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Author Topic: Obama Admin Seeks Tighter, Secret, Unknown, Unconstitutional Quarantine Power  (Read 1694 times)
Neo
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The constitution is my guide.


« on: August 05, 2009, 02:37:55 PM »

http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0809/25814.html

The Obama administration is quietly dusting off an effort to impose new federal quarantine regulations, which were vigorously resisted by civil liberties organizations and the airline industry when the rules were first proposed by the Bush administration nearly four years ago.

White House officials aren’t saying what their rules might ultimately require. But the previous administration proposed giving the federal government the authority to order a “provisional quarantine” of three business days — or up to six calendar days — for those suspected of having swine flu or other illnesses listed in a presidential executive order.

The Bush-era proposal would also have required airlines and cruise lines to store more information about domestic and international passengers, such as e-mail addresses, traveling companions and return flight information. The information would be subject to review by federal officials in a health emergency, though it would be voluntary for passengers to provide the data.

Opponents of the Bush administration’s efforts to enforce the new guidelines insist that they still are a mistake. “It’s not really going to help,” said Wendy Mariner, a professor of law and public health at Boston University. “The proposals to limit liberty represent a dangerous precedent to constitutional theory, particularly when there’s almost no evidence it will matter. ... It wouldn’t surprise me if they try to sneak this past in August, when people are away.”

The White House’s Office of Management and Budget has set a September target date to complete the first major overhaul of the quarantine regulations in about three decades. That would have at least some of the rules in place if swine flu returns with a vengeance later this year, though officials are reluctant to make that link publicly.

“It’s important to public health to move forward with the regulations,” said Christine Pearson, a spokeswoman for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. “We need to update our quarantine regulations, and this final rule is an important step.”

Pearson said CDC had made “changes where appropriate” to the 2005 proposals, but she did not specify those adjustments.

An OMB spokesman, Tom Gavin, confirmed the rules submitted by the CDC in June were in “an interagency review process.”

Civil liberties groups and some public health experts question the value of the effort and not just on privacy grounds — they also contend that mandatory quarantine is unlikely to be an effective tool to contain swine flu or other diseases in the modern era.

“It doesn’t surprise me that when swine flu or any other epidemic is featured prominently in the news, we see a return to quarantine and other public health regulations,” said Christopher Calabrese of the American Civil Liberties Union, which sharply criticized the Bush-era proposal as too heavy-handed. “The enemy here isn’t the American people or sick people. It’s an illness. ... Police officers with guns cannot make people obey a quarantine. In order for this to work, it has to be collaborative. They have to trust the government.”

Thus far, the Obama administration has gotten high marks from quarantine critics, particularly for rejecting suggestions that the U.S. close its border with Mexico during the initial swine flu outbreak. “The current administration quite rightfully resisted those calls,” Jennifer Nuzzo of the University of Pittsburgh’s Center for Biosecurity said.

A report in The Washington Post on Tuesday signaled that the administration may lessen some of the more stringent measures recommended for swine flu earlier this year, such as school closures. Analysts said the administration may want to hold new quarantine powers in reserve, for unforeseen situations or for diseases other than the flu.

POLITICO spoke with about a half-dozen health policy experts and travel industry representatives who submitted comments about the rules the Bush administration proposed in 2005. None of those interviewed had heard that the Obama administration was in the process of reviving the plan, though some hailed the move.

“This is great news,” said Paula Steib of the Association of State and Territorial Health Officials, which generally supported the 2005 proposals.

“I do believe that the coming flu season and the prospect of a resurgence is the reason for the rushed response,” said Georgetown law professor Lawrence Gostin. “I have been calling for the federal government to finalize the CDC regulations for a long time now. They are so antiquated that they provide insufficient powers. ... Much depends on what the final regulations actually say.”

While quarantines are sometimes imposed by state and local officials on uncooperative patients, federal quarantine has been almost unheard of in recent decades. Atlanta attorney Andrew Speaker was famously quarantined in 2007 for flying on international flights while infected with tuberculosis. The last reported federal quarantine before that was in 1963.

In recent months, American and British school groups — even New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin — have been quarantined in China by officials targeting swine flu. “They’ve gotten a lot of criticism from public health authorities,” Nuzzo said.

In April 2003, as severe acute respiratory syndrome spread through Asia, President George W. Bush issued an executive order adding that illness to the list of diseases that are grounds for a quarantine.

In April 2005, when avian flu hit hard overseas, Bush listed “influenza caused by novel or re-emergent influenza viruses that are causing, or have the potential to cause, a pandemic.” A variety of fearsome diseases were already subject to quarantine, including cholera, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox and viral hemorrhagic fevers like Ebola.

The CDC followed that November with the proposed regulations the Obama administration is now finalizing.

Bush administration officials said their proposal would have created a new appeals process for those served with quarantine orders. However, the proposed rules included no new judicial mechanism for review of quarantine orders. Those who objected to being held against their will should file habeas corpus petitions in federal court, guidance accompanying those rules suggested.

Officials said the proposed regulations focused mainly on detaining small numbers of individuals. However, the rules also discussed scenarios “when it is necessary to provisionally quarantine a large group of persons on a very short time frame.”

While any discussion of quarantine may stoke public fears of barbed wire camps filled with infected Americans or closures of international borders, public health experts said that sort of approach to H1N1 flu would not be effective.

“Particularly for flu, the disease is transmitted very rapidly. Within a few days, it’s all over the place,” Nuzzo said.

Critics also objected to a provision in the proposed rules that appeared to require anyone who knows that he or she has been exposed to or is suffering from a communicable illness to seek a “travel permit” from the director of the CDC before taking a train, a plane or even an automobile across state lines.

Agencies across the federal government are making preparations to deal with a serious flare-up of the H1N1 flu this winter. The Food and Drug Administration is overseeing expedited production of vaccines. And the military is considering a plan to give transportation and laboratory help to the Federal Emergency Management Agency in the event of a major outbreak, CNN reported last week.

When the swine flu first grabbed headlines earlier this year, Obama administration officials deflected all questions about quarantines.

“Most quarantine authority is held at the local and state level, and we’re nowhere near that sort of a decision,” Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano said at a news briefing in April.

Issuance of the new rules by the business-friendly Bush administration may have bogged down over the possible financial impact of forcing the travel industry to collect and keep more tracing data about passengers. CDC estimated that cost at between $118 million and $425 million.

In May, the airline industry wrote to Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius, asking her to enact the new quarantine rules while delaying the data collection provisions pending further review.

An HHS representative did not respond to requests for comment on the letter.


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Neo
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« Reply #1 on: August 05, 2009, 03:15:07 PM »

Here is the link for the 2005 CDC Quarantine Proposal http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pandemic/CRS_Quarantine_Authority.pdf

I'm pasting the docu also. Was Updated August 16, 2006:

Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority

Summary

In the wake of recent terrorist attacks and increasing fears about the spread of
highly contagious diseases, such as severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) and
pandemic influenza, federal, state, and local governments have become increasingly
aware of the need for a comprehensive public health response to such events. An
effective response could include the quarantine of persons exposed to infectious
biological agents that are naturally occurring or released during a terrorist attack, the
isolation of infected persons, and the quarantine of certain cities or neighborhoods.
The public health authority of the states derives from the police powers reserved
to them by the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.

The authority of the federal government to prescribe quarantine and other health measures is based on the
Commerce Clause, which gives Congress exclusive authority to regulate interstate
and foreign commerce. Thus, state and local governments have the primary authority
to control the spread of dangerous diseases within their jurisdictions, and the federal
government has authority to quarantine and impose other health measures to prevent
the spread of diseases from foreign countries and between states. In addition, the
federal government may assist state efforts to prevent the spread of communicable
diseases if requested by a state or if state efforts are inadequate to halt the spread of
disease. Some state laws are antiquated and, until recently, have not been reviewed
to address the spread of disease resulting from a biological attack. Other state laws
do not cover newly emerging diseases such as SARS or pandemic influenza. In light
of recent events, however, many states are reevaluating their public health emergency
authorities and are expected to enact more comprehensive laws relating to quarantine
and isolation. Public health experts have developed a Model State Emergency Health
Powers Act to guide states as they reevaluate their emergency response plans.

