Video: Psychotic control freak Chertoff still thinks he is head of Homeland Sec

[Neo]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=W_E1GXFE1-E&feature=pyv&gclid=COTI9dWF3ZkCFQa-sgodpEsoVQ

He sees a widening expanse of applications for secure documents and IDs that will work in the future in conjunction with our blackberries and other PDAs that will facilitate for us real time, all the time, access to secure sites.

[agentbluescreen]

Sure then we can all be grid-computed through our microprocessor control implants and jacked into the JP Morgan Borg-o-matic Collective.

But...

[Neo]

Did you hear that? "Real-time facilitation" They can track you 24/7

[agentbluescreen]

OMG we're all SAVED!!!

Our mark of the beast implants will always remember those pesky passwords for us all!

Whisk me off to this Paradise in control-freak Heaven,  I can feel the rapture now...

[Neo]

Security Document World 2010
09 February 2010
http://www.securitydocumentworld.com/public/news.cfm?&m1=c_10&m2=c_6&m3=e_0&m4=e_0&subItemID=838

Following the outstanding success of SDW 2009, which sold out in the exhibition and saw 265 conference attendees, Science Media Partners is delighted to announce the dates for Security Document World 2010 will be 9-10 February 2010.

With 1054 visitors to the overall show in 2009, the SDW event continues to grow at an unprecedented rate.

The show will continue its focus on advanced security documents, border control, e-ID, registered traveller and a special focus on document anti-counterfeiting.
 

    * Exhibition with 70 companies
    * More than 1250 attendees expected
    * 260+ conference delegates
    * Focus on Security Documents, ePassports, eID, border control, registered traveller and document anticounterfeiting

This event is designed for government officials, company executives and technologists in the ePassport, visa, e-ID, driving license, registered traveller, law enforcement, digital identity, employee ID, security printing, biometric and smart card industries.

 

 
Further Information

For all details on how to exhibit or sponsor then contact Exhibition manager, Pam Chattin at:

Tel: +44 (0)1322 663006
Email: p.chattin@sciencemediapartners.com

Visit the event website at:

http://www.sciencemediapartners.com

[Neo]

They are licking their chops to tag the cattle of the world.

SDW 2009 shines amid economic gloom
22 April 2009
http://www.securitydocumentworld.com/public/news.cfm?&m1=c_10&m2=c_6&m3=e_0&m4=e_0&subItemID=1677

Dispelling the economic gloom, Security Document World, held in London, 26-27 March 2009, attracted a world-class audience from the security document, border control and document anti-counterfeiting industries.

In just its third year, and in challenging economic conditions, the conference and exhibition, held at the prestigious Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre, attracted a record total attendance of 1054 (up by more than 25% on 2008).

Breaking that attendance down, it is clear that the event has also grown to become a truly international event, with more than 43 countries represented. Indeed 42% of the visitors came from outside of the UK, and 15% from outside of Europe.

Over the two-day event, the 265 conference attendees enjoyed three keynotes, 10 highly-topical streams and more than 50 expert presentations, all of which were professionally filmed and distributed after the event.

The exhibition also broke new ground, with 68 exhibitors from across the world, and from every part of the supply chain, ensuring that the show was a sell-out success. A record 13 sponsors also demonstrated their leadership in the industry, with a variety of sponsorship packages ensuring high individual visibility.

Commenting on the success of the event, Mark Lockie, Managing Director, Science Media Partners Ltd, said: “We are delighted with the clear endorsement of this event by industry and governments from across the world. In just two years we have almost doubled in size. But we are not complacent. It will be our mission in the coming months to ensure that our 2010 event becomes the largest gathering of security document, advanced border control and document anti-counterfeiting experts in the world.”

Dates for 2010 announced

Preparations for Security Document World 2010 are already underway and Science Media Partners Ltd is pleased to announce that the fourth Security Document World Conference and Exhibition will be held at the Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre, Westminster, London, 9-10 February 2010.

Further announcements will be made in the coming weeks and months about the new features at next year’s show. One which certainly will be returning is our VIP programme. Working on behalf of many of our exhibitors, Science Media Partners invited numerous special guests from across industry and government. We were delighted that more than 50 were able to attend the event, bolstering our already very high-quality visitorship, which was rated at an average of 4.3 out of 5 by our exhibitors.

Hear what some of our exhibitors said about the show:

“Great presentations that provide insight into projects around the globe combined with a large exhibition – what more can you ask for?”
Georg Hasse, Vice President International Business Development, Cross Match Technologies

“We found the format, the attendees and the whole organisation of the Conference exactly suited to how we want to do business. We will certainly be back next year.”
Philip Berrie, Sales Manager, Sun Chemical Security

"We had a large number of international visitors and appreciated the high quality of exhibitors.”
Jürgen Pampus, Vice President Sales & Marketing, Cognitec Systems GmbH

“On both days of the exhibition we interacted with a broad range of industry representatives; including potential end-users and technology collaborators.”
Dr A Burden, President Europe, Bilcare Technologies

"SDW 2009 is one of the best organized and best attended security conferences that we’ve participated in."
Lars Gabel, Director Passports and ID, Graphic Security Systems Corporation

"Prooftag has found with SDW a quality platform with the ideal audience. We look forward to the next edition.”
Christian Guichard, International Business Development Director, ProofTag

"We experienced SDW as a qualitatively superior platform for manufacturers of security documents."
Marcel Willi, Area Sales Manager, PROJECTINA AG

For more information on the conference please contact Mark Lockie, Managing Director, Science Media Partners Ltd.,
Tel:  +44 (0) 29 20 560459 , or email: m.lockie@sciencemediapartners.com

[agentbluescreen]

Just can't wait to have my DVD player tell me I can't watch the disc my friend lent me because I am not the party who rented and is authorized to view it.

[Neo]

New Jersey counties purchase VeriTrace systems

http://www.rfidnews.org/2009/04/22/new-jersey-counties-purchase-veritrace-systems

The VeriChip Corporation, the Florida-based maker of a variety of tracing solutions based on implantable RFID tags, has announced the sale of its VeriTrace system to two New Jersey counties. The VeriTrace system is designed to assist government agencies, like those of Mercer and Atlantic counties in New Jersey, in the management of emergency situations and disaster recovery using implantable RFID technology.

The VeriTrace system includes unique implantable RFID microchips, a Bluetooth-enabled handheld reader, and a customized Ricoh 500SE digital camera capable of receiving both RFID scanned data and GPS data wirelessly. The system integrates with a Web-based database for gathering and storing information and images captured during emergency response operations.

This database enables the precise collection, storage and inventory of all data and images related to human remains and associated evidentiary items during a disaster recovery. The collected information can be used in the recreation of an accurate and complete reconstruction of a disaster setting, crime scene or similar setting where recreation proves necessary.

The VeriTrace system was created in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, when it was used in the identification and tracking of the remains of hurricane victims. During the Katrina recovery operations, VeriTrace was used by the Federal Disaster Mortuary Operational Response Team.

[TheCaliKid]

I don't have a PDA.

[Neo]

Singapore to compress databases into a central one
http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/423861/1/.html

SINGAPORE: The Immigration and Checkpoints Authority (ICA) is setting up a centralised hub containing biometric data such as facial images and fingerprints of all Singaporeans, permanent residents as well as foreigners staying here.

ICA says this is to ensure it continues to provide speedy immigration clearance amid rising human traffic at clearing points. ICA said it cleared about 150 million people last year, seven million more than the figures in 2007.

It currently makes use of about five different databases to establish the identity of just one person.

The upcoming biometrics hub will provide one-stop biometrics matching services, which ICA says will improve efficiency.

ICA will also launch a new initiative that will allow foreigners to submit their applications to become permanent residents online. The first phase of the electronic Permanent Resident System will be launched in July this year.

A similar system will also be rolled out for people applying to become Singapore citizens. The electronic Singapore Citizenship (e-SC) application will be ready by the third quarter of this year.

By submitting their particulars online, applicants will be able to reduce the number of trips they have to make to the ICA headquarters in Kallang -- saving time.

Currently, the applicants have to make at least two trips there to complete the paperwork. These online capabilities will cut the number of trips to just one.

ICA also says that it now clears inbound cargos and vehicles at a faster rate.

It is now using the Integrated Cargo Inspection System that allows it to clear more than 200 vehicles per hour.

The drivers will just have to move underneath a gantry-like structure and their vehicles will be scanned immediately.

With the previous, more manual system, it took about half an hour to complete inspecting one vehicle.

The new system is already being used at the Pasir Panjang and Jurong Scanning Stations as well as the Changi Airfreight Centre.

[Neo]

I don't have a PDA.

Neither do I, but look what this idiot done.

http://www.rfidnews.org/2009/03/31/a-man-a-mazda-an-rfid-implant

Jon Oxer, who has been labeled “Australia’s geekiest geek” by a Sydney newspaper, has made some adjustments to his car. Most are not that surprising for a man who clearly takes his technology seriously: 24-hour internet access in Mazda RX-8 might be unusual, but not that extreme. The remote ignition controlled via his iPod Touch and iPhone could be considered downright handy.

