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The real underpinnings of DHS:Predicting Terrorist Attacks http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2008/02/predicting-terr/By Sharon Weinberger February 11, 2008 | 9:50 am An increasing number of contracts are being given out by the Pentagon with the seemingly Quixotic goal of predicting human behavior. For example, there’s the Integrated Crises Early Warning System, which looks at modeling potential political instability. But what about predicting terrorist events? A team led by the University of Alabama in Huntsville is looking at using computer models to forecast future attacks. Researchers at the university are working with a private company on a six month Air Force contract."One way to combat these attacks is to identify trends in the attackers’ methods, then use those trends to predict their future actions," said UAHuntsville researcher Wes Colley said. "Some trends from these attacks show important day-to-day correlations. If we can draw inferences from those correlations, then we may be able to save lives by heightening awareness of possible events or changing the allocation of our security assets to provide more protection."There are at least two main barriers to this sort of research. First, you need data, or more precisely, accurate data, otherwise it’s "garbage in, garbage out." And second, you need models that work. This is how the researchers are approaching the problem: A four-step process was used in this research, according to Colley. Researchers reviewed the behavior signatures of terrorists on 12,000attacks between 2003 and mid-2007 to calculate relative probabilities of future attacks on various target types.The four steps were: create a database of past attacks; identify trends in the attacks; determine the correlation between attacks and use analysis to calculate the probabilities of future attacks and their location.The goal was not to try to predict exactly when and what type of attack was going to happen next, but rather, which target types were more likely to be attacked next, according to Colley. “Our research won’t predict that an attack targeting civilians at a public market will take place tomorrow at 9:30 a.m.” The purpose of the models, the researchers reasonably argue, it to provide commanders in the field with information that could be used for planning. So, it’s not a crystal ball. The hope is that even general models, if accurate, would be useful. The question is, how useful? Human behavior is subject to hundreds of variables.A job that Ptech/Agility AI software can handle perfectly, just as it was used on 9/11 by MITRE and SAIC, it will be used against the entire global population. The perfect new eugenics/genocide tool of the 21st century.________________________________________________________ http://www.allamericanpatriots.com/48725699_computers_can_computer_models_help_quell_insurgent_drive_strife_and_instabilityCan Computer Models Help to Quell Insurgent-Drive Strife and Instability?By admin - Posted on June 26th, 2007 Tagged: Computers • Science Two scientists who have been using computers to help assess the behavior of insurgent groups told a AAAS-organized seminar that, despite their limitations, quantitative methods could play an important role in helping military commanders and political leaders make more informed decisions. While acknowledging that computer models are still in their infancy and can provide only hints of possible outcomes during the often chaotic conditions in combat zones, the specialists said the Pentagon has considerable interest in the use of cross-cultural research to help combat insurgencies. V.S. Subrahmanian, co-director of the University of Maryland's Laboratory for Computational Cultural Dynamics, described how computers can be programmed to automatically and quickly extract relevant data from thousands of news reports on a topic and offer a probability estimate that a particular action might happen. He spoke at a 14 June Capitol Hill seminar organized by AAAS's Center for Science, Technology and Security Policy. Subrahmanian's team has looked, for example, at reports of suicide attacks by the militant Hezbollah group, based in Lebanon. Preliminary results by the researchers suggest that when the group is engaged in education and propaganda activities in a major way, there's a 46-47% probability it will carry out suicide attacks. When it is not engaged in such activities, the probability of an attack rises to about 80%.
Subrahmanian's team also did an automated analysis of 1555 recent stories in the Afghan media to assess the perceived strength or weakness of Afghan President Hamid Karzai on a scale of minus 1 to plus 1. The analysis, which searched for phrases containing both opinions and statements of fact that can influence opinions, showed Karzai's overall rating was mildly positive for most news sources.