This report provides an overview of federal and state public health laws as they
relate to the quarantine and isolation of individuals, a discussion of constitutional
issues that may be raised should individual liberties be restricted in a quarantine
situation, and federalism questions that may arise where federal and state authorities
overlap. In addition, the possible role of the armed forces in enforcing public health
measures is discussed, specifically whether the Posse Comitatus Act would constrain
any military role, and other statutory authorities that may be used for the military
enforcement of health measures.

Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority

One very simple principle [justifies state coercion]. That principle is, that the
sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in
interference with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
John Stuart Mill (1856)

Introduction

The practice of avoiding persons with contagious diseases may be found in the
oldest of writings, including Leviticus and Numbers in the Old Testament, wherein
specific instructions are given for the inspection and sequestration of lepers.1 The
term “quarantine” is derived from the Italian words quaranta giorni, which refer to
the 40-day period during which certain ships arriving at the port of Venice during the
Black Death plague outbreaks of the 14th century were obliged to sit at anchor before
any persons or goods were allowed to go ashore.2 Following a plague epidemic in
London in 1664, England passed rigorous quarantine laws. All quarantined vessels
were required to show a solid yellow flag to indicate they were under quarantine. As
late as 1721, some ships coming to England from infected areas were burned at sea.3
The earliest evidence of quarantine in colonial America occurred in the
Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1647, when vessels from the West Indies were
forbidden to land or discharge passengers and cargo during a plague outbreak. The
first federal quarantine law was passed in 1796 in response to continued yellow fever
epidemics.4

In the event of a biological attack or the introduction of a highly contagious
disease affecting the public, the U.S. health system may take measures to prevent
those people infected with or exposed to a disease or a disease-causing biological
agent from infecting others.5 The terms used to describe these measures, quarantine
and isolation, generally apply to distinct groups of persons but are often used
interchangeably. Quarantine typically refers to the “(s)eparation of individuals who
have been exposed to an infection but are not yet ill from others who have not been
exposed to the transmissible infection.”6 Isolation refers to the “(s)eparation of
infected individuals from those who are not infected.”7 Varying degrees of
quarantine exist, and the authority to order quarantine or isolation is generally very
broad.

First, both complete quarantine and isolation usually involve the confinement of
contagious individuals to their residences pursuant to orders from the state health
department. Health officials post a public notice forbidding anyone from
entering or exiting the dwelling. Alternatively, health authorities may confine
an infected person to either a hospital or a prison. Second, health authorities may
order a modified quarantine, which selectively restricts an individual from
participation in certain activities, e.g. jobs involving food preparation, school
attendance, or particularly hazardous activities. The quarantine power also
includes the authority to place a contagious individual under surveillance to
insure strict compliance with quarantine orders. Finally, the health department
may issue segregation orders which require the separation of an entire group of
people from the general population. Quarantine orders may extend to any
persons who come into contact with the infected individual.8

Primary quarantine authority typically resides with state health departments and
health officials; however, the federal government has jurisdiction over interstate and
foreign quarantine. In addition, the federal government may assist with or take over
the management of an intrastate incident if requested by a state or if the federal
government determines local efforts are inadequate.9 This report examines
federalism and other constitutional issues related to quarantines, discusses current
federal and state statutes and regulations, and explains the military’s role in enforcing
quarantines.

Constitutional Issues

The preservation of the public health has historically been the responsibility of
state and local governments.10 Although the federal government has the authority to
authorize quarantine under certain circumstances, the primary authority exists at the
state level as an exercise of the state’s police power. The 4th Congress appears to
have recognized this principle when, in 1796, it debated whether to authorize the
President to establish regulations to impose quarantines at ports of entry.11 After
opponents argued that the authority belonged to the states, Congress passed a law
authorizing the President to assist states in enforcing their health laws,12 which it
soon replaced with a law requiring certain federal officials to observe restraints and
quarantines imposed by state laws and to aid state officials in their execution.13

In 1824, the Supreme Court alluded to a state’s authority to enact quarantine
laws in Gibbons v. Ogden.14 In Gibbons, the Court noted that although quarantine
laws may affect commerce, they are, by nature, health laws, and thus fall under the
authority of state and local governments. Courts have noted that the duty to ensure
that the public health is preserved is inherent to the police power of a state and cannot
be surrendered.15 However, the Supreme Court has recognized that state health laws
that intrude on a matter within Congress’s power to legislate must give way under the
Supremacy Clause.16

The federal or state origin of quarantine laws may influence the means and
methods of their enforcement. The Constitution does not expressly vest the executive
branch with the authority to execute state laws, and the federal government has no
authority to order state officials to execute federal law.17 Article IV, § 4, guarantees
federal assistance to states only in cases of invasion or insurrection, or at the request
of the state legislature (or the executive, if the legislature cannot be convened) in the
case of “domestic violence.” The Tenth Amendment provides that powers not
expressly vested in the federal government are retained by the states or the people.18
It may be argued that a distinctly federal interest must exist before Congress can
legislate with respect to public health and that, although the Constitution does not
expressly say so, federal law enforcement officers may not ordinarily enforce state
laws without the permission of the state government.19

Federal and state quarantine laws are also subject to constitutional due process
constraints. The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit governments at all levels
from depriving individuals of any constitutionally protected liberty interest without
due process of law.20 What process may be due under certain circumstances is
generally determined by balancing the individual’s interest at stake against the
governmental interest served by the restraints, determining whether the measures are
reasonably calculated to achieve the government’s aims,21 and deciding whether the
least restrictive means have been employed to further that interest. In addition, some
have suggested that military enforcement of quarantines raises additional civil
liberties concerns. These aspects are discussed more fully below.

Federal Quarantine Authority

Current Law and Regulations

Federal quarantine authority derives from the Commerce Clause, which states
that Congress shall have the power “(t)o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States...”22 Thus, under section 361 of the Public Health
Service (PHS) Act, 42 U.S.C. § 264, the Secretary of Health and Human Services
(HHS) has the authority to make and enforce regulations necessary “to prevent the
introduction, transmission, or spread of communicable diseases from foreign
countries into the States or possessions, or from one State or possession into any
other State or possession.”23 While providing the Secretary with broad authority to
promulgate regulations “as in his judgement may be necessary,” this law limits the
Secretary’s authority to the communicable diseases published in an Executive Order
of the President.24 The list of communicable diseases in Executive Order 13295
currently includes cholera, diphtheria, infectious tuberculosis, plague, smallpox,
yellow fever, viral hemorrhagic fevers, SARS, and influenza caused by novel or
reemergent influenza viruses that are causing or have the potential to cause a
pandemic.25

Generally, federal regulations authorizing the apprehension, detention,
examination, or conditional release of individuals are applicable only to individuals
coming into a state or possession from a foreign country or possession.26 Thus,
federal regulations require the reporting of ill passengers on international
conveyances such as airplanes and boats.27 During the 2003 response to the SARS
epidemic, federal officials provided health alert information to air travelers returning
to the United States from areas with SARS outbreaks, boarded airplanes with
travelers reported to be ill to assess their symptoms, and facilitated transport of ill
passengers to hospitals. Federal officials also provided updates to the public and
worked with state and local public health agencies to investigate possible SARS
cases.28

In addition, section 361 of the PHS Act authorizes the apprehension and
examination of “any individual reasonably believed to be infected with a
communicable disease in a qualifying stage29 and (A) to be moving or about to move
from a State to another State; or (B) to be a probable source of infection to
individuals who, while infected with such disease in a qualifying stage, will be
moving from a State to another State.”30 If found to be infected, such individuals
may be detained for such time and in such manner as may be reasonably necessary.31
During times of war, the authority to apprehend and examine individuals extends to
any individual “reasonably believed (1) to be infected with such disease [as specified
in an Executive order of the President] and (2) to be a probable source of infection
to members of the armed forces of the United States” or to individuals engaged in the
production or transportation of supplies for the armed forces.32

