Does it take a network to beat a network?Moved from A. H. Levis/AFRL - USJFCOM James Mattis - FF Terror (Effects Based Operations):**ALERT** UN/AFCEA NWO Global Military Takeover/CWID/C2/FCS/JFCOMhttp://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=110460.msg682339#msg682339JAMES N. MATTIS
On June 5 United States Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) wraps up a week-long war game designed to test the Pentagon's vision of warfare in the future. The war game looks ahead to the year 2020 and examines how U.S. and allied military forces -- along with civilian government, non-government, and international institutions -- cope with a failing state, a globally networked terrorist organization, and a peer competitor. The results of the war game are supposed to influence the conclusions of this year's Quadrennial Defense Review, an in-depth review of the Pentagon's strategies.
Officials at USJFCOM won't discuss the results of the war game until at least July; many of the most interesting conclusions may remain classified. But the commander of USJFCOM, General James Mattis of the Marine Corps, described his vision of the future while delivering a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
Mattis discussed how today's adversaries have adapted to U.S. conventional military superiority by forming disaggregated networks of small irregular teams that hide among indigenous populations. United States military forces, by contrast, have only come under greater central control. According to Mattis, this shift is due to evolutions in intelligence-gathering and communications technologies. Call it the new iron law of military bureaucracies: when commanders gain the technical ability to micromanage, they will micromanage.
Mattis, a four-star general at the top of command pyramid, deplores the trend. First, he asserts that the U.S. military command and control system is the most vulnerable such system in the world. Second, Mattis observes that throughout history and regardless of the type of conflict, military forces that centralized control and suppressed initiative at lower echelons have invariably been defeated.
Mattis believes that in order to defeat modern decentralized networks, U.S. forces will have to become decentralized themselves. This will entail giving autonomy to and requiring initiative from the youngest junior leaders in the Army and Marine Corps. High-performance small infantry units, "a national imperative" according to Mattis, will need to operate independent from higher control, finding their own solutions to local problems as they implement broader policy guidance.
For this approach to succeed, the recruiting, selection, and training of soldiers will have to fundamentally change. Mattis has created a "small unit center of excellence" at USJFCOM to improve the performance of lower-echelon combat units and their leaders. The focus of the center is on the human factors of success since U.S. infantrymen should not expect to enjoy any technological advantages over future enemy infantrymen.
Perhaps the most interesting question raised by Mattis's speeech is not whether the youngest soldiers can rise to the new demands that would be placed on them, but whether the colonels and generals -- and their civilian masters above -- will be able to relinquish the tight control technology has given them and to which they have become so accustomed. Will they ever acquire the courage necessary to trust a decentralized and distributed force of independent small units to find its own way of achieving the goals of a campaign? Mattis believes that this is the only path to success against tomorrow's enemies. What general or politician will have the nerve to take it?
Robert Haddick of Small Wars Journal is a former U.S. Marine Corps officer and was the director of research for a large private investment firm. He writes at Westhawk and The American.
Black Op Commander of False Flag Terrorism
Enemy Traitor of the Republic
of The United States of America,
US Constitution, & Bill of Rights
http://www.iraq-war.ru/article/197132http://www.clayandiron.com/news.jhtml?method=view&news.id=1945On May 12 James Mattis, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation ACT and commander of the U.S. Joint Forces Command, spoke at a three-day symposium called Joint Warfighting 09 in Norfolk, Virginia, where NATO's Allied Command Transformation is based, and stated: "I come with a sense of urgency. The enemy is meeting like this as well."
A local newspaper summarized his speech:"Mattis outlined a future in which wars will not have clearly defined beginnings and ends. What is needed, he said, is a grand strategy, a political framework that can guide military planning."
He failed, for what passes for diplomatic reasons no doubt, to identify who "the enemy" is, but a series of recent developments, or rather an intensification of ongoing ones, indicate which nation it is.
Last week the head of the U.S. Strategic Command, Gen. Kevin Chilton, told reporters during a Defense Writers Group breakfast on May 7 "that the White House retains the option to respond with physical force - potentially even using nuclear weapons - if a foreign entity conducts a disabling cyber attack against U.S. computer networks...."
See: http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=110460.0NATO DRILL SWEDEN RUSSIA CLAIMS ITS AN ATTEMPT TO NEW WORLD ORDER
Guidance for Effects-based
JAMES N. MATTIS
Herein are my thoughts and commander’s guidance regarding effects-based operations (EBO). This article is designed to provide the US Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and among our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.