Then there is the keyless entry option. Oxer has installed an RFID reader on the window of his car which is interfaced to the car’s security system. This enables him to unlock his car with the RFID tag he has had implanted in his left arm.

Oxer has also modified his house to take advantage of the tag, which operates door locks and other features. The tag was implanted via a tool usually found in veterinary clinics.

RX-8 remote-controlled by iPod touch & RFID
http://www.slashgear.com/rx-8-remote-controlled-by-ipod-touch-rfid-3139582/

Most car computers concentrate on adding internet access, big sound systems and complex GPS, but Jon Oxer went a few stages further.  His 2004 Mazda RX-8 is connected to the internet 24/7, can be remotely controlled via an iPod touch or iPhone, and unlocked via an RFID tag implanted in his arm.



Video demo after the cut

The car computer - an Alix-1, which is fast enough to run Linux and share a 3G internet connection over multiple WiFi clients, but low-power enough to run for prolonged periods from a battery - is connected to the RX-8’s OBD-II interface, so has access to the speed, RPM, intake manifold air temperature, engine load, fuel level and more.  It can then send that to a remote computer.

More impressively, though, the car can be remotely started or stopped by the iPod touch, together with operating the locks; Jon can unlock the car completely key-free, using an RFID tag that he’s had surgically implanted in his left arm via an RFID reader mounted on one of the windows.  More details at Jon’s project log.

Watch video at link http://www.slashgear.com/rx-8-remote-controlled-by-ipod-touch-rfid-3139582/

[TheCaliKid]

Ha, he's more in the virtual world, than the real world.

[Neo]

Ha, he's more in the virtual world, than the real world.

As noticed! 

[TheCaliKid]

Honestly, who needs all that? I'm happy just taking a hike in the national forest. I don't need all that expensive, BS that breaks down and has to be replaced or "upgraded" constantly.

[Neo]

Honestly, who needs all that? I'm happy just taking a hike in the national forest. I don't need all that expensive, BS that breaks down and has to be replaced or "upgraded" constantly.

........And tracked!

[TheCaliKid]

Yes, tracked like an animal. Not to mention, that when you buy this sh*t you are supporting those mega-international corporations who threat you like an animal as well by compiling data lists and selling them amongst themselves. (other international corps.)

[Neo]

Yes, tracked like an animal. Not to mention, that when you buy this sh*t you are supporting those mega-international corporations who threat you like an animal as well by compiling data lists and selling them amongst themselves. (other international corps.)

That's where they get there power. If the public at large stop buying this sh*t, we could regain power.

[Neo]

UK taps CSC, IBM for biometrics, IDs and passports
http://www.contactlessnews.com/2009/04/07/uk-taps-csc-ibm-for-biometrics-ids-and-passports

CSC announced that the UK Identity and Passport Service (IPS), an agency of the Home Office responsible for issuing UK passports and ID cards, has awarded the company a 10-year managed IT services contract to upgrade the IPS application and enrollment system. The agreement has an estimated value of $570 million.

IBM was awarded $390 million contract to run the UK’s National Biometric Identity Service, which will deliver a database for storing facial and fingerprint biometrics for the U.K. passport and ID card, according to a Bloomberg News report. The company will replace the Border Agency’s existing biometric database.

Under the terms of the contract, CSC will assume responsibility for several existing legacy IT service contracts supporting the IPS. CSC will upgrade the existing application and enrollment system with new capabilities to process applications for passports and ID cards. The additions include the ability for customers to apply online; improved background checking; a new system for reporting lost and stolen passports and ID cards; customer support for updating personal data; and new IT and telephony systems.

Working in conjunction with the IPS and its other delivery partners for the National Identity Service, CSC will help deliver the next generation of biometric passports and support the introduction of ID cards.

[TheCaliKid]

Exactly. We don't need a shooting war (which would be horrific & pointless), we simply need to unplug and walk away.


Stop feeding the Beast.

[CaptBebops]

So why does it matter what Chertoff wants?  He may want lots of things but he's no longer head of Homeland Security so who cares?

[Dig]

Isn't Chertoff a total piece of f**king shit who is no longer in office?

Is he planning to assassinate someone or conduct a false flag on American Soil?

Is the NRO keeping an eye on him?

Is Chertoff being tracked?

Those are the questions that I want answered.

What the f**k is he even doing in this country?

Get the hell out of here you piece of shit!  Building concentration camps on American soil, what a total asshole!

[Neo]

We could only dream, but in reality there are many sleepwalking and these bastards are moving faster than a steam roller. Despite the wishes of the people! They won't stop and people have to stop living in denial. They want to control us!

Singapore to compress databases into a central one
http://www.thirdfactor.com/2009/04/21/singapore-to-compress-databases-into-a-central-one

Czech Republic issuing e-passports
http://www.contactlessnews.com/2009/04/06/czech-republic-issuing-e-passports

There are many more surveillance stories on this website alone.

VeriSign launches PKI platform for governments
EU passes biometric passport rules
Taiwan begins issuing e-passports
Infineon supplying chips for India's e-passports
India will start issuing e-passports
Polish students like their electronic student cards
Gemalto provides first electronic student card in Serbia
Colorado State installs keyless entry system
Europe moving toward standard, contactless student ID
Streamlined card system to require new cards at Maine college
University of Bozen banks on single card with multiple contactless applications
Air France trials biometrics for passenger boarding
Smart cards on the horizon for Vancouncer public transit

[TheCaliKid]

So why does it matter what Chertoff wants?  He may want lots of things but he's no longer head of Homeland Security so who cares?

Exactly. When then, is he handing down edicts?

[Neo]

Isn't Chertoff a total piece of f**king shit who is no longer in office?

Is he planning to assassinate someone or conduct a false flag on American Soil?

Is the NRO keeping an eye on him?

Is Chertoff being tracked?

Those are the questions that I want answered.

What the f**k is he even doing in this country?

Get the hell out of here you piece of shit!  Building concentration camps on American soil, what a total asshole!

Are you ready for this one Sane? Chertoff now works for Covington Law Firm. Talk about a revolving door. Once again this proves they are all on the same team!

Chertoff joins Covington law firm http://fcw.com/articles/2009/03/27/chertoff-joins-covington-law-firm.aspx

Former Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff has joined the Covington and Burling LLP law firm’s Washington, D.C., office as senior of counsel, the firm announced on March 26. He will work in the white-collar defense and investigations group.

Chertoff was named to the top homeland security post by President George W. Bush in January 2005, replacing former Pennsylvania Gov. Tom Ridge. The department opened in March 2003 as a conglomeration of 22 federal agencies and 180,000 employees. Chertoff took on leadership of major programs including airport security, border security, Real ID Act and disaster preparedness and response.

Chertoff served from 2003 to 2005 as a federal judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. He previously served as the Assistant Attorney General for the Criminal Division of the Justice Department, where he oversaw the investigation of the 2001 terrorist attacks and formed the Enron Task Force.

Chertoff, who graduated from Harvard College and Harvard Law School, also served more than a decade as a federal prosecutor, including as U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey. He will work in Covington's white-collar defense and investigations group.

“Mike Chertoff is first and foremost a lawyer of considerable renown. His legal and public service, including his crisis management experience, make him a unique asset for senior executives,” Bruce Baird, chair of Covington’s white-collar practice, said in the release. “Mike is uniquely qualified to help executives who must understand and manage issues that have national, cross-border, legal and public policy implications.”

“What attracted me to Covington was the firm’s international reach, impressive list of clients, and collegial atmosphere,” Chertoff said in a statement. “I am looking forward to working with clients that face complex criminal and regulatory enforcement investigations, and other forms of legal crisis.”


Now get this on Sean Hannity's website of all places I found this.

Holder's former partnership in Covington & Burling, a law firm that represents 17Gitmo detainees, the USS Cole bomber, and the government of Yemen, certainly sounds like a very unholy alliance for a Secretary of State.
http://forums.hannity.com/showthread.php?t=1435211

[Neo]

http://www.mail-archive.com/ctrl@listserv.aol.com/msg122152.html
SEPTEMBER 12, 2007
COVINGTON & BURLING, A PFIZER LAW FIRM, CAUGHT CLEANING UP ITS REPUTATION ON WIKIPEDIA.

We recently wrote that several drug companies have been caught deleting important information from Wikipedia, in order to downplay the risk of their drugs.

Now the law firms working for the drug companies are getting caught doing the same thing and we got this story from the outstanding blog ClinPsych.

Covington & Burling, one of the largest white-shoe law firms in the country, representing AstraZeneca, GlaxoSmithKline, Merck, Novartis, Schering-Plough and Pfizer, just got caught very red handed deleting Wikipedia entries about the firm like crazy. Seems like them lawyers aren't that smart after all . . .

