBRN detection equipment on which
agency should have the missions and responsibilities to develop,
independently test, and certify detection equipment that first
responders can use to detect hazardous material releases in the
atmosphere;

* ensure that manufacturers' claims are independently tested and
validated regarding whether their commercial off-the-shelf CBRN
detection equipment can detect given hazardous material at specific
sensitivities;

* refine IMAAC's procedures by working with other federal, state, and
local agencies to (1) develop common/joint IMAAC emergency response
practices, including procedures for dealing with contradictory plume
modeling information from other agencies during a CBRN event; (2)
refine the concept of operations for chemical, biological, and
radiological releases; and (3) delineate the type and scale of major
CBRN incidents that would qualify for IMAAC assistance; and:

* in conjunction with IMAAC, work with the federal plume modeling
community to accelerate research and development to address plume model
deficiencies in urban areas and improve federal modeling and assessment
capabilities. Such efforts should include improvements to
meteorological information, plume models, and data sets to evaluate
plume models.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

We obtained written comments on a draft of this report from DHS and the
Department of Commerce. DHS concurred with our recommendations but
stated that GAO should consider other scenarios as alternative ways of
looking at the present national capabilities for CBRN response and the
current status of testing and certifying detection equipment. DHS
stated that in one alternative scenario, first responders, in the event
of a terrorist attack, will use a variety of prescreening tools, and
they will be assisted immediately by state and federal agencies that
will bring the best available state-of-the-art CBRN detection
equipment.

In our report, we have considered scenarios in which first responders
are on the scene before federal assets arrive, not knowing what
hazardous materials (including CBRN agents) have been released, either
accidentally or by terrorist acts. In these situations, it is the first
responder who has to first determine what was released and what tools
to use to make that determination before receiving assistance from
state and federal agencies.

By DHS's own assessments, these state-of-the-art CBRN detection tools
have significant limitations. DHS acknowledged that first responders do
not now have any equipment that can detect the dispersion of
radiological and nuclear materials in the atmosphere. DHS's S&T
Directorate assessed that while current detectors can be used for rapid
warning of chemicals in the vapor phase, they are generally considered
inadequate to provide information on the presence of chemical threat
agents at less than lethal but still potentially harmful levels.
According to DHS's S&T, HHAs, the tool that first responders would use
to detect biological threat agents, do not have the sensitivity to
detect the atmospheric concentrations of agents that pose health risks.
Moreover, the detection of biological agent aerosols and particulates
through the current BioWatch sample collection and laboratory analysis
process is time-consuming and labor intensive, with final confirmation
occurring long after initial exposure.

With respect to testing and validation of commercial CBRN detection
equipment available for first responder use, DHS stated that there is
no legislative requirement that such equipment for homeland security
applications meet performance standards. DHS also believes that it will
never be feasible for the federal government to fund testing of all
commercial detectors without first assessing their potential merits for
detection of CBRN agents because of the very large number of hazardous
CBRN agents and the expense of testing detectors against these agents.

While there is no legislative requirement that CBRN detection equipment
for homeland security meet performance requirements, we noted in our
report that DHS does require that commercial detection equipment first
responders purchase with DHS grant funds comply with equipment
performance standards adopted by DHS. However, DHS has adopted few
performance standards for CBRN detection equipment. Without such
standards, first responders may purchase detection equipment that does
not detect harmful levels or whose performance varies. Without
standards, there would be no way to ensure the reliability of the
equipment's detection capabilities.

As we indicated in our report, DHS had adopted only four standards for
radiation and nuclear detection equipment as of October 30, 2007. DHS
acknowledged that current testing is mainly limited to DHS and DOD CBRN
detection systems under development, and it has no process to validate
the performance of commercial CBRN detection equipment. However, we are
not recommending that DHS test all available commercial detection
equipment. We are recommending that DHS independently test and evaluate
detection equipment first responders purchase using DHS grant funds.
(DHS's comments appear in appendix III.)

In DOC's general comments on our draft report, DOC stated that it
believed that even with the implementation of our recommendations aimed
at improving IMAAC operations, the plume models will still have several
limitations as a primary tool for tracking the release of CBRN
materials in urban areas. To improve information available for
emergency managers, DOC suggested offering a recommendation that DHS
work with the federal plume modeling community to accelerate research
and development to address plume model deficiencies in urban areas.
Such efforts should include improvements to meteorological information,
plume models, and data sets to evaluate plume models. DOC acknowledged
that these improvements would be likely to take several years, but work
should be initiated while IMAAC is instituting improvements.

We believe that DOC's recommendation has merit and have included it in
our final report for DHS's consideration.

DOC also stated that it believed that IMAAC should be working to
improve federal modeling and assessment capabilities and to enhance the
national scientific capability through cooperation among the federal
agencies for incidents of national significance. IMAAC and the
atmospheric transport and diffusion community should support OFCM in
developing a joint model development and evaluation strategy.

We also agree that IMAAC should continue to improve federal modeling
and assessment capabilities with OFCM and other federal agencies
involved with modeling terrorist-related or accidental releases of CBRN
materials in urban areas. This is included in our recommendation. In
technical comments on our draft report, IMAAC operations staff at LLNL
stressed that improvements to plume modeling information and
predictions are best achieved by establishing trusted working
relationships with federal, state, and local agency operations centers
and deployed assets.

DOC also stated that the inference in our report that IMAAC will be
providing a single dispersion solution is misleading. IMAAC, as a
federal entity, provides a recommendation to the local incident
commander and the commander decides what information to use. This stems
from the basis that all events are local in nature. DOC stated that it
believed that the report should also highlight the need to promote an
aggressive program of educating first responder and local incident
commanders in the use of dispersion models.

