Iran/[Potomac] Encounter Grimly Echoes ’02 War Game

[Dig]

Iran/[Potomac] Encounter Grimly Echoes ’02 War Game
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/12/washington/12navy.html
By THOM SHANKER
Published: January 12, 2008

WASHINGTON — There is a reason American military officers express grim concern over the tactics used by Iranian sailors last weekend: a classified, $250 million war game in which small, agile speedboats swarmed a naval convoy to inflict devastating damage on more powerful warships.

In the days since the encounter with five Iranian patrol boats in the Strait of Hormuz, American officers have acknowledged that they have been studying anew the lessons from a startling simulation conducted in August 2002. In that war game, the Blue Team navy, representing the United States, lost 16 major warships — an aircraft carrier, cruisers and amphibious vessels — when they were sunk to the bottom of the Persian Gulf in an attack that included swarming tactics by enemy speedboats.

“The sheer numbers involved overloaded their ability, both mentally and electronically, to handle the attack,” said Lt. Gen. Paul K. Van Riper, a retired Marine Corps officer who served in the war game as commander of a Red Team force representing an unnamed Persian Gulf military. “The whole thing was over in 5, maybe 10 minutes.”

If the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, proved to the public how terrorists could transform hijacked airliners into hostage-filled cruise missiles, then the “Millennium Challenge 2002” war game with General Van Riper was a warning to the armed services as to how an adversary could apply similar, asymmetrical thinking to conflict at sea.

General Van Riper said he complained at the time that important lessons of his simulated victory were not adequately acknowledged across the military. But other senior officers say the war game and subsequent analysis and exercises helped to focus attention on the threat posed by Iran’s small, fast boats, and helped to prepare commanders for last weekend’s encounter.

“It’s clear, strategically, where the Iranian military has gone,” Adm. Mike Mullen, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told reporters on Friday. “For the years that this strategic shift toward their small, fast boats has taken place, we’ve been very focused on that.”

In the simulation, General Van Riper sent wave after wave of relatively inexpensive speedboats to charge at the costlier, more advanced fleet approaching the Persian Gulf. His force of small boats attacked with machine guns and rockets, reinforced with missiles launched from land and air. Some of the small boats were loaded with explosives to detonate alongside American warships in suicide attacks. That core tactic of swarming played out in real life last weekend, though on a much more limited scale and without any shots fired.

According to Pentagon and Navy officials, five small patrol boats belonging to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps charged a three-ship Navy convoy, maneuvering around and between an American destroyer, cruiser and frigate during a tense half-hour encounter. The location was where the narrow Strait of Hormuz meets the open waters of the Persian Gulf — the same choke point chosen by General Van Riper for his attack.

In the encounter last Sunday, the commander of one American warship trained an M240 machine gun — which fires upward of 10 armor-piercing slugs per second — on an Iranian boat that pulled within 200 yards of the American vessel. But the Iranians turned away before the commander gave the order to fire.

That was not the case in the simulation, sponsored by the military’s Joint Forces Command. The victory of the force modeled after a Persian Gulf state — a composite of Iran and Iraq — astounded sponsors of what was then the largest joint war-fighting exercise ever held, involving 13,500 military members and civilians battling in nine live exercise ranges in the United States, and double that many computer simulations to replicate a number of different battles.

General Van Riper’s attack was much more complex and sophisticated than anything that could have involved the Iranian boats last weekend. The broad outline of the 2002 war game was reported at the time, but in interviews since last weekend’s episode, General Van Riper and other officers have provided new details about the simulation.

In the war game, scores of adversary speedboats and larger naval vessels had been shadowing and hectoring the Blue Team fleet for days. The Blue Team defenses also faced cruise missiles fired simultaneously from land and from warplanes, as well as the swarm of speedboats firing heavy machine guns and rockets — and pulling alongside to detonate explosives on board.

When the Red Team sank much of the Blue navy despite the Blue navy’s firing of guns and missiles, it illustrated a cheap way to beat a very expensive fleet. After the Blue force was sunk, the game was ordered to begin again, with the Blue Team eventually declared the victor.

In a telephone interview, General Van Riper recalled that his idea of a swarming attack grew from Marine Corps studies of the natural world, where insects and animals — from tiny ant colonies to wolf packs — move in groups to overwhelm larger prey.