Regulations promulgated pursuant to this authority under the PHS Act may be
found in Parts 70 and 71 of Title 42 of the Code of Federal Regulations. Part 70
deals with interstate matters; Part 71 deals with foreign arrivals.33 Following a
transfer of authority from the Secretary of HHS to the Director of the CDC in 2000,
the Director of the CDC is authorized to take measures as may be necessary to
prevent the spread of a communicable disease from one state or possession to any
other state or possession if he or she determines that measures taken by local health
authorities are inadequate to prevent the spread of the disease.34 To prevent the
spread of diseases between states, the regulations also prohibit infected persons from
traveling from one state to another without a permit from the health officer of the
state, possession, or locality of destination, if such a permit is required under the law
applicable to the place of destination.35 Additional requirements apply to persons
who are in the “communicable period of cholera, plague, smallpox, typhus or yellow
fever, or who having been exposed to any such disease, is in the incubation period
thereof.”36

The PHS Act and related statutes also authorize measures to aid or enforce a
quarantine in the event of a public health emergency. Section 322(a) of the PHS
Act37 authorizes the PHS to care for and treat persons under quarantine. Such persons
may also receive care and treatment at the expense of the PHS from public or private
medical facilities when authorized by the officer in charge of the PHS station at
which the application is made.38 Section 311 of the PHS Act39 provides for federalstate
cooperative activities to enforce quarantines. The federal government may help
states and localities enforce their quarantines and other health regulations and, in
turn, may accept state and local assistance in enforcing federal quarantines. Under the
authority of 42 U.S.C. § 97, the Secretary of HHS may request the aid of Customs,
Coast Guard, and military officers in the execution of quarantines imposed by states
on vessels coming into ports.

Criminal sanctions are prescribed for violations of federal regulations issued
pursuant to section 361 of the PHS Act.40 Violation of a federal quarantine or
isolation order is a criminal misdemeanor, and individuals may be subject to a fine
of up to $250,000, one year in jail, or both. Organizational violations may be subject
to fines of up to $500,000 per event. Federal district courts may enjoin individuals
and organizations from violation of CDC quarantine regulations.41

Proposed CDC Regulations

Responding to the possible threat of an influenza pandemic, the CDC on
November 22, 2005, announced proposed changes to its quarantine regulations.42 If
adopted, these changes would constitute the first significant revision of the
regulations in Parts 70 and 71 in 25 years. The proposed changes are an outgrowth
of the CDC’s experience during the spread of SARS in 2003, when the agency
experienced difficulties locating and contacting airline passengers who might have
been exposed to the SARS virus during their travels. In announcing the proposed
regulations, CDC Director Julie Gerberding said, “These updated regulations are
necessary to expedite and improve CDC operations by facilitating contact tracing and
prompting immediate medical follow up of potentially infected passengers and their
contacts.”43

The proposed regulations would expand reporting requirements for ill
passengers44 on board flights and ships arriving from foreign countries. They would
also require airlines and ocean liners to maintain passenger and crew lists with
detailed contact information and to submit these lists electronically to CDC upon
request.45 The lists would be used to notify passengers of their suspected exposure
if a sick person were not identified until after the travelers had dispersed from an
arriving carrier. The proposed regulations address the due process rights of
passengers who might be subjected to quarantine after suspected exposure to disease;
the regulations also provide for an appeal process.46

State Police Powers and Quarantine Authority

Although every state has the authority to pass and enforce quarantine laws as an
exercise of their police powers, these laws vary widely by state. Generally, state and
local quarantines are authorized through public health orders, though some states
may require a court order before an individual is detained.47 For example, in
Louisiana, the state health officer is not authorized to “confine any person in any
institution unless directed or authorized to do so by the judge of the parish in which
the person is located.”48 Diseases subject to quarantine may be defined by statute,
with some statutes addressing only a single disease, or the state health department
may be granted the authority to decide which diseases are communicable and
therefore subject to quarantine.49 States also employ different methods for
determining the duration of the quarantine or isolation period. Generally, “release
is accomplished when a determination is made that the person is no longer a threat
to the public health, or no longer infectious.”50

One common characteristic of many state quarantine laws is their “overall
antiquity,” with many statutes being between 40 and 100 years old.51 The more
antiquated laws “often do not reflect contemporary scientific understandings of
disease, [or] current treatments of choice.”52 In the past, state laws were often
enacted with a focus on a particular disease, such as tuberculosis or typhoid fever,
leading to inconsistent approaches in addressing other diseases.53

Until recently, despite the inconsistencies and perceived problems with such
laws, state legislatures have not been forced to reevaluate their quarantine and
isolation laws due to a decline in infectious diseases and advances in public health
and medicine.54 However, in light of recent threats and security concerns, many
states have begun to reconsider their emergency response systems, including the
state’s authority to quarantine.55 A review of quarantine authority was listed as a
priority for state governments in the President’s 2002 National Strategy for
Homeland Security.56

Federal authority over interstate and foreign travel is clearly delineated under
constitutional and statutory provisions. Less clear, however, is whether the state
police powers may be used to restrict interstate travel to prevent the spread of
disease.57 In a public health emergency, federal, state, and local authorities may
overlap. For example, both federal and state agencies may have quarantine authority
over an aircraft arriving in a large city from a foreign country. Thus, coordination
between the various levels of government would be essential during a widespread
public health emergency.58 Bioterrorism exercises such as TOPOFF 2 in May 2002
have highlighted the legal issues that may arise when federal, state, and local
authorities respond simultaneously to a public health emergency. One author’s
comments on lessons learned from TOPOFF 2 are instructive:59

Perhaps the most significant lesson in reference to the law and TOPOFF 2 is the
most obvious, namely the fact that the law at the intersection of public health and
bioterrorism is extremely unsettled. There is not a lack of law to draw upon in
addressing specific questions, but rather a myriad of laws that must be
considered, most of which were developed to address more mundane public
health matters, or designed to respond to more traditional emergency situations.
It is critical for the legal responders to be sensitive to the rights of affected
individuals and the public at large, because in the heat of the moment concern for
individual rights may be seen as a secondary matter. In particular, heightened
sensitivity to human rights must be exhibited in areas where physical imposition
or restraint come into question, such as isolation, quarantine, and mandated
medical examinations. While considerable progress is being made in
coordinating approaches to the age-old practices of isolation and quarantine,
other rights issues in this context remain open questions, such as the need to be
sensitive to post-deprivation rights, the right to legal counsel, the nature of
clinical evidence required to justify such measures, and the policies concerning
the application of isolation and quarantine to populations.

Model State Emergency Health Powers Act

The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (the Model Act) was drafted
by The Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins
Universities.60 The Model Act seeks to “grant public health powers to state and local
public health authorities to ensure a strong, effective, and timely planning,
prevention, and response mechanism to public health emergencies (including
bioterrorism) while also respecting individual rights.”61 It is important to note that
the act is intended to be a model for states to use in evaluating their emergency
response plans; passage of the Model Act in its entirety is not required, so state
legislatures may select the entire model, parts of it, or none at all. Many states have
used parts of the Model Act while tailoring their statutes and regulations to respond
to unique or novel situations that may arise in their jurisdiction.62

The Model Act provides a comprehensive framework for state emergency health
powers, including statutory authority for quarantine63 and isolation.64 Section 604
of the Model Act authorizes the quarantine or isolation of an individual or groups of
individuals during a public health emergency.65 The Model Act encourages the
public health authority to adhere to specific conditions and principles when
exercising quarantine or isolation authority.66 These conditions and principles
include ensuring that the measures taken are the least restrictive means necessary to
prevent the spread of the disease; monitoring the condition of quarantined or isolated
individuals; and providing for the immediate release of individuals when they no
longer pose a substantial risk of transmitting the disease to others.67 The Model Act
provides that a failure to obey the rules and orders concerning quarantine and
isolation shall be treated as a misdemeanor.68

The Model State Emergency Health Powers Act sets forth procedures for
quarantine and isolation under two different sets of circumstances. Section 605(a)
addresses procedures for temporary quarantine and isolation without notice if a
“delay in imposing the isolation or quarantine would significantly jeopardize the
public health authority’s ability to prevent or limit the transmission of a contagious
or possibly contagious disease to others.” The quarantine or isolation must be
ordered through a written directive specifying the identity of the individuals subject
to the order, the premises subject to the order, the date and time at which the
quarantine or isolation are to commence, the suspected contagious disease, and a
copy of the provisions set forth in the act relating to isolation and quarantine.69 The
public health authority is required to petition within 10 days after issuing the
directive for a court order authorizing the continued isolation or quarantine if
needed.70

