Swine Flu-C.O.G.- Risk Management AI sustainability extermination CONFIRMED

[Anti_Illuminati]

http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06740t.pdf

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in the Committee’s hearing on pandemic influenza and continuity of operations (COOP) planning. As you know, essential government services can be interrupted by a range of events, including terrorist attacks, severe weather, building-level emergencies, and public health emergencies, such as pandemic influenza.

The federal government requires agencies to develop plans for ensuring the continuity of essential services during such emergencies. To assist agencies, the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which is responsible for managing federal response and recovery efforts following any national incident, has issued guidance that defines the elements of a viable COOP capability.

A potentially useful option for continuity planning is telework (in which work is performed at an employee’s home or at a work location other than a traditional office); this alternative has gained widespread attention over the past decade in both the public and private sectors as a human capital flexibility that offers a variety of potential benefits to employers, employees, and society.

In a December 2005 report to Congress, the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) indicated that 43 of the 82 federal agencies it surveyed had employees eligible to telework during 2004, and more than 140,000 federal employees used telework that year.1 OPM also reported that there is a symbiotic relationship between COOP and telework because many government functions that must be carried out in emergencies can be accomplished using telework.

Similarly, we reported in April 2004 that telework is an important and viable option for federal agencies in continuity planning and implementation efforts, especially as the duration of an emergency event is extended.2 This option appears particularly appropriate in the case of pandemic influenza, which occurs when an influenza virus causes an outbreak of disease that spreads easily from person to person and results in serious illness worldwide.

1 OPM, The Status of Telework in the Federal Government 2005 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2005)
2 GAO, Human Capital: Opportunities to Improve Federal Continuity Planning Guidance, GAO-04-384 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2004).

Page 1 GAO-06-740T

Experts believe that the effects of a pandemic could come in waves that last for weeks or even months, in which time absentee rates could reach 40 percent during peak periods due to illness, the need to care for family members, and fear of infection. Recent executive branch guidance states that social distancing measures, such as telework, may be appropriate public health interventions for infection control and containment during a pandemic outbreak.  

GAO recognizes the importance of telework and continuity planning and is striving to lead by example on these issues. For example, during certain emergencies, our current telework policy allows me to approve telework for all employees in an affected area to promote continuity of operations. We are also completing a supplement to our COOP plan that addresses preparations specific to a pandemic, and are coordinating our continuity planning efforts with those of other legislative branch agencies.

As you requested, I will discuss how agencies are addressing the use of telework in their continuity planning, based on work described in a report that we are issuing today.3 In earlier work, we identified steps agencies that should take to effectively use telework during an emergency, and we surveyed agency officials responsible for continuity planning at 23 major agencies.4 For this report, we repeated this survey to obtain updated information on the extent to which key telework practices were used in making continuity preparations.

3
GAO, Continuity of Operations: Selected Agencies Could Improve Planning for Use of Alternate Facilities and Telework during Disruptions, GAO-06-713 (Washington, D.C.: May 11, 2006).
4 GAO, Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies, GAO-05-577 (Washington, D.C.: Apr.
28, 2005).

Page 2 GAO-06-740T


We reviewed documentation submitted by agency officials to support their survey responses and compared these responses to those from our earlier work; we briefed your staff on the results of our work on April 13, 2006. This work was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.  

Results in Brief

More agencies reported plans for essential team members to telework during a COOP event than in our previous survey, but few documented that they made the necessary preparations to effectively use telework during an emergency:

●   Nine of the 23 agencies reported that some of their essential team members are expected to telework during a COOP event. However, only one agency documented that it had notified its team members of the expectation that they would telework during such an event.

●   None of the 23 agencies demonstrated that it could ensure adequate technological capacity to allow designated personnel to telework during an emergency.

●   Only 3 of the 23 agencies documented testing the ability of staff to telework during an emergency.  

FEMA’s guidance on COOP planning does not include specific information on preparations to use telework during emergencies; the absence of such specific guidance contributed to the low levels of preparations that agencies reported. Recently, FEMA disseminated additional guidance to agencies regarding the incorporation of pandemic influenza considerations into COOP planning.

Although this guidance suggests the use of telework during such an event, it does not address the steps agencies should take when preparing to use telework during an emergency. If agencies do not make adequate preparations, they may not be able to use telework effectively to ensure the continuity of their essential functions in emergencies, including pandemic influenza events.

Page 3 GAO-06-740T

Background

In our report, we recommended, among other things, that FEMA establish a time line for developing, in consultation with OPM, guidance on preparations needed for using telework during a COOP event. In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS partially agreed with our recommendation and stated that FEMA will coordinate with OPM in the development of a time line for telework guidance.

Federal operations and facilities have been disrupted by a range of events, including the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001; the Oklahoma City bombing; localized shutdowns due to severe weather conditions, such as hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma in 2005; and building-level events, such as asbestos contamination at the Department of the Interior’s headquarters. In addition, federal operations could be significantly disrupted by people-only events, such as an outbreak of severe acute respiratory illness (SARS).

Such disruptions, particularly if prolonged, can lead to interruptions in essential government services. Prudent management, therefore, requires that federal agencies develop plans for dealing with emergency situations, including maintaining services, ensuring proper authority for government actions, and protecting vital assets.

Until relatively recently, continuity planning was generally the responsibility of individual agencies. In October 1998, Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 67 identified FEMA—which is responsible for leading the effort to prepare the nation for all hazards and managing federal response and recovery efforts following any national incident—as the lead agent for federal COOP planning across the federal executive branch.

FEMA’s responsibilities include

●   formulating guidance for agencies to use in developing viable plans;

●   coordinating interagency exercises and facilitating interagency coordination, as appropriate; and

●   overseeing and assessing the status of COOP capabilities across the executive branch.

Page 4 GAO-06-740T

In July 1999, FEMA issued the first version of Federal Preparedness Circular (FPC) 65, its guidance to the federal executive branch on developing viable and executable contingency plans that facilitate the performance of essential functions during any emergency. FPC 65 applies to all federal executive branch departments and agencies at all levels, including locations outside Washington, D.C. FEMA released an updated version of FPC 65 in June 2004, providing additional guidance to agencies on each of the topics covered in the original guidance.
 
In partial response to a recommendation we made in April 2004, the 2004 version of FPC 65 also included new guidance on human capital considerations for COOP events.5 For example, the guidance instructed agencies to consider telework—also referred to as telecommuting or flexiplace—as an option in their continuity planning.

Telework has gained widespread attention over the past decade in both the public and private sectors as a human capital flexibility that offers a variety of potential benefits to employers, employees, and society. In a 2003 report to Congress on the status of telework in the federal government, the Director of OPM described telework as “an invaluable management tool which not only allows employees greater flexibility to balance their personal and professional duties, but also allows both management and employees to cope with the uncertainties of potential disruptions in the workplace, including terrorist threats.”6

A 2005 OPM report on telework notes the importance of telework in responding flexibly to emergency situations, as demonstrated in the wake of the devastation caused by Hurricane Katrina, when telework served as a tool to help alleviate the issues caused by steeply rising fuel prices nationwide.7

In 2004, we surveyed major federal agencies at your request to determine how they planned to use telework during COOP events.8

5 GAO, Human Capital: Opportunities to Improve Federal Continuity Planning Guidance, GAO-04-384 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 20, 2004).

6
OPM, Report to the Congress: The Status of Telework in the Federal Government (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2003).

7 OPM, Report to the Congress: The Status of Telework in the Federal Government (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2005).

8 The plans that we reviewed in 2004 were created before the issuance of FEMA’s revised FPC 65, which instructs agencies to consider the use of telework in their continuity planning.
 
Page 5 GAO-06-740T

We reported that, although agencies were not required to use telework in their COOP plans, 1 of the 21 agency continuity plans in place on May 1, 2004, documented plans to address some essential functions through telework. In addition, 10 agencies reported that they intended to use telework following a COOP event, even though those intentions were not documented in their continuity plans.

The focus on using telework in continuity planning has been heightened in response to the threat of pandemic influenza. In November 2005, the White House issued a national strategy to address this threat, which states that social distancing measures, such as telework, may be appropriate public health interventions for infection control and containment during a pandemic outbreak.

The strategy requires federal departments and agencies to develop and exercise preparedness and response plans that take into account the potential impact of a pandemic on the federal workforce. It also tasks DHS—the parent department of FEMA—with developing plans to implement the strategy in regard to domestic incident management and federal coordination. In May 2006, the White House issued an implementation plan in support of the pandemic strategy. This plan outlines the responsibilities of various agencies and establishes time lines for future actions.

Few Agencies Demonstrated That They Had Adequately Prepared to Use Telework in a COOP Event Although more agencies reported plans for essential team members to telework during a COOP event than in our 2004 survey, few documented that they had made the necessary preparations to effectively use telework during an emergency. While FPC 65 does not require agencies to use telework during a COOP event, it does state that they should consider the use of telework in their continuity plans and procedures.

All of the 23 agencies that we surveyed indicated that they considered telework as an option during COOP planning, and 15 addressed telework in their COOP plans (see table 1). For agencies that did not plan to use telework during a COOP event, reasons cited by agency officials for this decision included (1) the need to access classified information—which is not permitted outside of secured areas—in order to perform agency essential functions and (2) a lack of funding for the necessary equipment acquisition and network modifications.

Page 6  GAO-06-740T


The agencies that did plan to use telework in emergencies did not consistently demonstrate that they were prepared to do so. We previously identified steps agencies should take to effectively use telework during an emergency. These include preparations to ensure that staff has adequate technological capacity, assistance, and training.9 Table 1 provides examples of gaps in agencies’ preparations, such as the following:

●   Nine of the 23 agencies reported that some of their COOP essential team members are expected to telework during a COOP event. However, only one agency documented that it had notified its team members that they were expected to telework during such an event.

9 GAO, Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies, GAO-05-577 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 28, 2005).

Page 7 GAO-06-740T

●   None of the 23 agencies demonstrated that it could ensure adequate technological capacity to allow designated personnel to telework during a COOP event. No guidance addresses the steps that agencies should take to ensure that they are fully prepared to use telework during a COOP event.  When we reported the results of our 2004 survey, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the Under Secretary for Emergency Preparedness and Response to develop, in consultation with OPM, guidance on the steps that agencies should take to adequately prepare for the use of telework during a COOP event. However, to date, no such guidance has been created.
 
In March 2006, FEMA disseminated guidance to agencies regarding the incorporation of pandemic influenza considerations into COOP planning. The guidance states that the dynamic nature of a pandemic influenza requires that the federal government take a nontraditional approach to continuity planning and readiness. It suggests the use of telework during such an event. According to the guidance, agencies should consider which essential functions and services can be conducted from a remote location (e.g., home) using telework.

However, the guidance does not address the steps agencies should take when preparing to use telework during an emergency. For example, although the guidance states that agencies should consider testing, training, and exercising of social distancing techniques, including telework, it does not address other necessary preparations, such as informing designated staff of the expectation to telework or providing them with adequate technical resources and support.
 
Earlier this month, after we briefed your staff, the White House released an Implementation Plan in support of the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. This plan calls on OPM to work with DHS and other agencies to revise existing telework guidance and issue new guidance on human capital planning and COOP. The plan establishes an expectation that these actions will be completed within 3 months.

If the forthcoming guidance from DHS and other responsible agencies does not require agencies to make the necessary preparations for telework, agencies are unlikely to take all the steps necessary to ensure that employees will be able to effectively use telework to perform essential functions during any COOP event. In addition, inadequate preparations could limit the ability of nonessential employees to contribute to agency missions during extended emergencies, including a pandemic influenza scenario.

Page 8 GAO-06-740T

In summary, Mr. Chairman, although more agencies reported plans for essential team members to telework during a COOP event than in our previous survey, few documented that they had made the necessary preparations to effectively use telework during an emergency. In addition, agencies lack guidance on what these necessary preparations are. Although FEMA’s recent telework guidance does not address the steps agencies should take to prepare to use telework during an emergency event, new guidance on telework and COOP is expected to be released later this year.

If the new guidance does not specify the steps agencies need to take to adequately prepare their telework capabilities for use during an emergency situation, it will be difficult for agencies to make adequate preparations to ensure that their teleworking staff will be able to perform essential functions during a COOP event. In our report, we made recommendations aimed at helping to ensure that agencies are adequately prepared to perform essential functions following an emergency.

Among other things, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the FEMA Director to establish a time line for developing, in consultation with OPM, guidance on the steps that agencies should take to adequately prepare for the use of telework during a COOP event. In commenting on a draft of the report, the Director of DHS’s Liaison Office partially agreed with this recommendation and stated that FEMA will coordinate with OPM in the development of a time line for further telework guidance.

In addition, he stated that both FEMA and OPM have provided guidance on the use of telework. However, as stated in our report, present guidance does not address the preparations agencies should make for using telework during emergencies.  
 
Page 9 GAO-06-740T

With the release of the White House’s Implementation Plan regarding pandemic influenza, a time line has now been established for the issuance of revised guidance on telework; however, unless the forthcoming guidance addresses the necessary preparations, agencies may not be able to use telework effectively to ensure the continuity of their essential functions. Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at this time.

Contacts and Acknowledgements

For information about this testimony, please contact Linda D.
Koontz at (202) 512-6240 or at koontzl@gao.gov. Key contributions
to this testimony were made by James R. Sweetman, Jr., Assistant
Director; Barbara Collier; Sairah Ijaz; Nick Marinos; and Kim
Zelonis.

(310762)
Page 10 GAO-06-740T

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.

[Anti_Illuminati]

Bump

[dissident99]

Thanks for the info AI.

[ramallamamama]

So will a 'switch be flipped' to allow all these gov workers (and banksters probably) to use that new 'net standard, denying the common folk the regular net for communication and dissemination of real info?

[vCFy7W3SFb]

so basically give me an outline of the point of the article... i'm not quite understanding it

[Anti_Illuminati]

so basically give me an outline of the point of the article... i'm not quite understanding it

I will explain it to you why the hell this is so serious.

The main article below is FROM the AFCEA,  The AFCEA is the organization that either directly "sponsors" or is in some way highly affiliated with one of the guys directly responsible for 9/11, and that was Felix Rausch.  He's the one that installed Ptech on the FAA and NORAD's systems.  The AFCEA is also tied into all of the cyber-security meetings, they have Northcom generals and so forth on their own website, giving a brief description of them regarding their role/background with respect to all these cyber security conferences.

This audio is affiliated with the AFCEA:  http://audio.federalnewsradio.com/fedexfor/fedexfo_102507.wma 

It talks about COOP, Continuity of Operations (think NSPD-51).  One of the FEMA heads is in the audio, this is from 2007.  They talk in detail about TELEWORKING, in the context that huge governmental physical infrastructure will be contaminated with bird flu and no one will be able to physically go there to work indefinitely. 