We clarified our discussion in the report about the role of IMAAC in
order to remove any inference that it was expected to provide a single
dispersion solution. We noted in our draft report that IMAAC does not
replace or supplant the atmospheric transport and dispersion modeling
activities of other agencies whose modeling activities support their
missions. IMAAC provides a single point for the coordination and
dissemination of federal dispersion modeling and hazard prediction
products that represent the federal position during actual or potential
incidents requiring federal coordination. We also noted in our
conclusions that TOPOFF exercise results demonstrated the larger
problem of the confusion among first responders' awareness about the
timing, value, and limitations of plume models and other analyses
following a CBRN event. We agree that an aggressive program for
educating first responders on the use of dispersion models is needed.

DOC also commented on our discussion about the confusion from the
models produced during the TOPOFF 2 exercise. DOC noted that the
confusion resulted from models being generated using different
meteorological inputs--real weather versus "canned" weather. We noted
in our draft report that one major cause for the confusion was the use
of different meteorological inputs in the modeling conducted during
TOPOFF 2. (DOC's comments appear in app. IV.)

We also received technical comments from DHS and DOC, from DOD, and
from DOE (LLNL), and we made changes to the report where appropriate.
Technical comments we received from LLNL, in particular, proposed
broadening the recommendation related to revising IMAAC standard
operating procedures to deal with contradictory modeling inputs. IMAAC
operations staff at LLNL believed that integrating procedures with
other emergency response agencies are the key to clarifying plume
modeling information. They stated that their experience has shown that
refining IMAAC's standard operating procedures is relatively
ineffective unless this is coordinated with the development of joint
operating procedures with other agencies, leading to the incorporation
of IMAAC into these agencies' standard operations. We agreed and have
revised our recommendation accordingly.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of Commerce,
Defense, Energy, and Homeland Security and others who are interested.
We will also provide copies to others on request. In addition, the
report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [hyperlink,
http://www.gao.gov].

If you or your staff have any questions regarding this report, please
call me at (202) 512-2700. Key contributors to this assignment were
Sushil Sharma, Assistant Director, Jason Fong, Timothy Carr, and Penny
Pickett. James J. Tuite III, a consultant to GAO during our engagement,
provided technical expertise.

Signed by:

Nancy R. Kingsbury, Managing Director:

Applied Research and Methods:

List of Requesters:

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd:
Chairman:
Committee on Appropriations:
United States Senate:

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:

The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:

The Honorable John D. Dingell, Jr.
Chairman:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:

The Honorable David E. Price:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Homeland Security:
Committee on Appropriations:
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Bart T. Stupak:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations:
Committee on Energy and Commerce:
House of Representatives:

The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Ranking Member:
Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs:
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform:
House of Representatives:

[End of section]

Anti_Illuminati

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Re: ALERT: NWO ran Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague false flag runs 9+years in US
« Reply #10 on: December 13, 2009, 10:58:23 AM »
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

To assess the capabilities and limitations of chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) detection equipment, we interviewed
federal program officials from the (1) Science and Technology
directorate of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and its
Homeland Security Advanced Research Projects Agency; (2) the Defense
Threat Reduction Agency and the Joint Program Executive Office for
Chemical and Biological Defense in the Department of Defense (DOD); and
(3) the Department of Energy's (DOE) Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL), Los Alamos National Laboratory, and Oak Ridge
National Laboratory.

We also met with program officials from DHS's Responder Knowledge Base
(RKB) and the Department of Commerce's (DOC) National Institute of
Standards and Technology's Office of Law Enforcement Standards (OLES)
to obtain information on equipment standards and the testing of CBRN
detection equipment. We reviewed DHS, DOD, and DOE detection programs
in place and being developed, as well as these agencies' studies on
CBRN detection systems. We attended conferences and workshops on CBRN
detection technologies.

To obtain information on detection equipment standards and the testing
of CBRN detection equipment for first responders, we met with program
officials from DHS's RKB and OLES. We also interviewed local responders
in Connecticut, New Jersey, and Washington on their acquisition of CBRN
detection equipment. We chose these states because of their
participation in DHS-sponsored Top Officials (TOPOFF) national
counterterrorism exercises. In addition, we interviewed members of the
InterAgency Board for Equipment Standardization and Interoperability
(IAB). IAB, made up of local, state, and federal first responders, is
designed to establish and coordinate local, state, and federal
standardization; interoperability; compatibility; and responder health
and safety to prepare for, train for and respond to, mitigate, and
recover from any CBRN incident.

To assess the limitations of plume models, we interviewed modeling
experts from DHS, DOD, DOE's national laboratories, DOC's National
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and the Office of the Federal
Coordinator for Meteorological Service and Supporting Research (OFCM)
in the Department of Commerce. We also interviewed operations staff of
the Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center (IMAAC) at
LLNL. IMAAC consolidates and integrates federal efforts to model the
behavior of various airborne releases and is the source of hazards
predictions during response and recovery. We also interviewed local
responders in Connecticut, New Jersey, and Washington regarding the use
of plume models during the TOPOFF 2 and TOPOFF 3 exercises.

We reviewed documentation on the various plume models and reports and
studies evaluating models available for tracking CBRN releases in urban
environments and studies identifying future needs and priorities for
modeling homeland security threats. We attended several conferences and
users' workshops sponsored by the American Meteorological Society, DOD,
OFCM, and George Mason University, where modeling capabilities were
evaluated. We also reviewed DHS internal reports on lessons learned
from the use of modeling during the TOPOFF national exercises.