Apart from the emergency procedures outlined above, the public health authority
may petition a court for an order authorizing the quarantine or isolation of an
individual or groups of individuals, with notice of the petition given to the
individuals or groups of individuals in question within 24 hours.71 The public health
authority’s petition must include the same information as required in the emergency
directive discussed above, in addition to “a statement of the basis upon which
isolation and quarantine is justified in compliance with this Article.”72 A hearing
must be held within five days of the petition being filed, and the court “shall grant the
petition if, by a preponderance of the evidence, isolation or quarantine is shown to
be reasonably necessary to prevent or limit the transmission of a contagious or
possibly contagious disease to others.”73 An order authorizing quarantine or isolation
may not do so for a period exceeding 30 days, though the public health authority may
move to continue quarantine or isolation for additional periods not exceeding 30
days.74

The Model Act provides procedures that allow individuals subject to quarantine
or isolation to challenge their detention and obtain release, and it provides remedies
where established conditions were not met.75 Individuals subject to quarantine or
isolation would be appointed counsel if they are not otherwise represented in their
challenge.76

Legal Challenges to State Quarantine Authority

Public health measures in emergency situations, including quarantine, involve
balancing the rights of individuals with the state’s police power to protect the needs
of the public health, safety, and general welfare. Historically, this balance can be
seen in public health crises over the past century or so:77

It is well known that public health raises conflicts between individual and
societal interests. The context may vary, but the essential tension of balancing
individual and group interests is largely the same. For example, at the beginning
of the twentieth century, a key issue was vaccination against smallpox. In the
1980s, a contentious issue was the reporting of human immunodeficiency virus
(“HIV”) test results by name to public health authorities. After September 11,
2001, and the anthrax episode shortly thereafter, there has been a debate about
whether broad emergency powers to protect public health should be given to
governors and state health departments and, if so, whether special new legislation
is needed. Many of the same issues arise in the use of large-scale quarantine
measures, such as those used to combat SARS. [Footnotes omitted.]

The Supreme Court in Gibbons v. Ogden, in 1824, alluded to a state’s authority
to quarantine under the police powers. In 1902, the Court directly addressed a state’s
power to quarantine an entire geographic area in Compagnie Francaise de
Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of Health,78 where both the law and
its implementation were upheld as valid exercises of the state’s police power. A
shipping company in this case challenged an interpretation of a state statute that
conferred upon the state board of health the authority to exclude healthy persons,
whether they came from without or within the state, from a geographic area infested
with a disease.79 The shipping company alleged that the statute as interpreted
interfered with interstate commerce, and thus was an unconstitutional violation of the
Commerce Clause. The Court rejected this argument, holding that although the
statute may have had an effect on commerce, it was not unconstitutional.80

When a quarantine is established in a geographic area due to adverse conditions
in the area, courts are thus likely to uphold the restrictions. The Supreme Court has
stated that the right to travel “does not mean that areas ravaged by flood, fire or
pestilence cannot be quarantined when it can be demonstrated that unlimited travel
to the area would directly and materially interfere with the safety and welfare of the
area.”81 In Miller v. Campbell City,82 an order to evacuate an area was issued due to
leaking methane and hydrogen gases. After some residents from a subdivision in the
area became ill, the County Commissioners declared the subdivision uninhabitable.
The plaintiff was arrested when he crossed the roadblock enforcing the quarantine
in an attempt to return home. The court upheld a finding that the evacuation order
was substantially related to the public health and safety, and found no evidence that
the quarantine action was taken in bad faith or maliciously.83 The county needed to
act quickly because of the potential danger, so no liability was found.

Courts have recognized an individual’s right to challenge his or her quarantine
or isolation by petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus.84 Although the primary
function of a writ of habeas corpus is to test the legality of the detention,85 petitioners
often seek a declaration that the statute under which they were quarantined is
unconstitutional or violative of due process. Due process is a concern, though courts
are reluctant to interfere with a state’s exercise of police powers with regard to public
health matters “except where the regulations adopted for the protection of the public
health are arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable.”86 The courts appear to defer to
the determinations of state boards of health and generally uphold such detentions as
nonviolative of due process and as valid exercises of a state’s duty to preserve the
public health. Thus, the court in United States v. Shinnick87 upheld the Public Health
Service’s medical isolation of an arriving passenger because she had been in
Stockholm, Sweden, a city declared by the World Health Organization to be a
smallpox-infected area, and she could not show proof of vaccination.

In People ex rel. Barmore v. Robertson,88 the court refused to grant a habeas
corpus petition for a woman who ran a boarding house where a person infected with
typhoid fever had boarded. The woman was not herself infected with the disease, but
she was a carrier and had been quarantined in her home. She argued that her
quarantine was unwarranted because she was not “actually sick,” though the court
noted that “t is not necessary that one be actually sick, as that term is usually
applied, in order that the health authorities have the right to restrain his liberties by
quarantine regulations.”89 In justifying quarantine under these circumstances, the
court explained that because disease germs are carried by human beings, and as the
purpose of an effective quarantine is to prevent the spread of the disease to those who
are not infected, anyone who carries the germs must be quarantined.90 The court
found that in the case of a person infected with typhoid fever, anyone who had come
into contact with that person must be quarantined to prevent the spread of the
disease.91

However, some courts have refused to uphold the quarantine of an individual
in cases where the state is unable to meet its burden of proof concerning that
individual’s potential danger to others, or if a restriction is viewed as unreasonable
or oppressive.92 In Wong Wai v. Williamson,93 the San Francisco Board of Health
ordered all Chinese residents to be inoculated against bubonic plague and restricted
their right to leave the city, citing nine deaths allegedly from plague. The
inoculations were tainted, causing severe consequences. The court inferred that the
regulations were properly authorized, but nevertheless struck them down as “not
based on any established distinction in the conditions that are supposed to attend the
plague, or the persons exposed to its contagions.”94

Shortly after, in Jew Ho v. Williamson, the same court held that the quarantine requirements applied only to
Chinese and questioned whether bubonic plague actually caused the reported deaths.
It invalidated the quarantine as “unreasonable, unjust and oppressive.”95
Additional legal issues might be raised if quarantine, isolation, and other public
health measures were used to deal with a widespread public health emergency such
as a biological terror attack or an influenza pandemic. If government agencies
requisition private facilities for quarantine purposes, such as in the case of
overburdened medical facilities, the legal questions regarding eminent domain power
may arise.96 If a person with symptoms of a contagious disease is involuntarily
isolated in a hospital for a period of days or weeks, who pays for the person’s
hospital stay? What if medical personnel or hospital employees refuse to come to
work because of a medical emergency?97

Discrimination issues may arise if health
care providers refuse to treat infected patients or individuals who appear to be from
an area of the world where a disease outbreak originates, or if persons discriminate
against health care providers who treat individuals with infectious conditions.98 The
legality concerning mandatory vaccinations as a health measure may arise during an
infectious disease outbreak,99 and health authorities may face the related issue of
rationing limited supplies of available vaccines.100

The application of statutes such as the Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act (EMTALA)101 to a public health emergency situation may need to
be assessed. EMTALA requires hospitals to evaluate all patients who come to an
emergency room and to stabilize patients needing emergency care prior to any
transfer. Compliance with EMTALA during a health emergency may be
compromised if hospitals are overwhelmed by large numbers of persons seeking
treatment.102 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),103
and its implementing regulations at 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164 (Privacy Rule), may
also need to be assessed. While HIPAA requirements do not include broad waivers
that would exempt hospitals from compliance during an emergency situation, there
are provisions in the Privacy Rule that may be relaxed under emergency
circumstances.

