Pentagon/Northcom to stage domestic Cyber attacks/w/1918 flu to usher in IPv6

Author Topic: Pentagon/Northcom to stage domestic Cyber attacks/w/1918 flu to usher in IPv6  (Read 106976 times)

0 Members and 1 Guest are viewing this topic.

Offline OldSchool

  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 1,113
Re: The vaccine is partially a psyop, not taking it will not make you safe
« Reply #120 on: October 02, 2009, 09:28:52 PM »
The first part is with us, the second arrives through a needle.

It wouldn't be the first time they tried that. Binary recombination seems to be their stealth tactic. A couple years ago they pulled FluMist from the shelves as they claim to have found binary components of the bird flu in it.

It also sounds like they're putting the finishing touches on SkyNet (from Terminator)
Life is like a box of chocolates.....until some Neocon clubs you with your own leg and steals it.

Nomadinexile

  • Guest
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #121 on: October 02, 2009, 11:55:31 PM »
<---Not a coward.  Little crazy though.   8)       Yeah AI, this stuff is amazing.  Another sleepless night on the way I think.  Dang.  If only my brain was a super cloud networking computer.  My Hard drive is almost full. 

Offline Republic Renewal

  • Member
  • ****
  • Posts: 263
  • I felt the storm approaching...
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #122 on: October 03, 2009, 02:00:46 AM »
Do a favor, delete that message and reserve your credibility.
Nosce te Ipsum

Know Thyself

Offline jeremiahshine

  • Member
  • **
  • Posts: 79
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #123 on: October 03, 2009, 02:10:03 AM »
What is a super cloud computer?

Offline Satyagraha

  • Global Moderator
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 8,939
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #124 on: October 03, 2009, 11:07:28 AM »
What is a super cloud computer?

Here's a couple of youtube videos that will explain:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XdBd14rjcs0&feature=related

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6PNuQHUiV3Q

Then watch this, about Total Information Awareness, a Dod program, which will thrive when we're all on a cloud...
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uZ-LObTOV7s

Then watch this, about the Global Information Grid/Network (warning: propaganda):

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YrcqA_cqRD8
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9Ylcpyqz4fk&feature=related

Then read about TEMPEST... stickied in General.



And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40

luckee1

  • Guest
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #125 on: October 03, 2009, 12:12:13 PM »
you tube is down for maintenance on a Saturday afternoon???

Offline Satyagraha

  • Global Moderator
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 8,939
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #126 on: October 03, 2009, 12:33:54 PM »
you tube is down for maintenance on a Saturday afternoon???

Hmmm. Very strange time to clean house. Must be a lot of videos to clean up - you know, those truthers, birthers, holocaust questioners, supporters of Ron Paul, audit-the-fed'ers, and other people asking questions who need to be censored.
And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40

Offline ekimdrachir

  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 7,144
  • METATRON ON
    • Go Outside
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #127 on: October 03, 2009, 01:00:48 PM »
I have to create a current events newsletter tomorrow and include this, and all essential information ppl need to know regarding this topic. Please help by reccomending anything else you all think should be included, and I will post it here when I finish

Nomadinexile

  • Guest
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #128 on: October 03, 2009, 01:37:56 PM »
Oh, come on, they wouldn't do that would they?    ::)           http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aKjE7i7K0q3I

Offline Republic Renewal

  • Member
  • ****
  • Posts: 263
  • I felt the storm approaching...
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #129 on: October 03, 2009, 11:54:03 PM »
I have to create a current events newsletter tomorrow and include this, and all essential information ppl need to know regarding this topic. Please help by reccomending anything else you all think should be included, and I will post it here when I finish

Sir, check to see if anyones account was deleted and for what reason if listed. This may give us a leg up on what "cleaning" they are doing, and if its just truthers they are targeting.
Nosce te Ipsum

Know Thyself

Anti_Illuminati

  • Guest
Re: CSIS J. Lewis: "Internet should be able to be shutdown like planes on 911"
« Reply #130 on: October 04, 2009, 01:50:01 AM »
http://thehill.com/component/content/article/545-technology/56947-obamas-power-over-internet-central-to-cybersecurity-debate

Obama’s power over Internet is central factor in cybersecurity debate
By Kim Hart - 09/01/09 12:00 PM ET

Legislation that would give the president authority to shut down at-risk Internet networks would strengthen the country’s cyber infrastructure in an emergency, according to some security experts.

But industry and consumer groups argue the government shouldn’t meddle with private networks.

How and when President Barack Obama could intervene in public and private information systems has become the central point of contention in the new draft of the Cybersecurity Act of 2009.

Senate staffers have circulated the draft with industry groups, civil liberties advocates and security experts. The bill was first introduced four months ago by Senate Commerce Committee Chairman Jay Rockefeller (D-W.Va.), and ranking member Olympia Snow (R-Maine).

The debate over the legislation comes as the Obama administration struggles to coordinate a national approach to cybersecurity.

Obama pledged to create a cybersecurity czar in the White House. But that post remains empty after Melissa Hathaway, acting senior director of cybersecurity and a front-runner for the job, resigned last month. Industry groups argue the government should fix its own security systems before adding mandates to the private sector.

Rockefeller’s original bill gave the president the power to limit Internet traffic to critical networks — in both the public and private sectors — for national security reasons or in the case of an emergency. Industry groups raised alarm about that level of government interference, and the new draft dropped the specific language, instead allowing the president to direct a “national response” to the cyber threat.

That language is "an improvement" over the initial bill, but is too ambiguous, said Greg Nojeim, senior counsel for the Center for Democracy and Technology.

“What does national response mean?” he said. “The scope of (the president’s) power to direct private-sector critical infrastructure information system operators is left undefined and is problematic for that reason.”

Others say the president should be able to take such action. James Lewis, senior fellow for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which last year issued a set of cybersecurity recommendations to Congress, likened the provision to President George W. Bush’s call to shut down airlines after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001.

“It seems foolish not to have the same authority for cyberspace,” he said.
“It’s not that the president will wake up in a bad mood one day and implode Yahoo. This would apply only to severe national emergencies. … This is a great opportunity to blast us into a new level of discussion about cybersecurity.”


A Senate staffer with knowledge of the bill said the draft was circulated to stakeholders, including network operators and consumer advocates, in order to get more feedback on the provisions.

Senate Commerce Committee spokeswoman Jena Longo said in a statement that “the bill will not empower a ‘government shut down or takeover of the Internet.’ … The purpose of this language is to clarify how the president directs the public-private response to a crisis, secure our economy and safeguard our financial networks, protect the American people, their privacy and civil liberties, and coordinate the government’s response.”

She added that the president “has always had the Constitutional authority, and duty, to protect the American people and direct the national response to any emergency that threatens the security and safety of the United States.”

The bill would also require cybersecurity professionals and critical infrastructure operators to go through a more rigorous certification process to be developed by the Commerce Department. Opponents of the provision say the security industry has already developed its own certification requirements and shouldn’t have to jump through other government hoops.

Alan Paller, director of research for the Sans Institute, which provides computer security training, said most of the government contractors and employees hired to secure federal networks do not have enough skills for the job.

“You have to set a high bar and create a demand for these credentials,” he said. “The security technology is useless without people who know how to use it.”

The original version of the bill also called for a “clearinghouse” for private and public cybersecurity threats, allowing the Commerce Department to seize data vulnerable to attacks even if it contains personal information about citizens.

Privacy advocates bristled at that idea. The new draft drops the reference to the Commerce Department having the power override privacy statutes to get access to information, but it still allows the government to require the sharing of potentially sensitive data.

“Companies are concerned they would provide information to the government about vulnerabilities that could be useful to competitors if disclosed,” Nojeim said. “The bill’s scope isn’t clear.”

Industry groups are also closely watching a number of other cybersecurity bills.

Sen. Tom Carper (D-Del.), a member of the Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee and chairman of the subcommittee that handles government information, aims to update the Federal Information Security Management Act, a 7-year-old law requiring agencies to conduct annual reviews of their information system security efforts.

His bill, the Information and Communications Enhancement Act, introduced in April, would require agencies to have “an annual independent information security effectiveness evaluation.”

Security experts have been pushing for more robust FISMA standards for at least two years.

“Right now you can get a good FISMA rating and not be secure at all,” Lewis said. “We need to move from a paper test to performance-based metrics.”

Sen. Joe Lieberman (I-Conn.), chairman of the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee, introduced a bill in April directing the Department of Homeland Security to work with other intelligence agencies to create a plan to protect critical electric infrastructure from cyber attacks. A companion bill has been introduced in the House by Rep. Bennie Thompson (D-Miss.), chairman of the House Homeland Security Committee.

Nojeim said the CDT largely supports the other cybersecurity bills. “It’s about strengthening FISMA and getting the government’s own house in order, which is a prerequisite to any discussion about what the government should require of the private sector.”

Offline phosphene

  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 1,826
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #131 on: October 04, 2009, 02:23:13 AM »
http://www.freshpatents.com/-dt20090219ptan20090047353.php?type=description

http://targetfreedom.typepad.com/targetfreedom/2009/08/refuse-and-resist-mandatory-flu-vaccines.html
H1N1 Vaccine Patent Filed Before the Virus Was Spread!

Kistner Pharm filed the patent of H1N1 vaccine on 28 AUG 2007 before the virus was spread!

This is the US Patent office document:
Go to Page 7 #0056 and see for yourself!
http://www.theoneclickgroup.co.uk/documents/vaccines/Baxter%20Vaccine%20Patent%20Application.pdf
How could the vaccine come before the virus?
Don’t believe me, look it up for yourself!
Repost and email everywhere!
Patent Evidence That The ‘Swine Flu’ Pandemic Is Man-Made
http://nbgazette.com/index.php?entry=entry090802-133304
 
"A strange game. The only winning move is not to play."--Joshua

Offline freeflying

  • Member
  • ****
  • Posts: 482
Re: The vaccine is partially a psyop, not taking it will not make you safe
« Reply #132 on: October 04, 2009, 04:00:42 AM »
You got to wonder, if they want to use our military against us, why are they vaccinating our soldiers first?

Doubt it will be our military. They will die just like us and then they will bring in the Russians or Chinese troops.

Offline Dig

  • All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man.
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 63,090
    • Git Ureself Edumacated
Re: CSIS J. Lewis: "Internet should be able to be shutdown like planes on 911"
« Reply #133 on: October 04, 2009, 04:54:46 AM »
“What does national response mean?” he said. “The scope of (the president’s) power to direct private-sector critical infrastructure information system operators is left undefined and is problematic for that reason.” Others say the president should be able to take such action. James Lewis, senior fellow for the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which last year issued a set of cybersecurity recommendations to Congress, likened the provision to President George W. Bush’s call to shut down airlines after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001. “It seems foolish not to have the same authority for cyberspace,” he said.

And just like 9/11, the terrorists get flown around the world with prvate jets. After any cyber attack, the government funded terrorists will be the only ones allowed to use cyberspace.  THIS IS A SET UP, A CON, A SWINDLE!

Quote
“It’s not that the president will wake up in a bad mood one day and implode Yahoo. This would apply only to severe national emergencies. … This is a great opportunity to blast us into a new level of discussion about cybersecurity.” A Senate staffer with knowledge of the bill said the draft was circulated to stakeholders, including network operators and consumer advocates, in order to get more feedback on the provisions. Senate Commerce Committee spokeswoman Jena Longo said in a statement that “the bill will not empower a ‘government shut down or takeover of the Internet.’ … The purpose of this language is to clarify how the president directs the public-private response to a crisis, secure our economy and safeguard our financial networks, protect the American people, their privacy and civil liberties, and coordinate the government’s response.” She added that the president “has always had the Constitutional authority, and duty, to protect the American people and direct the national response to any emergency that threatens the security and safety of the United States.”

LIE LIE LIE!!!!!!!!!!!!!!  Please point out in the constitution where it says that one man has the power to shut down the flow of all communication to 305 million people unilaterally.  WTF are these psychotic pieces of f**king dog shit talking about.  This is like this lying victim of insanity saying "The president always has had the constitutional authority to rape your daughter, cut off her head, and feed it to Dick Cheney if he felt it was a super cool thing." I mean where the hell do they come up with this stuff?

Quote
The bill would also require cybersecurity professionals and critical infrastructure operators to go through a more rigorous certification process to be developed by the Commerce Department. Opponents of the provision say the security industry has already developed its own certification requirements and shouldn’t have to jump through other government hoops. Alan Paller, director of research for the Sans Institute, which provides computer security training, said most of the government contractors and employees hired to secure federal networks do not have enough skills for the job. “You have to set a high bar and create a demand for these credentials,” he said. “The security technology is useless without people who know how to use it.”

This is the creation of a class system on the internet. They use words like "High bar" and "credentials" but we know what they mean...just like animal farm, some animals are more equal than others.  DICK CHENEY BECAME VP DUE TO "HIGH BARS" AND "CREDENTIALS. DONALD RUMSFELD BECAME SECRETARY OF DEFENSE BECAUSE OF "HIGH BARS" AND "CREDENTIALS". The positions they had allowed unconstitutional powers because of the idea that some people are credential-ed to be more morally just than others.  All men are created equal, the founding fathers knew this well and that is why there is inherent in the constitution separate but equal branches of government with checks and balances and oversight.

Here are more facts for these assholes writing this shit...

The president is not the commander in chief of anything except his dick. There is no such thing as a secretary of defense. It is a completely manufactured position. There is no such thing as a department of defense in the constitution, it is also a completely made up department. During war times there was a department of war and a secretary of war.  Conditioning and predictive programming allowed us to create and view as essential these completely autonomous and tyrannically powerful systems of perpetual warfare that include unconstiutional "war powers". I mean the whole thing is so utterly ridiculous people need to wake up to it.

Quote
The original version of the bill also called for a “clearinghouse” for private and public cybersecurity threats, allowing the Commerce Department to seize data vulnerable to attacks even if it contains personal information about citizens. Privacy advocates bristled at that idea. The new draft drops the reference to the Commerce Department having the power override privacy statutes to get access to information, but it still allows the government to require the sharing of potentially sensitive data. “Companies are concerned they would provide information to the government about vulnerabilities that could be useful to competitors if disclosed,” Nojeim said. “The bill’s scope isn’t clear.” Industry groups are also closely watching a number of other cybersecurity bills.

Gee, duh, der...who is head of the Senate on Commerce?

All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

luckee1

  • Guest
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #134 on: October 04, 2009, 10:15:27 PM »
A_I, does not the S733 go into effect 1 year after the signing of the act?  We are looking at April of 2010?  No?

So Barky for all intents and purposes should not be able to pull it yet?

I am not trying to sound naive, but legally he can't have that control yet?  

From open congress:

  OpenCongress -

  U.S. Congress - Text of S.773 as Introduced in Senate Cybersecurity
  Act of 2009 </>

  S.773 </bill/111-s773/show> - Cybersecurity Act of 2009

A bill to ensure the continued free flow of commerce within the United
States and with its global trading partners through secure cyber
communications, to provide for the continued development and
exploitation of the Internet and intranet communications for such
purposes, to provide for the development of a cadre of information
technology specialists to improve and maintain effective cybersecurity
defenses against disruption, and for other purposes.

111th CONGRESS

1st SessionComments

S. 773Comments
17
To ensure the continued free flow of commerce within the United States
and with its global trading partners through secure cyber
communications, to provide for the continued development and
exploitation of the Internet and intranet communications for such
purposes, to provide for the development of a cadre of information
technology specialists to improve and maintain effective cyber security
defenses against disruption, and for other purposes.

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

      April 1, 2009
Mr. ROCKEFELLER (for himself, Ms. SNOWE, and Mr. NELSON of Florida)
introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the
Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation
------------------------------------------------------------------------
A BILL
1
To ensure the continued free flow of commerce within the United States
and with its global trading partners through secure cyber
communications, to provide for the continued development and
exploitation of the Internet and intranet communications for such
purposes, to provide for the development of a cadre of information
technology specialists to improve and maintain effective cybersecurity
defenses against disruption, and for other purposes

      /Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
      United States of America in Congress assembled,

      SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

      (a) SHORT TITLE- This Act may be cited as the ‘Cybersecurity Act
      of 2009’.

      (b) TABLE OF CONTENTS- The table of contents for this Act is as
      follows:

            Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.

            Sec. 2. Findings.

            Sec. 3. Cybersecurity Advisory Panel.

            Sec. 4. Real-time cybersecurity dashboard.

            Sec. 5. State and regional cybersecurity enhancement
            program.

            Sec. 6. NIST standards development and compliance.

            Sec. 7. Licensing and certification of cybersecurity
            professionals.

            Sec. 8. Review of NTIA domain name contracts.

            Sec. 9. Secure domain name addressing system.

            Sec. 10. Promoting cybersecurity awareness.

            Sec. 11. Federal cybersecurity research and
            development.

            Sec. 12. Federal Cyber Scholarship-for-Service
            program.

            Sec. 13. Cybersecurity competition and challenge.

            Sec. 14. Public-private clearinghouse.

            Sec. 15. Cybersecurity risk management report.

            Sec. 16. Legal framework review and report.

            Sec. 17. Authentication and civil liberties report.

            Sec. 18. Cybersecurity responsibilities and
            authorities.

            Sec. 19. Quadrennial cyber review.

            Sec. 20. Joint intelligence threat assessment.

            Sec. 21. International norms and cybersecurity deterrence
            measures.

            Sec. 22. Federal Secure Products and Services Acquisitions
            Board.

            Sec. 23. Definitions

      SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

      1
      The Congress finds the following:
            17
            (1) America’s failure to protect cyberspace is one of the
            most urgent national security problems facing the
            country.

            7
            (2) Since intellectual property is now often stored in
            digital form, industrial espionage that exploits weak
            cybersecurity dilutes our investment in innovation while
            subsidizing the research and development efforts of foreign
            competitors. In the new global competition, where economic
            strength and technological leadership are vital components
            of national power, failing to secure cyberspace puts us at a
            disadvantage.

            7
            (3) According to the 2009 Annual Threat Assessment, ‘a
            successful cyber attack against a major financial service
            provider could severely impact the national economy, while
            cyber attacks against physical infrastructure computer
            systems such as those that control power grids or oil
            refineries have the potential to disrupt services for hours
            or weeks’ and that ‘Nation states and criminals target our
            government and private sector information networks to gain
            competitive advantage in the commercial sector.’.

