Sorry but I think in one sense this is a hoax,
You are dead wrong, and have no idea what you are talking about.
The computer you are using right now can not possibly do that as it lacks the physical hardware. Take a look at how you could upload your data onto satellites. The technology is for sale, its called a satellite mobile phone. That should give even the most less technically able people a hint at the kind of hardware you need.
You are dead wrong, and have no idea what you are talking about.
Wireless Networking can be used to circumvent your firewall, it provides an invisible connection from outside your house or office to the internal network, which is behind the firewall.
You are dead wrong, and have no idea what you are talking about. This has nothing to do with wireless networking in the sense that you understand. It has absolutely NOTHING to do with 802.X ANYTHING, PERIOD.
Secondly, and this is truly evil, the new chipset introduced by intel, allows engineers to bypass the BIOS. They can, turn your computer on via the network, change the settings in the BIOS and access anything they want. This has been developed to drive down the costs of technical support. They want engineers to be able to sort out a customers computer without having to visit that office, saving time and money. It means they will not have to have a tech support guy on site.
This is a separate issue and is nothing compared to what has already been possible for apporximately 20 years already.
So while these sort of scare stories are for the minute science fiction, the future is coming and it will be scary.
Documented facts and massive corroborating testimony/evidence says otherwise, The "future" has already been here for approximately 20 years:
Excerpt:Michael Riconosciuto on Encryption
by J. Orlin Grabbe
Michael Riconosciuto is one of the original architects of the PROMIS backdoor. PROMIS was a people-tracking software system sold to intelligence organizations and government drug agencies worldwide. The global dispersion of PROMIS was part of a U.S. plot to spy on other spy agencies.
Riconosciuto, who was Director of Research for a Wackenhut-Cabazon Indian joint venture, oversaw a group of several dozen people who worked out of business offices in nearby Indio, California. According to the testimony of Robert Booth Nichols, a CIA agent associated with Meridian International Logistics and connected to Music Corporation of America (MCA), Riconosciuto was in frequent contact with Bobby Inman, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA) and then Deputy Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), during this time.
Since intelligence computers are, for security reasons, usually not connected to external networks, the original backdoor was a broadcast signal. The PROMIS software was often sold in connection with computer hardware (such as a Prime computer) using a specialized chip. The chip would broadcast the contents of the existing database to monitoring vans or collection satellites using digital spread spectrum techniques whenever the software was run.
Spread spectrum techniques offer a way to mask, or disguise, a signal by making it appear as "noise" with respect to another signal. For example, one may communicate covertly on the same spectrum as a local TV broadcast signal. From the point of view of a TV receiver, the covert communication appears as noise, and is filtered out. From the point of view of the covert channel, the TV signal appears as noise. In the case of the PROMIS broadcast channel, the signal was disguised as ordinary computer noise--the type of stuff that must be reduced for TEMPEST certification in the U.S.
In spread spectrum frequency communication, the transmitted spectrum is much wider than what is really necessary. In digital communication, the transmission widths of digital signals are expanded so that many "bit periods" are needed to represent one bit at baseband. This results in an improvement in the signal-to-noise- ratio. Spread spectrum techniques are used extensively in covert military communications and secure satellite systems. The remainder of the document as follows:
The covert communication channel operates off a pseudo-random binary sequence, such as a stream cipher. Stream ciphers differ from block ciphers such as DES (the Data Encryption Standard) widely used in banking.
A block cipher applies a static transformation to a fixed block of data. The DES algorithm, for example, encrypts a 64-bit block of data using 64-bit keys. (The effective key size is actually 56 bits, since every eighth bit is considered a parity bit and is disgarded.) In DES electronic code book (ECB) mode, each 64-bit block of data is encrypted separately from every other block. In cipher block chaining (CBC) and cipher feedback (CFB) mode, the encryption of the current data block is dependent on previous data blocks. But under any one of these three DES modes, the transformation of a given data sequence with a given DES key will nevertheless result in the same ciphertext, regardless of the time the encryption takes place.
A stream cipher, by contrast, applies a time- varying transformation to individual digits or bits of data. "Time-varying" means the same sequence of plaintext data bits seen at two different points in time will be encrypted to a different sequence of ciphertext data bits.
To illustrate this for a simple case, suppose we are doing encryption using simple XOR rules of addition, adding keybits k to plaintext bits x on a bit by bit basis to obtain cipher bits y: y = x + k. XOR addition follows the rules
0+0 = 0
0+1 = 1
1+0 = 1
1+1 = 0.