Now when I 1st heard this I was like "Get the f**k off".  They can't possibly be THAT insane.  Well, they're dead serious.  The hardcore reality will slam you right in the face when you watch the below video, which says EXACTLY THE SAME THING AS THE AUDIO, AND THEY ARE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT SOURCES OF INFORMATION, ONE BEING RIGHT FROM THE HORSES MOUTH:

http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/21134540/vp/12599973#12599973

NOW, Combine that with this reaffirmation of THE SAME THING AGAIN (remember I mentioned Juniper networks in my call?  I got that from the AUDIO above, IT IS MENTIONED IN THE AFCEA ARTICLE, BIG COINCIDENCE ISN'T IT?  NOT.:

http://www.imakenews.com/signal/e_article000950338.cfm

Agencies Connect Telework and Continuity of Operations
by Rita Boland

A recent study on the status and progress of government agencies for emergency preparedness and continuity of operations has identified telework as a critical piece of the puzzle. Many organizations are encouraging employees to work remotely now in preparation for any major work place disruptions because the experience could prove critical.

Juniper Networks conducted the survey of federal, state and local government agencies—both civilian and defense—in the third quarter of fiscal year 2007. Haywood Talcove, vice president, Public Sector Americas at Juniper, says one major point, or rock as he calls it, of the survey is the importance of telework to continuity of operations (COOP). According to Talcove, the first rock in the Juniper survey is unique because it links telework and COOP. That connection has not been made in the past. “People really look at those as different things,” Talcove states.

However, the study results show that the government is using telework technologies as part of its COOP portfolio. Sixty-two percent of respondents believe that telework is a critical component of agency COOP, with 41 percent saying that all government personnel should telework occasionally as a part of COOP preparation.

Seventy-nine percent of respondents shared that their agency supported some form of telework, although only 28 percent characterized it as routine. Of the 79 percent who reported agency support of telework, 64 percent said that on average, personnel teleworked one day or less per week.

While the use of telework to continue operations in many emergency scenarios is important, it could be the key to maintaining operations during specific emergencies such as a pandemic flu. During this type of crisis, “social distancing” may be mandatory to limit the spread of the disease. Therefore, remote working capabilities are necessary across all levels of an agency. At a mandatory minimum, Talcove says he would want his leadership team and critical employees that are involved in delivering services to citizens to have remote working capabilities.

[INSERT:  DO YOU SEE HOW THIS CONVENIENTLY GIVES THEM THE EXCUSE TO IMMEDIATELY USHER IN INTERNET 2?  THE STAGED BIO WEAPON ATTACK, IS FOLLOWED IMMEDIATELY WITH THE STAGED IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNET 2 BECAUSE THEY HAVE AN SEEMINGLY LEGITIMATE EXCUSE TO NEED IT SO DOD EMPLOYEES CAN MAINTAIN CRITICAL C.O.G., CONTINUITY OF GOVERNMENT, *REMOTELY*.  ONCE THIS IS DONE, IT WILL ALLOW THEM TO FAST TRACK THE NEXT PHASES OF THE GLOBAL INFORMATION GRID TO SOLIDIFY A WORLD POLICE STATE THAT CANNOT BE STOPPED.  THINK OF IT LIKE A Y2K 2.0 ON STEROIDS, CRACK, AND ADRENALINE X 1000.
__________________________________________________________
To prepare for telework during actual crises, agencies must learn what technology is needed and how to use it. Organizations cannot effectively respond to emergencies without being able to access information remotely. By offering the option of regular telework to employees, agencies can determine what technology and security they require, and personnel can become comfortable with the programs.

Tim LeMaster, director of systems engineering for Juniper, explains that if agencies use systems and capabilities regularly, then agencies know how to secure their connections, identifications and other tools they are required to use. Those same mechanisms would generally be used for telework during an emergency as well.

Agencies also can plan for emergency telework scenarios by implementing an In Case of Emergency (ICE) license. According to LeMaster, the license helps organizations to be more prepared for surges beyond the normal capacity of teleworkers. In an emergency, telework numbers could swell from a few hundred to several thousand. LeMaster explains that an ICE license enables agencies to increase what they can physically handle during an emergency. ICE is an only-as-needed solution that allows government agencies to manage sudden demand for remote connectivity by buying licenses that kick in and scale to meet user needs. With the license, agencies save the cost and commitment of a permanent license while remaining compliant with continuity of government requirements.

Also important to telework as part of COOP is practice. Despite government agencies’ belief in the importance of telework, only 40 percent have modified infrastructure to support remote working, and only 32 percent have dedicated resources to modifications. Less than 30 percent of survey respondents telework more than one day per week. Talcove illustrates the problems this deficiency could lead to by putting forth an analogy: What if military personnel are barred from the Pentagon? Thousands of personnel would need connections to telework and continue operations, but the capability would not be available. “We need to be in a position to ensure our government can deliver services to citizens when they’re needed the most,” Talcove states.

Practice assists the technology side as well. It ensures that during an emergency officials can just “flip a switch” so employees can resume operations. By having infrastructure in place and making sure people are training and budgeting for problems, agencies will be better prepared for actual emergencies.

Talcove emphasizes the importance of practice because agencies are better at handling the familiar. So the U.S. Defense Department is good at combating cyberattacks but not as proficient at handling pandemic flu or infrastructure failure. “We’re really good at what we deal with every day,” Talcove says. “We’re not so good at what we don’t deal with on a regular basis.”

[vCFy7W3SFb]

Yes thanks for the clarification. But I don't understand why teleworkers will need IP2, per say, because to do just about everything they want the network infrastructure is already in place. IE, using IRC chat, private wikis, blogs, live video, audio, skype all that jazz is already in place and good to use. So it's a pretty phony excuse to usher in a new world internet order.

[lordssyndicate]

Because everyone will need new IPv6 Ips when your carrier rolls them out  as soon as the government asks you too.

The point being IPv6 is built to utilize RBAC so it is what will be used to allow them to access X (being everything their "Admin" says is ok) and you to access nothing.....

[Anti_Illuminati]

http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/story/138527

Decision Theater tests pandemic flu plans

Ryan Gabrielson, Tribune

April 28, 2009 - 5:58PM


Dr. George Basile, executive director of ASU's Global Institute of Sustainability, shows a slide produced on the WHO Phase of Pandemic Alert at Decision Theater in downtown Tempe.
Darryl Webb, Tribune


Global health crises are nothing ASU health officials haven't seen before.

The influenza outbreaks they've experienced previously spread digitally across the screens that cover Decision Theater's walls.

State tests flu samples; hospitals see rush

There is nothing virtual about swine flu, the virus strain that has killed more than 100 people in Mexico and has infected dozens of others worldwide. But Arizona State University has hosted electronic simulations of an influenza pandemic the past two years to help ready state and local agencies for a real outbreak.

"We've run through this already, so we're very well prepared, which is kinda cool," said Dr. Allan Markus, director of ASU's Campus Health Services. To date, no cases of swine flu have been reported at the university or anywhere else in the state.

Using its Decision Theater, ASU has assisted the state Department of Health Services, Maricopa County and multiple local school districts in crafting their planned response to a deadly flu strain.

The theater is little more than a viewing room, with comfortable seats surrounded by floor-to-ceiling monitors. That is, until its computers and projection system power on, flooding the room's walls with charts, graphics, video, and sometimes 3-D visuals.

As part of the theater's pandemic flu simulation, fake cable news reports detail the disease's spread on one screen as the World Health Organization raises its threat level on another. Government officials that have participated in the test runs are asked how their emergency plan calls on them to respond at each stage in the crisis.

"We create artificial environments to help people think through these issues," said George Basile, Decision Theater's executive director.

Agency officials must make a huge volume of quick decisions during a health crisis. Basile said the goal for ASU is to make sure the crisis isn't the first time officials have considered their response to specific situations.

Tim Lant, the theater's research director, said he uses data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and other health agencies to construct mathematical models that predict how an outbreak of bird flu might spur a crisis.

What should a school district tell concerned parents? At what point in the disease's spread should schools close? "Those kinds of decisions are the reason why you want to run the exercise," Lant said.

Right now, with swine flu cases multiplying exponentially, ASU researchers and the theater are working to track the disease. Lant said he is watching everything from government agency releases to the number of Google searches for "swine flu."

ASU's simulated pandemic involves a strain that the medical community understands far better than it does the swine flu, which has proven fatal in Mexico City but mild elsewhere.

[Insert:  Yeah right]

"We do not have great evidence in the U.S. that this causes the severe mortality that the bird flu does," Markus said.

While details about the disease remain elusive, Basile said all the planning has brought government agencies closer together.

"We're actually seeing an encouraging amount of cooperation," Basile said. "It's really quite positive, the response."
_____________________________________________________________
Source

Friday, March 27, 2009

Sustainability
As resources dwindle, sustainability is only choice
Phoenix Business Journal - by Rick Heffernon

With the world population above 6 billion and zooming toward 9 billion by midcentury, talk of sustainability frequently hits the news. Many wonder where we will find the resources to maintain half again as many people on this planet when we already face food and energy pinches.

That, in a nutshell, is the central challenge of sustainability: how to maintain and improve the economy, the environment and our communities over the long haul.

Only the power and creativity of businesses — along with the help of markets that better reflect the true costs of unsustainable products — can convert our economy from wasteful to sustainable, and efficiently deliver the goods we need. Fortunately, sustainability already presents many upsides for companies that choose to work on solutions.

Sustainable business practices save money. One of the quickest and cheapest ways to reduce production costs is to eliminate material waste and energy inefficiencies, recycling a raw material rather than extracting a new supply for each use.

Sustainability provides a competitive advantage. Consumers at home and abroad increasingly choose to do business with companies that have green credentials.

New markets for green products are expanding rapidly. Asia’s demand for sustainable goods and services has been forecast to hit $100 billion a year over the next decade.

A growing number of employees prefer to work for a sustainability-oriented enterprise. After furniture manufacturer Herman Miller converted its U.S. factory to incorporate natural light, fresh air and live trees indoors, the company’s workers couldn’t be lured to a competitor’s traditional factory, even for higher pay.

The time is right. Companies that move faster toward sustainability will outperform their competitors when the going gets tough. What business wouldn’t love to possess the advantages of solar panels, a hybrid fleet, natural lighting and zero waste?

Arizona is a great place to do sustainable business. Its three state universities are advancing some of the world’s most far-reaching research on sustainable urban systems. Its land receives enough solar energy to power the entire country every day the sun shines. Its state government is moving toward a market approach for reducing harmful carbon emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels. And many regional governments are establishing procurement guidelines that give preference to sustainable products and services and level the playing field for green businesses.

While sustainability is, at heart, a global issue, that is not where the job will get done. The real action will take place locally, at work and at home, and it will be driven by individual choices made by businesses and their customers.

Rick Heffernon is a senior writer and policy analyst for ASU’s Global Institute of Sustainability and author of “Sustainability for Arizona: The Issue of Our Age,” produced by ASU’s Morrison Institute for Public Policy.

Originally ran in the Sustainability section of the Sept. 19, 2008 issue.

[Anti_Illuminati]

http://decisiontheater.wordpress.com/2009/02/12/pandemic-flu-school-closure-exercise-today/

Pandemic flu school closure exercise today  February 12, 2009

This morning, we just began another pandemic flu exercise, specifically targeted at schools.

Three Arizona school districts are participating.  The exercise focuses on the events leading up to a school closure should the World Health Organization declare a ‘WHO Level 6‘ pandemic.

Key decision-makers in these school districts will see what an event like this will entail,  following ‘news’ via simulated news bulletins, and data they have access to at each stage of the outbreak.

Opening the session, Dr. Peter Kelly (shown here) a physician who works with the Arizona Department of Health Services (AZDHS) put the event into context, reminding the attendees of the waves of infection that come with a pandemic, and the mutation that takes place in the quiet periods between those waves.

“School districts have been urged to have a plan in the event of a pandemic,” said Kelly. “The goal of this exercise today is to encourage them to continue to develop their influenza plans and effectively communicate with public health authorities at the county and state level.”
________________________________________________________________________
http://decisiontheater.wordpress.com/2009/02/16/what-the-pandemic-flu-exercise-revealed/

What the pandemic flu exercise revealed  February 16, 2009



At last Thursday’s Pandemic Influenza exercise, 12 senior administrators from three school districts in Arizona pried open a few interesting questions.

As we have noted before, when participants are faced with multiple sources of vital information in an immersive environment, they begin to draw a lot more insight from the data than they would from, say a handbook or spreadsheet. It would be easy for me to get blasé about interactive sessions since most of what we do has an interactive component. But I could see an interesting dynamic at work.

If the light bulbs went off, these were the ones that were flashing:

   1. Saying you have a response plan is not a matter of checking a few boxes but more about connecting the dots. You walk away feeling more empowered because of that.
   2. In crisis, even in a simulated one, there seem to be as many questions as there are answers.
   3. As Dr. Megan Jehn (of ASU’s School of Health Policy and Management) emphasized, it was not about having the plan, but about having a coordinated response plan.
   4. The need to pay attention to grief and counseling was a blind spot in existing plans, said one participant.

This Thursday, three school districts from three different counties will take part in the exercise. Watch this space for more updates.

If you want to go back to the first pandemic influenza planning exercise at Arizona State University, check out these links. Microsite and  story.

[Anti_Illuminati]

PDF_LINK

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM
TOM DAVIS, Virginia,Chairman
CHRISTOPHER SHAYS, Connecticut
DAN BURTON, Indiana
ILEANA ROSLEHTINEN, Florida
JOHN M. MCHUGH, New York
JOHN L. MICA, Florida
GIL GUTKNECHT, Minnesota
MARK E. SOUDER, Indiana
STEVEN C. LATOURETTE, Ohio
TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania
CHRIS CANNON, Utah
JOHN J. DUNCAN, JR., Tennessee
CANDICE S. MILLER, Michigan
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio
DARRELL E. ISSA, California
JON C. PORTER, Nevada
KENNY MARCHANT, Texas
LYNN A. WESTMORELAND, Georgia
PATRICK T. MCHENRY, North Carolina
CHARLES W. DENT, Pennsylvania
VIRGINIA FOXX, North Carolina
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio
——— ———
HENRY A. WAXMAN, California
TOM LANTOS, California
MAJOR R. OWENS, New York
EDOLPHUS TOWNS, New York
PAUL E. KANJORSKI, Pennsylvania
CAROLYN B. MALONEY, New York
ELIJAH E. CUMMINGS, Maryland
DENNIS J. KUCINICH, Ohio
DANNY K. DAVIS, Illinois
WM. LACY CLAY, Missouri
DIANE E. WATSON, California
STEPHEN F. LYNCH, Massachusetts
CHRIS VAN HOLLEN, Maryland
LINDA T. SANCHEZ, California
C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
ELEANOR HOLMES NORTON, District of
Columbia
BERNARD SANDERS, Vermont
(Independent)
DAVIDMARIN,Staff Director
LAWRENCEHALLORAN,Deputy Staff Director
TERESAAUSTIN,Chief Clerk
PHILBARNETT,Minority Chief of Staff/Chief Counsel
VerDate 11MAY200012:44 Sep 05, 2006