            1 <#>
            (4) The Director of National Intelligence testified before
            the Congress on February 19, 2009, that ‘a growing array of
            state and non-state adversaries are increasingly
            targeting-for exploitation and potentially disruption or
            destruction-our information infrastructure, including the
            Internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and
            embedded processors and controllers in critical industries’
            and these trends are likely to continue.Comments <#>Close
            Comments <#>Permalink <?version=is&nid=t0:is:44>

            6 <#>
            (5) John Brennan, the Assistant to the President for
            Homeland Security and Counterterrorism wrote on March 2,
            2009, that ‘our nation’s security and economic prosperity
            depend on the security, stability, and integrity of
            communications and information infrastructure that are
            largely privately-owned and globally-operated.’.

            6 <#>
            (6) Paul Kurtz, a Partner and chief operating officer of
            Good Harbor Consulting as well as a senior advisor to the
            Obama Transition Team for cybersecurity, recently stated
            that the United States is unprepared to respond to a
            ‘cyber-Katrina’ and that ‘a massive cyber disruption could
            have a cascading, long-term impact without adequate
            co-ordination between government and the private
            sector.’.

            3 <#>
            (7) The Cyber Strategic Inquiry 2008, sponsored by Business
            Executives for National Security and executed by Booz Allen
            Hamilton, recommended to ‘establish a single voice for
            cybersecurity within government’ concluding that the ‘unique
            nature of cybersecurity requires a new leadership
            paradigm.’

            4 <#>
            (8) Alan Paller, the Director of Research at the SANS
            Institute, testified before the Congress that ‘the fight
            against cybercrime resembles an arms race where each time
            the defenders build a new wall, the attackers create new
            tools to scale the wall. What is particularly important in
            this analogy is that, unlike conventional warfare where
            deployment takes time and money and is quite visible, in the
            cyber world, when the attackers find a new weapon, they can
            attack millions of computers, and successfully infect
            hundreds of thousands, in a few hours or days, and remain
            completely hidden.’.

            1 <#>
            (9) According to the February 2003 National Strategy to
            Secure Cyberspace, ‘our nation’s critical infrastructures
            are composed of public and private institutions in the
            sectors of agriculture, food, water, public health,
            emergency services, government, defense industrial base,
            information and telecommunications, energy, transportation,
            banking finance, chemicals and hazardous materials, and
            postal and shipping. Cyberspace is their nervous system--the
            control system of our country’ and that ‘the cornerstone of
            America’s cyberspace security strategy is and will remain a
            public-private partnership.’.

            3 <#>
            (10) According to the National Journal, Mike McConnell, the
            former Director of National Intelligence, told President
            Bush in May 2007 that if the 9/11 attackers had chosen
            computers instead of airplanes as their weapons and had
            waged a massive assault on a U.S. bank, the economic
            consequences would have been ‘an order of magnitude greater’
            than those cased by the physical attack on the World Trade
            Center. Mike McConnell has subsequently referred to
            cybersecurity as the ‘soft underbelly of this
            country.’.

            (11) The Center for Strategic and International Studies
            report on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency concluded
            that (A) cybersecurity is now a major national security
            problem for the United States, (B) decisions and actions
            must respect privacy and civil liberties, and (C) only a
            comprehensive national security strategy that embraces both
            the domestic and international aspects of cybersecurity will
            make us more secure. The report continued stating that the
            United States faces ‘a long-term challenge in cyberspace
            from foreign intelligence agencies and militaries,
            criminals, and others, and that losing this struggle will
            wreak serious damage on the economic health and national
            security of the United States.’.

            (12) James Lewis, Director and Senior Fellow, Technology and
            Public Policy Program, Center for Strategic and
            International Studies, testified on behalf of the Center for
            Strategic and International Studies that ‘the United States
            is not organized and lacks a coherent national strategy for
            addressing’ cybersecurity.

            10 <#>
            (13) President Obama said in a speech at Purdue University
            on July 16, 2008, that ‘every American depends--directly or
            indirectly--on our system of information networks. They are
            increasingly the backbone of our economy and our
            infrastructure; our national security and our personal
            well-being. But it’s no secret that terrorists could use our
            computer networks to deal us a crippling blow. We know that
            cyber-espionage and common crime is already on the rise. And
            yet while countries like China have been quick to recognize
            this change, for the last eight years we have been dragging
            our feet.’ Moreover, President Obama stated that ‘we need to
            build the capacity to identify, isolate, and respond to any
            cyber-attack.’.

            4 <#>
            (14) The President’s Information Technology Advisory
            Committee reported in 2005 that software is a major
            vulnerability and that ‘software development methods that
            have been the norm fail to provide the high-quality,
            reliable, and secure software that the IT infrastructure
            requires. . . . Today, as with cancer, vulnerable software
            can be invaded and modified to cause damage to previously
            healthy software, and infected software can replicate itself
            and be carried across networks to cause damage in other
            systems.’.

      SEC. 3. CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY PANEL.

      (a) IN GENERAL- The President shall establish or designate a
      Cybersecurity Advisory Panel.

      1 <#>
      (b) QUALIFICATIONS- The President--

            4 <#>
            (1) shall appoint as members of the panel representatives of
            industry, academic, non-profit organizations, interest
            groups and advocacy organizations, and State and local
            governments who are qualified to provide advice and
            information on cybersecurity research, development,
            demonstrations, education, technology transfer, commercial
            application, or societal and civil liberty concerns;
            and

            7 <#>
            (2) may seek and give consideration to recommendations from
            the Congress, industry, the cybersecurity community, the
            defense community, State and local governments, and other
            appropriate organizations.

      (c) DUTIES- The panel shall advise the President on matters
      relating to the national cybersecurity program and strategy and
      shall assess--

            1 <#>
            (1) trends and developments in cybersecurity science
            research and development;
            (2) progress made in implementing the strategy;
            (3) the need to revise the strategy;
            (4) the balance among the components of the national
            strategy, including funding for program components;
            (5) whether the strategy, priorities, and goals are helping
            to maintain United States leadership and defense in
            cybersecurity;
            (6) the management, coordination, implementation, and
            activities of the strategy; and
            (7) whether societal and civil liberty concerns are
            adequately addressed.

      4 <#>
      (d) REPORTS- The panel shall report, not less frequently than once
      every 2 years, to the President on its assessments under
      subsection (c) and its recommendations for ways to improve the
      strategy.

      7 <#>
      (e) TRAVEL EXPENSES OF NON-FEDERAL MEMBERS- Non-Federal members of
      the panel, while attending meetings of the panel or while
      otherwise serving at the request of the head of the panel while
      away from their homes or regular places of business, may be
      allowed travel expenses, including per diem in lieu of
      subsistence, as authorized by section 5703 of title 5, United
      States Code, for individuals in the government serving without
      pay. Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prohibit
      members of the panel who are officers or employees of the United
      States from being allowed travel expenses, including per diem in
      lieu of subsistence, in accordance with law.

      3 <#>
      (f) EXEMPTION FROM FACA SUNSET- Section 14 of the Federal Advisory
      Committee Act (5 U.S.C. App.) shall not apply to the Advisory
      Panel.

      SEC. 4. REAL-TIME CYBERSECURITY DASHBOARD.
      2 <#>
      The Secretary of Commerce shall--
            10 <#>
            (1) in consultation with the Office of Management and
            Budget, develop a plan within 90 days after the date of
            enactment of this Act to implement a system to provide
            dynamic, comprehensive, real-time cybersecurity status and
            vulnerability information of all Federal Government
            information systems and networks managed by the Department
            of Commerce; and

            1 <#>
            (2) implement the plan within 1 year after the date of
            enactment of this Act.Comments <#>

      SEC. 5. STATE AND REGIONAL CYBERSECURITY ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM.

      6 <#>
      (a) CREATION AND SUPPORT OF CYBERSECURITY CENTERS- The Secretary
      of Commerce shall provide assistance for the creation and support
      of Regional Cybersecurity Centers for the promotion and
      implementation of cybersecurity standards. Each Center shall be
      affiliated with a United States-based nonprofit institution or
      organization, or consortium thereof, that applies for and is
      awarded financial assistance under this section.

      6 <#>
      (b) PURPOSE- The purpose of the Centers is to enhance the
      cybersecurity of small and medium sized businesses in United
      States through--

            5 <#>
            (1) the transfer of cybersecurity standards, processes,
            technology, and techniques developed at the National
            Institute of Standards and Technology to Centers and,
            through them, to small- and medium-sized companies
            throughout the United States;

            2 <#>
            (2) the participation of individuals from industry,
            universities, State governments, other Federal agencies,
            and, when appropriate, the Institute in cooperative
            technology transfer activities;

            4 <#>
            (3) efforts to make new cybersecurity technology, standards,
            and processes usable by United States-based small- and
            medium-sized companies;

            4 <#>
            (4) the active dissemination of scientific, engineering,
            technical, and management information about cybersecurity to
            industrial firms, including small- and medium-sized
            companies; and

            1 <#>
            (5) the utilization, when appropriate, of the expertise and
            capability that exists in Federal laboratories other than
            the Institute.

      1 <#>
      (c) ACTIVITIES- The Centers shall--

            (1) disseminate cybersecurity technologies, standard, and
            processes based on research by the Institute for the purpose
            of demonstrations and technology transfer;
            (2) actively transfer and disseminate cybersecurity
            strategies, best practices, standards, and technologies to
            protect against and mitigate the risk of cyber attacks to a
            wide range of companies and enterprises, particularly small-
            and medium-sized businesses; and
            (3) make loans, on a selective, short-term basis, of items
            of advanced cybersecurity countermeasures to small
            businesses with less than 100 employees.

      2 <#>
      (c) Duration and Amount of Support; Program Descriptions;
      Applications; Merit Review; Evaluations of Assistance-

            (1) FINANCIAL SUPPORT- The Secretary may provide financial
            support, not to exceed 50 percent of its annual operating
            and maintenance costs, to any Center for a period not to
            exceed 6 years (except as provided in paragraph
            (5)(D)).

            (2) PROGRAM DESCRIPTION- Within 90 days after the date of
            enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall publish in the
            Federal Register a draft description of a program for
            establishing Centers and, after a 30-day comment period,
            shall publish a final description of the program. The
            description shall include--

                  (A) a description of the program;
                  (B) procedures to be followed by applicants;
                  (C) criteria for determining qualified
                  applicants;
                  (D) criteria, including those described in paragraph
                  (4), for choosing recipients of financial assistance
                  under this section from among the qualified
                  applicants; and

                  1 <#>
                  (E) maximum support levels expected to be available to
                  Centers under the program in the fourth through sixth
                  years of assistance under this section.

            3 <#>
            (3) APPLICATIONS; SUPPORT COMMITMENT- Any nonprofit
            institution, or consortia of nonprofit institutions, may
            submit to the Secretary an application for financial support
            under this section, in accordance with the procedures
            established by the Secretary. In order to receive assistance
            under this section, an applicant shall provide adequate
            assurances that it will contribute 50 percent or more of the
            proposed Center’s annual operating and maintenance costs for
            the first 3 years and an increasing share for each of the
            next 3 years.

            (4) AWARD CRITERIA- Awards shall be made on a competitive,
            merit-based review. In making a decision whether to approve
            an application and provide financial support under this
            section, the Secretary shall consider, at a
            minimum--

                  (A) the merits of the application, particularly those
                  portions of the application regarding technology
                  transfer, training and education, and adaptation of
                  cybersecurity technologies to the needs of particular
                  industrial sectors;
                  (B) the quality of service to be provided;
                  (C) geographical diversity and extent of service area;
                  and
                  (D) the percentage of funding and amount of in-kind
                  commitment from other sources.

            (5) Third year evaluation-

                  (A) IN GENERAL- Each Center which receives financial
                  assistance under this section shall be evaluated
                  during its third year of operation by an evaluation
                  panel appointed by the Secretary.
            
                  (B) EVALUATION PANEL- Each evaluation panel shall be
                  composed of private experts, none of whom shall be
                  connected with the involved Center, and Federal
                  officials. An official of the Institute shall chair
                  the panel. Each evaluation panel shall measure the
                  Center’s performance against the objectives specified
                  in this section.
                
                  (C) POSITIVE EVALUATION REQUIRED FOR CONTINUED
                  FUNDING- The Secretary may not provide funding for the
                  fourth through the sixth years of a Center’s operation
                  unless the evaluation by the evaluation panel is
                  positive. If the evaluation is positive, the Secretary
                  may provide continued funding through the sixth year
                  at declining levels.

                  (D) FUNDING AFTER SIXTH YEAR- After the sixth year,
                  the Secretary may provide additional financial support
                  to a Center if it has received a positive evaluation
                  through an independent review, under procedures
                  established by the Institute. An additional
                  independent review shall be required at least every 2
                  years after the sixth year of operation. Funding
                  received for a fiscal year under this section after
                  the sixth year of operation may not exceed one third
                  of the annual operating and maintenance costs of the
                  Center.

            (6) PATENT RIGHTS TO INVENTIONS- The provisions of chapter
            18 of title 35, United States Code, shall (to the extent not
            inconsistent with this section) apply to the promotion of
            technology from research by Centers under this section
            except for contracts for such specific technology extension
            or transfer services as may be specified by statute or by
            the President, or the President’s designee.

      (d) ACCEPTANCE OF FUNDS FROM OTHER FEDERAL DEPARTMENTS AND
      AGENCIES- In addition to such sums as may be authorized and
      appropriated to the Secretary and President, or the President’s
      designee, to operate the Centers program, the Secretary and the
      President, or the President’s designee, also may accept funds from
      other Federal departments and agencies for the purpose of
      providing Federal funds to support Centers. Any Center which is
      supported with funds which originally came from other Federal
      departments and agencies shall be selected and operated according
      to the provisions of this section.

      SEC. 6. NIST STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT AND COMPLIANCE.

      (a) IN GENERAL- Within 1 year after the date of enactment of this
      Act, the National Institute of Standards and Technology shall
      establish measurable and auditable cybersecurity standards for all
      Federal Government, government contractor, or grantee critical
      infrastructure information systems and networks in the following
      areas:

            (1) CYBERSECURITY METRICS RESEARCH- The Director of the
            National Institute of Standards and Technology shall
            establish a research program to develop cybersecurity
            metrics and benchmarks that can assess the economic impact
            of cybersecurity. These metrics should measure risk
            reduction and the cost of defense. The research shall
            include the development automated tools to assess
            vulnerability and compliance.

            (2) SECURITY CONTROLS- The Institute shall establish
            standards for continuously measuring the effectiveness of a
            prioritized set of security controls that are known to block
            or mitigate known attacks.


            (3) SOFTWARE SECURITY- The Institute shall establish
            standards for measuring the software security using a
            prioritized list of software weaknesses known to lead to
            exploited and exploitable vulnerabilities. The Institute
            will also establish a separate set of such standards for
            measuring security in embedded software such as that found
            in industrial control systems.

           (4) SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE- The
            Institute shall, establish standard computer-readable
            language for completely specifying the configuration of
            software on computer systems widely used in the Federal
            Government, by government contractors and grantees, and in
            private sector owned critical infrastructure information
            systems and networks.

            (5) STANDARD SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION- The Institute shall
            establish standard configurations consisting of security
            settings for operating system software and software
            utilities widely used in the Federal Government, by
            government contractors and grantees, and in private sector
            owned critical infrastructure information systems and
            networks.

            (6) VULNERABILITY SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE- The Institute
            shall establish standard computer-readable language for
            specifying vulnerabilities in software to enable software
            vendors to communicate vulnerability data to software users
            in real time.

            (7) National compliance standards for all software-

                  (A) PROTOCOL- The Institute shall establish a standard
                  testing and accreditation protocol for software built
                  by or for the Federal Government, its contractors, and
                  grantees, and private sector owned critical
                  infrastructure information systems and networks. to
                  ensure that it--
                        (i) meets the software security standards of
                        paragraph (2); and

                        (ii) does not require or cause any changes to be
                        made in the standard configurations described in
                        paragraph (4).

                  (B) COMPLIANCE- The Institute shall develop a process
                  or procedure to verify that--
                        (i) software development organizations comply
                        with the protocol established under subparagraph
                        (A) during the software development process;
                        and

                        (ii) testing results showing evidence of
                        adequate testing and defect reduction are
                        provided to the Federal Government prior to
                        deployment of software.

      (b) CRITERIA FOR STANDARDS- Notwithstanding any other provision of
      law (including any Executive Order), rule, regulation, or
      guideline, in establishing standards under this section, the
      Institute shall disregard the designation of an information system
      or network as a national security system or on the basis of
      presence of classified or confidential information, and shall
      establish standards based on risk profiles.

      (c) INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS- The Director, through the Institute
      and in coordination with appropriate Federal agencies, shall be
      responsible for United States representation in all international
      standards development related to cybersecurity, and shall develop
      and implement a strategy to optimize the United States position
      with respect to international cybersecurity standards.

      (d) COMPLIANCE ENFORCEMENT- The Director shall--

            (1) enforce compliance with the standards developed by the
            Institute under this section by software manufacturers,
            distributors, and vendors; and

            (2) shall require each Federal agency, and each operator of
            an information system or network designated by the President
            as a critical infrastructure information system or network,
            periodically to demonstrate compliance with the standards
            established under this section.

      (e) FCC NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN- In developing the national
      broadband plan pursuant to section 6001(k) of the American
      Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Federal Communications
      Commission shall report on the most effective and efficient means
      to ensure the cybersecurity of commercial broadband networks,
      including consideration of consumer education and outreach
      programs.

      SEC. 7. LICENSING AND CERTIFICATION OF CYBERSECURITY PROFESSIONALS.

      (a) IN GENERAL- Within 1 year after the date of enactment of this
      Act, the Secretary of Commerce shall develop or coordinate and
      integrate a national licensing, certification, and periodic
      recertification program for cybersecurity professionals.  