Therefore, we must return to time-honored principles and terminology that our forces have tested in the crucible of battle and that are well grounded in the theory and nature of war. At the same time, we must retain and adopt those aspects of effects-based thinking that are useful. We must stress the importance of mission type orders that contain clear commander’s intent and unambiguous tasks and purposes and, most importantly, that link ways and means with achievable ends. To augment these tenets, we must leverage non-military capabilities and strive to better understand the different operating variables that make up today’s more complex operating environments.
My assessment is shaped by my personal experiences and the experiences of others in a variety of operational situations. I am convinced that we must keep the following in mind. First, operations in the future will require a balance of regular and irregular competencies. Second, the enemy is smart
and adaptive. Third, all operating environments are dynamic with an infinite number of variables; therefore, it is not scientifically possible to accurately predict the outcome of an action. To suggest otherwise runs contrary to historical experience and the nature of war. Fourth, we are in error when we think that what works (or does not work) in one theater is universally applicable to all theaters. Finally, to quote General Sherman, “Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster.” History is replete with examples and further denies us any confidence that the acute predictabil-ity promised by EBO’s long assessment cycle can strengthen our doctrine.
The joint force must act in uncertainty and thrive in chaos, sensing opportunity therein and not retreating into a need for more information. USJFCOM’s purpose is to ensure that joint doctrine smooths and simplifies joint operations while reducing friendly friction. My goal is to return clarity to our planning processes and operational concepts. Ultimately, my aim is to ensure leaders convey their intent in clearly understood terms and empower their subordinates to act decisively.
While the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and many partner nations have adopted the EBO nomenclature, NATO’s policy focuses on the whole-of-government/Comprehensive Approach. In short, NATO’s effects-based approach to operations (EBAO) does not fully mirror US EBO. Thus I have not addressed NATO’s use of EBAO in this USJFCOM com-mander’s guidance.
This article explains my perspective and provides guidance on issues related to USJFCOM use of EBO, EBAO, operational net assessment (ONA), and system-of-systems analysis (SoSA) in future force development, training, and experimentation. Elements of these concepts have proven useful in addressing “closed systems” such as targeting, where their effects can be measured per the US Air Force’s deliberate analysis and targeting methods. However, the concepts have been misapplied by others to operations beyond their original intent, resulting in overextension and confusion. Therefore, we will change course and provide the joint warfighter with a more balanced and understandable framework in which to plan, execute, and assess operations.
After a thorough evaluation, it is my assessment that the ideas reflected in EBO, ONA, and SoSA have not delivered on their advertised benefits and that a clear understanding of these concepts has proven problematic and elusive for US and multinational personnel. For example, an analysis of the re-cent Israeli-Hezbollah conflict found that the EBO “terminology used was too complicated, vain, and could not be understood by the thousands of officers that needed to carry it out.”1 In US circles, elements of these concepts were pre-maturely injected into various joint and Service processes, resulting in inefficiency and confusion. This has resulted in an overall negative impact on joint warfighting. Regrettably, this confusion has also spread to our allies. While we have limited the impact of SoSA, ONA, and EBO within our own doctrine, confusion remains for many of our multinational partners. The US Army, US Marine Corps, and other observers have also concluded that EBO:
Assumes a level of unachievable predictability.
Cannot correctly anticipate reactions of complex systems (for ex-
ample, leadership, societies, political systems, and so forth).
Calls for an unattainable level of knowledge of the enemy.
Is too prescriptive and overengineered.
Discounts the human dimensions of war (for example, passion, imagination, willpower, and unpredictability).
Promotes centralization and leads to micromanagement from
Is staff, not command, led.
Fails to deliver clear and timely direction to subordinates.
Uses confusing terminology and is difficult to understand.2
The Israel Defense Forces’ (IDF’s) use of EBO during the Israeli-Hezbollah conflict in the summer of 2006 is informative. Although there are several reasons why the IDF performed poorly during the war, various postconflict assessments have concluded that overreliance on EBO concepts was one of the primary contributing factors for their defeat.3 After the war, one Israeli general observed that the new (EBO) doctrine was “in complete contradiction to the most important basic principles of operating an army in general . . . and is not based upon, and even ignores, the universal fundamentals of warfare. . . . This is not a concept that is better or worse. It is a completely mistaken concept that could not succeed and should never have been relied upon.”4
Other critical warfighting functions, such as campaign design and planning, combined arms training, command and control (C2) relationships, and so forth, were overlooked or neglected in favor of EBO operating principles designed to create a “consciousness of victory” for friendly forces and a “cognitive perception of defeat” for enemy forces. This point is driven home in a study conducted by the US Army Combined Arms Center, which noted that “EBO proponents within the IDF came to believe that an enemy could be completely immobilized by precision air attacks against critical military systems” and that “little or no land forces would be required since it would not be necessary to destroy the enemy.”5This type of thinking runs contrary to historical lessons and the fundamental nature of war.