To determine what information first responders have for determining the
effects of exposure to CBRN materials on heterogeneous civilian
populations, we reviewed agency documentation and studies on urban land
use and population density. We also reviewed documentation on acute
exposure guideline levels published by the Environmental Protection
Agency and other organizations. In addition, we reviewed studies on
human toxicity estimates by the U.S. Army and DOE's national
laboratories.

We conducted our review from July 2004 to January 2008 in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Chemical, Biological, and Radiological Agents:

Table 6: Chemical Warfare Agents:

Class: Blister;
Signs and symptoms: First irritates cells, then poisons them;
conjunctivitis (pink eye); reddened skin, blisters; nasal irritation;
inflammation of throat and lungs;
Name and symbol: Ethyldichloroarsine (ED);
Persistence: Moderate;
Rate of action: Immediate irritation; delayed blistering; Eye and skin
toxicity: Vapor harmful on long exposure; liquid blisters.

Class: Blister;
Signs and symptoms: First irritates cells, then poisons them;
conjunctivitis (pink eye); reddened skin, blisters; nasal irritation;
inflammation of throat and lungs;
Name and symbol: Lewisite (L);
Persistence: Days; rapid hydrolysis with humidity;
Rate of action: Rapid;
Eye and skin toxicity: Severe eye damage; skin less so.

Class: Blister;
Signs and symptoms: First irritates cells, then poisons them;
conjunctivitis (pink eye); reddened skin, blisters; nasal irritation;
inflammation of throat and lungs;
Name and symbol: Methyldichloroarsine (MD);
Persistence: Low;
Rate of action: Rapid;
Eye and skin toxicity: Eye damage possible; blisters.

Class: Blister;
Signs and symptoms: First irritates cells, then poisons them;
conjunctivitis (pink eye); reddened skin, blisters; nasal irritation;
inflammation of throat and lungs;
Name and symbol: Mustard (H, HD);
Persistence: Very high; days to weeks;
Rate of action: Delayed hours to days;
Eye and skin toxicity: Eyes very susceptible; skin less so.

Class: Blister;
Signs and symptoms: First irritates cells, then poisons them;
conjunctivitis (pink eye); reddened skin, blisters; nasal irritation;
inflammation of throat and lungs;
Name and symbol: Nitrogen mustard (HN-1, -2, -3);
Persistence: HN-1, - 3, very high, days to weeks; HN-2, moderate;
Rate of action: HN-1, -2, delayed 12 hours or more. HN-3, serious
effects, same as HD; minor effects sooner;
Eye and skin toxicity: HN-1, eyes susceptible to low concentration,
skin less so. HN-2, toxic to eyes; blisters skin. HN-3, eyes very
susceptible; skin less so.

Class: Blister;
Signs and symptoms: First irritates cells, then poisons them;
conjunctivitis (pink eye); reddened skin, blisters; nasal irritation;
inflammation of throat and lungs;
Name and symbol: Phenyldichloroarsine (PD);
Persistence: Low-moderate; Rate of action: Rapid;
Eye and skin toxicity: 633 mg-min/m[3] produces eye damage; less toxic
to skin.

Class: Blister;
Signs and symptoms: First irritates cells, then poisons them;
conjunctivitis (pink eye); reddened skin, blisters; nasal irritation;
inflammation of throat and lungs;
Name and symbol: Phosgene oxime (CX);
Persistence: Low, 2 hours in soil;
Rate of action: Immediate effects on contact;
Eye and skin toxicity: Powerful irritant to eyes and nose; liquid
corrosive to skin.

Class: Blood;
Signs and symptoms: Skin cherry red or 30% cyanosis (bluish
discoloration from lack of oxygen); gasping for air; seizures before
death;
Name and symbol: Arsine (SA);
Persistence: Low;
Rate of action: 2 hours to 11 days;
Eye and skin toxicity: None.

Class: Blood;
Signs and symptoms: Skin cherry red or 30% cyanosis (bluish
discoloration from lack of oxygen); gasping for air; seizures before
death;
Name and symbol: Cyanogen chloride (CK);
Persistence: Evaporates rapidly and disperses;
Rate of action: Very rapid;
Eye and skin toxicity: Low; tears and irritation.

Class: Blood;
Signs and symptoms: Skin cherry red or 30% cyanosis (bluish
discoloration from lack of oxygen); gasping for air; seizures before
death;
Name and symbol: Hydrogen cyanide (AC);
Persistence: Extremely volatile; 1-2 days;
Rate of action: Very rapid;
Eye and skin toxicity: Moderate.

Class: Nerve;
Signs and symptoms: Salivation, lacrimation (tearing), urination,
defecation, gastric disturbances, vomiting;
Name and symbol: Cyclosarin (GF); Persistence: Moderate;
Rate of action: Very rapid;
Eye and skin toxicity: Very high.

Class: Nerve;
Signs and symptoms: Salivation, lacrimation (tearing), urination,
defecation, gastric disturbances, vomiting;
Name and symbol: Sarin (GB);
Persistence: Low; 1-2 days; evaporates with water;
Rate of action: Very rapid; Eye and skin toxicity: Very high.

Class: Nerve;
Signs and symptoms: Salivation, lacrimation (tearing), urination,
defecation, gastric disturbances, vomiting;
Name and symbol: Soman (GD);
Persistence: Moderate; 1-2 days;
Rate of action: Very rapid;
Eye and skin toxicity: Very high.