“It is not a matter of size or of individual capability, but whether you have the numbers and come from multiple directions in a short period of time,” he said.

Although Washington and Tehran continue to duel over details of the encounter, American officials say the Iranians may have been seeking to provoke a violent confrontation as President Bush was about to visit the region. Or, the officials say, they might have been hoping to test the American reaction. Yet there is no certainty that the encounter was ordered by the government in Tehran.

Pentagon officials on Friday said there were two encounters with small Iranian boats in the region last month. In one, a Navy warship fired warning shots and in the other a warning whistle was sounded. Both encounters ended without injury after the Iranian vessels turned away.

Regardless, American sailors have not forgotten how a small boat that hid among refueling and garbage vessels off a port in Yemen detonated alongside the American destroyer Cole in October 2000, killing 17 Americans and crippling the warship.

[Dig]

Are the CIA using failed Iran false flags on America?

Are these failed Iran false flags like the bay of pigs to the CIA? Are they now using those false flags against our own country?

Is there any history of the CIA changing their plans (like the bay of pigs invasion) and then using it against our very country?

I am sure the Bilderberg controlled media is already investigating this so no big deal. They would have said something if there was anything to worry about. They do not keep silent about things, they are the media.

[Dig]

If you take a look at the people that planned the Bay of Pigs,....
http://www.democraticunderground.com/discuss/duboard.php?az=show_mesg&forum=104&topic_id=5501005&mesg_id=5501409


   ...I think you'll find people of the same basic rightwing political persuasion as those that steered us into illegally invading Iraq. Nixon, Dulles, and the JCS were some of the primary planners, with the CIA involved in the recruitment and training of the anti-Castro Cuban troops to be used in the assault. The Bay of Pigs failed when JFK refused to allow American air and naval units to participate in the invasion as included in the original plan.

The names of CIA operatives E. Howard Hunt, Frank Sturgis, Bernard Barker, and Felix Rodriguez are heavily tied to the Bay of Pigs operation. All four men were contemporaries of George H. W. Bush, who is also tied to the Bay of Pigs by the codename applied to the invasion, Operation Zapata. Zapata just happened to be the name of Bush's oil drilling company. Additionally, two of the landing craft procured from the Navy were repainted and renamed the "Houston" and the "Barbara". Hunt, Sturgis, and Barker were involved in Watergate, and Rodriguez was involved with the Iran-Conta Scandal as an aide to VP GHWB.

JFK fired the top three CIA executives, including Dulles, following the Bay of Pigs, and threatened to completely dismantle the Agency.

[Dig]

The Whole Bay of Pigs Thing
2 min 37 sec - Dec 31, 2006
Nixon talks in the Oval office of how the Watergate investigation could open up 'The whole Bay of Pigs thing'.
www.youtube.com/watch?v=i-y2KQvvYtg - Related videos


Opening Up The Whole "Bay Of Pigs" Thing ...
8 min - Nov 21, 2007   
Clips from Oliver Stone's movies JFK
www.youtube.com/watch?v=T0-mJZ9ur_8 - Related videos

June 23, 1972

This is the transcript of the recording of a meeting between President Nixon and H.R. Haldeman in the Oval Office on June 23, 1972 from 10.04am to 11.39am.
Listen to the Audio of the Smoking Gun tape


Haldeman:  okay -that's fine. Now, on the investigation, you know, the Democratic break-in thing, we're back to the-in the, the problem area because the FBI is not under control, because Gray doesn't exactly know how to control them, and they have, their investigation is now leading into some productive areas, because they've been able to trace the money, not through the money itself, but through the bank, you know, sources - the banker himself. And, and it goes in some directions we don't want it to go. Ah, also there have been some things, like an informant came in off the street to the FBI in Miami, who was a photographer or has a friend who is a photographer who developed some films through this guy, Barker, and the films had pictures of Democratic National Committee letter head documents and things. So I guess, so it's things like that that are gonna, that are filtering in. Mitchell came up with yesterday, and John Dean analyzed very carefully last night and concludes, concurs now with Mitchell's recommendation that the only way to solve this, and we're set up beautifully to do it, ah, in that and that...the only network that paid any attention to it last night was NBC...they did a massive story on the Cuban...