A new development in the law relating to quarantine is the possible use of selfimposed
or home quarantines. States may need to consider whether their ability to
impose quarantine also includes the authorities necessary to support a population
asked to voluntarily stay at home for a period of time.104 Such authority may include
the ability to offer legal immunity to businesses asked to provide facilities for
quarantine. Compliance with public health measures such as quarantine or isolation
may also be affected by employment-related issues, because individuals may fear
losing their jobs or benefits while staying at home for social distancing measures
such as “snow days” or voluntary quarantines, or for caring for a sick relative.105

Military Enforcement of Health Measures

In light of recent concerns that a strain of avian influenza could mutate to cause
a pandemic, President Bush has suggested that Congress should authorize him to
employ military forces to enforce any quarantine that might become necessary in the
event of an outbreak in the United States.106 President Bush also suggested that the
National Guard might be employed under federal rather than state control to carry out
measures to contain such an outbreak.107 Critics of the proposal have expressed
concern that an additional exception to the Posse Comitatus Act,108 which prohibits
active military personnel from carrying out certain law enforcement activities without
express statutory authority,109 would lead to a form of martial law, with the attendant
threats to civil liberties.110

Posse Comitatus Act

The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, punishes those who, “except in
cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of
Congress, willfully use any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus
or otherwise to execute the laws.”111 Some view the act as the embodiment of the
American tradition that abhors the use of soldiers to compel citizens to obey the
law.112 Yet the Constitution does not explicitly bar the use of military forces in
civilian situations or in matters of law enforcement; in fact, it empowers Congress
to provide for calling forth the militia to execute federal law.113

Courts have held that, absent a recognized exception, the Posse Comitatus Act
is violated when (1) civilian law enforcement officials make “direct active use” of
military investigators, (2) the use of the military “pervades the activities” of the
civilian officials, or (3) the military is used to subject citizens to the exercise of
military power that is “regulatory, prescriptive, or compulsory in nature.”114 To the
extent that quarantine enforcement measures involve the compulsion of civilians to
remain in or leave an area, for example, it appears that the Posse Comitatus Act
would be implicated. Thus, unless a pandemic were to lead to significant civil unrest
or call for other military activity already authorized pursuant to existing exceptions,115
Congress would have to enact a law to authorize military enforcement of health
measures.

The act does not prohibit activities conducted for a military purpose, which
could encompass restrictions implemented on bases or to control a communicable
disease affecting service members. The Posse Comitatus Act does not apply to the
National Guard unless it is employed in federal service as a reserve force of the
armed forces. If the National Guard is called up to enforce U.S. laws, however, it is
not subject to the Posse Comitatus Act.116

Possible Military Enforcement Under Other Statutes

The President may be authorized by the Constitution or by statute to use the
military to enforce a quarantine or conduct other law enforcement activities as needed
during an epidemic. Prior to the Civil War, Congress was generally reluctant to
involve itself with any type of disaster assistance,117 and health measures, except in
areas under exclusive federal jurisdiction, were generally left to the regulation of the
states. However, Congress has given the President, through the Secretary of HHS,
the authority to help states enforce quarantine laws with respect to any vessels
arriving in or bound to any of their ports or districts, including the use of the
military.118 This authority, which originated in a law passed in 1796,119 does not
extend to the control of movement of persons within the United States.

In 1866, when issues involving military government and states’ rights figured
prominently in the nation’s political discourse, the Senate considered a bill that
would have given the Secretary of War the responsibility, “with the cooperation of
the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Treasury ... to cause a rigid
quarantine against the introduction into this country of the Asiatic cholera through
its ports of entry.”120 The bill would have further authorized the Secretary of War to
“use the means at [his] command” to enforce “sanitary cordons to prevent the spread
of said disease from infected districts adjacent to or within the limits of the United
States.” After the bill’s sponsor affirmed that the power could extend to the
declaration of martial law,121 the questioner responded, “I would rather have the
cholera than such a proposition as this.”122 Most of the ensuing debate centered
around Congress’s power to legislate, either under the Commerce Clause, the
Guarantee Clause, or the “war power” and on whether the legislation would
impermissibly intrude on the police powers of the states.123 The power to regulate
foreign commerce appears to have attracted the most support; as finally passed, the
bill gave authority to the Secretary of the Treasury, until January of 1867, to make
and enforce quarantine regulations deemed necessary to help state and municipal
authorities guard against cholera.124

Outside of the Coast Guard’s role in enforcing CDC health regulations with
respect to foreign passengers and cargo,125 the armed forces have not historically
played a major role in enforcing quarantines during epidemics.126 The Army Medical
Corps has provided medical assistance to victims of yellow fever and other epidemics
and contributed extensively to medical research,127 but it does not appear that an
outbreak of disease has ever overwhelmed state and local authorities to the point
where federal military intervention was required. It is, however, conceivable that in
a major epidemic, opposition to quarantine measures could lead to civil disorder and
significant numbers of state and local law enforcement officials could themselves fall
victim to the disease, in each case to such an extent that federal assistance or
intervention would be needed to ensure the execution of federal or state laws.

In such circumstances, the President could invoke the Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. §§
331-335, to employ the National Guard or regular armed forces to execute federal
law or state law (if requested by the state legislature).

Section 331 of title 10, U.S. Code, authorizes the President to use the military
to suppress an insurrection at the request of a state government. This authorization
is meant to fulfill the federal government’s responsibility to protect states against
“domestic violence.” Section 332 delegates Congress’s power under the
Constitution, art. I, § 8, cl. 15, to the President, authorizing him to determine that
“unlawful obstructions, combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the
authority of the United States make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the United
States” and to use the armed forces as he considers necessary to enforce the law or
to suppress the rebellion. Section 333 permits the President to use the armed forces
to suppress any “insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful combination, or
conspiracy” if law enforcement is hindered within a state and local law enforcement
is unable to protect individuals’ rights guaranteed by the Constitution, or if the
unlawful action “obstructs the execution of the laws of the United States or impedes
the course of justice under those laws.”

This section was enacted to implement the
Fourteenth Amendment and does not require the request or even the permission of
the governor of the affected state. The Insurrection Act has been used to send the
armed forces to quell civil disturbances a number of times during U.S. history, most
recently during the 1992 Los Angeles riots and during Hurricane Hugo in 1989.128
The President could use the Insurrection Act to enforce health measures in the event
that civil officials were overwhelmed during a pandemic and unable to enforce those
laws.
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http://www.ajph.org/cgi/content/full/97/Supplement_1/S49

Encouraging Compliance With Quarantine: A Proposal to Provide Job Security and Income Replacement

Mark A. Rothstein, JD and Meghan K. Talbott, JD

The authors are with the Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy and Law, University of Louisville, School of Medicine, Louisville, Ky.


ABSTRACT

A human influenza virus is considered the most likely source of a pandemic in the near future. Quarantine has the potential to be the most effective measure for limiting the spread of infection. The major obstacles to compliance for those asked to enter quarantine include loss of income during quarantine and loss of employment after quarantine. We discuss current antidiscrimination and compensation laws, as well as options to expand coverage for quarantined individuals to encourage public cooperation by guaranteeing job security and providing income replacement.

  INTRODUCTION

IN NOVEMBER 2005, OUT OF concern over the possible spread of avian flu in humans, President George W. Bush released the National Strategy for Pandemic Flu. The plan, which outlined measures to prepare, identify, detect, and respond to a pandemic disease threat, is intended to "provide guidance to all levels of government on the range of options for infection control and containment."1 The strategy lists social distancing measures for controlling and containing the spread of disease, including restrictions on large gatherings, "snow days," and quarantine and isolation, but it does not provide details about how these measures should be implemented.

Quarantine, the most restrictive measure, has the potential to be the most effective at limiting the spread of infection.2 Its effectiveness depends on public cooperation and compliance, but there are major impediments to compliance for those asked or ordered to enter quarantine, including the loss of income during quarantine and loss of employment after quarantine. Unfortunately, the National Strategy for Pandemic Flu makes no mention of these potentially serious obstacles to voluntary compliance.1

In the United States, authority to quarantine is vested primarily in state governments. Federal authority to order a quarantine is reserved for containment at the national borders and preventing the spread of infection between states,3 but the federal government can be expected to take the lead in setting policy for the states in the event of a pandemic. Quarantine can take place in various locations, including homes, workplaces, schools, hospitals, and other settings, and compliance may be voluntary or pursuant to a governmental order.4 Individuals subjected to quarantine may be reluctant to adhere to government directives to limit their movement, because of the disruption that it creates in their daily lives.5 When individuals are quarantined in their own homes, they are effectively isolated from the outside world, and their livelihoods may be jeopardized.5 Quarantined individuals not only risk the loss of income if they become infected and miss work, they also risk losing their employment entirely because of absence or stigma related to the disease, regardless of whether they become infected. Loss of income heads the list of most frequently cited major obstacles to compliance with quarantine.6,7

Because quarantine reaches its peak of effectiveness at 90% compliance,6,8 public cooperation with quarantine is critical in containing the spread of disease. Countries affected by severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 recognized the importance of legal protections for job security and income replacement caused by quarantine and moved quickly to enact the needed legislation. It is not clear that similar legislation could be enacted so rapidly in the United States, and even if it could, having laws in place before a pandemic strikes is a much better approach. Unfortunately, there are few laws in the United States to replace the lost income of individuals during quarantine9 and to provide job security after quarantine. Furthermore, no federal legislation is pending or is a part of the National Strategy for Pandemic Flu.