If you want to see for yourself what the glorious lawyers at Covington & Burling have been up to, go here. If you just want the facts, here they are:

One entry deleted was the connection between Covington & Burling and secret societes:
There have been many connections drawn between Covington & Burling and the Skull & Bones or Illuminati. One notable connection is William P. Bundy who started out his career in 1947 working for Covington & Burling. In 1951 Bundy quit Covington & Burling to begin openly working for the CIA as an analyst, and then as assistant to the deputy director of the CIA.

                                                         
Another deletion dealt with Covington & Burlings involvment with mad cows and toxic smoke:

In April 2004, the Washington DC newspaper The Hill reported: "Creekstone Farms Quality Beef, which has been battling the U.S. Department of Agriculture to get permission to test its cattle for mad cow disease, has hired Covington & Burling to help it make its case."[2]

At the time, Creekstone was one of two U.S. beef producers who were seeking to resume exports to Japan, South Korea and other countries by testing every head of cattle they processed for mad cow disease.

According to a September 2003 press release from the firm, Covington & Burling successfully argued on behalf of the Southern Peru Copper Corporation to drop a lawsuit brought against it under the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA) by Peruvian citizens charging the copper company with polluting communities and causing health problems. ATCA has been used to address serious human rights violations in places like Burma and East Timor. In their release, Covington & Burling decried the "aggressive, expansionist plaintiffs' litigation" under ATCA.[3]

Covington & Burling also served as corporate affairs consultants to the Philip Morris group of companies, according to a 1993 internal budget review document which indicated the firm was paid $280,000 to "serve as general counsel to the Consumer Products Company Tort Coalition, agree the legal objectives with member company litigators, draft legislation and amendments, prepare lobby papers and testimony for legislative committees and administer the coalition's budget". [4]

During the $280 billion U.S. federal lawsuit against big tobacco, Covington & Burling partner John Rupp, a former lawyer with the industry-funded Tobacco Institute, testified that "the industry sought out scientists and paid them to make an 'objective appraisal' of whether secondhand smoke was harmful to non-smokers, a move they hoped would dispel the 'extreme views' of some anti-smoking activists." He "said the scientists, who came from prestigious institutions such as Georgetown University and the University of Massachusetts, did not consider themselves to be working 'on behalf' of cigarette makers even though they were being paid by the industry." Rupp said, "We were paying them to share their views in forums where they would be usefully presented," according to Reuters. [5]

Something else the Covington people didn't like was for people to learn their association with Halliburton and the following was deleted:

In 2003 Halliburton hired the firm to lobby Washington on behalf of its KBR Government Operations division, the same division being pummeled by the media, the Pentagon and Congress for its handling of Iraq contracts. Covington & Burling was paid $520,000 to handle "inquiries concerning company's construction and service contracts in Iraq," the firm said in a filing.

According to the filing, Covington & Burling listed the following people as lobbyists for Halliburton/KBR: Roderick A. DeArment, who was chief of staff to now-retired Sen. Bob Dole (R-KS); Martin B. Gold, former counsel to Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist (R-TN); Stuart E. Eizenstat, U.S. ambassador to the European Union during the Clinton administration; Alan A. Pemberton, coordinator of the firm's government contracts practice; David M. Marchick, who served in various posts in the Clinton administration; Jack L. Schenendorf; Peter Flanagan; Jennifer Plitsch; Benjamin J. Razi; and Allegra Lane.

Halliburton's lobbying expenses are disclosed in documents submitted under the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995, which requires congressional and executive branch lobbyists to disclose their lobbying activities twice per year. Each year the information is disclosed at the Senate Office of Public Records.

In 2003 Halliburton hired the firm to lobby Washington on behalf of its KBR Government Operations division, the same division being pummeled by the media, the Pentagon and Congress for its handling of Iraq contracts. Covington & Burling was paid $520,000 to handle "inquiries concerning company's construction and service contracts in Iraq," the firm said in a filing.

And Covington didn’t like this description of the firm:

Covington & Burling is a major legal and lobbying firm focused on "industry and regulatory" and "corporate, tax and benefits" issues, and litigation.[1] They have U.S. offices in Washington DC, New York City and San Francisco, and European offices in London and Brussels.

Instead, they wrote this:

Covington & Burling LLP is a leading international law firm with more than 600 lawyers practicing in Brussels, London, New York, San Francisco, and Washington. Founded in 1919, the firm advises leading multinationals on many of their most significant transactional, litigation, regulatory, and public policy matters. The firm has long emphasized the strength of its Corporate and Litigation Practices derived from the firm's industry expertise acquired through its broad regulatory expertise. Representative clients include The National Football League, Microsoft, PBS, and The Washington Post. Covington's pro bono program has been recognized as preeminent in the legal community. As part of its pro bono program, the firm has rotation programs, which allow attorneys and staff to work for six months at three local legal services organizations - Neighborhood Legal Services Program (NLSP), the Children's Law Center (CLC), or Bread for the City (BFTC).

To do your own detective work on Wikipedia use the WikiScanner.

[Anti_Illuminati]

Are you ready for this one Sane? Chertoff now works for Covington Law Firm. Talk about a revolving door. Once again this proves they are all on the same team!

Chertoff starts The Chertoff Group, joins Covington & Burling
Posted April 08, 2009
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=98295.0

You guys see why it's so important to understand what all that interoperability stuff I've exposed is really all about?  This is about being able to track you to make sure that you cannot exist in any form of non-enslaved economy and geography.  It will also be used to dynamically change your "threat assessment" from, say for example-a dumb sheep who gets a low level security risk, to an instant red-high level risk if that sheep suddenly wakes up.  At that point, with everything tied into the GIG infrastructure autonomous weaponry can be deployed to assassinate you anywhere on the Earth at any time.  If they get this in place there will be no escape.

This whole agenda was the main motive for 9/11--to be able to have the illusion of legitimacy to put the GIG in place, as well as get the funding that they needed for it starting right after the attacks.  The globalists could have never driven the world into a depression back in 2001, 02, 03, etc.  Remember also that The NWO considers themselves behind schedule with this (due to the delays from Iraq/Cheney, etc).  I have some info that I will follow up on this shortly.

[Anti_Illuminati]

http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/050519_chertoff_transcript.pdf

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN HOMELAND

SECURITY


May 19, 2005


The Center for Strategic and International Studies


Participants:

David Heyman

Director, Homeland Security Program

CSIS 

John Hamre

President and CEO

CSIS 

Michael Chertoff

U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security

David Heyman: Good morning. Thank you all for coming here at the early hour of 9 o’clock. Mr. Secretary, or I guess it’s “Judge Secretary”, members of the diplomatic corps, and distinguished guests, thanks for joining us, and welcome to CSIS. I’m David Heyman, I run the Homeland Security Program here and I just want to say a little context of what we’re doing today. This morning we welcome Secretary Chertoff before he departs for Europe later this week. I think it’s appropriate in advance of that trip that we have a little discussion on the international dimensions of homeland security.

If there’s anything we learned from September 11 attacks it’s that terrorism is a trans-national endeavor, and that the 9/11 attackers as we know conceived their plans in the Philippines, planned them in Malaysia and Germany, recruited from Yemen and Saudi Arabia, trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and carried them out in the United States.  And if terrorism doesn’t stop at our borders, homeland security must reach past our shores as well.

With globalization and the melting of borders and the merging of domestic and foreign interests, it means that we must forge new partnerships here at home and abroad. If over the past couple of years, homeland security effort here has been primarily inward-focused it’s not a surprise, but it now must fully embrace the international dimensions of security. And similarly I would add that the military has been primarily outward-focused and it must now provide greater support at home.
 
To discuss these issues, and the broader international dimensions of homeland security, we’re very pleased to have the Secretary here today, who I would note is sporting the traditional homeland security beard, and to welcome him here today, the President and CEO of CSIS, John Hamre, and we’ll be doing questions after this. 

John Hamre: Thank you, David. And thank you all for coming. I’m glad so many of you are here.

As you know, the Secretary’s boss threw a curveball yesterday and moved up the Cabinet meeting and so we had to move this session up. And I at the time thought, “oh God, we’ll never get anybody there”, you know? And I think it’s a real testament to everybody’s curiosity about you, that they wanted to come to this session.(laughter) 

And in all honesty, you’re going to be, all of you, colleagues in the
audience, are going to be just wonderfully surprised. This is a very fine leader for this department, and the kind of leader we need right now. You know Washington is filled with people who say they were offered a job but decided to turn it down, that’s Washington. We’re very lucky that the kind of person that we need right now said yes, and that’s Secretary Chertoff. He has the kind of background that’s crucial at this time.