Other critics of EBO have characterized it as overemphasizing precision air-delivered fires to the detriment of ground maneuver fundamentals. Precision fires alone proved to be ineffective during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, Kosovo operations in 1999, and more recently during the “shock and awe” phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. The inconclusive results of these operations underscore the fact that effects-based operations tend to be ineffective when used exclusive of ground maneuver operations. The US Army Combined Arms Center study also suggested that confusing EBO planning methods and new terminology resulted in imprecise and unclear instructions to subordinate commanders, causing various interpretations of what senior leaders wanted to accomplish. These examples, coupled with mediocre re-sults in exercises, experiments, and current operations, bring into question the credibility and effectiveness of EBO as an operating concept, including when combined air-ground forces are employed.
Most warfighters acknowledge that elements of effects-based thinking, if used for targeting against closed systems, can have a positive influence on planning. For example, EBO has fostered a thorough examination of desired outcomes and possible consequences of actions. In particular, this has been true with respect to targeting and specific operations against well-defined, closed systems such as power grids, road networks, or railway infrastructure. EBO also caused a renaissance in combat assessment beyond simple battle damage assessment and imparted an increased understanding of the impacts of our actions. However, “chaos makes war a complex adaptive system, rather than a closed or equilibrium-based system,” which makes predicting, and then assessing, how physical actions cause behavioral effects a significant challenge.6 There is also very strong agreement that any planning construct that mechanistically attempts to provide certainty and predictability in an inher-ently uncertain environment is fundamentally at odds with the nature of war.
While many correctly argue that EBO has evolved to a much more “art of war” type of thinking, we must recognize that the term effects-based is fundamentally flawed, has far too many interpretations, and goes against the very nature of war to the point that it expands confusion and inflates a sense of predictability far beyond that which it can be expected to deliver. Effects-based thinking and terminology have been used to describe the challenge of integrating diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) instruments of national power to create the necessary conditions for success. Coordinating DIME into a comprehensive approach to joint opera-tions does not require effects-based thinking or a new lexicon; it does, how-ever, require a firm educational foundation and the collaborative means to gain and maintain a shared understanding of the problem and the complexity involved in developing comprehensive solutions.
The best way to accomplish this is through effective campaign design, planning, and assessment as out-lined in chapter 4 of Field Manual 3–24/Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3–33.5,Counterinsurgency, and US Army Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525–5–500,Commander’s Appreciation and Campaign Design. We must return clarity to our planning processes and operational concepts, especially if we want to break down cross-governmental barriers. This clarity will better enable us to link “ends” to policy, strategy, campaigns, and operations through clear “ways” and “means.” The use of “effects” has confused what previously was a well-designed and straightforward process for determining “ends.”
Furthermore, its use has created unrealistic expectations of predictability and a counterproductive information appetite in American headquarters. It requires unattainable levels of knowledge about the enemy exercising its independent will. The best way forward is to re-baseline our terminology and concepts by returning to time-honored principles, such as mission type orders, unambiguous commander’s intent, and clear articulation of ends, ways, and means that have been tested in combat and are historically grounded in the fundamental nature of war while incorporating, where logical, the issues introduced by today’s more complex environment.
Current State of “Effects” One must ask the critical question: Is EBO even a viable operating concept? Joint Publication (JP) 3–0,Joint Operations, and JP 5–0,Joint Operation Planning, provide the current official perspective of the US military’s use of effects and related concepts in joint operations. These publications contain very little of the original deterministic EBO concept, though they do have some room for improvement in better clarifying existing effects-related terminology and explanations. Additionally, the US Army distanced itself from EBO by concluding in 2007 that the concept has no place in Army doctrine.7 This position was reinforced by the recent release of Field Manual 3–0,Operations
(February 2008), which rejects the more mechanistic aspects of EBO but recognizes the value of operational variables, such as the political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical, and time characteristics of the operating environment. Furthermore, the cumbersome and complex ONA and SoSA processes have been largely rejected in doctrine based on feedback from both US and multinational training and field operations.
While the EBO concept has matured over the past few years, our experimentation and operations with it have fallen short of the mark. I agree with Justin Kelly and David Kilcullen that “while aspirations advanced by supporters of effects-based operations . . . are laudable they may not be achievable, particularly in the land warfare environment.”8We are reminded that a concept contrary to war’s fundamental nature will always come up short. Joint doctrine highlights the importance of mission analysis to understanding the nature of a given problem and the purpose of the operation.