Suppose the plaintext data is "1011". The current key might be "1010". Then the ciphertext data is
1011+1010 = 0001.
The ciphertext "0001" gives no information about the original plaintext. The plaintext could have been any one of 2^4 = 16 possible sequences of 0s and 1s. To restore the original plaintext, we XOR the ciphertext "0001" again with the key "1010" to obtain
0001+1010 = 1011.
In a stream cipher, the keystream will typically be different at different points of time. This the encryption of a repeated plaintext "1011" might take the form
time 1: 1011 + 1010 = 0001
time 2: 1011 + 1111 = 0100
time 3: 1011 + 0011 = 1000
and so on for other times. In this example, the "time- varying transformation" takes the simple form of a time- varying keybit stream.
The most famous stream cipher is the Verdam cipher, or "one-time pad", which follows the encryption scheme just described. If the current time is i, the current plaintext bit is x(i), and the current key bit is k(i), then the ciphertext bit is y(i) = x(i) + k(i). The number of key bits, N, must exceed the number of plaintext bits M: N>M. The bits in the keystream sequence k(1), k(2), . . . , k(N) must be independently and uniformly distributed, and are used only once and then disgarded (hence "one- time pad"). Of course, this scheme--while not breakable by cryptanalysis--has other security problems. It requires both parties to have a copy of the current key, and the key to be kept secret from all hostile parties. This in turn requires that the keys be generated, stored, and communicated in a totally secure manner--a massive problem in itself. So one-time pads are typically only used in "hot lines", such as the old Red Telephone between Moscow and Washington, D.C. that was installed with the hope that a little jawboning could help avert nuclear war. ("Can we talk?")
Practical cryptography for digital and analog communication thus uses "keystream generators" which typically determine the keystream as some function f of an underlying key K, and the current state of the system s(i):
k(i) = f(K, s(i)).
This key stream k(i) can be added to the original bit stream to produce a new (encrypted) stream (as is done in "direct sequence" spread spectrum systems). Or the key stream can be used to make the carrier frequency hop around within the spread sprectrum bandwidth (as is done in "frequency hopping" systems). Many variations and combinations are possible.
Like many people associated with PROMIS (including Earl Brian, the man who sold it around the world), Michael Riconosciuto is in jail. Riconosciuto was convicted on charges relating to the construction of a methamphetamine lab.
Michael Riconosciuto appears in a recent manuscript The Last Circle by "Carol Marshall" (whose real name is Seymour). Much of the book is based on interviews with, and files purloined from, Riconosciuto. Part of the subject matter of The Last Circle involves the West Coast activities of "The Company", a paramilitary drug dealing operation using ex-law enforcement and ex-intelligence personel that was based in Lexington, KY, in the late 70s and early 80s. However, because The Last Circle makes extensive use of Riconosciuto's files, it is also concerned with many other activities, including in particular a biowarfare project undertaken by the Wackenhut-Cabazon Indian joint venture. ("The Company" itself is the subject of another book entitled The Bluegrass Conspiracy by Sally Denton.)
Riconosciuto wrote me in regard to a speech I gave to the Libertarian Party of Colorado on digital cash on April 20, 1997. I have added some comments with respect to the issues mentioned.
May 8, 1997
M. Riconosciuto
21309-086 Med. A-1
Box 819
Coleman, FL 33521
"Orlin,
"[Name omitted] has been sending me some of your published material for some time. I have some questions concerning your talk on digital cash. :
"First a little of my background. I started with computers when a "laptop" was an IBM porta-punch. My first serious computing experience was on an IBM system 1620. I went from there to the IBM 7090/7094 systems and from there to the then "new" IBM 360 family. I missed the 370 generations, because during that time my responsibilities had me in a position where comp center staff handled all my data processing. I have been on the DEC/PDP systems since they first came out (PDP 8, PDP 10, PDP 11) and stayed with them as they matured into the VAX system. My programming experience runs the gamut from absolute coding sheets in unit record type systems, to top down/structured programming. I have been at this for awhile. I am not impressed by the Intel/MS standard that has taken over the computing world. Although I might note that Windows NT has suspicious similarity to the VAX/VMS operating system.
"Up until six months ago I had access to a computer and the latest literature because of my inmate job assignments in facilities management and prison industries. We had a high end Pentium CAD set up in facilities and a network connection on a Data General Avion system in Unicor prison industries. I also had the responsibility of maintenance on a Honeywell building automation control DDC-HVAC system.