He does not carry the baggage of biases that so many in the security community bring to this job, and he brings a very deep consciousness about the expectations that we provide a safe America, and an America that is comfortable with our civil values and civic values. This is a man who has dedicated his life to that. We’re very lucky. We’re very lucky that he’s been willing to take this assignment. It’s not a thankful job, it’s a thankless job, but we’re thankful that he’s taken it.
 
I introduce to you now Secretary Chertoff, Secretary of Homeland Security. 

Michael Chertoff: Well, thank you everybody, for turning out at this early hour. John, thank you for that warm introduction, and David thank you for your remarks which actually anticipated virtually my entire remarks, so I’m done.  (laughter) Actually I have not prepared a speech, what I think I will do is outline some of what I envision as being the international dimension of what we do, as I look forward to my first trip overseas, I guess yeah, it’s my first trip overseas in this job, coming up next week. 

And I think it is significant to me at least, to be here, because I know what fine work this CSIS has been doing, for years it’s been an important forum for debating, and having dialogue about strategic issues of global importance. I remember seeing Secretary Ridge, I think I watched it on C-Span, shortly before he went on his last trip to Europe, talking about what he was going to bring with him on the trip, what he had learned over his two years in the department, and so it’s, seems appropriate for me to be here to talk about what my vision is as we go forward, in terms of dealing with the homeland security question outside the homeland, abroad. 

And before I begin I really do want to pay a brief tribute to Governor Ridge, who did a phenomenal job with Admiral Loy and everybody else who were the original, I guess what they call plank owners, of the Department of Homeland Security, because they really built it from scratch. And although we are currently engaging in a review, looking to making some adjustments in terms of maybe organization and mission, the fact that we can be in a position to take this kind of a review two years into it, is a testament to the very fine foundational work that was done that leads us up to this point. And I would be remiss in not dealing with that. 

I think as David pointed out, we know that terrorism is preeminently a global threat. There are obviously domestic characteristics to terrorism, but in terms of what the public is concerned about, and certainly what the department was formed in order to address first and foremost, it is global radical terrorism. 

And as Thomas Friedman said recently in I guess his latest book The World Is Flat, it is really, terrorism in the twenty-first century is really the globalization of the kind of terror acts that we saw in the twentieth century. And much as globalization has transformed the world of business, it has transformed the world of terror. And so we need to think about how we confront terrorism by looking at twenty-first century structures and characteristics that terrorists exploit in order to carry out their missions. 

As David pointed out, 9/11 itself is a great example of this. We’re talking about a plot that was hatched in Central Asia, with recruits who came from Saudi Arabia, who were trained in Afghanistan, who set up and began to develop their infrastructure and their platform in Europe, and then who carried out and executed their mission here in the United States. That is globalization. That is networking. That is outsourcing. That is all the characteristics of twenty-first century organization that we’re accustomed to thinking about in the context of international business, but that unfortunately is also available to those who want to commit acts of international terror. 

So we are fighting a different kind of a war. It’s not a war that we are going to win in the same way that we won World War II, by massing superior forces in the field, or even the kind of war that at least the first part of the campaign in Iraq was, where we bring in superior air power, mobile forces, and then we crush the enemy. This is fighting a network, and so as we talk about a strategy to deal with global terror, we have to think about what is a strategy for dealing with a network.  And clearly one way to look at it is we have to create our own network, to compete with that network, and to combat that network. 

We also have to look at what vulnerabilities networking has, and those vulnerabilities tend to be things like communication, transportation, movement of people, movement of cargo. Those are the kinds of activities that bind a network together. If you think about, for example a benign network, a global business, you have to communicate with the various parts of the business, you have to move people and goods and services, and that’s how a network works in a positive way.

In a negative way as well, of course the terrorists exploit that strategy to carry out their missions, and so we need to look at the peculiar vulnerabilities that networks have, and that is this connective tissue that allows bad people and bad stuff to move back and forth internationally. What that tells us right away is, that if we’re going to challenge the kind of interdependence that a terrorist network thrives upon, we have to be able to confront the network everywhere it operates, and that means we have to be able to function internationally, and do it in part (inaudible) with our overseas allies.

And I don’t think this is a new insight, we’ve certainly had movement in this direction over the past couple of years. 
The Department of Homeland Security, and before that the various elements that make up the department, were talking about, with our overseas allies, about issues like container security, passport security, and increasing our ability to have biometric and secure travel documents, exchange of information about travelers, so that we could anticipate who might be coming in and block those people that we don’t want to have coming in. 

In my own prior job, as head of the criminal division of the Department of Justice, we put people overseas, to work with prosecutors and investigators in Europe, precisely because we needed to build up a network of law enforcement that would parallel the network of terror. So this is not new, but as we are poised here two years after the department was formed, it’s a good time to think about, how do we take this to the next level, how do we move beyond simply partnering on an individual episodic basis to building a true partnership that will operate in a mission-oriented focus, where we will work together with our allies overseas to accomplish a mission that will secure the entire world.
 
And let me tell you where I would like to see us go with this, at the end of this next stage of development. We need to have a world that is banded with security envelopes. Meaning, secure environments through which people and cargo can move rapidly, efficiently, and safely without sacrificing security.

And in that kind of a world, it would be possible, with the proper security vetting, with the proper technology, with the proper travel documents, with the proper tracking of cargo, to move relatively freely from point to point all across the globe, with the understanding that those within the security envelope, we have a high confidence and trust about, so that they don’t have to be stopped at every point mechanically and revetted and rechecked, and those outside the envelope would be those on which we could focus our resources in terms of the kind of in-depth analysis and the kind of in-depth vetting that is necessary to make sure bad people can’t come in to do bad things. 

So that is ultimately the vision of where we go, and I think it’s one which would happily not require a sacrifice of liberty or privacy in order to promote security, it’s one that would maximize all of these values, which is of course again what our ultimate goal is, is to preserve our lives but also to foster our way of life. And let me talk specifically about three areas in which I think we can start to concretely move forward, as we try to develop this worldwide security envelope. First of all, the issue of screening. We have to have a systematic approach to screening that meshes with the approach taken by our overseas allies, that takes advantage of modern technology, and that gives us a real sense of confidence that we are screening out bad people. 

Right now we are using the most primitive kind of screening in many respects, meaning we screen for bad names, and of course names are not the best way of identifying people, they’re certainly not as good as biometrics. We screen with technology and by hand searching for certain kinds of bad cargo. We are starting to move forward using somewhat more technologically advanced devices at our ports, that now allows that we would look inside cargo containers without actually breaking (balk?).

We’re starting to use more sophisticated methods of screening that rely upon getting information about cargo, and using that to sort out what the most high-risk cargo is, and then focus on that high-risk cargo. So we are starting to develop more sophisticated tools, but we really have to press that forward. And that’s going to boil down in the first instance to the question of information sharing. 

We are going to need to have better information about trusted travellers, if we are truly going to move to the security envelope, where people can move freely, but with the sense that we can trust them. Now that means that we need to get information not only from within this country but from abroad about people who are travelling. And that runs into some important cultural and legal challenges. For example, although we all, I think we here in the United States and our allies overseas believe in the importance of privacy and liberty, we sometimes define how these values get implemented in somewhat different ways. 

The issue of data protection, for example, as we deal with it, is sometimes a little bit mismatched with the way the Europeans do. So we need to start to think of ways to get congruence between these sets of values and to translate them in a way that allows us to operate together. It’s my contention really at the end of the day, if we had a true system for providing necessary passenger information in advance of travel, securing it against improper or inappropriate dissemination or distribution, that that would actually foster privacy.

That we would have less intrusive checking at the border, checking at the doorway to the airline, easier travel which means a greater sense of freedom, so that in the end we would in fact be fostering all the things we want to foster. But we need to get by some legal and cultural mismatches in order to get to that better position. So that’s step one. 

I hope that we can go to Europe and go overseas and start to talk about how we can finish the process of getting our information shared appropriately, and with due respect for peoples’ privacy. Second, technology is obviously going to be critical. We need technology for screening cargo, we can use it for screening people as well. We’re doing a lot of work in this country, Europeans
are doing a lot of work, we ought to make sure we get on the same page with that work for two reasons.

First of all we maximize our resources if we have fully available to us all of the ingenuity and talent across the globe of people who are thinking about ways to use technology. 

Secondly, we’ve got to be compatible. It doesn’t make a lot of sense, for example, to have radio frequency chips that use different kinds of modalities in the United States than in Europe and in Asia, because we’re simply going to make it hard for us to interconnect. So that to the extent that we can start to build common platforms and common technological approaches, again we will move ourselves closer to this concept of a security envelope. And we will also save ourselves some money, and some effort, and some time. 

Finally law enforcement. As I’ve indicated, intelligence sharing and law enforcement sharing has been critical to dealing with the threat of terrorism globally, we need to continue to advance on that front. We’ve done a lot, I know for example in Europe, the Europeans themselves through the EU mechanism, Eurojust and Europol, have been working to try to have greater connectivity among their various law enforcement agencies and intelligence agencies. We need to build on that, we need to encourage it, again because that free flow of information and cooperation gives us an ability to network in a way that lets us match the network of the enemy. 