      (b) MANDATORY LICENSING- Beginning 3 years after the date of
      enactment of this Act, it shall be unlawful for any individual to
      engage in business in the United States, or to be employed in the
      United States, as a provider of cybersecurity services to any
      Federal agency or an information system or network designated by
      the President, or the President’s designee, as a critical
      infrastructure information system or network, who is not licensed
      and certified under the program.

      SEC. 8. REVIEW OF NTIA DOMAIN NAME CONTRACTS.

      (a) IN GENERAL- No action by the Assistant Secretary of Commerce
      for Communications and Information after the date of enactment of
      this Act with respect to the renewal or modification of a contract
      related to the operation of the Internet Assigned Numbers
      Authority, shall be final until the Advisory Panel--

            (1) has reviewed the action;

            (2) considered the commercial and national security
            implications of the action; and

            (3) approved the action.

      (b) APPROVAL PROCEDURE- If the Advisory Panel does not approve
      such an action, it shall immediately notify the Assistant
      Secretary in writing of the disapproval and the reasons therefor.
      The Advisory Panel may provide recommendations to the Assistant
      Secretary in the notice for any modifications the it deems
      necessary to secure approval of the action.

      SEC. 9. SECURE DOMAIN NAME ADDRESSING SYSTEM.

      (a) IN GENERAL- Within 3 years after the date of enactment of this
      Act, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and
      Information shall develop a strategy to implement a secure domain
      name addressing system. The Assistant Secretary shall publish
      notice of the system requirements in the Federal Register together
      with an implementation schedule for Federal agencies and
      information systems or networks designated by the President, or
      the President’s designee, as critical infrastructure information
      systems or networks.

      (b) COMPLIANCE REQUIRED- The President shall ensure that each
      Federal agency and each such system or network implements the
      secure domain name addressing system in accordance with the
      schedule published by the Assistant Secretary.

      SEC. 10. PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY AWARENESS.

      The Secretary of Commerce shall develop and implement a national
      cybersecurity awareness campaign that-


            (1) is designed to heighten public awareness of
            cybersecurity issues and concerns;

            (2) communicates the Federal Government’s role in securing
            the Internet and protecting privacy and civil liberties with
            respect to Internet-related activities; and

            (3) utilizes public and private sector means of providing
            information to the public, including public service
            announcements.

      SEC. 11. FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

      (a) FUNDAMENTAL CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH- The Director of the
      National Science Foundation shall give priority to computer and
      information science and engineering research to ensure substantial
      support is provided to meet the following challenges in
      cybersecurity:

            (1) How to design and build complex software-intensive
            systems that are secure and reliable when first
            deployed.

            (2) How to test and verify that software, whether developed
            locally or obtained from a third party, is free of
            significant known security flaws.
            (3) How to test and verify that software obtained from a
            third party correctly implements stated functionality, and
            only that functionality.

            (4) How to guarantee the privacy of an individual’s
            identity, information, or lawful transactions when stored in
            distributed systems or transmitted over networks.
            (5) How to build new protocols to enable the Internet to
            have robust security as one of its key capabilities.

            (6) How to determine the origin of a message transmitted
            over the Internet.

            (7) How to support privacy in conjunction with improved
            security.

            (8) How to address the growing problem of insider
            threat.Comments

      (b) SECURE CODING RESEARCH- The Director shall support research
      that evaluates selected secure coding education and improvement
      programs. The Director shall also support research on new methods
      of integrating secure coding improvement into the core curriculum
      of computer science programs and of other programs where graduates
      have a substantial probability of developing software after
      graduation.

      (c) ASSESSMENT OF SECURE CODING EDUCATION IN COLLEGES AND
      UNIVERSITIES- Within one year after the date of enactment of this
      Act, the Director shall submit to the Senate Committee on
      Commerce, Science, and Transportation and the House of
      Representatives Committee on Science and Technology a report on
      the state of secure coding education in America’s colleges and
      universities for each school that received National Science
      Foundation funding in excess of $1,000,000 during fiscal year
      2008. The report shall include--

            (1) the number of students who earned undergraduate degrees
            in computer science or in each other program where graduates
            have a substantial probability of being engaged in software
            design or development after graduation;

            (2) the percentage of those students who completed
            substantive secure coding education or improvement programs
            during their undergraduate experience; and

             (3) descriptions of the length and content of the education
            and improvement programs, and a measure of the effectiveness
            of those programs in enabling the students to master secure
            coding and design.

      (d) CYBERSECURITY MODELING AND TESTBEDS- The Director shall
      establish a program to award grants to institutions of higher
      education to establish cybersecurity testbeds capable of realistic
      modeling of real-time cyber attacks and defenses. The purpose of
      this program is to support the rapid development of new
      cybersecurity defenses, techniques, and processes by improving
      understanding and assessing the latest technologies in a
      real-world environment. The testbeds shall be sufficiently large
      in order to model the scale and complexity of real world networks
      and environments.

      (e) NSF COMPUTER AND NETWORK SECURITY RESEARCH GRANT AREAS-
      Section 4(a)(1) of the Cybersecurity Research and Development Act
      (15 U.S.C. 7403(a)(1)) is amended--

            (1) by striking ‘and’ after the semicolon in subparagraph
            (H);
            (2) by striking ‘property.’ in subparagraph (I) and
            inserting ‘property;’; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following:
                ‘(J) secure fundamental protocols that are at the heart
                of inter-network communications and data
                exchange;
                ‘(K) secure software engineering and software assurance,
                including--
                      ‘(i) programming languages and systems that
                      include fundamental security features;
                    
                     ‘(ii) portable or reusable code that remains
                      secure when deployed in various
                      environments;

                      ‘(iii) verification and validation technologies to
                      ensure that requirements and specifications have
                      been implemented; and

                      ‘(iv) models for comparison and metrics to assure
                      that required standards have been met;

                ‘(L) holistic system security that--

                      ‘(i) addresses the building of secure systems from
                      trusted and untrusted components;

                      ‘(ii) proactively reduces vulnerabilities;

                      ‘(iii) addresses insider threats; and

                      ‘(iv) supports privacy in conjunction with
                      improved security;

                ‘(M) monitoring and detection; and

                ‘(N) mitigation and rapid recovery methods.’.

      (f) NSF COMPUTER AND NETWORK SECURITY GRANTS- Section 4(a)(3) of
      the Cybersecurity Research and Development Act (15 U.S.C.
      7403(a)(3)) is amended--

            (1) by striking ‘and’ in subparagraph (D);

            (2) by striking ‘2007’ in subparagraph (E) and inserting
            ‘2007;’; and

            (3) by adding at the end of the following:

                      ‘(F) $150,000,000 for fiscal year 2010;
                      ‘(G) $155,000,000 for fiscal year 2011;
                      ‘(H) $160,000,000 for fiscal year 2012;
                      ‘(I) $165,000,000 for fiscal year 2013;
                      and
                      ‘(J) $170,000,000 for fiscal year 2014.’.

      (g) COMPUTER AND NETWORK SECURITY CENTERS- Section 4(b)(7) of such
      Act (15 U.S.C. 7403(b)(7)) is amended--

            (1) by striking ‘and’ in subparagraph (D);
            (2) by striking ‘2007’ in subparagraph (E) and inserting
            ‘2007;’; and
            (3) by adding at the end of the following:
                      ‘(F) $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2010;
                    

luckee1

  • Guest
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #135 on: October 04, 2009, 10:24:35 PM »
      SEC. 18. CYBERSECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES AND AUTHORITY.

      The President--

            (1) within 1 year after the date of enactment of this Act,
            shall develop and implement a comprehensive national
            cybersecurity strategy, which shall include--

                  (A) a long-term vision of the Nation’s cybersecurity
                  future; and
           
                  (B) a plan that encompasses all aspects of national
                  security, including the participation of the private
                  sector,
including critical infrastructure operators
                  and managers;

            (2) may declare a cybersecurity emergency and order the
            limitation or shutdown of Internet traffic to and from any
            compromised Federal Government or United States critical
            infrastructure information system or network;

           (3) shall designate an agency to be responsible for
            coordinating the response and restoration of any Federal
            Government or United States critical infrastructure
            information system or network affected by a cybersecurity
            emergency declaration under paragraph (2);
            (4) shall, through the appropriate department or agency,
            review equipment that would be needed after a cybersecurity
            attack and develop a strategy for the acquisition, storage,
            and periodic replacement of such equipment;
            (5) shall direct the periodic mapping of Federal Government
            and United States critical infrastructure information
            systems or networks, and shall develop metrics to measure
            the effectiveness of the mapping process;
            (6) may order the disconnection of any Federal Government or
            United States critical infrastructure information systems or
            networks in the interest of national security;

            (7) shall, through the Office of Science and Technology
            Policy, direct an annual review of all Federal cyber
            technology research and development investments;
            (8) may delegate original classification authority to the
            appropriate Federal official for the purposes of improving
            the Nation’s cybersecurity posture;
            (9) shall, through the appropriate department or agency,
            promulgate rules for Federal professional responsibilities
            regarding cybersecurity, and shall provide to the Congress
            an annual report on Federal agency compliance with those
            rules;
            (10) shall withhold additional compensation, direct
            corrective action for Federal personnel, or terminate a
            Federal contract in violation of Federal rules
, and shall
            report any such action to the Congress in an unclassified
            format within 48 hours after taking any such action;
            and
            (11) shall notify the Congress within 48 hours after
            providing a cyber-related certification of legality to a
            United States person.

      SEC. 19. QUADRENNIAL CYBER REVIEW.

      (a) IN GENERAL- Beginning with 2013 and in every fourth year
      thereafter, the President, or the President’s designee, shall
      complete a review of the cyber posture of the United States,
      including an unclassified summary of roles, missions,
      accomplishments, plans, and programs. The review shall include a
      comprehensive examination of the cyber strategy, force structure,
      modernization plans, infrastructure, budget plan, the Nation’s
      ability to recover from a cyberemergency, and other elements of
      the cyber program and policies with a view toward determining and
      expressing the cyber strategy of the United States and
      establishing a revised cyber program for the next 4 years.

      (b) INVOLVEMENT OF CYBERSECURITY ADVISORY PANEL-

            (1) The President, or the President’s designee, shall
            apprise the Cybersecurity Advisory Panel established or
            designated under section 3, on an ongoing basis, of the work
            undertaken in the conduct of the review.

            (2) Not later than 1 year before the completion date for the
            review, the Chairman of the Advisory Panel shall submit to
            the President, or the President’s designee, the Panel’s
            assessment of work undertaken in the conduct of the review
            as of that date and shall include in the assessment the
            recommendations of the Panel for improvements to the review,
            including recommendations for additional matters to be
            covered in the review.

      (c) ASSESSMENT OF REVIEW- Upon completion of the review, the
      Chairman of the Advisory Panel, on behalf of the Panel, shall
      prepare and submit to the President, or the President’s designee,
      an assessment of the review in time for the inclusion of the
      assessment in its entirety in the report under subsection
      (d).

      (d) REPORT- Not later than September 30, 2013, and every 4 years
      thereafter, the President, or the President’s designee, shall
      submit to the relevant congressional Committees a comprehensive
      report on the review. The report shall include--

            (1) the results of the review, including a comprehensive
            discussion of the cyber strategy of the United States and
            the collaboration between the public and private sectors
            best suited to implement that strategy;
            (2) the threats examined for purposes of the review and the
            scenarios developed in the examination of such
            threats;
            (3) the assumptions used in the review, including
            assumptions relating to the cooperation of other countries
            and levels of acceptable risk; and
            (4) the Advisory Panel’s assessment.

      SEC. 20. JOINT INTELLIGENCE THREAT ASSESSMENT.

      The Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of
      Commerce shall submit to the Congress an annual assessment of, and
      report on, cybersecurity threats to and vulnerabilities of
      critical national information, communication, and data network
      infrastructure.

      SEC. 21. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND CYBERSECURITY DETERRANCE MEASURES.

      The President shall--

            (1) work with representatives of foreign
            governments-
-

                  (A) to develop norms, organizations, and other
                  cooperative activities for international engagement to
                  improve cybersecurity; and
                  (B) to encourage international cooperation in
                  improving cybersecurity on a global basis; and

            (2) provide an annual report to the Congress on the progress
            of international initiatives undertaken pursuant to
            subparagraph (A).

      SEC. 22. FEDERAL SECURE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES ACQUISITIONS BOARD.

      (a) ESTABLISHMENT- There is established a Secure Products and
      Services Acquisitions Board. The Board shall be responsible for
      cybersecurity review and approval of high value products and
      services acquisition and, in coordination with the National
      Institute of Standards and Technology, for the establishment of
      appropriate standards for the validation of software to be
      acquired by the Federal Government. The Director of the National
      Institute of Standards and Technology shall develop the review
      process and provide guidance to the Board. In reviewing software
      under this subsection, the Board may consider independent secure
      software validation and verification as key factor for
      approval.

      (b) ACQUISITION STANDARDS- The Director, in cooperation with the
      Office of Management and Budget and other appropriate Federal
      agencies, shall ensure that the Board approval is included as a
      prerequisite to the acquisition of any product or
      service--

            (1) subject to review by the Board; and
            (2) subject to Federal acquisition standards.

      (c) ACQUISITION COMPLIANCE- After the publication of the standards
      developed under subsection (a), any proposal submitted in response
      to a request for proposals issued by a Federal agency shall
      demonstrate compliance with any such applicable standard in order
      to ensure that cybersecurity products and services are designed to
      be an integral part of the overall acquisition.

      SEC. 23. DEFINITIONS.

      In this Act:

            (1) ADVISORY PANEL- The term ‘Advisory Panel’ means the
            Cybersecurity Advisory Panel established or designated under
            section 3.

            (2) CYBER- The term ‘cyber’ means--

                  (A) any process, program, or protocol relating to the
                  use of the Internet or an intranet, automatic data
                  processing or transmission, or telecommunication via
                  the Internet or an intranet; and
                  (B) any matter relating to, or involving the use of,
                  computers or computer networks.

            (3) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND UNITED STATES CRITICAL
            INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND NETWORKS- The term
            ‘Federal Government and United States critical
            infrastructure information systems and networks’
            includes--

                  (A) Federal Government information systems and
                  networks; and
                  (B) State, local, and nongovernmental information
                  systems and networks in the United States designated
                  by the President as critical infrastructure
                  information systems and networks.

            (4) INTERNET- The term ‘Internet’ has the meaning given that
            term by section 4(4) of the High-Performance Computing Act
            of 1991 (15 U.S.C. 5503(4)).

            (5) NETWORK- The term ‘network’ has the meaning given that
            term by section 4(5) of such Act (15 U.S.C.
            5503(5)).

Offline jeremiahshine

  • Member
  • **
  • Posts: 79
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #136 on: October 04, 2009, 10:53:36 PM »
To protect "intellectual properties that are vulnerable to espionage"...Will they regulate door locks next?  "We need to step in and control security at your home now.  Your door locks may be ineffectual against stopping a burglary.  Thus, we will put cameras and security lights in your foyers, hallways, and garages.  Not only will this protect your stuff, but it will let us see what you're doing 24/7 should we decide to peak in."

Anti_Illuminati

  • Guest
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #137 on: October 05, 2009, 12:21:06 AM »
A few excerpts of the bill that I will highlight.  The entire bill is totally tyrannical as hell and incredibly unconstitutional and hellbent fascist.

(4) SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE- The
            Institute shall, establish standard computer-readable
            language for completely specifying the configuration of
            software on computer systems
widely used in the Federal
            Government, by government contractors and grantees, and in
            private sector owned critical infrastructure information
            systems and networks.

THIS GIVES THE NWO FULL CONTROL OVER ANY PRIVATE COMPANY (AND YOUR PERSONAL PC IN YOUR HOME) TO FORCE BACKDOORS INTO THEIR SYSTEMS, WHERE PREVIOUSLY THERE MAY HAVE BEEN NONE THAT WERE EXPLOITABLE BY THE GOVT.  THIS WILL ELIMINATE ANY ESCAPE FROM GOVT. INTRUSION, AND BACKDOOR ACCESS INTO ANY SYSTEM, AND MAKE USE OF ANY FREEDOM PROMOTING OPERATING SYSTEMS ILLEGAL.

AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THEY CAN DESIGNATE ALL HOME COMPUTERS AS "CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE" IS PROPAGANDIZE ON MSM THAT A BUNCH OF BOTNETS OR PERSONAL COMPUTERS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR DISRUPTING GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS, OR SHUTTING DOWN A BANK (THAT ANGLE HAS ALREADY BEEN PSYOP'D TO THE PUBLIC BECAUSE IT FITS IN AS A CONVENIENT TRUMP CARD DUE TO THE MANUFACTURED ECONOMIC CRISIS).

(7) National compliance standards for all software-

                  (A) PROTOCOL- The Institute shall establish a standard
                  testing and accreditation protocol for software built
                  by or for the Federal Government, its contractors, and
                  grantees, and private sector owned critical
                  infrastructure information systems and networks. to
                  ensure that it--

                        (i) meets the software security standards of
                        paragraph (2); and

                        (ii) does not require or cause any changes to be
                        made in the standard configurations described in
                        paragraph (4).

THIS MAY VERY WELL MAKE IT UNPROFITABLE FOR ANYONE OTHER THAN NWO FUNDED SOFTWARE COMPANIES FROM MAKING SOFTWARE.  ANOTHER WAY OF CREATING A MONOPOLY/CORNERING THE MARKET BY MAKING IT TOO EXPENSIVE FOR SMALL COMPANIES TO COMPLY WITH SUCH TYRANNICAL BULLSHIT.

(b) CRITERIA FOR STANDARDS- Notwithstanding any other provision of
      law (including any Executive Order), rule, regulation, or
      guideline, in establishing standards under this section, the
      Institute shall disregard the designation of an information system
      or network as a national security system or on the basis of
      presence of classified or confidential information, and shall
      establish standards based on risk profiles.

THIS MEANS THAT EVERY SINGLE COMPUTER AND THE ENTIRE INTERNET IS CONSIDERED AS BEING DIRECTLY PART OF THE DOD, EVERYTHING IS THE PROPERTY OF THE GOVERNMENT, AND YOU HAVE ZERO RIGHTS, AND ZERO FREEDOM WITH RESPECT TO THE USE OF YOUR OWN PC IN YOUR HOME.