"As a direct result of the TV interview with the Germans I was pulled off my premium inmate job and re- assigned to the duty of picking up cigarette butts in the recreation yard for $5 per month. This was inspite of exemplary job assignment reports and no disruptive behavior incidents."
[Comment: Riconosciuto is referring here to an interview he gave on the PROMIS backdoor to German television.]
"[paragraph omitted]
"The point of all this is to make it clear that I am not that far out of touch with the current state of the art.
"This brings me to the first question that I want to ask about your digital cash speech.
"1) In your reference to the "discrete logarithm problem" are you taking into consideration the Donald Coppersmith work? Coppersmith developed a computationally feasible way to take discrete logarithms back in the 80s. Needless to say, this work has been played down, but it has been in the open literature."
[Comment: The discrete log problem is the problem of finding x such that g^x =y mod n, for a given y, g, and n. Here x is the discrete logarithm of y to the base g. Since this is hard to do, one can form a public/private key system with x as the private (secret) key and y = g^x mod n as the public key.
[Of course, the hard-to-do job of taking discrete logarithms may not be the only way to approach a given problem. The security of Diffie-Hellman, to which I referred in my speech, is apparently based on discrete logarithms, but is susceptable to a simple attack by a person in the middle of the communication process. In Diffie- Hellman, Alice generates x and send Bob g^x mod n. Bob generates y and sends Alice g^y mod n. They both then calculate g^(xy) mod n as the session key. (The best an observer can do is calculate g^(x+y), without taking discrete logarithms.) However, if Eve controls all communication between the two, she can substitute her own parameters, and decrypt both sides of the conversation before forwarding the messages. Be this as it may, Diffie introduced a simple variant of this process--called Station to Station (STS) protocol--which completely eliminates the man-in-the-middle attack.
[Riconosciuto refers to the work of Coppersmith [1], [2] in finding discrete logarithms. Coppersmith greatly increased the efficiency of finding discrete logs in fields of characteristic 2 (which use digits 0 and 1, and thus are efficient in programming), so that the modulus has to be of the order of n = 2^1000 to be secure.]
"2) You of course are aware that RSA type algorithms are no more secure that the modulus is difficult to factor. Are you aware of the latest advances in . . . differential cryptanalysis and meet in the middle techniques? Are you aware of the work by Lenstra . . . et al with their methods of quadratic sieves etc?"
[Comment: Riconosciuto is refering here are to several types of cryptanalytic attacks. Differential cryptanalysis and meet-in-the- middle generally refer to attacks on DES, while the work of Lenstra is directly relevant to RSA.
[The methods of Lenstra [3], Cohen and Lenstra [4], and Pomerance, Rumely, and Adleman [5], use Fermat's Little Theorem (or its analog in extension fields of rational numbers) and Gauss and Jacobi sums to test for primality.
[The quadratic sieve for factoring n has running time of the order of exp((ln n ln ln n)^.5). A slightly faster method is [6] the number field sieve, which has running time of the order of exp((ln n)^(1/3) (ln ln n)^(2/3)).]
"3) Have you ever heard of the Hilbert spectral processing technique and its application to high speed factoring systems?
[Comment: I'm not sure exactly what Riconosciuto has in mind here. But communication signals can be decomposed into addable parts using systems of orthogonal functions such as Fourier series or Walsh functions.
[Riconosciuto may be referring to the results of Xiao and Massey [9], who characterize correlation-immune functions in terms of their Walsh transforms.]
"4) Are you familiar with fast elliptical encryption methods?"
[Comment: I did not refer to these in my speech as they are fairly complex. Elliptic curve cryptosystems stem from the work of Neal Koblitz [7] and others.
[The analog of taking a power in modular arithmetic is multiplication on elliptic curves. So the analog of the Diffie- Hellman problem in the elliptic curve world is to find the integer n such that nB = P, where B and P are points on an elliptic curve. Here n can be thought of as the "discrete logarithm" of P to the base B. Elliptic curve cryptosystems are believed to offer equal security at shorter key lengths.]
"5) Do you remember the hard knapsack problems of Merkle and Hellman and how they fell?"
[Comment: Knapsack problems were so- named because they resemble the problem of fitting a number of items k into a total volume V--like packing a knapsack.. They have the characteristic that they are NP- complete, so that theoretically an encryption scheme could be constructed from them that is not solvable in polynomial time (with respect to k). However, the original Merkle-Hellman knapsack was broken by Shamir. So Riconosciuto is suggesting that implemented discrete log systems may have hidden weaknesses much like the original knapsack encryption systems. There is a knapsack system due to Chor and Rivest that hasn't been broken yet, to my knowledge.]