C O N T E N T S
Page
Hearing held on May 11, 2006 ...............................................................................1 Statement of:
Kriens, Scott, chairman and CEO, Juniper Networks; Paul B. Kurtz, executive director, Cyber Security Industry Alliance; and Alonzo Plough, board of directors, Trust for America’s Health .............................89 Kriens, Scott ..............................................................................................89 Kurtz, Paul B. ............................................................................................98 Plough, Alonzo ...........................................................................................108 Walker, David M., Comptroller General, Government Accountability Office, accompanied by Linda D. Koontz, Director for Information Management Issues; Linda Springer, Director, Office of Personnel Management; John O. Agwunobi, M.D., Assistant Secretary for Health, Department of Health and Human Services; and Jeffrey W. Runge, M.D., Acting Under Secretary for Science and Technology, Chief Medical Officer, Department of Homeland Security ................................................28 Agwunobi, John O. ....................................................................................49 Runge, Jeffrey W. ......................................................................................68 Springer, Linda ..........................................................................................43 Walker, David M. ......................................................................................28 Letters, statements, etc., submitted for the record by:
Agwunobi, John O., M.D., Assistant Secretary for Health, Department
of Health and Human Services, prepared statement of ............................51
Burton, Hon. Dan, a Representative in Congress from the State of Indi
ana, prepared statement of ..........................................................................126
Cummings, Hon. Elijah E., a Representative in Congress from the State
of Maryland, prepared statement of ............................................................24
Davis, Chairman Tom, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Virginia, prepared statement of ...................................................................4
Issa, Hon. Darrell E., a Representative in Congress from the State of
California, prepared statement of ................................................................128
Kriens, Scott, chairman and CEO, Juniper Networks, prepared statement
of ...92
Kucinich, Hon. Dennis J., a Representative in Congress from the State
of Ohio, prepared statement of ....................................................................17
Kurtz, Paul B., executive director, Cyber Security Industry Alliance, pre
pared statement of ........................................................................................100
Plough, Alonzo, board of directors, Trust for America’s Health, prepared
statement of ...................................................................................................111
Runge, Jeffrey W., M.D., Acting Under Secretary for Science and Tech
nology, Chief Medical Officer, Department of Homeland Security, pre
pared statement of ........................................................................................71
Springer, Linda, Director, Office of Personnel Management, prepared
statement of ...................................................................................................45
Walker, David M., Comptroller General, Government Accountability Of
fice, prepared statement of ...........................................................................31
Waxman, Hon. Henry A., a Representative in Congress from the State
of California, prepared statement of ...........................................................8

WORKING THROUGH AN OUTBREAK:PANDEMIC FLU PLANNING AND CONTINUITY OF OPERATIONS


THURSDAY, MAY 11, 2006

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tom Davis (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Tom Davis, Shays, Platts, Duncan, Issa, Foxx, Schmidt, Waxman, Cummings, Kucinich, Davis of Illinois, Watson, Lynch, Van Hollen, Ruppersberger, and Norton.

Staff present: David Marin, staff director; Lawrence Halloran, deputy staff director; Ellen Brown, legislative director and senior policy counsel; Jennifer Safavian, chief counsel for oversight and investigations; Patrick Lyden, parliamentarian; John Hunter, counsel; Chas Phillips, policy counsel, Rob White, communications director; Andrea LeBlanc, deputy director of communications; Susie Schulte, professional staff member; Teresa Austin, chief clerk; Sarah D’Orsie, deputy clerk; Allyson Blandford, office manager; Leneal Scott, computer systems manager; Karen Lightfoot, minority communications director/senior policy advisor; Robin Appleberry and Sarah Despres, minority counsels; Richard Butcher and Tania Shand, minority professional staff members; Earley Green, minority chief clerk; and Jean Gosa, minority assistant clerk.
Chairman TOMDAVIS. Good morning. The committee will come to order.

We are going to have two very distinguished panels of witnesses here today to discuss what health experts describe as one of the largest dangers facing our Nation—the threat of pandemic flu.  We don’t know when or where the next pandemic will strike. We don’t know what strain of influenza will be the culprit, although much evidence points to the avian flu. The virulent H5N1 strain has already caused 115 deaths in Southeast Asia, China, and the Middle East. Nor do we know if avian flu will turn out to be more like swine flu, a pandemic that never materialized. But regardless, we need to improve our readiness because we can be sure that the next flu pandemic is a matter of when, not if. And when that time does come, the stakes will be enormous.

Experts have projected that more than half a million Americans could die. Over 2 million could be hospitalized. Forty percent of the 2 work force would be unable to report to work in the event of a U.S. pandemic flu outbreak.

It is our responsibility to make sure America is prepared, not just prepared to address the massive health implications of a pandemic, but prepared for the enormous economic and societal disruptions as well. Beyond efforts to protect human health, Government agencies and private sector businesses must have the ability to maintain essential functions through an outbreak. Recent natural disasters and terrorist attacks raise questions about how the Federal Government will continue to operate during emergencies.  Last week, President Bush released the administration’s Implementation Plan for its National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza.  The plan designates the National Response Plan [NRP], as the primary mechanism to coordinate the Federal Government’s response.  Under the NRP, the Department of Homeland Security is the lead agency to coordinate all Federal activities.

As seen during Hurricane Katrina, the NRP can be ambiguous, and individual authorities among agencies are not clearly identified. It is the committee’s hope that lessons learned from Katrina are being applied to any deficiencies in the NRP so the country is more readily prepared for future disasters.

A key part of the Government’s implementation plan is its emphasis on telework to ensure essential Government operations can continue during a pandemic, when it may not be possible or advisable for employees to report to work and be in close quarters. Much to my frustration, the Federal Government has long lagged behind the private sector in promoting telework, despite the traffic, energy, cost, productivity, and employee morale benefits it can provide.

I was pleased to see the pandemic implementation plan requires the Office of Personnel Management to develop guidance for Federal departments on continuity of operations planning criteria and telework to provide instructions for alternative workplace options during a pandemic.

This is an important step forward, and I am hopeful the pandemic implementation plan will spur the Government to take serious strides in getting more employees to become teleworkers. I am also hopeful that this will help the Federal Government address several inadequacies in the COOP planning including—we call it the COOP planning—including deficient guidance to identify essential functions and ensure continued delivery of services during a crisis.

The Government’s implementation plan also acknowledges the limits of the Federal Government while highlighting the importance of preparedness by individuals, communities, and the private sector. I think all of us here today agree that our State and local health officials will be on the front lines of pandemic response. It is our job to provide them with the adequate support and essential guidance they need to effectively prepare for and respond to a pandemic.

Our experience with last year’s hurricane season is a sad reminder of the need for State and local authorities to be prepared
for anything. Disasters or pandemics don’t happen according to plan. Response requires agility, flexibility, and a willingness by leaders to take action when needed.

We have many important issues today to discuss within the context of pandemic flu. I look forward to a constructive dialog with our witnesses on these lifeanddeath issues.

[The prepared statement of Chairman Tom Davis follows:]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And I would now recognize the distinguished ranking member, Mr. Waxman, for his opening statement.  Mr. WAXMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing, and thank you for your leadership on this important issue.  Experts tell us there will be another influenza pandemic. We don’t know if it is going to be the avian flu or not, but pandemics happen every so often. They also tell us that the Nation is not prepared to confront this threat. There are multiple holes in our capacity to respond.

We need to increase our vaccine production capacity, strengthen our public health infrastructure, create adequate hospital surge capacity, and draft contingency plans that will ensure the continued operation of important Government functions.
Because we do not know when or how severe the next pandemic that will strike us will be, we don’t have the luxury of time. We need to act quickly and move beyond the planning stage to the implementation stage. The administration has taken some important steps. In particular, they have produced several planning documents. But this is not enough, and some of their actions have actually been counterproductive.

According to the President’s pandemic preparedness plan, the burden of responding to a flu pandemic will largely fall on State and local governments. Yet the President’s fiscal year 2000 (sic) budget cuts more than $200 million from the public health programs at the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention that fund State and local training and preparedness efforts.
Pandemic preparedness also requires a clear and coherent leadership structure that is capable of responding in an emergency. Unfortunately, the President’s implementation plan, which was released last week, creates divided authority. It would establish the same type of structure that led to the tragic confusion and delay in the response to Hurricane Katrina.

Under the President’s plan, HHS is in charge of the medical response, but DHS is in charge of the overall response. There is no clear delineation of how that will work or who will have final authority over medical operations. This approach ignores the adage that when everyone is in charge, no one is in charge.

A related weakness is that the core Federal medical asset, the National Disaster Medical System, is currently a part of DHS. To lead a medical response, therefore, HHS has to rely on personnel, supplies, equipment, and communications systems that are actually controlled by the Department of Homeland Security. Well, this is the same arrangement—medical assets separated from those charged with leading the medical response—that was a major factor in the chaos after Hurricane Katrina.

According to the administration officials, there is a plan to move the National Disaster Medical System out of DHS to HHS. But these plans are not imminent. We cannot afford to wait until next year to be ready with a medical response.
Preparing for a flu pandemic will not be easy, and the Federal plans will change as we learn more about the threat and the best means of response. But the Nation has a right to expect that the Federal Government will not repeat its mistakes, which is what it seems intent on doing.

One important part of the Federal response is ensuring continuity of operations, and I would like to thank Representative Danny Davis for his leadership in this area. Today, he will introduce legislation that would require the Federal Government to establish a demonstration project to test and evaluate telework from alternate work sites, including from employees’ homes.
This demonstration project will be important for our understanding of the effectiveness of telework and will give us an opportunity to identify and fix problems that arise.

I want to thank the witnesses for coming today, and I look forward to your testimony.
[The prepared statement of Hon. Henry A. Waxman follows:]

Chairman TOMDAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Waxman.

Mr. Shays.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, one, thank you for having this hearing. In this same room—and it is very eerie because I look around, and I don’t see any TV media here. We are talking about one of the biggest issues, in my judgment, facing our country. Not unlike a hearing, I had a few years ago where a doctor of a major medical magazine said his biggest fear was that a small group of scientists would create an altered biological agent that would wipe out humanity as we know it.

If we know that influenza killed approximately 30,000 to 50,000 persons a year in the United States and 1 million to 3 million Nation (sic) wide when you don’t have a pandemic, and when we realize that we have had 10 pandemics in the last 300 years—the one most severe in 1919, when our population was one third the size worldwide, and we lost 50 million to 100 million people—it should get our attention. And it is getting the attention of this committee, and it is getting the attention of some in Government.

But I think what we are going to find is that we need a much more unified effort to make sure that we minimize the deaths we know will occur. And I just salute you and others who are working on this. This is a very, very important hearing we are having today, and the work of the people that are appearing before us can’t be measured lightly.
Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Any other Members wish to make opening statements?

Ms. WATSON. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes, ma’am? The gentle lady from California.

Ms. WATSON. I, too, want to thank you for this hearing.

Biological preparedness is considered crucial in the current world climate. Our Government has no control over a natural phenomena that will threaten citizens every year. But the Government Reform Committee has an important public service to perform in regard to preparedness for a flu pandemic.

Flu pandemic has the ability to cause death in catastrophic proportions. On one hand, Government should not place the public into a state of fear. But on the other hand, Government should educate the public and have a clear plan for action in case of an outbreak.

Do we have a plan in place? Has this administration and Congress fully funded the resulting solution? Do we have the domestic manufacturing capability to cover the needs of the United States during a crisis?

Only one of the two FDA approved flu vaccine manufacturers in America, and Chevron Corp. does not have a production facility located on the U.S.controlled soil.

Mr. Chairman, the administration’s May 3, 2006, Implementation for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza leaves too
many concerns. The complete breakdown of DHS leadership, responsiveness, and accountability during the Hurricane Katrina
places congressional oversight into question if we allowed a similar structure to be approved. ‘‘Fool me once, shame on you. But fool me twice’’—we are approaching a hurricane season again. Is the DHS structure equipped to handle the elemental fury of mother nature again—are we prepared—much less at the same time as her biological scorn?

So, Mr. Chairman, I am looking forward to today’s testimony and the positive solutions that our witnesses can provide. The President has requested $7.1 billion, and the Congress appropriated $3.8 billion in the DOD appropriations act. Is the funding sufficient?  I am interested to hear the panel’s assessment of the Danny Davis legislation, the Continuity of Operations Demonstration Project Act. We need a much better system in place to accommodate a flu pandemic or a large natural disaster situation.

So let us put a plan in place that answers the questions and not creates them. I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman TOMDAVIS. Thank you very much.

Members will have 7 days to submit opening statements for the record.

Mr. Davis, do you want to say anything?

Mr. DAVIS OF ILLINOIS. Yes. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I want to thank you and Ranking Member Waxman for calling this hearing and for your leadership of the Government Reform Committee.

In the late 1990’s, the Government Reform and Education and the Workforce Committees held oversight hearings to examine the barriers to telecommuting and the development and promotion of telework programs by Federal agencies.
It was then thought that the primary benefits of telecommuting were a reduction in traffic congestion and pollution, improvements to the recruitment and retention of employees, a reduction in the need for office space, increased worker productivity, and improvements to the quality of life and morale of Federal employees.

These benefits continue to be compelling and valid reasons for implementing agencywide telework programs. Representative Frank Wolf is to be commended for continuously pushing agencies to increase the number of Federal employees who telecommute.  However, with the Oklahoma City bombing, September 11th, Hurricane Katrina, and now the possibility of a pandemic, we have other very compelling reasons to push Federal agencies and ourselves to develop and to implement the infrastructure and work processes necessary to support telecommuting.

Federal agencies must be able to continue operations during an emergency. The question we must ask ourselves is this. In the event of an emergency, are we—this committee, our staffs, and all of the Federal agencies—prepared to serve the American people if our primary places of work are no longer available to us?

In conjunction with this hearing, the Government Accountability Office [GAO], will issue a report entitled ‘‘Continuity of Operations.’’ Selected agencies could improve planning for use of alternate facilities and telework descriptions. From the population of alternate facilities, GAO selected six to evaluate for compliance with Federal Preparedness Circular [FPC] 65 guidance.

The report, which was requested by Chairman Tom Davis, found that most of the agencies’ documented plans and procedures related to alternate facilities included site preparation and activation plans.  However, none of the agencies had conducted all of the applicable tests and exercises required by FPC 65, including annual exercises that incorporate deliberate and preplanned movement of COOP personnel to an alternate facility.

Further, agencies did not fully identify the levels of resources necessary to support essential functions, thereby creating the lack of assurance that facilities are adequately prepared.

Today, I will introduce legislation that will push agencies to address the contingency planning failures detailed in GAO’s reports.  The legislation, a modified version of H.R. 4797, which I introduced in the 108th Congress, would require the chief human capital officer to conduct and to evaluate a 10day demonstration project that broadly uses employees’ contributions to an agency’s operations from alternate work locations, including home.

The outcome of the demonstration project would provide agencies and Congress with approaches to gaining flexibility and to identifying work processes that should be addressed during an extended emergency. The number and types of potential emergency interruptions are unknown, and we must be prepared in advance of an incident with the work processes and infrastructures needed to establish agency operations.

In a world where anything is possible, we must be prepared for all of the possibilities, and I trust that Chairman Davis will join with Ranking Member Waxman and others to cosponsor this bill.  And I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you. Well, I probably will.

We have a vote on. I have sent Mr. Shays over to vote so he can come back. And when he comes back, hopefully, we can keep this moving because I know we have some time constraints on some of our witnesses.
Anybody else need to make an opening statement? Mr. Kucinich.

Mr. KUCINICH. I thank the gentleman.

‘‘You are on your own.’’ That has been the credo for the administration’s approach to health care, and it summarizes their approach to avian flu. The implementation plan gives a little guidance to State and local governments and businesses and then wishes them luck.

