**Alert** NWO/Soft-Coup-Nuke Wep Officer FIRED/NRO chief/Cyber/Off resigned

[Dig]

Pentagon Secret Budget Tops $35 Billion
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/08/pentagon-secret-budget-tops-35-billion/
By David Axe  August 13, 2009  |  2:22 pm  |  Categories: Air Force

The Defense Department will spend $35.8 billion on secret technologies in 2010, according to a new report from the Washington, D.C.-based Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. That represents the “second highest level of funding provided for classified acquisition programs since FY 1987,” CSBA claims. The post-Cold War peak, in 2007, was just 1 percent higher.

What does all this “black” cash buy? The funding is apparently split roughly evenly between research and weapons purchases. The vast majority of it — 80 percent, in fact — belongs to the Air Force. Indeed, black spending accounts for nearly half of the Air Force’s purchases. In past decades, secret Air Force spending produced the SR-71 recon plane, the F-117 stealth fighter and the B-2 stealth bomber. These days, communications gear and satellites probably gobble up the bulk of the black cash, CSBA contends.

“Restrictions placed on access to classified programs have meant that DoD and Congress typically exercise less oversight over classified programs than unclassified ones,” the report notes. That can result in big losses, when programs go awry.

Take the hush-hush Future Imagery Architecture program, meant to “develop the next generation of spy satellites for the National Reconnaissance Office.” “The electro-optical satellite component of the program was canceled in 2005 due to significant cost overruns and technical issues,” CSBA recalls, “resulting in what was reported as a $4 billion loss for the government.”

[Dig]

Pentagon’s Black Budget Grows to More Than $50 Billion (Updated)
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/05/pentagons-black-budget-grows-to-more-than-50-billion/
By Noah Shachtman  May 7, 2009  |  7:39 pm

The Pentagon wants to spend just over $50 billion on classified programs next year, newly-released Defense Department budget documents reveal. “That’s the largest-ever sum,” according to Aviation Week’s Bill Sweetman, a longtime black-budget seer — a three percent increase over last year’s total.

It makes the Pentagon’s secret operations, including the intelligence budgets nested inside, “roughly equal in magnitude to the entire defense budgets of the UK, France or Japan,” Sweetman adds. All in all, about seven and a half percent of the Defense Department’s total spending is now classified.

Black-world weapons-buying “remains dominated by the single line item,” according to Sweetman. (You can find it under the Air Force’s “other procurement” section, on page F-21 here.) “This year’s number stands just above $16 billion. In inflation-adjusted terms, that’s 240 per cent more than it was ten years ago.”

Many of the secret budgets still remain clandestine, however. In the research budget, the line item for a “Special Program”of the super-secret National Security Agency is a string of zeros. Same goes for an NSA “Cyber Security Initiative” kitty. And don’t even ask about NSA’s “Intelligence Support to Information Operations” account. That’s a blank slate, too.

Some other fun facts, buried in the Pentagon’s just-released budget docs:
Money for “Directed Energy Technology” — real-life ray gun research — jumps from $62.7 million last year to $105.7 million in 2010.
Cash for “Prompt Global Strike Capability Development” — weapons that can hit anywhere on the planet, in just a few hours — jumps from $74.1 million to $166.9 million.
The high-flying Global Hawk drones get an an extra $486.8 million.
The Office of the Secretary of Defense is pushing $75 million in new alt-fuel and alt-power projects — from “Landfill Gas Energy Capture” to a “Tactical, Deployable Micro-Grid.”
The Maui Space Surveillance System gets a major downgrade, from $36.3 million to a mere $5.8 million. Aloha, space-watchers!

UPDATE:CQ’s Tim Starks reports that “the budget would also allocate an unspecified amount to the new ‘Imagery Satellite Way Ahead‘ program, a joint effort between the Office of the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Defense designed to revamp the nation’s constellation of spy satellites.”

The mostly classified plan would include new, redesigned “electro-optical” satellites, which collect data from across the electromagnetic spectrum, as well as the expanded use of commercial satellite imagery. Although the cost is secret, most estimates place it in the multibillion-dollar range.

[Dig]

Remarks to the National Network of Electro-Optical Manufacturing Technologies Conference
http://fas.org/irp/nro/hall9802.html
9 February 1998


Keith Hall
Director of the National Reconnaissance Office



Thank you for the kind introduction. It was hard to leave the endless freezing February rain of Washington D.C. to come all the way out to Tucson, but I decided to make the sacrifice for this group. There are two meccas of Electro-Optics in this country: one is in the Northeast; the other is right here in Arizona. Given the season, I congratulate you on your astute choice for this event.

Of course, I would attend no matter where you decided to hold the conference. As Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) , I feel a particularly close relationship to the electro-optical industry. This industry and NRO programs have enjoyed mutually beneficial initiatives for over 30 years; the industry continues to be critical to what we do today; and it is essential to our plans for tomorrow.

Along those lines, I would like to salute Congressman Jack Murtha -- a longtime supporter of a robust national reconnaissance capability and the man whose vision helped form the National Network of Electro-Optical Manufacturing Technologies. This and future focus efforts will help assure continued robustness in our electro-optical capabilities.

Today I would like to talk about E-O and the importance of Imagery Intelligence -- IMINT -- to our national security. I feel a little uncomfortable as the Director of NRO -- the Nations eyes and ears in space -- focusing solely on IMINT. Signals Intelligence [or SIGINT], Communications Intelligence [or COMINT], and all of the other "INTs" that are part of our operations are just as critical to our national security. Indeed, they work in concert with imagery to accomplish our intelligence objectives. In deference to this group, however, I will focus primarily on imagery and the value of imagery to this country.

At the National Reconnaissance Office, like the rest of government, the reality is that our budgetary resources are limited. Someone once said - -"It's hard to reach for the stars, when you are clutching your wallet!" We now must make choices about which capabilities we will pursue -- long gone are the days of buying whatever capabilities the state of technology will permit. To manage our budget, we must make decisions about what technology we need and what capabilities we can afford. That often means we have to quantify the value of satellite reconnaissance to this country. This is a difficult task. How do you explain what an image from space is worth? We've all heard the old saw "a picture is worth a thousand words." But that is certainly a gross underestimate, particularly when you consider that in Washington a thousand words won't even answer a simple question. So today I would like to try to give you a better explanation, starting with some history.

History and Significance of IMINT

It's hard to believe that only 40 years ago the US space program was in its infancy with no successful satellites or anything else put into space. Those early years were plagued with problems. In one launch attempt, the rocket went suborbital and a piece of debris landed in Cuba killing a cow. Castro filed a complaint at the UN the US team quickly dubbed the incident "the herd shot round the world."

After numerous unsuccessful attempts, the first image from space floated toward earth in August of 1960. Captain Harold Mitchell, piloting a C-119 flying boxcar, snagged the parachute in midair on his third pass. The film was from the first photoreconnaissance satellite, the CORONA. That image was worth a Distinguished Flying Cross for Captain Mitchell - - and I would venture to guess that quite a few other careers were made on that day, as well.

It is hard to calculate what that first image was worth to the President and the nation's top military and civilian national security advisors. The airfields, missile bases, and nuclear facilities of the Soviet Union had dropped from view abruptly several months earlier, when Francis Gary Powers' U-2 was shot down. For months we had no idea what Khruschev was doing, planning, or building. Think of the concern we have today when Saddam Hussein bars UN inspection teams from Iraq for a few weeks. Increase that by several orders of magnitude. There was intense demand for that first image from space. When we developed the canister of film, we found that one satellite mission had successfully photographed more of the Soviet Union than all previous U-2 flights combined.

As the Cold War progressed, IMINT played a key role in keeping the peace. It told us what Soviet capabilities were so we could gauge our own defenses accordingly. Before we had space-based reconnaissance, we were greatly overestimating Soviet strength. We were spending money we didn't need to spend to counter imaginary capabilities. So what we spent on satellites, we probably saved several times over in defense spending.

Beginning in the 70s, IMINT was a key tool for verifying arms control treaties with the former Soviet Union and helping to wind down a dangerous nuclear arms race. Those agreements -- which would not have been possible without a space-based monitoring capability -- have formed the backbone for peace in the latter part of this century.

Importance of IMINT and E-O Technologies Today

Today, it is still difficult to calculate the worth of a satellite image. Advances in electro-optics have opened up an astounding world of new possibilities and capabilities. Of course, 'possibilities' and 'capabilities' are two things that I can't talk about in any detail. However, I can give you an idea of what those capabilities mean to the United States in the post-Cold War world.

Those images from space allow our national leaders to build foreign policy on a remarkably solid, broad, and detailed foundation of information. They continue to guard the peace. Imagery intelligence also makes it less likely that the US will be drawn into international conflict by providing early warning when other countries are preparing for hostilities. Sometimes that warning can give US policy makers and diplomats the time they need to avert a war.

When conflict can't be avoided, NRO satellite systems help protect our troops. Imagery intelligence is there wherever US troops are deployed -- the Persian Gulf, Haiti, Bosnia. Information from satellites helps reduce casualties and greatly increase the odds that our military mission will succeed. Imagery does this in a number of ways.

IMINT warns of hidden dangers -- on a near real time basis. Imagery information supports precision-guided weapons and bomb damage assessment. And, it reduces potentially deadly confusion by telling our troops precisely where they are in relation to the enemy and in relation to our own forces.

Real-time imagery capabilities provided by E-O and other technologies is causing a revolution in warfare. Eliot Cohen, writing in Foreign Affairs in 1996, compared this revolution to the change from battleship to carrier in being able to fight at great distances. He said:

"A military cliche has it that what can be seen on the modern battlefield can be hit, and what can be hit will be destroyed. Whereas at the beginning of this century this applied with deadly certainty only to front line infantrymen, it now holds not only for readiness on the front lines but for supporting forces in the rear." He goes on to point out that " ... as all countries gain access to the new forms of [space based reconnaissance and unmanned aerial vehicles], hiding large scale armored movements or building up safe rear areas chock-a-block with ammunition dumps and truck convoys will gradually become impossible."

The Gulf War was a watershed event that made us realize the remarkable possibilities of these technologies for tactical support to warfighters. There were problems to overcome -- primarily problems of the dissemination of imagery and information to the field. Nevertheless, DESERT STORM taught us much about the value of real-time space support to military operations. Satellite reconnaissance was a major factor in the rapid US victory. That victory demonstrated to the world the meaning of space dominance -- believe me, we don't ever want to find out what it means to lose space dominance.

Since the Gulf war, we have made tremendous progress in improving our intelligence support to the warfighter. E-O made much of this progress possible by enabling high volume collection and near real-time capability. This allows us, for example, to provide up-to-date imagery and targeting information to every pilot on every sortie. We are developing -- in fact testing -- a system of feeding this data directly into the cockpit as a pilot is en route to the target.

Advances in electro-optics also give NRO systems a unique advantage in countering what we refer to as the transnational threats: the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and terrorism. These are global threats that can emerge anywhere at any time. To counter global threats we need global capabilities, including satellites that can quickly provide US decision makers with the imagery and information they need to respond to a crisis. Once again, E-O makes what we do possible. Let me give you a few examples:

Perhaps the greatest threat we face today is the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the ballistic missile systems to deliver them. Over two dozen countries now have such weapons programs. The high volume and high quality of imagery that we can produce thanks to E- O technologies gives us a very effective way to discover nuclear programs, gauge their progress, and to track the shipment of materials and components. Satellite reconnaissance acts to reduce the threat by monitoring compliance with arms control treaties and various sanctions regimes.

If not for imagery from our space systems, we would know a lot less about the weapons programs of Saddam Hussein and Kim Chong Il. Undoubtedly, these programs would be more advanced and more dangerous than they are today. In the case of North Korea, we were able to provide early warning that the North was developing a nuclear program. As a result, the US was able to negotiate an end to nuclear development.

IMINT also helps to reduce the terrorist threat to US citizens and interests. It can help to locate terrorist camps and facilities and provide other information that helps us to track terrorists.

In addition to supporting military operations and countering transnational threats, imagery makes an enormous contribution in other, nontraditional areas.

During humanitarian crises, satellites monitor refugee flows and provide information to facilitate international aid. These systems also document war crimes by detecting mass graves and other evidence of atrocities.

Imagery satellites are also turning out to be a tremendous tool for environmental scientists. Imagery is being used to create a comprehensive global base of information on environmental conditions. Satellites also provide strategic warning of environmental threats and can monitor environmental treaties and agreements.

Another nontraditional area for NRO systems is support to civil authorities in coping with natural and manmade disasters, including hurricanes, floods, forest fires, earthquakes, and volcanic eruptions. Within hours after a disaster strikes, the Intelligence Community can provide unclassified maps and other products derived from classified imagery. These maps save hours of field work by giving an overview of damage to roads, bridges, buildings, and power infrastructure. By quickly pointing disaster relief workers to areas of greatest distress, these maps can save lives and property.

The NRO and the National Imagery and Mapping Agency have also made an impact in the field of medicine by sharing technology. Technologies developed to help us spot changes in satellite imagery -- for example, modifications to a missile site -- are now being used to help doctors detect changes in mammograms that could indicate breast cancer. The use of these technologies with digital mammography promises to greatly enhance our ability to detect cancers at the earliest stages. This could give millions of women much better odds of beating the disease.