"This should be a good place to start. Let me know if you receive my letter. [sentence omitted.]
"Michael Riconosciuto
"21309-086"
[Comment: Encryption issues are important. However, I doubt they will be the deciding security issue in most systems of digital cash. Ross Anderson [8] has accumulated a lot of evidence from the financial services industry that demonstrates that most security failures involve errors in protocol or in implementation. Equally important, most current systems that have been called "digital cash" have been designed with deliberate security holes to allow monitoring of transactions at critical points.]
References
[1] D. Coppersmith, "Fash Evaluation of logarithms in fields of characteristic two," IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 30, 1984, 587-594.
[2] D. Coppersmith, A. Odlyzko, and R. Schroeppel, "Discrete Logarithms in GF(p)," Algorithmica 1, 1986, 1- 15.
[3] A. Lenstra, "Primality testing," Cryptology and Computational Number Theory, Proc. Symp. Appl. Math, 42, 1990, 13-25.
[4] H. Cohen and H. W. Lenstra, Jr., "Primality testing and Jacobi sums," Math. Comp. 42, 1984, 297-330.
[5] L.M. Adleman, C. Pomerance, and R.S. Rumely, "On Distinguishing prime numbers from composite numbers," Annals of Math. 177, 1983, 173-206.
[6] A. Lenstra and H. W. Lenstra, Jr., eds. The Development of the Number Field Sieve, Springer-Verlag, 1993.
[7] Neal Koblitz, A Course in Number Theory and Cryptography, Springer-Verlag, 1994.
[8] Anderson, Ross, "Why Cryptosystems Fail," Association for Computing Machinery, 1st Conf.- Computer and Comm. Security `93, November 1993.
[9] G. Z. Xiao and J. L. Massey, "A spectral characterization of correlation-immune functions," IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, 34, 1988, 569-571.
Posted September 2, 1997
Web Page:
http://www.aci.net/kalliste/homepage.html_____________________________________________________________
A Document that Wright Patterson Air Force base that required changing the original URL to access (because the original had been removed):
FLTC Perspective
Focused Long Term Challenges (FLTCs) are an innovative approach
to match user requirements with relevant technology development,
while also leveraging from existing multi-directorate research.
The eight FLTCs created are focused to address all threat areas
addressed in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Of the eight
shown on the graphic, there are four with specific application to the
Information Directorate, identified on the following slides or link.
Focused Long Term Challenges
1. Anticipatory Command, Control & Intelligence (C2I)
2. Unprecedented Proactive Surveillance & Reconnaissance (S&R)
3. Dominant Difficult Surface Target Engagement/Defeat
4. Persistent & Responsive Precision Engagement
5. Assured Operations in High Threat Environments
6. Dominant Offensive Cyber Engagement
7. On-demand Theater Force Projection, Anywhere
8. Affordable Mission Generation & SustainmentAFRL/IF FLTC Emphasis
Categories
#1 - Anticipatory C2I
#5 - Assured Operations in High Threat Environments
#6 - Dominant Offensive Cyber Engagement
#7 - On-Demand Theater Force ProjectionFLTC #1 Anticipatory Command, Control & Intelligence (C2I)Anticipate Enemy Actions and Respond with Synchronized Management of Battlespace Effects
Find Threatening Systems and Objects
Predict Adversary Behaviors
Perform Near-Real Time Decision Management
Assure Fully Effective C2 Operators
Conduct On-Demand Collaboration Across Operator and Sensor SystemsFLTC #5 Assured Operations in High Threat EnvironmentsAchieve Mission Objectives With Impunity Against Full Spectrum Threats, from Anti-Access IADS to Cyber
Anticipate and Avoid Threats Through Stealth and Deception
Detect and Defeat Threats Through Active Defenses
Survive the Attack Through Passive and Adaptive Protection
Recover from Threat EffectsFLTC #6 Dominant Offensive
Cyber EngagementConduct full spectrum offensive cyber/info ops against military, leadership, and infrastructure
Access Adversary’s Cyber/Info Systems Anywhere, Anytime
Operate with Stealth and Persistence in Cyber
Generate Robust Cyber Intelligence (CYBINT)
Deliver Integrated D5 Information Operations Effects
Deliver Counter Electronics EffectsFLTC #7 On-Demand Force Projection, AnywhereTimely Deployment of Flexible Ground, Information & Space Capabilities for the Commander
Rapidly Constitute Multi-Mission, Affordable Satellites
Rapidly Deploy Multi-Mission, Affordable Space Payloads
Generate On-Demand, Reusable Affordable Space Access
Rapidly Checkout Spacecraft and Autonomous Operations
Globally Project Ground Forces and Material Anywhere in All Weather
Globally Move, Manage, And Process Information In Real-time_____________________________________________________________
THREATS FULFILLED
Videnieks alleged threats came true – Riconosciuto was arrested, and Bobbie's former husband was given favorable treatment in the courts in her absence.