So these are the three principal areas that I hope to start to dialogue and talk to our European partners about when I go overseas, I think this is the first step in what has to be ultimately a worldwide effort that gets us to this notion of a security envelope. And I think it’s important to us as Americans because in the end, we have to make sure that what we are doing to defend our homeland is consistent with our vision of the way the homeland has to be.

We don’t win the war against terror if we destroy those things which we value in our own lives. We win the war on terror by being able to conduct lives, encourage prosperity, protect liberty, preserve privacy, while preventing terrorists from carrying out actions in this country. 

So we don’t want a fortress state, but we want to have a state that is open, that encourages the historic flow of students coming into this country in order to get an education, I mean that is a huge and important part of the war against terror, is bringing people into the country and showing what we have to offer. And so we want to have more of that, we just want to make sure we do it securely.  Trade—we are a great engine for trade, we are creative, we have an enormous amount of energy, we want to make sure we are not slowing up or blocking the channels of trade because we are not smart enough in terms of how we protect ourselves against bad cargo. 

All of this, then, is the vision that we have to keep in front of us as we work specifically on creating this worldwide security envelope. At the end of the day of course, it boils down to something that I’ve spoken about previously, and which I know many of you here have talked about, which is risk management. We have to go into the process of balancing all of these characteristics, recognizing that we are always going to be managing risk.

There is a perfect way to avoid risk. If you want to avoid risk to ports, you shut ports down. If you want to avoid risk to air traffic, you never have air traffic. But we all realize that’s foolish and self-defeating. So in order to strike the balance we want to strike, and create an appropriate security envelope and not one that is clogged and dysfunctional, we have to again always use risk management as a philosophy.

So with that being said, I am very much looking forward to my upcoming trip, I’m sure I’ll have interesting observations and opportunities to meet with my colleagues overseas, we’ve got people in countries all over the world that have contended with terror for many, many years and have tremendous insight, not only into the technology and the process, but also the psychology of how a society deals with terror, and so I’m going over to learn and to listen more than to speak and instruct, but I’m hoping we can begin this dialogue of moving our partnership to the next level and creating this worldwide security envelope. 

I want to thank David and John again for inviting me here, giving me an opportunity to kind of preview what I’m hoping to achieve, and I guess we have some time for questions. (applause)

[Anti_Illuminati]

David Heyman: The Secretary will now take questions. Please identify yourself, there’s microphones in the room and they’ll come forward. Sir. 

Question: Thank you Mr. Secretary for this opportunity. I guess while talking about law enforcement with the rest of the world, one question now, how about the issue of rendition of prisoners. Could you tell us if so far it was effective as a policy, have there been any good results? 

Michael Chertoff: Well, of course there are various legal authorities and requirements that govern the way we treat prisoners. Let me step back and put the issue in context. The principal weapon we have in the war against terror is information. In World War II we had radar. Radar told us when bombers or enemy aircraft or enemy ships were coming in, we could combat that. There is no radar against terror. Even these screening devices, no matter how technologically advanced, are only an imperfect way of warning us so that we can intercept and prevent. So we do need to have strategies for getting information, and dealing with intelligence so we can anticipate in advance how to save lives. 

We do that in a way that is consistent with the law, but we need to be mindful of the fact that getting information, getting intelligence, is the number one way in which we anticipate attacks and save human lives. If we didn’t have intelligence, I’m afraid that the death tolls would be much higher, and the impact on societies across the board would be much harsher. Yes. 

Question: I’d like to know... I’m doing my doctoral dissertation at AU, and I’m working on terrorist financing issues. What is the degree of cooperation you’re getting post-title III of USA Patriot Act with the other departments, the DOJ, the Treasury, and State, and so on. And how do you affect [inaudible} group of banking standards. What’s the degree of collaboration [inaudible], and how are things going right now? 

Michael Chertoff: Well we do have a lot of cooperation within the United States government of course, there’s traditionally there’s always been issues involved in making sure we’re working together. I think we’re much further along with that than we were two or three years ago, inside the U.S. government.  You’re right to point out that this is an international effort, we’ve been working with our counterparts overseas. In many ways we have a very good working relationship, sometimes we have differences of opinion about where the particular groups should be treated as terrorist groups in terms of financing, and whether they ought to be on lists that require monitoring, or even in fact require shutting down channels of money, so we have to work through some of those issues.

But—and of course we have the so-called off-line methods of transmitting money, including hawala and things of that sort, which we have adapted ourselves to deal with. But I do think there’s been a tremendous amount of progress and I’ve read recently, and I’ve forgotten which institute reported on this, that in fact there’s been significant progress made. But you know, money is like water, it finds a way to get past barriers if there’s any crevice or crack, and again, this is an area where networking and technology will help us a great deal in terms of choking off the flow of resources that allow terrorists to carry out their operations.
 
Question: Andre [inaudible] Tass News Agency of Russia. Mr. Secretary, are you planning to visit Russia while in Europe, and if so, whom are you going to meet with, and what issues would be on the agenda, and how would you describe the level of cooperation between the two countries on security issues in general, and on information sharing in particular? Thank you.
 
Michael Chertoff: That’s a lot of questions. Russia is not on the agenda for this trip, which will be a short trip, although I’m hopeful that at some point in the future I will be able to go over there. I did actually take a trip to Russia when I was head of the criminal division, with the Attorney General, and we had a very good set of meetings with our counterparts over there. I think it underscores again the fact that we all deal with terror and terrorists.

Sometimes the particular variation that a particular country deals with is different, but you know the terrorists are networking now too. And there’s a bit of a tendency I see sometimes in the press or in the media to focus on for example, Al Qaeda, as if it is a stand-alone, formal organization like a corporation. Again I want to drive back to this idea of a network. While there is an Al Qaeda, it is also a network with other organizations, including organizations that obviously have impact on Russia, and of course we are very mindful of what happened in Beslan.

So we are always working again to improve our information flow, I think that everybody now has an understanding that this is a global threat.  Sometimes there are obviously hiccups in the process of keeping ourselves informed, but the intent, and the desire, and the recognition of the importance, I think, remains. Yes. 

Question: Armand Peschard from CSIS: I was wondering if you could comment on the work of the, I think eleven, working groups that you chair under the security and prosperity partnership of North America, and to what extent is inter-operability being emphasized in the work of the working groups?
 
Michael Chertoff: Well of course, just to remind everybody, the SPP, the Security and Prosperity Partnership was announced by the President, with the President of Mexico and the Prime Minister of Canada, in March in Crawford, we were there. I think it is... all three heads of state view it as a very important initiative because we have a unique relationship since we are part of the North American continent. We have a common perimeter, we have obviously very robust trade relationships, and we therefore have certain unique common security and prosperity issues.

We’re working very hard on those issues, and I think we’re due to report towards the end of June on our progress. I can tell you I spent a fair bit of time on it, I know I’ve spoken to both my counterparts both in Canada and in Mexico on a regular basis about it, and I think it’s an important opportunity for us, first of all to make sure that the huge volume of trade between our countries does not diminish because of the need to make sure of security, but at the same time making sure that we are working together and cooperatively in terms of information exchange, in terms of common protocols at the perimeter about how we handle cargo and passengers, so that we don’t have seams or cracks between us that can be exploited by terrorists. 

You know, sometimes people say, treat security and prosperity as if they’re trade-offs, where one is a win, you know it’s a zero sum game. I think quite the contrary. Without adequate security we’re not going to have prosperity. I think we know that if there are incidents that result in serious terrorist consequences that are attributable to some individual or some commerce that came across the border, that is going to have a negative reaction on commerce, it’s going to have a tendency to close the border up to some degree. We don’t want that to happen. So prosperity depends on security, but at the other extreme, security without prosperity is pointless. So this is kind of a concrete area where we’re working, to make sure we move both of these values in tandem. 

Question: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Nat Thomas with CIRRA [ph] Given the emphasis that you’ve placed on technology in the fight against terrorism, what plans does your department have for more fully utilizing the research and development being done at our universities here in the U.S. and abroad to fight against terrorism, beyond the centers of excellence that are already being established. Thank you. 

Michael Chertoff: We have obviously a science and technology directorate, which was written into law precisely in order to leverage our ability to encourage science and technology, which is the key to, I think, it’s really our competitive advantage in dealing with terrorists. And there’s also something which we call SHARPA which is the homeland security advanced research network, which again I think we need to make sure we are adequately exploiting in order to encourage the development of the correct technologies.