I have just given you a partial list of what NRO systems can do for this country. Today many of these things are taken for granted. We have raised a generation ofleaders who have come to rely on a wide array of space services as a routine matter of business. As we have introduced new capabilities, we have managed to maintain the continuity of services, basically without interruption. Our leadership has come to expect that these services will always be there. They don't give them a second thought. It's really a testimony to the effectiveness of the government- industry team that delivers these marvelous capabilities to our national leadership. Capabilities that would make any foreign leader's eyes water are just a routine part of the US national security "tool kit."

Industry-Government Partnership

Let me turn now to that industry-government partnership:

During the first era of space reconnaissance -- from the 1960s to the 1980s -- Government requirements drove the technical state of the art in Electro-Optics. Actually, the term "government requirements" is a pretty mild description of what went on. What we had was the President and his top national security advisors squinting and frowning at those early, fuzzy images of large Soviet construction sites and demanding to know precisely what the Soviets were building. The Director of Central Intelligence and the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office were ordered to do whatever was necessary to deliver higher resolution imagery on a more timely basis. They, in turn, marshalled the best minds in private industry to the task. That intense pressure drove E-O research and experimentation at a headlong pace. Many of the advances that came out of this process then filtered out into the commercial world.

During the 1990s we are seeing a transformation. Today, commercial and consumer sector requirements are driving many state-of-the-art E-O technologies. It is impossible to be in the space business and not see the thundering herd of commercial satellites on the horizon. This is an exciting development and will play a large role in the future of space. We not only have commercial imagery satellites, we are also seeing tremendous growth in the popularity of consumer items that use digital E-O technologies, including cameras and videocams.

We are achieving a balance that will be beneficial for both government and industry. Innovations, such as large ultra-lightweight optics and structures, that came out of the world of classified imagery will continue to fuel the growth of new high technology industries. At the same time, the NRO can take advantage of commercial technologies to reduce costs and increase efficiency. I anticipate a transformation from a craft type industry, to a manufacturing industry that can deploy national security space systems better, cheaper, and faster. Indeed, this has already begun. National security interests started many space programs; commercial ventures will now dramatically accelerate the development of future space programs.

I want to highlight one specific opportunity made possible by commercial remote sensing systems. Recently, the National Academy of Public Administration, NAPA, conducted a study regarding the application and usefulness of geographic information databases. The results clearly concluded that a National Spatial Data Infrastructure (NSDI) would provide the United States a decided economic and competitive advantage in the global economy. The study also advocated cooperative activity between government and industry to develop and populate the spatial data infrastructure. I see exciting possibilities here for the electro- optical industry.

Future of E-O and NRO

As we look to the future, the National Reconnaissance Office has one overriding goal -- to help ensure that the US maintains global information superiority. Information superiority means that our leaders will maintain the upper hand in decision making and negotiations, our troops will have a continued advantage on the battlefield, and our high-tech industries will enjoy a continued edge in the international marketplace.

The Future Imagery Architecture [or FIA], will be an integral part of future information superiority. It is the product of an exhaustive survey of our imagery users. We took a close and critical look at customer needs that are not now being fulfilled. We resolved to fill those gaps in the future. FIA is an advanced program that will replace existing systems with a mix of smaller satellites that will provide better performance, more tailored service to our customers, and reduced costs. FIA will use advanced technology conceived and developed by many of the people here today. Also, under consideration is the possibility of joint development with key allies. It is becoming ever more likely that in future conflicts, the US will fight side by side with coalition partners. As many of our allies are contemplating their own overhead systems, there may be solutions where we jointly develop an architecture. We could deliver a more responsive capability than if we each go it alone.

As you well know, the collection is only one part of the picture. Imagery is made useful by the way it is processed, stored, compressed, disseminated, displayed, and manipulated. Our job is to deliver useful information into the hands of our customer -- whether that customer is the President of the United States or a pilot approaching a target in Bosnia. Depending on the user, that information may come in the form of a picture, it may come as text analysis based on imagery, or it may be an unclassified map derived from imagery. I know that you are collectively making great strides in these areas. I can only urge you on to greater accomplishments, because the demand for imagery and specialized imagery products will grow exponentially.

This is particularly true in the area of US military planning and operations. In the future, our imagery and other space assets will be an even more important part of military planning and operations than they are today. Working with our partner, the National Imagery and Mapping Agency new dissemination techniques and new imagery products will soon help to give US military commanders in the field a complete, real- time view of the battle space. Moving target indication -- or MTI -- will allow us to track moving targets from space. We are now working with the Air Force and DARPA, to develop this capability. These unique imagery products and applications will give our warfighters an incredible advantage that any enemy would find extremely difficult to overcome.

To sum up, our space capabilities are the nation's 911 system -- on call 24 hours a day -- ready to respond instantly to a request for an image from any part of the globe. But they are more than just that; they are also a tremendous boon to US world leadership, technological robustness, and economic competitiveness. I think we can all take immense pride in these capabilities. I salute all of you in the Electro-optical industry who are helping us achieve the goal of imagery collection on demand, anytime, anywhere. You play a tremendous role in making our space systems the envy of the world. Thank you.

[Dig]

Pioneers in Space Reconnaissance: A Brief History of The NRO
http://www.fas.org/irp/nro/commission/app_e.htm

It was during the Cold War period of pioneering technological achievements in space reconnaissance that the NRO emerged and enjoyed the greatest levels of recognition and support for its programs at the highest levels of the U.S. Government...."

Americans have found themselves captivated by adventure novels like Tom Clancy's "Patriot Games" that come to life on the big screen. The scenes depicting the use of U.S. spy satellites add to the intrigue. We are mesmerized as a spy satellite transmits what appears to be real-time video of a night assault by U.S. Special Operations Forces on a terrorist camp located in the Sahara Desert. The satellite images vividly depict the assault force in action and terrorists dropping to the ground from close-range gunfire. They convey a sense of CNN-like coverage of breaking news.

The capabilities of these "movie satellites" (not constrained by the laws of physics) are the result of computer-simulated graphics and skillful special effects. Nonetheless, the premise for such capabilities is the spectacular technological achievements in satellite reconnaissance pioneered by the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO).

The NRO emerged at the height of the Cold War. During that time in U.S. history, the nation faced the threat of destruction from a nuclear attack. The Soviet Union's nuclear weapons and closed Communist society were the dominant threat to U.S. national security. Weekly civil defense drills and backyard bomb shelters instilled a real sense of "clear and present danger" to the American public.

The lack of insight into the Soviet Union during the early days of the Cold War and the fear of its nuclear arsenal were the focus of national attention. Tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union were high. Ambiguous and conflicting information from traditional intelligence sources concerning the extent of Soviet nuclear capabilities threatened to fuel the nuclear arms race. The risk of nuclear war led the U.S. Air Force to consider building as many as 10,000 ICBMs to counter the perceived threat. The Strategic Air Command flew around-the-clock airborne alert missions with B-52 bombers armed with nuclear warheads in order to deter the USSR from launching a preemptive nuclear strike on the United States.

In an effort to gain timely and more accurate information concerning Soviet capabilities, President Eisenhower initiated a covert program to develop an overhead reconnaissance capability to gather intelligence on the development, capabilities, location, and readiness of Soviet strategic nuclear forces. Advanced technology elements of the CIA and the Air Force were joined together to attack this problem. They rapidly developed the U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, which was able to penetrate Soviet airspace at higher altitudes than those at which Soviet fighters could then operate.



However, in their four years of operation, the U-2s were able to cover only one-tenth of the 10 million square miles of the USSR and provide only limited insight into Soviet strategic nuclear capabilities. Further, these flights were ended on May 1, 1960 after a U-2 piloted by Francis Gary Powers was shot down by a Soviet surface-to-air missile. Powers was captured and the Soviets turned the incident into a major propaganda event. As a result, the need for a satellite reconnaissance capability to provide assured access over denied Soviet territory became paramount to U.S. national security.

The Air Force and CIA had been working on covert reconnaissance capabilities from space for some time. This was a high-risk effort and the program suffered a dozen failed missions before achieving its first success in August 1960.

The then-covert program, named Corona, finally yielded results that were considered spectacular at the time. The amount of Soviet territory covered in the film recovered from the very first Corona mission, for example, exceeded the area that had been covered previously by all the U-2 flights.

The information collected by Corona provided U.S. military planners and policy-makers with concrete evidence that the Soviet Union did not have overwhelming strategic superiority as had been feared. Subsequently, knowledge of the size and characteristics of Soviet nuclear forces made verification of arms control treaties possible and enabled the firm U.S. response to Soviet military expansion in the 1980s that eventually induced the USSR to collapse.

Like the Air Force in its efforts to collect imagery, the Navy and Air Force had tried to gather electronic radar signals intelligence (ELINT) by conducting aircraft flights along the periphery of the USSR, but these efforts could never provide more than a fraction of the required intelligence. As a result, the Navy in 1958 proposed an ELINT satellite. The proposal was supported by the Department of Defense and CIA, and was approved by President Eisenhower in 1959. The Naval Research Laboratory developed the satellite under the cover of an experimental solar radiation research satellite called GRAB (Galactic Radiation and Background). The first launch in June 1960 succeeded in orbiting a GRAB satellite. Like Corona, however, many early GRAB missions were unsuccessful and four of the next five missions failed. The program nevertheless continued.



The data provided by the successful GRAB missions were priceless. The ELINT was used to develop operational plans for retaliatory strikes against the Soviet Union in the event of war. The National Security Agency analyzed and catalogued the data, determining from it, for example, that the Soviets were operating a radar in support of an anti-ballistic missile capability as early as the early 1960s. Navy programs were incorporated into NRO in 1962. GRAB was succeeded by other NRO satellite collectors of signals intelligence that have operated ever since.

A more recent example of the NRO's contribution to U.S. national security is the electro-optical imagery satellite program. The Corona photographic satellite system had limitations. The duration of missions was limited by the amount of film that could be carried on board, and the images obtained were not available to users for days or weeks after they were taken since all film had to be expended and the film capsule recovered before it could be processed.



NRO engineers addressed these challenges. They were able to develop an electronic "eye" that was able to convert light waves into electrical signals that could be relayed to Earth in near-real time. This and other technologies necessary electro-optical satellite system developed by the NRO have found their way into commercial and individual uses, including commercial electro-optical imagery satellites.

The NRO's real-time imagery satellite program was a lengthy effort. It was costly and often the subject of intense budgetary debate. Fortunately, influential individuals like Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, a founder of the Hewlett-Packard Corporation and an electrical engineer, were able to understand the program's technical feasibility and value and lent it their full support.

The first electro-optical satellite reconnaissance system--the name of which is still classified--was deployed by the NRO in 1976. The electro-optical imagery satellite system was declared operational by President Jimmy Carter on his first day in office, January 20, 1977.

Those satellites, and their improved successors, have enabled the United States to base its national security strategy on facts rather than fear and on empirical evidence rather than speculation. As President Lyndon B. Johnson said, commenting in March 1967 on the value of the NRO's photo-reconnaissance satellites:
...we've spent thirty-five or forty billion dollars on the space program. And if nothing else had come out of it except the knowledge we've gained from space photography, it would be worth ten times what the whole program cost. Because tonight we know how many missiles the enemy has and, it turned out, our guesses were way off. We were doing things we didn't need to do. We were building things we didn't need to build. We were harboring fears we didn't need to harbor.

It was during this Cold War period of pioneering technological achievements in space reconnaissance that the NRO enjoyed the greatest levels of recognition and support for its programs at the highest levels of the U.S. Government. The technologies pioneered and developed by the NRO forty years ago were just as amazing in their day as the simulated technological capabilities portrayed in the cinema today.

Armed with intelligence provided by NRO, the United States was able to out last Soviet power and now is able to lead the world into a new century which hopefully will be less violent and destructive than the last.

[Dig]

Sapp To Assume Key NRO Position
http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=aerospacedaily&id=news/SAPP041609.xml
Apr 16, 2009


By Amy Butler


U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates has named Betty Sapp as the new principal deputy director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), according to defense and intelligence officials.

Sapp is currently the acquisition and resource director for the under secretary of defense for intelligence. She has held that position while Gates has pushed for more fielding of intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance resources to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

She has had this position during several recent policy clashes between the Defense Department and the intelligence community, including disputes over the direction of the now defunct Space Radar and an electro-optical satellite imaging program called Basic.

Among the issues on her plate at the NRO will be the acquisition strategy for a new electro-optical/infrared intelligence satellite program recently approved by President Barack Obama.

The program aims to field multiple EO/IR satellites to avoid a gap in U.S. overhead-imaging capabilities. It is widely thought the work will be sole-sourced to Lockheed Martin, though the NRO has not publicly announced an acquisition strategy.

Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair approved Sapp for the appointment, according to the officials. Sapp – whose new position would not require Senate confirmation – would succeed Ralph Haller, who left about three months ago. Sapp will take her new position as NRO Director Scott Large also plans to depart this month. No replacement for Large has been named.