First, there is the leadership vacuum. The plan calls for HHS to coordinate the medical response, but calls for Homeland Security to coordinate Federal operations and resources.

A bipartisan report out of the Senate released in April found that the department has lagged in fixing the problems that plagued its atrocious response to Hurricane Katrina. It found that major structural reforms were necessary and that little has changed in the department so far.

So how can we expect Homeland Security to adopt a similar motto to the one they adopted last summer? The point is we can expect them to adopt that motto. ‘‘You are on your own.’’

What is more is that the plan has been called ‘‘the mother of all unfunded mandates.’’ While $7.1 billion for avian flu preparedness is a step in the right direction, it is simply not enough. Dr. Irwin Redlener, director of the National Center for Disaster Preparedness at Columbia University’s Mailman School of Public Health, called the budget ‘‘completely unrealistic.’’

A big part of the reason it is insufficient is that it has to make up for years of steady erosion of the public health infrastructure due to lack of funding. In fact, Dr. Redlener points out the need for $5 billion just for staff, equipment and supplies, and general resiliency. Yet the vast majority of the administration’s funding is going toward the antiviral and vaccine stockpile.

This plan, therefore, gives us inadequate leadership and inadequate funding, which leaves the clear impression that we truly will be on our own in a pandemic. And a crisis is precisely the time we need to look out for each other the most.
However, we can be assured that everyone is not left to his or her own devices. On November 4, 2005, in front of this committee, HHS Secretary Michael Leavitt stated during the Q&A that he would not be issuing a compulsory license for the antiviral drug Tamiflu. He also declared that he was in negotiation with Roche, manufacturer of Tamiflu, over the cost of the drug being purchased for the national stockpile.

On one hand, Secretary Leavitt has a congressional mandate to stockpile enough Tamiflu for 25 percent of the Nation. On the other hand, he withdrew the threat of compulsory licensing even if Roche tries to price gouge. In doing so, Mr. Leavitt undercut his own negotiating power and effectively surrendered control of the price to Roche.

On November 10th, 6 days after the hearing, the New York Times reported that Roche announced they would be charging developed countries for Tamiflu 15 euros or about $19 for a course of treatment. Wondering how the price negotiations between HHS and Roche went, my office recently asked HHS what they were paying for Tamiflu for the stockpile—the asking price of 15 euros or $19?

Even with the bulk purchasing power of 810 million pills, HHS did not bother to get a better deal than the asking price. Lest you get the impression that this price is fair, allow me to point out that Roche did not sink a dime into research on their drug. They simply licensed it from its inventor, Gilead Sciences. That means there is no need to recoup research costs.
Furthermore, we know it can be sold for a profit for much less.  Cipla, a generics manufacturer in India, for example, is selling Tamiflu for only $12. That is 36 percent less than what the Federal Government here is paying. If we paid Cipla’s price instead of Roche’s, we would save over a half billion dollars.

Now I bet local health agencies and hospitals could save a lot of lives with that kind of money. Think of what we could do with a half billion dollars. We could reduce the deficit, put teachers in classrooms, invest in renewable energy, provide health care to some of the uninsured.

Those that stand to gain from the inflated prices for pandemic pharmaceuticals are doing well. Roche’s sales for the first quarter of 2006 are up 22 percent to $7.7 billion. Gilead Sciences, the company that originally developed Tamiflu and continues to receive royalties on its sales, outperformed RBC Capital Markets estimate of $350 million in Tamiflu sales by $163 million.

In essence, we are telling State and local governments there is not enough money to fund things like medical personnel and equipment while we are giving away bags of money to the already incredibly profitable pharmaceutical industry. In other words, you are on your own unless you are a big pharma.

Thank you. I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Dennis J. Kucinich follows:]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

The gentleman from Maryland?

Mr. CUMMINGS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for holding this critically important hearing.

Hurricane Katrina demonstrated with abundant clarity that Government incompetence and poor preparation during a time of national peril are not victimless crimes. Those failures, coupled with the Government’s inability to secure sufficient quantities of vaccine courses in a recent flu season, compel us to rigorously question our Nation’s pandemic flu and continuity of operations plans.

It should give us all pause that a pandemic could result in the deaths of over 500,000 Americans and infect 25 percent of the world’s population. The Baltimore Sun on June 12, 2005, reported in an article entitled ‘‘Fears of Flu Pandemic Spurring Preparations’’ that, ‘‘The threat of an avian flu pandemic from Asia could cause 12,000 deaths in the State of Maryland early on, with the possibility of many, many more later.’’

Make no mistake. Such a loss of life would fundamentally undermine our economy and our society. With H5N1 considered likely to cause a global pandemic, the time is long overdue for our Nation to have a comprehensive plan to withstand the onslaught of a pandemic.

The White House recently released the Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza in an effort to provide clarity to the public and to private entities about their respective roles and responsibilities. Unfortunately, this plan suffers from critical deficiencies that need to be immediately addressed.  To begin, I am concerned that the Department of Homeland Security is charged with coordinating all Federal operations and assets. In no uncertain terms, DHS failed to ably respond to Hurricane Katrina. Nearly a year later, calls for major structural reforms and a substantive change in leadership at DHS have fallen on deaf ears.

With a pandemic being described as ‘‘Hurricane Katrina hitting all of America at the same time,’’ how can we be confident in DHS’s ability to coordinate effectively, dispense resources rapidly, or provide the type of leadership needed to steer this Nation out of a flu pandemic?

Second, the plan fails to identify a specific individual at the White House who is charged with the Federal response coordination. As illustrated in Hurricane Katrina, the lack of an identified ultimate decisionmaker at the White House could result in, one, unnecessary delays in addressing the needs of State and locals and, two, an unnecessary delay in comprehending the scope of human suffering and a loss of life in devastated communities on the ground.

Furthermore, the plan disturbingly fails to specify how States ought to distribute limited supplies of vaccines and antivirals.  Make no mistake, who and under what conditions citizens get vaccinated or medicated with antivirals in the midst of a flu pandemic will be one of the greatest challenges that confront all levels of government.

Indeed, those decisions will literally be a matter of life and death for many, and it is not enough to say the Federal Government is working with the State governments to establish distribution plans.  And finally, Mr. Chairman, I am also deeply concerned that this Congress could find $70 billion for tax cuts that will disproportionately benefit the wealthy, but could not find the resources or the will to fully fund $7.1 billion requested to expand our vaccine capacity, purchase antivirals, conduct research, and support State and local preparedness.

The American people are closely watching how its Government responds to this challenge. One that will no doubt test the wisdom of our priorities, our ability to effectively govern in a time of international crisis, and the firmness of our resolve to protect our citizens from threats both seen and unseen.

These threats demand that we improve our preparedness efforts on everything from ensuring our governmental entities are clear as to their roles and responsibilities, to strengthening our continuity of operation plans that are essential to keeping Government up and running in the wake of a disaster.

And with that, Mr. Chairman, I thank you, and I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Hon. Elijah E. Cummings follows:]

Chairman TOMDAVIS. Thank you, gentlemen.

We now welcome our witnesses. We have before us the Honorable David M. Walker, who is the Comptroller General of the GAO.  We have the Honorable John O. Agwunobi, Assistant Secretary for Health, Department of Health and Human Services. The Honorable Jeffrey W. Runge, Acting Under Secretary for Science and Technology, Chief Medical Officer, Department of Homeland Security.  The Honorable Linda Springer, Director, Office of Personnel Management.

Thank you all for being here. As you know, we swear you all in.

So if you would rise?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOMDAVIS. I would note for the record that our witnesses have responded in the affirmative.
Comptroller Walker, you have the floor. Thank you for being here.

And it is my understanding that you have convened a GAOsponsored conference on Inspector General Act, and that Linda Koontz, Director for Information Management Issues for GAO, will remain and answer our questions. Did she stand to be sworn in?

Mr. WALKER. She did, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOMDAVIS. OK. Well, that is great. Thank you for doing that.

So you have a statement and then will be replaced by someone who will ably be able to answer the questions as well.
Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Walker.

Mr. WALKER. I want to thank you, and I want to thank the staff for your understanding.

The Congress had asked me to convene a panel on the IG Act.  I am chairing it. It is going on right now, and so I appreciate your indulgence.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. It is easy to understand, and we appreciate and the staff appreciates you even being here.

STATEMENTS OF DAVID M. WALKER, COMPTROLLER GENERAL, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ACCOMPANIED BY LINDA D. KOONTZ, DIRECTOR FOR INFORMATION MANAGEMENT ISSUES; LINDA SPRINGER, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT; JOHN O. AGWUNOBI, M.D., ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES; AND JEFFREY W.

RUNGE, M.D., ACTING UNDER SECRETARY FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, CHIEF MEDICAL OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

STATEMENT OF DAVID M. WALKER

Mr. WALKER. Thank you very much.

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in the committee’s hearing on pandemic influenza and continuity planning. As each of you are well aware, the Government plays many important roles in responding to emergency situations, such as natural disasters, terrorist events, and pandemic flu outbreaks should they occur.

But in order to provide both direct emergency response as well as other essential services, Government agencies must be positioned to continue functioning even when the agencies themselves are disrupted. Accordingly, agencies are required to develop plans to ensure continuity of operations, or socalled COOP plans.  In preparing such plans, the executive branch agencies are to follow guidance that is issued by the Federal Emergency Management Agency [FEMA]. In developing COOP plans, a potentially useful option is telework. That is employees performing work from remote sites, often their homes or another location that is not a traditional office.

As we pointed out in April 2004, telework offers potential benefits to employers, employees, and society as a whole in the normal course of operations. It is also important and a viable option for Federal continuity planning, especially as the duration of an emergency is extended, which would be the case if a flu pandemic were to come to the United States.

According to health experts, absentee rates in a pandemic could reach 40 percent during peak periods. The need for care for family members, the need to deal with the illness, and the fear of infection would have a broadbased effect within the country.
In such a situation, the use of telework or other means to avoid unnecessary contacts among people, which is referred to as social distancing measures, is clearly appropriate. This is recognized by recent executive branch guidance recommending social distancing measures, such as telework and public health interventions, to control and contain infection during a pandemic outbreak.

GAO recognizes the importance of telework in continuity planning and is striving to lead by example on these issues. For example, about 13.5 percent of GAO employees used telework last year, as compared to 5.2 percent for Federal civilian employees in 2004.  Furthermore, our current telework policy allows me, during certain emergencies, to approve telework for all employees in an affected area to promote continuity of operations. We are also completing a supplement to our COOP plan that addresses preparation specific to a pandemic and are coordinating our continuity planning efforts with those of other legislative branch agencies and of Congress as a whole.

As per your request, the balance of my remarks will focus on the report that we are issuing today, which was referred to by Mr.  Davis. In 2005, we previously issued a report based upon a survey of Federal officials responsible for continuity planning at 23 major agencies. For the current report, we basically reissued the same survey in order to try to be able to get an update and find out what type of progress has been made.

This time, more agencies reported plans for essential team members to telework during the COOP event than in the previous survey. However, only a few of the agencies documented that they had made the necessary preparations to effectively use telework during an emergency.

For example, although 9 of 23 agencies reported that they expected some of their essential team members to telework during a COOP event, only 1 agency documented that it had notified its team members of this expectation. In addition, none of the 23 agencies demonstrated that it could ensure adequate technological capacity to allow designated personnel to telework during an emergency, and only 3 of 23 agencies documented that they had actually tested the ability of their staff to telework effectively during an emergency.

One reason why agencies reported these low levels of preparation for telework is that none of FEMA’s COOP guidance addresses the steps that agencies should take to ensure that they are fully prepared to use telework during a COOP event. In 2005, when we reported on the previous survey, we recommended that FEMA develop such guidance in consultation with the Office of Personnel Management. Unfortunately, this guidance has yet to be created.  This guidance suggests the use of telework and recommends that agencies consider which essential functions should be performed from remote locations, such as employee homes. That’s the most recent guidance that the agency—that the executive branch has issued.

However, the guidance still does not address the steps that agencies should take when preparing to use telework during an emergency. For example, it does not address certain necessary preparations, such as informing designated staff that they are expected to telework or providing them with adequate technical resources and support to make it effective.

If agencies do not make adequate preparations, they may not be able to use telework effectively to ensure the continuity of their essential functions in emergencies, including in the event of a pandemic influenza. Accordingly, we recommended in our report that FEMA establish a timeline for developing such guidance. DHS partially agreed with our recommendation and stated that FEMA will cooperate with OPM in developing this timeline.

Last week, the White House released an Implementation Plan in support of the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza. This plan calls for OPM to work with DHS and other agencies to revise existing telework guidance and to issue new guidance on human capital planning and COOP planning. The plan establishes an expectation that these actions will be completed within the next 3 months.  We’ll see.

We are encouraged that DHS has now established a timeline for issuing revised telework guidance. However, unless the forthcoming guidance addresses the necessary preparations, agencies may not be able to use telework effectively to ensure the continuity of essential functions.

On the other hand, if they prepare telework effectively, agencies could enable both essential and nonessential employees to contribute to agency missions during the extended emergencies, including a pandemic influenza.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I obviously will make Ms. Koontz available for any questions that you may have or the other members of the committee.

[NOTE.—The May 2006 GAO report entitled, ‘‘Continuity of Operations, Selected Agencies Could Improve Planning for Use of Alternate Facilities and Telework during Disruptions,’’ GAO–06–713, may be found in committee files.]

[Anti_Illuminati]

[The prepared statement of Mr. Walker follows:]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Walker.

If you don’t mind just coming up here a quick second, we will start with you, Ms. Springer. Thank you.

STATEMENT OF LINDA SPRINGER

Ms. SPRINGER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

OPM appreciates being invited to testify before this committee today about the steps we are taking to prepare the Federal Government as an employer for the possibility of a pandemic influenza.  The President’s Implementation Plan for the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza tasks OPM with developing appropriate guidance on human resources management policies relating to a possible flu epidemic. In addition, the implementation plan directs OPM to update three existing telework guides. We’ve approached these tasks with a set of guiding principles in mind. First, that we should cause no harm. In other words, don’t induce any panic or contribute to that type of atmosphere in the Federal work force while, at the same time, maintaining a sense of urgency.

Communication will be a key to carrying out our role. Our communications with Federal agencies and employees on these HR issues relating to a possible pandemic epidemic would be credible, clear, timely, frequent, visible, and sensitive. In coordination with the White House, we will consult with other key departments and agencies, as well as the Chief Human Capital Officers Council and the Federal executive boards, to identify the issues to be addressed in our guidance materials and the audiences to which these materials should be directed.

Our policies will strike an appropriate balance between the institutional interests of the Federal Government as an employer and the needs and concerns of individual Federal employees and their families.

Finally, we will draw on OPM’s considerable experience in providing advice and assistance to Federal agencies and employees in emergency situations. The internal pandemic working group we have already established at OPM has been at work identifying categories of human resource issues for which guidance already exists, needs revision, or should be developed.
We’ve been aided in this process by keeping an inventory of questions we’ve already received from Federal HR professionals and from individual employees. I’d like to share a couple of those with you and give you a sense—

Mr. SHAYS[presiding]. I am going to interrupt you and ask you, Mr. Walker, why don’t you get on your way? Because you have things you have to do.

Mr. WALKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. You are making me nervous here.

[Laughter.]

I am sorry to interrupt you.