Class: Nerve;
Signs and symptoms: Salivation, lacrimation (tearing), urination,
defecation, gastric disturbances, vomiting;
Name and symbol: Tabun (GA);
Persistence: Low; 1-2 days if heavy concentration;
Rate of action: Very rapid;
Eye and skin toxicity: Very high.

Class: Nerve;
Signs and symptoms: Salivation, lacrimation (tearing), urination,
defecation, gastric disturbances, vomiting;
Name and symbol: VX;
Persistence: Very high; 1 week if heavy concentration; as volatile as
oil;
Rate of action: Rapid;
Eye and skin toxicity: Very high.

Source: Analytic Services Inc., Central Intelligence Agency, and
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center.

[End of table]

Table 7: Biological Warfare Agents:

Agent: Bacterium: Anthrax;
Possible means: of delivery: Aerosol;
Time: Incubation 1-5 days;
symptoms in 2-3 days;
Symptoms: Fever, malaise, fatigue, cough, and mild chest discomfort,
followed by severe respiratory distress;
Lethality: 3-5 days;
shock and death 24-36 hours after symptoms;
Stability: Spores are highly stable.

Agent: Bacterium: Brucellosis;
Possible means: of delivery: Aerosol, expected to mimic a natural
disease;
Time: Rate of action usually 6-60 days;
Symptoms: Chills, sweats, headache, fatigue, joint and muscle pain, and
anorexia;
Lethality: Weeks to months;
Stability: Organisms are stable for several weeks in wet soil and food.

Agent: Bacterium: Cholera;
Possible means: of delivery: Sabotaged food and water supply;
aerosol;
Time: Sudden onset after 1-5 days incubation;
Symptoms: Initial vomiting and abdominal distention, with little or no
fever or abdominal pain, followed rapidly by diarrhea;
Lethality: One or more weeks;
low with treatment;
high without treatment;
Stability: Unstable in aerosols and pure water;
more stable in polluted water.

Agent: Bacterium: Plague;
Possible means: of delivery: Contaminated fleas, causing bubonic type,
or aerosol, causing pneumonic type;
Time: Rate of action 2-3 days;
incubation 2-6 days bubonic, 3-4 days pneumonic;
Symptoms: High fever, chills, headache, spitting up blood, and toxemia,
progressing rapidly to shortness of breath and cyanosis (bluish
coloration of skin and membranes);
Lethality: Very high;
Stability: Extremely stable but highly transmissible.

Agent: Bacterium: Q fever;
Possible means: of delivery: Dust cloud from a line or point source;
Time: Onset may be sudden;
Symptoms: Chills, headache, weakness, malaise, and severe sweats;
Lethality: Very low;
Stability: Stable.

Agent: Bacterium: Tularemia;
Possible means: of delivery: Aerosol;
Time: Rate of action 3-5 days;
incubation 1-10 days;
Symptoms: Fever, chills, headache, and malaise;
Lethality: 2 weeks moderate;
Stability: Not very stable.

Agent: Bacterium: Typhoid;
Possible means: of delivery: Sabotaged food and water supply;
Time: Rate of action 1-3 days;
incubation 6-21 days;
Symptoms: Sustained fever, severe headaches, and malaise;
Lethality: Moderate if untreated;
Stability: Stable.

Agent: Bacterium: Typhus;
Possible means: of delivery: Contaminated lice or fleas;
Time: Rate of action 6-15 days;
onset often sudden, terminating after about 2 weeks of fever; Symptoms:
Headaches, chills, prostration, fever, and general pain; Lethality:
High; Stability: Not very stable.

Agent: Toxin: Botulinum;
Possible means: of delivery: Sabotaged food and water supply;
aerosol;
Time: Rate of action 12-72 hours;
incubation hours to days;
Symptoms: Blurred vision;
photophobia;
skeletal muscle paralysis and progressive weakness that may culminate
abruptly in respiratory failure;
Lethality: High;
Stability: Stable.

Agent: Toxin: Ricin;
Possible means: of delivery: Aerosol;
Time: Rate of action 6-72 hours;
Symptoms: Rapid onset of nausea, vomiting, abdominal cramps, and severe
diarrhea with vascular collapse;
Lethality: High;
Stability: Stable.

Agent: Virus: Ebola;
Possible means: of delivery: Aerosol;
direct contact;
Time: Rate of action: sudden;
Symptoms: Malaise, headache, vomiting, diarrhea;
Lethality: High: 7-16 days;
Stability: Unstable.

Agent: Virus: Marburg;
Possible means: of delivery: Aerosol;
direct contact;
Time: Rate of action 7-9 days;
Symptoms: Malaise, headache, vomiting, diarrhea;
Lethality: High;
Stability: Unstable.

Agent: Virus: Smallpox;
Possible means: of delivery: Airborne;
Time: Rate of action 2-4 days;
incubation 7-17 days;
Symptoms: Malaise, headache, vomiting, diarrhea, small blisters on
skin, bleeding of skin and mucous membranes;
Lethality: High;
Stability: Stable.

Agent: Virus: Venezuelan; equine; encephalitis;
Possible means: of delivery: Airborne;
Time: Sudden rate of action;
incubation 1-5 days;
Symptoms: Headache, fever, dizziness, drowsiness or stupor, tremors or
convulsions, muscular incoordination;
Lethality: Low;
Stability: Unstable.

Agent: Virus: Yellow fever;
Possible means: of delivery: Aerosol;
Time: Sudden rate of action;
incubation 3-6 days;
Symptoms: Malaise, headache, vomiting, diarrhea;
Lethality: High;
Stability: Unstable.

Source: Analytic Services Inc., Central Intelligence Agency, and
Edgewood Chemical Biological Center.