In this article, we discuss current job security and income replacement laws, as well as options to expand coverage for quarantined individuals. We propose measures to provide job security and income replacement to meet the basic needs of individuals in quarantine. Although many details of the income replacement program need to be developed, the purpose of the article is to raise awareness of this issue and to stimulate public health officials and policymakers to include these matters in public health emergency plans.

JOB SECURITY LAWS

Fear of infection can and has led to employment discrimination against groups of people, even when few people in those groups are actually infected or contagious.7 Of equal or greater concern is that employers might discharge or replace employees who missed work because they were in quarantine. Thus, without job security legislation, there is a real possibility that people might lose their livelihood during or after quarantine. In a 2006 survey, 1 in 3 Americans reported that they would be very worried about being treated unfairly after a quarantine period.10

In 2003, to protect the job security of individuals infected with SARS or quarantined because of SARS, the government of Ontario enacted the SARS Assistance and Recovery Strategy Act, providing SARS emergency leave and protecting the jobs of people in Ontario affected by SARS-related illness, quarantine, or isolation. Employees were entitled to a leave of absence without pay if they were unable to work as a result of investigation or treatment related to SARS or because they were subjected to quarantine or isolation. The law applied to individuals sent home by their employer because of concern about SARS and those who provided care or assistance to family members for a SARS-related concern, including school closures.11

Americans With Disabilities Act
The United States has laws prohibiting employment discrimination based on disability, but the laws are inapplicable to individuals in quarantine. The federal Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) prohibits discrimination in employment against individuals with physical or mental disabilities. To be covered under the ADA, an individual must have a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits 1 or more of the major life activities of that individual, have a record of such an impairment, or be regarded as having such an impairment.12 This definition would not cover a healthy individual in quarantine, because the individual would not have any impairment. The "regarded as" part of the definition also would not provide coverage, because the Supreme Court has held that the condition the individual is "regarded as" having must constitute a substantial limitation of a major life activity.13 Indeed, the ADA would not even cover individuals who contract and later recover from the communicable illness, regardless of whether they were in isolation, because the ADA does not apply to temporary impairments.14

Family and Medical Leave Act
The Family and Medical Leave Act provides up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave to employees with at least 12 months service and 1250 hours of work completed in the preceding year. The Family and Medical Leave Act applies to employers with 50 or more employees and state and local government agencies. The application of the Family and Medical Leave Act to quarantine is doubtful because the statute grants leave only in cases of childbirth, adoption, or "serious health condition."15 An asymptomatic individual in quarantine would not meet this standard. The coverage is similar under several state laws.

Common Law
Another possible basis of legal protection for the job security of individuals in quarantine is the common law of wrongful discharge. A 2006 report of the Congressional Research Service provides, "If isolation or quarantine were to attempt or limit the spread of a pandemic influenza virus and an employee was terminated because of absence from the workplace, a claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy might arise."16 This statement and the accompanying discussion in the report overestimates the likelihood of success of such an action and ignores the practical limitations.

Private sector employees working without a collectively bargained or individual contract are considered employees "at will" who generally may be terminated without notice for any reason, except where doing so violates a specific statute, such as those prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, gender, national origin, age, disability, or other proscribed criteria. In addition, 43 states prohibit "wrongful discharge" in violation of public policy, which gives rise to a legal action in tort or contract.17 There are 4 types of public policy generally recognized by courts: refusing to commit unlawful acts, exercising a statutory right, fulfilling a public obligation, and reporting illegal activity.17 Observing quarantine during a pandemic is arguably "fulfilling a public obligation." The cases asserting a public obligation, however, are difficult to prove and fall into a few recognized categories in which the employee is legally compelled to engage in certain conduct, such as serving on a jury, obeying a subpoena, testifying in a legal proceeding, and reporting suspected abuse of children, the elderly, patients, or institutionalized individuals.17 No court has ever held that it violates public policy to discharge an individual because he or she missed work because of quarantine.

Even if such an approach were theoretically possible, there are practical reasons why wrongful discharge is an inadequate basis for protecting the employment rights of individuals in quarantine. First, courts might well condition protection on the individual acting pursuant to a judicial or administrative order of quarantine. Requiring numerous orders, however, would be burdensome on the public health and judicial systems in an emergency. Second, the question of whether a discharge was lawful could not be determined in advance of litigation, and individuals would be faced with the prospect of forgoing any income for months or years in the hope that a court might eventually rule in their favor. Third, the uncertainty of recovery and the relatively small amounts in dispute might make it difficult for a plaintiff to find a lawyer. Thus, common law approaches are not an attractive way of dealing with job security in the event of quarantine and do not obviate the need for a specific statute.

State Statutes
In the last 5 years, some states have enacted laws giving a measure of job security to quarantined employees.18–25 The laws of these states vary in coverage and protection (Table 1Go). Most require that the employee be under isolation or quarantine by order of a state official or judge and do not cover employees who simply comply with requests for isolation or quarantine or who are caring for a family member in quarantine or isolation.

The statutory remedies provided for discharged employees also vary. Delaware and New Mexico make it unlawful to terminate a quarantined or isolated employee but do not provide a specific way for an employee to be reinstated.18,25 Kansas and Maine provide penalties for employers that discharge quarantined employees but make no provision for reinstatement.20,21 Iowa allows an employee to petition for reinstatement.19 Maine and Minnesota require this to be done through a civil action,21,23 leading to the same problems discussed with bringing a wrongful discharge suit. Just 2 state statutes prohibit adverse treatment other than termination or discharge, such as failure to receive a promotion or a decrease in pay.19,23 Although state laws provide some protection to employees, a more comprehensive federal statute would better protect quarantined individuals.

JOB SECURITY PROPOSAL

In the United States, there is precedent for enacting laws requiring employers to provide unpaid leave for employees engaging in socially desirable activities. The 2 best examples are laws dealing with federal jury service26 and military duty.27 A comparable law could mandate a leave of absence and job protection for all individuals subject to quarantine and isolation, as well as for individuals who provide services to family members in quarantine and isolation. The purpose of such job protection laws would be to remove apprehension about job loss, thereby reassuring individuals that compliance with quarantine and aiding quarantined individuals would not jeopardize their jobs. Affording protection to care-givers is as important as protecting individuals in quarantine. If caregivers cannot provide these services without risking their job security, they will be reluctant to provide care, and quarantined individuals may be induced to break quarantine to deal with their own needs.

Although the initial legislative enactments have been at the state level, federal legislation would be simpler and more comprehensive than would a series of possibly incomplete or contradictory laws. The proposed Emergency Flu Response Act of 200428 included a National Quarantine Compensation Program, which provided for the replacement of lost wages during quarantine, afforded employees the right to their position after quarantine, and protected employees from employment discrimination. The proposed legislation had some significant limitations.

The bill failed to define "employee" or "quarantine" and appeared to provide compensation only for workers quarantined by order of a federal or state agency, leaving out those who comply with quarantine requests and those who care for quarantined or isolated family members. The bill was intended to address concerns about the adequacy of annual influenza vaccine supplies, and as the flu season elapsed, so did the perceived urgency of enactment. Although federal legislation is preferable, in the absence of congressional action, model state legislation should be drafted for widespread consideration and enactment.