Ms. SPRINGER. We’ve received so far dozens of questions from employees from HR professionals in the Federal Government. I will give you a couple of examples, and you’ll get the flavor of this.

Question No. 1, what kinds of alternative work arrangements are available to assist agencies and employees in accomplishing a critical agency mission during a pandemic influenza?

Local health officials have confirmed that since the children in my son’s daycare center have been exposed to the flu, their families have also been exposed to the virus. My child is not yet sick. What leave may I take to care for my child?
Another one. My elderly mother died due to complications from the flu. I have to make arrangements for and attend her funeral.  May I use sick leave?

If I have been designated as an emergency employee, may I refuse to report for work if I don’t think it is safe to do so?
And these go on and on and on. And that’s been an ongoing indicator to us of the concern and the interest at all levels throughout the civilian work force.

So while we have not yet finalized answers to these questions and the others that we’ve received, or completed our consultation with other Federal departments and agencies, it is clear that our guidance materials must include information on alternative work arrangements.

We’re also keenly aware of this committee’s interest in ensuring that Federal agencies take appropriate steps to integrate telework policies into their continuity of operations plans. And let me assure you that we will include a discussion on teleworking options and policies in our guidance to Federal agencies, as we’re required to do under the President’s plan.
Our guidance will also describe relevant leave and work scheduling policies, as well as other benefits and flexibilities designed to assist Federal employees in the event of a pandemic influenza. In addition, our guidance will include information on hiring flexibilities and additional categories of guidance that we will identify as our review continues.

OPM is on track to meet the 3month deadline specified in the President’s implementation plan. In addition, we anticipate and plan to release some information interimly during that 90day period.

It is important to note that OPM must prepare to carry out its own responsibilities in the event of a pandemic influenza. We will be practicing our plan for continuing to carry out the work that Congress and the President have entrusted to us. We expect that what we learn from these efforts will help inform the guidance we provide to other Federal agencies and employees.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate again the opportunity to testify today and look forward to any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Springer follows:]

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

I want to make sure I am pronouncing your name correctly. It is Dr. Agwunobi?

Dr. AGWUNOBI. That is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Your mic needs to be on. So you have to hit that button there.

Dr. AGWUNOBI. That is correct.

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you. Lovely to have you here. Thank you. You have the floor.

STATEMENT OF JOHN O. AGWUNOBI, M.D.

Dr. AGWUNOBI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for this opportunity to testify before you on the critically important subject of pandemic influenza preparedness.  Pandemics are, indeed, a fact of life, a reality of living on this planet. They have occurred numerous times in the past, and they will likely, unfortunately, occur in the future.
Our ultimate goal must, therefore, be to achieve a constant, yet flexible state of national preparedness, an enduring national ethic of readiness for any and, indeed, for all hazards.

If the next pandemic is anything like the one that we experienced as a planet in 1918, I know currently of no nation that can credibly claim to be ready today. Therefore, much work remains to be done.

We hope and pray that the next pandemic is a mild one. But as my colleague Julie Gerberding often says at the CDC, hope is not a strategy, and prayer is not a plan. More, quite frankly, is expected of Government.

Fortunately, some recent modeling shows that with aggressive Nationwide preparedness, exercised readiness—not just a paper plan, but an exercised plan—and an unhesitant leadership when the alarm bell rings, that we can actually manage our way through a pandemic, greatly reducing its negative impact on individuals and our community.

We learn more with each passing day. And as we learn, we will continue to strengthen our planning and our preparedness.
On November 1, 2005, the President announced the release of the National Strategy for Pandemic Influenza, including a request for $7.1 billion to fund that strategy. Already $3.8 billion has been appropriated, and our journey of preparedness is now well underway.

This month, the White House released a more detailed implementation plan that delineates 300 critical preparedness tasks for agencies of Government and the private sector. Of these, 199 are assigned to the department—the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services.

HHS is clearly identified as being in charge of all the public health and medical aspects of preparedness and our response in a pandemic, and we work very closely with our sister agency, the Department of Homeland Security.

We have international and domestic responsibilities. Our efforts abroad involve the strengthening of international public health and medical partnerships and cooperation, global surveillance, and 50 rapid response—the building of rapid response capabilities and enhanced capacity globally to respond.

Our efforts at home include improved intra and interagency collaboration, coordination, at both the horizontal and vertical level across public health in medical communities, the continued strengthening of surge capacity across the Nation, enhanced domestic surveillance, and improved State and local planning and exercising of those plans, including a recent effort to reach out to every State in the form of pandemic summits in which the Secretary himself participated. We’ve now completed 49, and we continue to reach those that we haven’t got to yet.

We focus and recognize the importance of preparedness of individuals and families in this movement to develop a nation prepared for a pandemic. The development of clear and open risk communication is an essential strategy and a part of our plan.

Our efforts include the stockpiling of prepandemic H5N1 vaccine and efforts to build our capacity to provide 300 million pandemic vaccine courses within 6 months of the declaration of a pandemic.  Our strategy includes efforts to promote scientific research and to advance technology used in vaccine development and manufacturing. While we are working to stockpile antiviral drugs, we are also investing in the search for new and improved antiviral alternatives.

We are working to further the search for rapid, accurate, yet portable diagnostic tests for H5N1, and we continue to stockpile other drugs and resources, including ventilators and personal protective equipment.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, preparedness is a journey, not a destination. It’s a journey that must be Nation wide, involve Federal, State, and local leaders in partnership, and include every sector of society. Every individual, every community must do their part.

In combination, our efforts to prepare for a pandemic can and will have a dramatic impact on even the worst type of pandemic.  But it may also help us resolve the recurring problems that we have seen in recent years with seasonal flu vaccine distribution and perhaps even reduce the dramatic numbers of citizens lost each year to seasonal influenza. As you know, sir, on average about 36,000 lives are lost per year.

Preparedness for a pandemic makes us a nation better prepared for any and all hazards, man made or natural. We’re better prepared today than we were yesterday, and Mr. Chairman, I have no doubt we will be better prepared as a nation tomorrow than we are today.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Agwunobi follows:]

Mr. SHAYS. Thank you.

Before you jump in, Mr. Runge, I have heard three kind of memorable statements. Hope is not a strategy. Prayer is not a plan.  Preparedness is a journey, not a destination.

So I want to add mine. When one of the witnesses says, ‘‘We are taking steps in the right direction,’’ I want to remind you of what former senator Sam Nunn, his observation, said. It is often not enough to take steps in the right direction. A gazelle running from a hungry cougar is ‘‘taking steps in the right direction.’’ But survival in that case, and in ours, is more a matter of speed than direction.

So the question isn’t just are we doing the right things, but are we doing them in time? The sense of urgency is as critical against a pandemic flu as the plan to fight the outbreak.

So now I have added mine. And Mr. Runge, you can add one, too, if you care to. [Laughter.]

STATEMENT OF JEFFREY W. RUNGE

Dr. RUNGE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to add that my name is Jeff Runge, RUNGE. Yes, sir. Thank you very much for the chance to—

Mr. SHAYS. Mr. Runge, I apologize.

Dr. RUNGE. That’s no problem.

Mr. SHAYS. It is nice to have you here, Mr. Runge.

Dr. RUNGE. I serve as the Chief Medical Officer for the Department of Homeland Security, as well as the Acting Under Secretary for Science and Technology. I am very pleased to be here with my colleague, Dr. Agwunobi, to discuss the role of DHS as the overall incident manager and the coordinator of the Federal response in the event of a flu pandemic.

DHS is working very closely with its Federal partners—the HHS, Department of Defense, USDA, and the Veterans Administration, and the Homeland Security Council—to prepare for the worst and to ensure that we are coordinated. Together with our Federal partners, we understand our roles in managing the outbreak of disease, whether it’s an outbreak that’s confined to the bird population or whether it is a fullscale human pandemic.

The USDA, with support from its State agriculture counterparts, will manage an outbreak in the bird population without help from DHS. HHS will manage the public health and medical aspects of an outbreak in the human population in prevention, response, and treatment. DHS will support HHS in fulfilling their responsibilities in any way we can.

Now even though we recognize the need to be ready at the Federal level, Secretary Leavitt and Secretary Chertoff, as well as Dr.  Agwunobi and I, have made the point on numerous occasions that preparedness for an incident such as this must be defined at the local level. We have stood shoulder to shoulder with our colleagues in HHS and USDA at nearly 50 State pandemic summits, discussing the need to work together with State and local governments, nongovernmental organizations, faithbased organizations, and the private sector to ensure a condition of readiness.

Now the mechanism for coordination of a broad Federal response like this is the National Response Plan. The NRP supports the concept that incidents are handled at the lowest jurisdictional level, even as it provides the mechanism for a concerted national effort.  Let me digress a moment into the likely scenario if a pandemic were to present serious and socioeconomic problems for the United States. The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with other Cabinet members and the President, would likely declare an incident of national significance and implement the appropriate coordinating mechanisms. DHS is already ensuring that the appropriate multiagency coordinating structures are in place well before an outbreak.

As a threat becomes more imminent and as a situation warrants, the Secretary may consider activating various elements of the national response, including designating a principal Federal official [PFO] standing up the joint information center and joint field offices.

Secretary Chertoff has already identified a candidate to become the national PFO for pandemic influenza. This individual will be intimately involved in the planning and exercising of all the contingency plans as we work toward the condition of readiness. In the event we are faced with a pandemic, the Secretary would also activate a national planning element composed of senior officials of relevant Federal agencies, who have already been identified, to coordinate strategic level national planning and operations.  He would also likely establish as many as five regional joint field offices that would be staffed and resourced with a deputy principal Federal official in charge of each of these regional joint field offices to work directly with their State and local counterparts.

Now this framework provides a coordinated response for all levels of Government, for nonGovernment agencies and volunteer organizations, and the private sector. This system also affords full coordination between joint regional field offices and the military joint task forces that might be established.

In the event of a pandemic, obviously, a close, synchronous working relationship with HHS is absolutely essential. Our national public health and medical resources will unquestionably be taxed, probably beyond capacity. And DHS will do everything in its power to assist HHS with its mission.

As our department’s Chief Medical Officer, I am and will be the primary point of interface with HHS, as well as being Secretary Chertoff’s advisor on all medical issues, including pandemic influenza.

Implementation of the national strategy announced last week contains over 300 action items with very aggressive timelines. Dr.  Agwunobi’s department has 199 that they are responsible for primarily. We have 58, and we are supporting other departments in another 84 items. We are prioritizing them and figuring out how we can best carry them out.

As the committee understands, the department has many competing priorities right now. But we are fully engaged to make sure that we are as prepared as we can be. In addition to our job as overall incident manager, we have some areas of unique responsibility to maintain the function of our Nation’s critical infrastructures, border management, and DHS work force assurance.

We are also focused on identifying the economic consequences to our Nation during the pandemic. These issues are interrelated as we consider policies related to the transportation industry, the flow of trade across borders, and maintenance of the supply chain for food and other goods.

Mr. Chairman, as with any illness, prevention is by far the most effective method of dealing with this disease. We fully support the efforts of President Bush and the Department of HHS to improve our domestic vaccine production, to stimulate transformational change in vaccine technology, and to reinforce the capacity of State and local public health organizations, as well as educating the public on good health practices.

And one last point, Mr. Chairman. I want to make the point that the best way to prepare for a pandemic is to strengthen the institutions that we use every day, namely, the public health medical and emergency services, as well as the support of medical science for new vaccines and therapeutics.

The collateral benefits that we gain will improve our Nation’s quality of life as well as our preparedness for any biological incident, whether it’s man made or through a terrorist action.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to answer any questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Runge follows:]

Chairman TOM DAVIS[presiding]. Thank you very much.

Dr. Agwunobi, let me start with you. What lessons did HHS learn from Katrina and the 2005 hurricane season that can be applied to pandemic planning and preparedness?

Dr. AGWUNOBI. I think there’s one broad lesson that I think is very clear. And that is that a pandemic is fundamentally different than what we saw in Katrina. In Katrina, I think we realized that an essential part of our response was the rallying to the needs of those communities by the professionals and the first responders of other communities from around the Nation. In a pandemic, we envision that every community will be simultaneously facing the crisis of a pandemic and that there may be—in fact, it’s probably guaranteed that there will be very limited ability for other States and other communities to rally to the aid of a community living through a pandemic.

I think other lessons are obvious, and that is that we need to collaborate and strengthen our ability to work with health professionals within every community. Medical Reserve Corps was one that we used during Katrina and are building upon now. This notion that practitioners from across the Nation can be prepared to respond to the needs of their own communities if you organize them beforehand, credential them beforehand, and train them beforehand. And we’re doing just that with the Medical Reserve Corps.

I think, last, I’ll just add that a great lesson learned and one that we will buildupon is this notion of a partnership between us and Homeland Security. The need to not only focus on the health and medical aspects of a pandemic, but also those other aspects of the community that might be affected, like critical infrastructure, electricity supplies, water supplies, and the like.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. But given the decentralized nature of the U.S. public health system, much of the pandemic preparedness really needs to occur at the State and the local level. One of the problems of Katrina, of course, is we never got a unified command.  How many State pandemic plans has CDC reviewed or approved?

Dr. AGWUNOBI. I believe the CDC has actually reviewed all of the State pandemic plans to date. Clearly, those plans change with time. They’re constantly being improved at the State level, and CDC is constantly reviewing the updated versions as they are submitted.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Is every State in compliance and has a plan at this point as far as you know?

Dr. AGWUNOBI. Every State does have a plan, and those plans are being improved on a continual basis.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Do you have performance measures over these plans?

Dr. AGWUNOBI. The CDC guidance that is being prepared to date and will be issued with—along with funds designated to enhance preparedness and exercising of those plans will contain detailed performance requirements and expectations.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. The States found these guidelines helpful, do you think?

Dr. AGWUNOBI. I think we’re hearing back from the States that planning and preparedness is well underway. They recognize that, like every nation, that there’s more that needs to be done. We’re hoping and are beginning to see that these plans are going beyond the State, but they’re now being developed into communities by local leaders, and that’s very heartening.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And let me ask you, to what extent are you and the Department of Health and Human Services planning to use telework during a continuity of operations?

Dr. AGWUNOBI. Our continuity of operations plan contemplates the need for telework and work at offsite settings. I fully expect that as we release our own implementation plan for the Department of Health and Human Services that it will contain in large part great plans for telecommuting.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Dr. Runge, as you saw during Hurricane Katrina, the National Response Plan can be ambiguous. Individual authorities among agencies were not always clearly identified. How are DHS and HHS using the lessons learned from Katrina to fix deficiencies in the National Response Plan so that the country is more rapidly prepared for future disasters? I will tell, in Katrina, not being there rapidly getting things together ended up costing lives and money. In this case, with a pandemic, time is critical and being able to move in. What have we learned here?

Dr. RUNGE. That’s obviously a great question, and it’s one that we spent quite a bit of time. I had the—I would say it was a luxury, but it actually is not a luxury of joining the department after Katrina and working backward with my new colleagues who arrived on the scene after Katrina. And we were not happy either with the coordination that occurred with DHS and HHS, and we have taken tremendous steps in fixing that.