[End of table]

Table 8: Radiological Warfare Agents:

Radioactive isotope: Americium-241;
Respiratory absorption and retention: 75% absorbed; 10% retained;
Gastrointestinal absorption and retention: Minimal, usually insoluble;
Skin wound absorption: Rapid in first few days;
Primary toxicity: Skeletal deposition; marrow suppression; hepatic
deposition.

Radioactive isotope: Cesium-137;
Respiratory absorption and retention: Completely absorbed; follows
potassium;
Gastrointestinal absorption and retention: Completely absorbed; follows
potassium;
Skin wound absorption: Completely absorbed; follows potassium;
Primary toxicity: Renal excretion; beta and gamma emissions.

Radioactive isotope: Cobalt-60;
Respiratory absorption and retention: High absorption; limited
retention;
Gastrointestinal absorption and retention: Less than 5% absorption;
Skin wound absorption: Unknown;
Primary toxicity: Gamma emitter.

Radioactive isotope: Iodine-131;
Respiratory absorption and retention: High absorption; limited
retention;
Gastrointestinal absorption and retention: High absorption; limited
retention;
Skin wound absorption: High absorption; limited retention;
Primary toxicity: Thyroid ablation carcinoma.

Radioactive isotope: Plutonium-238 and Plutonium-239;
Respiratory absorption and retention: Limited absorption; high
retention;
Gastrointestinal absorption and retention: Minimal, usually insoluble;
Skin wound absorption: Limited absorption; may form nodules;
Primary toxicity: Local effects from retention in lung.

Radioactive isotope: Polonium 210;
Respiratory absorption and retention: Moderate absorption; moderate
retention;
Gastrointestinal absorption and retention: Minimal; Skin wound
absorption: Moderate absorption;
Primary toxicity: Spleen, kidney.

Radioactive isotope: Strontium-90;
Respiratory absorption and retention: Limited retention;
Gastrointestinal absorption and retention: Moderate absorption;
Skin wound absorption: Unknown;
Primary toxicity: Bone, follows calcium.

Radioactive isotope: Uranium-235 and Uranium-238;
Respiratory absorption and retention: High absorption; high retention;
Gastrointestinal absorption and retention: High absorption;
Skin wound absorption: High absorption; skin irritant;
Primary toxicity: Renal, urinary excretion.

Source: Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, Medical
Management of Radiological Casualties Handbook, 2nd ed. (Bethesda, Md.:
April 2003), app. B.

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:

U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov]:

Homeland Security:

April 16, 2008:

Ms. Nancy Kingsbury:
Managing Director, Applied Research & Methods:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Ms. Kingsbury:

RE: Draft Report GAO-08-180, Homeland Security: First Responders'
Ability to Detect and Model Hazardous Releases in Urban Areas Is
Significantly Limited (GAO Job Code 460570)

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity
to review and comment on the draft report referenced above. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) makes three recommendations to
the Secretary of Homeland Security. Officials within DHS's Science and
Technology Directorate agree with the recommendations. However, we
believe GAO should consider other scenarios as alternate ways of
looking at the present national capabilities for chemical, biological,
radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) response and the current status of
testing and certification of detection equipment.

With respect to CBRN detection equipment and the validation of such
equipment, the report suggests that in response to a CBRN attack all
first responders (presumably fire fighters, HAZMAT teams and local law
enforcement) will be called upon to assess the extent of contamination
using detectors that are capable of detecting all potential CBRN agents
at concentrations that are below those hazardous to themselves and the
general public.

The report also appears to suggest that any and all CBRN detection
equipment designed by entrepreneurial manufacturers for sale to first
responders should be validated by the federal government.

There are, however, alternative ways of looking at the present national
capabilities for CBRN response. In one alternative scenario, in the
event of a terrorist attack, first responders will use a variety of
prescreening tools, and they will be assisted immediately by state and
federal agencies that will bring the best available state-of-the-art
CBRN detection equipment. First responders receive training now
primarily in the detection and identification of chemical and
biological (CB) agents in the form of suspicious packages
and other visible threats. Detection schemes for aerosols and
particulates rely on sample collection and subsequent analysis by
trained laboratory personnel.

The draft report also seems to imply that the federal government should
test all CBRN detection equipment sold to first responders. There is
not a current legislative requirement that CBRN detection equipment for
homeland security applications meet performance standards. However,
both the Department of Defense (DOD) and DHS have committed
considerable federal resources to building a next generation of CBRN
detection systems that will enhance the security of the nation. These
CBRN detection systems are being deployed on a risk-based priority
basis across the nation.

DHS has made significant progress in supporting the development of
consensus standards and test protocols. Working with our interagency
partners, we are continuing to support the development of new standards
and protocols as needs arise. The voluntary consensus standards that
are being developed for detectors used for CBRN agents--by ASTM
International for chemical agents, by AOAC International for biological
agents. and by the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers for
radiological and nuclear materials--are gaining acceptance by the
manufacturers, the first responders and the public health community.
The detector testing currently taking place, as the draft report notes,
is mainly limited to systems under development by DOD and DHS but these
systems were selected from numerous proposals and are a good
representation of the best available technology. The standards and test
protocols under development now by the federal government and the
"voluntary standards" community are intended to build an enduring
capability for standards and testing that will encourage multiple
manufacturers to engage in a pay-to-play product development venture.
It will never be feasible for the federal government to fund testing of
all commercial detectors without first assessing their potential merits
for detection of CBRN agents because of the very large number of
hazardous CBRN agents and the expense of testing detectors against
these agents.

Technical comments have been provided under separate cover.