(2) shall require each Federal agency, and each operator of
            an information system or network designated by the President
            as a critical infrastructure information system or network,
            periodically to demonstrate compliance with the standards
            established under this section.

THIS ALLOWS THE GOVERNMENT TO FORCE THEMSELVES DIRECTLY INTO YOUR HOME TO INSPECT YOUR COMPUTER TO MAKE SURE THAT YOU ARE COMPLYING WITH THE NWO'S BULLSHIT ENSLAVEMENT DIRECTIVES.  IT IS LIKE APPLYING MAXIMUM LEVEL SEX OFFENDER REGISTRATION MONITORING TO THE VERY USE OF ANY COMPUTER IN YOUR OWN HOME.  BILDERBERG/CSIS/CFR/NCOIC WILL ORDER THE PRESIDENT TO DECLARE *EVERYTHING* AS "CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE".

THERE WILL NOT BE ANY COMPUTER, NETWORK, OR INTERNET CONNECTED DEVICE THAT WILL BE EXEMPT FROM BEING DESIGNATED AS SUCH.  THEIR VERBIAGE IN THIS REGARD IS A COMPLETE PYSOP, SUGGESTING THAT "DON'T WORRY, YOUR COMPUTER OR NETWORK MIGHT NOT BE DESIGNATED AS SUCH, AND YOU MIGHT NOT HAVE TO WORRY ABOUT IT."  --BULLSHIT, IT *WILL* BE FORCED ON EVERYONE.


e) FCC NATIONAL BROADBAND PLAN- In developing the national
      broadband plan pursuant to section 6001(k) of the American
      Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, the Federal Communications
      Commission shall report on the most effective and efficient means
      to ensure the cybersecurity of commercial broadband networks, including consideration of consumer education and outreach
      programs.

THIS MEANS FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF IPV6, FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF RBAC ENSLAVEMENT ON A PER PERSON BASIS/BIOMETRIC LOGON AUTHENTICATED INTO A GLOBAL ENTERPRISE ARCHITECTURE WHERE YOU WILL HAVE ZERO FREEDOM AND YOU MIGHT AS WELL NOT USE THE INTERNET PERIOD BECAUSE IT WILL BE COMPLETELY USELESS.

SEC. 10. PROMOTING CYBERSECURITY AWARENESS.

      The Secretary of Commerce shall develop and implement a national
      cybersecurity awareness campaign that-


            (1) is designed to heighten public awareness of
            cybersecurity issues and concerns;

            (2) communicates the Federal Government’s role in securing
            the Internet and protecting privacy and civil liberties with
            respect to Internet-related activities; and

            (3) utilizes public and private sector means of providing
            information to the public, including public service
            announcements.

THIS IS ABOUT USING FULL SPECTRUM PSYOPS TO ONCE AGAIN PULL THE PUBLIC INTO THE ILLEGITIMATE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE PARADIGM--APPLYING THE SAME BULLSHIT ABOUT "GOING GREEN" (COMMUNISM) TO THE INTERNET.  THE GOVT. IS GOING TO TRY TO FORCE YOU TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT WHAT THEY WANT YOU TO BE CONCERNED ABOUT AS IF ANYTHING THEY TELL YOU IS EVEN REMOTELY A REAL THREAT.

SEC. 11. FEDERAL CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT.

      (a) FUNDAMENTAL CYBERSECURITY RESEARCH


(5) How to build new protocols to enable the Internet to
            have robust security as one of its key capabilities.

THIS IS IPV6, TOTAL ENSLAVEMENT.  IPV6 WILL RUN THE CASHLESS MONETARY SYSTEM, IT WILL ENABLE THE UNITED NATIONS TO DELINEATE "RIGHTS" TO YOU OR REVOKE THEM AT WILL, DYNAMICALLY IN REAL TIME, DEPENDING ON "HOW GOOD OF A SLAVE" YOU ARE IN THE GLOBAL CORPORATIST FEUDALIST PRISON PLANET.  IPV6 WILL ENABLE TOTAL COHERENCY FOR GLOBAL AUTONOMOUS ROBOTIC AI SYSTEMS, SURVEILLANCE/WEAPONS GRIDS, AREA DENIAL, ANTI-ACCESS (I.E. BLOCKING YOU FROM TRAVEL).

SEC. 23. DEFINITIONS.

      In this Act:

            (1) ADVISORY PANEL- The term ‘Advisory Panel’ means the
            Cybersecurity Advisory Panel established or designated under
            section 3.

            (2) CYBER- The term ‘cyber’ means--

                  (A) any process, program, or protocol relating to the
                  use of the Internet or an intranet, automatic data
                  processing or transmission, or telecommunication via
                  the Internet or an intranet; and
                  (B) any matter relating to, or involving the use of,
                  computers or computer networks.

THIS MEANS THAT SIMPLY USING A COMPUTER FOR ANYTHING WHATSOEVER, OR EVEN OWNING A COMPUTER, WHETHER YOU EVEN USE IT OR NOT, AND WHETHER ARE ON THE INTERNET OR NOT, STILL FULLY PUT YOU UNDER SUBJECTION OF THE TOTAL TYRANNY OF THIS BILL, FORCED INTO THE UNCONSTIUTIONAL, HIGH TREASON, AND PSYOP OF "NATIONAL SECURITY", AND (IN THEIR CONTEXT) "CYBERSECURITY".  "CYBERSECURITY" AS USED IN THIS BILL MEANS:  "WE f**kING OWN ALL DIGITAL DATA AND ALL COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY AND WE CAN COME IN YOUR HOUSE AND INSPECT YOUR SHIT, AND FINE YOU, TAKE YOU TO PRISON, OR SHOOT YOU DEAD FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH US.

(3) FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND UNITED STATES CRITICAL
            INFRASTRUCTURE INFORMATION SYSTEMS AND NETWORKS- The term
            ‘Federal Government and United States critical
            infrastructure information systems and networks’
            includes--

                  (A) Federal Government information systems and
                  networks; and
                  (B) State, local, and nongovernmental information
                  systems and networks in the United States designated
                  by the President as critical infrastructure
                  information systems and networks.

ONCE AGAIN, *EVERYTHING* THAT FACILITATES FREEDOM IN ANY WAY, SHAPE, OR FORM--WILL BE DESIGNATED AS "CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE", SO THAT THEY CAN REMOVE THAT FREEDOM FROM YOU.  THIS IS BEING IMPLEMENTED REGARDLESS OF THE EXISTENCE OF THIS BILL, REGARDLESS IF IT HAS NOT OR DOES NOT PASS.  THE BILL MEANS NOTHING BECAUSE THE CONTENTS OF IT, AND WORSE, WILL BE IMPLEMENTED BY FIAT BY THE CSIS/NCOIC.  IF THEY PULL THIS OFF, EVERYONE WILL DIE OR BE TOTALLY ENSLAVED FOR THE REST OF YOUR LIFE.

Offline SUPREMEMASTER

  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 1,830
  • Commander
    • http://www.activismoverdrive.comze.com
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #138 on: October 05, 2009, 04:10:59 AM »
Anti_Illuminati, how do you really feel?   ;)

I hear you!  It seems that there are too many people in all the media (including Alex), that are not taking seriously what you and now, thanks to you many of us know, what is truly going on and how TPTB is executing their plan.  

My question to you is, how will we know (aside from the internet going down) that the DOD is teleworking?   I know that COG is already in place and all of that has been set for quite some time already.

For you two newbies, I highly recommend you read Anti_Illuminatis other posts and read and read.

Everyone can take the following for what it is worth:

Delta Force Colonel gets off secure communications link call to General in Northern Command:

Delta Force Colonel:  "They're coming, and they said they're going to deliver a Christmas present to the American People."

Delta Force Colonel:  "The virus is a 2 part virus, the vaccine is 1 part of the virus, it is an RNA recombinant."

Delta Force Colonel:  "They are preparing to round up the blue list (patriots) and put them in FEMA camps.  The military is on the red list and they will be ordered to assist in the roundup and takeover, or they will be killed."

Former Bio Weapons scientist from Ft. Detrik, M.D. (name withheld to protect family):  "The swine flu was reverse engineered from the 1918 super flu virus, and the vaccine is 1 part of the virus."

Those are from real life personal sources relayed to me directly. They line up with Dr. Horowitz, Dr A. True Ott, and many others.

Maybe you should take a look at this as well:

http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=136811.msg822696#msg822696

With that thread, it makes sense of the cryptic email I got from a usually jovial dude.  

BTW, I quit my job because they went to an AI program that monitors customers viewing habits and financial records addresses etc.

If you don't mind me asking, the second, third, and forth lines of red text were an actual conversation?
Automatic User Post Signature:
The message has to be put out in the right way.
Website Still Needs to be updated |ActivismOverDrive.comze.net|

Anti_Illuminati

  • Guest
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #139 on: October 05, 2009, 11:44:57 AM »
Everyone can take the following for what it is worth:

Delta Force Colonel gets off secure communications link call to General in Northern Command:

Delta Force Colonel:  "They're coming, and they said they're going to deliver a Christmas present to the American People."

Delta Force Colonel:  "The virus is a 2 part virus, the vaccine is 1 part of the virus, it is an RNA recombinant."

Delta Force Colonel:  "They are preparing to round up the blue list (patriots) and put them in FEMA camps.  The military is on the red list and they will be ordered to assist in the roundup and takeover, or they will be killed."

Former Bio Weapons scientist from Ft. Detrik, M.D. (name withheld to protect family):  "The swine flu was reverse engineered from the 1918 super flu virus, and the vaccine is 1 part of the virus."

Those are from real life personal sources relayed to me directly. They line up with Dr. Horowitz, Dr A. True Ott, and many others.

Maybe you should take a look at this as well:

http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=136811.msg822696#msg822696


With that thread, it makes sense of the cryptic email I got from a usually jovial dude.  

BTW, I quit my job because they went to an AI program that monitors customers viewing habits and financial records addresses etc.


If you don't mind me asking, the second, third, and forth lines of red text were an actual conversation?

Yes, it was an actual conversation.
_________________________________________________________

"These people are waking up too fast, they've already exposed our cyber false flag terror intentions with official documents, and exposed them on the air to millions already, DAMMIT!"



Offline Outer Haven

  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 1,939
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #140 on: October 05, 2009, 01:57:18 PM »
Yes, it was an actual conversation.
WHAT IN THE CRAP?!
How do you know it's real???
Quote
What the hell is that?! Al-Qaeda wants to poison our water!!! NOOOOOOOO!!!
Gather before me, darkness of the abyss!

luckee1

  • Guest
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #141 on: October 06, 2009, 12:33:37 AM »
O.H.  When ever the U.S. Gov claims Bin Laden or Sadam has done or will do  anything, it means our country has already implemented it on our country.  The best paid hackers out there are employed by uncle sam.  Water poisoning has been going on for a long time.

themarla has been posting tons of water tampering evidence just for her area, Fresno.
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=117072.msg723960#msg723960


Offline Satyagraha

  • Global Moderator
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 8,939
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #142 on: October 06, 2009, 01:30:53 PM »

This pdf file has what seems to be the complete roadmap for how to take over the infrastructure (delivered as if to the 'terrorists' out there.. but in fact is probably the blueprint for the next false flag... Some slides that I thought were particularly revealing...


Page 12: Where WE THE PEOPLE are vulnerable to False Flags...


Page 17: The Government agencies running infrastructure: (Or, "Why PTech was needed to ensure a successful outcome in the face of many potential observable situations - the sofware AI works better than the brain. See: 911 False Flag.)



Page 19:


Page 21:


Page 25: PROBLEM...(Be AFRAID)....


Page 30
:


Page 66:



              ANY








And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40

Offline Dig

  • All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man.
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 63,090
    • Git Ureself Edumacated
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #143 on: October 06, 2009, 02:09:46 PM »
Woweeee, shared situational awareness before 9/11/2001:

Look at how much it has to do with AVIATION!!!!!!!!!!!!

The entire Bibliography is like a must read for any super elite wishing to pull of a 9/11 like attack. Amazing most of the referenced material was all written before 9/11 but had very important 9/11 type information.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Situation awareness
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Situation_awareness

Situation awareness, or SA, is the perception of environmental elements within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future. It is also a field of study concerned with perception of the environment critical to decision-makers in complex, dynamic areas from aviation, air traffic control, power plant operations, military command and control — to more ordinary but nevertheless complex tasks such as driving an automobile or motorcycle.

Situation awareness (SA) involves being aware of what is happening around you to understand how information, events, and your own actions will impact your goals and objectives, both now and in the near future. Lacking SA or having inadequate SA has been identified as one of the primary factors in accidents attributed to human error (e.g., Hartel, Smith, & Prince, 1991; Merket, Bergondy, & Cuevas-Mesa, 1997; Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden, 2005). Thus, SA is especially important in work domains where the information flow can be quite high and poor decisions may lead to serious consequences (e.g., piloting an airplane, functioning as a soldier, or treating critically ill or injured patients).

Having complete, accurate and up-to-the-minute SA is essential where technological and situational complexity on the human decision-maker are a concern. SA has been recognized as a critical, yet often elusive, foundation for successful decision-making across a broad range of complex and dynamic systems, including aviation and air traffic control (e.g., Nullmeyer, Stella, Montijo, & Harden 2005), emergency response and military command and control operations (e.g., Blandford & Wong 2004; Gorman, Cooke, & Winner 2006), and offshore oil and nuclear power plant management (e.g., Flin & O’Connor, 2001).
[edit]
Etymology

Although numerous definitions of SA have been proposed, Endsley’s definition (1995b), "the perception of elements in the environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of their status in the near future," is firmly established and widely accepted. While some definitions are specific to the environment from which they were adapted, Endsley’s definition is applicable across multiple task domains. Several other definitions of SA have been suggested, generally restating the same themes:
“accessibility of a comprehensive and coherent situation representation which is continuously being updated in accordance with the results of recurrent situation assessments” (Sarter & Woods, 1991)
"the combining of new information with existing knowledge in working memory and the development of a composite picture of the situation along with projections of future status and subsequent decisions as to appropriate courses of action to take" (Fracker, 1991b)
"the continuous extraction of environmental information along with integration of this information with previous knowledge to form a coherent mental picture, and the end use of that mental picture in directing further perception and anticipating future need" (Dominguez, Vidulich, Vogel, & McMillan, 1994)
"adaptive, externally-directed consciousness that has as its products knowledge about a dynamic task environment and directed action within that environment” (Smith & Hancock, 1995)
"the ability to maintain a constant, clear mental picture of relevant information and the tactical situation including friendly and threat situations as well as terrain" (Dostal, 2007)
SA is simply “knowing what is going on so you can figure out what to do” (Adam, 1993)
“what you need to know not to be surprised” (Jeannot, Kelly, & Thompson, 2003)
The term SA "is a shorthand description for "keeping track of what is going on around you in a complex, dynamic environment" (Moray, 2005, p. 4)
The "aim of efficient SA is to keep the operator tightly coupled to the dynamics of the environment" (Moray, 2005, p. 4)
[edit]
History

Although the term itself is fairly recent, the concept has roots in the history of military theory—it is recognizable in Sun Tzu's Art of War, for instance. The term itself, can be traced also to World War I, where it was recognized as a crucial component for crews in military aircraft (Press, 1986).

Before being widely adopted by human factors scientists in the 1990s, the term was first used by United States Air Force (USAF) fighter aircrew returning from war in Korea and Vietnam (see Watts, 2004). They identified having good SA as the decisive factor in air-to-air combat engagements—the "ace factor" (Spick, 1988). Survival in a dogfight was typically a matter of observing the opponent's current move and anticipating his next move a fraction of a second before he could observe and anticipate one's own. USAF pilots also came to equate SA with the "observe" and "orient" phases of the famous observe-orient-decide-act loop (OODA Loop) or Boyd cycle, as described by the USAF fighter ace and war theorist Col. John Boyd. In combat, the winning strategy is to "get inside" your opponent’s OODA loop, not just by making your own decisions quicker, but also by having better SA than the opponent, and even changing the situation in ways that the opponent cannot monitor or even comprehend. Losing one's own SA, in contrast, equates to being "out of the loop."