Bobbie's arrest was timely. Her husband filed a declaration with the Federal Grand Jury in Chicago in compliance with a subpoena to testify. He told the Grand Jury that he needed two customized DEC VAX 11-730 computers with the customized operating system media. This is equipment seized by the U.S. Government when Riconosciuto was arrested. The declaration of Riconosciuto was filed in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois Eastern Division (case No. 92 C 6217, Michael J. Riconosciuto, et al., Plaintiffs vs. Nicholas Bua, et al., Defendants.)
GRAND JURY STATEMENT
Riconosciuto told the Grand Jury that with the equipment he could produce information about various operations which developed extremely sensitive military applications from highly advanced technology, such as:
* Electrostatic heat transfer, modified to enable ordinary and readily available electronic parts and hardware to transform ordinary and readily available explosives into devices capable of destruction of nuclear dimension.
* Biotechnological weapons, including, but not limited to, lethal monoclonal antibodies which are gene specific, e.g., able to distinguish between specific racial characteristics and cause painful, disastrous, lethal effects for only those individuals exposed to such antibodies whose cell structure contains the target genes.
* Compact high voltage power supplies, intended to be used in various hi-tech weapons systems and development.
* Advanced communications systems, e.g., spread spectrum data compression, which would enable current microwave transmissions to be 100 times more efficient and, under appropriate development, 100 times more deadly.
* Advanced precious metals recovery systems essential to hi-tech weapons systems.
* Advanced infrared sensor technology, used in night vision goggles, missile surveillance and tracking, and in more sinister applications, saturation surveillance of all movements of all people in every open, visible space on the entire planet.
* Thermal imaging, enabling surveillance through fog.
* Bragg cell technology.
_____________________________________________________________
http://www.rae.page.tl/PROMIS-software.htm?PHPSESSID=c81dcfdc9aa2f832de10689f6a5a21e0PROMIS software (From unknown author)
The story of PROMIS software has to be one of the most intriguing stories I've ever read - especially since it is true. It involves government officials, computerized theft of information, treachery, murder and intrigue. It is my belief that it is also at the root of the many of the problems we have today.
The best place to start with the story of PROMIS software is with the Investigative Report titled, "The INSLAW Affair" inslaw_affair.htm prepared by the Judiciary Committee of the Congress in 1992. Unfortunately, the website where I obtained it is no longer active. The Wayback Machine had a copy of it, but the footnotes are not included on the document. I left in the footnote indicators even though the footnote text is missing.
Also very interesting are a series of articles in a Special Report, "Federal Corruption, INSLAW"
http://www.sonic.net/sentinel/gvcon7.html written by Harry V. Martin. The first articles were copyrighted by the Napa Sentinel. The last article is copyrighted by FreeAmerica. These articles have one detail that I've only seen in Mr. Martin's articles. That is the fact that IBM bailed out INSLAW from their bankruptcy ordeal in 1991.
When I first read about the PROMIS software, I was especially intrigued since I am a Systems Analyst/Programmer. The only way I could figure out that government computer systems could be breeched like this was if there was a back door in the IBM communications controllers and an IBM Systems Engineer with a background in telecommunications was exploiting it.
People with those skills were a rarity even back in those days. Anyway, I was busy reading and researching 9-11 so I set aside thinking about PROMIS. Then I found a video, "The PTECH Story
http://www.snowshoefilms.com/911coverup.html" of Indira Singh telling her story about PROMIS software AND 9-11.
As the story goes, the PTECH software is a pirated copy of the PROMIS software. At this point, I'm hooked. I have to get to the bottom of this story. The first thing was there were some things in Indira Singh's story that just didn't sit right with me. The first of those questions were that the risk management software she was describing sounded rather magic to me.
Having been a systems developer for 20 years in mainframe shops, I was suspect of the description of the system for an operation like JP Morgan. Secondly, there was a key detail of the story that she left out on the video. The missing detail was, 'what happened that caused her to stop the software presentation so she could run to the phone to call her colleagues?