The deputy secretaries of both agencies, together with our counterparts, have spent many hours talking about how we’re going to improve the coordination and function of the Emergency Support Function 8, as well as my chief of staff has spent the last week in the Gulf States talking about how we are better coordinated with hurricane preparedness, playbooks. We are coming together with a pandemic—a playbook for pandemic.

We’ve also, and I think you’ll be interested in this, have been going department by department and talking about the importance of using the National Response Plan and that the plan is no good unless it’s used. It may be no surprise that the tenets of the National Response Plan, perhaps because they are a bit ambiguous and unusual for the nonmilitary, such as myself, that we actually have to sit down and discuss how to operationalize that coordination. And I think that we are well on the way toward a completely bolted together HHS and DHS.

The Office of the Chief Medical Officer was just created as a result of the second stage review, and they have a constant point of contact for all of these issues. I’m much more confident that we are better equipped not only for this hurricane season, but in the event of a pandemic.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Thank you very much.

To what extent is DHS planning to use telework during—

Dr. RUNGE. One of our workgroups, Mr. Chairman, is continuity of Government, continuity of operations. We have quite a bit of expertise in the department. We’ve got an integrated team working on that issue, headed by Coast Guard Chief Medical Officer, Admiral Higgins.

But I will say, in all fairness, that the other side of our agency, the Infrastructure Protection Office, has responsibility for the maintenance of the 17 critical infrastructures of which telecommunications is one, is looking very carefully at this issue.  It’s one thing to say that we’ll all go home and use the Internet for work. It’s another matter to make sure that the backbone is in place, that the last mile of copper going into neighborhoods will, in fact, withstand the increased traffic.

Our Critical Infrastructure Partnership Office has had a couple of tabletops with the telecommunications industry involving this issue, and it turns out to be quite a more complex problem than simply saying, ‘‘Guys, go home and log on.’’

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Absolutely.

Ms. Springer, what happens if a Federal agency doesn’t adequately incorporate telework in its COOP planning for a pandemic?  In other words, what are the risks to that agency and the public if the agency isn’t prepared to carry out its essential functions?

Ms. SPRINGER. Well, each agency, in my judgment, needs to have telework as a part of its COOP plan. And as the Comptroller mentioned, the GAO guidance is, in fact, exactly that, that is an important component. So it’s hard for me to imagine that wouldn’t be.  The telework statute, as it exists right now, does not authorize OPM to regulate the telework program. So we aren’t in the position to actually direct agencies to include it. But working with FEMA, I think—

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Would you like to have that authority?

Ms. SPRINGER. I think someone needs to have it.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK.

Ms. SPRINGER. But I think certainly from an emergency standpoint, which is different than the routine type of telework, the daytoday normal condition telework, but in an emergency situation, I think at a minimum, the FEMA direction needs to be that is a must component of COOP plans.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. OPM and DHS issue guidelines and offer assistance in COOP and telework planning, but Federal agencies can take it or leave it. And according to GAO surveys, they often leave it. Frankly, the progress of Federal agencies in adopting COOP plans and implementing telework is not very impressive.  In fact, the White House pandemic implementation plan says nothing at all about requiring Federal agencies to develop COOP pandemic plans or incorporate telework in those plans. It also doesn’t require DHS or OPM to review agency plans once they are developed.

So what steps can OPM take to ensure that other Federal agencies follow your guidance on COOP planning, especially in the face of pandemic? And what additional authority would OPM need to assure compliance, and do you think OPM is the right agency?  Ms. SPRINGER. Well, OK. There are several questions you asked there. Let me answer those because they’re all important.

At this point, we think roughly half the agencies—or actually, this is our most recent telework survey. We’re about to go out with another one, which I think is pretty timely. But about half the reporting agencies had included telework in their COOP plans. About another half were working to achieve that goal.

As you noted, we’re required under the implementation plan from the White House to issue guidance. But to the extent that we want to help to ensure that guidance is actually put into practice, there are several things we can do. I’ve already arranged to meet with the inspectors general community, the PCIE, at their June meeting. And to work with them and encourage them, even though we don’t have the authority to commit them to do this, but to put into place a protocol for practicing not just telework, but to make sure that there is a practice of those plans at their agencies.

I’ve asked our own inspector general at OPM to—at the right time to evaluate a test that we will be doing of telework. We may take a Saturday or we may take a week day or two and actually commit those who are going to telework to actually do that. And then we’ll have our inspector general—so I think inspector general commitment and involvement is going to be helpful here.

I think that we will develop best practices. That will be one of the sets of guidance that we put out. Not just here’s how telework can work, whether you need an agreement, what needs to be in writing, that kind of thing. But actually some best practices as a result of those tests and what we find at OPM.

So those are the things where I see us actually going a little bit beyond the strict task that we’ve been given under the implementation plan. Beyond that, we don’t have any particular statutory authority. I think that would—that implementation role resides at this point more likely with FEMA than OPM.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. What role will OPM have in this June’s interagency COOP exercise Forward Challenge? Are there plans for an interagency COOP exercise based on a pandemic flu scenario? And how essential is it for all the Federal agencies to engage in Governmentwide exercises for COOP?

Ms. SPRINGER. Well, the last question is the easiest to answer.  It’s essential for everyone to participate. We will be participating in that June exercise. OPM, as I noted in my opening statement, has to make sure that OPM is running as well. In addition to the Governmentwide guidance that we provide, we are a guidance agency.

But our own planning has led to the key essential functions that we need to do, and about a third of those are internal functions or infrastructure, keeping things running, telecommunications, things like that. But then there are others that are more externally focused. So we’ll be testing those in the June exercise.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right. Ms. Koontz, let me move to you.  One of the criticisms from GAO was that FEMA didn’t provide adequate guidance to agencies to prepare for telework in the case of emergencies. Now the White House pandemic implementation plan directs OPM to issue guidelines for agencies on COOP planning criteria for a pandemic and to update its telework guidelines. Do you think that is an adequate response?

Ms. KOONTZ. We’re encouraged that there’s now a timeframe for issuing this kind of guidance. But what I’m not sure about at this point is whether the guidance will actually include the specifics on what agencies need to do to make sure that they are able to use telework effectively when—during an emergency situation. And that includes everything from testing to communications to technological capacity.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. If an agency already regularly uses telework, why does it need to test its COOP telework capabilities?

Ms. KOONTZ. I think as other witnesses have indicated, that testing is just critical of every part of continuity planning. But under an emergency, particularly a pandemic, you may have a lot more people teleworking than normal. And it may be—it’s probably important to make sure that you actually have the technological—you have the communications capacity to do this. You have the software licenses that you need to do this. Frankly, you don’t know what you don’t know. And what an exercise does is that it shows you those kinds of things, and you can feed them back into your continuity planning.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. What do you think is the most important thing agencies can do to prepare to continue operations during a pandemic?

Ms. KOONTZ. There are many things, but I’ll touch on a few from the continuity perspective. And that is, first of all, they need to have a robust telework program that includes all the necessary preparations. And then also I think agencies need to strengthen their basic continuity planning, and that includes identifying essential functions, identifying the interdependencies, identifying what resources you need, and then testing to make sure that it all works.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Yes, but for agencies that have already begun planning to use telework, what should they do to ensure that the capability will be there in emergencies?

Ms. KOONTZ. We outline a full list of the practices that we think need to be present, but I’ll highlight several. One is, is that they need to make sure that agency personnel understand that they are expected to work during an emergency using telework and understand what they’re supposed to do in that scenario. They also need to make sure that we have the technological capacity, including telecommunications, and we also need to test to make sure that we’re able to do that.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. OK. Well, we have a vote on the floor. Unfortunately, somebody didn’t get their amendment made in order on the defense authorization bill. So they are getting up and moving to adjourn every few minutes. I think they think that by doing that, they will get maybe their amendment next time. I am not sure if that works that way or not.  So I think at this point, I am going to let this panel go. I want to thank you for your testimony. You know, we will stay in touch with you on this. It is just very, very important. We will take about a 10minute recess while we go vote, and then we will swear in our next panel.

Thank you all very much.
[Recess.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Everybody take their seats. We are going to move to our second panel. It is a very distinguished panel.  We have Mr. Scott Kriens, who is the chairman and CEO of Juniper Networks. We have Paul Kurtz, the executive director of the Cyber Security Industry Alliance, and I think we have Alonzo Plough, who will be out in just a minute.
Let me just say it is our policy that all witnesses be sworn before you testify, and he will be here—oh, here he comes. Just raise your hand and say ‘‘I do.’’ Will you please rise and raise your right hands?

[Witnesses sworn.]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you, and be seated.

Mr. Kriens, we will start with you.

STATEMENTS OF SCOTT KRIENS, CHAIRMAN AND CEO, JUNIPER NETWORKS; PAUL B. KURTZ, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, CYBER SECURITY INDUSTRY ALLIANCE; ANDALONZO PLOUGH, BOARD OF DIRECTORS, TRUST FOR AMERICA’S HEALTH

[Anti_Illuminati]

STATEMENT OF SCOTT KRIENS

Mr. KRIENS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

I’d just like to make a couple of comments today in light of what we heard earlier. And I will skip over the alarming statistics, because I’ve certainly personally heard plenty of those, and get to the question of what can we do here? And how can we make this better?

Because the real risk of the pandemic is not in the although tragic consequences of the pandemic itself, the real risk of loss is going to be in how well we do or do not handle it. And we have a great tool here. The Internet itself was, as many of you know—and I know you know, Mr. Chairman—was born from research work done by the Government in the 1960’s.

But sometimes what’s not known about that is it was actually founded on the concern in the cold war days that centers of communication and through threats from other enemies we would be disrupted as a Nation. And the Internet and the structure of its design was meant to recover communications in the event that major centers were disrupted and were out of service. And here we are, 40 or 45 years later, with an opportunity to see that vision help us through other crises.
And yet, while we can do that, we also have evidence presented earlier from Mr. Walker that isn’t what is happening. While we have 9 of 23 agencies expected to be able to respond to telework and to be able to continue operations in the COOP planning that’s been spoken about, only 1 of those has notified, zero have really demonstrated the readiness, and only 3 of 23 have tested to be prepared for teleworking.

So while we have plenty of evidence—certainly not only in our company at Juniper, but throughout Silicon Valley and in other examples across the country and private industry—there are literally millions of people capable of teleworking and prepared and using technologies to do so, we somehow find ourselves mysteriously underprepared to see the same kind of continuous operations in command and control exhibited either in the face of a pandemic or other concerns. So it isn’t what is happening, even though it can be.

And yet, in Afghanistan, Jim Vanderhoff, the CIO of the State Department, has deployed telework capabilities for our staff, both military and civilian, in Afghanistan, who are using telework and remote capabilities to protect themselves from the dangers in a country that remote with difficulties of that magnitude in order to save life and limb, in order to continue operations there.

So while we see ourselves less prepared than we should be in our own country, we also have examples in locations as remote as Afghanistan where teleworking and the benefits of it and the ability to operate through difficulty continues.
So in light of that, I’d like to make just a couple of recommendations. And in doing so, perhaps we can use the alarm of this pandemic to make something good come out of something that may be, in fact, very bad. And the first of those recommendations is, in fact, to start at the top.

This is a capability that can be deployed today, and we need to set an example. And our first recommendation I would make and offer to the committee for consideration is that the executives and the leadership in Government are those who should adopt teleworking as a primary priority and as an example to set for others.  And that with those proven examples, we have the ability to then start a wave of acceptance. Not so much by staff reports and by guidance and by hope and prayer, as was said earlier, but by actual examples set by senior leadership.

Using telework today to conduct operations before the pandemic and before the crises so that when it does happen, it’s a capability that is proven and tested and that we’re all comfortable with. So that would be probably first and primary recommendation would be let’s start this at the top and let’s make it work.

The second is to rely on the proven examples. There is proven capability, and my colleague Mr. Kurtz will speak to some of this in a moment about the ability of technology to authorize, to authenticate, and to demonstrate the legitimacy and the safety and security of this use.

It’s protecting our troops in battle. It can certainly protect our leaders in Government in our own country as a reliable tool. So we should rely on the safety, security, and proven capabilities of the technology.

And finally, to call for open standards in the implementation.  These are systems which have been proven, which must and do interoperate today. And to any extent possible the committee can provide that kind of open requirement and guidance in the specifics that it drives to us in industry to deliver these technologies, it will be enormously valuable.

As a final thought and perhaps a reference, again, to where this capability has been used, one of the primary directives in engaging with the enemy is to be able to move, shoot, and communicate. And we have a very dangerous enemy facing us in this pandemic threat, and we must be able to move. We must be able to pick the targets that we are going to attack, and primarily to enable that, we must be able to communicate as a Nation and for the Government to communicate across its leadership in order to make these capabilities a tool and a weapon in the battle that we face.

So, with that, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman and the committee, for the time to come and speak with you today. And certainly I look forward to answering any questions you might have.  [The prepared statement of Mr. Kriens follows:]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Mr. Kurtz.

STATEMENT OF PAUL B. KURTZ

Mr. KURTZ. Mr. Chairman, it’s a pleasure to be here today. And beginning, I wanted to recall the little quote on the front of your report on Katrina, which talked about the five frogs sitting on a log. And four of the frogs decided to jump off, and how many are left? And the answer was five.

And I think that’s the theme of what I heard earlier today.

There’s a lot of, if you will, people deciding, but not doing. A lot of guidance, but no action. And I think the flu pandemic planning that we all must go through is an opportunity to fundamentally change the way we do business in the Federal Government.  Obviously, my comments will focus on one of the White House’s key goals of sustaining the infrastructure and mitigating the impact of a flu pandemic. I note in 1918, there was an ad in a Canadian newspaper, Canadian Bell, which talked about only using telephones for emergency use. Obviously, IT has a much wider use today. It’s integral to our society. So it’s much more than just emergency use.

We know from what’s happened over the past several years that we need to take an allhazards approach to emergency preparedness. We need to have a more resilient society. So with that in mind, I want to cover four areas today.
First, investing in the capability to distribute—to have a distributed Federal work force. Second, using the flu pandemic to break down Federal barriers. Third, addressing the burden that a flu pandemic could have on the overall information infrastructure. And fourth, offer a few recommendations.

The scenarios that play out that we see on various network TV shows, I don’t think we need to recall necessarily what could happen during a flu pandemic. But the reality is that today’s Federal work force, most of the contingency plans are designed for a maximum downtime of 2 or 3 days. And if you actually look at the circulars that are put together, they go out to, if you will, 30 days.  Ensuring the continuity of Government operations for an extended period is a central responsibility of this Government’s leadership. Moreover, when you look at the continuity plans as they exist today, often they have people moving from one facility together to another facility. And as we know from the White House plans, that’s not going to play out right in a flu pandemic.

The private sector has been pursuing telework for a long period of time. In fact, with the events of September 11, a lot of the financial industry, if you will, moved their physical facilities outside lower Manhattan. Now they’re going one step further, and they’re actually dispersing their personnel, enabling them to work from a variety of locations. They call this a distributed work force capability.

AT&T, prior to the merger, of course, had a very aggressive telework program where a variety of employees involving managers, if you will, essential and nonessential employees were able to telework on a frequent basis. The benefits are, if you will, well known and widely accepted in the private sector. But we have roughly one tenth of the Federal work force that is able to telework today, where you have at least 20 percent in the private sector.  When we look at the barriers to a distributed work force, I think there are a number of issues that would come to mind. In large part, they’re systemic. I think it’s interesting to note there was a lot of conversation earlier today about guidance. But just this March, GSA issued guidance which had a few very key points in it.