[Dig]

Atlas V Poised for NRO Secret Mission
http://www.spaceref.com/news/viewnews.html?id=1253
Craig Covault/AviationWeek.com
Saturday, December 8, 2007


 The following story appears online at aviationnow.com.

A secret National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) spacecraft is poised for launch Dec. 10-11 from Cape Canaveral on board a U.S. Air Force Atlas V rocket.

Details emerging about the mission indicate that the Atlas V will launch a Boeing Satellite Data System (SDS) type relay satellite.

The flight is designated NROL-24. The payload will replace one launched into the same "Molniya" highly elliptical orbit on board a Lockheed Martin Titan IV in July 1996.

The SDS system relays imagery and other information from NRO intelligence spacecraft to processing facilities. The data may have initially been sent to an NRO ground station that is in communication with both the SDS relay and intelligence spacecraft. The technique enables "bent-pipe" real time forwarding of critical data.

The SDS spacecraft have been most often associated with relaying visible and infrared imagery from NRO/Lockheed Martin Advanced KH-11 type electro optical satellites. Liftoff from Launch Complex 41 is scheduled for Dec. 10 at 5:04 p.m. EST. If the flight slips the launch time will move 5 minutes for each day the flight is delayed

The mission may be visible to people along the U.S. East Coast as far north as New England. This is because the United Launch Alliance Atlas V will fly an unusual trajectory at dusk, closely paralleling the Eastern Seaboard.

The spacecraft will be placed in about a 500 x 25,000 mile orbit inclined 63 degrees. However, it may initially be placed in a lower orbit. This will mark the first SDS launched by an Atlas V.

The flight could be slipped depending upon launch timing for the space shuttle Atlantis. The NRO and Air Force have agreed to slip their launch if necessary to enable the NASA mission to launch as early as possible.

[Dig]

NRO Honors Once-Secret Pioneers Behind Spy Satellites
http://www.space.com/news/spacehistory/nro_second_side_000926.html
By Paul Hoversten
Washington Bureau Chief
posted: 07:00 am ET
26 September 2000



WASHINGTON -- Time has taken its toll on the 56 men credited with helping establish the discipline of national space reconnaissance 40 years ago.

Some have died, taking the story of their top-secret work to the grave. Others are too ill to travel. One asked the government not to identify him at all.



Former Secretary of Defense William Perry (right) pictured here with Army Gen. John Shalikashvili (left), chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, helped advise the NSA and CIA on how to use the NRO's data.

But the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) will honor all of them at a ceremony September 27 at NRO Headquarters in Chantilly, Virginia.

Forty-six men -- mostly from the military, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) or the aerospace industry -- will be cited as "pioneers" who made significant and lasting contributions to national reconnaissance. Ten others -- largely scientists -- will be acknowledged as "founders" who also aided in the effort.

Pioneers and their contributions:

James Baker, Harvard astronomer. Designed most of the lenses and many of the cameras used in aerial over flights of "denied territory," enabling the success of the U.S. peacetime strategic reconnaissance policy.

Lee Battle, Jr., Air Force colonel. Directed the government and contractor team that produced, launched and operated the world's first satellite recovery system.

John Bennett, TRW chief engineer. Conceived the spacecraft design, including reflectors, used in CIA signals-intelligence satellite systems.

John Browning, Air Force colonel (deceased). Directed a key Air Force signals-intelligence satellite project, managing its launch and operations.

Jon Bryson, Air Force colonel. Directed the development, acquisition and operation of an Air Force signals-intelligence satellite system that handled rapidly increasing data rates.

Roy Burks, CIA. Managed combined team of Air Force, CIA and contractors on the CORONA project.

Frank Buzard, Air Force colonel. Headed an Air Force imaging satellite program described as the most complex electromechanical device ever put in orbit.

Cornelius "Connie" Chambers, Lockheed. Contributed flight "protective measures" adopted for use on most NRO satellites.

John Copley, Air Force colonel. Guided development of Air Force signals-intelligence satellites from the earliest experiments to later constellations that provided broader coverage.

Robert Crotser, Lockheed. Wrote the handbook on cost and schedule management that remains a standard reference in spacecraft acquisition.

John Crowley, CIA (deceased). Established a true partnership between the CIA and Defense Department elements of the NRO.

James de Broekert, Advent Systems. Contributed key payload designs for several first-generation Air Force signals-intelligence satellites.

Gary Geyer, Air Force colonel. Improved signals-intelligence collection, data processing and distribution that allowed data to reach military and civilian users in near real-time.

Thomas Haig, Air Force colonel. Led team that developed operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite, its launch vehicle and ground stations.

Frederick Kaufman, TRW. Directed team that produced first communications cross-link systems in space.

Robert Kohler, CIA. Introduced photographic edge-measurement and edge-sharpening tools used to improve overhead imagery.

Ellis Lapin, Aerospace Corporation. Managed system design and engineering effort for Air Force imaging satellites that nearly doubled their functional time in orbit.

Lloyd Lauderdale, CIA (deceased). Managed CIA team that developed an advanced signals intelligence system.

Richard Leghorn, Itek Corporation. Pushed peacetime strategic reconnaissance and founded company that produced the lenses and cameras for the CORONA and other satellite systems.

Walter Levison, Itek Corporation (deceased). Designed the camera for CORONA and other satellite programs.

Howard Lorenzen, Naval Research Laboratory (deceased). Directed the development of GRAB, the nation's first signals-intelligence satellite.

Frank Madden, Itek Corporation. Directed the design, testing and production of the CORONA camera and its improved versions.

James Mannen, Air Force colonel. Introduced procedures that improved targeting of satellites and increased their photographic resolution.

Paul Mayhew, TRW. Managed two signals-intelligence satellite systems.

Reid Mayo, Naval Research Laboratory. Conceived and designed the first Navy signals-intelligence satellite, GRAB/DYNO, and later served as project engineer and technical director of Navy satellite reconnaissance program.

James Morgan, Navy (deceased). Developed targeting and data distribution guidelines for key Navy satellite reconnaissance programs.

Mark Morton, General Electric. Directed team that designed, built and tested reentry capsules used in the CORONA film-return satellite and other programs.

Alden Munson Jr., Aerospace Corporation and TRW. Conceived and built a fully automatic electronic intelligence system to support U.S. troops in the field.

Charles Murphy, Air Force colonel. Served as the first technical director of the CORONA Advanced Projects Integration Facility, the project's main link to the U.S. intelligence community.

Frederic "Fritz" Oder, Air Force colonel. Directed the nation's first reconnaissance satellite project, the Air Force WS-117L (later SAMOS) in the late 1950s.

Julius "Val" Peline, Lockheed. Served as test director and program manager for a key imagery-intelligence satellite program.

Robert Powell, Lockheed. Devised a novel orbital maneuver that greatly extended the lifetimes of satellites on orbit.

Edward Reese, General Electric. Led the development of the ground-data system that processed digital imagery from electro-optical imaging satellites.

Osmond "Ozzie" Ritland, Air Force major-general (deceased). Managed the U-2 spy plane program, which made overflights of the Soviet Union possible.

Lee Roberts, Air Force colonel (deceased). Directed improvements in a key Air Force satellite reconnaissance effort that produced high-resolution imagery of Earth's surface.

Charles Roth, CIA (deceased). Served as the CIA manager of a government-industry team that produced the first electro-optical-imaging reconnaissance satellite system.

Robert Roy, Air Force colonel. Directed NRO launch operations at Vandenberg Air Force Base.

Charles Spoelhof, Eastman Kodak. Worked on the design of the U-2, A-12 and SAMOS cameras and directed efforts that led to the use of thin-based Mylar film in NRO reconnaissance satellites.

Forrest Stieg, CIA. Devised a process for selecting an optimum orbit that balanced signals collection with satellite longevity.

Marvin Stone, TRW. Served as a payload systems engineer and project manager on CIA electronic intelligence satellite programs.

Don Tang, Lockheed. Established a "collection scale" for determining what signals could be technically collected at affordable costs.

Albert "Bud" Wheelon, CIA. Served as first director of the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology and was responsible for U-2 overflights and the development of four satellite reconnaissance systems.

Peter Wilhelm, Naval Research Laboratory. Invented new techniques and devices that improved the performance of signals-intelligence satellites.

Roy Worthington, Air Force colonel. Directed the integration and launch of some 200 satellites from the Western Test Range.

Robert Yundt, Air Force colonel. Directed an Air Force team that introduced a new, long-lived, multi-purpose signals-intelligence satellite.

Founders and their contributions:

William Baker, AT&T Bell Laboratories. Served as scientific counselor to the National Security Agency, CIA, Navy and NRO on overhead reconnaissance systems.

Merton Davies, RAND. Invented a rotating, panoramic camera and worked on designs for a family of film-based reconnaissance satellites that led to CORONA.

Sidney Drell, theoretical physicist and presidential advisor. Served as a key scientific consultant to the CIA's satellite reconnaissance program and was instrumental in securing congressional approval for several NRO special projects.

Richard Garwin, physicist and presidential advisor. Established standards and found solutions for electro-mechanical design of modern spacecraft.

Amrom Katz, RAND (deceased). Performed the first experimental simulation of electro-optical satellite imaging and co-directed projects that eventually led to CORONA.

James Killian, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (deceased). Served as MIT president and chaired the panel that recommended building the U-2 aircraft and reconnaissance satellites.

Edwin "Din" Land, Polaroid (deceased). Served as CEO of Polaroid, advised President Nixon on the capabilities of electro-optical imaging and advised NRO of new and existing overhead systems.

Frank Lehan, presidential advisor (deceased). Instrumental in the decision to proceed with an important high-altitude signals-intelligence satellite system and contributed to the reflector design for that system.

William Perry, former Secretary of Defense. Advised the National Security Agency and the CIA on programs to intercept and evaluate Soviet missile telemetry and communications intelligence.

Edward Purcell, Harvard Nobel Laureate (deceased). Developed methods to make reconnaissance satellites difficult, if not impossible to observe with radar.

[Dig]

Intel Lawmaker Urges NRO Fixes
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/07/22/intel-lawmaker-urges-nro-fixes/
 
By Colin Clark Wednesday, July 22nd, 2009 5:53 pm
Posted in Intelligence, Policy, Space

The builder of the nation’s highly classified spy satellites, the NRO, should be getting a makeover soon, and one of the top House intelligence lawmakers says it’s about time.

“We need a new charter, a new look at the NRO,” Rep. Mac Thornberry, ranking member House Intelligence’s technical and tactical intelligence, told me yesterday. A panel of senior intelligence gurus led by former Missile Defense Agency Director Trey Obering has put together recommendations about the new charter as well as other on other issues relating to the NRO. Thornberry called the panel’s work and the prospect of change at the NRO “an opportunity we shouldn’t miss.”

Thornberry’s subcommittee oversees the NRO, as well as the National Geospatial Intelligence Program and the NSA’s Consolidated Cryptologic Program, among other things. He said he had not been briefed on the panel’s findings yet.

A former government official familiar with the Obering panel’s work described the new charter as “a modernizing document” that does not make dramatic changes to either the NROs responsibilities or its relationships to other parts of the government. The source would not discuss many details, noting that people like Thornberry have not yet been briefed. However, “some relationships” between the NRO and other agencies have been redefined. And we appeared to get a hint when the former government official said to “keep in that mind” that the DNI was given new roles in “setting budgets and setting requirements” in the Intelligence Reform act of 2004.

By the way, the former government urged Thornberry to request a briefing. He said the congressman might well like what he hears.

[Dig]

Spy Agency May Face Ax
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/07/01/spy-agency-may-face-ax/
By Colin Clark Wednesday, July 1st, 2009 9:35 am
Posted in Intelligence, Policy, Rumors, Space

The Senate Intelligence Committee may try to break up the nation’s storied spy satellite agency — the NRO — once a paragon of American technological brilliance and now considered by many a troubled bureaucracy that has had trouble getting the big things right. In parallel, the Director of National Intelligence was briefed June 23 by a panel of distinguished experts about the best path ahead for the National Reconnaissance Office. The panel “considered options to break up NRO or reassign functions but recommended continuation of a single, unified program,” a former senior intelligence official said. The report about the Senate committee came from this same source, a respected insider.

Dennis Blair, director of National Intelligence, has drafted a panel of trusted intelligence experts to revamp the troubled National Reconnaissance Office, builder of America’s multi-billion dollar spy satellites.

The panel, led by Trey Obering, former director of the Missile Defense Agency, includes: Marty Faga, a member of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and a former NRO director; Joanne Isham, head of Washington operations for L-1 Identity Solutions and former deputy director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency; Paul Kaminski, former undersecretary of Defense for acquisition, technology and logistics who recently penned a study recommending acquisition changes for the NRO; Tom Moorman, a VP at Booz Allen who was named by Space News as one of the 10 most influential space leaders; and Vincent Vitto former president and CEO of the Draper Lab, a private research and development company and vice chairman of the Defense Science Board.

The panel examined every facet of the NRO — its mission, charter, staffing, requirements, organization, funding and relationship to other organizations. One of the key jobs the Obering panel had is drafting a new charter for the NRO. The current charter was drafted 44 years ago and refers to jobs that no longer exist.