This is like asking the guests to a dinner party to leave before you serve the dinner. It's not done. And WHY would she leave out THE key detail in a video presentation. That didn't make sense to me since Indira was giving a live presentation of her story on the video.
After several rather nasty encounters with Indira Singh on the internet (another story for another day), I found out that the missing clue was in the written account of the PTECH story on Mike Ruppert's website - FromTheWilderness
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/. From Singh's written account, the PTECH marketing people were Saudis.
They basically walked into JP Morgan and offered to hack JP Morgan's computer system to demonstrate the software. That was Indira's clue that something was wrong with the PTECH software. In my experience, there is not a software professional in the world that is stupid enough to walk into a bank and offer to hack their computer system. That's like a bank robber walking into a bank offering to crack their safe.
I tried to find Indira's original account that was on From the Wilderness but couldn't find it. I did find the two paragraphs in the timeline below:
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/012005_ptech_pt1.shtml"September 1996. Ptech already working with DoD's research group, DARPA: "Ptech, based in Cambridge, Mass., offers an integrated set of object-oriented tools that enable users to create interactive blueprints of business processes. Software code can be generated from the hierarchical layout, providing rapid and consistent application development.
The [Defense] Advanced Research Projects Agency is using [Ptech's program called] Framework
http://egov.alentejodigital.pt/Page10549/Arquitectura/IBM_Ptech_FrameWork.pdf to help transfer commercial software methodologies to the defense sector."
http://www.govexec.com/archdoc/rrg96/0996rrg5.htm"May 2002. Dr. Hussein Ibrahim, co-founder of BMI and Ptech's chief scientist, and a delegation of other Ptech personnel come to JP Morgan at Singh's invitation, to demonstrate why Singh's blueprint project should buy Ptech software for its inference engine core.
But the Ptech delegation has come to the Morgan offices unprepared, and they behave strangely: Singh's suspicions are aroused when Ibrahim offers to demonstrate the software on his laptop, using proprietary JP Morgan data. This would have compromised JPM information security and is entirely outside industry protocols ("a show-stopper").
In an adjoining room, Singh calls Roger Burlton
http://www.bpmg.org/gbpf/Speakers_Details/RogerBurlton_Chairmans_Introduction.htm, who runs Business Process Renewal in Vancouver. He tells her, "Don't let them out of your sight and don't let them leave with anything." Burlton recommends that she speak with Jeff Goins
http://www.findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0EIN/is_2001_August_28/ai_77601448, a former Ptech employee. Goins informs Singh that Saudi terror financier Yassin Al Qadi is an investor in Ptech.
Al Qadi claims to have met Dick Cheney in Jeddah before he became vice president, and that they still maintain "cordial relations." Singh confirms that Goins had taken his concerns to an FBI agent, and arranges to speak with that agent."
As I read Indira's account, my feeling was - "Gimme a Break here - she is tying the PTECH story to 9/11 and she is pointing fingers at Saudis who sound totally clueless. BMI is an anagram of IBM. And PTECH was an IBM Business Partner - meaning that IBM was assisting PTECH in marketing their software.
Now - refer back to Harry Martin's news article that says that IBM saved INSLAW from bankruptcy - which means that IBM owned the PROMIS software. My feeling is that either Indira Singh is an unwitting dupe or a participant in a misdirection and cover story for IBM's very significant role in the PROMIS/PTECH saga. My suspicions are amplified by the fact that Lou Gerstner Jr. who was the CEO of IBM is now the Chairman of the Carlyle Group
http://www.carlyle.com/eng/team/l3-team1024.html.
What was driving me crazy about this whole story was the question, "How did the PROMIS/PTECH software work"? The concept of a back door in IBM's communications controllers was possible, but it wasn't very satisfactory. From the accounts of all that was possible to do with this software, they would need an easier way than through the controllers. Then it hit me - OF COURSE! I know how they did it!
As the flying fickle finger of fate would have it, early in my career - in the late 1970's, I interviewed for a company that was developing a computerized system for warehouses. The concept was a radio frequency controlled terminal on a forklift that communicated with the main computer. This allowed the forklift driver to enter the location of pallets in a warehouse as he stored them. This was probably among the first wireless telecommunications systems for the business world. THAT was the way they did it. After that, I bought Danny Casolaro's book, Octopus. That book confirmed my suspicions on the method of access.