Sincerely,

Penelope G. McCormack:
Acting Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:

[End of section]

Appendix IV Comments from the Department of Commerce:

THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE:
Washington, D.C. 20230:

April 2, 2008:

Ms. Nancy Kingsbury:
Managing Director:
Applied Research and Methods:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Ms. Kingsbury:

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's draft report entitled Homeland Security: First
Responders' Ability to Detect and Model Hazardous Releases in Urban
Areas is Significantly Limited (GAO-08-180). I enclose the Department
of Commerce's comments on the draft report.

Sincerely,

Signed by:

Carlos M. Gutierrez:

Enclosure:
Department of Commerce:

Comments on the Draft GAO Report Entitled "Homeland Security: First
Responders' Ability to Detect and Model Hazardous Releases in Urban
Areas is Significantly Limited" (GAO-08-180/March 2008): 

General Comments:

The Department of Commerce (DOC) appreciates the opportunity to review
this report on urban plume modeling. As the report contains no
recommendations for DOC, we only have general and factual/technical
comments, which are provided below.

DOC believes, even with the implementation of GAO recommendations aimed
at improving Interagency Modeling and Atmospheric Assessment Center
(IMAAC) operations, the plume models will still have several
limitations as a primary tool for tracking the release of chemical,
biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) materials in urban areas. To
improve the information available for emergency managers, we suggest
you offer a recommendation that the Department of Homeland Security
work with the federal plume modeling community to accelerate research
and development to address plume model deficiencies in urban areas. It
would be ideal if such efforts include improvements to meteorological
information, plume models, and data sets to evaluate plume models. We
acknowledge it would likely take several years to achieve results.
Therefore, work should be initiated while the IMAAC is instituting
improvements.

DOC also believes the IMAAC should be working to improve federal
modeling and assessment capabilities, and to enhance the national
scientific capability through cooperation among the federal agencies
for incidents of national significance. IMAAC and the atmospheric
transport and diffusion community should support the Office of the
Federal Coordinator for Meteorology to develop a joint model
development and evaluation strategy.

In addition, the inference that the IMAAC will be providing a single
dispersion solution is misleading. The IMAAC, as a federal entity,
provides a recommendation to the local Incident Commander and the local
Incident Commander decides what information to use. This stems from the
basis that all events are local in nature. While the draft report
documents the difficulties for first responders to detect and
characterize a release of hazardous material in an urban environment,
it could also highlight a significant opportunity to promote an
aggressive program of educating first responders and local incident
commanders on the use of dispersion models. This program could address
the different types of dispersion models and strengths and weaknesses
of each type. It could also provide the overall state of dispersion
modeling and the information needed by the modelers when responding to
a request for a dispersion model.

Finally, the report identifies "confusion" regarding the models
produced for the Top Officials (TOPOFF) 2 exercise, which is repeated
in various forms throughout the document. While there was confusion,
the confusion resulted from models being generated using different
meteorological inputs. One model was generated using real weather, and
the second was generated using canned weather. Canned weather was used
in order to meet exercise objectives and its use was approved during
exercise planning conferences involving local, state, and federal
officials.

[End of section]

Footnotes:

[1] Anthrax in this report reflects common terminology. Technically,
the word refers only to the disease caused by Bacillus anthracis, not
the bacterium or its spores.

[2] The Homeland Security Council is intended to ensure the
coordination of all activities related to homeland security by
executive departments and agencies and to promote the effective
development and implementation of all homeland security policies. See
also "Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council,"
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-1, The White House,
Washington, D.C., Oct. 29, 2001.

[3] Individuals responsible for protecting and preserving life,
property, evidence, and the environment in the early stages of a
terrorist attack, natural disaster, or other large-scale emergency are
known as first responders or emergency response providers. They include
"Federal, State, and local governmental and nongovernmental emergency
public safety, fire, law enforcement, emergency response, and emergency
medical (including hospital emergency facilities), and related
personnel, agencies, and authorities." See 6 U.S. Code §101(6).

[4] While we use CBRN for convenience, we do describe, later in the
report, differences in the behavior and effects of these materials when
they are released into the atmosphere.

[5] The White House, Office of Homeland Security, The National Strategy
for Homeland Security (Washington, D.C.: July 16, 2002), p. 2.
[hyperlink, http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/book].

[6] The National Strategy for Homeland Security, p. ix.

[7] Management of Domestic Incidents," Homeland Security Presidential
Directive/HSPD-5, The White House, Washington, D.C., Feb. 28, 2003.
[hyperlink, http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/02/20030228-
9.html].

[8] Effective March 22, 2008, DHS renamed the National Response Plan,
calling it the National Response Framework.

[9] National Preparedness," Homeland Security Presidential Directive/
HSPD-8, The White House, Washington, D.C., Dec. 17, 2003. [hyperlink,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/12/20031217-6.html].

[10] An antimicrobial is a substance that kills or inhibits the growth
of microbes such as bacteria, fungi, or viruses.

[11] In the early hours of December 3, 1984, methyl isocyanate gas
leaked from the Union Carbide plant in Bhopal, India.

[12] GAO, Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to
Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response
Capabilities Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-1015 (Washington, D.C.:
Sept. 21, 2006).

[13] RadNet is a national network of monitoring stations that regularly
collect air, precipitation, drinking water, and milk samples for
analysis of radioactivity.

[14] John H. Marburger III, Director, "Purchase of Anthrax Detection
Technologies," Memorandum for Federal Mail Managers and First
Responders to Federal Mail Centers, Executive Office of the President,
Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, D.C., July 19,
2002.