The panel’s work “was very well received” by DNI Dennis Blair. In addition to its primary recommendation to essentially keep the NRO structure as is — an amalgam of CIA officials, Air Force officers and some civilians, the panel “made many suggestions on external relationships and internal moves that could make it more effective, the former intelligence official said.

When I asked if this meant a realignment of Air Force and CIA officials, or some changes in how the organization relates to the Defense Department and intelligence community, my source said he was “not sure that relationships will change.”

[Dig]

Oh snap!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

More info on the Feinstein shit!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!

FYI, ever wonder where the media gets private emails, phone call recordings, videos from wallmarts, streets?  It is the NRO which has become a smear agency among other things to target politicians/celebrities who dare F with their power.  Even though Feinstein/Harman/Pelosi are fricking succubus medusas, looks like some exposure of the insanity of the NRO (non elected, no oversight, not in the constitution) might finally be coming out.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Feinstein Slams New Spy Sats
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/06/09/feinstein-slams-exquisite-spy-sats/
By Colin Clark Tuesday, June 9th, 2009 12:20 pm
Posted in Intelligence, Policy, Space

UPDATED: Congressional Aide Says Huge Fight On Between Senate Intel Committee and IC, DoD Over EO System. It May Get Killed. IC Source Rebuts Feinstein.

The chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence expressed “extraordinarily serious concern” that the intelligence community and Pentagon may repeat the disaster of the Future Imagery Architecture system and made clear to Gates that there is bipartisan support on her committee for questioning the electro-optical system President Barack Obama recently approved.

“We have extraordinarily serious concerns involving the waste of many, many dollars over a period of years and are rather determined it not happen again,” said Sen. Diane Feinstein, who is also a member of the Senate Appropriation defense subcommittee. Feinstein said she and Sen. Kit Bond, a Republican who shares the same committee assignments, shares her concerns about the EO system.

“We also have information that the lesser tier can also be as capable and have a stealth capability,” Feinstein said.

An intelligence community source familiar with the technical issues at issue rejected Feinstein’s claims. “I think there are no real shortcuts to high performance although such claims are made. I really think you should point out that the ‘exquisite’ proposal is just the fifth updating of a system flown for 33 years,” the source said.

A congressional aide contacted after the hearing said there is a “huge philosophical difference raging” between members of the Sneate intel committee and the intelligence community. This aide said the Senate body is convinced that the lesser system could handle much of what needs doing and is concerned that “that the last few percent [in improvements] drive the large costs.”

Enormous quantities of cash are at stake in this debate since the best estimates I’ve heard for the exquisite system indicate it will suck up at least $10 billion over the next three to five years.

Feinstein said technical advisors to her committee had said the lower resolution system could do the job just as well as the exquisite system.

Gates said he had approved the exquisite system because it is “needed by the intelligence community.” But he also conceded that he approved the lower tier system “because there is some schedule and technical risk associated with the upper tier.”

Feinstein made clear she did not want to see a repeat of the FIA fiasco: “To make a mistake once or twice is alright, but to continue to make that mistake does not make sense.”

[Dig]

Likely Leader of Spy Sat Agency
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/05/27/likely-leader-of-spy-sat-agency/
By Colin Clark Wednesday, May 27th, 2009 7:55 pm
Posted in Intelligence, Rumors, Space

The presumptive next director of the National Reconnaissance Office, builder and operator of America’s spy satellites, is the recently retired commander of Air Force Materiel Command, Bruce Carlson.

His predecessor at the NRO, Scott Large, resigned one day after President Obama approved a major new electro-optical spy satellite system that will be built and operated by the spy satellite agency.

Carlson has limited experience in the space world, as his official biography makes clear. He did serve at Strategic Command as head of the Joint Functional Component Command for space and global strike from 2002 to 2005, but he is not a hard-core space enthusiast or a top technologist. In the past that would have made him an unlikely candidate to lead the tight-knit NRO. He retired from the Air Force on New Year’s Day.

The initial reaction to his selection from the intelligence community was positive. “Good pick, I believe. Limited experience in space or intel but a classy guy who I think will lead the place,” a former senior intelligence official wrote in an email.

“If he is selected for DNRO, Bruce Carlson certainly has the right background and experience to do a tremendous job,” said Keith Masback, president of the United States Geospatial Intelligence Foundation. “Carlson’s street cred with the warfighters, bona fide space operations time, as well as significant acquisition leadership experience, make him uniquely qualified to lead the ongoing resurgence of the NRO.”

A former senior Air Force official with intelligence experience noted that the Obama administration has “had a very hard time finding someone qualified that would take the job” and was surprised to hear Carlson surface as a DNRO candidate. This source said Carlson would bring one very important attribute to the NRO: “One characteristic of four-stars, all four stars but especially ones that had significant three-star jobs as Carlson did (J-8 and 8th AF), is that they like to be in charge, know how to be in charge, and expect to be in charge. The fact that Carlson is pretty new to details of space, and even NRO-like acquisition management, won’t keep him from being in charge. He’ll come up to speed fast, but won’t give away his authorities while that is happening.”

Change is clearly afoot at the NRO. Betty Sapp, until two weeks ago the deputy undersecretary for intelligence, acquisition, resources, and technology, is the NRO’s new principal deputy director. Sapp is reportedly part of a push by her former boss, Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence Jim Clapper, to restore milestone decision authority to the NRO. Under current law, the NRO’s acquisition authority is held jointly by the Defense Secretary and the Director of National Intelligence. And the NRO has been stripped of its authority at least three times in the last few years as concerns have grown about its ability to execute its critical mission of building the right stuff to gather information from space on our friends and enemies.

However, Masback said Sapp could prove crucial to the NRO, citing her “superb reputation for being detail-oriented, demanding, and a tireless worker,” as well as her strong ties to the Defense Department.

The former senior Air Force official agreed that Sapp would be valuable in her new role: “Betty will be a #2 – probably a very valuable one because she’s smart and knows where a decade-worth of skeletons are stored (not buried) and has good instincts, but definitely the #2.”

[Dig]

DNI Pushes Spy Sat Shakeup
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/05/14/dni-pushes-spy-sat-shakeup/
By Colin Clark Thursday, May 14th, 2009 8:35 pm
Posted in Intelligence, Policy, Space

Dennis Blair, director of National Intelligence, has drafted a panel of trusted intelligence experts to revamp the troubled National Reconnaissance Office, builder of America’s multi-billion dollar spy satellites.

The panel, led by Trey Obering, former director of the Missile Defense Agency, includes several people who also advised Blair on the electro-optical spy satellite program recently approved by President Obama.

The panel, some of whose members Blair met with Thursday, includes: Marty Faga, a member of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board and a former NRO director; Joanne Isham, head of Washington operations for L-1 Identity Solutions and former deputy director of the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency; Paul Kaminski, former undersecretary of Defense for acquisition, technology and logistics who recently penned a study recommending acquisition changes for the NRO; Tom Moorman,  a VP at Booz Allen who was named by Space News as one of the 10 most influential space leaders; and Vincent Vitto former president and CEO of the Draper Lab, a private research and development company and vice chairman of the Defense Science Board.

The panel will examine every facet of the NRO — its mission, charter,  staffing, requirements, organization, funding and relationship to other organizations. It should report its findings by mid-June, according to a former government official familiar with the effort.

One source who is following the panel’s work was highly skeptical of its work, reflecting widespread disillusionment in some intelligence circles with an organization that once was so secret its existence was classified.

“The panel is just another look at a terminally ill patient for whom last rites and pulling the plug is required,” said this source.

The former government official said the NRO’s death is not one of the options being considered by the Obering panel. Its members believe the organization still offers the country crucial capabilities no other entity could produce. However, the former official said that the NRO is being crippled by interference and conflicting demands from the many groups with which it interacts. Blair, this source said, understands the damage these conflicting needs and desires are causing the NRO.

A former senior intelligence official agreed that the NRO has far too many masters. “The DNRO [NRO director] now has a lot of bosses: JCS, USD(ATL), USD(I), ODNI, CIA (manning), AF (manning), and of course, four to six committees in Congress.  These groups are all taking active roles, pulling the NRO in different directions, and the DNRO doesn’t have the ability now to lead properly,” this official said.

One of the key jobs the Obering panel will have is drafting a new charter for the NRO. The current charter  was drafted 44 years ago,  noted the former government official, and refers to jobs that no longer exist.  A quick reading of the charter also reveals that many of the jobs once done by the NRO are now done by other agencies such as the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency, whose creation was driven by technology changes that the charter’s drafters could not have foreseen, such as digital mapping. The charter also endows the Secretary of Defense with final budget authority for the NRO, something that Defense Secretary Robert Gates himself overturned in a memo two years ago. That memo granted the DNI budget authority over any program funded with 51 percent or more of money from the National Intelligence Program.

In an exchange with Gates at Wednesday’s House Armed Services Committee budget hearing,  Rep. John Kline of Minnesota asked how the rewriting of the charter was faring.  Kline,  a Republican, is also a member of the House Select Permanent Committee on Intelligence.

“Director Blair and I are in full agreement on the need for a new charter for NRO.  The only thing holding it up is the appointment of a new director,” Gates said, putting his best intelligence community spin on things. The last director, Scott Large, resigned one day after Obama approved a massive new satellite system to be built by the NRO.

But the charter may be the last thing the Obering panel works on. The former government official said Blair was told by a panel member to hold off on writing the charter until the NRO’s new missions and authorities have been determined. “You write the charter after you decide what you want to do,” this source said.

Also, the chase for a new NRO director faces rough ground. Three sources told us that numerous candidates have been approached and have turned the job down.  The former intelligence official said the new charter may have to be written before they can get a new director, which might complicate Gates’ life. “I’m guessing that they are having a hard time getting a great leader to fill the position, and a clarifying charter might very well be a condition to get someone great,” the former intelligence official said.

[Dig]

Spy Satellite Agency Head Resigns
http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/04/08/spy-satellite-agency-head-resigns/
By Colin Clark Wednesday, April 8th, 2009 11:44 pm
Posted in Intelligence, Policy

UPDATED: Management Failures May Have Played Role in Spy Sat Director’s Resignation

In the wake of Tuesday’s decision by President Barack Obama to approve a huge new classified spy satellite system, the director of the organization that would have overseen and then run the new satellites has resigned.

The director of the secretive National Reconnaissance Office, Scott Large, issued an email message to staff on Wednesday announcing his resignation, which is effective April 18.

“Yesterday, the President approved a plan for the NRO to develop our next generation EO (electro-optical) systems. This gives the NRO an opportunity to continue our long tradition of excellence and deliver unparalleled capabilities to the nation as we do today …. Today, in consultation with the DNI, we have concluded that a change in leadership here at the NRO is appropriate,” Large wrote.

Large has been tarred with the brush of the disastrous program known as the Future Imagery Architecture by some observers and that appears to have played a role in the decision that he leave. Boeing ran the program, which several experts have said was so complex as to be humanly impossible to build and operate. Senior officials at the Director of National Intelligence and National Reconnaissance Office virtually cringe when FIA is mentioned.

A former intelligence official familiar with the NRO ascribed Large’s resignation to management failures that doomed his tenure, irrespective of the FIA fiasco. “I think the real difficulties for Scott were his utter inability to manage and lead the NRO. Some time ago he kicked off a major reorganization, which quickly became a chaotic disorganization from which the NRO has been trying to recover for many, many months,” this source said in an email. “He had also lost control of planning and programing, direction of which moved steadily into ODNI hands. Finally, he was unsuccessful in getting the IC space world to play nicely with the DoD folks, despite his cordial relations with [the head of Air Force Space Command, Air Force Gen. Robert] Kehler.

However, a former senior Pentagon official defended Large’s performance, noting that “it takes a village” to build and screw up a highly complex spy satellite program.

“It seems like Scott Large is a casualty of all the recent bickering over the way forward. Scott’s a good man, and a talented professional. He received an inordinate amount of the blame for FIA, and was given a short leash by [former NRO Director] Don Kerr. We will never really know how Scott would have run the NRO, nor how he would have completed its much-needed transformation. He wasn’t given a fair shot,” the former official said. A former intelligence official agreed with this, positing that Blair and Gates simply want new leadership under a new administration.

Large, the former Pentagon official noted, was not running the NRO when most of the major decisions about the program — aside from killing it before it wasted even more than the $10 billion estimated to have been blown on FIA — and bore no more responsibility for its failures than any other senior NRO official.

But Blair and Gates must have concluded that they just could not afford to leave someone associated with FIA, as well as with the failure of the failed satellite US 193, which was shot down by the US Navy last year lest it tumble down in the atmosphere. Senior OSD and intelligence officials have been highly critical of the NRO in the last 18 months, pointing to a long string of problems at what was once one of America’s great national assets.

Several names have been floated for the new NRO director since the November elections but my intel on this is not fresh. I’ll update as soon as possible

[Dig]

AJ should have this guy on the show to explain why he did not like the electo-optical satellite that just got approval.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Scott F. Large
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Scott_F._Large
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
 

Scott F. Large became the second Principal Deputy Director of the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) and Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force (Intelligence Space Technology) on April 2, 2007. Prior to these appointments, he was the Director, Source Operations and Management Directorate at the National Geospatial Intelligence Agency (NGA).