The intensity of opinions can influence how a group might act during times of stress and conflict, Subrahmanian said. Behavioral scientists would like to find ways to accurately predict how a group might respond, he said, and do so in a matter of hours or days rather than weeks or months."You would like to find the pressure points where you can exert influence to change behavior," said Alexander Levis, an engineering professor at George Mason University in Fairfax, Va., and former chief scientist for the U.S. Air Force.The Pentagon, primarily through the Air Force Office of Scientific Research, has been funding research by Subrahmanian, Levis and others in an effort to better understand the potential cultural, religious and social impact of military actions in combat zones. The Pentagon is proposing to spend more than $120 million over six years on social science modeling projects. The goal is to provide a new suite of tools that analysts can use to help assess the emergence of insurgent groups, how they interact with the local population and how they might respond to military or economic interventions. Such models would go beyond the purely military objectives that are at the heart of computerized war games.Levis said his current work has been funded by both the Air Force Office of Scientific Research and the Office of Naval Research. His open-source academic research builds on similar studies pursued during the past 10 to 15 years by the intelligence community, he said.The key, according to Levis, is to find ways to fuse the insights from different quantitative models, drawing on the strengths of each. "We need to make sure that the tools play together when used properly," he said. But he stressed that none of the tools will allow analysts to make firm predictions.
"We're not predicting outcomes," Levis said. "We do comparisons of the effectiveness of alternatives." INSERT: Traitor, engineer of the technology to execute 9/11, is lying in the above portions highlighted in brown above, as will be shown elsewhere.In one project, Levis and his colleagues developed a computer model that offered U.S. forces in Iraq options for securing two old silk roads in the Diyala province that been attacked by insurgents using improvised explosive devices, or IEDs. The roads, one controlled by the Kurds and the other controlled by Sunni and Shia groups, had long been routes for both legitimate trade and for smuggling of drugs and other covert goods.When IEDs began to be used along the Sunni-Shia route, the movement of covert goods shifted to the north along the Kurdish-controlled route, Levis said. Suppressing the attacks on one of the routes led to increased attacks on the other, he said.
Rather than deploying additional U.S. forces to help control the IED incidents, the computer model suggested that U.S. commanders should turn over security along the roads to Iraqi forces and allow them to ignore the smuggling of goods along the routes."We wanted to maintain the economic activity on the two routes," Levis said. The preferred option also included educational efforts among the local populace to reduce support for the insurgency, the re-establishment of services, and external financial support to help improve the local economy. The model projected that all of the actions, taken together, would take at least six months of concerted effort to significantly reduce the number of IEDs. It projected that support for the insurgency would decline below 50 percent after about 21 months. "I have absolutely no clue whether it would take 21 months or not," Levis said. But the model does tell an analyst that the recommended actions would take "not one or two months [but] a whole bunch of months," he said. Such information can be useful to an analyst who is offering options for policy makers. But Levis cautioned that the numbers must be used appropriately. "This is not a view graph to be shown to the commander," he said, as a guide for planning troop withdrawals after 21 months. Some of the computer tools have been given to defense and intelligence agencies for testing and user feedback. And some data has been provided to field commanders. Subrahmanian said his team "shipped a bunch of information on several tribes in the Pakistan-Afghanistan borderlands" to the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division before it deployed to Afghanistan in 2006. "So we have valuable results as well as much work to be done," he said.One long-term goal of Subrahmanian's research is to develop a three-dimensional "virtual experience environment," a cultural and behavioral analogue of a computer war game, where U.S. decision-makers could decide how best to play out the actions of multiple groups in a region. The virtual environment would resemble the real landscape of the region being modeled, with characters behaving according to rules of behavior drawn from relevant and timely data collected by the researchers.The modelers are just starting to grapple with the complexities of such a virtual environment, Subrahmanian said. They can do visual reconstructions of the landscapes, but they have little real-world content and few real-time news and information feeds. Among the key challenges, he said, is extracting useful knowledge from perhaps a thousand times more data than the team has been using.[INSERT: AND THAT IS THE EXACT REASON FOR FULL SPECTRUM, MASS SURVEILLANCE EVERYWHERE, TO MAKE SURE THE NWO *ALWAYS* HAS ALL THE INFO THEY NEED TO PUMP YOUR GUTS FULL OF LEAD, OR BLOW YOU TO PIECES ANYWHERE ON EARTH IF YOU DARE OPPOSE WORLD GOVERNMENT, PEDOPHILE RAPE RINGS, SECRET TORTURE FACILITIES, HAVING ALL OF YOUR GUNS, YOUR FOOD, AND PROPERTY SIEZED, AND ENDLESS WARFARE ACROSS THE GLOBE AGAINST INNOCENT, PEACEFUL PEOPLE.