You know we have various kinds of programs with universities, we have the tremendous capabilities of the national laboratories, which not only deal with technology in a narrow sense but deal with systems, and proper thinking of how do you create systems that would ensure better screening and better protection for the country. I’ve met with, in the course of my three months on the job I’ve made it a point to meet with scientists and technology people, private and public, to get a sense of what is out there. And there’s tremendous opportunity for us to harness the energy and the creativity of the private sector, and academia to build not only
just individual items of technology, but systems of technology that will give us leverage and will give us the upper hand in this kind of asymmetric warfare that we deal with with terrorism. Yes. 

Question: Hi, David Silverberg, HS Today magazine. You mentioned earlier the review that’s ongoing now. What’s the status of that review, is there an end date in sight now, and will you be announcing all the results at one time? 

Michael Chertoff: The first question takes a little longer to answer. The answer to the second is yes, and the answer to the third is no. The status of the review is this. I had directed that the groups working on this, report in to me, be prepared to report into me, by the end of this month, and we are essentially on track to get that done. What I anticipate will be happening is I will be sitting down with the various groups that are working on elements of this review over the next weeks, and discussing and working out what the suggestions are, how we ought to react, and starting to develop proposals for moving forward on those things.

This is not going to result in unveiling a printed report that then gets put out. It’s rather going to be a template and the strategy for going forward over the next months, across the board, dealing with all the missions of the department and all the department’s responsibilities. I have no doubt that there will be some aspects of this that we will unveil probably very early in June, some may take a little bit longer.

The purpose of this was not to produce a single document that could then be published and sent around, but it was really for me and the leadership team at the department to be able to look across the board at what we’re doing, figuring out what the gaps are, where we need to make some changes, and also really working out some substantive policies.

It was a great opportunity I think for people in a cross-cutting way, from different disciplines, to think outside the usual categories, not to be constrained by what they think is possible or acceptable or conventional, but to really talk about what would you do if you could take a fresh piece of paper, knowing what we know after two years, how would you draw a mission plan, an operations plan, to get where we need to get. 

I think, my impression is there’s a lot of energy and excitement in the department about doing this. I’ve actually started to sit down, and get a preview of some of what the findings and the suggestions are, and I think we will produce from very interesting and important results in terms of mapping our next months of activity. 

Question: Bill Courtney, CSE. In the defense context, the kinds of goals that you outlined for your European trip, we pursued in NATO for a half century, both the technological cooperation as well as the political impulse to assure the technological cooperation takes place. Do you foresee for homeland security and counter-terrorism a need to have, if you will, a large international, super-national organization, that can have both a political and a technical dimension to achieve its goals? 

Michael Chertoff: No. I think this is really about networking. There are a lot of multi-lateral institutions. You know, the EU obviously is a point of contact for us, as are the individual bilateral contacts. We have had a long-standing superb relationship with the British, our allies in Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, we have a very good relationship with Mexico. I don’t know we need to build more bureaucracy, I think what we need to do is network with the existing structures, and have a clear vision of what we want to accomplish, and then move on it. 

Question: Andrew Howell, with the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. I want to follow up on one of your three areas, that of screening and registered travellers, specifically as you may know there’s going to be a pilot program in Orlando, with a private sector company running a registered traveller program. How do you envision in this process the role of the private sector going forward, is Orlando the beginning of a larger set of private sector initiatives to screen travelers and provide tangible benefits to them, or do you view that as kind of the traditional, now I guess what TSA has done so far in registered travel, a more traditional government role? 

Michael Chertoff: I don’t think we necessarily are limited to a traditional government role. I mean, there are a number of ways in which the private sector can really add value and play a major role in this process. One is of course technological, I mean to the extent we have tools that are more efficient in screening, that’s often an area where the private sector contributes. Second, where we do—and I want to be very careful about how I say this—where we do screening, and we do need a certain amount of limited information for screening, some of that’s available in the private sector.

Now it may be that it should remain in the private sector, that we don’t want the government to accumulate a lot of data, but that we want to figure out a way to deal with the private sector so that we can get a signal or a flag that there is, for example with respect to a traveller, a reason to be concerned, without actually having to dive into the underlying data and get access to things that I think people might be reluctant to have the government see.

So I actually think the private sector can help us construct an architecture that will be privacy, pro-privacy, and privacy-protective, while giving us the ability to see results that would be important in terms of deciding who we have to focus on. Finally the private sector can deal with it this way: You’ve got a lot of people travelling, almost always for private business.

As we talk about trusted traveller programs, getting more of the kind of information that allows us, for example, to let people move freely through airports, as we talk about biometric types of identification, which maybe become available on a kind of voluntary basis, the private sector can create a marketplace for this. If people in fact see value in having a biometric card, and volunteering some information for it in return for getting some kind of trusted traveller status, that will create a marketplace for the technology, and a marketplace for the systems that we need to drive that forward, so that’s another area where we look to the private sector.
 
Question: I wanted to ask another question about collaboration with the private sector in screening, but a different kind of screening, and that is screening for job applicants, for particularly sensitive positions, for example in critical infrastructure. And what your thoughts might be on the practicality, value and feasibility of screening those applicants against information that the government may have with respect to whether it’s the NCIC or eventually, if they become reliable enough, some sort of terrorist watch list. 

Michael Chertoff: Well, we have, again, we have pieces of this on the drawing board. I mean there is a TWIK program, a transportation workers card which is designed to deal with people who are going to be transporting hazardous materials. We have of course, government buildings have various kinds of screening devices. At the end of the day, again I think you do want to have a capability to screen people who have access to critical material, either when it moves or when it’s housed someplace, nuclear power plants for example, and I think you want to build a capability that has the following aspects:

First of all, that does check against databases that are accurate, and that means not just name databases, but biometric databases, so that we can determine if a person in fact is secure. And by the way, you want an ability to update that, so that if you get something, information about a person in year one, and the person, something happens and they become a terrorist in year eight, you’re going to find out about that.

And I think you can build that, because your platform ultimately is a verifiable card, which has a biometric so that we know, a person, once cleared, and once vetted, we know the person who is coming in is in fact the person who they say they are, you can do that with fingerprints, for example. You can build into the card an RF chip, or some kind of a capability so that if in fact the status changes, you can somehow decommission the card, or you can put a red flag on it. 

These are technology solutions, but they’re really broader, they’re system solutions, and in the end if we create this kind of a platform, in theory it could roll out in the transportation area, in the critical infrastructure area, nuclear power plants, government buildings, and if we have it, although we don’t want to merge them necessarily in one data base, if there’s some interoperability and a capability of speaking across the platforms, you might be able to carry a single card that would get you into a courthouse, get you into a government building, and get you into your job, and at a minimum of invasion of your privacy and interference with your freedom of movement. 

Question: Much seems to be made from some countries, particularly European countries Mr. Secretary, with respect to the different perspective on the international anti-terrorism activities. Some European countries particularly seem to be concerned about what they see as an undue emphasis on the war, about war on terrorism, versus a multi-disciplinary, multi-agency approach. Do you see that as an actual impediment to international cooperation, and how do you see, will you comment on that kind of an issue?
 
Michael Chertoff: Well, there may be different views about how you think about what we do. I have no doubt that we are in a war, and I don’t know any way you could define what happened on 9/11, the fact that bin Laden declared war on us, the fact that he tried to blow up an airliner with a shoe bomber, the fact that we have some bombings in Bali and Madrid, I don’t know how you could define that as anything other than a global war. 

But I think at the end of the day, even if there are different ways of talking about this, in Europe and other parts of the world, we can get beyond that, because I think we all want to achieve the same result. And by the way, I think this war is a multi-disciplinary war. The first line of defense is the president’s strategy to take the war to the enemy because, not only do we get valuable
intelligence, but if they’re worrying about themselves, they’re having less time to think about how to plot against us.

So that clearly, I mean I have no doubt that as a principal element of the strategy of fighting the war, the president is absolutely right in taking us overseas and fighting the war over there. But we use all the tools, and I think, you know, we’ve always talked about giving the President, and I think this applies to foreign leaders as well, all the tools in the toolbox, and that includes domestic law enforcement, it includes science and technology, it includes all the dimensions of what we can bring to bear including financial resources, and diplomacy.

So it’s a war fought with a, perhaps a different or a broader set of tools, and I think that we can all internationally agree that we need to get this thing done, even if we want to talk about it in slightly different ways. 

Question: When you talk about the desire to create the security envelope -

•   I’m Eric Clifton from the New York Times—what kinds of information from the Europeans and what categories and for what purposes would you like to try to be able to have access to, to create this global security envelope? What are some examples, if you could, please. 

Michael Chertoff: Well, for example, if you’re dealing with cargo, let’s take shipping cargo and containers, one would like to know, for example, as much as one can know about the constituents of a particular container. You know, you can go to FedEx, or UPS, or other kinds of freight-forwarding and shipping companies, and they have a phenomenal ability to track information and monitor, they can tell you where your package is, you know your own columnist Thomas Friedman describes this in his book, about how great UPS is at doing all this stuff.