Within that context, current doctrine has properly retained the following
ideas related to EBO:
Better understanding the history and culture of a society, interaction among military, interagency, and international organizations, socio-economic makeup, political systems, and other factors in the operational environment.
Using mission analysis to visualize and describe commander’s intent, thus creating unity of action.
Employing nodal analysis as it relates to targeting.
Conducting periodic assessments of operations to determine progress toward achieving objectives.The Way Ahead
The underlying principles associated with EBO, ONA, and SoSA are fundamentally flawed and must be removed from our lexicon, training, and operations. EBO thinking, as the Israelis found, is an intellectual “Maginot Line” around which the enemy can maneuver. Effective immediately, USJFCOM will no longer use, sponsor, or export the terms and concepts related to EBO, ONA, and SoSA in our training, doctrine development, and support of JPME. Approved joint doctrine (specifically JP 3–0, Joint Operations, and JP 5–0, Joint Operation Planning) is the authoritative source for information on how we use effects in joint operations in terms of desired outcomes. As our concepts evolve, these documents must be further refined to comply with guidance contained in this article. We will continue to emphasize the art of command, the importance of proactive collaborative action with interagency and multi-national partners, and comprehensive whole-of-government approaches to achieving our objectives.
Acknowledging the unpredictability of war is fundamental to our view of future conflict. We seek to provide concepts and methods that will better enable us to find our way through the fog, friction, and chaos of warfare. We seek to smooth and simplify joint operations rather than complicate them. So we focus on the enemy, thereby reducing, rather than aggravating, our internal frictions. We seek to reduce friendly friction rather than to inject difficult-to-understand terminology and processes that demand increasingly large staffs to access effects and that tend to inhibit information flow and hinder rapid decisionmaking.
I want us to reinforce the reality that conflict is inherently complex and unpredictable. It is a nondeterministic human endeavor whose ramifications are never fully guaranteed because our adversaries have free will, which will inevitably impact the operating environment in unpredictable ways.
Technology and training are key enablers to gain advantages over our adversaries, but no amount of technology or training will enable us to accurately predict reactions of complex systems.The enemy’s free will, manifested by courage, imagination, resolve, and other human factors, denies predictability in most aspects of war.
We must use focused training and technology-enabled solutions or problem-solving techniques to enhance initiative, pattern recognition, and decentralized decisionmaking. However, effects-based thinking and associated tools cannot be used as a substitute for creative campaign design and critical thinking. War is not composed of the tactics of targetry or an algebraic approach to measuring effects resulting from our actions, but rather operations guided by commander’s intent and constant feedback loops. Furthermore, the centralized nature of EBO is inconsistent with the tenets of the US Joint Forces Command C2 vision, which places a premium on the importance of decentralized command and control as a means for resilient forces to prevail in chaos and degraded information environments.Our goal is to develop a joint force that acts in uncertainty and thrives in chaos through a common understanding of the essence and nature of the problem and the purpose of the operation.
In practice, this means that leaders must ensure their vision and intent are understood and their subordinates act decisively in concert with that vision and intent. As Clausewitz stated, the “trinity of chance, uncertainty, and friction [will] continue to characterize war and will make anticipation of even the first order consequences of military action highly conjectural.” Taking a “systems approach to warfare where second - and third-order consequences of actions can be predicted, let along managed,” is thus an illusion.9
Concepts and experimentation are intended to be innovative and must be pushed to their extremes. Most experiments fail, yet through failure springs success. That is acceptable and is part of the price we pay for unregimented thinking and open-minded, disciplined experimentation. That said, I want us to be mindful of the lessons of the past 7 years.
If we made one mistake, it was that we fast-tracked some operational concepts and allowed them to gain inappropriate influence while unproven by history, experimentation, and current operations.
We must be mindful that the world’s militaries often look to the United States and USJFCOM for the way ahead, and history (including recent history) reminds us that there is a cost in lives, as well as mission failure, when concepts are misapplied. We must execute the processes that underpin this command’s key functions with intellectual honesty, rigor, and discipline. We must clearly define the problems we are trying to solve and propose value-added solutions that have been properly explored, validated, and vetted.
Our solutions must include clear language and terminology that promote shared understanding and enable subordinates to act, per commander’s intent, without single point of failure reliance on technology or burgeoning headquarters. Lastly, decentralized decisionmaking, with emphasis on empowering subordinates’ initiative in accordance with intent, clearly defined objectives, and executable tasks, is the best approach to achieve our goals.