GENERAL RENUART, GENERAL MATTIS, GENERAL CARTWRIGHT ARE COMIN TO BLOW THE GUTS OUT OF YOUR CHILDREN, YOUR WIVES, AND ALL DEFENDERS OF THE CONSTITUTION FOR THEIR SATANIC SCUMBAG MOTHERF*CKING ENEMY TERRORIST CONTROLLERS BILDERBERG, RIIA/CFR/CSIS/TRIALTERAL COMMISSION/CLUB OF ROME--USING FUTURE COMBAT SYSTEMS, ONLY MADE POSSIBLE FROM PTECH, WHOSE FORMER BOARD MEMBER, YAQUB MIRZA, JUST HAPPENES TO BE A SHAREHOLDER OF THE OPERATING SYSTEMS USED BY FCS, CALLED LINUXWORKS, WHO ALSO DONATED 1.5 MILLION TO GMU, WHERE ALL OF THIS GENOCIDE, BLACK OPS FALSE FLAG TERROR ENGINEERING CALLED "PREDICTIVE BATTLESPACE AWAREHNESS" IS COLLABORATIVELY WORKED ON WITH MIT/AFRL/MITRE/SAIC/QINETIQ. F*CK YOU YOU SONS OF BITCHES, YOU HAVE BEEN EXPOSED, GET THE F*CK OUT OF MY COUNTRY, YOU NEED TO BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY AND TRIED FOR CRIMES THAT ARE PUNISHABLE BY EXECUTION VIA FIRING SQUAD, IMMEDIALTEY, HOW THE F*CK ARE YOU NOT IN JAIL AWAITING TRIAL FOR PREMEDITATED MASS MURDER AND HIGH TREASON AGAINST THE CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS AND A THREAT TO *REAL* NATIONAL SECURITY? F*CK YOU LEVIS YOU SON OF A BITCH!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!While some former military officials have been skeptical of the computer-modeling work, Subrahmanian noted that "we're not the only ones building these immersive experiences." Even Hezbollah has a war-fighting video game that it sells to potential recruits, he said.Source: AAAS  Alexander Levis and V.S. Subrahmanian________________________________________________________ http://cryptome.org/whats-truth.htmLet's step back in time: http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/27/nyregion/27KALL.htmlThe New York Times October 27, 2001SECURITY Network Would Link Municipal Law Officials With Federal Intelligence InformationBy RALPH BLUMENTHAL The former F.B.I. official heading New York State's antiterrorism campaign said yesterday that the state's 80,000 municipal law enforcement officers would be tied into a new network providing intelligence information intended to prevent new terrorist attacks. The official, James K. Kallstrom, said he spoke to a group of 300 police chiefs and officers in Albany this week, telling them, "We are going to get all of you back into the business of counterterrorism." He called the local forces "our front line of defense."In an interview in his office at 633 Third Avenue in Manhattan, Mr. Kallstrom, former director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's New York office and now Gov. George E. Pataki's director of public safety, said the effort was intended in part to keep better track of foreigners who are considered potential security risks after years of letting them into the country with few controls. "If some night police on the Taconic Parkway stop someone who's an illegal alien who doesn't have proper documentation, we need a better system of contacts and follow-up," he said. He declined to describe the network in any detail, saying only that it would be some kind of computer link."We are communicating with every cop on the street and every sheriff on the street with relevant real- time information all the way from Washington and down to the cops and back again," he said. "We want to make their vision even more peripheral and piercing."College security officials should also be mobilized to look out for foreign students who obtain visas for study in the United States but disappear before ever registering, Mr. Kallstrom said.To assist him in his duties, he said, he lured out of retirement a former chief of the New York Police Department, Louis R. Anemone, to be his deputy, and was planning a staff of 25 to 30. Among those who have volunteered their services, he said, are a former official of the Central Intelligence Agency and a businessman with expertise in biological threats."I want to have people of many different mind-sets in the room," Mr. Kallstrom said. He said he was setting up a number of "brain trusts" of experts in health, science and engineering. "Shame on us if we don't take advantage of biometrics and our ability to positively identify someone," he said, referring to the science of identifying people through their individual characteristics, like fingerprints or retinal patterns. He said he was also working closely with a special state subcommittee on terrorism formed by State Senator Roy M. Goodman, the Manhattan Republican and chairman of the Senate Investigations Committee. In three weekly closed-door meetings so far, including one on Wednesday with Mr. Kallstrom, that panel, which includes four former New York police commissioners and several former federal agents, identified persistent vulnerabilities in aviation, rail and waterway systems; emergency medical care; and other areas, and offered a variety of remedies, some drawn from the war against organized crime.