Nixon:   That's right.

Haldeman:   thing.

Nixon:   Right.

Haldeman:   That the way to handle this now is for us to have Walters call Pat Gray and just say, "Stay the hell out of this...this is ah, business here we don't want you to go any further on it." That's not an unusual development,...

Nixon:   Um huh.

Haldeman:   ...and, uh, that would take care of it.

Nixon:   What about Pat Gray, ah, you mean he doesn't want to?

Haldeman:   Pat does want to. He doesn't know how to, and he doesn't have, he doesn't have any basis for doing it. Given this, he will then have the basis. He'll call Mark Felt in, and the two of them ...and Mark Felt wants to cooperate because...

Nixon:   Yeah.

Haldeman:   he's ambitious...

Nixon:   Yeah.

Haldeman:   Ah, he'll call him in and say, "We've got the signal from across the river to, to put the hold on this." And that will fit rather well because the FBI agents who are working the case, at this point, feel that's what it is. This is CIA.

Nixon:   But they've traced the money to 'em.

Haldeman:   Well they have, they've traced to a name, but they haven't gotten to the guy yet.

Nixon:   Would it be somebody here?

Haldeman:   Ken Dahlberg.

Nixon:   Who the hell is Ken Dahlberg?

Haldeman:   He's ah, he gave $25,000 in Minnesota and ah, the check went directly in to this, to this guy Barker.

Nixon:   Maybe he's a ...bum.

Nixon:   He didn't get this from the committee though, from Stans.

Haldeman:   Yeah. It is. It is. It's directly traceable and there's some more through some Texas people in--that went to the Mexican bank which they can also trace to the Mexican bank...they'll get their names today. And pause)

Nixon:   Well, I mean, ah, there's no way... I'm just thinking if they don't cooperate, what do they say? They they, they were approached by the Cubans. That's what Dahlberg has to say, the Texans too. Is that the idea?

Haldeman:   Well, if they will. But then we're relying on more and more people all the time. That's the problem. And ah, they'll stop if we could, if we take this other step.

Nixon:   All right. Fine.

Haldeman:   And, and they seem to feel the thing to do is get them to stop?

Nixon:   Right, fine.

Haldeman:   They say the only way to do that is from White House instructions. And it's got to be to Helms and, ah, what's his name...? Walters.

Nixon:   Walters.

Haldeman:   And the proposal would be that Ehrlichman (coughs) and I call them in

Nixon:   All right, fine.

Haldeman:   and say, ah...

Nixon:   How do you call him in, I mean you just, well, we protected Helms from one hell of a lot of things.

Haldeman:   That's what Ehrlichman says.

Nixon:   Of course, this is a, this is a Hunt, you will-that will uncover a lot of things. You open that scab there's a hell of a lot of things and that we just feel that it would be very detrimental to have this thing go any further. This involves these Cubans, Hunt, and a lot of hanky-panky that we have nothing to do with ourselves. Well what the hell, did Mitchell know about this thing to any much of a degree?

Haldeman:   I think so. I don 't think he knew the details, but I think he knew.

Nixon:   He didn't know how it was going to be handled though, with Dahlberg and the Texans and so forth? Well who was the asshole that did? (Unintelligible) Is it Liddy? Is that the fellow? He must be a little nuts.

Haldeman:   He is.

Nixon:   I mean he just isn't well screwed on is he? Isn't that the problem?

Haldeman:   No, but he was under pressure, apparently, to get more information, and as he got more pressure, he pushed the people harder to move harder on...

Nixon:   Pressure from Mitchell?

Haldeman:   Apparently.

Nixon:   Oh, Mitchell, Mitchell was at the point that you made on this, that exactly what I need from you is on the--

Haldeman:   Gemstone, yeah.

Nixon:   All right, fine, I understand it all. We won't second-guess Mitchell and the rest. Thank God it wasn't Colson.

Haldeman:   The FBI interviewed Colson yesterday. They determined that would be a good thing to do.

Nixon:   Um hum.

Haldeman:   Ah, to have him take a...

Nixon:   Um hum.