Clearly, SA has far reaching application as it is needed for individuals and teams to function effectively in their environment. Thus, we are beginning to see SA going beyond the field of aviation and work being conducted in a wide variety of domains. Currently, the study of SA is now being examined in such diverse areas as air traffic control, nuclear power plant operation, vehicle operation and anesthesiology (Endsley, 1995b; Gaba, Howard & Small, 1995; Collier & Follesf, 1995; Bolstad, 2000, Sollenberger & Stein, 1995).
[edit]
Related concepts

Several cognitive processes related to situation awareness are briefly described in this section. The matrix shown below attempts to illustrate the relationship among some of these concepts [1]. Note that situation awareness and situation assessment are more commonly discussed in complex domains such as aviation and military operations and relate more to achieving immediate tactical objectives. Sensemaking and achieving understanding are more commonly found in industry and the organizational psychology literature and often relate to achieving long-term strategic objectives.   Phase
Process   Outcome
Objective   Tactical (short-term)   situation assessment   situation awareness
Strategic (long-term)   sensemaking   understanding

[edit]
Situational understanding

Situation awareness is sometimes confused with the term “situational understanding.” In the context of military command and control applications, situational understanding refers to the "product of applying analysis and judgment to the unit's situational awareness to determine the relationships of the factors present and form logical conclusions concerning threats to the force or mission accomplishment, opportunities for mission accomplishment, and gaps in information" (Dostal, 2007). Situational understanding is the same as Level 2 SA in the Endsley model — the comprehension of the meaning of the information as integrated with each other and in terms of the individual’s goals. It is the “so what” of the data that is perceived.
[edit]
Situation assessment

Endsley (1995b, p. 36) argues that “it is important to distinguish the term situation awareness, as a state of knowledge, from the processes used to achieve that state. These processes, which may vary widely among individuals and contexts, will be referred to as situation assessment or the process of achieving, acquiring, or maintaining SA.” Thus, in brief, situation awareness is viewed as "a state of knowledge," and situation assessment as "the processes” used to achieve that knowledge. Note that SA is not only produced by the processes of situation assessment, it also drives those same processes in a recurrent fashion. For example, one’s current awareness can determine what one pays attention to next and how one interprets the information perceived (Endsley, 2000).
[edit]
Mental models

Accurate mental models are one of the prerequisites for achieving SA (Endsley & Jones, 1997; Sarter & Woods, 1991). A mental model can be described as a set of well-defined, highly-organized yet dynamic knowledge structures developed over time from experience (Glaser, 1989; Kozlowski, 1998). The volume of available data inherent in complex operational environments can overwhelm the capability of novice decision makers to attend, process, and integrate this information efficiently, resulting in information overload and negatively impacting their SA (Endsley, 1997). In contrast, experienced decision makers assess and interpret the current situation (Level 1 and 2 SA) and select an appropriate action based on conceptual patterns stored in their long-term memory as ‘mental models’ (Serfaty, MacMillan, Entin, & Entin, 1997). Cues in the environment activate these mental models, which in turn guide their decision making process.
[edit]
Sensemaking

Klein, Moon, and Hoffman (2006) distinguish between situation awareness and sensemaking as follows:

“...situation awareness is about the knowledge state that’s achieved—either knowledge of current data elements, or inferences drawn from these data, or predictions that can be made using these inferences (Endsley, 1995b). In contrast, sensemaking is about the process of achieving these kinds of outcomes, the strategies, and the barriers encountered.” (p. 71)

In brief, sensemaking is viewed more as “a motivated, continuous effort to understand connections (which can be among people, places, and events) in order to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively” (Klein et al., 2006, p. 71) rather than the state of knowledge underlying situation awareness. Endsley (2004) points out that as an effortful process, sensemaking is actually considering a subset of the processes used to maintain situation awareness. In the vast majority of the cases, SA is instantaneous and effortless, proceeding from pattern recognition of key factors in the environment – “The speed of operations in activities such as sports, driving, flying and air traffic control practically prohibits such conscious deliberation in the majority of cases, but rather reserves it for the exceptions.” Endsley (2004) also points out that sensemaking is backward focused, forming reasons for past events, while situation awareness is typically forward looking, projecting what is likely to happen in order to inform effective decision processes.
[edit]
Theoretical model of situation awareness

The most common theoretical framework of SA is provided by Dr. Mica Endsley (1995b). Endsley’s model illustrates three stages or steps of SA formation: perception, comprehension, and projection.

Perception (Level 1 SA): The first step in achieving SA is to perceive the status, attributes, and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment. Thus, Level 1 SA, the most basic level of SA, involves the processes of monitoring, cue detection, and simple recognition, which lead to an awareness of multiple situational elements (objects, events, people, systems, environmental factors) and their current states (locations, conditions, modes, actions).

Comprehension (Level 2 SA): The next step in SA formation involves a synthesis of disjointed Level 1 SA elements through the processes of pattern recognition, interpretation, and evaluation. Level 2 SA requires integrating this information to understand how it will impact upon the individual’s goals and objectives. This includes developing a comprehensive picture of the world, or of that portion of the world of concern to the individual.

Projection (Level 3 SA): The third and highest level of SA involves the ability to project the future actions of the elements in the environment. Level 3 SA is achieved through knowledge of the status and dynamics of the elements and comprehension of the situation (Levels 1 and 2 SA), and then extrapolating this information forward in time to determine how it will affect future states of the operational environment.

Endsley’s model of SA (see Figure 1 below) also illustrates several variables that can influence the development and maintenance of SA, including individual, task, and environmental factors. For example, individuals vary in their ability to acquire SA; thus, simply providing the same system and training will not ensure similar SA across different individuals. Endsley’s model shows how SA “provides the primary basis for subsequent decision making and performance in the operation of complex, dynamic systems” (Endsley, 1995a, p. 65). Although alone it cannot guarantee successful decision making, SA does support the necessary input processes (e.g., cue recognition, situation assessment, prediction) upon which good decisions are based (Artman, 2000).

SA also involves both a temporal and a spatial component. Time is an important concept in SA, as SA is a dynamic construct, changing at a tempo dictated by the actions of individuals, task characteristics, and the surrounding environment. As new inputs enter the system, the individual incorporates them into this mental representation, making changes as necessary in plans and actions in order to achieve the desired goals. SA also involves spatial knowledge about the activities and events occurring in a specific location of interest to the individual. Thus, the concept of SA includes perception, comprehension, and projection of situational information, as well as temporal and spatial components.



Figure 1. Endsley's model of situation awareness (adapted from Endsley, 1995b).

In summary, the model consists of several key factors:
Perception, comprehension, and projection as three levels of SA,
The role of goals and goal directed processing in directing attention and interpreting the significance of perceived information,
The role of information salience in “grabbing” attention in a data-driven fashion, and the importance of alternating goal-driven and data-driven processing,
The role of expectations (fed by the current model of the situation and by long-term memory stores) in directing attention and interpreting information,
The heavy demands on limited working memory restricting SA for novices and for those in novel situations, but the tremendous advantages of mental models and pattern matching to prototypical schema that largely circumvent these limits,
The use of mental models for providing a means for integrating different bits of information and comprehending its meaning (relevant to goals) and for allowing people to make useful projections of likely future events and states,
Pattern matching to schema - prototypical states of the mental model – that provides rapid retrieval of comprehension and projection relevant to the recognized situation and in many cases single-step retrieval of appropriate actions for the situation.

For a more complete description of the model, see Endsley (1995b) and Endsley (2004). See also Endsley (2000) for a review of other models of SA.
[edit]
Situation awareness in team operations

In many systems and organizations, people work not just as individuals, but as members of a team. Thus, it is necessary to consider the SA of not just individual team members, but also the SA of the team as a whole. To begin to understand what is needed for SA within teams, it is first necessary to clearly define what constitutes a team. A team is not just any group of individuals; rather teams have a few defining characteristics. As defined by Salas et al. (1992), a team is:

"a distinguishable set of two or more people who interact dynamically, interdependently and adaptively toward a common and valued goal/objective/mission, who have each been assigned specific roles or functions to perform, and who have a limited life span of membership."
[edit]
Team SA

Team SA is defined as “the degree to which every team member possesses the SA required for his or her responsibilities” (Endsley, 1995b, p. 39; see also Endsley, 1989). The success or failure of a team depends on the success or failure of each of its team members. If any one of the team members has poor SA, it can lead to a critical error in performance that can undermine the success of the entire team. By this definition, each team member needs to have a high level of SA on those factors that are relevant for his or her job. It is not sufficient for one member of the team to be aware of critical information if the team member who needs that information is not aware.

In a team, each member has a subgoal pertinent to his/her specific role that feeds into the overall team goal. Associated with each member's subgoal are a set of SA elements about which he/she is concerned. Team SA, therefore, can be represented as shown in Figure 2. As the members of a team are essentially interdependent in meeting the overall team goal, some overlap between each member’s subgoal and their SA requirements will be present. It is this subset of information that constitutes much of team coordination. That coordination may occur as a verbal exchange, a duplication of displayed information, or by some other means.



Figure 2. Team SA can be determined by examining the goals and SA requirements of all team members (adapted from Endsley & Jones, 1997, 2001).
[edit]
Shared SA

Shared situation awareness can be defined as "the degree to which team members possess the same SA on shared SA requirements" (Endsley & Jones, 1997, p. 47; 2001, p. 48). As implied by this definition, there are information requirements that are relevant to multiple team members. A major part of teamwork involves the area where these SA requirements overlap — the shared SA requirements that exist as a function of the essential interdependency of the team members. In a poorly functioning team, two or more members may have different assessments on these shared SA requirements and thus behave in an uncoordinated or even counter-productive fashion. Yet in a smoothly functioning team, each team member shares a common understanding of what is happening on those SA elements that are common — shared SA. Thus, shared SA refers to the overlap between the SA requirements of the team members, as presented in Figure 3. As depicted by the clear areas of the figure, not all information needs to be shared. Clearly, each team member is aware of much that is not pertinent to the others on the team. Sharing every detail of each person's job would only create a great deal of “noise” to sort through to get needed information. It is only that information which is relevant to the SA requirements of each team member that is needed.



Figure 3. Shared SA Requirements (adapted from Endsley & Jones, 1997; 2001).
[edit]
Team SA model

The situation awareness of the team as a whole, therefore, is dependent upon both (1) a high level of SA among individual team members for the aspects of the situation necessary for their job; and (2) a high level of shared SA between team members, providing an accurate common operating picture of those aspects of the situation common to the needs of each member (Endsley & Jones, 2001). Endsley and Jones (1997; 2001) describe a model of team situation awareness as a means of conceptualizing how teams develop high levels of shared SA across members (see Figure 4). Each of these four factors — requirements, devices, mechanisms and processes — act to help build team and shared SA.



Figure 4. Model of team situation awareness (adapted from Endsley & Jones, 2001).

1. Team SA Requirements - the degree to which the team members know which information needs to be shared, including their higher level assessments and projections (which are usually not otherwise available to fellow team members), and information on team members' task status and current capabilities.

2. Team SA Devices - the devices available for sharing this information, which can include direct communication (both verbal and non-verbal), shared displays (e.g., visual or audio displays, or tactile devices), or a shared environment. As non-verbal communication, such as gestures and display of local artifacts, and a shared environment are usually not available in distributed teams, this places far more emphasis on verbal communication and communication technologies for creating shared information displays.

3. Team SA Mechanisms - the degree to which team members possess mechanisms, such as shared mental models, which support their ability to interpret information in the same way and make accurate projections regarding each other's actions. The possession of shared mental models can greatly facilitate communication and coordination in team settings.

4. Team SA Processes - the degree to which team members engage in effective processes for sharing SA information which may include a group norm of questioning assumptions, checking each other for conflicting information or perceptions, setting up coordination and prioritization of tasks, and establishing contingency planning among others.
[edit]
Measurement of situation awareness

While the SA construct has been widely researched, the multivariate nature of SA poses a considerable challenge to its quantification and measurement (for a detailed discussion on SA measurement, see Endsley & Garland, 2000; Fracker, 1991a; 1991b). In general, techniques vary in terms of direct measurement of SA (e.g., objective real-time probes or subjective questionnaires assessing perceived SA) or methods that infer SA based on operator behavior or performance. Direct measures are typically considered to be ‘product-oriented’ in that these techniques assess an SA outcome; inferred measures are considered to be ‘process-oriented,’ focusing on the underlying processes or mechanisms required to achieve SA (Graham & Matthews, 2000). These SA measurement approaches are further described next.
[edit]
Objective measures of SA

Objective measures directly assess SA by comparing an individual’s perceptions of the situation or environment to some ‘ground truth’ reality. Specifically, objective measures collect data from the individual on his or her perceptions of the situation and compare them to what is actually happening to score the accuracy of their SA at a given moment in time. Thus, this type of assessment provides a direct measure of SA and does not require operators or observers to make judgments about situational knowledge on the basis of incomplete information. Objective measures can be gathered in one of three ways: real-time as the task is completed (e.g., "real-time probes" presented as open questions embedded as verbal communications during the task – Jones & Endsley, 2000), during an interruption in task performance (e.g., Situation Awareness Global Assessment Technique (SAGAT) – Endsley, 1995a , or the WOMBAT Situational Awareness and Stress Tolerance Test mostly used in aviation since the late 1980s), or post-test following completion of the task.
[edit]
Subjective measures of SA

Subjective measures directly assess SA by asking individuals to rate their own or the observed SA of individuals on an anchored scale (e.g., Participant Situation Awareness Questionnaire (PSAQ) – Strater, Endsley, Pleban, & Matthews, 2001; the Situation Awareness Rating Technique (SART) – Taylor, 1989). Subjective measures of SA are attractive in that they are relatively straightforward and easy to administer. However, several limitations should be noted. Individuals making subjective assessments of their own SA are often unaware of information they do not know (the "unknown unknowns"). Subjective measures also tend to be global in nature, and, as such, do not fully exploit the multivariate nature of SA to provide the detailed diagnostics available with objective measures. Nevertheless, self-ratings may be useful in that they can provide an assessment of operators’ degree of confidence in their SA and their own performance. Measuring how SA is perceived by the operator may provide information as important as the operator's actual SA, since errors in perceived SA quality (over-confidence or under-confidence in SA) may have just as harmful an effect on an individual's or team's decision-making as errors in their actual SA (Endsley, 1998).

Subjective estimates of an individual’s SA may also be made by experienced observers (e.g., peers, commanders, or trained external experts). These observer ratings may be somewhat superior to self-ratings of SA because more information about the true state of the environment is usually available to the observer than to the operator, who may be focused on performing the task (i.e., trained observers may have more complete knowledge of the situation). However, observers have only limited knowledge about the operator’s concept of the situation and cannot have complete insight into the mental state of the individual being evaluated. Thus, observers are forced to rely more on operators’ observable actions and verbalizations in order to infer their level of SA. In this case, such actions and verbalizations are best assessed using performance and behavioral measures of SA, as described next.
[edit]
Performance and behavioral measures of SA

Performance measures ‘infer’ SA from the end result (i.e., task performance outcomes), based on the assumption that better performance indicates better SA. Common performance metrics include quantity of output or productivity level, time to perform the task or respond to an event, and the accuracy of the response or, conversely, the number of errors committed. The main advantage of performance measures is that these can be collected objectively and without disrupting task performance. However, although evidence exists to suggest a positive relation between SA and performance, this connection is probabilistic and not always direct and unequivocal (Endsley, 1995b). In other words, good SA does not always lead to good performance and poor SA does not always lead to poor performance (Endsley, 1990). Thus, performance measures should be used in conjunction with others measures of SA that directly assess this construct.

Behavioral measures also ‘infer’ SA from the actions that individuals choose to take, based on the assumption that good actions will follow from good SA and vice-versa. Behavioral measures rely primarily on observer ratings, and are, thus, somewhat subjective in nature. To address this limitation, observers can be asked to evaluate the degree to which individuals are carrying out actions and exhibiting behaviors that would be expected to promote the achievement of higher levels of SA (see, for example, the Situation Awareness Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scale (SABARS) – Matthews, Pleban, Endsley, & Strater, 2000; Strater et al., 2001). This approach removes some of the subjectivity associated with making judgments about an individual’s internal state of knowledge by allowing them to make judgments about SA indicators that are more readily observable.
[edit]
Process indices of SA

Process indices examine how individuals process information in their environment, such as by analyzing communication patterns between team members or using eye tracking devices. Team communication (particularly verbal communication) supports the knowledge building and information processing that leads to SA construction (Endsley & Jones, 1997). Thus, since SA may be distributed via communication, computational linguistics and machine learning techniques can be combined with natural language analytical techniques (e.g., Latent Semantic Analysis) to create models that draw on the verbal expressions of the team to predict SA and task performance (Bolstad, Cuevas, Gonzalez, & Schneider, 2005; Bolstad, Foltz, Franzke, Cuevas, Rosenstein, & Costello, 2007). Although evidence exists to support the utility of communication analysis for predicting team SA (Foltz, Bolstad, Cuevas, Franzke, Rosenstein, & Costello, in press), time constraints and technological limitations (e.g., cost and availability of speech recording systems and speech-to-text translation software) may make this approach less practical and viable in time-pressured, fast paced operations.

Psycho-physiological measures also serve as process indices of operator SA by providing an assessment of the relationship between human performance and a corrected change in the operator’s physiology (e.g., French, Clark, Pomeroy, Seymour, & Clarke, 2007). In other words, cognitive activity is associated with changes in the operator’s physiological states. For example, the operator’s overall functional state (as assessed using psycho-physiological measures, such as electroencephalographic (EEG) data, eyeblinks, and cardiac activity) may provide an indication as to whether the operator is sleep fatigued at one end of the continuum, or mentally overloaded at the other end (Wilson, 2000). Other psycho-physiological measures, such as event related potentials (ERP), event related desynchronization (ERD), transient heart rate (HR), and electrodermal activity (EDA), may be useful for evaluating an operator’s perception of critical environmental cues, that is, to determine if the operator has detected and perceived a task-relevant stimulus (Wilson, 2000). In addition, it is also possible to use psycho-physiological measures to monitor operators’ environmental expectancies, that is, their physiological responses to upcoming events, as a measure of their current level of SA (Wilson, 2000).
[edit]
Multi-faceted approach to SA measurement

The multivariate nature of SA significantly complicates its quantification and measurement, as it is conceivable that a metric may only tap into one aspect of the operator’s SA. Further, studies have shown that different types of SA measures do not always correlate strongly with each other (cf. Durso, Truitt, Hackworth, Crutchfield, Nikolic, Moertl, Ohrt, & Manning, 1995; Endsley, Selcon, Hardiman, & Croft, 1998; Vidulich, 2000). Accordingly, rather than rely on a single approach or metric, valid and reliable measurement of SA should utilize a battery of distinct yet related measures that complement each other (e.g., Harwood, Barnett, & Wickens, 1988). Such a multi-faced approach to SA measurement capitalizes on the strengths of each measure while minimizing the limitations inherent in each.
[edit]
Digital Situation Awareness

The current paradigm for Cyber Security is based on protection. Protection depends on identifying vulnerabilities and applying countermeasures to neutralize their effects. These are complex human based activities whose results are uncertain and not capable of according 100% assurance. While used with some effect for components, applications, and stand-alone systems, the paradigm of protection is insufficient for assuring systems of systems, such as, the nation’s critical infrastructure and DOD’s Global Information Grid. For systems of systems, the paradigm for Cyber Security must be based on resiliency. Resiliency is the ability to anticipate, avoid, withstand, minimize, and recover from the effects of adversity whether manmade or natural under all circumstances of use. The essential capabilities in composing, fielding, and operating resilient systems of systems are coordinated recovery time objectives, operation sensing and monitoring, digital situation awareness, distributed supervisory control, interoperability, and reconstitution of data and information.