Panel members said they called for installing chemical and biological sensors in airports, rail stations and tunnels; arming pilots in the cockpit; and getting the Federal Aviation Administration and private contractors out of the airline security business.The group reviewed about 2,000 possible targets, a list compiled for the millennium celebrations[/color], said Raymond W. Kelly, a former New York police commissioner and United States customs commissioner. Robert J. McGuire, another former police commissioner, said that if the country was truly at war, the authorities should be viewing terrorist suspects more as potential prisoners of war to be interrogated than as criminals to be prosecuted. Mr. Kallstrom said he would not comment on Mr. McGuire's position. Henry I. DeGeneste, a former superintendent of the Port Authority police in charge of the New York area's airports, said food service employees and other staff members still had too much unsupervised access to secure areas, and he called for passenger and employee screenings to be taken over by federal officers.
One medical specialist who addressed the panel, Dr. Irwin Redlener, president of the Children's Hospital at Montefiore Medical Center in the Bronx, told the group that the emergency health care system was not paying enough attention to the needs of children, who are particularly vulnerable to chemical and biological agents.
Mr. Kallstrom said, "There may be bumps in the road," but vowed an unrelenting engagement. "We're obsessed with this, not having something happen," he said.
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AND NOW, THE REAL REASON FOR THE CREATION OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, CRIMINAL, HIGH TREASON OF "HOMELAND SECURITY", AND THE PRIMARY UNDERLYING MOTIVE FOR CARRYING OUT 911, THE MOTIVE WHICH EVEN SUPERCEDES WORLD GOVERNMENT, BECAUSE THIS IS WHAT WAS NEEDED TO CONSOLIDATE ALL POWER OF EVERY NATION INTO THE HANDS OF THE GLOBALSIT ELITE. THIS ONE DOCUMENT ALONE, EXPOSES THE ENTIRE FRAUD OF THE POLICE STATE SURVEILLANCE INFRASTRUCTURE, AND BY ITSELF PROVES THAT IS NEVER HAD ANYTHING WHATSOEVER TO DO WITH "TERRORISM", BUT WAS ALWAYS ABOUT ***CONTROL***, AND MANUFACTURED TERROR WAS THE ONLY WAY TO SELL THE IMPLEMENTATIONS OF WHAT WAS ALWAYS C.O.G. TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, AND TO THE WORLD. JAY ROCKEFELLER CAN SHOVE THIS UP HIS ASS, BEHOLD THE POWER OF THE INTERNET YOU CRIMINAL SON OF A BITCH!!!!