Again, the flying finger of fate comes into play. I also worked for a corporation that manufactured microchips so I knew that chips were manufactured to precise specifications. The properties of the silicon ingots are transformed by the chemical baths they are put through during the manufacturing process so when I found an article on the 'miracle' of the metallic ferris oxide coatings on microchips for wireless communications, I knew then that the PROMIS/PTECH software was a way to do direct communications with a chip on the motherboard. My God, I thought - this is brilliant. It is almost the perfect crime.The PROMIS/TECH software could be as simple as just a keystroke program. On all corporate and government systems, the first thing that anybody enters on the machine is their ID and password. All the program on the chip would have to do is to record the first 25 keystrokes after any period of inactivity on the machine.
With the capability of getting the ID and password of key people in an organization - the DBA, the RACF security person, the payroll person, the Key men in a corporations, an intruder could do anything. The possibilities were virtually limitless. NOBODY would think to consider the hardware as an open door to a computer system - at least in the early days.
The programmers would be looking for software bugs in their own code - the thought of an external intrusion into the system to a microchip via wireless communications wouldn't even cross their minds. That means that anything that was done on the computer would be attributed to a software bug - or to the person whose ID was used to execute a transaction.
Most people, upon reading this will think simply of the ability to steal money - and most certainly the people behind this conspiracy did do that. But again, these people are brilliant and I believe they had bigger things in mind - such as a coup d'etat on the United States government. If you control the U.S. government - by controlling the people in key government positions and most importantly - controlling the investigative arms of the government, then you are well on your way to controlling the world - right? Sounds pretty fantastic doesn't it?
Since the INSLAW case began with law enforcement files and court systems, the obvious thing would be to add your people onto the payroll of the FBI and into the court system. With your own people in the FBI, you could block investigations that would lead to a discovery of the conspiracy.
As with the pre-9/11 FBI agents. They found suspicious characters doing suspicious things - but when they tried to investigate, their information went into the FBI management and into a black hole. This is completely inexplicable if FBI management are there to do the job they were hired to do.
It only makes sense if they were on the FBI payroll to block such investigations. And the beauty of the whole thing is that secrecy is the watch word of these organizations so each agent is basically working in a blackbox. Since they are ostensibly working for the U.S. government - following orders of their immediate supervisor, they have no way of knowing if they are legitimately working for the FBI or if they are unwittingly part of a conspiracy.
My suspicions on this were confirmed the other day when I was listening to the Greg Szymanski radio program. His guest was John Peeler, a guy who claimed to have worked for the FBI and who was involved in the Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah building. He thought his job was to infiltrate the conspiracy which the FBI knew about - but he was also ordered to be a participant - up to and including helping Tim McVeigh figure out how to build the bomb.
One of the callers on the radio called the guy a pathological liar. He didn't sound like a liar to me so I called and asked him two questions. 1) When did you go to work for the FBI? 2) Did you go to the FBI academy? The answers were 1988 (in the time frame) and 'NO' - he was hired for a special black op program that officially didn't exist. He said he was hired because of his background which I guessed was Special Forces (I have more information on this - "Special Forces - and teams working independently is the 'New American Way of War').
April 20, 2006 - John Peeler with Greg Szymanski
http://mp3.rbnlive.com/Greg06.htmlI believe that the guy's story is true. He did think he was working for the FBI and he no doubt was drawing an FBI paycheck. He was probably added to the FBI's payroll via the PROMIS/PTECH software. And nobody would be the wiser - least of all John Peeler. Further, his story is that his son is serving life in prison for a crime he didn't commit. Peeler's story is that his son was setup and that he was convicted on no evidence at all linking him to the crime that was supposedly committed. According to Peeler - this was done in an attempt to keep Peeler from telling his story.
It is highly possible that the judge is one of the conspirators. In one of my email groups, there is a lawyer who was on to this story with the judges. Apparently there is supposed to be some paperwork on file for judges - signed commission papers. He has made a project out of filing requests for this paperwork on judges - and he is finding a whole lot of judges that don't have the proper paperwork on file. My guess would be that these judges were 'inserted' into the system via PROMIS/PTECH also.
The whole scenario fits with what we observe as outsiders - which is that we have a government at war with itself. There are unwitting drones like Peeler who thought they were working for the government who are actually working for the conspirators. We have honest hardworking people working for the government who are confounded by the obstruction to their doing the job they were hired to do - with no recourse because of the secrecy required of them.
We have conspirators who - through the use of this software are able to set up anybody to take a fall for crimes they didn't commit and with the ability to create chaos in the government computer systems. Nobody knows who they can trust - who is real and who is not. As I said earlier - almost the perfect crime.
http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/012705_ptech_pt2.shtml RICONOSCUITO: TRAPDOOR TECHNOLOGY REVEALED
German scientists validate Michael Riconoscuito’s description of radical PROMIS technology.