Well, can we use those kinds of systems when we’re dealing with shipping material through containers into ports, to determine, you know verify who in fact the manufacturer is, what the product is, track that as it moves through the shipping system, until it gets onto the ship, or better yet when it arrives at the final port of embarkation, so we know what needs to be inspected physically and what we’re confident about can just be moved through, that is an example of getting the kind of information that is currently, by the way, completely available to shippers in the private sector.

And building on that kind of a technique, so that when we confront the millions of containers that move into the United States every day, we can be confident that we’re inspecting the ones that need to be inspected, and the ones where we have a security envelope, because we know what’s in it and we know that there’s been protection given to the containers so no one can put something inside of it, sneak something into it, then that kind of freight, that verified freight, can move very rapidly, and I think at the end of the day that’s going to be a competitive advantage to shippers, they’re going to want to have a program that gives us the kind of information we need to keep cargo secure so it can move rapidly through the system. 

Question: Just wondering if you support the Bush administration plans to expand the Patriot Act to allow the subpoena of business records without judges’ approval? 

Michael Chertoff: Yes. 

Question: Could you expand on that?
 
Michael Chertoff: Yes I do. (Laughter) No, I mean, not to be facetious about it. Getting information quickly is really important, and you know, I obviously was around when the Patriot Act was passed, I think it has been a tremendous, positive, value-added element of the war against terror. It’s allowed us to get information promptly, and it’s allowed us to make sure it gets to the right people, and we connect it up. And I think it’s been handled in a responsible way.

Now, I know that as the Attorney General has acknowledged, there’s always an opening to consider calibrating or making adjustments if experience suggests that ought to be done, but I think that it is an important weapon in making sure again that we have available to us the most important tool against terror, which is advance information and knowledge that we can use to intercept and prevent a terrorist act. Thank you very much.
 
David Heyman: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. We look forward to continuing to dialogue with you, we wish you good speed on your next journey. Thank you. 

[Anti_Illuminati]

Dark Winter - Pretext for TOPOFF/CCMRF/CBRNE Martial Law TREASON
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=87844.msg569659#msg569659

Bird Flu/Cyber FF plot thickens: W. Crowell/Narus/VirtualAgility/Northcom
http://forum.prisonplanet.com/index.php?topic=92523.msg542514#msg542514



House Armed Services Committee Discusses Impact Of 9/ll Commission Findings
WASHINGTON - AUGUST 11: John Hamre, former deputy Secretary of Defense, makes a point as he testifies during a hearing before the House Armed Services Committee August 11, 2004 on Capitol Hill in Washington, DC. The hearing was held to discuss the 9-11 Commission's proposed intelligence reforms on the Department of Defense.
Photo:
Aug 11, 2004

_____________________________________________________________

                                                                           

Pacific Forum CSIS
                                                                                                 Hawaii

                                                                         September 14, 2001

A Dark Day for Civilization 

by John Hamre

Tuesday, September 11, was a dark day for America, but not for America alone. It was a dark day for civilization as well.  Frankly, America is lucky to have been spared tragedies that the rest of the world sees all too often. On September 11, however, terror came home. The physical tragedy is inescapable, and our hearts go out to the injured and to all those who lost their loved-ones. But there is another cost - the potential loss of hope. Our innate hope in a larger good was shattered by an unexplainable evil.

We must now start to draw lessons about the broader meaning of these tragic events. My first hope is that this tragedy breaks the rhythm of the popular drumbeat around the world that “proud America” needs to be taken down a notch. Our grief is great, and we have all been enormously consoled by the flood of thoughtful messages from friends around the world. These words of encouragement demonstrate the depth of support that America can count on in a time of crisis. Our friends are standing with us and they are many.

I also hope that through this tragedy we can overcome the growing divide between America and the rest of the world about American “unilateralism.” I do not personally believe that America has turned down a unilateralist path, although I hear the argument made often. What is clear from the events of September 11 is that, in a global age, national security depends on extensive collaboration with other countries. We have no hope of stopping terrorists in the United States if we try to manage the problem alone. In fact, these events prove we must have strong collaboration with other countries not just to knock down hateful extremists, but to tackle the range of problems that transcend the sovereign control of any one country.

This tragedy opens an opportunity for a new partnership in the world. The nature of our global age is such that we cannot solve problems in America that spring from causes in other countries without the partnership of those countries in the shared challenge. That is the nature of governance in the twenty-first century. We need two things to navigate safely and successfully the dangerous waters of globalization: strong and competent governments around the world and a shared consensus on problems and solutions. We cannot handle the dark side of globalization, or really benefit from its opportunities either, without both of these conditions.

It was this cooperative spirit that drove us to work with other countries fifty years ago to create the global institutions that so successfully managed the challenges that we have since faced.  We need to rediscover this spirit at the start of this decade. I hope that this is the phoenix that rises from the terrible rubble in New York and Washington.

Dr. John Hamre is President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.
_____________________________________________________________

1001 Bishop Street, Pauahi Tower, Suite 1150, Honolulu, HI   96813   Tel: (808) 521-6745   Fax: (808) 599-8690
Email: pacforum@hawaii.rr.com   Web Page: www.csis.org/pacfor

[Anti_Illuminati]

Additional CSIS Commentary

On the terrorist attack. Following Tuesday’s brutal attack, the solidarity shown by allies and friends, as well as some adversaries has been widespread. It provides an opportunity for rebuilding the Grand Coalition that, 10 years ago, was to shape a new world order. In Europe, the allies understand that the feasibility of such an attack on the United States reveals their own exposure as well.  That is why NATO members have hardly objected to stating their solidarity in the context of the alliance’s Article 5. In Russia, Vladimir Putin sees this as an opportunity to bare the soul the president gave him, as well as to get some credit for the internal problems he may fear in and beyond Chechnya.

In the Middle East, the Arab states are growing increasingly concerned over a conflict that is getting out of hand, first between Israelis and Palestinians in the streets, and now between Islamist radicals and America (and others). Even under enormous time pressure - with retaliation possible sooner rather than later - allied support for U.S. military action should be sought and can, in fact, be expected. The events of September 11 also serve as a reminder that the Middle East conflict cannot be neglected for long without dangerous impact elsewhere. Accordingly, U.S. military retaliation, whatever its form, will be most effective, and allied support most likely, if it is accompanied by a renewed U.S.  engagement in the peace process.
Dr. Simon Serfaty, Director, Europe Program.

On new trends in Islamic extremism. The tragic events of September 11 point to a disturbing trend in the evolution of Islamic extremism and its regional and international networks.  The new brand of extremists is ideologically less sophisticated, more inflexible, and more dogmatic. The core of their ideology is a distorted version of the concept of Jihad (Holy War), hence their identification as Jihadists. This particular brand of Islamic extremists has its roots in the Afghan conflicts: the Russo-Afghan War and the Afghan Civil War. In addition, many members and/or sympathizers of this brand have been hardened by doing battle elsewhere, including Bosnia, Chechnya, and the Tajik Civil War (1992-1997).

This engagement in warlike situations has provided the new breed of extremists with military training skills, hereto unavailable to them, including flying sophisticated aircraft, and has given rise to a geographically widespread network of extremists who have common experiences. The policy implications of dealing with the new breed of extremists and the network they have created requires new policies on the part of the United States beyond immediate retaliatory measures.

A long-term strategy should include: building a more cohesive multilateral strategy to deal with international terrorism - especially with U.S. allies but also other countries who face problems of terrorism; a more active policy of peace-making in trouble spots, notably Afghanistan; a more stringent policy vis-à-vis countries who in one form or another help terrorist groups, including countries such as Pakistan which do not have an openly hostile attitude towards the United States; insistence that countries - including some U.S. allies - who help Diaspora organizations with Jihadist tendencies stop such assistance and dissuade their private citizens and/or organizations from doing so; discouraging Muslim and other governments from using extremists groups - even if they are not exactly part of terrorist networks - from the advancement of their immediate goals without concern for long-term consequence. Afghanistan should serve as a sobering example of such an approach. Dr. Shireen Hunter, Director, Islam Program.

On U.S. Security Implications. On Tuesday, our national security paradigm changed. We no longer have the luxury of thinking about U.S. national security primarily in terms of protecting American allies and interests abroad; we need to give far more serious attention to protecting the U.S. homeland against a range of asymmetric threats, including terrorism. In the weeks and months ahead, it is critical that we conduct a comprehensive interagency assessment of our homeland security requirements.  Such an assessment should identify and prioritize shortfalls across the board and should produce a comprehensive plan to address these shortfalls in the upcoming budget cycle.

This will mean broadening the discussion beyond missile defense to include everything from airport security, to enhancing our intelligence capabilities, to critical infrastructure protection, to defense against biological and chemical weapons, and more. As the meaning of this paradigm shift sinks in, the American public may be willing to trade some civil liberties for enhanced security. They may, for example, be more willing to put up with more extensive and intrusive security checks at airports. For the U.S. government, this shift should force us to break out of the organizational stovepipes that have constrained our ability to address threats like terrorism in the past. We must have a new level of interagency cooperation and a new way of doing business. Ms. Michèle Fluornoy, Senior Fellow, International Security Program.