First, agencies now are able to pay for broadband installation and monthly access. Second, they can provide new or excess equipment for people to use. Third, they can provide help desk support so we can keep on having task forces, if you will, that talk about issuing new guidance, or we can actually implement the guidance.  I note that Emergency Preparedness Circular No. 65, which was recently redone, also includes a reference to telework. So the guidance exists today for Federal agencies to do more in telework.  I do want to note, before I move on to my recommendations, that we do need to think about the burden on the overall information infrastructure during a crisis. We saw this after September 11th.  We saw it in Katrina. I know your committee has looked at this.  But we need to think more widely about what would happen. We need to get the appropriate private sector folks involved from whether it’s the NSTAC or NIAC, which are both Presidential advisory committee.

If I can look at recommendations, I would say, first of all, we need a topdown approach from the White House involving the Office of Management and Budget and the Homeland Security to push down into Federal agencies the need to telework and to set strict metrics.

Second, as I mentioned, I think NSTAC and NIAC, these Presidential advisory committees need to look closely at the issue of the burden on the information infrastructure. And third, I would encourage Congress to pursue a three-pronged strategy. A, look at what statutory barriers there might be to the expansion of telework. For example, I understand from my conversations that agencies, if you will, don’t have the incentive to pursue telework because any gains they may make or—excuse me, savings they may make have to be returned to the Treasury.  Also there was a recent study that was done that talked about FISMA being perceived as a potential barrier to telework. I think it’s worthwhile exploring that issue as well.
And then, finally, I think we ought to think about, if you will, a carrot and stick approach. Incentivize agencies so they can win at telework.

Finally, to close, Mr. Chairman, I know last year at this time, you talked about the need to decentralize Federal agency—Federal agency operations. And I really don’t think, you know, since last year, even since September 11th, we’ve really had that change in mindset, to change from brick and mortar mentality to a decentralized Federal Government operation.
Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Kurtz follows:]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you very much.

Dr. Plough.

STATEMENT OF ALONZO PLOUGH

Mr. PLOUGH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee.

On behalf of Trust for America’s Health, I really appreciate this opportunity to testify on this critically important issue of pandemic influenza preparedness.

I am here representing Trust for America’s Health, where I serve on the board of directors. I’m currently vice president for the California Endowment, a private philanthropy in the State of California also focused on these issues. But my comments are really with my hat on as a board member.

My comments are really gleaned from my 20 years of experience, though, as a local public health official—the last 10, as of last July, as director of the Seattle and King County Department of Public Health. And that on-the-ground perspective of what it means to be an effective responder in communities in disasters are the contexts that I’m drawing on today.

Recently, the public is catching up with the concern we have had in the public health community around pandemic influenza. It’s something that we have warned about for years, but I think recent events and certainly the visibility of these hearings and the visibility of the recently released report, not to mention heightened media coverage and madeforTV movies, has raised these concerns to new levels.

The question is, how do we make sure that we have operationalized these responses on the ground that can serve the public well in the event of a pandemic?

Trust for America’s Health and other health organizations actually hear, and I heard a lot when I was a local health official, of frustration from individuals and businesses that actually believe that little or nothing can be done. And certainly a sense of fatalism does not lead to the kind of collaboration needed to develop a good response to pandemic influenza.

We have gone over in the previous panel the frightening data on the infection rates and the absenteeism of 40 percent. When I was a public health official, I was always asked, ‘‘What keeps you up at night?’’ Pandemic influenza planning was the single factor that kept me up at night in the complexity of what I looked at in public health, mainly because a true response is a collaboration between Government at all levels, business, schools, faith-based organization, the medical community. We’re behind the curve. We need to prepare now.

I’m very, very proud that Seattle and King County are recognized as among the most prepared communities in America for pandemic influenza, and I think it serves as an example of how a community can prepare, how the Federal Government can best encourage what local preparedness looks like. And I’m going to tell you briefly some of the things we did over those last 10 years to get to that position.

We started by defining clear lines of authority and accountability during health emergencies. The public health department is in charge in that jurisdiction, maintaining central coordinating role, incident command role around all other governmental structures.  This operational clarity is one of the—or lack of operational clarity is one of the weakest points of many other local plans, as well as the Federal plan.

Seattle and King County also benefit from having a unified public health department that includes emergency medical services. It serves both all the 40 cities in the county as well as the county as a whole. It means that public health, health care providers, first responders, trauma units, and hospitals are all connected on the ground in a way that is not common practice in most cities and counties across the country.

Additionally, Seattle and King County have an all hazards approach to Federal preparedness. Despite of how the targeting of the funds might go, this health department thinks about what do we have to do to be ready for all kinds of threats? So clear authority, collaboration throughout the community, judicious use of Federal funds are the ingredients that led to our success and could be modeled across the Nation.

On May 3rd, the White House unveiled the detailed implementation plan for pandemic influenza. Three hundred activities already cited today—tied to specific accountability, measured in timelines—are part of that plan. And while we commend that plan in many ways, the real measure of effectiveness of a plan is its implementation and how it works on the ground.
And Trust for America’s Health plans to actively monitor the progress of how this plan is actually carried out with the nuances of community responsibility, and through that lens, we’ve identified a few specific concerns.

Well, first, it’s unclear what individual and which agency will lead the Federal response during a pandemic. The plan currently gives responsibilities to both the Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Homeland Security without making clear which of these departments is ultimately accountable. We know that at a local level, you do need single accountability.  And Trust for America’s Health strongly believes that HHS should be designated as the lead agency, with the Secretary charged with coordinating other Federal efforts. This is a health crisis, and health expertise should guide all of the decisions. It would mirror the structure that’s worked so well in Seattle and King County.

Second, the plan does not adequately address the financial blow that the country would take during a pandemic outbreak. For example, once an effective vaccine is available, there are no measures in place to figure out how much it will cost, who will purchase the 600 million doses. We really cannot leave such important implementation decisions to the middle of a national crisis.

Beyond improving the plan, there are other steps that must be taken to ensure the Nation is prepared. Trust for America’s Health has identified some specific recommendations that are detailed in my written testimony. Let me just highlight a couple of those.

Where you live in this country, shouldn’t—rural, urban—where in the country shouldn’t determine what your level of preparedness is. We need to be much more even on that. Right now, planning largely rests on State and local shoulders. It’s unacceptable to leave communities virtually on their own with respect to preparing for pandemic flu, particularly leaving communities with large non-English speaking populations, like in California, with fewer resources at higher risk.

Health and Human Service, in consultation with public health and medical professionals, should develop much more detailed guidance for State and local officials so this ontheground response matches the diversity of what preparedness means across our country. There should be priorities for—clear prioritization for the populations that are going to get limited vaccines, incentivizing mechanisms for health care workers, and equitable distribution of federally held stockpile.

Second point is that there will be ongoing life and activity after a pandemic, and we really need to ensure that the consequence management system is sound. The Government needs to take steps right now to ensure sustainability of the health industry.

This kind of response that hospitals and health providers will have to a pandemic could shut down our emergency care facilities just at the point when we need them most. People could not seek diagnostic care because they don’t—can’t pay for this. This is not a time to have individuals, because they are uninsured, also become high probability carriers of a flu in a flu outbreak.

So it’s very important that we not let affordability of the health care be a barrier to people seeking treatment and not spreading this influenza. So Trust has proposed the creation of a standby Medicaid authority that would grant emergency temporary Medicaid eligibility to individuals who are uninsured. This really helps to preserve our hospital infrastructure and make sure that individuals get treated and don’t spread the disease.

In conclusion, considerable progress has been made, really even since the 10 months that I have not been a health officer. Given where we were a year ago, I’m actually really shocked where we are today. This plan is a great improvement over the past, and a lot of progress has been made.

Lots of flaws to fix. A lot of specificity is needed. And Congress needs to really act now.

Thank you for letting me talk to you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Plough follows:]

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. Kriens, you have to leave in a couple of minutes is my understanding. Is that—

Mr. KRIENS. We’ve extended a bit of time. So please.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. All right. Thank you.

Well, let me start. Why do you think that Federal employees have been slow to roll out or the Federal Government has been slow to roll out teleworking employees? Now that you are sitting there, both to ask you and Mr. Kurtz. And how can we get buyin from senior management? How do you do it in the private sector?

I will start with you, Mr. Kriens.

Mr. KRIENS. It’s, as you know, multifaceted, Mr. Chairman. But if I were to put it in a commonly used phrase, I think we’re trying to boil the ocean. And what we really need to do is to have use of teleworking spread in the same way the Internet itself developed, which was to sprout up in pockets and then have those pockets communicate with one another.

Ironically, as we sit here talking about pandemics, it’s something we call ‘‘viral progress’’ in the deployment of communications and new technology. Because as people see the benefit of it through use by others and talk amongst themselves, it makes more progress in deploying these technologies than anything we can legislate or that we can dictate or that we can plan a report on.

So it’s one of the reasons for our recommendation that, really, if this starts with the leadership, such as yourselves and others who are familiar with this and do use it, taking it to heart and spreading it from the top down, that will do more to motivate progress and acceleration than anything that we can do from the bottom up.  Chairman TOM DAVIS. We try here at the legislative branch. But ultimately, this is an executive branch function. We have continued—Mr. Davis has legislation moving, trying to get the Government to move on it. And it has just been very, very slow.

Mr. Kurtz, any comment on that?

Mr. KURTZ. Yes, I would—there are three factors that I intend to contribute. I think one is Cabinetlevel agencies don’t necessarily have the incentive to aggressively pursue telework. I know that in the GSA survey that was released last year, it talks about, you know, who has more telework versus less.

And it’s very interesting to look at several of the senior agencies, including Labor, Treasury, and HUD. The actual number of people who are eligible for telework has gone down. So I think, you know, there is a budgetary issue that needs to be addressed.

Second, I think there is a perception among IT managers that perhaps FISMA is a barrier. I think that’s probably misplaced. But FISMA could be used as, if you will, a reason as to why one cannot pursue telework.

I understand at DHS, at least, that they don’t allow the use of wireless. Well, it’s kind of hard to telework if you don’t have any sort of wireless technology capabilities. There are technologies today to handle all of the security, the authentication issues associated with telework.

The third issue I think is basically managers wanting to have eyes on their employees. And once again, we have technology that is available today that helps managers understand what their employees may be doing from afar. In other words, when I might come onto the computer, what applications I may access. Those type—you know, how long I’m on the system.
Those kind of issues, I think, combined, those three, create an environment where seniorlevel managers and agencies are not pursuing telework. You’ll note that I have not said security is an issue. The technologies are out there today in order to have secure, reliable telework, and the private sector is case in point.

One final point that I think is fascinating, and you look at AT&T, the old AT&T, if you will, before the merger. Forty percent of their management was able to telework. When you ask that question of Federal executive managers, 30 percent are not allowed. That was the response, 30 percent are not allowed to telework.

And so, you know, set the standard at the top. Have managers themselves begun to telework. The guidance is in place. We don’t need more guidance. It’s just starting to do it.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. In fact, until I think a couple of years ago, when we passed legislation out of this committee, Federal contractors weren’t allowed to charge telework back to the Government.  And sometimes that is the most productive work.
Mr. Kriens, let me ask you the lastmile solution, such as residential broadband, will be relied on if the Federal civilian employees are to telework. How are these networks designed to ensure resilience?

Mr. KRIENS. The primary source of the resilience is actually in the dispersity and the breadth of the physical infrastructure itself.  By the time one gets to the last mile, whether that’s a copper wire or a coaxial cable or, in some cases, as Paul mentioned, a wireless access, the pure dispersion of that is the very diversity that we need.

Any one of those points or perhaps even a neighborhood can be affected, but the protection is in the dispersion of the work force across many tens or hundreds of square miles. And there are also for key executives or for key needs an ability to, by the very nature of the competing entities here as service providers, the cable operator and the wireless operator and the traditional wire line telephone company have built three separate infrastructures.

So in the case of critical executives, it’s quite possible for literally $50 a month to duplicate redundant capabilities and facilities all the way into the offices in the home of critical executives. So it’s a cost issue, but it’s a very modest one in the case of protecting senior leadership from any physical diversity requirement—

Chairman TOM DAVIS. It has to be done now. I mean, you don’t want to sit and wait until this thing is on top of us.

Mr. KRIENS. We cannot wait to put this in place when the work force has been immobilized. Not just the work force that we speak of, but those who must enable and go out and deploy and make those connections. We have the ability to do that now. I think it’s clearly within reach and within technical means without question. And so, now is certainly the time, and it’s easily doable.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. And you don’t feel that basically from that, that our agency employees that deal with sensitive and classified information, those are very resolvable if we stay ahead of the game?

Mr. KRIENS. Again, the best example of that is we’re using the very same technology to protect our troops in battle with the ultimate reliability requirement. They are relying today in work we do with the defense agency, you know, we are relying on battlefield information as an alternative to deploying contingent troops and materiel in battle because we need that information to know the specificity and location and magnitude of enemy force.

And we are relying on it to that degree that we are keeping our men and women out of harm’s way as a result of the use of this technology every day in conditions much more demanding than those that would be required to reach a given neighborhood in this country.

Chairman TOM DAVIS. Thank you.

Mr. Issa.

Mr. ISSA[presiding]. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will be fairly brief. I realize that you are, even with an extension, on a short leash time wise. And Mr.—I apologize—Klines?
  Mr. KRIENS. Kriens.

Mr. ISSA. Kriens. I apologize. I am a little concerned, though, about the statement you made on $50 a month. I telecommute relatively effectively, but—and by necessity. But you can’t do it for $50 a month. Are you saying that you think that the average Federal employee or health care provider, first responder will provide all of the software and hardware, and all we have to do is pay for the connection? Where do you get the $50 figure?

Mr. KRIENS. And let me clarify, Congressman Issa, the—I was really specifically answering the question of redundancy. So there is an initial cost, as you accurately described, for setting up the computing capability, the software and security. And that will vary depending on the amount of performance and processing power.  The $50 a month is actually probably more than it would cost to deliver the physical redundancy. So that if there were a capability via your traditional telephone supplier on a DSL line over copper and one were to seek a cable line for backup or wireless access for backup, the incremental cost of that access in various counties and States around this country is in the sometimes $29 to $30 a month range.

But I was really referring purely to the cost of the chairman’s question on providing physical diversity. There’s a cost, it would probably be more in the $100 range, which would be the establishment of the capability, maybe $150 if you wanted to amortize the equipment as well, in setting up the telecommuting/telework capability. And then the additional moneys would be for providing the physical redundancy for critical need.

Mr. ISSA. And how many health care professionals do you think would be required? In other words, give me the gross number of people so we can do the multiple.

Mr. KRIENS. The gross number of people that would need to telework in an emergency?

Mr. ISSA. Yes.

Mr. KRIENS. I’m not sure one would be capable or I’m not capable certainly of predicting that here without having a guess as to the magnitude—

Mr. ISSA. More than 100,000?

Mr. KRIENS. More than 100,000 people?

Mr. ISSA. Well, if we look at every location in the Nation—

Mr. KRIENS. Uhhuh.