The challenge lies in anticipating and avoiding the effects of adversity, and this depends on highly refined situation awareness. So it is in the area of operation sensing and monitoring that a game-changing innovation can be found. What is needed is to obtain digital situation awareness so as to anticipate cascade triggers in the critical infrastructure and deploy effective distributed supervisor control protocols that can avoid these triggers. Digital situation awareness can be derived from traffic flow and volume. The method envisioned to anticipate and avoid cascade triggers in the critical infrastructure is based on traffic flow and volume and is specified as follows: 1. Identify industry sectors of interest to cyber security resiliency 2. Identify each enterprise and organization in each industry sector of interest 3. Identify each computer system of interest in each enterprise and organization 4. Identify each I/O port on each machine of interest 5. Record traffic flow and volume on every port for every second of every day for up to twelve months 6. Using recorded traffic flow and volume, determine expected normal operation based on derived upper and lower control limits for varying time intervals 7. Using traffic flow and volume scenarios, derive operating protocols, such as, shutdown, switch to backup, and switch to a designated alternate mode, for use by intelligent middlemen charged with distributed supervisory control of critical infrastructure operations
[edit]
See also
Single pilot resource management
Air safety
Brownout (aviation)
Decision-making
Spatial disorientation
Situated cognition
Korean Air Lines Flight 007: ICAO reason for flight deviation
[edit]
References
^ S. M. Fiore, personal communication, November 6, 2007
FDSE's COP Page [1]
Adam, E. C. (1993). Fighter cockpits of the future. Proceedings of 12th IEEE/AIAA Digital Avionics Systems Conference (DASC), 318-323.
Artman, H. (2000). Team situation assessment and information distribution. Ergonomics, 43(8), 1111-1128.
Atherton, G., Situational Awareness: The Difference Between Life and Death for Corrections Officers, Corrections Connection Network News
Blandford, A. & Wong, W. (2004). Situation awareness in emergency medical dispatch. International Journal of Human–Computer Studies, 61, 421–452.
Bolstad, C. A. (2000). Age-related factors affecting the perception of essential information during risky driving situations. Paper presented at the Human Performance Situation Awareness and Automation: User-Centered Design for the New Millennium Conference, Savannah, GA.
Bolstad, C. A., Cuevas H. M., Gonzalez, C., & Schneider, M. (2005). Modeling shared situation awareness. Proceedings of the 14th Conference on Behavior Representation in Modeling and Simulation (BRIMS). Los Angeles, CA.
Bolstad, C. A., Foltz, P., Franzke, M., Cuevas, H. M., Rosenstein, M., & Costello, A. M. (2007). Predicting situation awareness from team communications. Proceedings of the 51st Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. Santa Monica, CA: HFES.
Collier, S. G. & Follesf, K. (1995). SACRI: A measure of situation awareness for nuclear power plant control rooms. Proceedings of an International Conference: Experimental Analysis and Measurement of Situation Awareness (pp. 115–122). Daytona Beach, FL.
Dominguez, C., Vidulich, M., Vogel, E. & McMillan, G. (1994). Situation awareness: Papers and annotated bibliography. Armstrong Laboratory, Human System Center, ref. AL/CF-TR-1994-0085.
Dostal, B. C. (2007). Enhancing situational understanding through the employment of unmanned aerial vehicles. Army Transformation Taking Shape ...Interim Brigade Combat Team Newsletter, No. 01-18. Retrieved November 7, 2007, from http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/call/call_01-18_ch6.htm
Durso, F. T., Truitt, T. R., Hackworth, C. A., Crutchfield, J. M., Nikolic, D., Moertl, P. M., Ohrt, D., & Manning, C. A. (1995). Expertise and chess: A pilot study comparing situation awareness methodologies. In D.J. Garland & M.R. Endsley (Eds.), Experimental analysis and measurement of situation awareness (pp. 295–303). Daytona Beach, FL: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University Press.
Endsley, M. R. (1988). Situation awareness global assessment technique (SAGAT). Proceedings of the National Aerospace and Electronics Conference (NAECON), 789-795. New York: IEEE.
Endsley, M. R. (1989). Final report: Situation awareness in an advanced strategic mission (No. NOR DOC 89-32). Hawthorne, CA: Northrop Corporation.
Endsley, M. R. (1990). Predictive utility of an objective measure of situation awareness. Proceedings of the Human Factors Society 34th Annual Meeting (pp. 41–45). Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors Society.
Endsley, M. R. (1995a). Measurement of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors, 37(1), 65-84.
Endsley, M. R. (1995b). Toward a theory of situation awareness in dynamic systems. Human Factors 37(1), 32-64.
Endsley, M. R. (1997). The role of situation awareness in naturalistic decision making. In Zsambok, C. E. & G. Klein (Eds.), Naturalistic decision making (pp. 269–283). Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
Endsley, M. R. (1998). A comparative analysis of SAGAT and SART for evaluations of situation awareness. In Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society 42nd Annual Meeting (pp. 82–86). Santa Monica, CA: The Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.
Endsley, M. R. (2000). Theoretical underpinnings of situation awareness: A critical review. In M. R. Endsley & D. J. Garland (Eds.), Situation awareness analysis and measurement. Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
Endsley, M. R. (2004). Situation awareness: Progress and directions. In S. Banbury & S. Tremblay (Eds.), A cognitive approach to situation awareness: Theory, measurement and application (pp. 317–341). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing.
Endsley, M. R. & Garland, D. J. (Eds.) (2000). Situation awareness analysis and measurement. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Endsley, M. R. & Jones, W. M. (1997). Situation awareness, information dominance, and information warfare (No. AL/CF-TR-1997-0156). Wright-Patterson AFB, OH: United States Air Force Armstrong Laboratory.
Endsley, M. R., & Jones, W. M. (2001). A model of inter- and intrateam situation awareness: Implications for design, training and measurement. In M. McNeese, E. Salas & M. Endsley (Eds.), New trends in cooperative activities: Understanding system dynamics in complex environments. Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society.
Endsley, M. R., Selcon, S. J., Hardiman, T. D., & Croft, D. G. (1998). A comparative evaluation of SAGAT and SART for evaluations of situation awareness. Proceedings of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society Annual Meeting (pp. 82–86). Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. http://www.satechnologies.com/Papers/pdf/HFES98-SAGATvSART.pdf
Flin, R. & O’Connor, P. (2001). Applying crew resource management in offshore oil platforms. In E. Salas, C.A. Bowers, & E. Edens (Eds.), Improving teamwork in organization: Applications of resource management training (pp. 217–233). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum.
Foltz, P. W., Bolstad, C. A., Cuevas, H. M., Franzke, M., Rosenstein, M., & Costello, A. M. (in press). Measuring situation awareness through automated communication analysis. To appear in M. Letsky, N. Warner, S. M. Fiore, & C. Smith (Eds.), Macrocognition in teams. Aldershot, England: Ashgate.
Fracker, M. L. (1991a). Measures of situation awareness: An experimental evaluation (Report No. AL-TR-1991-0127). Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Armstrong Laboratories.
Fracker, M. L. (1991b). Measures of situation awareness: Review and future directions (Report No. AL-TR-1991-0128). Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, OH: Armstrong Laboratories.
French, H.T., Clark, E., Pomeroy, D. Seymour, M. , & Clarke, C.R. (2007). Psycho-physiological Measures of Situation Awareness. In M. Cook, J. Noyes & Y. Masakowski (eds.), Decision Making in Complex Environments. London: Ashgate. ISBN 0 7546 4950 4.
Gaba, D. M., Howard, S. K., & Small, S. D. (1995). Situation awareness in anesthesiology. Human Factors, 37, 20-31.
Glaser, R. (1989). Expertise and learning: How do we think about instructional processes now that we have discovered knowledge structures? In D. Klahr & K. Kotovsky (Eds.), Complex information processing: The impact of Herbert A. Simon (pp. 269–282). Hillsdale, NJ: LEA.
Gorman, J. C. Cooke, N. J., & Winner, J. L. (2006). Measuring team situation awareness in decentralized command and control environments. Ergonomics, 49 (12-13), 1312–1325.
Graham, S. E. & Matthews, M. D. (2000). Modeling and measuring situation awareness. In J.H. Hiller & R. L. Wampler (Eds.), Workshop on assessing and measuring training performance effectiveness (Tech. Rep. 1116) (pp. 14–24). Alexandria, VA: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences.
Hartel, C. E. J., Smith, K., & Prince, C. (1991, April). Defining aircrew coordination: Searching mishaps for meaning. Paper presented at the 6th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, Columbus, OH.
Harwood, K., Barnett, B., & Wickens, C.D. (1988). Situational awareness: A conceptual and methodological framework. In F.E. McIntire (Ed.), Proceedings of the 11th Biennial Psychology in the Department of Defense Symposium (pp. 23–27). Colorado Springs, CO: U.S. Air Force Academy.
Jeannot, E., Kelly, C. & Thompson, D. (2003). The development of situation awareness measures in ATM systems. Brussels: Eurocontrol.
Jones, D. G. & Endsley, M. R. (2000). Examining the validity of real-time probes as a metric of situation awareness. Proceedings of the 14th Triennial Congress of the International Ergonomics Association and the 44th Annual Meeting of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. Santa Monica, CA: Human Factors and Ergonomics Society. http://www.satechnologies.com/Papers/pdf/HFES2000-probes.pdf
Klein, G., Moon, B, & Hoffman, R. R. (2006). Making sense of sensemaking 1: Alternative perspectives. IEEE Intelligent Systems, 21 (4), 70-73.
Kozlowski, S. W. J. (1998). Training and developing adaptive teams: Theory, principles, and research. In J. A. Cannon-Bowers, & E. Salas, (Eds.), Making decisions under stress: Implications for individual and team training (pp. 115–153). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.
Matthews, M. D., Pleban, R. J., Endsley, M. R., & Strater, L. G. (2000). Measures of infantry situation awareness for a virtual MOUT environment. Proceedings of the Human Performance, Situation Awareness and Automation: User-Centered Design for the New Millennium. Savannah, GA: SA Technologies, Inc.
Merket, D. C., Bergondy, M., & Cuevas-Mesa, H. (1997, March). Making sense out of teamwork errors in complex environments. Paper presented at the 18th Annual Industrial/Organizational-Organizational Behavior Graduate Student Conference, Roanoke, VA.
Moray, N. (2004). Ou sont les neiges d'antan? ("Where are the snows of yesteryear?"). In D. A. Vincenzi, M. Mouloua & P. A. Hancock (Eds), Human performance, situation awareness and automation: Current research and trends (pp. 1–31). Mahwah: LEA.
Nullmeyer, R. T., Stella, D., Montijo, G. A., & Harden, S. W. (2005). Human factors in Air Force flight mishaps: Implications for change. Proceedings of the 27th Annual Interservice/Industry Training, Simulation, and Education Conference (paper no. 2260). Arlington, VA: National Training Systems Association.
Press, M. (1986). Situation awareness: Let's get serious about the clue-bird. Unpublished manuscript.
Salas, E., Dickinson, T. L., Converse, S., & Tannenbaum, S. I. (1992). Toward an understanding of team performance and training. In R. W. Swezey & E. Salas (Eds.), Teams: their training and performance (pp. 3–29). Norwood, NJ: Ablex.
Sarter, N. B. & Woods, D. D. (1991). Situation awareness: A critical but ill-defined phenomenon. International Journal of Aviation Psychology, 1, 45-57.
Serfaty, D., MacMillan, J., Entin, E. E., & Entin, E. B. (1997). The decision-making expertise of battle commanders. In C. E. Zsambok & G. Klein (Eds.), Naturalistic decision making (pp. 233–246). Mahwah, NJ: LEA.
Smith, K., & Hancock, P. A., (1995). Situation awareness is adaptive, externally directed consciousness. Human Factors, 37 (1), 137-148.
Sollenberger, R. L., & Stein, E. S. (1995). A simulation study of air traffic controllers’ situation awareness. Proceedings of an International Conference: Experimental Analysis and Measurement of Situation Awareness (pp. 211–217). Daytona Beach, FL.
Spick, M. (1988). The Ace Factor: Air Combat and the Role of Situational Awareness. Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press.
Strater, L. D., Endsley, M. R., Pleban, R. J., & Matthews, M. D. (2001). Measures of platoon leader situation awareness in virtual decision making exercises (No. Research Report 1770). Alexandria, VA: Army Research Institute.
Taylor, R. M. (1989). Situational awareness rating technique (SART): The development of a tool for aircrew systems design. Proceedings of the AGARD AMP Symposium on Situational Awareness in Aerospace Operations, CP478. Seuilly-sur Seine: NATO AGARD.
Vidulich, M. A. (2000). Testing the sensitivity of situation awareness metrics in interface evaluations. In M. R. Endsley & D. J. Garland, (Eds.), Situation awareness analysis and measurement (pp. 227–246). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Watts, B. D. (2004). "Situation awareness" in air-to-air combat and friction. Chapter 9 in Clausewitzian Friction and Future War, McNair Paper no. 68 (revised edition; originally published in 1996 as McNair Paper no. 52). Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University
Wilson, G. F. (2000). Strategies for psychophysiological assessment of situation awareness. In M. R. Endsley & D. J. Garland, (Eds.), Situation awareness analysis and measurement (pp. 175–188). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
All eyes are opened, or opening, to the rights of man. The general spread of the light of science has already laid open to every view the palpable truth, that the mass of mankind has not been born with saddles on their backs, nor a favored few booted and spurred, ready to ride them legitimately

Nomadinexile

  • Guest
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #144 on: October 06, 2009, 02:19:26 PM »
CNN.com Live broadcast of CDC press conference:  Their *statements" in RED.  These are not quotes.  I was listening to this and alex at the same time, typing and doing stuff in between..   I will not be able to provide link as it was broadcast live, though there is probably footage out there of boring press conference.  

We have confidence that by mid-october, we will have enough vaccine to meet demand.

we wish it were available for everyone, but the technology isn't quit here yet (reference to coming years)

On "Anticipated Schedule"  running start mid-late october

We need more people to get Pnuemonia vaccine

ON VACCINE RESISTANCE:    Most polls find most people want to get vaccinated after being asked about only 40% wanting it according to study.  

It's a great idea to get vaccinated, we haven't seen a flu like this in 50 years.




Offline Satyagraha

  • Global Moderator
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 8,939
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #145 on: October 07, 2009, 12:34:32 AM »
Significant Cyber Events since 2006
By James Andrew Lewis
Jun 12, 2009
http://csis.org/publication/23-cyber-events-2006

A list of significant cyber events since 2006.
This list is a work in progress that we update as new incidents come to light.  If you have suggestions for additions, send them to techpolicy@csis.org.  Significance is in the eye of the beholder, but we focus on successful attacks on government agencies, defense and high tech programs, or economic crimes with losses of more than a million-dollars.

Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006
http://csis.org/files/publication/090717_cyber_events_since_2006.pdf

This list is a work in progress that we update as new incidents come to light. If you have
suggestions for additions, send them to techpolicy@csis.org. Significance is in the eye of the
beholder, but we focus on successful attacks on government agencies, defense and high tech
programs, or economic crimes with losses of more than a million dollars.

1. May 2006: The Department of State’s networks were hacked and unknown foreign intruders
downloaded terabytes of information. If Chinese or Russian spies backed a truck up to the
State Department, smashed the glass doors, tied up the guards and spend the night carting off
file cabinets it would be an act of war, but when it happens in cyberspace, we barely notice.

2. August 2006: A senior Air Force Officer states publicly that “China has downloaded 10 to
20 terabytes of data from the NIPRNet [the unclassified military network].”

3. September 2006: Israel disrupts Syrian Air defense networks (with some collateral damage
to its own domestic networks) during the bombing of an alleged Syrian nuclear facility

4. December 2006: NASA was forced to block email with attachments before shuttle launches
out of fear they would be hacked, and Business Week Reported that the plans for the latest
U.S. space launch vehicles were obtained by unknown foreign intruders.

5. April 2007:   The Department of Commerce had to take the Bureau of Industrial Security ‘s
networks offline for several months. This Commerce Bureau reviews high tech exports and
its networks were hacked by unknown foreign intruders.

6. May 2007: “The National Defense University had to take its email systems offline because
of hacks by unknown foreign intruders that let spyware on the system.”

7. May 2007:   Estonian government networks are harassed by a denial of service attack by
unknown foreign intruders, most likely at the behest of the Russian government. Some
government online services are temporarily disrupted and online banking is halted. These
were more like cyber riots than crippling attacks, and the Estonians responded very well, but
they created a wave of fear in countries like the U.S. that depend heavily on cyberspace.

8. June 2007:   The Secretary of Defense’s unclassified email was hacked by unknown foreign
intruders.

9. August 2007:   The British Security Service, the French Prime Minister’s Office and the
Office of German Chancellor Angela Merkel all complained to China about intrusion on their
government networks. Merkel even raised the matter with China’s President.

10. September 2007:   Contractors at DHS and DOD had their networks hacked, as backdoors
into agency systems.

11. 2007:   British authorities report that hackers, believed to have come from China’s People’s
Liberation Army, penetrate the network of the Foreign Office and other key departments.
Jonathan Evans, the head of Britain’s Security Service (MI5), also warns business and
legal firms of the rise in the online threat from Chinese state organizations.

12. January 2008: A CIA official said the agency knew of four incidents overseas where
hackers were able to disrupt, or threaten to disrupt, the power supply for four foreign cities.

13. March 2008: South Korean Officials claimed that China had attempted to hack into Korean
Embassy and Korea military networks.

14. March 2008: US officials report that American, European and Japanese companies are
experiencing significant losses of intellectual property and business information to criminal
and to industrial espionage in cyberspace, but details cannot be provided in an unclassified
setting.

15. June 2008: The networks of several Congressional offices were hacked by unknown foreign
intruders. Some incident involved offices with an interest in human rights in Tibet.

16. Summer 2008: The databases of both Republican and Democratic presidential campaigns
were hacked in the summer of 2008 and downloaded by unknown foreign intruders.

17. August 2008: Computer networks in Georgia are hacked by unknown foreign intruders, most
likely at the behest of the Russian government. There is little or no disruption of service but
much press attention is given to annoying graffiti on Georgian government websites.

18. November 2008:   Classified networks at DOD and CENTCOM were hacked by unknown
foreign intruders. Even worse, it took several days to dislodge the intruders and resecure the
networks.

19. December 2008: Even tiny CSIS was hacked in December by unknown foreign intruders.
They probably assumed that some CSIS staff would go into the new administration and may
have though it might be interesting to read their emails beforehand.