Haldeman:   An interrogation, which he did, and that, the FBI guys working the case had concluded that there were one or two possibilities, one, that this was a White House, they don't think that there is anything at the Election Committee, they think it was either a White House operation and they had some obscure reasons for it, non political,...

Nixon:   Uh huh.

Haldeman:   or it was a...

Nixon:   Cuban thing-

Haldeman:   Cubans and the CIA. And after their interrogation of, of...

Nixon:   Colson.

Haldeman:   Colson, yesterday, they concluded it was not the White House, but are now convinced it is a CIA thing, so the CIA turn off would...

Nixon:   Well, not sure of their analysis, I'm not going to get that involved. I'm (unintelligible).

Haldeman:   No, sir. We don't want you to.

Nixon:   You call them in.

Nixon:   Good. Good deal! Play it tough. That's the way they play it and that's the way we are going to play it.

Haldeman:   O.K. We'll do it.

Nixon:   Yeah, when I saw that news summary item, I of course knew it was a bunch of crap, but I thought ah, well it's good to have them off on this wild hair thing because when they start bugging us, which they have, we'll know our little boys will not know how to handle it. I hope they will though. You never know. Maybe, you think about it. Good!

**********

Nixon:   When you get in these people when you...get these people in, say: "Look, the problem is that this will open the whole, the whole Bay of Pigs thing, and the President just feels that" ah, without going into the details... don't, don't lie to them to the extent to say there is no involvement, but just say this is sort of a comedy of errors, bizarre, without getting into it, "the President believes that it is going to open the whole Bay of Pigs thing up again. And, ah because these people are plugging for, for keeps and that they should call the FBI in and say that we wish for the country, don't go any further into this case", period!

Haldeman:   OK

Nixon:   That's the way to put it, do it straight (Unintelligible)

Haldeman:   Get more done for our cause by the opposition than by us at this point.

Nixon:   You think so?

Haldeman:   I think so, yeah.

[Dig]

Ray McGovern: Obama and Panetta are afraid of the CIA assassins that killed JFK
Exclusive: 27-Year CIA Vet says Obama May be Afraid of the CIA ... For Good Reason...
http://www.bradblog.com/?p=7408
By Brad Friedman on 9/11/2009 3:00PM 



Alluding to the assassination of JFK, long-time high-level CIA analyst says Panetta and the President 'afraid of these guys because these guys have a whole lot to lose if justice takes its course'...

During my interview last night with 27-year CIA analyst Ray McGovern on the Mike Malloy Show (which I've been guest hosting all this week), the man who used to personally deliver the CIA's Presidential Daily Briefings to George Bush Sr., among other Presidents, offered an extraordinarily chilling thought --- particularly coming from someone with his background.

In a conversation at the end of the hour (audio and transcript below), as I was trying to pin him down for an opinion on whether or not he felt it was appropriate for CIA Director Leon Panetta to have reportedly attempted to block a lawful investigation into torture and other war crimes committed by the CIA, McGovern alluded to a book about the assassination of John F. Kennedy, and noted he felt it likely that both Panetta and President Obama may have reason to fear certain elements of the CIA.

"Let me just leave you with this thought," he said, "and that is that I think Panetta, and to a degree President Obama, are afraid --- I never thought I'd hear myself saying this --- I think they're afraid of the CIA."...


McGovern went on to note "the stakes are very high here," in relation to Attorney General Eric Holder's recently announced investigation of the CIA now under the direction of Panetta. "His main advisers and his senior staff are liable for prosecution for war crimes. The War Crimes statute includes very severe penalties, including capitol punishment for those who, if under their custody, detainees die. And we know that at least a hundred have, so this is big stakes here."

He then recommended James W. Douglass' new book, JFK and the Unspeakable: Why He Died and Why It Matters.

"He makes a very very persuasive case that it was President Kennedy's, um, the animosity that built up between him and the CIA after the Bay of Pigs, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because he was reaching out to the Russians and so forth and so on. It's a very well-researched book and his conclusion is very alarming," the long-time CIA veteran noted in what turned out to be a chilling end to our interview in which he described "two CIAs".

One, he says, was created by President Truman to "give him the straight scoop without any fear or favor. And then its covert action arm, which really doesn't believe --- which doesn't belong in this agency." McGovern referred to that CIA "advisedly" as the President's "own personal gestapo" which acts without oversight by the Congressional committees once tasked to do so.