http://www.aiaa.org/portal/index.cfm?adview=12&tcspageid=826&getcomm=69 The AIAA Information and Command and Control System Technical Committee had an excellent meeting in December in Washington, D.C. We were able to have several outside government speakers to address critical issues that are important to the US government. These presentations included. * Implications of September 11 for C3I, John Stenbit, ASD C3I * International Cooperation and Information Sharing for Complex Emergencies, William Wood, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State (Analysis and Information Management * Effects-Based Operations, Dr. Alex Levis, Chief Scientist, U.S. Air Force
* Defense Transformation after September 11, VADM Arthur Cebrowski,(USN Ret), Director, Office of Force Transformation, OSD,* S&T Budget for DoD, Dr. Charlie Holland, DUSD, S&T Some high level observations are: * DoD S&T budget and DARPA budget will increase
* Network Centric Operations is a key area
* DoD transformation will change the culture, policies and processes of DoD
* Effects based operations is important to DoD The TC also held a meeting in August in Alburquerque, New Mexico. We had sessions on: * Strategic Plan for the TC with emphasis on new strategic directions * Update on the Sensemaking Workshop that took place 23-25 October. Note that CCRP had the lead New Committee Appointments Membership - Mitzi Wertheim Liaison - Jude Franklin Strategic Planning - Gary Doblen Meetings - Cindy Williams Workshops - Larry Wentz Awards Bill Kemple Short Courses - Dick Hayes Furthe notes from the 17-18 December meeting in Pentagon City, VA Members arei requested to verify their information with AIAA The following new members were unanimously voted onto the TC Jim Brooks Chip Picket Mark Coumotus Dawn Meyeriecks Strategic Planning Round Robin: "Committee Background" slide * Sensemaking Workshop is on a "book tour" and has been well received * Code of Best Practices is being expanded and turned into a book at the request of the new J9 "Strategic Planning" slide * Initiatives need a sponsor so the work doesn't run into a brick wall * How much do we bring C3I back into AIAA, our parent organization? Do we need more TC interaction to share our expertise with AIAA? * Need to continue the discussions started in Kosovo. Do these lessons have greater importance in light of 9/11? Increased working relationships among agencies that haven't traditionally worked together?
* Should the TC push to get more civil agencies involved? TC Meeting If the Sensemaking paper is suitable for publishing, shouldn't we publish it? Should we post it to the AIAA's website as well? Possible new members: *Bill Kincaid (Orincon) *Dan Randeau (Sandia) *Charlie Holland (S&T) *Dick Mosier (Raython) * Johnny Grimes (Raytheon) TC appears to be outside the strict AIAA guidelines bout TC organization and length of time members remain on the TC - Cindy and Stuart will meet with AIAA to discuss. The TC should put its charter up on the website Potential next meetings: * Workshop in the DC area the last three days of February 2002 * Boston in early spring * Millennium Challenge in Tidewater area (24 July - 9 August) * Colorado Springs * C2 battlefield at Hurlburt * Colorado in general (Joint Test & Evaluation Center, NORAD/Cheyenne Mountain, Space Warfare Center, Space Commands) * San Diego (Hunter Warrior) M&S Workshop Round Robin Objective is to improve the acquisition of C4ISR through M&S What does success look like? What are the roles and responsibilities for the government and industry attendees? How are the break-out sessions envisioned to occur? * Identify key areas for inputs to the budget process? Volunteers for workshop chairs/co-chairs * Stuart Starr * Ken Jordan * Tip Slater * Ron Nishinaga * David Sundstrom * Cindy Williams * Dave Messner * Jim Brooks * Jeff Cooper Areas for workshop: * Systems-of-systems * Sensors * Information Processing What are the shortfalls (near and far term)? With respect to each area: * What would participants like M&S to be able to do for them? Can they do it now? Of the things they can't do now, what is too hard, hard but solvable, easy but just not done yet, etc. Is the majority of the TC interested in the workshop? (yes) Is there a sponsor? Does it fulfill the TC's strategy and charter? Other areas of TC focus Is there a nugget in Peace Support Ops that can be gleaned for Homeland Security, or vice versa? Homeland Defense Coalition Impacts DoD Intelligence interaction with Law Enforcement Intelligence * Rocky Mountain Intel Network as example Summary of lessons learned from 9/11 [INSERT: WTF IS THIS?]* How did networks get reconfigured? * What worked? * What didn't? * What do you wish you had, but didn't? * What were your true core needs, as shown by the crisis itself?
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