Michael Riconoscuito, CIA research scientist and computer programmer who served as Project Director for the Wackenhut/Cabazon Joint Venture, has long claimed that he headed up the research team which modified the Inslaw PROMIS software with a ‘trap door’, allowing the computer program to be used for espionage. This spring, from a federal prison in Estill, South Carolina where he’s serving a 20 year term for drug trafficking, Riconoscuito gave a video interview to German journalist Egmont Koch, discussing for the first time the specific technology used to ‘bug’ the Inslaw PROMIS software.
The interview, recorded in video, was broadcast on German ZDF public television channel 2 in April as a major part of a 45 minute documentary entitled “Hackers on Secret Missions,”—a title Riconoscuito says he doesn’t particularly like. Former UNCLASSIFIED editor David MacMichael was also interviewed for the program.
The most startling revelation in Riconoscuito’s discussion is that the PROMIS software wasn’t ‘bugged’ by any ordinary means (say, by providing a secret telephone line access). Instead, it utilized a radical new technology Riconoscuito developed that actually enabled the ‘bugged’ computer to broadcast—without wires or phone connections—signals which could be picked up at a remote site, “say from an Elint satellite,” Riconoscuito explained later.
The software modification forces the computer to produce non-sinusoidal waveforms called “Walsh functions,” waveforms different from radio waves or other kinds of transmission media. “All the files were read out, all the files were broadcast constantly,” Riconoscuito said. He added that the technique has vast commercial applications, and will “allow wireless computer networking, with very small amounts of power, over very large distances.” Egmont Koch, unsure whether or not he was being treated to some interesting science fiction,[
INSERT: So while these sort of scare stories are for the minute science fiction, the future is coming and it will be scary.
took the Riconoscuito interview and some supporting technical articles Riconoscuito provided through writer Jack Colhoun, to show to twelve German computer experts and scientists.
To his surprise, they validated Riconoscuito’s unusual scientific innovation. “This guy knows what he’s talking about,” said Andreas Pfitzmann, Professor of Computer Science at the University of Dresden.
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Privacy-enhancing TechnologiesCurriculum Vitae
Prof. Dr. Andreas Pfitzmann is head of the privacy and data security group at Technische Universität Dresden. For more than 25 years, his research interests include privacy and multilateral security, mainly in communication networks, mobile computing, and distributed applications. Current research projects are on "anonymous web surfing" (JAP), "Privacy and Identity Managment in Europe for Life" (PrimeLife), and "steganography". Andreas Pfitzmann received diploma and doctoral degrees in computer science from the University of Karlsruhe. He is a member of ACM, IEEE, and GI, where he served as chairman of the Special Interest Group on Dependable IT-Systems for ten years._________________________________________________________________________________________
Harmut Pohl, Professor at the University of Bochoit and former computer expert in the German intelligence community, confirms “All what I heard and read does make sense, absolutely!” “After I had spoken to at least a dozen scientists and other experts I have no doubt that Riconoscuito is credible about PROMIS and that technique,” Koch said when introducing his TV program to the press.
Riconoscuito, a controversial figure around the Inslaw case for some time, alleged he was threatened by Peter Videnieks, Department of Justice contract officer for the Inslaw software, in 1991 if he revealed anything about the secret PROMIS project. “Back off or else,” he quoted Videnieks as saying. Riconoscuito went ahead anyway and provided Inslaw with a sworn affadavit some days later, and within two weeks he was arrested and imprisoned. The resulting trial—one which students of that case claim contains many irregularities—sent Riconoscuito to prison for 20 years on a drug trafficking charge which he vehemently denies.
The validation of the German experts, however, gives Riconoscuito a major jump in credibility; for the first time, there is objective, scientific information which corroborates an important part of his story. Koch is currently preparing to interview Riconoscuito again, this time for a cover article for the popular German magazine, DER SPIEGEL.
While the Inslaw case has suffered a press blackout in the United States, interest in Europe has been heating up. A Dutch television program was made about it last year, recently a Japanese program as well, and reports indicate that a French program is in the works. Although the complete transcript of the Riconoscuito interview was unavailable by press time, we hope to bring further updates on the Riconoscuito/PROMIS story.
(Thanks to Jack Colhoun, who has been working with Egmont Koch, for information used in the preparation of this article. Garby Leon can be reached by email at ).
Thank you for attempting to challenge my discernment and research skills.