Mr. Large joined the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1986 as a Project Management Engineer in the Office of Development and Engineering developing advanced spacecraft payloads at the NRO. He held various senior development and systems engineering positions within the NRO's Imagery Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate through 1996. Also during this time, he served one year as the Executive Assistant to the Director of the NRO. In 1997, he became Deputy Director of the Future Imagery Architecture Program.

A year later, Mr. Large was appointed the Deputy Chief for Programs within the CIA Directorate of Operations' Technical Management Office. In this position, he helped administer a joint national program while assisting in the development of the program's strategic plan and program management process. In 2000, he was selected as Director of the Clandestine Signals Intelligence Operations Group in the Office of Technical Collection within the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology. While there, he led the development and execution of critical collection operations for the Intelligence Community. In September 2000, he became the Deputy Director of the Office of Technical Collection.

Beginning in August 2001, Mr. Large served as the CIA's Associate Deputy Director for Science and Technology. Following that assignment, he moved back to the NRO to serve as the Director, Imagery Systems Acquisition and Operations Directorate, from July 2003 to November 2006.

Mr. Large received a Bachelor of Science degree in Engineering in 1979 from the University of Central Florida, majoring in electro-optics and semiconductor devices. Before joining the government, he spent seven years in industry, during which time he received three patents in fiber optics technology.

His awards include the NRO Meritorious Service Medal, the NRO Superior Service Medal, the CIA Intelligence Commendation Medal, the CIA Director's Award, and the NGA Medallion for Excellence.

[Dig]

He was one of only 2 head directors ever, WTF? Something must have seriously pissed him off.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2009_cr/large.html
[Congressional Record: June 26, 2009 (Extensions)]
[Page E1611]
                       

 
                  IN RECOGNITION OF MR. SCOTT F. LARGE

                                 ______
                                 

                          HON. SILVESTRE REYES

                                of texas

                    in the house of representatives

                         Friday, June 26, 2009

  Mr. REYES. Madam Speaker, I rise today to pay tribute to a man of
great integrity, intelligence and insight, Mr. Scott F. Large, on the
occasion of his retirement after 23 years of distinguished service to
the Intelligence Community.
  I have had the pleasure of working with Mr. Large throughout his
tenure as the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office. When he
assumed this role in 2007, the organization was undertaking significant
transformation that he helped initiate in earlier leadership roles. He
carefully guided changes to strengthen his organization's role as the
nation's primary source of space reconnaissance for military and
intelligence forces.
  Mr. Large's prior assignments prepared him well for this leadership
role. He served as the Principal Deputy Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office from April, 2007 until his appointment as
Director later that year. He also served as Director of the Imagery
Systems Operations and Acquisition Directorate from 2003 to 2006,
during a period of significant technological and programmatic
challenges.
  Mr. Large has carried out leadership assignments in two other
intelligence community organizations. He was Director of the Source
Operations and Management Directorate at the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency. He also served in the Central Intelligence
Agency's Directorate of Operations and as Associate Director of the
Science and Technology directorate, leading technology development
programs. Mr. Large made fundamental contributions to these programs
and helped establish them as some of the nation's premier intelligence
efforts.
  Mr. Large's determination to lead fundamental changes in his
organization, his willingness to assume leadership roles in other
intelligence organizations, and his ability to facilitate collaborative
partnerships with other elements of the Intelligence Community are
testament to the quality of his leadership.
  In announcing that he was stepping down as Director of the National
Reconnaissance Office, Mr. Large reminded his workforce of the critical
role of space reconnaissance to the nation: For nearly 50 years the NRO
has provided this nation with an undeniable intelligence and
operational advantage. Today the NRO continues to provide mission
critical information to all of our end users. We are clearly on the
verge of taking our mission to the next level and have set in motion
strategic initiatives which will clearly demonstrate the importance of
what you do.
  The nation's space reconnaissance workforce and systems are better
positioned to contribute to the nation's defenses as a result of the
leadership of this public servant. For this, we thank Mr. Large and
wish him continued success in all of his future endeavors.

                          ____________________

[Dig]

Spy satellite agency boss resigns
http://uk.reuters.com/article/idUKTRE5385AP20090409
Thu Apr 9, 2009 8:58pm BST

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The head of the U.S. spy satellite agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, has announced his resignation, a spokesman said on Thursday.

Scott Large sent a memo to NRO employees on Wednesday announcing his decision, which will be effective on April 18, NRO spokesman Rick Oborn said.

His announcement came just a day after the U.S. government said it would buy expensive new spy satellites and order more imagery from two commercial providers in a plan which analysts estimate will cost around $10 billion.

Oborn said Large had given no specific reason for his departure, saying he had made a personal decision.

His resignation was first reported by the website dodbuzz.com, which reports on the Department of Defense.

The Obama administration approved the new spy satellite plan despite strong criticism from Congress.

The program will replace one that was initially awarded to Boeing Co, but was partially canceled three years ago when its costs soared billions of dollars over budget.

Sen. Christopher Bond, the top Republican on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, told Dennis Blair, the director of national intelligence, in a letter dated March 16, that the new plan had "zero" chance of delivering satellites on schedule and would cost too much.

A former government official, who spoke anonymously given the classified nature of the program, said the contract would likely go to Lockheed Martin Corp, particularly given concerns about Boeing's work on the earlier program.

[gEEk squad]

Who's above the President on this organizational chart???
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB35/index.html

[Dig]

Who's above the President on this organizational chart???
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB35/index.html

N R O !!!

This is probably one of the most important positions of power that we know about and what we know is almost nothing.

[lavosslayer]

I don't think its NRO, the NRO is already listed there in the middle of the line below the POTUS.

[Dig]

I don't think its NRO, the NRO is already listed there in the middle of the line below the POTUS.

Oh yeah, who is the head cheese?

Federal Reserve?

[N.E.P.]

Speaking of black money, here is a Frontline doc about it.

part 1-7
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ljWQ5twqxko&feature=channel_page

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=50hM8QlLUVw&feature=channel_page

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vyp-0VVMhyQ&feature=channel_page

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lsivw2zbOgc&feature=channel_page

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QJ35oYrJMS8&feature=channel_page

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WiubZzQtZPc&feature=channel_page

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zieSsvQyYAI&feature=channel_page

[lavosslayer]

Oh yeah, who is the head cheese?

Federal Reserve?

The Fed/CFR and Bilderberg Group (which really almost seems like the secret version of the UN) I'm guessing since there are two positions above the POTUS that are on equal ground

[Satyagraha]

The Fed/CFR and Bilderberg Group (which really almost seems like the secret version of the UN) I'm guessing since there are two positions above the POTUS that are on equal ground

Rockefeller/Rothschild/Queen Liz... who else at the top?
                            |
                            |
                            |
      ____________________________________________________________________
     Bilderberg/CFR      IMF/World Bank   Big Oil         Big Pharma  DefenseContractors
         |                               |                 |                    |                     |
         |                               |                 |                   |
       Obama                    Bernanke   Bush Sr./carlysle?                       Cheney etal?


One thing is clear; Obama is not in charge here.

[lavosslayer]

Rockefeller/Rothschild/Queen Liz... who else at the top?
                            |
                            |
                            |
      ____________________________________________________________________
     Bilderberg/CFR      IMF/World Bank   Big Oil         Big Pharma  DefenseContractors
         |                               |                 |                    |                     |
         |                               |                 |                   |
       Obama                    Bernanke   Bush Sr./carlysle?                       Cheney etal?


One thing is clear; Obama is not in charge here.

Nice chart...makes sense...perhaps Al Gore is the talking head of Pharma?

(the following is just in jest because I wanted to laugh at something ridiculous that wasn't in the main stream media)

 Maybe Michael Jackson really isn't dead and is the grand master behind it all! I mean who writes a song called "we are the world" with a blatant NWO message and gets everyone to sing it like a church hymn on a Sunday morning then someone that has a grand vision to bring all together as one and dominate it? I wouldn't even be surprised if the song had subliminal harmonic tones in it that make people obey some twisted MKULTRA-inspired command! I mean maybe he bleached himself white so that he could fit into the NWO at the top with the rest of the WASPs?

[Satyagraha]

LOL... lavo - we should add another position at the Obama level:

Ministry of Propaganda
CNN, NBC, Microsoft, Michael Jackson, Viacom, NewsCorp, etc.

[N.E.P.]

Nice chart...makes sense...perhaps Al Gore is the talking head of Pharma?

(the following is just in jest because I wanted to laugh at something ridiculous that wasn't in the main stream media)

 Maybe Michael Jackson really isn't dead and is the grand master behind it all! I mean who writes a song called "we are the world" with a blatant NWO message and gets everyone to sing it like a church hymn on a Sunday morning then someone that has a grand vision to bring all together as one and dominate it? I wouldn't even be surprised if the song had subliminal harmonic tones in it that make people obey some twisted MKULTRA-inspired command! I mean maybe he bleached himself white so that he could fit into the NWO at the top with the rest of the WASPs?

oh man, I'am having flash backs from when I was in kindergarden. We all had to sing that dreadful song for a recital. My mom used to play "We are the World" on full volume while belting out the lyrics.
"There's a Choice we're making....We're saving our own lives.......It's true we can make a better day...Just you and meeeeeeeee"  

[Anti_Illuminati]

He was one of only 2 head directors ever, WTF? Something must have seriously pissed him off.

Yeah wtf, this sounds really effed up.  You don't "just leave" because "you aren't hardcore" (because you would normally learn to adapt to your new role and get brought up to speed, etc.  Thnk of everything this way:  "He was "good enough" under the past administrations, but not under Obama? (aka the most hardcore direct NWO control, making themselves fully visible to all--this trend has extended out in other areas as well, such as Beckstrom.) The translation of it was: "We need someone who will use this new off the charts surveillance against the American People, and if you aren't hardcore enough of a traitor, then I "suggest" you resign."  Maybe he was death threatened?

[Dig]

Yeah wtf, this sounds really effed up.  You don't "just leave" because "you aren't hardcore" (because you would normally learn to adapt to your new role and get brought up to speed, etc.  Thnk of everything this way:  "He was "good enough" under the past administrations, but not under Obama? (aka the most hardcore direct NWO control, making themselves fully visible to all--this trend has extended out in other areas as well, such as Beckstrom.) The translation of it was: "We need someone who will use this new off the charts surveillance against the American People, and if you aren't hardcore enough of a traitor, then I "suggest" you resign."  Maybe he was death threatened?

it has to do with the  Electro-Optical Sat, any research on WTF this thing's capability is?

[GhostofTsenzei]

it has to do with the  Electro-Optical Sat, any research on WTF this thing's capability is?

Not sure about the sattelite or full capabilities, and it may be more than just "Electro-Optical" but here's wikipedia's entry on what "Electro-Optics" is: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electro-optics

"Electro-optics is a branch of technology involving components, devices and systems which operate by modification of the optical properties of a material by an electric field. Thus it concerns the interaction between the electromagnetic (optical) and the electrical (electronic) states of materials."

Note on Devices from the same page:

"The electro-optic effect relates to a change in the optical properties of the medium which usually is a change in the birefringence and not simply the refractive index. In a Kerr cell, the change in birefringence is proportional to the square of the electric field, and the material is usually a liquid. In a Pockels cell, the change in birefringence varies linearly with the electric field, and the material is a crystal."

[lavosslayer]

I"ve used and seen EO imagery while on active duty...however I don't know what this new satillite is supposed to offer since it really is nothing special.

[GhostofTsenzei]

Another wiki article covering Electro-optic modulation: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Electro-optic_modulator

This article primarily deals with the specific (common) devices, including phase and amplitude modulation.  Primarily of laser light.  It also covers the creation of "Sidebands" via modulation: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sideband

An idea of potential capabilities:

A company called Electro-Optical Sciences is a medical development company working on a project to get a device called "MelaFind", which uses multi-spectrum digital images to attempt to identify whether a mole is benign or a malignant cancer without any invasive surgery.  Of course, that devices is very localized, and still in development, but it purports to be able to take images from blue to near infrared spectrums.  I imagine however that the spectrums available to be gathered are only limited by the sophistication of the modulation and imaging technology.

I"ve used and seen EO imagery while on active duty...however I don't know what this new satillite is supposed to offer since it really is nothing special.

Generally speaking, multi-spectrum imagery with EO isn't something I could see someone resigning over on its face.  I'd guess that there's more to it than articles report.

[Dig]

I"ve used and seen EO imagery while on active duty...however I don't know what this new satillite is supposed to offer since it really is nothing special.

well it got one of only 2 directors of the NRO to cut and run.  who knows WTF is really in that damn satellite.

also, remember the shoot down of the nuclear powered satellite, that was all NRO too.  What the F are they doing up there. China is concerned too:

http://www.thenewamerican.com/index.php/world-mainmenu-26/asia-mainmenu-33/1643

China Warns Against an Arms Race in Space
Written by James Heiser    
Wednesday, 12 August 2009 12:30          



Building on a February 2008 proposal by the governments of China and Russia, the communist regime in the People’s Republic of China is now pushing for a ban on weapons in space.