INCOME REPLACEMENT

Many people can be expected to enter quarantine voluntarily for the public good, but concern for the community alone might not be sufficient to keep enough individuals separated from society, particularly when those same individuals are faced with the prospects of unpaid bills and hungry children. To enforce compliance, every state in the United States has laws authorizing public health officials to compel individuals, under the force of law, to be quarantined.29 Yet, the use of compulsory power is a burden on public health, the judiciary, and law enforcement, and it will not necessarily lead to a higher rate of compliance. In fact, history demonstrates that the use of force in quarantine has led to additional social problems.29,30 Even in countries considered to have a more communitarian culture and social solidarity, such as China, there still have been problems enforcing quarantine.7

Americans are widely believed to be much less inclined to adhere to voluntary or compulsory quarantine measures than the residents of Canada, China, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Vietnam, based on our individualists and libertarian traditions.7,31 Similarly, Americans are less likely to support techniques for monitoring compliance with quarantine, such as video monitoring, remote medical monitoring, and electronic bracelets.10 Rather than strengthening coercive laws and practices to enforce compliance in the United States, public cooperation should be encouraged, including by guaranteeing job security and providing income replacement.

Various models of income replacement laws for quarantine have been enacted internationally (Table 2Go). The federal government of Canada amended its employment insurance regulations to make it easier for individuals to obtain benefits. This action allowed the unemployed and those with interrupted employment because of quarantine to receive employment insurance benefits by removing the 2-week waiting period for benefits and removing the requirement of a medical certificate if the period for which the individual was seeking compensation was during the SARS-related 10-day quarantine period.6 Canada also passed a federal income relief program for health care workers who were not eligible for employment insurance. The law provided Can $400 per week for full-time workers and Can $200 per week for part-time6 workers with Can $6000 maximum compensation available over a 15-week period.6

Ontario, the Canadian province most affected by SARS,7 enacted a similar compensation program for individuals who were sick, quarantined, or provided care to someone directly affected by SARS for at least 5 days during the SARS outbreak period and did not receive full compensation for the pay that they lost from other sources. Some commentators have suggested that the compensation packages implemented by the Canadian and Ontario governments played a large part in the success of the voluntary quarantine program in Canada during the SARS outbreak.6

In Beijing, China, employers were responsible for paying the full salary and benefits of employees quarantined or placed under medical observation because of suspicion of SARS and who were subsequently confirmed not to have SARS.32 In Shanghai, China, employers were required to pay full compensation to employees when an employee was quarantined or under medical observation because of close contact with a SARS-infected individual or one suspected of having SARS, and the employee was later determined not to have SARS or when an employee was required to travel to a SARS-affected area for employment reasons, placed in quarantine on return, and later determined not to have SARS.32

In Hong Kong, the Emergency Financial Assistance Scheme for Prevention of the Spread of SARS was created for persons identified to be close contacts of SARS patients and who were placed in confinement.33 The government also provided cash payments to families of SARS patients to pay for living expenses.

In Singapore, the government amended its workers’ compensation act to include SARS. For those required to be quarantined, the government, through the Home Quarantine Allowance Scheme, paid an allowance of Singapore $70 (US $41) per day for self-employed persons and for employees of small businesses (defined as employing 50 or fewer persons) that were forced to close because of home quarantine of their employees. Employees under this compensation scheme were deemed to be under hospitalization leave, and their employers were reimbursed up to a maximum of US $41 per day.34 The government advised employers that the home quarantine period should be treated as paid hospital leave for their employees under the Employment Act.

In Taiwan, the government required all employers to give full paid leave to employees quarantined because of SARS. Part of a US $50 billion SARS Emergency Relief Act went to compensating employers for SARS-related leaves.35 Also, guest workers who were quarantined were paid salaries and had their jobs secured and medical bills paid by the Taiwanese government. Individuals receiving notice of quarantine, complying with the regulations, and found not to be sick received economic assistance, including stipends in an amount equivalent to approximately US $150.

In the United States, a portion of individuals would not suffer a total loss of income during the quarantine or isolation period because they would be covered under an existing income protection mechanism. For example, some employees would be able to use vacation days or paid sick leave on the days of their quarantine or isolation. Those quarantined at work, such as health care workers, may be entitled to regular compensation, possibly including overtime. However, dependence on current income protection mechanisms will leave many quarantined individuals without income replacement.

Workers’ Compensation
Most employees in the United States are covered by workers’ compensation laws that provide medical benefits and income replacement for workers with employment-related injuries or illnesses,17 but these laws are unlikely to help quarantined individuals. Individuals who are quarantined but never develop the disease have no compensable injury or illness. Even if current workers’ compensation laws were amended to allow for the eligibility of healthy quarantined employees, the illness for which quarantine is ordered would have to arise from employment. Thus, individuals would have to prove they were exposed to or contracted the disease at work.17

Unemployment Insurance

Unemployment insurance, a joint federal and state compensation program, does not require illness and is designed to provide financial assistance to individuals who are temporarily out of work because of a lawful reason and are looking for employment. To qualify for benefits, unemployed workers must meet multiple requirements that vary by state, but most require: (1) sufficient wages in the past year, (2) work for a sufficient period of time, (3) involuntary separation from employment, and (4) availability for work.36 Unemployment insurance may offer some income relief, but its exclusions would effectively leave out many quarantined individuals. First, individuals are only eligible for unemployment insurance if they have actually lost their job and are actively seeking work. Therefore, it would not apply to many quarantined individuals, because they would still be employed and would not be "available" for work. Second, there are certain workers generally not covered by unemployment insurance, including the 7.4% of working adults who are self-employed.37 Third, minimum employment time requirements and minimum earnings requirements exclude other people, particularly workers new to or reentering the workforce and part-time workers.


INCOME REPLACEMENT PROPOSAL

Current laws leave a large percentage of individuals who will need to be quarantined in the event of a large-scale infectious disease outbreak without any income replacement. Because maximal compliance is vital to halting the spread of disease, economic protections must be in place. There are several options for income replacement programs, including replacing the entire amount of employees’ lost wages, predetermined benefit amounts, such as in Canada and Singapore, and requiring employers to pay employees for time off, as in China and Taiwan.

The simplest and most efficient way to provide for income replacement would be to institute a flat-rate payment system. The employment income replacement programs in Canada could serve as an effective model for the United States. This model uses flat-rate weekly payments, one for full-time and a reduced rate for part-time workers, with a required minimum number of days in quarantine and a maximum number of weeks of compensation available. The Canadian program also provided for the ability to receive a greater amount, if proven that there was greater loss, up to a maximum amount.

The National Strategy Against Pandemic Influenza allocates more than 90% of spending for vaccines and antiviral medications.4 The remaining money is to be used to ensure that all levels of government are prepared to respond to a pandemic outbreak.38 It is difficult to predict exactly how much money will be needed to fund an income replacement program, but it is clear that federal funding will be necessary and should be a part of any plan to prepare for a future pandemic. A major pandemic would eventually empty any fund created, but quarantine is most effective, and therefore, best implemented before the widespread transmission of a disease.9 By the time a disease spreads extensively within the population and the quarantine compensation funds begin dwindling, the effectiveness of quarantine as a method of preventing disease transmission will likely be declining.

Implementing an effective and efficient income replacement program for individuals in quarantine will not be simple. In addition to legislative authorization and adequate funding, systems need to be designed for application and eligibility verification. Expedited procedures are essential, and they must take place without any face-to-face contact, such as through online and telephone applications and electronic fund transfers. Because of the need to enact legislation and develop implementing procedures, it is important to begin immediate action. Waiting until a pandemic strikes will be too late.


CONCLUSION

As the international experience with SARS makes clear, an effective quarantine requires more than governmental requests or orders for large numbers of individuals to stay at home or otherwise maintain a social distance for a period of time. Economic issues, including providing job security and income replacement, must be addressed to achieve voluntary quarantine compliance rates capable of slowing or halting the spread of infection.


      Footnotes
 
Peer Reviewed

Contributors
M.A. Rothstein originated the article and participated in all aspects of the research, analysis, and writing. M. K. Talbott had primary responsibility for the research and assisted with the analysis and writing.

Human Participant Protection
No protocol approval was needed for this study.

Accepted for publication October 21, 2006.

References

1. Homeland Security Council. National strategy for pandemic influenza. The White House Web site. November 2005. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/homeland/pandemic-influenza.html. Accessed June 19, 2006.