"And so if you're asking why Obama and Panetta are going very very kid-glove-ish with the CIA, I think part of the reason, or the explanation is they're afraid of these guys because these guys have a whole lot to lose if justice takes its course."

"So, it's pretty scary. Yes, it is," he concluded.

* * *


• The complete audio archive of the entire interview (appx. 37 mins.) can be download here or heard online here...

• The final few minutes (appx. 6 mins) containing the conversation described above, as transcribed below, can be heard here...

The transcript of the above-described 9/10/09 conversation between Brad Friedman and 27-year CIA analyst Ray McGovern on the Mike Malloy Show, follows below...
BRAD FRIEDMAN: Was it appropriate, in your opinion, for Panetta to try to block this lawful investigation into torture by Eric Holder's investigation. Is that the appropriate thing for a CIA Director to do?


RAY MCGOVERN: Well, you and I know that it's not appropriate if he's Director. If he sees his role as the agency's lawyer --- which apparently he does --- then there's nothing unlawful about him pleading their special causes. The stakes are very high here. His main advisers and his senior staff are liable for prosecution for war crimes. The War Crimes statute includes very severe penalties, including capitol punishment...

BF: Yeah...

RM: ... for those who, if under their custody, detainees die. And we know that at least a hundred have, so this is big stakes here.

And let me just leave you with this thought, and that is that I think Panetta, and to a degree President Obama, are afraid --- I never thought I'd hear myself saying this --- I think they're afraid of the CIA.

And you look in history...look to the incredible book written recently by Jim Douglass, JFK and the Unspeakable. He makes a very very persuasive case that it was President Kennedy's, um, the animosity that built up between him and the CIA after the Bay of Pigs, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because he was reaching out to the Russians and so forth and so on. It's a very well-researched book and his conclusion is very alarming.

And so if you're asking why Obama and Panetta are going very very kid-glove-ish, with the CIA, I think part of the reason, or the explanation is they're afraid of these guys because these guys have a whole lot to lose if justice takes its course. And that's why I think Attorney General Holder is to be applauded.

I'm really just delighted to have somebody from The Bronx, where I grew up, try to do something to wipe out the blot that Colin Powell has put on The Bronx.

BF: Even though its a narrow investigation, you still applaud it. But Ray McGovern, 27-year CIA analyst, you're saying that there is reason to be concerned about the CIA --- that Barack Obama should be concerned.

Having been there 27 years, I guess you know what you're talking about. Uh...but that's a chilling thought I gotta say, Ray.

RM: Well, read the book. James Douglass, JFK and the Unspeakable. Uh, Brad, as you probably know, there are two CIAs. Okay? The one that was set up by Truman to give him the straight scoop without any fear or favor. And then its covert action arm, which really doesn't believe --- which doesn't belong in this agency --- but is the one that is entitled, so to speak, by one sentence in the National Security Act of 1947 which says 'the Director of Central Intelligence shall perform such other functions and duties as the President shall direct.'

That gives the President the ability to use the CIA as his own personal gestapo --- and I use the word advisedly --- the only check on that are what used to be called the oversight committees of Congress, now they're called the overlooked committees of the Congress...

BF: Indeed.

RM: So it's pretty scary. Yes, it is.

[Satyagraha]

 Zapata just happened to be the name of Bush's oil drilling company. Additionally, two of the landing craft procured from the Navy were repainted and renamed the "Houston" and the "Barbara".

Noun 1. hubris - overbearing pride or presumptionarrogance, haughtiness, hauteur, high-handedness, lordliness - overbearing pride evidenced by a superior manner toward inferiors

Guys... our best friend is the elite's intense need to demonstrate their power - something as simple as the name of a boat can reveal their ego-maniacal intent. They can't operate in secret because then nobody would know .. they need us to know because the thirst for power requires an audience. ("SEE WHAT I DID??? I'M AMAZING!!!). Explains why some of the most outrageous events are out in plain sight. Is it the fluoride/media/chemtrails/advertising/shock & awe that prevents people from actually recognizing this? Must be.. it's not actually 'hidden'.