According to an Associated Press story, Yang Jiechi, the Chinese foreign minister, addressed the topic today at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. AP quotes Yang as follows, "Outer space is now facing the looming danger of weaponization. Credible and effective multilateral measures must be taken to forestall the weaponization and arms race in outer space."

Given the fact that China and the United States have already successfully tested weapons capable of destroying satellites, the topic of an arms race in outer space is far from hypothetical. Yang’s comments will almost certainly be welcome news to the Obama administration, which is on record as supporting such a ban. According to a January 25 Reuters story, “Moments after Obama's inauguration last week, the White House website was updated to include policy statements on a range of issues, including a pledge to restore U.S. leadership on space issues and seek a worldwide ban on weapons that interfere with military and commercial satellites. It also promised to look at threats to U.S. satellites, contingency plans to keep information flowing from them, and what steps are needed to protect spacecraft against attack.”

However, unnamed sources within the administration hint that Obama may pursue a course that amounts to little more than unilateral disarmament in space. According to the Reuters story: “A defense official, who also asked not to be named, said the Obama administration had not yet held briefings for top officials working on military space issues, but it was clear that the focus would shift toward more diplomatic initiatives. Work on classified projects involving an ‘active’ military response to attacks against U.S. satellites might be halted in favor of more monitoring and passive protection measures, he said.”

Another unnamed defense official told Reuters, “The new administration would work through the complex military space issues during a defense review to be completed by September, and as part of a space report due in December.” The defense review would certainly explain the timing of Yang’s remarks, as they lend support to those favoring Obama’s desired ban on weapons in space.

Consulting Yang’s full August 12 remarks reveals several additional interesting points. First, the two paragraphs devoted to the topic of weapons in space come at the end of a six-page address that is primarily devoted to issues of nuclear arms control. Yang insisted, “China opposes the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery.... China calls for peacefully resolving the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula and Iranian nuclear issue through dialogue and negotiation, and has made unremitting efforts toward this goal” — but China’s actions tell a very different story. China’s “record” on nuclear proliferation and disarmament provide an enlightening context for evaluating Yang’s call for disarmament in space.

Second, Yang called on the Conference on Disarmament to “soon start substantive discussions on the draft [the draft Treaty on the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space] so as to contribute to improving the legal system concerning outer space and maintaining its security.” Among other provisions of the draft treaty, it may be noted in Article XI that the treaty would be of “unlimited duration” — an utterly unworkable provision in any treaty concerning future developments in outer space. Furthermore, given the United Nations' checkered record regarding the inspection and monitoring of Earth-based WMDs, it defies belief that any meaningful enforcement of the treaty could be carried out with regard to totalitarian regimes, since under Article VI any “transparency and confidence-building” measures would be strictly voluntary, and any space-based weapons (whether directed toward Earth, satellites, or space stations) would fall outside areas accessible to UN inspectors.

The timing of Yang’s remarks and the defense review should give a signal to watch for further developments in the coming weeks. In the midst of the media attention devoted to economic issues and healthcare reform proposals, there are grounds for being concerned that the United States may concede important strategic “high ground” without a shot having been fired or may become a party to an essentially unenforceable treaty which allows potential enemies to prepare for war far beyond the reach of any inspector.

[JTCoyoté]

 If my suspicions are correct, these satellites would be the bars of the prison planet... this technology at an extreme distance is a system that can read or activate RFID unit's. This is more control grid stuff, and you must remember this RFID technology has become a nanotechnology with chips smaller than the period at the end of of this sentence. In any case this technology is reader/activator technology...

Let's say you were injected with hundreds of thousands of little nano chips, ask yourself, what could these things be commended to do given a specific signal... or how far away could they be read using a specific device...

What a marvelous use for supposed NASA dollars...

--Oldyoti

"What we meant, in going for those redcoats was this --
we had always governed ourselves, and always meant to...
they, didn't mean we should."
~ An old New England militia
captain, after the battles of
Lexington and Concord
 April 19, 1775

[Dig]

August 10, 2009
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=111742106&ps=cprs
As head of the U.S. Strategic Command, Gen. Kevin Chilton oversees nuclear, space and cyberspace defense systems. Gen. Chilton and NPR Pentagon correspondent Tom Bowman identify sources of possible attacks, and how the U.S. is working to defend itself.

Copyright © 2009 National Public Radio®. For personal, noncommercial use only. See Terms of Use. For other uses, prior permission required.

LYNN NEARY, host:

This is TALK OF THE NATION. Neal Conan is away. I'm Lynn Neary, in Washington.

As Americans celebrated July 4th this year, a coordinated cyber attack hit U.S. government and commercial Web sites, including the White House, the Department of Homeland Security, the State Department and the New York Stock Exchange - just one example of our vulnerability in cyberspace. And when it comes to the possibility of nuclear attack, there is constant concern about the nuclear capabilities of countries like China, Russia and now North Korea and Iran, among others, not to mention terrorist groups like al-Qaida.

And then there's space. Could our satellite systems in space be attacked? All this is the responsibility of General Kevin Chilton. As head of the United States Strategic Command, General Chilton oversees our nuclear space and cyberspace defense system. General Chilton joins us in a moment.

Later in this hour: them versus us. Should government be more or less involved in our lives?

But first: What are your concerns about national security and cyber security, specifically? If you want to talk with the head of U.S. Strategic Command, our number here in Washington is 800-989-8255. Our email address is talk@npr.org. Or join the conversation at our Web site. Go to npr.org and click on TALK OF THE NATION. General Kevin Chilton joins us here in Studio 3A. Welcome to TALK OF THE NATION.

General KEVIN CHILTON (Commander, United States Strategic Command): Thank you, Lynn. It's a pleasure to be with you.

NEARY: And also with us is NPR Pentagon correspondent Tom Bowman. Good to have you with us, Tom.

TOM BOWMAN: Good to be with you, Lynn.

NEARY: So, General Chilton, as I mentioned, we recently had a vivid example of how our computer systems can be hacked. It didn't do a huge amount of harm this time around, but what about the future? Just how vulnerable are we to a paralyzing cyber attack?

Gen. CHILTON: Well, Lynn, I think - first, we have to take a look at how dependent we are on cyberspace to kind of scope how much we need to pay attention to our vulnerabilities. And I think what we found, particularly in the military, we have particularly dependent on cyberspace for the way we do operations in land, air, sea and space. And so we recognize that dependence, and I would venture to say, personally, I've become dependent on cyberspace in just my daily life, as well as companies, etc., in the United States. So recognizing that dependence, we can anticipate that potential adversaries in the future would look to find vulnerabilities there. And in recognizing that, also, we need to take the appropriate actions, I think, to address those vulnerabilities.

NEARY: What do you define as a cyber attack, first of all? And…

Gen. CHILTON: Yeah. That's a good question. Today, what we're seeing a lot of, as far as intrusions into our military networks, I would not go as far as to say they're attacks, but exploitation or espionage, taking of information today. But what we want to be prepared for is what we saw on July 4th and happened in Estonia and what happened in Georgia, where you saw coordinated cyber attacks that were aimed at the computer infrastructure of those countries or those operations and tried to take away their ability to use their computer networks to conduct operations. That would be more along the lines of an attack, and one that we in the military think about and want to be prepared to counter should that ever happen.

NEARY: Tom Bowman, I want to bring you in the conversation.

BOWMAN: Yeah, General, I wanted to ask you specifically about China. Now, here are a couple of headlines we have here. Wall Street Journal earlier this year: "Wide Cyber Attack is Linked to China." Another from Scientific American two years ago: "China's Cyber Attacks Signal New Battlefield is Online." How much of a threat is there from China?

Gen. CHILTON: Well, Tom, our threats actually span the spectrum from the - what I call the bored teenage hacker, who was really more of a threat back in the late 1990s than they are today - to the criminal element, which is not trivial either, particularly to our society, to the organized nation-state, who may be looking at opportunities either to steal information, as we see happening today, or to the point we just talked about, where they can perhaps conduct an attack in some future conflict.

Attribution is a difficult thing to do in this domain, but it's not impossible. And it's an area that we work hard at and need to continue to work hard at for two reasons: One, if you want to deter that activity in cyberspace, you must convince potential adversaries that you know who did it - or you will know who did it if something bad happens in the future. And that gets to attribution. And secondly, if something does actually happen, you can bet the president's going to turn and say, well, who caused this? So that he can make the appropriate decisions to take actions in the other direction.

So, much more difficult than, say, an airplane that might attack the United States in the cyber domain, but a problem that we have to work.

BOWMAN: But what about China? Clearly, they're putting a great emphasis on this area of cyber warfare. What can you tell us about that, and how worried should Americans be?

Gen. CHILTON: Well, all nations are putting a lot of effort into this…

BOWMAN: Particularly China, by the way.

Gen. CHILTON: China his put a lot of effort into cyber. They've written about openly in their documents, in their military open documents, about how they believe future conflicts will involve conflict in both cyberspace and space. They've written about that, as well. So, you know, if they're writing about it now, they're thinking about and they're certainly making the investments in those areas. So, you know, we're forewarned, and it's - this is an area we need to increase our emphasis on.

BOWMAN: And in any of these attacks you've seen on Pentagon systems, have you seen the hand of the Chinese government?

Gen. CHILTON: Well, Tom, I don't want to go into the attribution piece specifically, here. Let me just leave it at that. It is not as simple as other domains, but it's not impossible. And what I worry about is not any specific country, per se, as I do, writ large, the broad - any attempt to intrude in our networks and take information today or prepare to deny us the abilities to use those networks in time of conflict.

NEARY: When does a cyber attack rise to the level that it requires a very serious response, and what would that response be?

Gen. CHILTON: Lynn, I think that's a key question that is unanswered at this point, and will be one that will have to be answered by our senior leadership -the president and secretary of defense - in time of crises. And there will be the attribution piece. How confident are you that you can attribute the attack? And then we'll have to weigh the effect of the attack. Was it just an attack that affected computer networks? What were the - what are the second and third order effects of that attack? Did it take down your emergency response systems in a city? Did that attack affect power systems that maybe support hospitals, and lives are lost as a result? And so there's a lot of questions that you would ask afterwards to determine what the appropriate response would be for a cyber attack.

NEARY: What's being done to - what's being worked on now to ensure that you will know who to attribute an attack to? How do you - are there systems in place now to determine that? And how is that being worked on?

Gen. CHILTON: Well, I can't go into specifics on what we do to try to solve that problem, but we do pay a lot of attention to the attribution element because we know it will be one of the first things asked of us by the president. Who did this?

NEARY: Yeah. What about the financial systems? I think that's something that a lot of people are worried about, that people could hack into the financial system, bring down the economy in this country and perhaps around the world. What's your role in defending our financial system from those kinds of attacks?

Gen. CHILTON: Great question. There is actually a division of roles between what the Department of Defense does and what I do as - my command does in U.S. Strategic Command, and what the Department of Homeland Security does. At STRATCOM, my command, we are chartered to operate and defend the military networks. So, in computer parlance, that would be the www.mil, not the www.com or .net, or even .gov that maybe the State Department uses or Capitol Hill. Those portions of the networks of the United States, that defense of those has been given to the Department of Homeland Security. Now, we support them, and they support us. We share information if they see an attack in the .gov or in some other networks. They share those attack vectors with us. And when we see attacks on the military networks, we share with we see with them so that we can, you know, improve our defenses. But right now in Strategic Command and the Department of Defense, we're focused on the military networks.

NEARY: Tom?

BOWMAN: And increasingly so. This is from a speech you made back in February: In a cyberspace domain, here are some obvious things. We are under attack. We are behind. We are reactive. We are not proactive. How do you become proactive here?

Gen. CHILTON: Well, there's three things that we're trying to change in the military - under STRATCOM leadership writ large. In all our services and the way we think about cyberspace, we're trying to change the culture, the conduct and our capabilities.

Culture, of course, is probably one of the more difficult ones. You can't just fix that with investment, but we've grown up with a culture, and I think it's probably true in our personal lives, that cyberspace and our computers are just a convenience. They make life easier.

What the switch we have to make in the military is the realization that we're dependent on cyberspace for military operations on air, land and sea and in space, and we cannot effectively conduct out operations in those areas without the cyberspace domain and our military networks.

So they're not just a convenience, they're a necessity, and that means when you have a problem there, the commander in charge of forces ought to be, whether he's in charge of air, land or sea forces, ought to be very worried about his networks and paying attention to their health, are they defended properly, etcetera.

In the conduct area, we need to do a better job of training people to point out that anybody in the military who's using a computer plugged into a military network is the same as a gate guard standing in front of a base, protecting the gate. And if they don't do their job correctly, they can allow someone to intrude on those networks and steal information or interrupt operations.

So training is part of the conduct change, and then we have to hold people accountable. We haven't done a very good job of that, in my view, for people who don't follow the rules, because we haven't seen it as being that big a deal. It is a big deal, and we know it will be in the future.