20. 2008: Britain’s MPs were warned about e-mails apparently sent by the European Parliament,
amid fears that they could be used by Chinese hackers to implant viruses. Chinese hackers
were also thought to be responsible for shutting down the House of Commons computer
system in 2006.

21. January 2009: Hackers attacked Israel’s internet infrastructure during the January 2009
military offensive in the Gaza Strip that briefly paralyzed government sites. The attack,
which focused on government Websites, was executed by at least 5000,000 computers.
Israeli officials believe carried out by a criminal organization from the former Soviet Union,
and paid for by Hamas or Hezbollah.

22. February 2009: FAA computer systems were hacked and, as the FAA’s increasing use of
modern IP-bases’ networks increase, so does the risk of the intentional disruption of
commercial air traffic.

23. February 2009:   French combat aircraft planes were grounded after military databases were
infected with the Microsoft “conficker” virus.

24. March 2009: The German government warned that hackers were offering a freeware version
of the new Microsoft operating system that installs Trojans.”

25. March 2009: Canadian researchers find a computer espionage system that they attributed to
China implanted on the government networks of 103 countries.

26. March 2009: Reports in the press say that the plans for Marine Corps 1, the new presidential
helicopter, were found on a file-sharing network in Iran.

27. April 2009: Wall Street Journal articles have laid out the vulnerability of the U.S. power grid
to cyber attack – a vulnerability the U.S. is busily increasing – and the intrusions into F-35
databases by unknown foreign intruders.

28. May 2009: In May 2009, Merrick Bank, a leading issuer of credit cards, claimed it lost $16
million after hackers compromised as many as 40 million credit card accounts.

29. May 2009: The Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) was hacked by unknown
intruders. The hackers gained access to the data by getting into the HSIN account of a federal
employee or contractor. The bulk of the data obtained was federal, but some state
information was also accessed.
And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40

Offline Satyagraha

  • Global Moderator
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 8,939
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #146 on: October 07, 2009, 12:41:52 AM »
Twenty Important Controls for Effective Cyber Defense
and FISMA ComplianceConsensus Audit Guidelines

Draft for comment
By John Gilligan, Ed Skoudis
Aug 10, 2009
http://csis.org/publication/twenty-important-controls-effective-cyber-defense-and-fisma-compliance

Securing the United States against cyber attacks has become one of the nation’s highest priorities. To achieve this objective, networks, systems, and the operations teams that support them must vigorously defend against external attacks. Furthermore, for those external attacks that are successful, defenses must be capable of thwarting, detecting, and responding to follow-on attacks on internal networks as attackers spread inside a compromised network.

A central tenet of the U.S. Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) is that "offense must inform defense." In other words, knowledge of actual attacks that have compromised systems provides the essential foundation on which to construct effective defenses. The Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee moved to make this same tenet central to the Federal Information Security Management Act in drafting FISMA 2008.

Details here: http://csis.org/publication/twenty-important-controls-effective-cyber-defense-and-fisma-compliance

And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40

Offline Satyagraha

  • Global Moderator
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 8,939
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #147 on: October 07, 2009, 12:47:37 AM »
U.S. Cyber Challenge: Can We Catch Up?
http://csis.org/event/us-cyber-challenge-can-we-catch

Date: Monday, Jul 27, 2009
Location:
Room 1539
Longworth House Office Building
US Capitol
 
CSIS is hosting a luncheon called “U.S. Cyber Challenge – Can we catch up?”.  This luncheon is part of a larger initiative called the U.S. Cyber Challenge - a program designed to encourage young people to develop the aptitude and skills to become the core of a strong cybersecurity community moving forward. 

Speakers:

Richard Schaeffer, Director, Information Assurance, National Security Agency
Steven D. Shirley, Executive Director, Cyber Crime Center (DC3), Department of Defense
S. Sanford Schlitt, Vice Chairman of the Board for Aerospace Education
Greg White, Professor of Computer Science at the University of Texas at San Antonio, Director of the Center for Infrastructure Assurance and Security
Peter Fonash, Acting Director of the National Cybersecurity Dvision (NCSD), U.S. Department of Homeland Security

 Please send your RSVP to techpolicy@csis.org with your name, title, and affiliation.

For more information on the U.S. Cyber Challenge, please visit www.csis.org/uscc or www.sans.org/uscc
And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40

Offline Satyagraha

  • Global Moderator
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 8,939
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #148 on: October 07, 2009, 12:57:07 AM »
Commission on Cybersecurity for the 44th Presidency
Part of the: Technology and Public Policy
http://csis.org/program/commission-cybersecurity-44th-presidency

The CSIS Cybersecurity Commission was formed to provide advice to the 44th president on the creation and maintenance of a comprehensive cybersecurity strategy......The CSIS Cybersecurity Commission provided findings and recommendations to secure cyberspace in the 44th Presidency, and to help guide policy-making.  It called for immediate action.  The new administration has cybersecurity high on its agenda and it is making a serious effort to take what has already been done and improve our national cyber posture. But there is much to be done.  Building cybersecurity will be a long-term effort.

Commission members produced a detailed report, "Securing Cyberspace for the 44th Presidency," released on Capitol Hill on December 8, 2008. 

Commission Activity, Phase II


Commission Activity, Phase I


And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40

Offline Satyagraha

  • Global Moderator
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 8,939
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #149 on: October 07, 2009, 01:01:38 AM »
Twenty Important Controls for Effective Cyber Defense
and FISMA ComplianceConsensus Audit Guidelines

Draft for comment
By John Gilligan, Ed Skoudis
Aug 10, 2009
http://csis.org/publication/twenty-important-controls-effective-cyber-defense-and-fisma-compliance

Securing the United States against cyber attacks has become one of the nation’s highest priorities. To achieve this objective, networks, systems, and the operations teams that support them must vigorously defend against external attacks. Furthermore, for those external attacks that are successful, defenses must be capable of thwarting, detecting, and responding to follow-on attacks on internal networks as attackers spread inside a compromised network.

A central tenet of the U.S. Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI) is that "offense must inform defense." In other words, knowledge of actual attacks that have compromised systems provides the essential foundation on which to construct effective defenses. The Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee moved to make this same tenet central to the Federal Information Security Management Act in drafting FISMA 2008.

Details here: http://csis.org/publication/twenty-important-controls-effective-cyber-defense-and-fisma-compliance


PDF file on this subject is here: http://csis.org/files/publication/Twenty_Critical_Controls_for_Effective_Cyber_Defense_CAG.pdf
And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40

Offline Satyagraha

  • Global Moderator
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 8,939
Re: NWO is going to decapitate IT infrastructure with 2 phase RNA recomb Flu
« Reply #150 on: October 07, 2009, 07:24:32 PM »
http://csis.org/files/publication/Twenty_Critical_Controls_for_Effective_Cyber_Defense_CAG.pdf
Some excerpts from the PDF file referenced above...
Twenty Important Controls for Effective Cyber Defense

Document Contributors

What makes this document effective is that it reflects knowledge of actual attacks and defines
controls that would have stopped those attacks from being successful.
To construct the
document, the following types of people have provided first-hand knowledge and input
regarding how computer and network attacks are being carried out and the defensive
techniques that are most important in thwarting attacks:

1. Blue team members inside the Department of Defense who are often called in when
military commanders find their systems have been compromised and who perform
initial incident response services on impacted systems

2. Blue team members who provide services for non-DoD government agencies who
identify prior intrusions while conducting vulnerability assessment activities

3. US-CERT and other non-military incident response employees and consultants who are
called upon by civilian agencies and companies to identify the most likely method by
which systems and networks were compromised

4. Military investigators who fight cyber crime

5. The FBI and other police organizations that investigate cyber crime

6. Cybersecurity experts at US Department of Energy laboratories and federally funded
research and development centers

7. DoD and private forensics experts who analyze computers that have been infected

8. Red team members in DoD tasked with finding ways of circumventing military cyber
defenses during their exercises

9. Civilian penetration testers who test civilian government and commercial systems to
determine how they can be penetrated with the goal of better understanding risk and
implementing better defenses

10. Federal CIOs and CISOs who have intimate knowledge of cyber attacks

11. The Government Accountability Office (GAO)

Additionally, input from over 100 other collaborators has been incorporated into the current
version of the document.

The Twenty Critical Controls

These 20 critical security controls were agreed upon by knowledgeable individuals from the
groups listed above. The list includes 15 controls that can be validated at least in part in an
automated manner and five that must be validated manually. It is important to note that the
20 control categories are not presented in order of priority. The process of gathering these
specific controls and subcontrols focused on identifying the highest priority defenses
and
represent a subset of controls found in other audit guidelines and documents. Each of the 20
categories is important and offers high-priority techniques for thwarting real-world attacks.

Critical Controls Subject to Automated Collection, Measurement, and Validation:

 1. Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Devices
 2. Inventory of Authorized and Unauthorized Software
 3. Secure Configurations for Hardware and Software on Laptops, Workstations, and Servers
 4. Secure Configurations for Network Devices such as Firewalls, Routers, and Switches
 5. Boundary Defense
 6. Maintenance, Monitoring, and Analysis of Security Audit Logs
 7. Application Software Security
 8. Controlled Use of Administrative Privileges
 9. Controlled Access Based on Need to Know
10. Continuous Vulnerability Assessment and Remediation
11. Account Monitoring and Control
12. Malware Defenses
13. Limitation and Control of Network Ports, Protocols, and Services
14. Wireless Device Control
15. Data Loss Prevention

Additional Critical Controls (not directly supported by automated measurement and validation):

16. Secure Network Engineering
17. Penetration Tests and Red Team Exercises
18. Incident Response Capability
19. Data Recovery Capability
20. Security Skills Assessment and Appropriate Training to Fill Gaps

In the pages that follow, each of these controls is described more fully. Descriptions include
how attackers currently exploit the lack of the control, detailed subcontrols that describe what
an organization needs to do in each area and requirements for measuring these activities, and
suggestions regarding how standardized measurements can be applied. As pilot
implementations are completed and agencies gain experience with automation, it is expected
that the document will be expanded into a detailed audit guide that agency CIOs can use to
ensure they are doing the right things for effective cyber defense and that IGs can use to verify
the CIOs’ tests.

Insider Threats vs. Outsider Threats

A quick review of the critical controls may lead some readers to think that they are heavily
focused on outsider threats and may, therefore, not fully deal with insider attacks. In reality,
the insider threat is well covered in these controls in two ways. First, specific controls such as
maintenance of security audit logs, control of administrative privileges, controlled access based
on need to know, data loss prevention, and effective incident response all directly address the
key ways that insider threats can be mitigated. Second, the insider and outsider threats
sometimes merge as outsiders penetrate security perimeters and effectively become “insiders.”
All of the controls that limit unauthorized access within the organization work to mitigate both
insider and outsider threats. It is important to note that these controls are meant to deal with
multiple kinds of computer attackers, including but not limited to malicious internal employees
and contractors, independent individual external actors, organized crime groups, terrorists, and
nation state actors, as well as mixes of these different threats. While these controls are
designed to provide protection against each of these threats, very sophisticated, well-funded
actors such as nation states may sometimes employ attack techniques that require extreme
defenses that go beyond the scope of this document.

These controls are not limited to blocking only the initial compromise of systems, but also
address detecting already-compromised machines, and preventing or disrupting attacker’s
actions. The defenses identified through these controls deal with decreasing the initial attack
surface by hardening security, identifying already-compromised machines to address long-term
threats inside an organization’s network, controlling super-user privileges on systems, and
disrupting attackers’ command-and-control of implanted malicious code
.


Figure 1 illustrates the scope of different kinds of attacker activities
that these controls are designed to help thwart.


The rings of Figure 1 represent the actions computer attackers often take against target
machines.

These actions include initially compromising a machine to establish a foothold by
exploiting one or more vulnerabilities.

Attackers can then maintain long-term access on a system, often by creating accounts,
subverting existing accounts, or altering the software on the machine to include backdoors and rootkits.

(Promis/PTech perhaps?)

Attackers with access to machines can also cause damage, which could include stealing, altering,
or destroying information; impairing the system’s functionality to jeopardize its business effectiveness
or mission; or using it as a jumpoff point for compromise of other systems in the environment.

Where these rings overlap, attackers have even more ability to compromise sensitive information
or cause damage. The various defensive strategies located outside of each set of rings in the figure
are covered throughout the controls described in this document.

Defenses in any of the rings help to limit the abilities of attackers, but improved defenses are required
across all three rings and their intersections. It is important to note that the Twenty Critical Controls
for Effective Cyber Defense are designed to help improve defenses across each of these rings, rather
than to merely prevent initial compromise.

And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40


luckee1

  • Guest
Re: Pentagon document admits Northcom will Cyberattack U.S. Infrastructure
« Reply #152 on: October 08, 2009, 03:53:31 PM »
Thanks for the Reading assignment, A_I  ;)!  1167 pages!  Holy crap!


Is this true? CoG is basically a PRIME DIRECTIVE of our system, even when the People don't want the Continuance?

Yes, you can Wiki, COG or Continuity of Government.

That whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that Governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shewn, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same Object evinces a design to reduce them under absolute Despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such Government, and to provide new Guards for their future security.

Anti_Illuminati

  • Guest
Excerpt from above:
(4) SOFTWARE CONFIGURATION SPECIFICATION LANGUAGE- The
            Institute shall, establish standard computer-readable
            language for completely specifying the configuration of
            software on computer systems
widely used in the Federal
            Government, by government contractors and grantees, and in
            private sector owned critical infrastructure information
            systems and networks.

THIS GIVES THE NWO FULL CONTROL OVER ANY PRIVATE COMPANY (AND YOUR PERSONAL PC IN YOUR HOME) TO FORCE BACKDOORS INTO THEIR SYSTEMS, WHERE PREVIOUSLY THERE MAY HAVE BEEN NONE THAT WERE EXPLOITABLE BY THE GOVT.  THIS WILL ELIMINATE ANY ESCAPE FROM GOVT. INTRUSION, AND BACKDOOR ACCESS INTO ANY SYSTEM, AND MAKE USE OF ANY FREEDOM PROMOTING OPERATING SYSTEMS ILLEGAL.

AN EXAMPLE OF HOW THEY CAN DESIGNATE ALL HOME COMPUTERS AS "CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE" IS PROPAGANDIZE ON MSM THAT A BUNCH OF BOTNETS OR PERSONAL COMPUTERS WERE RESPONSIBLE FOR DISRUPTING GOVERNMENT SYSTEMS, OR SHUTTING DOWN A BANK (THAT ANGLE HAS ALREADY BEEN PSYOP'D TO THE PUBLIC BECAUSE IT FITS IN AS A CONVENIENT TRUMP CARD DUE TO THE MANUFACTURED ECONOMIC CRISIS).

http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/107156/OMG_pushes_standards_for_verifying_software_security?taxonomyId=017&source=x06

OMG pushes standards for verifying software security
Framework would be an aid to vendors, government buyers


Framework would be an aid to vendors, government buyers
By Jaikumar Vijayan
December 16, 2005 12:00 PM ET

Computerworld -  A report released early this month by a task force within the Object Management Group outlines the standards needed to develop a consistent process for verifying the security of software sold to government agencies.

The task force, which is composed of representatives from private-sector companies and government agencies, is part of a broader effort to ensure that software products used by the government meet consistent and defined security standards.

"What the OMG is hoping to achieve in putting together these standards. is to have a formal way of measuring if software is trustworthy," said Djenana Campara, co-chairman of the Architecture-Driven Modernization Task Force within the OMG.

The standards will give vendors and software purchasers a consistent way to evaluate a system's design robustness, reliability, process integrity and configuration controls, said Campara, who is also CTO of Klocwork Inc., a Burlington, Mass.-based vendor of vulnerability analysis software.

Such a framework is crucial to allowing software suppliers and buyers to represent their claims and requirements along with a way to verify them, said Joe Jarzombek, director of software assurance at the National Cyber Security Division of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.

"When vendors make claims about the safety, security and dependability of products, what is the standard by which they are making those claims and what are the minimum levels of evidence" that are needed? he asked. "The reason to have a standard is it tells you, Here's how you can make a claim, here are the attributes we are looking for, and here are the things you need to include when making a claim," he said.

Having a process for enabling security verification is becoming important because of the increasing complexity of software systems, their growing interconnectedness and the globalization, of software developers, Campara said.

Government systems that are used for national security purposes already need to go through a Common Criteria Certification process to determine whether they meet security requirements. OMG's framework -- which still has to go through a long approval process -- will give another option to agencies that are not mandated to use the Common Criteria process, Jarzombek said.

In addition, a systems and software assurance standard that's being finalized by the International Standards Organization (ISO/IEC 15026) will also give government agencies a standard they can use for assessing software security sometime next year, he said. The ISO standard is focused on the management of risk and assurance of safety, security and dependability of systems and software, he added.

____________________________________________________________
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Ptech+submits+metalmodel+as+proposed+OOAD+standard+--+Leading...-a019100984

BOSTON--(BUSINESS WIRE)--Feb. 7, 1997--Ptech, a leader in enterprise-wide business process modeling and code generation tools, announced today that it recently submitted a proposed standard for object-oriented analysis and design. The document responds to the
Object Analysis and Design RFP-1 of the Object Management Group in Framingham, Mass.

Ptech develops the software solution FrameWork, an object-oriented business process modeling and application development tool that lets business and technology professionals use a single graphical interface to capture business goals and design processes to support them. FrameWork 5.0 for Microsoft Windows NT and 95 facilitates conceptualizing, modeling and implementing processes and information for maximum competitive advantage. The Ptech Abstract Code Generator (ACG) lets customers generate up to 90 percent of application code directly from the models.

"Ptech is submitting a response to the OMG request for proposals as a result of customer feedback highlighting a void in the marketplace," explained James Cerrato, vice president of technology deployment. "We are convinced that our approach will enrich the emerging OMG standard. Since most approaches in the marketplace focus on systems development, they often result in applications that do not reflect actual business needs. The Ptech approach, in contrast, is actually driven by business strategy."