On a U.S. Response. We are now in a period where there is a real risk that we can overreact and use the wrong words. We face a new level of terrorism, an attack on our homeland tantamount to war. We need to act decisively. But we also need to fully understand who is responsible and not simply blame Osama bin Laden or Iraq or whoever else is convenient.

We need to prepare. We cannot achieve anything in terms of deterrence if we simply strike at low-level perpetrators. If we are to succeed, we must attack and kill the leaders of the movements responsible. At the same time, we must know the full chain of responsibility, whether governments are really involved and who in those governments is involved. We cannot simply lash out at another country like Afghanistan. We have to strike precisely.  This means we have to rethink retaliation in our military operations and do so calmly and objectively.

Similarly, we cannot throw money at homeland defense or counterterrorism or simply try to defend against one type of attack. We need to have a comprehensive reassessment of how we budget and plan for homeland defense. We obviously need to change our priorities, but to do so, we need careful planning, and we need to be very, very sure that what we do is effective and is worth the cost both in dollars and our civil liberties. It is this need for careful evolution which should be our response, not seeking some sudden fix or finding a scapegoat and attacking the wrong target. 
Dr. Anthony Cordesman, Burke Chair in Strategy.
 
On Implications for Asia. It is too soon to speculate on the nature of American retaliation for the 11 September terrorist attacks on our nation, since neither the organizers nor collaborators have been clearly identified. However, the Pentagon has made it clear that the response will not be a single strike but “a broad and sustained campaign.” As a result, it is not too soon to be asking what Washington might ask of its allies and friends in Asia.

The European response has been unequivocal; invoking Article 5 of the NATO Charter clears the way for NATO support for, and perhaps even direct participation in any U.S. military response. It appears unlikely that the U.S. would call on any of its Asia-Pacific allies - Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand - to participate directly in any planned retaliatory military operation, although some (or at least Australia) may offer to do so. America’s Asia allies must be prepared unequivocally to stand behind any U.S. reaction, however, and to provide logistical support if needed.

In South Asia, this may also involve a test of the embryonic strategic relationship between Washington and New Delhi, since facilities in India may prove to be ideal staging bases if Afghanistan proves, as suspected, to be among those responsible. At a minimum, overflight rights may be required from India and/or Pakistan.

Throughout the greater Asia and Pacific regions, Washington is likely to also seek (and receive) greater cooperation in its international fight against terrorism - this is one area where U.S.  and Chinese strategic objectives clearly overlap. China, like Russia, has strongly condemned the attacks and appears willing to work more closely with the U.S. to combat international terrorism.

Great care must also be taken to separate condemnation of Islamic (or any other type of) extremism from Islam itself. East Asia Moslem nations such as Indonesia and Malaysia have joined their East Asian neighbors in strongly condemning Tuesday’s terrorist attack. But, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir is already arguing against retaliation. Such actions reinforce rather than break the link between the extremists and the moderate Islamic community.

Finally, to reinforce Dr. Hamre’s opening message, we at the Pacific Forum have been deeply touched by the expressions of sympathy and support streaming in from throughout the Asia-Pacific community. This was not just an attack on America, it was an attack against humanity and we join our friends worldwide in grieving over this tragic, senseless loss of human life. 
Ralph A. Cossa, President, Pacific Forum CSIS.

[Dig]

These guys are such pieces of shit it is beyond reality.  They are all named, exposed, ideologues that remove all human expression in favor of their self deluded visions of dystopian pyramidic asylums.

How did they get away with this shit for so long?

CIA/FBI/NSA/NRO...These are your terrorists, this is exactly the definition of Al-Qaeda/terrorism/enemies of the state/threats to national security/public enemy #1...are you guys still invading rural book discussions where they serve milk and cookies while these guys run rampant all over the place? C'mon, how do you justify that shit?

[Elvis]

C'mon, how do you justify that shit?

Justify your department or get your budget cut - hence, American Al-Kie-Da.

"Yeah, that's the ticket; I like that."

[Anti_Illuminati]

http://www.public.asu.edu/~huanliu/sbp08/organizer.html

Organizers:

    Huan Liu, Arizona State University

    John Salerno, Air Force Research Laboratory

    Michael Young, Air Force Research Laboratory

     
Organizing Committee

    Huan Liu, John Salerno, Michael Young, Co-Chairs

    Nitin Agarwal, Proceedings Chair

    Lei Yu, Poster Session Chair

    Hessam Sarjoughian, Treasurer

    Lei Tang and Magdiel Galan, Publicity Chairs
     

Program Committee:

    Edo Airoldi, Princeton University

    Chitta Baral, ASU

    Herb Bell, AFRL

    Lashon Booker, MITRE

    Sun-Ki Chai, University of Hawaii

    Hsinchun Chen, Univiversity of Arizona

    David Cheung, University of Hong Kong

    Gerald Fensterer, AFRL

    Laurie Fenstermacher, AFRL

    Harold Hawkins, ONR

    Michael Hinman, AFRL

    Hillol Kargupta, UMBC

    Rebecca Goolsby, ONR

    Alexander Levis, GMU

    Huan Liu, ASU

    Mitja Lustrek, IJS, SI

    Terry Lyons, AFOSR

    Hiroshi Motoda, AFOSR/AOARD

    Dana Nau, University of Maryland

    John Salerno, AFRL

    Hessam Sarjoughian, ASU

    Jaideep Srivastava, UMN

    Gary Strong, Johns Hopkins University

    V.S. Subrahmanian, University of Maryland

    John Tangney, ONR

    Tom Taylor, ASU

    Ray Trechter, Sandia National Laboratory

    Belle Tseng, NEC Labs

    Ronald Yager, Iona College

    Michael Young, AFRL

    Philip Yu, IBM T.J. Watson

    Jun Zhang, AFOSR

    Jianping Zhang, MITRE

    Dianel Zeng, University of Arizona


_______________________________________________________________________________
https://www.dhs.gov/xres/committees/gc_1192471996410.shtm


Homeland Security Science and Technology Advisory Committee (HSSTAC) Members

Mr. Norman Polmar, Chair
Dr. A. Michael Andrews, Vice Chair
Mr. Ervin Kapos, Executive Director

    *
      Mr. Norman Polmar
      U.S. Naval Institute
    *
      Dr. A. Michael Andrews
      Vice President and Chief Technology Officer, L3 Communications; Former Army Deputy Assistant Secretary (Research & Technology) Chief Scientist
    *
      Dr. Steven Bellovin
      Professor of Computer Science, Columbia University
    *
      RADM Thomas Brooks, USN (Ret.)
      Adjunct faculty member at Joint Military Intelligence College; Former Director of Naval Intelligence
    *
      Dr. Phil DePoy
      Former President, Center for Naval Analyses
    *
      Dr. Frank Fernandez
      Former Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)
    *
      Dr. Baruch Fischhoff
      Howard Heinz University Professor, Carnegie Mellon University
    *
      Dr. David Franz
      Vice President and Chief Biological Scientist Midwest Research Institute
    *
      MAJGEN Tom Garrett, ARNG (Ret.)
      Former Commanding General, 42nd Infantry Division (Mech); former Special Assistant to the Director, New Jersey Office of Homeland Security Preparedness
    *
      Mr. Gary Goldberg
      Private Consultant
    *
      Sheriff Ted Kamatchus
      Sheriff, Marshalltown, Iowa; Immediate Past President, National Sheriffs Association
    *
      Dr. Alexander Levis
      University Professor of Electrical, Computer, and Systems Engineering, George Mason University; former Chief Scientist for the Air Force
    *
      Mr. Ernest Mitchell
      Past President, International Association of Fire Chiefs
    *
      Dr. Lawrence Papay
      CEO and Principal Consultant PQR, LLC
    *
      Mr. Kenneth Rapuano
      Director of Advanced Systems & Policy Analysis, the MITRE Corporation
    *
      Dr. Richard Roca
      Director, Applied Physics Laboratory, Johns Hopkins University
    *
      Ms. Teresa Smith
      Corporate Lead, IED Defeat Integration Group, Northrop Grumman
    *
      Dr. Reginald Vachon
      Chairman of Direct Measurements, Inc.; past President, American Society of Mechanical Engineers

Contact

Department of Homeland Security
Washington, DC 20528
Phone: 202-254-6137

This page was last reviewed/modified on April 21, 2009.

[hyperqube]

OMG we're all SAVED!!!

Our mark of the beast implants will always remember those pesky passwords for us all!

Whisk me off to this Paradise in control-freak Heaven,  I can feel the rapture now...

oh my gosh and how many christians would gladly accept it, cuz hey this can't be the mark of the beast cuz they haven't been raptured yet!