And then in a capability area, that's investment in the technologies to make sure our military men and women have the same kind of technologies available that you can invest in to defend and protect your home computer, to include automatic connections to your Internet service provider that can push antivirus software to you as soon as it's made available electronically, so you don't have to go, as we often do in the military, machine to machine with a disk and upgrade the defenses on the computer.

So we need those capability and technology investments, as well.

NEARY: Do you know how many times a day there are attempted - attempts to hack into the Pentagon?

Gen. CHILTON: Well, into the military networks writ large, there's thousands. And it's hard to say are they attempts to hack, or are they just a curiosity, someone going to that site just to see what they can find, or is it malicious attacks? It's hard to parse those until they succeed, but there's thousands attempts a day for unauthorized entry into the military networks.

NEARY: How many times are they successful in a day?

Gen. CHILTON: Well, our job is to make them unsuccessful, and often times it's difficult to prove the negative, but we have had cases where we know we have been intruded on, and that's getting back to Tom's point. We have lost information, and that's important information - not classified, but important to operations.

NEARY: We're talking with General Kevin Chilton. He's the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command, and we'll be taking your calls and emails when we return.

Joining me today is Tom Bowman, NPR Pentagon correspondent. Give us call at 800-989-8255. I'm Lynn Neary, it's TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.

(Soundbite of music)

NEARY: This is TALK OF THE NATION. I'm Lynn Neary in Washington. We're talking with General Kevin Chilton, head of U.S. Strategic Command. He oversees our nuclear, space and cyberspace defense systems, among other missions.

If you want to talk with him, give us a call. What are your concerns about national security and nuclear weapons or about how we defend ourselves in space and about how this affects you? 800-989-8255, or send us an email. The address is talk@npr.org.

And also joining me today, NPR Pentagon correspondent Tom Bowman, and we're going to turn to the phones now. Let's take a call from a guest in Folsom, California. Hi, go ahead.

Unidentified Man (Caller): Hi, actually, as I'm listening, I have another question now. The first question I was interested in is that okay, so if cyberspace goes down, me as a citizen, can I bypass it so I could carry on my day-to-day life? What are some of your advice?

And then the other question that I thought of, is that, can you guys create a mil-space, where it is only for military use?

NEARY: General?

Gen. CHILTON: Yes. Well, when we talk - and cyberspace was a broad term to basically define the domain that includes the wires and the computers and the servers and the routers, etcetera. To the caller's first question, he's probably, as I am at home, using the Internet and using the www.com or .edu or .net to business, maybe with your bank, etcetera, or whatever. And so it would be difficult, I think, to take down the broader Internet, but it may be possible to take down a particular site or service that you're interested in using.

And so here's where, in the Department of Homeland Security, where they need to think about and worry about defending critical infrastructure in the United States of America, our financial systems, our power grids, our transportations, telecommunications systems that are essential to all of our citizens day in and day out.

To the military point, we do have these portions of the cyberspace that we operate in, and the dot-mil, that are both unclassified, that is plugged into the Internet, and we have also classified networks that are more isolated from the Internet. And so we do do our military operations there. And the logic to having a military organization operate and defend those is we know, in time of conflict, that we must have those networks available for everybody else to do their operations in the military.

NEARY: Okay, thanks so much for your call. We're going to go to Mark(ph). Mark is calling from Cambridge, Massachusetts. Hi, Mark, go ahead.

MARK (Caller): Hi. General Chilton touched on this a bit, but it seems that the federal government's cyber-security efforts are very fragmented, in that you've got General Chilton at Strategic Command, you've got Homeland Security, Department of Energy, and even within the Department of Energy, when you start looking at electricity-grid security, you've got DOE and FERC and NERC and all these different people talking about it.

Now, something like the energy grid is clearly a military, as well as a civilian, interest. And I'm wondering first of all, until there's a security czar appointed, and I guess the administration has talked about appointing someone like that, how do you integrate all these efforts, and once a security czar, cyber-security czar is appointed, will General Chilton be reporting to that person, or will there be some kind of a coordinated effort, or will it always between Homeland Security, military, DOE and other groups.

Gen. CHILTON: Mark asked a very good question. The first effort to try to do, I think, from a national perspective and get our arms around this and put some serious funding and organizational construct to this was the National Cyber Security Initiative, which was pushed forward in the last year of President Bush's administration and was carried forward in the current administration.

President Obama just had a - one of his first acts was to have a group get together and take a look at how to go forward, and one of the things they are considering is whether or not to have a cyber czar, and you describe.

And so it will be interesting to see how that works out in the future. Again, Department of Homeland Security has had the rose pinned on them for the broader issues with regard to the nation and to Department of Defense for the military networks.

MARK: And who's in charge of the electricity grid? Because I know the Department of Energy seems to be within their purview, but that would also seem to be a Homeland Security issue.

Gen. CHILTON: It is, but here - you know, here's an interesting point. Who's in charge of the energy grid? A lot of the energy in our country is provided by private companies, and so here's where, you know, you start getting into some issues of maybe why you don't want the Department of Defense doing that type of work directly. But for sure, at the end of the day, regardless of how we organize, and this gets back to your question of who should be doing what. At a minimum, we need to be - we need to have robust information-sharing constructs put in place.

MARK: Presumably, that's what a cyber-security czar would do, I guess.

Gen. CHILTON: I'm not sure exactly what their responsibilities would be, particularly, but I know in the military, what we want to be able to do is share information about - particularly about threats that are coming against any part of the society, because we can anticipate them being brought to bear against us, as well, in the military.

NEARY: All right, thanks so much for your call, Mark.

MARK (Caller): Thank you.

NEARY: Let me read you an email, General, from Brian(ph), also calling from Massachusetts, in Hopkinton. General, could you talk about your international counterparts? Which countries have appointed counterparts to your role in their governments, and which countries are you hopeful will do so in the near future? And do you have enough cooperation with key nations to adequately deal with international threats?

Gen. CHILTON: There are - cyberspace and threats in cyberspace are being taken seriously by all governments around the world. I mean, Estonia, obviously, was attacked, and I've had the opportunity to meet with their minister of defense, as he came over and educated us on exactly what happened and how they dealt with that attack. But many of our key allies and friends as well, beyond Estonia, are also paying close attention to this area. And I think this is an area we can improve our military-to-military dialogue. We already do have dialogues at certain levels with - and I've had dialogues with Australia, had dialogues with the United Kingdom, with France on the cyber-issues, but it's one that we're going to want to again share information with our friends and allies because we don't have the corner on all the knowledge here.

NEARY: All right, let's take another call. We're going to go to Vernon(ph), calling from Oakland, California. Thanks. Hi, Vernon.

VERNON (Caller): Hi, thank you for taking the call. My question is, could somebody, and our people at this time, try to come up with a super-virus that they might be able to introduce, either from a foreign nation or via some operative - foreign operative in the United States, that may be tapping directly into cable. Are there such efforts that you know of that are going on, and is the United States also trying to come up with a super-virus that might disable an enemy upon their attack of the United States?

Gen. CHILTON: Well, I don't know about any super-viruses, Vernon. I would say - in the greater context, remember if a nation-state were to take down, attempt to take down the broader international financial systems or international commerce systems that ride on the Internet, odds are they're injuring themselves as dramatically as they would be injuring the nation they were targeting, whether it be the United States or someone else.

It's possible, and certainly terrorist organizations wouldn't be so concerned about that. And so that's another area of concern you have to think about is those not aligned with a nation-state, you have a lot to lose by the Internet going down, but maybe you have a lot to gain by creating chaos in other countries, is another threat factor we worry about.

NEARY: Yeah. You know, if that kind of chaos were created by our enemies taking down an important part of our social life, really, or our lives, our economic life, for example, which you were talking - we were talking about a little bit earlier, and we touched on this a little bit earlier, but maybe you can expand on this. What is the response?

I think that you have said that - I mean, could a nuclear response be part of that? How aggressive would we be in response to something that we knew was intended to create chaos and to disrupt our lives?

Gen. CHILTON: Yeah, Lynn, I think I might have been misquoted on that previous interview there. What I said in that conversation was, don't - how we respond will be decided by the president of the United States of any attack on the United States of America, and I wouldn't preclude any options for the president ever. I wouldn't take any options off the table for him how to respond.

If I could change the focus of your question a little bit, I think the real trick and the real challenge for us is to make sure we take the appropriate steps today in changing culture, conduct and fielding the right capabilities to make sure that that eventual - that theoretical attack can't be successful against us.

Now, I know, and being a military person, there's no such thing as the Maginot Line or perfect defense. So we have to be able to anticipate how we're going to continue to operate under attack. That's some of the things we learned from Estonia and listening to them, I mean, they were not completely shut down.

They were greatly affected by the attack, but they continued to operate and work through it, and we took some learning points from that, and we need to make sure we're able to - we think about that for the future.

BOWMAN: But what about offensive capabilities? There was a story not too long ago, I think in the Washington Post, about early in the Iraq War, or maybe prior to the Iraq War, there was talk about cyber-attacks on Iraq itself. And that was considered for a little bit, but then it was decided that may be too widespread. It may take down systems throughout the region. And they kind of backed away from doing any cyber-attacks.

Is this something that should be considered? Do you - should build up an offensive capability?

Gen. CHILTON: Tom, I think what we've learned in the history of warfare is that oftentimes the best defense includes a good offense - it's whether that's air, land, sea operations. And I think the same applies here in cyber space.

So I think we do want to develop those capabilities. You don't want to just have a (unintelligible) defensive line that just fends off attacks. In time of conflict, you want to be able to go forward and make them stop, as opposed to just protect yourself from the attacks. So, it's good - I think it's good sense to develop offensive capabilities.

One thing you have to be cautious of, though, is that if you're going to use a particular offensive capabilities, that your defenses are prepared to sustain further attacks, or more sophisticated attacks. Now, clearly, we have to have that in place any way, day in and day out. But it's another calculus that you have weigh in, when you weigh whether or not, you're going to respond to a cyber attack, with a cyber attack or in some other domain.

BOWMAN: But what's the status of U.S. offensive capabilities in the cyber realm? Are they pretty robust now? Does there have to be a lot of work done on this area?

Gen. CHILTON: Yeah. Tom, it's an area I probably can't - shouldn't talk too much about, but it's an area that we're focused on. And - because we recognize that a good defense also incorporates elements of an offensive capability.

BOWMAN: You need a lot more money in this area?

Gen. CHILTON: You know, money - there has been budget requests that went in with the National Cyber Security Initiative - which, if sustained, will be very helpful - but I would tell you, I think our biggest shortfall in this area is in people dedicated to work in these particular missions. Now, I'm speaking for the STRATCOM perspective and what we do in military - defense in the military networks. And so the expertise - and frankly, you know, the services, they organize forces for the combatant commanders to use. So Naval forces and fleets, and Air Forces and wings, and Army forces and divisions and corp - we need to (unintelligible) equivalent, if you will, of forces to support the cyber defense of our military networks.

And the services are stepping up to that. And there's going to be a training element and an organizational element that they'll have to put in place; and we're starting to see that. But not - if I could ask for something today, it wouldn't be the next piece of technology, although that doesn't hurt, it'd be people.

NEARY: All right. We are talking with General Kevin Chilton. He's the commander of the U.S. Strategic Command. And if you'd like to give us a call, the number is 800-989-8255. You can also call us - you can also get in touch with us by email at TALK OF THE NATION at npr.org.

And you are listening to TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.

And we're going to take a call now. We're going to Dom(ph) calling from St. Louis. Hi, Dom.

DOM (Caller): Hello, good afternoon. Thank you for taking my call. And General Chilton, I'd just like to say thank you very much for your honorable service to our country. And I know we're talking about hacking into the network right now. But I was wondering if you might address a little bit about the consequences of electromagnetic pulse from, say, a rouge state launch of a nuclear - thermo nuclear weapon. There's a lot of those out there, and you know, I was just wondering if you might be able to address that somewhat about - how that might affect our military systems.

Gen. CHILTON: Sure, Dom. And when a nuclear detonation occurs, you're absolutely correct, there's a large electromagnetic pulse that goes out. It's not very long lived, but what we found is that it has a greater effect on some of our high tech microcircuit technology that we've deployed in various things, whether it'd be computers or electronic that supports automobiles, et cetera, et cetera. Good news and bad news. The good news is that it's a finite area that has affected, it's not infinite or global in nature. The bad news is you have to consider this, which is almost the inconsiderable, would be the detonation on nuclear weapon. And the consequences which not only would result from the blast but also from an EMP and what it would have on our electronics systems.

For that reason, we take steps to protect our critical commanding control elements from an EMP blasts, so that we always provide the president the opportunity to command and control his nuclear forces even in that environment. And that's really important.

NEARY: All right. Thanks so much for your call, Dom.

Let's go to Norman. And Norman is calling from Rome, Georgia. Hi, Norman.

NORMAN (Caller): Hi. Thank you. General, you mentioned that the next generation of recruit to the military going to need to be versed in this technology and cyber warfare. I'm an ROTC cadet at Princeton University, what would you ask our generation and the new recruits going into the military to train themselves and equip themselves to better help the Armed Forces in this area?