Reprinted with the permission ofJoint Force Quarterly(JFQ), 51 (4th Quarter 2008).
1. Matt M. Matthews,We Were Caught Unprepared: The 2006 Hezbollah-Israeli War, The Long War Series Occasional Paper 26 (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008), 26.
2. US Army Doctrine Update #1, Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate, US Army Combined Arms Center (Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: 24 February 2007); Effects Based Operations Conference, US Marine Corps (Quantico, Va.: 7 September 2005), slides 6–9.
3. Avi Kober, “The Israel Defense Forces in the Second Lebanon War: Why the Poor Performance?”Journal of Strategic Studies, 31 (February 2008), 16-28, 37-38; Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Winograd Report, Information and Internet Department, 30 January 2008; Matthews, 23-28, 61-65.
4. Matthews, 62.
5. Ibid., 24.
6. Justin Kelly and David Kilcullen, “Chaos Versus Predictability: A Critique of Effects-Based Operations,”Australian Army Journal, 2 (Winter 2004), 90.
7. US Army Doctrine Update #1, 4.
8. Kelly and Kilcullen, 87.
9. Ibid., 97.Autumn 2008
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Jul 07, 2009
CBP Completes Unmanned Aircraft Surveillance in Great Lakes Region
Fort Drum, N.Y. – U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Office of Air and Marine announced that it concluded surveillance operations along the U.S. side of the maritime border of Lake Ontario and St. Lawrence Seaway, and the land border of New York and Ontario on June 25, 2009. As part of a multi-agency effort called Operation Empire Shield, CBP deployed a Predator B unmanned aircraft system (UAS) and P-3 aircraft to the Northern Border to perform law enforcement operations.“The deployment was exceptional,” said Michael Kostelnik, CBP Assistant Commissioner for the Office of Air and Marine. “Operational objectives were met, and interagency and bilateral relationships were established and expanded.
The operation was designed to demonstrate unmanned aircraft operations and evaluate law enforcement coordination concepts over both land and maritime environments at the Northern Border. An after action assessment, which will be completed in coordination with multiple CBP offices, will be used to prepare for future UAS expansion.
CBP currently has six Predator B aircraft that provide unique border security surveillance capacity through superior optical equipment coupled with extended flight duration. CBP’s unmanned aircraft typically fly up at 250 knots at an altitude of 19,000 feet while carrying up to 3,000 pounds of sensors for land and maritime surveillance and tracking in day and night environments.
Operation Empire Shield included a number of firsts for CBP’s UAS program. On Saturday, June 20, 2009, CBP demonstrated the capability to fly and operate three UAS aircraft simultaneously in the National Airspace System via satellite. On June 20th, UAS from North Dakota and Arizona were launched and executed law enforcement missions within their respective airspace. An hour later, the third UAS was launched from Wheeler-Sack Army Airfield in Fort Drum, New York and control of the remotely piloted aircraft was seamlessly transferred to a crew operating from the Air and Marine Operations Center in Riverside, California. All three aircraft performed law enforcement missions including streaming live video to select members of law enforcement, homeland security, and members of the U.S. Congress.
CBP also established a milestone by completing its longest duration UAS flight. On June 24, 2009, the UAS landed in New York after flying over 20 hours. The ability to fly for 20 hours is approximately twice the endurance of most manned aircraft, offering a unique and persistent surveillance capability to secure the homeland. During this endurance mission, control of the UAS was passed between UAS operations centers located at New York, North Dakota, and Arizona.
The nearly 100 hours of CBP UAS flight operations in the Northeast are just one component of an integrated law-enforcement effort
to secure the region. The UAS deployment serves as an exceptional opportunity for other law enforcement partners to participate and refine concepts of operations when working with advanced aircraft such as CBP’s Predator B UAS and the P-3.
CBP Air and Marine continues to serve as a critical component and advocate of DHS’ Secure Border Initiative. Advanced security operations such as CBP’s UAS deployment along the Northern Border is a vital element of this strategy.The Federal Aviation Administration remains a key facilitator and partner of CBP Air and Marine, helping to ensure CBP UAS flights in the Northeast integrate safely and seamlessly with other aircraft operating in the region.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection is the unified border agency within the Department of Homeland Security charged with the management, control, and protection of our Nation’s borders at and between the official ports of entry. CBP is charged with keeping terrorists and terrorist weapons out of the country while enforcing hundreds of U.S. laws.
Contact: Juan Muñoz-Torresjuan.firstname.lastname@example.org
For more information contact:
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General Atomics Aeronautical Systems, Inc.