[15] AOAC International is an independent scientific association of
analytical scientists with members throughout the world. AOAC provides
validated methods, proficiency test samples, accreditation criteria,
and scientific information to industry, government agencies, and
academic institutions. See [hyperlink, http://www.aoac.org].

[16] DHS BioWatch officials provided cost data on the following program
categories: Management, Oversight, and Program Control; Laboratory
Operations; Field Operations; Studies and Analyses; National Security
Special Events; New Technology Development and Transition, and Public
Health Support-Outreach and ReachBack.

[17] Laszlo Retfalvi and others, "The Challenges of Effective
Biological Agent Detection in Homeland Security Applications" (paper,
8th International Symposium on Protection against Chemical and
Biological Warfare Agents, June 2004).

[18] Retfalvi, p. 7.

[19] LAB is a users' working group of responders from the federal
government, various local and state governments, and private
organizations. It is designed to establish and coordinate local, state,
and federal standardization, interoperability, compatibility, and
responder health and safety to prepare for, train, respond to,
mitigate, and recover from incidents by identifying requirements for an
all-hazards incident response, with a special emphasis on CBRNE issues
(E representing explosives).

[20] DHS, Office of Inspector General, Review of DHS' Progress in
Adopting and Enforcing Equipment Standards for First Responders, OIG-
06-30 (Washington, D.C.: March 2006).

[21] OLES also serves as IAB's executive agent for implementing and
administering first responder equipment standards. IAB has developed a
strategic plan to identify, adopt, modify, and develop a common suite
of first responder equipment standards.

[22] A new standard for chemical warfare vapor detectors that DHS has
not yet adopted--ASTM E2411-07, Standard Specification for Chemical
Warfare Vapor Detector--would establish minimum performance
requirements to detect, identify, and quantify the amount of chemical
agent vapor in a threat environment. The instrument would be able to
simultaneously detect multiple threat agents at or below levels that
are immediately dangerous to life or health. The standard requires
detection at the first level of EPA's acute exposure guidelines or
lower.

[23] According to EPA, its Environmental Technology Verification
Program develops testing protocols and verifies the performance of
innovative technologies that have the potential to improve the
protection of human health and the environment. The goal of the program
is to provide credible performance data for commercial-ready
environmental technologies to speed their implementation for the
benefit of purchasers, vendors, and the public.

[24] The SAVER program is also supported by other organizations,
including DHS's Center for Domestic Preparedness; DOE's Nevada Test
Site; the Science Applications International Corporation; the Technical
Support Working Group; the U.S. Army Soldier Systems Center, Natick,
Massachusetts; and the U.S. Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center,
Charleston, South Carolina.

[25] DOD has also established the Non-Standard Equipment Review Panel
that evaluates commercial off-the-shelf chemical and biological defense
equipment DOD purchases for consequence management. The DOD panel has
established partnerships with DHS's RKB and SAVER programs to share
information and leverage existing resources.

[26] OFCM, Atmospheric Modeling of Releases from Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Response by Federal Agencies in Support of Homeland
Security (Silver Spring, Maryland: Aug. 1, 2002).

[27] The atmosphere near Earth's surface, called the boundary layer, is
influenced by temperature, turbulence, air flow, and the like. It
consists of a very turbulent mixed layer, a less turbulent residual
layer, and a nocturnal, stable, sporadically turbulent boundary layer.
Winds in the nocturnal boundary layer often accelerate at night.

[28] Counterproliferation is the full range of military preparations
and activities to reduce, and protect against, the threat posed by
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and their associated delivery
means.

[29] NRC, Tracking and Predicting the Atmospheric Dispersion of
Hazardous Material Releases: Implications for Homeland Security
(Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2003), p. 4.

[30] A Monte Carlo method is a computational algorithm that relies on
repeated random sampling to compute its results. Monte Carlo methods
are often used when simulating physical and mathematical systems.

[31] NRC defines "dirty bomb" as a weapon not of mass destruction but,
rather, of "mass disruption," combining a conventional explosive, such
as dynamite, with radioactive material that, "depending on the scenario
. . . could create fear and panic, contaminate property, and require
potentially costly cleanup." See "Fact Sheet on Dirty Bombs," U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. [hyperlink,
http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/fact-sheets/dirty-
bombs.html].

[32] The mission of FRMAC, part of DOE's National Nuclear Security
Administration, is to coordinate and manage all federal radiological
monitoring and assessment activities during major radiological
emergencies within the United States in support of state, local, and
tribal governments.

[33] The mission of NARAC, at LLNL, the DHS and DOE operational support
and resource center for plume modeling, is to provide timely and
credible assessment advisories to emergency managers for hazardous
releases to the atmosphere in order to help minimize exposure of the
populations at risk.

[34] Ground truth, as we indicated earlier, refers to information
collected on location to verify modeling. It relates the model
simulation to real features and materials on the ground.

[35] Other urban plume models include the FEM3MP, a CFD urban model
developed by LLNL; CFD-Urban, developed by CFD Research Corporation;
FLUENT-EPA, a commercial model adapted by EPA; and FLACS/FEFLO-Urban.
However, these CFD models are too slow to be used for real-time
emergency response.

[36] The goal of verification and validation is a model that can
accurately predict the performance of the real-world system that it
represents, or to predict the difference in performance between two
scenarios or two model configurations. DOD Instruction 5000.61
describes the requirements and procedures for the verification,
validation, and accreditation of DOD models and simulations. See "DOD
Modeling and Simulation (M&S) Verification, Validation, and
Accreditation (VV&A)," DOD Instruction 5000.61, Under Secretary of
Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), May 13, 2003.