Gen. CHILTON: Well, first of all, thank you for being in the ROTC and joining the all-volunteer force to serve our nation. You have my highest respect for that. We need skill sets across the board, in the United States military -whether it'd be in cyberspace, air, land, sea operations. And so, I would encourage you to follow your passion of study because whatever you're passionate about is what you'll be best at it and you'll do well at it. And then come on board, and we have great training programs in the military to bring up to speed in a particular expertise that we may lack. But we certainly value, in the space and cyberspace business in U.S. Strategic Command, engineering backgrounds, computer science backgrounds, astronomical engineering backgrounds. And we have places for those type of students in our command, in our supporting commands that are quite vital to our operations.

NEARY: All right. Thanks so much for your call. And let's go to Chuck(ph) who's calling from San Francisco. Hi, Chuck.

CHUCK (Caller): Hi, thanks a lot, Ms. Neary, and good afternoon, General. I'd very much like to see an effective verifiable regime to prevent a space arms race and the revitalization of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Are either both of those on the agenda for the current administration?

Gen. CHILTON: Good afternoon, Chuck. Let me talk about space, first of all. And the concept arms race in space - of course, there is a treaty today, a space treaty, that the nations are - the Soviet Union and the U.S. signed up to and many other nations that prevents putting nuclear weapons in space - which I think is a good thing, or putting weapons on other planetary bodies like the moon. And that's about the extent of the treaty, though.

And there's been talk, not new but for many years, about how do you define a weapon in space? I mean, a nuclear weapon is pretty easy to find. I often ask people. I say, well, if I could build a spaceship or a spacecraft that could go up into space, and then let's say I put a chemical arm on it and I could fly it up next to another country's satellite and reach out and pluck the solar rays off, would that be a weapon? They often say, yes. And I remind them that I flew on that. It's called a space shuttle. So, defining a weapon is really, really tough.

NEARY: All right. Thank you so much, general. It was great talking to you today. General Kevin Chilton, commander of the U.S. Strategic Command joined us today. Author Tom Bowman, NPR Pentagon correspondent. Thanks to both of you for being with us.

BOWMAN: You're welcome.

Gen. CHILTON: You're welcome, Lynn. A pleasure.

NEARY: I'm Lynn Neary. It's TALK OF THE NATION from NPR News.

[GhostofTsenzei]

If my suspicions are correct, these satellites would be the bars of the prison planet... this technology at an extreme distance is a system that can read or activate RFID unit's. This is more control grid stuff, and you must remember this RFID technology has become a nanotechnology with chips smaller than the period at the end of of this sentence. In any case this technology is reader/activator technology...

That's a possibility.  It could potentially have to do with this topic as well: http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=126271.0

However I don't personally have enough information on the PROMIS/Ptech issues raised by AI in that post to have a good idea of how reasonable it would be to use an EO Sat. for it vs. other technology possibly already in place.

[Anti_Illuminati]

http://www.dodbuzz.com/2009/04/01/blair-gates-ok-multi-billion-secret-sats/
Blair, Gates OK Multi-Billion Secret Sats
By Colin Clark Wednesday, April 1st, 2009 10:17 am
Posted in Intelligence, Policy, Space



UPDATED: With Confirmation, Explanation by DNI spokeswoman

DNI spokeswoman Vanee Vines confirmed April 2 that the DNI and Defense Secretary approved the “next generation electro-optical satellites.” Vines said the decision was “based on the results of multiple panels and studies conducted over the last several years…” She said the DNI was “working to ensure we can continue to provide deep insights” into world events for the president and military forces, a clear reference to the possibility of a gap in the American eletroc-optical constellation. Vines would not discuss the costs or schedule of the proposed satellite system.

President Barack Obama is expected to approve a new constellation of highly classified multi-billion dollar spy satellites in the next few days, injecting a major new expenditure into the Defense Department budget that was not planned when the administration began its budget deliberations.

The debate between the intelligence community and the military over this system has been particularly sharp. In the words of one Hill source familiar with the issue. “A deep path has been worn between the Pentagon and the White House on this one,” the source said.

Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair signed a classified memo approving the program on March 30, according to two sources familiar with the program. Details of the program are highly classified. A DNI spokesman had not responded by the time we posted this story but may provide details later.

However, we have obtained a few details in the meantime.

The system may cost $3.5 billion to get started, if earlier estimates are accurate. It may cost up to $10 billion, over the next five years depending on which technical approach was approved and on how many satellites will be built.

The Hill source said that the DNI and Pentagon would have great trouble paying for the system. “I don’t think they can come up with enough to pay for two-plus-two,” the source said, refusing to add any details.

This is what led to the decision to approve the new system. Blair commissioned a group, led by Paul Kaminski, former undersecretary of Defense for acquisition and technology, to tell him whether the US faces a capabilities gap as aging satellites die and the US continues to fail to put new ones into orbit. While there is vigorous disagreement within Congress, DoD and the intelligence community as to whether there really be a gap that needs to be filled, the official consensus seems to be that the country cannot afford the risk.

Kaminski and his panel, “basically said, we want everything, a robust constellation,” according to one source familiar with the discussions. In the coded language that the intelligence community uses dealing with people who aren’t cleared, this means that Blair is pushing an “exquisite” solution. And that means it’s a really technologically advanced satellite with big and expensive optics able to deliver the rarest and finest strategic intelligence to the president. “We are asking for the Rolex,” said our source. This source does not believe the country needs what the DNI wants: “We are chasing what we want, rather than what we need.”

A former government official with experience of space programs was sharply critical of the DNI’s approach: “The panel recommendations appear to be another triumph of over-the-top programs that seek performance beyond reasonable need. The costs are astronomical in terms of dollars, risk, and missed opportunities. Though I highly respect the panel members, at some point we should ask ourselves whether it’s wise to rely exclusively on ‘greybeards’ when considering the kind of changes required in this post-Cold War era.

All this echoes comments made recently by Marine Gen. James Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the country does not need exquisite systems and Cartwright is a major player in the debate about what electro-optical satellites need building. For example, he was present when Gates was briefed.

The Pentagon and DNI will pull money from across all of DoD and the intelligence community. Pentagon funding will not come from the space budget (black or white).

There may be one big flaw in the plan currently being considered: it completely ignores US policy that requires the government use commercial data whenever possible. A senior Defense Department official said the current constellation would not include any commercial satellites or any money to buy commercial data from the two American companies that have satellites in orbit.

DoDBuzz readers have known about this effort from the beginning when we broke the story about the failed effort by the last DNI, Mike McConnell, to try and stuff $3.5 billion into the recently passed financial rescue supplemental. The money would have gone to build at least one of these satellites. Some $300 million of it would have gone to buy commercial data on the side.

In the latest effort, Kaminski and his panel of so-called greybeards have briefed Blair and Gates. Kaminski spoke two weeks ago with the tiny coterie of Hill aides who determine intelligence spending and policy. Apparently, he told them little beyond how the process worked and the broad outlines of his plan. But the Hill aides, who have been very frustrated with the slow pace and uncertain course of both the Pentagon and intelligence community on the electro-optical constellation, reportedly told Kaminski they will support the way ahead as long as somebody actually takes a decision and does something.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

"This is trying to revive the B.A.S.I.C. program. The issue is that it will kill companies that rely on the promise of imagery sales. The prospects for GEOEYE and DIGITALGLOBE will die and two more companies will go by the wayside.

Kind of goes hand in hand with he new administrations plans to take over companies, fire CEO’s and now kill companies.

Do we really need it? NO, but we really want it."

[Anti_Illuminati]

http://www.defensetech.org/archives/cat_cyberwarfare.html

Resignations at the Top of the Cyber Sec Ranks

Mischel Kwon has resigned as director of the U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team in the Department of Homeland Security. She was the fourth U.S. CERT director in five years.

It is believed she will remain in authority until September 2nd of this year. This comes at a particularly interesting time. The same day she resigned, Phil Reitinger, the director of the National Cyber Security Center at DHS, said in a statement that the administration "has made cyber security a top priority." One article stated that Kwon had become frustrated by bureaucratic obstacles and a lack of authority to fulfill her mission.

Kwon's resignation follows that of Rod Beckstrom who resigned back in March.

[INSERT:  Resigned Cybersecurity "chief" to be used as scapegoat for 2009 false flag?
Kissinger/Brzezinski [CSIS], 4-star Generals [NCOIC] taking over Internet
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=91406.msg529346#msg529346

He claimed the lack of support inside the agency and what he described as a power grab by the National Security Agency were the reasons for his departure.

Earlier this week Melissa Hathaway, who was regarded as one of the top cyber advisor to the White House recently resigned as well. So why did she resign? Good question and a question that Sen. Susan Collins (R-Maine), a senior ranking member on the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee, wants answered. Collins has requested that her staff members interview Hathaway regarding why she is leaving. Hathaway would only site personal reasons for her resignation which is effective August 24th.

That being said Hathaway reportedly noted in her comments that it has been two months since President Obama made a highly publicized speech stating the importance of cyber security. Hathaway has been quoted as saying "I wasn't willing to continue to wait any longer, because I'm not empowered right now to continue to drive the change."

These resignations highlight a much larger problem, it shows the inability of the federal government to hire and retain qualified cyber security leaders. Two months after President Obama pledged to "personally" select someone to be the White House's cyber security coordinator (AKA Cyber Czar), the position remains unfilled. He said that it was time the country had one official to coordinate against likely future attacks on the nation's technological infrastructure. One report by Government Info Security says that about 30 people have been considered for the job and yet the position remains unfilled.

Why not takers? What do they know that we don't? The nation's security is actually at risk and not having a cyber czar doesn't help. The continued churn has other concerning implications that point to a much bigger issue.

-- Kevin Coleman
August 10, 2009 06:32 AM | Cyber-warfare

[Anti_Illuminati]

Originally posted by Catalina (moved to this thread).

Navy Removes Top Nuke Weapons Officer
http://www.military.com/news/article/navy-removes-top-nuke-weapons-officer.html

BANGOR, Wash. - The Navy dismissed the commanding officer of a Washington state-based nuclear weapons facility Friday, citing a loss of confidence in his ability to lead, the Pentagon said.

Capt. Timothy J. Block, who headed the Navy's Bangor operation arming Trident submarines with nuclear warheads, was relieved of duty on by Rear Adm. Stephen E. Johnson, the Navy's director of strategic systems programs, according to the Kitsap Sun.

A Navy spokesman told The Associated Press that no single incident led to Block's removal. The spokesman would only comment anonymously because he felt he should not pre-empt his supervisor.

Pentagon spokesman Cmdr. J.A. "Cappy" Surette told the newspaper that public safety was not jeopardized and that no "specific issue" was involved.

Washington state's Naval Base Kitsap-Bangor is home to nuclear submarines, ships and laboratories. The facility also assembles and stores nuclear weapons before outfitting the subs.

Block was about a year into a three-year stint. Surette says the captain has been reassigned but his next station has not been determined.

Navy Capt. Kevin Zumbar, deputy director of strategic systems programs based in the Washington, D.C., area, will take over command until a replacement is found.

Block is the second facility commander in recent years to be relieved of duty for "a loss of confidence." Capt. Keith Lyles was dismissed after failing a nuclear weapons inspection om 2003.

Now this.

Minot Air Force Base 69th Bomb Squadron Soon Activated
http://www.kxmb.com/News/428622.asp

After months of anticipation and preparation, the Minot Air Force Base is ready to officially activate its newly formed 69th Bomb Squadron. The new unit will be the fourth operational B-52 squadron in the Air Force.

The Minot base is home to the 23rd Bomb Squadron and Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana has two operational B-52 units.

Colonel Julian Tolbert says this is a great milestone for the base, and they will be receiving additional personnel and aircrafts in order to complete this mission. While some members of the new squadron are already in town, Colonel Tolbert says the base is preparing to accomodate the remainder of the arrivals, which will be staggered over the next 8 to 12 months.

(Col. Julian Tolbert / MAFB) "We have been building new some facility for the new bomb squadron, we have been increasing our capacity to have additional flights and to house additional personnel as they arrive at Minot Air Force Base."


The 69th Bomb Squadron activation ceremony is set to take place this Thursday at the Base.

The new squadron will include about 800 new personnel. Video http://www.kxmb.com/video.asp?ArticleId=428622&VideoId=30398

[ekimdrachir]

The us govt should run some secret operations to generate some cash cause I think they've got a bit behind on minimum payments

[luckee1]

If my suspicions are correct, these satellites would be the bars of the prison planet... this technology at an extreme distance is a system that can read or activate RFID unit's. This is more control grid stuff, and you must remember this RFID technology has become a nanotechnology with chips smaller than the period at the end of of this sentence. In any case this technology is reader/activator technology...

Let's say you were injected with hundreds of thousands of little nano chips, ask yourself, what could these things be commended to do given a specific signal... or how far away could they be read using a specific device...

What a marvelous use for supposed NASA dollars...

--Oldyoti

"What we meant, in going for those redcoats was this --
we had always governed ourselves, and always meant to...
they, didn't mean we should."
~ An old New England militia
captain, after the battles of
Lexington and Concord
 April 19, 1775

You are thinking of a nano/satellite kill switch?  Plausible.