"Ptech has always advocated a fully open approach, providing customers with all the underlying metamodels that define the Ptech methodology and cover the full life cycle from enterprise modeling through application implementation," added Oussama Ziade, chairman and CEO. "The Ptech metamodel is based on seventeen years of practical experience with customers and notable industry experts. Since the metamodel is easy to extend, users have continually expanded and refined it so that it reflects a degree of maturity, formality and integration unique in the marketplace. We are excited about submitting this Ptech metamodel to support the OMG in their standardization effort for object analysis and design."

The Ptech submission is one of a handful offered by industry leaders for consideration. It consists of an overview of the Ptech method, a description of the models supported and a glossary of terms. The body of the document addresses these topics:

-- Structural models

-- Architectural models

-- Behavioral models

-- Distributed processing models

-- Usage models

-- Annotation models

The revised submission in April will also address the relationship between metamodel constructs defined in this submission and specifications in the Business Object Facility, the Meta Object Facility, the CORBA Interface
Repository and CORBA Services.

For details about Ptech or FrameWork, call 617/577-7100 or visit www.ptechinc.com . -0- Founded in 1994, Ptech Inc. is a privately held software company located in Boston, Massachusetts.

Ptech and the Ptech logo are trademarks of Ptech Inc.

CONTACT: Ptech

Janet Fink, 617/577-7100 x360

fink@ptechinc.com

Offline Republic Renewal

  • Member
  • ****
  • Posts: 263
  • I felt the storm approaching...
Wow full backdoor acccess into our systems... they are just waiting for a reason.. HOW DO WE KNOW THEY HAVEN"T COME UP WITH ONE? I'm thinking false flag attacks on government and major installation websites and servers.
" We are gonna have to initiate the internet takeover to protect the American People"
BS TAKE OVER!! The world will have no way to connect with eachother if they are being monitored at all times..

Start hacking training people ...
Nosce te Ipsum

Know Thyself

Offline Mithridates

  • Member
  • ***
  • Posts: 174
Haven't they already been hyping Chinese/Russian hackers takin over the internets?

Offline Republic Renewal

  • Member
  • ****
  • Posts: 263
  • I felt the storm approaching...
http://www.defencetalk.com/chinese-russian-hackers-probing-us-power-grid-report-17662/

"It appears their aim is not to disrupt the systems now, but to ensure that if these states were ever in a position where they have their backs against the wall that they have another option to atomic weapons or whatever."
Nosce te Ipsum

Know Thyself

Offline Satyagraha

  • Global Moderator
  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 8,939
AI's interview on the Corbett Report is available - see this thread:
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=139649.0


And  the King shall answer and say unto them, Verily I say unto you, 
Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren,  ye have done it unto me.

Matthew 25:40

Offline trailhound

  • Member
  • *****
  • Posts: 4,722
http://www.daily.pk/new-evidence-that-the-%E2%80%98swine-flu%E2%80%99-pandemic-is-man-made-7780/

New Evidence: That The ‘Swine Flu’ Pandemic Is Man-Made
Written by Satinder Singh World Aug 1, 2009

Murder suspects are either convicted or acquitted at trial based on the prosecution’s presentation of EVIDENCE which usually hinges on MOTIVE, OPPORTUNITY, and TIME-LINES combined with physical documents. To gather such hard evidence, detectives and/or federal agents often spend months following leads and interviewing witnesses. In the trial phase, re-creating the sequence of events is essential. I submit this paper will provide more than enough hard evidence to at least result in a series of criminal indictments of charges of MASS MURDER, and CONSPIRACY TO COMMIT WORLD GENOCIDE against Novartis Pharmaceutical principals and agents and others.

PRIMARY MOTIVE

The Primary Motive behind this alleged criminal activity is also the primary cause of most murders in the world today, and that motivation is simply: BIG MONEY. Billions of Dollars of windfall profits from government contracts worldwide, as a matter of fact.
I will provide evidence that will show that Novartis Pharmaceuticals of Basel, Switzerland has conspired with corrupt “scientists” at the U.S. Army Institute of Pathology ­ Ft. Detrick, Maryland, to create a “novel” strain of weaponized “influenza” virus by means of “reverse engineering” the deadly 1918 killer strain ­ which strain was maliciously and surreptitiously released upon the world in March and April of 2009 for the primary purpose of creating a panic-stricken world-wide demand for Novartis vaccine material.

The evidence will also clearly show that the Novartis vaccine material is in reality designed to facilitate the further mutation of the pandemic into more lethal waves of increasingly virulent and deadly disease, rather than to curtail and limit the existing outbreak. The evidence will show that Novartis is willingly being used, (and extremely well-paid) to facilitate the edicts of the global elite’s Club of Rome; which edicts clearly call for a massive and sudden depopulation of certain segments of the earth’s human population.

PRIMARY EVIDENCE

To realize such windfall profits on an engineered, global flu pandemic, detailed covert planning must take place of course.
Patents protecting the proprietary flu vaccine must be applied for and secured before the pandemic virus is released in order to minimize the competition and maximize the profit potentials. In a biological attack of this nature, timing is extremely critical.
Indeed, the evidence is clear ­ Novartis applied for just such a patent on Nov. 4, 2005, and the U.S. Patent Office accepted this application and granted US 20090047353A1 for a “Split Influenza Vaccine with Adjuvants” on February 19, 2009. (See bottom of page).

With this patent now secured, the conspirators were now free to create the demand for their “novel” split influenza vaccine by releasing a “novel” split-influenza (combining multiple viruses) pandemic virus from a weapons lab test-tube into unsuspecting human hosts. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/06/17/AR2009061703271.html

The so-called “Swine Flu” grabbing headlines today is actually a recombinant, or “split-influenza” virus consisting of A-strain Bird-Flu (H5N1), Swine Flu (H1N1) and multiple strains of human flu (H3N2). Likewise, the 1918 Killer Flu that killed untold millions of people was a recombinant or “split-influenza” virus composed of Bird flu, Swine Flu, and multiple strains of human flu.

CRIMINAL TIMELINE

The criminal timeline begins in 1997, when Dr. Jeffrey Taubenberger assembled a team of geneticists and microbiologists to analyze the genome structure, and then to REPRODUCE (i.e. reverse engineer) what is arguably one of the most deadly viral structures the world has ever been cursed with ­ the 1918 killer flu virus. According to numerous published stories and reports, Taubenberger and his team utilized super-computers to map the complex RNA and DNA structures of the killer virus, then utilized human plasmids to successfully re-create the 1918 killer. Taubenberger completed his work in early 2005, then immediately left the employ of the U.S. Army at Ft. Detrick to take a much more lucrative position with the National Institutes of Health. His new focus was to create a VACCINE against the very same 1918 killer flu that he and his team had, just months earlier, successfully “reverse engineered” and created.

This researcher is very confident that a focused criminal investigation would likely reveal prima facia evidence that Taubenberger was in reality working for Novartis while employed with the N.I.H. ­ and was quite likely the primary author of Novartis’ Nov. 6, 2005 “provisional” patent application. On page 2, paragraph 32 of the patent publication we read, quote: “The influenza virus [that the 'invention vaccine' is designed to protect against] may be a reassortant strain, and may have been obtained by reverse genetics techniques. Reverse genetics techniques allow influenza viruses with desired genome segments to be prepared in vitro using plasmids.” The remnant of the paragraph then goes into very specific detail as to the actual mechanics of how the pandemic virus was actually created by Taubenberger’s Ft. Detrick team. At the very least, the author of the patent application had to have studied Taubenberger’s various published reports on his work at Detrick, for the wording and science is virtually verbatim.

Furthermore, this paragraph is even more damning by the words “may have been obtained”. Who “obtained” this virus and for what reason was it “obtained”? Keep in mind the CDC and HHS would have Americans believe that the pandemic viral outbreak is totally a “natural” occurrence ­ if so then how could Novartis have such an incredible advance knowledge to the point of developing a vaccine with such absolutely PERFECT TIMING???

WHO EXACTLY IS “NOVARTIS”??

Novartis International AG is simply the world’s largest, multi-national pharmaceutical company with over $53 Billion USD revenue generated in 2008. It’s headquarters is located in Basel, Switzerland, home of the vaunted “Swiss Guards” who provide all security measures for the Vatican and the Club of Rome. The company logo symbolizes the “eternal flame” of the Illuminati “enlightened ones”. Dig into Novartis International AG’s long history, and one finds that it began as a component of the infamous I.G. Farben combine, which in turn was primarily responsible for the rise of Adolph Hitler and the German/Austrian Third Reich.

Dig a bit deeper and you find that Novartis also wholly owns a company called Sandoz ­ which was the inventor of LSD and other strong hallucinogenic “truth” drugs, and was the supplier of LSD to the CIA allowing them to scale new heights with their covert “MK ULTRA” mind control experiments. Documents released to U.S. Congressional investigators in 1977 show that Sandoz Labs had arranged for certain Nazi scientists to gain new identities in Allen Dulles’ CIA at the conclusion of WWII. This was accomplished under a secret extraction program called “Operation Paper Clip”.

The address listed on the Novartis Patent applications is a P.O. Box in Emeryville, California. Up until the summer of 2005, this Emeryville California address belonged to Chiron Inc. ­ the world’s second-largest INFLUENZA VACCINE MANUFACTURER. Chiron was doing very well, with reported sales of $357 million in fiscal 2002. Chiron’s sales nearly doubled, peaking at a whopping $678 million in 2003 ­ and it was mostly due to the marketing and sale of FLU VACCINE CONTRACTS to the federal government. Novartis, which owned much of Chiron’s stock, was very pleased, until disaster struck in 2004 — the entire year’s stock of flu vaccine was found to be contaminated and was condemned.

Stock values plummeted on the news. With the stock at a historic low, Novartis quickly purchased the remainder of Chiron’s stock and began immediately to work on the massive “novel pandemic flu” vaccine that they somehow knew would soon have worldwide demand ­ especially if they controlled the exclusive patent they could effectively “corner the pandemic flu vaccine market”!!

OTHER CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES

I would submit that killing tens of thousands of innocent humans via the systemic creation of a “pandemic” in order to make billions of dollars is vile enough, but there is also evidence that there is an even more heinous hidden agenda at work here, and it is spelled GENOCIDE.

It is no mystery that Adolph Hitler advocated the elevation of a Nordic “Master Race” that would rule the world in a “New Order of the Ages” called the “Third Reich”. Sadly, not all of the EUGENIC/GENOCIDAL National Socialists were executed at Nuremburg.
In reality, the elite financiers that actually dictated the agenda to Hitler, merely went underground, willing to bide their time until their godless agenda to liquidate BILLIONS of people could be successfully implemented.

The evidence that the Novartis-controlled “Pandemic Vaccine” may well be a tool of mass genocide, is actually quite overwhelming.
At this point, some readers may scoff and ask: “Why would any company want to kill off their customers?” The answer is that these “customers” control large blocks of assets and equity. As Kissinger’s “NSSM-200″ report outlines, the “spoils” of genocide include controlling large tracts of land and mineral assets. This is secondary, of course, to their warped dream of creating a Utopian World Order with only 500 million “worthy” humans allowed to share in it.

WHAT’S THE EVIDENCE?

While George H.W. Bush was busy saving the world from the evil dictator Saddam Hussein in 1991, pursuant to his U.N. speech to create a “new world order” an agenda for an “Initiative for Eco-92 Earth Charter” elitist meeting happened to fall into honest, Christian hands. This agenda basically reiterated the genocide outlined in Henry Kissinger’s infamous NSSM-200 report of 1974, and called for “the immediate reduction of world population.” The entire report can be downloaded at:

My extensive research shows that by 1992, the massive death rate of AIDS had simply not materialized to the Elite’s satisfaction, and a more efficient mass killer had to be engineered in order to fulfill the edicts cut into the “Georgia Guidestones”.

Evidence shows that like the 2009 “Novel” Flu Virus the HIV virus was also engineered and manufactured in the labs of Ft. Detrick.

In 1969, during a House Appropriations Committee hearing, the Defense Department’s Biological Warfare (BW) division at Ft. Detrick requested funds to develop, through complex gene-splicing (i.e. genetic engineering) a “novel” new disease that would both be resistant to, and break down a victim’s immune system. The Congressional Record reads:

“Within the next 5 to 10 years it would probably be possible to make a new infective micro-organism which could differ in certain important respects from any known disease-causing organisms. Most important of these is that it might be refractory to the immunological and therapeutic processes upon which we depend to maintain our relative freedom from infectious diseases.”

The funds for this “Dr. Strangelove” project were somehow approved. AIDS “magically” appeared within the requested time frame, and of course, just happens to exhibit the exact characteristics specified by the Ft. Detrick scientists.

Three years later, in 1972, the fledgling World Health Organization (WHO) published a very similar proposal to the one submitted to the U.S. House Appropriations Committee in 1969. The WHO proposed that: “An attempt should be made to ascertain whether viruses can in fact exert selective effects on immune function, e.g., by …affecting T cell function as opposed to B cell function. The possibility should also be looked into that the immune response to the virus itself may be impaired if the infecting virus damages more or less selectively the immune cells responding to the viral antigens.” (Bulletin of the W.H.O., vol. 47, p 257- 274.) This is a “textbook” clinical description of the function of the HIV/AIDS virus.

The W.H.O. shortly thereafter begins a massive “smallpox vaccination” program in Africa in 1975. Within two years, millions of smallpox vaccines are provided by Novartis et. al, under U.N.I.C.E.F. funding. A decade later, it is determined by independent journalists in the U.K. that the incidence of AIDS infections’ MAPPED AND GRAPHED EPICENTERS in Africa coincided exactly with the locations of the W.H.O. smallpox vaccination program centers in the mid-1970’s (Source, The London Times, May 11, 1987). Some 14,000 Haitians then on UN ‘humanitarian missions’ to Central Africa were also vaccinated in this campaign, and soon contracted HIV. Personnel actually conducting the vaccinations of the Haitians maintain they had been completely unaware that the vaccine was anything other than a routine shot.

In 1987, Dr. Hilleman, head of all vaccine production of Merck Pharmaceuticals stunned the world with his public admissions that the mass vaccination campaigns of the 1950s and ’60s likely caused thousands of cancer deaths each year. This was due to the presence of a cancer-causing virus that contaminated the first polio vaccine, according to Dr. Hilleman. Known as SV40, the virus originated from dead monkeys whose kidney cells were used to culture the first Salk vaccines. Doctors estimate that the virus was injected into tens of millions during the vaccination campaigns, including several million in Canada, before being detected and screened out in 1963. Those born between 1941 and 1961 are thought to be most at risk of having been infected with SV40, and are estimated to have a 300% greater chance of developing cancer. According to Hilleman MERCK KNEW THE VACCINES WERE INFECTED WITH SV40, but distributed them anyway. See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=edikv0zbAlU

Furthermore, research doctors in New Orleans reported in 1963 that a percentage of the Salk polio vaccines were found to have attenuated, (live) viruses, which actually CAUSED tens of thousands of polio cases during the 1950’s.

Following the successful liberation of Kuwait in Operation Desert Storm, hundreds of thousands of victorious American troops are suddenly stricken with a wide variety of auto-immune disorders that doctors named the Gulf War Syndrome, (GWS). After a decade of medical investigation, the culprit is finally determined to be an ingredient in the anthrax vaccinations mandatorily given to the troops. This offending “adjuvant” is a synthetic material known as squalene ­ aka, oil-in-water adjuvant. Writer and Gulf War correspondent Gary Matsumoto documents this entire, tragic saga in his seminal book, “Vaccine-A”. See www.vaccine-a.com.

Understanding these historical facts is very important for this reason: Those that ignore history are doomed to repeat it. This is doubly true when it comes to blindly accepting a “novel” mass vaccination for a weaponized, “reverse engineered” virus.

The historical record is very clear ­ attenuated, live viruses in vaccines SPREAD the disease very effectively. When combined with SQUALENE ADJUVANT ­ the virus becomes many times more potent and lethal. When given to CHILDREN IN SCHOOLS, millions of “typhoid Matts and Marys” will be spreading the disease exponentially.

Chillingly, the Novartis patent for the “novel pandemic flu” declares that “African green monkey kidney cells” will be used for the “viral growth substrate” ­ i.e. the carrier medium.
(Page 3, paragraph 0037) We also see that “oil-in-water” squalene-based adjuvants will also be included (page 8 ­ 0098) but most incredible of all, because this is a “recombinant” and “novel” split vaccine, it is deemed necessary to include fragments of attenuated viruses (i.e. live pathogens) in the vaccine medium.

On July 13, 2009, the W.H.O. sanctioned this lunacy by declaring: “In view of the anticipated limited vaccine availability at global level and the potential need to protect against “drifted” strains of virus, it is recommended that promoting production and use of vaccines such as those that are formulated with oil-in-water adjuvants and live attenuated influenza vaccines is important.”

In conclusion and summation, it should be evident that the “2009 Swine Flu” could just as easily be called the “Bird Flu” ­ because it is as much H5N1 (bird flu) as H1N1 (pig flu.) Novartis knew this in 2005 when it received hundreds of millions of dollars from Mike Leavitt’s HHS to develop and patent the “bird flu” vaccine. I publicly charge that Novartis had advance knowledge of this “combination” because they had been in consultation with Jeffrey Taubenberger for years.

It is further evident that Novartis’ patent provides for “influenza vaccine kits” to be provided to other pharmaceutical manufacturers as well. These “kits” are the basic raw ingredients needed for the other companies to build their own vaccines under their own label.

In 2005, this “jobbing” of separate ingredients by multiple companies would never have been allowed because of the legal liability issues involved. However, in 2009, all liabilities for death and disability from faulty or contaminated vaccines have been stripped away. Any wrongful death or disability lawsuits against Novartis or any other company will today be summarily dismissed.
Novartis today has carte blanche blanket immunity for their actions ­ and any large pharmaceutical company who so desires, can join them at the feeding troughs just by paying millions for their “kits”.

If this isn’t the pinnacle of criminality, then I don’t know what is.

Novartis, if this “novel split vaccine” is so wonderful and safe, why do you require such blanket protection from litigation?

"Do not let your hatred of a people incite you to aggression." Qur'an 5:2
At the heart of that Western freedom and democracy is the belief that the individual man, the child of God, is the touchstone of value..." -RFK

luckee1

  • Guest
lostdog2323, nice find.