[37] D.R. Brook and others, "Validation of the Urban Dispersion Model
(UDM)," International Journal of Environment and Pollution 20, nos. 1-
2 (May 10, 2004): 11-21.

[38] A model evaluation usually has three main components: (1) an
assessment of the model's physics, (2) an operational performance
evaluation with field data, and (3) operational testing against real-
world events. The physics is assessed from a scientific review and
comparison of the model with data from intensive field experiments, as
well as numeric and laboratory simulations. Data in the operational
evaluation can be from intensive experiments or routine monitoring
networks. Operational testing evaluates the usability, efficiency,
consistency, and robustness of models for operational conditions. A
central issue is how well models can be evaluated in the presence of a
large natural variability in concentration from atmospheric turbulence.
According to modeling experts, two major limitations of many model
evaluations and field experiments are a lack of information on the
vertical distribution of concentration and the random variability or
inherent uncertainty in concentration.

[39] Sulfur hexafluoride and perfluorocarbon are stable, colorless,
odorless gases used extensively and safely since the mid-1960s as
atmospheric tracers. At the low concentrations used for atmospheric
studies, sulfur hexafluoride tracer gas has no known environmental
effect or health risk. It is easily detected, easily handled, and
relatively inexpensive.

[40] Steven Hanna and others, "Use of Urban 2000 Field Data to
Determine Whether There Are Significant Differences between the
Performance Measures of Several Urban Dispersion Models" (paper, Fifth
Conference on Urban Environment, American Meteorological Society,
Vancouver, British Columbis, August 2004).

[41] Joseph C. Chang and others, "Use of Salt Lake City URBAN 2000
Field Data to Evaluate the Urban Hazard Prediction Assessment
Capability (HPAC) Dispersion Model, "Journal of Applied Meteorology 44,
no. 4 (2005): 485-501.

[42] NARAC modeling experts state that model predictions within a
factor of 2, approximately 50 percent of the time, if proper input and
boundary condition data is available, is an acceptable level of
accuracy. However, they acknowledge that the inaccuracy of model inputs
is often the primary limitation on how well the models perform.

[43] Steve Warner, Nathan Platt, and James F. Heagy, "Comparisons of
Transport and Dispersion Model Predictions of the URBAN 2000 Field
Experiment," Journal of Applied Meteorology 43:6 (June 2004): 829-46.

[44] Akshay Gowardhan and others, "Evaluation of QUIC Urban Dispersion
Model Using the Salt Lake City URBAN 2000 Tracer Experiment Data--IOP
10" (paper, 6th American Meteorological Society Symposium on the Urban
Environment and the 14th Joint Conference on the Applications of Air
Pollution Meteorology with the Air and Waste Management Association,
Atlanta, Georgia, February 2006).

[45] Jeffry Urban and others, "Assessment of HPAC Urban Capabilities
Using Joint Urban 2003 Field Trial Data" (paper, 10th Annual George
Mason University Conference on Atmospheric Transport and Dispersion
Modeling, Fairfax, Virginia, August 2006).

[46] IDA, Comparisons of Transport and Dispersion Model Predictions of
the Joint Urban 2003 Field Experiment (Alexandria, Virginia: 2007).

[47] Hanna Consultants, Source Term Estimation Methods for Releases of
Hazardous Chemicals to the Atmosphere Due to Accidental and Terrorist
Incidents at Industrial Facilities and during Transportation
(Kennebunkport, Maine: 2005).

[48] DOE operates the Nonproliferation Test and Evaluation Complex at
the Nevada test site, which can conduct open air testing of toxic
hazardous materials and biological simulants.

[49] A mesonet is a network of automated weather stations designed to
observe mesoscale meteorological phenomena.

[50] OFCM, Federal Research and Development Needs and Priorities for
Atmospheric Transport and Diffusion Modeling (Silver Spring, Maryland:
September 2004).

[51] Lethal concentration is the concentration of a chemical in the air
that would kill 50 percent of a group of test animals. Lethal dosage is
the dosage that kills 50 percent of the animals tested.

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Offline trailhound

  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 4,722
Re: ALERT: NWO ran Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague false flag runs 9+years in US
« Reply #11 on: December 13, 2009, 11:38:31 AM »
Just cant help but to think of all the reports of heavy spraying in the ukraine ???

"Do not let your hatred of a people incite you to aggression." Qur'an 5:2
At the heart of that Western freedom and democracy is the belief that the individual man, the child of God, is the touchstone of value..." -RFK

luckee1

  • Guest
Re: ALERT: NWO ran Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague false flag runs 9+years in US
« Reply #12 on: December 13, 2009, 11:53:19 AM »
Oh my God, they not only admit but do so with a heartless frankness.  GD MF's!!!
I am sending this to everyone I know!  

luckee1

  • Guest
Re: ALERT: NWO ran Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague false flag runs 9+years in US
« Reply #13 on: December 13, 2009, 11:57:35 AM »
Just cant help but to think of all the reports of heavy spraying in the ukraine ???

You have a point.  But the key thing here, is all this is proof that they have been spraying in the U.S. with all these agents.  People in the U.S. should print this off, take it to there reps.  Slap them in the face with it, and rub their nose in it and tell them to shut down this bullshit.

Offline trailhound

  • Member
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  • Posts: 4,722
Re: ALERT: NWO ran Aerosolized Pneumonic Plague false flag runs 9+years in US
« Reply #14 on: December 13, 2009, 12:16:31 PM »
BUMP!

"Do not let your hatred of a people incite you to aggression." Qur'an 5:2
At the heart of that Western freedom and democracy is the belief that the individual man, the child of God, is the touchstone of value..." -RFK