2. Ferguson NM, Cummings DAT, Fraser C, Cajka J, Cooley PC, Burke DS. Strategies for mitigating an influenza pandemic. Nature. April 2006 (published online):1–5. Available at http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/vaop/ncurrent/full/nature04795.html. Accessed June 19, 2006.

3. Gostin L. Public health strategies for pandemic influenza: ethics and the law. JAMA. 2006;295:1700–1704.[Free Full Text]

4. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. Facts sheet on isolation and quarantine. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Web site. May 3, 2005. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/isolationquarantine.htm. Accessed June 19, 2006.

5. Ries NM. Public health law and ethics: lessons from SARS and quarantine. Health Law Rev. 2004;13:3–6.[Medline]

6. The SARS Commission (Canada). Second interim report. SARS and public health legislation. LSU Law Center Web site. April 5, 2005. Available at: http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blaw/sars/Interim_Report_2.pdf. Accessed July 2, 2006.

7. Blendon RJ, Benson LM, DesRoches CM, Raleigh E, Taylor-Clark K. The public’s response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in Toronto and the United States. Clin Infect Dis. 2004;38:925–931. Available at: http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/CID/journal/contents/v38n7.html. Accessed July 1, 2006.[CrossRef][Web of Science][Medline]

8. Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. Public health guidance for community-level preparedness and response to Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) Version 2. Suppl D: Community containment measures, including non-hospital isolation and quarantine. Appendix D2: Frequently asked questions about use of community containment measures. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Web site. May 3, 2005. Available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/sars/guidance/D/app2.htm. Accessed July 2, 2006.

9. DiGiovanni C, Bowen N, Ginsberg M, Giles G. Quarantine stressing voluntary compliance. Emerg Infect Dis. 2005;11:1778–1779.[Web of Science][Medline]

10. Blendon RJ, DesRoches CM, Cetron MS, Benson JM, Meinhardt T, Pollard W. Attitudes toward the use of quarantine in a public health emergency in four countries. Health Aff (Millwood). January 2006 (published online):w15–w25. Available at www.healthaffairs.org. Accessed on June 19, 2006.

11. Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy and Law at the University of Louisville School of Medicine. Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS. Report to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Louisville, KY: Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy and Law at the University of Louisville School of Medicine; 2003.

12. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2000).

13. Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999).

14. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j) (2003).

15. 29 U.S.C. § 2612 (a) (1)(D) (2000).

16. Jones NL, Shimabukuro JO. Congressional Research Service. Quarantine and isolation: selected legal issues relating to employment. Available at: http://www.cdt.org/opencrs/demo. Accessed October 10, 2006.

17. Rothstein MA, Craver CB, Schroeder EP, Shoben EW. Employment Law. Third Edition. St. Paul, MN: West; 2004.

18. Del. Code Ann. tit. 20, § 3136 (2005).

19. Iowa Code § 139A. 13A (2005).

20. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65–129d (2005).

21. Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 875 (West Supp. 2005).

22. Md. Code Ann., Health-Gen. I § 18–906 (2005).

23. Minn. Stat. § 144.4196 (Supp. 2006).

24. N.J. Stat. Ann. §26:13–16 (West Supp. 2006).

25. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 12–10A-16 (Michie Supp. 2003).

26. 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2000).

27. 38 U.S.C. §§ 4301–4331 (2000).

28. The Emergency Flu Response Act of 2004, H.R. 5409, S. 2968, 108th Cong. (2004).

29. Friel B. Bird flu fears raise quarantine questions. Government Executive magazine Web site. October 25, 2005. Available at: http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/1005/102505nj1.htm. Accessed July 1, 2006.

30. World Health Organization Writing Group. Nonpharmaceutical interventions for pandemic influenza, national and community measures. Emer Infect Dis. 2006;12:88–94.[Web of Science][Medline]

31. Rothstein MA. Are traditional public health strategies consistent with contemporary American values? Temp L Rev. 2004;77:175–192.

32. Bosco SY, Chan H, Eichelberger, Herrold B. SARS: Guidance for employers in Beijing and Shanghai. Perkins Coie LLP Web site. May 9, 2003. Available at: http://www.perkinscoie.com/content/ren/updates/china/050903.htm. Accessed March 28, 2006.

33. Government of Hong Kong Web site. LCQ4: patients infected with SARS. June 18, 2003. Available at: http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200306/18/0618198.htm. Accessed March 27, 2006.

34. Ooi PL, Lim S, Chew SK. Use of quarantine in the control of SARS in Singapore. Am J Infect Control. 2005; 23:252–257.

35. Tealit.com SARS report. Teaching English and Living in Taiwan Web site. December 18, 2003. Available at: http://www.tealit.com/sarsreport.html. Accessed March 28, 2006.

36. Almanac of Policy Issues Web site. Unemployment compensation. Available at: http://www.policyalmanac.org/social_welfare/archive/unemployment_compensation.shtml. Accessed March 26, 2006.

37. US Bureau of Labor Statistics Web site. Household data annual averages. 2006. Available at http://ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/lf/aat12.txt. Accessed June 19, 2006.

38. The White House Web site. Fact sheet: safeguarding America against pandemic influenza. November 1, 2005. Available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/pandemicflu/archive.html. Accessed June 19, 2006.
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Monkeypox
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« Reply #3 on: August 05, 2009, 03:51:49 PM »

Change!
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« Reply #4 on: August 05, 2009, 04:06:44 PM »

Here is the link for the 2005 CDC Quarantine Proposal http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/BJA/pandemic/CRS_Quarantine_Authority.pdf

I'm pasting the docu also. Was Updated August 16, 2006:

Federal and State Quarantine and Isolation Authority

snipped due to the breathtaking audacity of the spew....

the court in United States v. Shinnick87 upheld the Public Health
Service’s medical isolation of an arriving passenger because she had been in
Stockholm, Sweden, a city declared by the World Health Organization to be a
smallpox-infected area, and she could not show proof of vaccination.

The
legality concerning mandatory vaccinations as a health measure may arise during an
infectious disease outbreak,99 and health authorities may face the related issue of
rationing limited supplies of available vaccines.

 The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),103
and its implementing regulations at 45 C.F.R. Parts 160 and 164 (Privacy Rule), may
also need to be assessed. While HIPAA requirements do not include broad waivers
that would exempt hospitals from compliance during an emergency situation, there
are provisions in the Privacy Rule that may be relaxed under emergency
circumstances.

Yet the Constitution does not explicitly bar the use of military forces in
civilian situations or in matters of law enforcement; in fact, it empowers Congress
to provide for calling forth the militia to execute federal law.

Thus, unless a pandemic were to lead to significant civil unrest
or call for other military activity already authorized pursuant to existing exceptions,115
Congress would have to enact a law to authorize military enforcement of health
measures.

They have covered their asses well...
Is it possible to see the Obama version?
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« Reply #5 on: August 05, 2009, 04:29:51 PM »

They have covered their asses well...
Is it possible to see the Obama version?

Believe me, I've searched to see if it's available yet.
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« Reply #6 on: August 05, 2009, 05:33:31 PM »

Believe me, I've searched to see if it's available yet.
Yeah, I figured...I was just hoping...God knows why...so I could scare myself witless I guess or get my blood pressure up.
It's just so audacious and insulting.
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« Reply #7 on: August 28, 2009, 01:15:06 PM »

Any person who knowingly violates an order of the commissioner or his or her designee, or of a local public health authority or its designee, given to effectuate the purposes of this subsection shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 6 months, or by a fine of note more than one thousand dollars, or both.
http://www.infowars.com/swine-flu-martial-...husetts-senate/

Will your state be next? Contact your Senator, Representatives!! Don't let them force this squalene filled vaccine on us, on our children. It's bad enough that they're shoving the GM foods at us, the Monsanto and big Pharma taking over and ruining the small farmer, soon there will nothing ORGANIC left, that they are SPRAYING lunchmeats with viruses to PROTECT us, that they flouridate the water we drink, that there are over five hundred different pharmaceuticals and chemicals in our drinking water, in our bottled water as well, and now this H1N1 vaccine filled with squalene, the same adjuvant in the vaccines given to our troops that has caused over ten thousand deaths to date...and they want to give this to my kids??? 
 
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