Mr. ISSA. And we look at every person that you would like to have this redundancy capability—and I am not trying to be unfair to your proposal. I actually want to embrace it. I am looking at when we try to turn, you know, it is like, you know, Dr. Plough?  Mr. PLOUGH. Plough.

Mr. ISSA. Plough. Thank you. Had—I am not doing good on names today.

Mr. PLOUGH. That’s OK.

Mr. ISSA. But, you know, I appreciate that we need 600 million doses of X worldwide. But then there is X, Y, Z, A, B, C. In a recent trip to Geneva, one of the questions, you know, that you have to ask is, do we invest in the ability to quickly find or quickly refine and distribute in the future Z when it comes along, or do we stockpile A, B, C, D, E, F, G of various known? And what are the cost tradeoffs?

So I really believe, and you have Virginia’s former secretary of technology right behind you. So he will smile when I say this. I really believe America needs to be connected from a redundancy standpoint in every home and that this has to be a basic capability.  Then the question is whether you are a health care professional, an AT&T executive, or a Congressman, or a school teacher, how do we analyze how much is going to be borne by our middle class citizens, and how much is going to be borne by potentially Government agencies?

Mr. KRIENS. It’s an excellent point, and I have an affinity for practicality. So let me respond in kind. The actual physical redundancy requirement, I would believe, is actually quite limited because it’s only the senior executive and senior leadership for whom that degree of accessibility on an uninterrupted basis would be required.

As the reports and various study of this has delineated, there are executive leadership, there is essential and potentially nonessential, or I would prefer to think of them as perhaps less essential, for whom the redundancy is not a requirement because there are others who could substitute. And the real availability, which is a different term, is borne by the fact that the dispersed work force is scattered over hundreds or, in the case of the country, millions of square miles.

So there is no effect that would likely take out more than a pocket of them, and there are others who could substitute and fill in and come from other areas. And as a result, there isn’t a need for this kind of redundancy or additional expense other than for the senior.

And I would just start at the ultimate irreplaceable leadership.  The President of the United States literally has a mobile cell that follows him across his ranch in Crawford, TX, and goes down into the gullies when he decides to go chop wood so that he is accessible, obviously, on a moment’s notice.

From there, one could step down—

Mr. ISSA. And his is fully secure at the highest possible security level, too?

Mr. KRIENS. We spend a lot of time at Juniper making sure of that, as a matter of fact. But we can quickly move to a case where much of the leadership really can be substituted for or for which contingency planning could avoid the hard cost, and it certainly would echo your point that we have to be practical about this and reserve those kinds of duplicate costs for only the premium and really irreplaceable leadership requirements.

Mr. ISSA. And would that number be relatively similar if, instead of talking about a pandemic, we were looking at the next Hurricane Katrina?

Mr. KRIENS. It’s an interesting thing. Yesterday, I’m in town also as a member of the National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee that reports to the President, and we had our meeting yesterday. And one of the comments that was made was that Katrina itself actually replicates in many cases a nuclear threat example and certainly a pandemic example because the water didn’t come in and go out.

Most hurricanes and floods and tornadoes and other events happen over the course of 24 or 48 hours, and then we are able to rebuild the infrastructure and recover. And Katrina is actually a fantastically frightening example of what can happen if the threat is sustained and carries over weeks and months. And there’s an inability to reach infrastructure, to reestablish power, to reestablish communications, command, and control.

So it’s quite an opportunity for us to learn about how we would conduct continuous operations, and the pandemic is going to be another example of that, if and when and to what magnitude it hits.  Because we will have extended loss of access to facilities and resources, and we have the wherewithal to continue operations during that extended and very difficult condition.

Mr. ISSA. OK. I am going to not belabor this point, but is one that I am sure this committee was going to deal with in the future.  One last sort of the exit question that often we ask. When looking at the President’s recent proposals, 300 and some items, if you were to break them down, how many of them are dual or multiuse and have relatively small cost other than the, if you will, the preparation, the thinking, the onetime cost of preparing versus what are the major, when you get to the other extreme, what are the major items that we have to look at—not in this committee, but in the Committee on Appropriations—that are significant, very significant dollars and not one time? If you would just touch on the key ones.

Mr. KURTZ. Maybe I’ll try to come to your—let me try to come to your question a different way. I’m not going to position myself as being able to analyze the full plan that the President has put together. But in your previous question—

Mr. ISSA. Pick five or six. That would probably do it.

Mr. KURTZ. We’re talking about cost.

Mr. ISSA. Yes.

Mr. KURTZ. And I think there are a couple of things that strike me when we talk about the area that I know best, and that is on a communications side. And first of all, just 2 or 3 years ago, we couldn’t talk about having, if you will, Webbased applications.  They’re far more prevalent than there are today.

You made a statement that, you know, who’s going to buy all the software? Well, the fact is, I can be at home now, and I can tap in through technologies that are available today that don’t require me to have software on my computer. I can use a Webbased application to go in, to tap into the home bank or the enterprise, and see what I need to do and do my business.
The other thing—the other issue I’d highlight with regard to cost. A lot of the cost associated with the pandemic or planning a pandemic, if you will, may be onetime cost or a sum cost. That’s not the case when you think about telework.

Telework helps us with routine activity every day, everyday business activity in the Federal Government. It also helps us with all hazards. It’s not just a onetime sum cost to help us with a pandemic. It helps us with a hurricane. It helps us with a terrorist attack. It helps us with a blizzard. And so, if we can change our mindset to think more broadly about this, then I think it would be helpful.

And the final comment, if I can, is to think about scope. There’s a lot of conversation about only essential employees. I disagree. I think we ought to dig deeper into the agency and think more broadly about who is included and just as a—as an estimate, you know, the top third or so of the agency.

So that when we look at contingency plans as the guidance that the Federal Government has today, it’s 72 hours or so that you can exist on essential employees. Then you’re dispersing to a location for like 30 days. It’s only the top employees.
Well, when you look at the plan that the White House has put together, we’re well beyond 30 days. So the essential employees are not—not—going to be able to keep the operation going for an extended period of time. So we have to dig down more deeply into agencies as we think about the flu pandemic.

Mr. PLOUGH. If I could just respond from the public health side?

Mr. ISSA. Yes, please.

Mr. PLOUGH. The President’s plan builds multiuse capacity that is applicable to many kinds of infectious diseases, earthquake, floods, because it heightens the connectivity of first responders with community in a way that, if funded appropriately, is sustainable and builds a missing piece of our protective structure for public health.

So those—there are sustainable and multiuse components of this. Pandemic is one of the worst cases. If you are properly prepared for pandemic influenza, you are prepared for SARS, you are prepared for West Nile, you are prepared for an earthquake. You are prepared for a variety of public health disasters.

Mr. ISSA. Excellent. Well, I don’t have any other questions.

The record will remain open for 5 legislative days for any additional questions from people that are not able to be at the dais and so you may revise and extend as your rather cogent capabilities allow you to think of things.

In addition, I would like to thank you very much for the generosity of your time, being here today, and the thoroughness, including the fact that no one is rubberstamping somebody else and that we do have a very active debate because of this hearing between what happens on day 1 and what happens after day 30.

And with that, we stand adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] [The prepared statements of Hon. Dan Burton and Hon. Darrell E. Issa follow:]

[Silveryminnow]

In the words of the Church Lady, "Isnt that Convieeeenent?"

[Anti_Illuminati]

http://www.eastvalleytribune.com/story/138527

Decision Theater tests pandemic flu plans

Ryan Gabrielson, Tribune

April 28, 2009 - 5:58PM


Dr. George Basile, executive director of ASU's Global Institute of Sustainability, shows a slide produced on the WHO Phase of Pandemic Alert at Decision Theater in downtown Tempe.
Darryl Webb, Tribune


Global health crises are nothing ASU health officials haven't seen before.

The influenza outbreaks they've experienced previously spread digitally across the screens that cover Decision Theater's walls.

State tests flu samples; hospitals see rush

There is nothing virtual about swine flu, the virus strain that has killed more than 100 people in Mexico and has infected dozens of others worldwide. But Arizona State University has hosted electronic simulations of an influenza pandemic the past two years to help ready state and local agencies for a real outbreak.

"We've run through this already, so we're very well prepared, which is kinda cool," said Dr. Allan Markus, director of ASU's Campus Health Services. To date, no cases of swine flu have been reported at the university or anywhere else in the state.

Using its Decision Theater, ASU has assisted the state Department of Health Services, Maricopa County and multiple local school districts in crafting their planned response to a deadly flu strain.

The theater is little more than a viewing room, with comfortable seats surrounded by floor-to-ceiling monitors. That is, until its computers and projection system power on, flooding the room's walls with charts, graphics, video, and sometimes 3-D visuals.

As part of the theater's pandemic flu simulation, fake cable news reports detail the disease's spread on one screen as the World Health Organization raises its threat level on another. Government officials that have participated in the test runs are asked how their emergency plan calls on them to respond at each stage in the crisis.

"We create artificial environments to help people think through these issues," said George Basile, Decision Theater's executive director.

Agency officials must make a huge volume of quick decisions during a health crisis. Basile said the goal for ASU is to make sure the crisis isn't the first time officials have considered their response to specific situations.

Tim Lant, the theater's research director, said he uses data from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and other health agencies to construct mathematical models that predict how an outbreak of bird flu might spur a crisis.

What should a school district tell concerned parents? At what point in the disease's spread should schools close? "Those kinds of decisions are the reason why you want to run the exercise," Lant said.

Right now, with swine flu cases multiplying exponentially, ASU researchers and the theater are working to track the disease. Lant said he is watching everything from government agency releases to the number of Google searches for "swine flu."

ASU's simulated pandemic involves a strain that the medical community understands far better than it does the swine flu, which has proven fatal in Mexico City but mild elsewhere.

[Insert:  Yeah right]

"We do not have great evidence in the U.S. that this causes the severe mortality that the bird flu does," Markus said.

While details about the disease remain elusive, Basile said all the planning has brought government agencies closer together.

"We're actually seeing an encouraging amount of cooperation," Basile said. "It's really quite positive, the response."
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Source

Friday, March 27, 2009

Sustainability
As resources dwindle, sustainability is only choice
Phoenix Business Journal - by Rick Heffernon

With the world population above 6 billion and zooming toward 9 billion by midcentury, talk of sustainability frequently hits the news. Many wonder where we will find the resources to maintain half again as many people on this planet when we already face food and energy pinches.

That, in a nutshell, is the central challenge of sustainability: how to maintain and improve the economy, the environment and our communities over the long haul.

Only the power and creativity of businesses — along with the help of markets that better reflect the true costs of unsustainable products — can convert our economy from wasteful to sustainable, and efficiently deliver the goods we need. Fortunately, sustainability already presents many upsides for companies that choose to work on solutions.

Sustainable business practices save money. One of the quickest and cheapest ways to reduce production costs is to eliminate material waste and energy inefficiencies, recycling a raw material rather than extracting a new supply for each use.

Sustainability provides a competitive advantage. Consumers at home and abroad increasingly choose to do business with companies that have green credentials.

New markets for green products are expanding rapidly. Asia’s demand for sustainable goods and services has been forecast to hit $100 billion a year over the next decade.

A growing number of employees prefer to work for a sustainability-oriented enterprise. After furniture manufacturer Herman Miller converted its U.S. factory to incorporate natural light, fresh air and live trees indoors, the company’s workers couldn’t be lured to a competitor’s traditional factory, even for higher pay.

The time is right. Companies that move faster toward sustainability will outperform their competitors when the going gets tough. What business wouldn’t love to possess the advantages of solar panels, a hybrid fleet, natural lighting and zero waste?

Arizona is a great place to do sustainable business. Its three state universities are advancing some of the world’s most far-reaching research on sustainable urban systems. Its land receives enough solar energy to power the entire country every day the sun shines. Its state government is moving toward a market approach for reducing harmful carbon emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels. And many regional governments are establishing procurement guidelines that give preference to sustainable products and services and level the playing field for green businesses.

While sustainability is, at heart, a global issue, that is not where the job will get done. The real action will take place locally, at work and at home, and it will be driven by individual choices made by businesses and their customers.

Rick Heffernon is a senior writer and policy analyst for ASU’s Global Institute of Sustainability and author of “Sustainability for Arizona: The Issue of Our Age,” produced by ASU’s Morrison Institute for Public Policy.

Originally ran in the Sustainability section of the Sept. 19, 2008 issue.

http://www.osc.edu/press/releases/2009/janies.shtml

Ohio researcher tracks movement of H1N1 influenza virus with the aid of supercomputer, mapping software

OSU project adapts Supramap program from earlier study of avian influenza

Columbus, Ohio – May 7, 2009 - An Ohio State University Medical Center biomedical informatics researcher is tapping the power of the Ohio Supercomputer Center to monitor the spread of the H1N1 influenza virus.

Associate professor Daniel Janies, an expert in computational genomics, synthesizes large, diverse datasets to understand the spread of infectious diseases over hosts and geography.  The resulting maps can be viewed with Google Earth.

“Currently, we are investigating H1N1 cases from around the world - and Ohio - by building evolutionary trees that discover how this strain came to be assembled and jumped from animals to humans.  We are also monitoring viral genomes for mutations that could confer resistance to drugs” Janies said. “Using parallel programming on OSC’s high performance computing systems greatly improves the efficiency of our work.”

With his findings, Janies will project the evolutionary tree of the virus’ mutations and host shifts onto the globe using Supramap, an easy-to-use, web application. He and his colleagues created Supramap in 2007 to track avian influenza.  However the underlying technology is applicable to any infectious disease.

“The supercomputer enables us to make comprehensive sets of background data comprised of genomes of viral isolates from all over the world.  Large datasets are vitally important to properly understand the host and national origins of each gene in the H1N1 virus causing the outbreak and map its evolution and spread,” Janies said.

“Our ultimate goal is to help predict where the next outbreak of the virus is likely to occur,” he said. “When we’re done, we will be able to tell you where each viral gene came from in the world and what mutations are specific to the outbreak lineage.  We then share these tools and maps so that diseases can be diagnosed and treated rapidly.”

OSC recently addressed the growing needs of Ohio’s bioscience and research efforts with a $4 million expansion of its flagship supercomputing system. When the upgrade to the IBM Cluster 1350 is completed this summer, Ohio researchers such as Janies will have access to more than twice the system’s current computing power and memory.

Janies earned his doctorate in zoology at the University of Florida and his bachelor’s degree in biology at the University of Michigan. He was formally trained as a biologist, but as a result of the computational demands of the biological questions he was investigating, he began developing hardware and software. He led the design, construction, and integration of the parallel computing cluster at a previous post with the American Museum of Natural History.

To see interactive visualizations of Janies’ work or make your own maps, go to http://supramap.osu.edu.

Note to editors: Contact Susan Mantey, susan@osc.edu or 614-688-3949, for electronic images of Daniel Janies or the Supramap screen shot pictured above.

The Ohio Supercomputer Center (OSC) is a catalytic partner of Ohio universities and industries that provides a reliable high performance computing infrastructure for a diverse statewide/regional community including education, academic research, industry, and state government. Funded by the Ohio Board of Regents, OSC promotes and stimulates computational research and education in order to act as a key enabler for the state's aspirations in advanced technology, information systems, and advanced industries. For additional information, visit http://www.osc.edu.